As stated in the title, the topic of this book is the relationships between language and nationalism in Europe, and particularly the “significance of language for nationalism and national identity” (p. 9) – a topic qualified as “fascinating” by the editors (v) and in Barbour’s initial chapter (16, 17). A question arises in the reviewer’s mind: Is this a unitary, unequivocal subject? Of course, in a certain rather philosophical way it is unitary – which does not mean general agreement even from this philosophical view, but at least it may be identified as “a proper subject.” However, it is not at all unequivocal insofar as the terms of the relationship are not clarified. This is precisely what Barbour’s opening chapter intends. Notions such as “ethnic group,” “nation,” “national identity,” “nationalism,” and “nation-state” charge the author to unveil their meanings, nuances, and relationships. Implicitly or explicitly, all contributors are confronted by the same issue. Unanimously, they adopt a historical stance and reject essentialist interpretations; as a result, leaving the first term aside, all the others are understood as the outcome of relatively recent processes in European history. A similar analysis applies to “language,” “dialect,” “standard language,” and the roles these play in either defining or building up national realities, since “language is the main vehicle for a national culture – the wisdom of centuries preserved” (285). We can also consider the matter from the opposite perspective, since “the growth of nations and the sharp demarcation of languages are actually related processes” (13, in reference to language planning).
Specific topics dealt with throughout the book are recapitulated in Carmichael’s closing chapter. A dynamic view of sociolinguistic processes emerges: (i) “the ways in which certain languages have become dominant as national languages”; (ii) “the relationship between language, ethnicity, and state formation”; (iii) “the stories of the waning of some peripheral languages”; (iv) “the codification of standard languages”; and (v) “the increasing use of English as a lingua franca” (280). She also sketches a brief critical review of scholars’ statements on nationalism in the past 30 years.

The scope of this book is limited to Europe (it leaves out the Caucasus region because of its geography, geopolitics, and linguistic complexity), because Europe is taken as the historical paradigm of national development and also is a field where, apparently, issues of submerged nations, emerging nationalism, and nation-state building are still on the agenda. This is interesting at a time when a supranational polity is in progress in Europe, and globalization is overwhelmingly present in socio-economic, political, and communicative practices and relationships. In Carmichael’s words: “We are witnessing two parallel and apparently contradictory phenomena: the abandonment of nationalism and the re-emergence of nationalism” (288).

The national groups and languages mentioned in the text are associated with land and permanence: a continuous area that they have occupied from ancient times. The claim to nationhood is supported on a territorial basis. Otherwise, diasporic and immigrant groups have only an ethnic status. Ethnic, national, state, and linguistic borders rarely coincide: they may maintain an inclusion relationship but also overlap, and they may or may not coincide or not with other – religious, cultural, or class – divisions. Thus, analysts may be led to understand a national conflict as, for example, a class conflict, but this does not mean that people view or live it this way. The opportunity given, language is raised to a salient position among markers of national distinctiveness and self-consciousness.

Things are never so clear-cut, however. The UK case is exemplary in showing “how nationalism may not be linked to language in any simple sense” (43). English has successfully acquired a dominant position, but this does not mean either ethnic or national uniformity. In contrast, Celtic languages – Irish, Scottish Gaelic, Cornish, Manx, and Welsh – are well advanced among the vanishing languages of Europe, with the exception of Welsh (Cornish, though the object of a recent revival movement, has been an extinct language since the end of eighteenth century, and the last fluent speaker of Manx died a few decades ago). Englishmen do not seem especially aware of their national language and identity, whereas some Celtic groups do, even if only to remember their linguistic past and their ancestors’ language, or even if their national awareness is linked rather to social class or religious affiliation.

In many cases, new states have arisen out of earlier empires, such as Hungary and Austria out of the Austro-Hungarian Empire or Estonia and Georgia out of the former Soviet Union; in contrast, France (treated in a chapter by Anne Judge) is
an instance of the development of a nation from a state, to such an extent that the motto “one state, one nation, one language” has been, consciously or not, assumed by generations of French citizens. This has been both the result of history and national ideology. Since the French Revolution, the Jacobins’ view of the state prevailed over that of the Girondins (72–73). Between equality and freedom, the French founding fathers chose equality, as far as language is concerned. Equality was thought of as the cornerstone of democracy. Citizens were to be equal before the law – and the law was written in Parisian French. Why so? By whom? Does equality equal uniformity and the interdiction of language differences? Are these irrelevant questions?

The linguistic history of France exposed here includes both institutionalizing French and pushing away regional languages (Occitan, Basque, Breton, Catalan, Alsatian, Corsican, Flemish, Franco-Provençal), as well as today’s challenges. The chapter closes with a rather optimistic outlook for the near future.

France’s centralized structure has been a model followed by other European states. Spain (discussed by Clare Mar-Molinero) is among them, even though after Franco’s regime, the constitution of 1978, “a masterpiece of compromise and consensus” (98) – and of semantic trickery – is one of the most advanced in Europe in recognizing autonomy for “nationalities,” or historical nations: the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia, and “regions,” and their linguistic rights. However, Linz’s statement – published in 1973, two years before Franco’s death – is quoted as still quite properly describing the situation: “Spain today is a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a large part of the population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities” (104).

A particularly interesting area is northern Europe, reviewed by Lars S. Vikør, which includes five states (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Iceland). As a preliminary statement, there seems to be full correspondence between statehood and national identity, aside from the Sámi people, originally nomadic and spread through the north of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and the Kola Peninsula in Russia. These countries share a cultural and political history. Their languages belong to the Uralic (Finnish and Sámi) and Indo-European families, the latter being the extreme north languages of the Germanic branch (Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, and Icelandic). Since the formation of the kingdoms of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway in the Middle Ages, a hazardous history has united, partially separated, and partially reunited them, under the dominant power of either Denmark or Sweden. Their current status is a recent outcome, with Norway, Finland, and Iceland becoming independent as late as the 20th century. The linguistic evolution of the area is an instance of how language convergence or divergence may be achieved through language planning. Furthermore, Norway is a case of a multiple standardization: earlier Landsmål (“the language of country, or the countryside”), currently named Nynorsk (“New Norwegian”), represents traditional rural varieties of the language, and Bokmål (“book language” or “literary language”) is associated with an urban and educated population.
The two modalities have to some degree converged, although unification has not been possible, and both are official. Language standards are markers of Norwegian national identity with regard to outside, but also of other criss-crossed identities in the home front.

A prima facie similar case, but different in detail, is represented by Greek diglossia, with its two standard varieties, Katharevousa and Dhimotiki, promoted by right- and left-wing governments, respectively, through the past century. Both standards are linked in a rather complex way to two different and competing perceptions of Greek national identity; to oversimplify, one stresses ancient and Classical Greece and its contribution to Western civilization (Ellinismos), and is associated with oligarchy and military elites, and the other focuses on the Byzantine heritage and the heroic struggle against the Turks (Romiosini), and is associated with peasant culture and Orthodox mysticism (248–9). Nowadays it seems that convergence in favor of Dhimotiki has prevailed.

Modern Turkey provides another interesting case of language planning. Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern state, advanced a language policy that was part of multiple moves toward modernization, secularization, and the adoption of a western European way of life. Persian and Arabic loans were eradicated from Turkish (an Altaic language), and the Roman alphabet substituted for the Arabic.

In Greece, as in Italy, several minorities live side by side, including the Greek-speaking population, speakers of Balkan Romance, South Slavonic, Albanian, and Turkish. In Turkey, there is an important Ladino community in Istanbul, and some groups of Greeks, Kurds, and Armenians remain, in spite of the traditional Greek-Turkish conflict and the massacre of Armenians in 1915, when about a million and a half Armenians were killed. Greece and European Turkey are treated in chapters by Carmichael and by Peter Trudgill.

Although this book does not deal directly with individual identity, it is clear that a multidimensional view of it is assumed. Nevertheless, national and ethnic, gender, sexual, religious, or other “hyphenated” identities are not considered to be on an equal footing. Carmichael acknowledges, in a concluding chapter, that “there is a strong emotional interface between language and identity” (285). Then, one may wonder whether it is true – and if so, why it is – that “questions of national identity still dominate the daily lives of some Europeans, whereas others have consigned the question to the back of their minds” (284). These seem not to be trivial questions, and they merit some answer. I guess that we confront threatened or unaccomplished national identities in the former eventuality, and political power-controlled mechanisms of ideological invisibility in the latter. I contend that what discourse conceals is as relevant as what it states explicitly. This explains why “to be a nationalist” is used in contemporary political discourse in Spain to designate the fact of being a Basque, Catalan or (to a lesser extent) Galician nationalist, whereas it does not apply to adherents of Spanish nationalism. In fact, according to power’s discourse in Spain, to be a Spanish nationalist...
is not one way of being nationalist, but just one way of being: the way of being that is to be naturally expected from any Spanish citizen.

The editors’ perception is right: The topic of this book is a fascinating one, and the cases described are as variegated as they are illustrative. The book itself is fascinating, too. The reader will be attracted not by an abstract and controversial subject, but by a clear exposition of lively stories of human communities in one region of the world. It is a readable book about an interesting story, from which we can learn to understand our world and to avoid former errors. For one thing, it may be sane for us to recall that “the denial of national self-determination is an act of denial that defines the actions of others as deviant, abnormal or irrational” (288) – so much more so if we live comfortably installed in an unproblematic setting, without having to struggle for evidence.

(Received 9 January 2002)