Non Accusative Objects*

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Abstract

In this paper we propose an asymmetrical approach to Case-licensing where, on the one hand, the functional architecture in the verbal system can license at most one DP, and, on the other, only certain DPs require formal licensing. Our proposal straightforwardly explains long-lasting syntactic problems in the syntax of Spanish and other languages concerning Differential Object Marking (DOM), Raising to Subject asymmetries in *se* constructions, and Person Case Constraint effects. Then, we analyze the consequences and challenges of our proposal for the explanation of the clitic behavior in *laísta* dialects in contexts where both internal arguments seem to be independently formally licensed, one of them via DOM, and the other by means of a dative clitic. We show that this dative clitic does not establish an agreement relation, but it is an incorporated determiner, as in the case of third person accusative clitics (Ormazabal and Romero 2013a).

Keywords: case; agreement; Differential Object Marking; clitics; microdialectal variation; *laísmo*; *se*-constructions; Spanish.

<div align="center">**Table of Contents**</div>

1. Introduction

In previous work (Ormazabal and Romero 2007, 2013a, 2013b) we have argued that some objects do not require any formal licensing –they do not enter into an agreement relation or receive Case–, while others must establish a formal relation with the verb. The kind of objects that belong to one group or the other is not arbitrary, but it is parametrically determined. In Ormazabal and Romero (2013b), we argue that Differential Object Marking (DOM) is an overt manifestation of this split. In Spanish, animate and specific direct objects, indirect objects, and raised-to-object subjects of embedded clauses, among other DPs, must establish a formal relation with the verb, and, as a morphological manifestation of that relation, they end up differentially object marked. The rest of the objects remain in situ violating the Case Filter. In the case of Spanish, we have argued elsewhere that the evidence for this hypothesis is very compelling and shows up in a variety of areas such as the Person Case Constraint (PCC), microvariation on object clitics or *se* constructions. In all these contexts, first and second person objects (and in some constructions and dialects also third person animate ones) behave differently from the rest of the objects. Thus, for instance, in the PCC they are not compatible with a dative clitic, and in *se* constructions they do not trigger subject agreement. Regarding clitic microvariation, it is almost completely restricted to third person objects. We have extensively argued that these differences should be derived from their different behavior with respect to Case and agreement.

In this paper we develop some additional arguments that support the asymmetric approach to Case theory and discuss some of its consequences. In section 2 we argue that there is at most one object position per sentence. First we show that if two objects require DOM, only one of them can receive it, and, in consequence, in most sentences the output is ungrammatical. Next we provide evidence that this is not a morphological restriction, a Double-DOM Filter, or Double-*a* Filter, as it has been termed. In section 3, we show that the same split found in Spanish also shows up in polysynthetic languages, and we briefly sketch a theory of object Case assignment based on López (2012). Finally, in section 4 we deal with an apparent counterexample, and we explain how certain microvariation facts regarding *laísmo* could take place.

2. One object position

Specific and animate direct objects as well as clitic-doubled datives must receive DOM in Spanish, but only one argument per sentence can carry this mark.[1] When two arguments require DOM, the sentence is rendered as ungrammatical. This situation appears, for instance, when in the same sentence there is an animate and specific direct object and a dative clitic-doubled DP (1).

(1) a. *Les   mandaron (a)l   Sr. Lobo a   los mafiosos.
        DAT.3PL sent.3PL   DOM-the Mr. Lobo DOM the mobsters
        'They sent the mobsters Mr Lobo.'

    b. *Le   propusieron (a) las candidatas al   presidente.
        DAT.3SG proposed.3PL DOM the candidates DOM-the president
        'They proposed the president the candidates.'

Both sentences become grammatical as soon as the dative clitic is removed. There is, however, a subset of animate and specific object DPs that in this context can appear in a bare DOM-less form, allowing the IO to appear clitic doubled (2).

(2) a. Enviaron *(a) todos los enfermos   a   la doctora von Tan.
        sent.3PL DOM all   the sick people DOM the doctor von Tan
        'They sent all the sick people to doctor von Tan.'

    b. Le   enviaron (*a) todos los enfermos   a   la doctora von Tan.
        DAT.3SG sent.3PL DOM all   the sick people DOM the doctor von Tan
        'They sent doctor Von Tan all the sick people.'

The availability of (2b) is extremely restricted. Sentences like (2b) are only grammatical with nouns such as sick people, soldiers, slaves, kids, etc.; nouns whose referents are regularly treated as entities lacking free will. The range of animate nouns that can appear without DOM in this context is, more or less, the same one that allow incorporation in polysynthetic languages (see Baker 1996a; also see section 3, below, for details).

Some authors (see, for instance, López 2012; Ordóñez and Treviño 2013; and references therein) have recently proposed that the ungrammaticality of sentences in (1) and (2b) is due to a morphological filter against double DOM.[2] According

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1. Concerning the general semantic properties of Differentially Marked animate objects in Spanish, and some qualifications, see Leonetti (2008), Rodríguez Mondoñedo (2007), Zdrojewski (2008), and references therein among others. For arguments that the mechanisms involved in dative clitic constructions are the same as DOM see Ormazabal and Romero (2013b) and references there.
2. In fact, there is evidence that *prima facie* seems to support this idea. In Hindi there are examples of double-*ko* (Bhatt and Anagnostopoulou 1996), what suggests a parameterizable Double DOM Filter. On the other hand, in Spanish the DO receives DOM when the dative clitic is not doubled: *Les mandaron al Sr. Lobo* 'They sent them Mr. Lobo'. We will return to this issue in section 4.

to them, the syntactic relations established by the object are the same in (2a) and (2b), and the ungrammaticality of (2a) is due to morphological reasons. However, there is evidence that DOM is essentially a syntactic phenomenon. Consider first the case of so-called *se* constructions. These constructions share with regular passives the property that the external argument is dropped and the internal argument triggers agreement with the verb (3a). However, when the object receives DOM, the object retains this marking and the verb shows up in a default form (3rd singular; DF) (3b).

(3) a. Se llevaron/*llevó   los regalos a la doctora.
         SE took.3PL took.DF the presents to the doctor
         '(The) presents were sent to the doctor.'

     b. Se llevó / *llevaron a   los enfermos a la doctora.
         SE took.DF took.3PL DOM the sick people to the doctor
         'The sick people were sent to the doctor.'

The explanation for this asymmetry is straightforward: animate DOs (3b), unlike inanimate ones (3a), are Case-marked and frozen in place; in consequence, they cannot further move to subject position. If the absence of DOM in (2b) were just a morphological issue and the object formal relations were the same than in (2a), we would expect its object to pattern after (3b) in a *se* construction; i.e., since the object is Case marked, subject agreement would be blocked. However, as shown in (4), when DOM is assigned to the dative, the object triggers subject agreement, and default agreement results in ungrammaticality.

(4) Se le   llevaron/*llevó   los enfermos a   la doctora.
     SE DAT.3SG took.3PL took.DF the sick people DOM the doctor
     'The sick people were sent to the doctor.'

Note that the minimal pair in (3) does not easily fit in a Case theory *à la* Marantz, where Case is post-syntactically determined, since the arguments structurally present are the same in (3a) and (3b). We can see no principled reason why the object in (3b) cannot receive a default Case as in (3a). Furthermore, there is evidence that DOM objects are in a different structural position (Bhatt and Anagnostopoulou 1996; López 2012). Consider the following sentences:

(5) a. Mandó a   una asesora a todos los gerentes.   ∃ >∀ / ∀ >∃
         sent.3SG DOM an   advisor to every manager

     b. Mandó   una asesora a todos los gerentes.   *∃ >∀ / ∀ >∃
         sent.3SG an   advisor to every manager
         'He sent an advisor to every manager.'

     c. Les   mandó (*a)   una asesora a   todos los gerentes.
                                                              *∃ >∀ / ∀ >∃
         DAT.3PL sent.3SG   DOM an   advisor DOM every manager

     d. [A   todos los gerentes] les   mandó a   una asesora.
                                                              ∃ >∀ / ∀ >∃
          DOM every manager   DAT.3PL sent.3SG DOM an   advisor
         'He sent every manager an advisor.'

In (5a) the object receives DOM, and has scope over the universal quantifier. In (5b), on the contrary, the object is not marked, and cannot have scope over the universal quantifier (López 2012). This is the main argument in the literature to support the idea that DOM flags object movement. Now, consider (5c). In this sentence there is a dative clitic doubling structure, and the object cannot receive DOM. Under a morphological approach this restriction has to be attributed to a Double DOM Filter: there is no reason why the DO, if specific, could not raise to the position where DOM is morphologically assigned, carrying a silent DOM. But if it is so, we expect the object to be able to take scope over the universal quantifier. But, as seen in (5c), this prediction is not borne out. Finally, in (5d), where the clitic is not doubled, the DO receives DOM and takes again scope over the universal quantifier. In consequence, independently of DOM morphological properties, there is a clear structural difference: DOM DPs raise, and non-DOM DPs do not raise.

Accordingly, DOM can be considered some kind of Exceptional Case Marking (ECM) structure, in the sense of Bošković (1997, 2002) who argues that ECM accusative subjects or dative shifted IOs, but not regular transitive objects, overtly undergo A-movement to an object agreeing position. Examples in (6) show that ECM and Double Object Constructions, (6d), are not compatible in spite of the fact that they both are independently available (6c) and (6a).

(6) a. I showed you the proof.

     b. I showed you that the defendants were guilty.

     c. I showed the defendants to be guilty.

     d. *I showed you the defendants to be guilty.

As we have seen in Spanish for the case of DOM (2), the raised object and the IO cannot coappear in the same sentence (see Rezac 2013 for some qualifications, and Hartmann 2012 for a different explanation).

In Spanish, the list of objects that move to that position is slightly larger than in English, including animate and specific direct objects, pronouns and ECM subjects, both animate and inanimate (7), among others (Ormazabal and Romero 2013b).

(7) a. Hizo   *(a) la lavadora   funcionar.
         made.3SG DOM the washing machine work
         'He made the washing machine work.'

     b. Oyó   *(a) la bicicleta estamparse contra el   suelo.
         heard.3SG DOM the bicycle   smash   against the ground
         'He heard the bicycle smashing against the ground.'

Summarizing, and simplifying our findings, by now we assume the following generalizations:

(i)   At most one argument may be Differentially Object Marked (2b), and it is due to the fact that *there is only one position* where objects can raise (4)-(5c).
(ii) a. DOM objects (DO and IO indistinctly) are not available for subject-agree-ment with T in *se*-constructions;
      b. Non-DOM objects obligatorily trigger subject agreement in *se*-construc-tions.[3]
(iii) Only DOM arguments raise to object position in Spanish.[4]
(iv) Corollary: only DOM arguments receive Case.

3. On the Theoretical Status of Caseless arguments

In the previous section, we have shown that certain objects must move to a posi-tion where a formal relation is established. This movement is overtly flagged by DOM (2), but, as expected, it also has scope (5) and other syntactic effects: the DP moves to a position where Case is checked, and it is not eligible for further movement (3). However, other objects do not enter into this kind of relations, and are not subject to these effects; in spite of this, the resulting sentence is grammati-cal (see Danon 2006). This fact poses a theoretical challenge to the Case Filter, interpreted as the condition that every argument has to be formally licensed via Case (or agreement). In our view, the right answer to this question is to remove the Case Filter from the theory, and to treat Case as part of the general checking theory. Remember that we have argued that the fact that the DO raises to subject position (or checks subject Case/agreement) in (8b) is contingent upon its lack of Case in (8a).

3. Determinerless nouns in some dialects do not trigger agreement (Mendikoetxea 1999).
4. For the purpose of this paper we let aside inanimates.

(8) a. Le   enviaron (*a) todos los enfermos   a   la doctora von Tan.
         DAT.3SG sent.3PL   DOM all   the sick people DOM the doctor   von Tan
         'They sent doctor Von Tan all the sick people.'

     b. Se le   llevaron/*llevó   los enfermos   a   la doctora von Tan.
        SE DAT.3PL took.3PL took.DF the sick people DOM the doctora von Tan
        'The sick people were sent to the doctor.'

In its minimalist formulation, Case is conceived as a stop condition. Once Case is checked, the DP cannot enter into a new A-relation, it is frozen. For several reasons, this is an anomalous conception. Case theory is not easy to handle in the MP. From a theoretical perspective, it is not clear what it means that every DP has to receive Case in order to be a legitimate object, whether at LF or at PF. If there is not a dedicated module for Case, as it used to be in the GB architecture, it is not evident where we can define or locate this filter. There is no level in a minimalist derivation where such condition must be satisfied (see Lasnik 2008 for discussion). A factual statement may be made that simply establishes that all nouns or argumental NPs enter the derivation with an uninterpretable Case feature, but that is just an empirical claim. In the next subsection we show from incorporation data in Mohawk that it is false (see Danon 2001, 2006 for similar arguments regarding indefinite NPs in Hebrew). Then, in subsection 3.2 we make some remarks about how a proper Case theory should look like.

3.1. Incorporation and Case

In Mohawk, animate objects must be licensed either by incorporating into the verb (9a), or by overt agreement with the verbal auxiliary (9b). If neither of these two options takes place (9c), or if the two of them take place together (9d), the result is ungrammatical (data from Baker 1996a: 21-22, 193-194, 206-207; characterization from Ormazabal and Romero 2007: 323ff):

(9) a. Ra-wir-a-núhwe'-s.   *Mohawk*
         SG.MASC-baby-Ø-like-HAB
         'He likes babies.'

     b. Shako-núhwe'-s   (ne owirá'a).
        SG.MASC/3PLO-like-HAB NE baby
        'He likes them (babies).'

     c. *Ra-núhwe'-s   ne owirá'a.
          SG.MASC-like-HAB NE baby
        'He likes babies.'

     d. *?Shako-wir-a-núhwe'-s.
          SG.MASC3PLO-baby-Ø-like-HAB
        'He likes babies.'

Incorporation of animate arguments is highly restricted universally (Mithun 1984; Evans 1997; Baker 1996a): it is basically allowed with some nouns referring to regularly free-will deprived individuals: soldiers, sick people, children, etc. That is, more or less the same DPs that are allowed in dative constructions without DOM in Spanish. In contrast, most animate objects show obligatory overt agreement, on a par with DOMed animate objects in Spanish. This pattern, which we can term «Differential Object Agreement» (DOA), is found in languages like Zulu (Adams 2010), Swahili, Hungarian, Palauan and Muna (Danon 2006; Bárány 2012; and references therein). Both systems, DOM and DOA, coexist in certain Basque and Spanish dialects where both agreement and Case are differentially stated (Odria 2012; Ormazabal and Romero 2013a). Mohawk belongs to the DOA language group. Coherent with this picture, inanimate objects may incorporate or stay in situ, but they never show object agreement (DOA).

Up to now, we have seen that DOM/DOA is broadly in complementary distribution with noun incorporation. Consider now applicative constructions. In these constructions the applied argument *must* agree with the verb (Baker 1996a). When combined with inanimate objects, the applied argument shows obligatory agreement and the object may incorporate or stay in situ (10).

(10) a. Λ-khey- ahsir-úny-Λ- '   ne owira.   *Mohawk*
         FUT-1sF/FsO-blanket-make-BEN-PUNC NE baby
         'I will make a blanket for the baby.'

     b. Áhsir-e'   Λ-khey-úny-Λ-'   ne owira.
         blanket-NSF FUT-1sF/FsO-make-BEN-PUNC NE baby
         'I will make a blanket for the baby.'

When the object is animate, in most cases the sentence is ungrammatical. Applicatives are only compatible with animate nominals if they are of the type that may incorporate. In this case, the applied argument *must* agree and the animate object *must* incorporate (11).

(11) Λ-hi-skar-a-tshΛry-a-'s-e'.   *Mohawk*
     FUT-1sA/MsO-friend-Ø-find-Ø-BEN-PUNC
     'I will find him a girlfriend.'

If the animate object does not (or cannot) incorporate, the sentence is ungrammatical (12).

(12) a. *káskare' Λ-hi-tshΛry-a-'s-e'.   *Mohawk*
          friend   FUT-1sA/MsO-find-BEN-PUNC
          'I will find him a girlfriend.'

     b. *Λ-ku-(ya't)-óhare-'s-e'   ne owirá'a.
          FUT-1sA/2sO-wash-BEN-PUNC NE baby
          'I will wash the baby for you.'

Baker (1988) proposes that in transitive clauses Case is absorbed by the incorporated nominal. This is a necessary move for him, because if Case is not absorbed, in transitive sentences there would remain a non assigned Case, and the derivation should fail. However, data from applicatives show clearly that Case is not absorbed, because it is needed for the applied argument. In consequence, incorporated arguments and inanimate arguments in general do not receive Case. This is clearly shown in the contrast between (10b) and (12), where the non incorporated inanimate object does not block applied argument licensing, contrary to the animate one. In sum, data from Mohawk show that inanimate DPs do not have the same licensing requirements as animate ones. As a matter of fact, they do not seem to have any requirement at all. In consequence, we assume that not all objects receive Case, and therefore a general Case Filter cannot be established as an empirical fact. However, in the previous section we saw that there is evidence that some objects do require Case. In the following subsection we make a broad characterization of a Case theory compatible with these facts.

3.2. Remarks on a minimalist Case theory

Observations of this kind, and, in general, data related to Case variation, have lead several authors to propose, following an influential paper by Marantz (1991), that Case does not form part of the syntactic theory, but it is morphologically determined. However, there is ample evidence, like the one previously presented regarding the interaction of DOM and *se* constructions, that Case is, at least in part, a syntactic relation. Therefore, the right move must be simply to assume that Case is like any other formal relation. When a Case feature is present in the structure, it triggers (probes) a formal relation; but it is otherwise absent, like, say, agreement, where no one has proposed an agreement filter: there is no abstract agreement for infinitives and other non-agreeing verbal forms.

When we say 'like any other formal relation' we are referring to the fact that Case has a somewhat weird characterization in the MP. It is considered a by-product of other checking relations: once Case is checked, the DP is frozen in place. Contrary to this, we propose that, as other formal features, its presence and its shape may be parameterized. Assuming DOM is the hallmark of object Case, it is assigned to different kinds of nouns, but not to others. On the other hand, it adopts a variety of morphological realizations (Bossong 1991, 1997; Glushan 2010). Although DOM has semantic effects, there are reasons to think that its presence is due exclusively to formal reasons (de Swart and de Hoop 2007).

Consider in this respect the broad split among DOM languages between those that assign DOM to DOs when they are specific (Turkish, Hebrew, etc.), and those that require, in addition, the object to be animate. Although semantic effects in inanimate DPs are the same in both groups of languages, they only receive Case in the first group. Furthermore, object Case is also related to voice, often in intricate ways (Sigurðsson 2012). Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that a proper object Case theory has to be constructed considering syntactic general properties (what kind of objects receive Case in a language L), and lexical and functional

properties of the heads involved in Case assignment (voice, aspect, etc.). On the other hand, the relation between Case and agreement has to be discarded as a spurious generalization, as clearly shown by Case assignment in infinitives in Basque, or, in general, by quirky Case (see Baker 2011 for a proposal in this sense specific for object Case and agreement). In section 4 we show that this relation is also contradictory with object Case/agreement characterization in Spanish.

In sum, abstract Case is not a general condition on DP licensing, but a formal feature that triggers certain relations between the functional architecture of the verbal system and some DPs.

Before concluding these brief remarks on Case, something has to be said about languages showing independent accusative and dative morphology. For these paradigms we assume, following Baker and Vinokurova (2010) that morphological case can be assigned in a Marantz style, but, as said, there is also a *bona fide* abstract Case. This distinction can actually be argued to be explicit in the distinction between inherent and structural Case (see Woolford 2006; cf. Caha 2009 for a different view). Inherent Case marked DPs do not require any syntactic operation to be licensed; they simply carry a morphologically redundant marking according to their thematic role. The existence of two different cases for V internal arguments should be regarded as a paradigmatic effect of the same kind as the one found in gender marking in those nouns where gender is semantically vacuous.

In short, there is no syntactic basis for distinguishing accusative and dative. There is only one formal relation, which has a dedicated structural position. We assume that this position is the one that has been recently analyzed by several authors as the position where DOM is assigned (Torrego 2010; López 2012). If there are two internal arguments in the same active sentence, one of them will remain syntactically caseless, although it can bear some morphological marking.

4. *Laísmo* and microvariation

In this section we deal with the contrast between (5c) and (5d), repeated here as (13).

(13) a. Les   mandó (*a) una asesora a   todos los gerentes.   *∃>∀ / ∀>∃
        DAT.3PL sent.3SG DOM an   advisor DOM every manager

    b. Les   mandó a   una asesora.   ∃>∀ / ∀>∃
        DAT.3PL sent.3SG DOM an   advisor
        'He sent every manager an advisor.'

This minimal pair poses a challenge to the idea that the verb only assigns one Case. Apparently, both dative and DOM are independently assigned to different arguments: The indirect object is represented by the dative clitic, *le*, and the DO is preceded by DOM (***les mandó *a* una asesora***). Therefore, this example constitutes a *prima facie* counterexample to our proposal. In order to analyze (13b), we first provide an additional set of data from *laísta* dialects, which shows Case variation precisely in this construction and can shed some light on its derivation. Then we propose that 3rd person dative clitics have different sources, which show different

agreement properties. Finally, in section 4.2, we propose an analysis based on the idea that silent goals, *pros*, incorporate into the applicative preposition.

4.1. Laísmo *in a nutshell*

Laísmo is almost the only case in Spanish where clitic variation is not related to third person direct object clitics, but to dative ones. In *laísta* dialects, when the indirect object is feminine, the clitic used is *la*, and if it is masculine is *le* (14), while in the rest of the dialects, dative clitics mark Case and number (*le-les*), but not gender.[5]

(14) a. *la*   envié   tus   regalos.
       DAT.F.3SG sent.1SG your gifts
       'I sent her your gifts.'

    b. *le*   envié   tus   regalos.
       DAT.M.3SG sent.1SG your gifts
       'I sent him your gifts.'

Romero (2012) argues that *laísmo* is not merely dative gender motion. Specifically, he shows that it is restricted to those contexts where accusative can be assigned. In consequence, *laísmo* is not found, for instance, in passive (15) or unaccusative (16) constructions, nor with copulative verbs (17).

(15) a. *tus regalos la   fueron   enviados.
       your gifts   3.DAT.F.SG were.3PL sent

    b. tus   regalos le   fueron   enviados.
       your gifts   3.DAT.SG were.3PL sent
       'She/He was sent your gifts.'

(16) a. *En la manifestación la   cayó   un bote de humo.
       in the demonstration 3.DAT.F.SG fell.3SG a   teargas canister

    b. En la manifestación le   cayó   un bote de humo.
       in the demonstration 3.DAT.SG fell.3SG a   teargas canister
       'In the demonstration a tear gas canister fell on her/him.'

(17) a. *Tu hermano no la   resulta simpático.
       your brother not 3.DAT.F.SG is   nice

    b. Tu   hermano no le   resulta simpático.
       your brother not 3.DAT.SG is   nice
       'Your brother is not nice to her.'

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5.   It has to be noted that in the dialects under discussion, there is an additional condition: the dative has to be animate. We will ignore this property for the purposes of this paper. For a complete characterization of the dialect under discussion, the standard *laísta* dialect (Fernández Ordóñez 1999), see Romero (2012).

Observe that while in (14) dative clitics distinguish masculine and feminine, this distinction is lost in contexts where accusative Case is not independently assigned (15)-(17). According to what we have said in the previous sections, we can consider the accusative clitic, when it stands for a DP that does not receive DOM, as a morphologically accusative clitic. In fact, Ormazabal and Romero (2013a) argue that this clitic is actually a determiner incorporated into the verb, and, as any other incorporated element, it lacks syntactic Case. Therefore, the lack of *laísmo* in (15)-(17) can be understood as the morphological version of Burzio's Generalization: since the syntax does not provide the appropriate context for (morphological) accusative, only the dative form can be inserted. This explanation will be refined in section 4.2.

However, consider now the minimal pair in (18).

(18) a. les /   *las   enviaron los regalos a   las niñas.
         3.DAT.PL 3.DAT.F.PL sent.3PL the gifts   DOM the girls
         'They sent the girls the gifts.'

      b. ??les / las   enviaron los regalos.
         3.DAT.PL 3.DAT.F.PL sent.3PL the gifts
         'They sent them the gifts.'

In Romero (2012) it is argued that *laísmo* in (18a) is ungrammatical because accusative Case, in contrast to dative Case, is not compatible with doubling: in Spanish only strong pronouns in object position can be doubled by a clitic. However, there are two reasons to cast doubts on this explanation. First, examples in (18) differ structurally from those in (15)-(17): sentences in (18) are instances of transitive structures. As a matter of fact, (18a) and (18b) represent exactly the same argument structure. It is not obvious how these dialects can cheat the morphological component to make it think that accusative cannot be assigned. And second, there are reasons to think that the derivations in (18a) and (18b) follow different paths.

Consider again the sentences in (13). As observed in (13b), when there is no doubling, the direct object may receive DOM, and its scope changes with respect to (13a) scope. As expected, exactly the same scope asymmetries are manifested between (18a) and (18b). In consequence, the contrast in (18) is not merely a morphological issue: two different structures are involved. In the first one, (18a), the indirect object receives DOM and takes scope over the DO. On the contrary, in the second one, the DO receives DOM, and, in consequence, scope is reversed. In section 3, following Torrego (2010), and López (2012), we argue that DOM reflects object raising to a certain position. Furthermore, we also argue that DOM is the only Case available for internal arguments. If these proposals are correct, for the DO to appear DOM marked in (18a), the indirect object *cannot* receive Case. Obviously, the minimal pairs in (13)-(18) constitute a challenge to the idea that there is only one object Case: the indirect object appears dative marked, and the DO receives DOM. In the next subsection we argue that the indirect object actually does not receive Case because it is an incorporated clitic.

4.2. Where some anomalies return to the fold

In order to explain these facts according to the sketched hypothesis, we, first, assume the proposals in Ormazabal and Romero (2013a). In this paper, following Roca (1996), we argue that in Spanish accusative clitics are not the exponent of an agreement relation, but determiners clitiziced onto the verb. This analysis is based on certain contrasts between Northern *leísta* dialects, where animate objects trigger a real object agreement relation, and other Peninsular dialects. It is shown, among other arguments, that there are elements such as negative quantifiers that enter into agreement relations but that cannot be doubled by an accusative clitic. Consider clitic left dislocated constructions in (19) (remember that accusative doubling *in situ* is forbidden in Spanish).

(19) a. *Ningún libro lo   han   vendido.
          None   book 3.ACC.M.SG have.3PL sold
          'They have not sold any book.'

   b. A   ninguna estudiante le   han   dado el   título.
       DOM none   student   3.DAT.SG have.3PL given the degree
       'They did not give any student the degree.'

Negative quantified NPs result in ungrammaticality when doubled by an accusative clitic (19a), but are perfectly grammatical when they are dative (19b). This fact can be derived if the accusative clitic, as proposed, is actually a determiner, and not an agreement marker, but the dative one is true agreement (see Ormazabal and Romero 2013a for details).

Assuming that this proposal is correct, if *la* in *laísta* dialects is accusative, as shown by examples in (15)-(17), then *it is* a clitizeced determiner. This poses at least two questions: (i) how can the determiner clitizice from a structurally completely different position? and (ii) what happens with dative agreement?

4.2.1. On dative agreement

Dative agreement in Spanish is peculiar. In most cases, if not in all, it is optional. The indirect object may appear in a purely prepositional phrase, or in a dative clitic doubling structure preceded by DOM. In other works we have proposed, following Larson (1988) and Baker (1996b) among others, that the prepositional variant is the primitive one, and the clitic doubling structure, as well as the Double Object Construction, are derived via P incorporation (for the purposes of this paper, a Low Applicative Phrase would also do the job). If so, the presence of dative agreement is related to P incorporation. This idea is also used to explain why dative agreement does not disappear in passive, and other non-transitive structures.

Interestingly, there is another dimension in which dative agreement is peculiar: in most Peninsular dialects third person dative clitic does not trigger number agreement when it appears doubled by DP in its base position (20a), but it obligatorily agrees when it is not doubled (20b) (Marcos Marín 1978).

(20) a. le /   ??les   dieron   un regalo a   las niñas.
         3.DAT.SG 3.DAT.PL gave.3PL a gift   DOM the girls

   b. *le /   les   dieron   un regalo. [las niñas]
         3.DAT.SG 3.DAT.PL gave.3PL a gift   the girls
   'They gave the girls a gift.'

In principle we could link the distribution in (20) to the fact that spurious *se* lacks number features. However, we are not aware of any other systematic agreement mismatch of this kind. As a matter of fact, the opposite is quite common: empty categories trigger default agreement, but full specified DPs trigger full agreement. This suggests that although Case is encoded in the same phrase for both indirect and direct object, agreement follows its own rules to which we return immediately.

4.2.2. On cliticization
In this section we provide an analysis compatible with the facts just discussed:

(i)   Scope is reversed between (13a) and (13b).
(ii) The clitic must express full agreement only in (13b); in (13a) agreement is defective.
(iii) *Laísmo* is only available in (13b).

Consider first (13a) for which we propose the derivation in (21):

(21)

```
                        KP
                   ____/  \____
                  /            \
        a todos los gerentes    K'
                           ____/  \____
                          /            \
                  le(s) mandó           VP
                                   ____/  \____
                                  /            \
                          t le mandó            PP
                                            ___/  \___
                                           /          \
                                   una asesora          P
                                                    ___/  \___
                                                   /          \
                                                 t le        t a todos los gerentes
```

First, we assume P is an applicative preposition. This preposition in Spanish, and allegedly in any dative language, has agreement features. These agreement features encode 1st and 2nd person singular and plural, and a (3rd person) default form.[6] In (21) we represent this applicative preposition by means of this

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6. Admitedly, in languages like Irish with preposition agreement, P also encodes number agreement. However, things are slightly different in this language since P agreement and pronouns are mutually exclusive (see, for instance, Acquaviva 2001 and references therein). On the other hand, in Spanish there is only one inflected preposition, *con*, but it inflects only for the first and second person singular (and for the reflexive), but not for the plural. Finally, in the nominal area, the dummy

default form, *le*. The applicative preposition incorporates into V. Next V moves to K and in its specifier DOM is assigned to P complement (see a more detailed derivation in Ormazabal and Romero 2010).

Some clarifications are in order. KP is a shorthand for whatever category (voice, aspect) probes object Case and agreement. This projection appears both in transitive and intransitive sentences and it is responsible for DOM and scope effects (López 2012). In Standard Spanish, object agreement is only active for the first and the second person (Ormazabal and Romero 2013a).[7] In the same way, when P has a 1st or 2nd person feature, it makes active KP agreement, and full person and number agreement arises.[8] However, when P lacks person, KP agreement is not activated, and it shows up as a default form. Essentially, (21) is a regular Case/agreement configuration, where these relations are obtained by the conjunction of a lexical head, P, and a functional one, K.

This derivation is perfectly coherent with the properties described in (i)-(iii). The IO has scope over the object, agreement is defective, and *laísmo* is barred because there is no determiner incorporation.

Consider now (13b), to which we assign the following derivation:

(22)

```
                          KP
                   ╱             ╲
         a una asesora            K'
                            ╱           ╲
                   les mandó              VP
                                      ╱         ╲
                            t les mandó           PP
                                             ╱         ╲
                                  t una asesora           P
                                                      ╱       ╲
                                               t les           t pro
```

---

preposition *de* obligatorily becomes a possessive adjective with the first and the second person (*de mí 'of me' → *mío* 'mine'; *de ti 'of you' → *tuyo* 'yours'), but only optionally for the third person where it makes no number distinction. Furthermore, spurious *se*, the third person clitic form that appears in clitic clusters does not make number distinctions.

7. This is not the case for Northern *leísta* dialects, where object agreement is also active for third person animate objects and in some other contexts (Ormazabal and Romero 2013a). On the other hand, Rigau (1988) observed that even in the case of strong pronouns, their syntactic behavior differed from that of the 1st and 2nd person ones. We can add another piece of evidence in this sense. 3rd person strong pronouns can, under certain conditions (contrastive focus and an additional clitic, among them), appear undoubled:

   (i) No me llevéis   a mí, llevaos   A   ELLA.
         not 1SG take.SUBJ.2PL DOM me take.IMP.2PL DOM her
         'Don't take me, take HER.'

8. This «activation» may be due to the fact that P cannot morphologically encode agreement. Ormazabal and Romero (2007) observe that those languages where P can represent agreement, as Celtic languages, lack Doble Object Construction.

If, as proposed, *laísmo* appears when a determiner cliticizes, *la* is an accusative clitic, the fact that *laísmo* is available in (22) forces us to argue that the first step in this derivation is P complement incorporation onto P. In the first place, it has to be noted that this cliticization cannot be barred, as long as it has a morphological representation; i.e., it is a perfectly grammatical operation. Furthermore, it explains all the properties associated to the construction. The number, as well as the gender feature, are pied-piped by *pro*, and, in consequence, the whole set of φ features are represented in the clitic, as in the case of object determiner cliticization. Finally, since *pro* is cliticized onto P, it does not require to check Case. Therefore, DOM can be assigned to the DO, which raises to Spec,KP and takes scope over the IO.

Note that, according to this hypothesis, dative *la* is not agreement. It is expected, in consequence, *laísmo* to be incompatible with negative quantified phrases in a CLLD position, as in (19). This prediction is borne out (23).

(23) *A   ninguna estudiante la   dieron   un coche.
     DOM any   student   3.DAT.F.SG gave.3PL a   car
     'They did not gave any student a car.'

In sum, the cut off between (13a) and (13b) derivations lies in P complement licensing. In (13a) the DP is licensed in a Case/agreement configuration, while in (13b) it is licensed by incorporation. The rest of the derivation follows with no additional provisos.

5. Conclusion

In this paper we have argued that the verb can only license one argument by means of a Case/agreement relation. When there are two potential DPs for this relation, one of them remains unlicensed (or gets incorporated). The typology of objects that can remain unlicensed is subject to parametric variation, although it seems to be the general case that nonspecific objects do not require any formal licensing.

Incorporation and Case/agreement are different ways for satisfying DP formal features. This is not new. This is a common assumption since Baker's (1988) pioneering work on this topic. The existence of different possible derivational paths for the same structure is an expected property of a derivative system, which is highly dependent on the properties of the syntactic objects affected by its operations. In a GB type modular approach, each module implements the way its properties are to be satisfied, therefore, we expect rigid procedure systems (*the property P has to be satisfied according to the procedure Q*). But this is not the way a derivational system works. From this point of view, repair strategies are just available, although infrequent, operations. In this sense, the fact that a certain derivation is more frequent than other is not a competence problem, but a performance one, possibly related to maximization in featural representation.

In this paper we have proposed two different derivations, (21) and (22), for the same basic ditransitive structure. There are reasons to think that they do not exhaust the possibilities. We can see, for instance, no principled reason why *pro* raising to

Spec,KP in (22) can be blocked. As a matter of fact, this is possibly the derivation in (19b). This option would be incompatible with an animate and specific object, but it is otherwise allowable.

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