

Consequences of Brexit in terms of Security for the United Kingdom and the European Union

Final Degree Project

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CONSEQUENCES OF BREXIT IN TERMS OF SECURITY FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

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1. Introduction.

My TFG will explain the consequences of Brexit for the European Union and United Kingdom in terms of Defence.

On the 23th of June 2016 a Referendum about to leave or to remain the European Union took place in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom has always been a pro-NATO country and has always wanted to work among on the Security of Europe joint forces with this Atlantic Organization.

The Brexit's results will have a great impact on the European Defence in terms of money, troops, arms, nuclear weapons, but also in the direction and aim of European Defence. Furthermore, the Brexit will have consequences for the country itself. What will be the advantages and the disadvantages for the European Union and for the United Kingdom? Which scenarios are we possibly facing?

I will try to answer these questions through a neo-realist point of view. This theory of International Relations uses a more scientific approach than the classical realism. According to this theory, States are the most important actors of the international system. There are some of the characteristics of this theory: every State has an offensive military capacity; States will never be sure about the intentions of others States, one defensive doctrine could be perceived as offensive; the first objective of the States is to survive and the States are rational actors who act with imperfect information (Waltz, 1988).

The neo-realism is able to see power in different ways, but the ultimate State interest is the security for guaranteeing power. While power is not the prime motivator of the States, its distribution was the major factor determining the nature of the structure of the international system (Waltz, 1988).

The neorealist theory will be helpful to understand the power relations that take place between the European Union and the United Kingdom. This distribution of power is determined by the military capabilities (economic, troops, nuclear weapons...) of each European Member, for that reason the neorealist theory will be more explanatory than any other. Also, this theory can help me to take conclusions about the possible scenarios that we are facing, because the

European Union and the United Kingdom will always try to guarantee their own survival in the actual unstable world.

To apply neorealist theory, I will first explain the legal cooperation framework between the European Union and the United Kingdom. The legal framework will contribute to understand the relations of power between both actors.

First of all, I have to examine the legal base of the European Union: The Treaty of Lisbon, signed in December 2007. In order to analyse who has the major responsibilities for the European Defence.

In addition, I will consider the European Defence and Security Strategies signed in 2003, 2008 and 2016, to understand the aim and objectives of the European Defence.

In this point, I will investigate the contributions of the United Kingdom to European Security and Defence. In order to do that, I will examine the U.K. Security Strategy of 2015, the U.K. budget and its economical contributions to E.U., the English troops that are part of the European Military Operations and the nuclear capacity of the U.K.

Once I have done the theoretical part of the assignment, I will do the practical one. The main body of the assignment will be composed by three parts: The consequences for the European Union and the consequences for the United Kingdom, the possible scenarios with the advantages and disadvantages for both actors and the conclusions of the assignment. Last but not least, the conclusions.

2. Theoretical framework: Description of the actual situation.

2.1. Legal Base of the European Union.

During the first decade after the Second World War, European issues of foreign policy, security and defense were at the centre of the debates on European integration. From 1954 these issues were considered taboo.

The European Defense Community (EDC), was a proposal of the French First Minister to create a European Army (1950). The principal objective of this proposal was to improve the European integration process. Nevertheless, this proposal had never been crystallized because States did not want to give up their sovereignty in this area at that moment (1954). For that reason, the European integration process occurred through other area, the economy (Soriano, 2016).

In the 80's, the intention of cooperation in the field of defence and foreign policy reappeared. In 1986 is signed the Single European Act that establishes the compromise of the Members of European Community with need to increase their supranational procedures in foreign policy (Soriano, 2016).

In 1992, with the Maastricht Treaty, or the European Union Treaty, the European Union with 3 pillars was created: The European Community, the Justice and Internal Affairs and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (European Council, 1992).

The establishment of the CFSP was a reaction of the European Members to the serious conflict at the Balkans at the 1990's, the absence of a unique vision, the crisis and the European dependence through NATO. All that made the European States realize that they need to develop a CFSP and a European Security and Defense Policy. Since then, the process of integration in this field has been growing and now, under the legal framework of the Lisbon treaty that reproduces the security aspects included in the Treaty of the European Union (1992) (Soriano, 2016).

The Article 41 of the Treaty of the European Union establishes the rules of financing the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including the missions and operations of the CSDP. In one hand, the civilian CSDP missions are financed from a Common Budget whereas the military operations are financed from the contributions of the Member States, in accordance with gross national income scale.

In this common Budget, the Member States (except Denmark, who opted to be out of military CSDP activities) contribute economically in this fund according their gross national income too.

The military missions have to be approved by the unanimity of the European Council, and the aspects related to the financing and administering by qualified majority. So the cooperation in security terms is different of the other sectors of the EU cooperation, in order to protect their security, the EU Members have to decide by unanimity. The EU Member States that decide to contribute to a military operation have to cover the costs (European Parliament, 2016).

Also, the Athena mechanism covers the EU military operations and EU military actions, in support of a third State or a third organization that is out of the European Union.

After fifteen years of reforms of Maastricht Treaty (1992), in 2007 the Lisbon Treaty is signed. With the came into force of Lisbon Treaty at 2009, the CFSP was strengthened: the role of the High Representative of Foreign Affairs was strengthened, being at the same time the Vice-President of the Commission; the European External Action Service was created (it manages EU diplomatic relations with other countries outside EU territory and directs EU foreign and security policy) (European Parliament, 2016).

Like I said, the mechanism of cooperation in the military and civil operations is the same as it was in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) (European Council, 2007).

2.2. European Defence and Security Strategies (2003, 2008 and 2016).

The European Defence and Security Strategies are the reference framework for foreign policy and security policy of the European Union. This documents are presented by the High Representative of Foreign Affairs to the European Council (Heads of State and Government) and have to be approved by unanimity to come into force. These documents establish the direction of the EU in external action.

There are three documents: The European Strategy of Security- A Secure Europe in a Better World- (2003), the Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy-Providing Security in a changing world- (2008) and A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy-Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe (2016).

The first one is a very brief document of 15 pages, in which the EU's threats (terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational organized crime, regional conflicts that have direct consequences in Europe despite being far ...) and security objectives (need of cooperation to build a secure world and the responsibility of Europe to assume the maintaining global security and building a better world are analysed). Nevertheless, this document did not establish the mechanisms or institutions to deal the European threats and how to get the objectives (European Council, 2003).

The second document, Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy-Providing Security in a changing world-, wanted to establish how to implement the European Strategy of 2003 but what it really happened is that the objectives and threats were extended, and did not provide mechanisms to address the firsts ones (European Council, 2008).

For that reason, in 2015, the European Council ordered to the High Representative of Foreign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, to redact a new Security Strategy. The bases of this document are the rights and duties of the European Union in its territory and abroad; in the second place, there is a charter about the direction of the Foreign Policy (unity, compromise, responsibility, joint collaboration...), the third charter about the priorities of the Foreign Policy and last one, a re-examination of the 2003 and 2008 European Strategies (Izquierdo, 2016).

In the third part of the document, the most extensive one, the priorities of the external action are explained. The charter is divided in 5 categories: The Security of our Union, The State and Societal Resilience to our East and South, An Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises, Cooperative Regional Orders and Global Governance for the 21st Century.

To guarantee the Security of the Union, the document proposes to work in five areas of actuation: Security and Defense, Fight against Terrorism, Cybersecurity, Energy Security and Strategic Communications. For that reasons, the EU has to be ready to protect and defend its interests, cooperate with its allies like the NATO, defend the EU values to fight against terrorism and more integration.

In reference of The State and Societal Resilience to our East and South, a review of the policy to enlargement of the EU is made, and the priority of the EU to have good relations with its

neighbours is established, work for build inclusive, prosper and secure societies in the border regions and develop a more effective migration policy.

The Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises gives relevance to the need to manage conflicts with a multilateralist approach for having a quick and accountable answer for the crises.

Cooperative Regional Orders is an innovative view because it proposes to work with actors that there are not States, with International Organizations, to solve conflicts or to improve relations with other regions. Some of this international organizations are: OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), CEDEAO (Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest), G5, CELAC (Comunidad de Estados de Latinoamerica y el Caribe), ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations).

In the last part, the Global Governance for the 21st Century proposes to support the civil actors, the multilateral mechanisms, sustainable energy and the development of the cyber-diplomacy (European Council, 2016).

2.3. Legal Framework of Cooperation between the United Kingdom and European Union.

The United Kingdom ratified the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, so the Country is, at least for now, under the legislation of this treaty (Government of the UK, 2015).

By this way, the English Head of State or Government, participates as one of the Members of the European Council. The European Council is formed by all Heads of State or Government of the European Union, the President of the Council and the High Representative of Foreign Affairs. One of functions of the Council is to decide, by unanimity, the directions of the CSDP.

The UK, like all the EU members, retains an effective veto on any new EU CSDP activity and complete control over the allocation of UK personnel to EU activity, in order to control its security and sovereignty. However, the EU Council could establish a common position that

national governments would then have to accommodate in their external policies. For example, the EU's common position on anti-personal landmines (European Council, 2007).

Continuing with the obligations, Member States have their own security policy independently to the European Union. But United Kingdom, as one of the European Members, has to cooperate and to inform the EU Members through the CSDP to increase the security of Europe.

The Lisbon Treaty established that "If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter" (European Council, 2007). This is called the "mutual assistance clause".

It has to be taken into account that the UK is one of the five permanent Members with right of veto in the Security Council of the United Nations, the most important international organization in the world with the primary objective of keeping international peace and security. So the UK is Member of the only institution who has the legal capacity to approve a military operation.

The CSDP does not pretend to assume the role of collective defense of the NATO and does not want to duplicate its structures or sources. In 2003, the Berlin Plus Agreement allows the European Union to use the NATO sources and the capabilities to planning for the operations of crises management directed by the European Union (Soriano, 2016).

In order to support the EU's CSDP, the United Kingdom contributes to the following EU missions, (the thirteen civil missions and in the five out of six military missions):

- EUFOR ALTHEA Bosnia-Herzegovina (European Union External Action)
- EU NAVFOR Somalia (Atalanta) (European Union External Action)
- EUTM Somalia (European Union External Action)
- EUTM Mali (European Union External Action)
- EUNAVFOR MED Mediterranean Sophia (European Union External Action)

According to the UK Government, for 2012 this State covered the 14,12% of the costs of the European military operations. This payment covered the UK contribution to Operation Althea

(Balkans), Operation Atalanta (Counter Piracy) and Phase II of the EUTM Somalia mission (Government of the UK , 2017).

2.4. Contributions of United Kingdom to the European Security and Defense Policy.

In this part I will explain the contributions of United Kingdom to European Security in terms of economic, troops and nuclear capabilities.

Economic contributions

As explained before, the Member States participate to the CDSP according to their Gross National Income. So we can know which Member contributes more if we measure the national income by the GDP indicator.

Table 1: Economic Contribution of the EU Members States to the CDSP

| Countries/Indicators | 2015 PIB in current \$ (mil millions) | % GDP UE |
|-----------------------------|--|---------------------|
| Austria | 376,95 | 2,31 |
| Belgium | 455,09 | 2,79 |
| Bulgaria | 50,20 | 0,31 |
| Croatia | 48,73 | 0,30 |
| Cyprus | 19,56 | 0,12 |
| Czech Republic | 185,16 | 1,14 |
| Denmark | 295,09 | 1,81 |
| Estonia | 22,46 | 0,14 |
| Finland | 231,95 | 1,42 |
| France | 2.418,84 | 14,83 |
| Germany | 3.363,45 | 20,62 |
| Greece | 194,85 | 1,19 |
| Hungary | 121,72 | 0,75 |
| Ireland | 283,70 | 1,74 |
| Italy | 1.821,50 | 11,17 |

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| Latvia | 27 | 0,16 |
| Lithuania | 41,17 | 0,25 |
| Luxemburg | 57,79 | 0,35 |
| Malta | 9,75 | 0,05 |
| Netherlands | 750,28 | 4,60 |
| Poland | 477,07 | 2,92 |
| Portugal | 198,92 | 1,22 |
| Romania | 177,95 | 1,09 |
| Slovakia | 87,26 | 0,53 |
| Slovenia | 42,78 | 0,26 |
| Spain | 1.199,06 | 7,35 |
| Sweden | 495,62 | 3,04 |
| United Kingdom | 2.858,00 | 17,52 |
| Total | 16.311,90 | 100 |

Source: compilation based on the database of the World Bank (2016).

As indicated in the table, the United Kingdom is the second economy of the European Union, so it is the second State which contributes more to the CDSP.

In the European Union Financial Report of 2015, the economical sources given to the Common Foreign and Security Policy were 261 millions of euros. If we make an analogy because we know that the United Kingdom had at 2015 the 17,52% of the European Union GDP, we could see that the United Kingdom contributed to the CDSP at 2015 with more or less 45,73 millions of euros.

Germany is the first contributor, with a 20,62% of the European Union GDP at 2015, that is it translated with 53,82 millions of euros to the CDSP. France which is the third one, with a contribution of 38,71 millions of euros.

If we put together the contributions of these three States, we can conclude that they provide more than half of the economical sources: 138,26 millions of euros.

One of the purposes of the CSDP is to increment the defense capabilities of the EU Members. The UK is the Member that most invests in defence according this table elaborated in base on a report of the Institute of Security Studies of the EU:

Table 2: EU Member State Defence Expenditure 2014

| Countries/Indicators | 2014 | | | |
|-----------------------|--------------|----------------------------|-------------|---------------|
| | Million € | Constant 2005 million € | % of GDP | Per capita |
| Austria | 2,45 | 2,03 | 0,79 | 289 |
| Belgium | 3,82 | 3,17 | 0,99 | 341 |
| Bulgaria | 584,00 | 409,00 | 1,46 | 80 |
| Croatia | 561,00 | 460,00 | 1,24 | 132 |
| Cyprus | 319,00 | 267,00 | 2,01 | 280 |
| Czech Republic | 1,52 | 1,15 | 1,01 | 145 |
| Denmark | 3,44 | 2,93 | 1,38 | 809 |
| Estonia | 384,00 | 266,00 | 2,03 | 290 |
| Finland | 2,75 | 2,26 | 1,38 | 506 |
| France | 43,07 | 37,27 | 2,05 | 652 |
| Germany | 32,40 | 27,88 | 1,20 | 402 |
| Greece | 4,16 | 3,47 | 2,33 | 377 |
| Hungary | 758,00 | 651,00 | 0,72 | 77 |
| Ireland | 898,00 | 820,00 | 0,52 | 195 |
| Italy | 20,59 | 17,26 | 1,33 | 344 |
| Latvia | 226,00 | 154,00 | 1,30 | 112 |
| Lithuania | 303,00 | 216,00 | 0,85 | 102 |
| Luxemburg | 189,00 | 153,00 | 0,41 | 348 |
| Malta | 45,00 | 37,00 | 0,62 | 106 |
| Netherlans | 7,75 | 6,64 | 1,25 | 461 |
| Poland | 7,78 | 6,44 | 1,91 | 202 |
| Portugal | 1,94 | 1,67 | 1,19 | 185 |
| Romania | 2,01 | 1,60 | 1,40 | 101 |

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| Slovakia | 765,00 | 623,00 | 1,02 | 141 |
| Slovenia | 353,00 | 284,00 | 0,98 | 171 |
| Spain | 10,35 | 8,57 | 0,99 | 222 |
| Sweden | 5,07 | 4,36 | 1,19 | 529 |
| United Kingdom | 45,78 | 42,16 | 2,34 | 714 |
| Total | 5579,88 | 4242,87 | 35,89 | 8313 |

Source: compilation based on EUISS Yearbook of European Security (2015).

As we can see in this table, the UK is the EU Member that has the higher Defence Expenditure in 2014 in economic terms. The UK devoted 45,776 millions of euros to military spending. Is the most investing Member in terms of %GDP too.

Military contributions

The EU does not have military forces for its own, troops of the CDSP operations are drawn from dedicated national forces. So the European Union articulates and protects its military security through the national forces of the Member States.

It should also be noted the cooperation between EU-NATO, the great majority of EU Members are NATO Members too. The Berlin-Plus Agreement allows the EU access to NATO's collective assets and capabilities for EU operations.

According to the Government of United Kingdom, the UK is placed seventh out of 28 Member States in terms of numbers seconded staff to civilian CSDP missions, behind Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, France and Finland. In July 2014 there were 93 English deployed in EU civilian missions. For the UK, the EU is the first client in terms of deployed in multilateral operations (Government of the UK, 2015).

Table 3: Numbers of UK Staff in Civilian CSDP

| Mission | UK Deployed | Other International Deployed or EU Members deployed | % UK deployed |
|---|--------------------|--|----------------------|
| EULEX Kosovo | 40 | 734 | 5,5% |
| EUMM Georgia | 19 | 250 | 7,6% |
| EUPOL Afganhistan | 9 | 203 | 4,4% |
| EUAM Ukraine | 10 | 80 | 12,5% |
| EUCAP Nestor (Horn of Africa) | 4 | 61 | 6,5% |
| EUCAP Sahel Mali | 1 | 56 | 1,8% |
| EUPOL COPPS (Occupied Palestinian Territories) | 4 | 43 | 9,3 |
| EUBAM Libya | 2 | 42 | 4,8% |
| EUSEC DR Congo | 3 | 41 | 7,3% |
| EUCAP Sahel Niger | 1 | 31 | 3,2% |
| EUPOL DR Congo | 0 | 22 | 0% |
| EUBAM Rafah (Occupied Palestinian Territories) | 0 | 2 | 0% |
| Total | 93 | 1.565 | 0,6% |

Source: compilation based on the report UK Defence in Numbers (2015).

If we appreciate this table, we could see that in spite of the fact that the UK is one of the most powerful State Member in terms of Security and Defence, is not a great contributor in terms of staff to the civil missions of the CSDP.

As I said before, the United Kingdom participated in 2015 in five out of the six military operations of the European Unions and in all of the civil missions. The concrete numbers in terms of personnel are:

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- 70 deployed to the Somalia operation (Government of the UK, 2015)
- 815 deployed on the Mediterranean operation (Government of the UK, 2015)
- 101 deployed controlling the EUFOR Althea (Government of the UK, 2015)
- Operation in Mali: missing information.

Furthermore, these are the UK military capabilities in comparison with the other EU Members:

Table 4: Active Armed Forces of the EU Members States

| Countries/Indicators | Active Armed Forces in 2016 |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Austria | 23.000 |
| Belgium | 31.000 |
| Bulgaria | 31.000 |
| Croatia | 17.000 |
| Cyprus | 12.000 |
| Czech Republic | 22.000 |
| Denmark | 17.000 |
| Estonia | 6.000 |
| Finland | 22.000 |
| France | 209.000 |
| Germany | 179.000 |
| Greece | 143.000 |
| Hungary | 27.000 |
| Ireland | 9.000 |
| Italy | 175.000 |
| Latvia | 5.000 |
| Lithuania | 16.000 |
| Luxemburg | 1.000 |
| Malta | 2.000 |
| Netherlans | 36.000 |
| Poland | 99.000 |

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| Portugal | 33.000 |
| Romania | 71.000 |
| Slovakia | 16.000 |
| Slovenia | 8.000 |
| Spain | 122.000 |
| Sweden | 30.000 |
| United Kingdom | 155.000 |
| Total | 1.522.000 |

Source: compilation based in the Yearbook Military Balance (2016).

According to this table, the first EU Member with active armed forces that could be used in case of a crisis in security is France (209.000), the second one is Germany (179.000), the third one is Italy (175.000) and the fourth is United Kingdom (155.000).

Nuclear Capabilities

The nuclear deterrent provides the ultimate guarantee of the UK's national security and represents a vital point to the defence of the European Union.

The UK is one of the two European countries and one of the few countries in the world who has nuclear weapons.

In January of 2016 the ranking of nuclear capability in the world was:

Table 5: Nuclear Capabilities

| Country | Nuclear Capabilities |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
| Russia | 7.290 |
| United States | 7.000 |
| France | 300 |
| China | 260 |
| United Kingdom | 215 |

| | |
|--------------------|------------------|
| Pakistan | 110-130 |
| India | 100-120 |
| Israel | 80 |
| North Korea | 10 |
| Total | 15.365 – 15. 405 |

Source: compilation based on the database of SIPRI (2016).

The United Kingdom is the fifth country with major nuclear capabilities in the world and the second in Europe. If we sum the nuclear capabilities of France and United Kingdom we could say that in Europe there are 515 nuclear warheads.

3. Consequences for the European Union and consequences for the United Kingdom.

In this section, I will explain the consequences for both actors, the European Union and the United Kingdom.

Starting with the European Union, we have to take into account the role that the United Kingdom has played in the European defence integration. In 1999, the Common Security and Defence Police (CSDP) has been created after the Saint-Malo Declaration. This declaration was an agreement between UK and France to balance the French enthusiasm for EU defence and the British support for the primacy of NATO, allowing the integration of EU defence while the role of NATO is protected.

So the first consequence is that the UK exit will allow the European Union to get more integrated in defence field. The second one is that they will develop it without an atlantist approach.

The UK will not participate in the European Council. This fact will facilitate the process to decision adoption, because there will be less Members to adopt unanimity. In other words, less Members to protect the primacy of their sovereignty in front of the interests of the rest of States Members. Also, the mechanism of votes in the European Council will have to be resettled: big europeist States like Germany and Italy are expected to have more power under the new circumstances.

The political power in the Security area will be reconfigured. The Brexit, and the empty of power that this situation provoke, will induce other European Members to fill in. European Members with an important military resources like Italy, Greece or Spain will take advantage on this situation to expand its sphere of influence and power in the European Security. Germany and France will strengthen their power too, thanks to the departt of the United Kingdom.

On a political level, the British exit will induce the re-appearance of some European States priorities in the EU agenda, that have been vetoed by UK: EU operational headquarters, the expansion of the 'Athena' common funding mechanism for EU operations, or plans for a 'European Army' are examples of this.

Furthermore, some agenda problems will appear like the different point view of the European Policy of France and Germany, the most powerful members as we have seen in the charter of military and economic capabilities. France is interested in improving the efforts of the military and civil missions, especially in North Africa. By contrast, Germany is interested in coordinating the national defence policies and the military capabilities of the EU States Members.

These debates of the role of the European Security will be linked with the European integration projects. Those States Members who want more integration in the Defence field will put all of its resources to the effectiveness of the European combat groups. Other States Members with a more "Eurosceptic" view will not participate in the development of this combat groups.

The security sphere and the general sphere of foreign policy can not be separated. For that reason, the Brexit will rise the debate of the role of the European Union in the world, its security tools, the European union cooperation... This debate will take more force after Brexit. So maybe there will be a new European Defence and Security Strategy (Soriano J.P., personal communication, 25th of April 2017).

As I said, the Lisbon Treaty established that: "If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter." If one State Member is attacked, the UK, one of the most military capable

Member, is not obligated to assistance. This is not too significant because the great major EU Members are also NATO Members, and NATO provides mutual assistance in case of armed attack too.

Other political consequence is that the UK will not be obligated to inform EU Members in terms of Defence or relevant information in security matters. The States Members have to cooperate and inform to EU Members through the CSDP to increase the security of Europe. The EU Members maybe will loose the UK information.

On a military level, the EU will lose one of the most capable military powers: UK is the first military spending Member, with military expenditure of 45,775 million of euros in 2015, the UK is also placed seventh out of 28 States Members in terms of numbers seconded staff to civilian CSDP missions, fourth placed in the ranking of EU Members with active armed forces and the second EU Member with nuclear capabilities.

The consequences for the UK depends on the type of relations that will be established with the European Union after the Brexit negotiations. Instead of that, it is sure that the UK will not participate in the European Council with the same role. So the UK will not be able to vetoed any decision of the European Council for the benefit of its national interest, as it had done.

In reference of the CSDP missions, the UK will not participate in the EU CSDP missions, unless an agreement is signed with EU. For that reason, the UK will not be able to influence in the direction of this CSDP missions.

The British Foreign, Security and Defence policy has never been solely pursued through the EU. The UK, as one one of the most military resources in Europe and in the world, has built its foreign and security network though bilateral agreements or other International Organizations. The UK is the second most important member of the most important military organization in the world: NATO. In this sense, the military capabilities of UK and its implication with other organizations or States will allow UK not to be isolated in foreign and security policy.

The United Kingdom will probably try to reinforce its partnership with NATO in order to ensure its security umbrella. Through NATO the United Kingdom will maintain a compromise with the European Security too (Soriano J.P., personal communication, 25th of April 2017).

Other political consequence for the United Kingdom is about image. The Brexit will draw an image of vulnerability and less security capacity of the United Kingdom. This image is not necessary to be true in reality but the other States could perceive United Kingdom more fragile in security terms. That is because of United Kingdom will not have the security umbrella of the European Union (Soriano J.P., personal communication, 25th of April 2017).

4. Possible scenarios for the European Union and the United Kingdom.

Now, I am going to draw the possible scenarios that will be able to take place (in legal terms) between the European Union and the United Kingdom. For doing that, I inspired myself through the Richard G. Whitman article “The UK and EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after Brexit: Integrated, Associated or Detached?”

In case that the UK and the European Union decide to establish an agreement in Defence field in which the UK will have a Special Status in the European Security these will be the scenario (EU+1):

The UK will not longer be participant of the European Council with the benefits of being a State Member: the UK will not decide any decision of the European Council, will not decide to deploy a military or a civil mission... But the UK will participate with a Special Status with voice. In this sense, the UK will be able to influence in the final decision of the Council but not to adopt the decision itself.

In the political level too, the EU will not lose the defence and security information of the UK because the UK will participate in the European Council and its working groups.

In exchange, the EU will not lose the military capacity of the British State, because the EU will allow the UK to participate in the civil and military missions if UK wants. In the same way, the UK will be able to participate economically in the CSDP budget.

In this scenario will be more difficult that some agenda items reappear. The economical and military dependence of the UK will hide them.

The second possible scenario is the UK as an associated player. The UK will support the EU direction, declarations and actions in a moral sense. In this scenario the UK will not integrate its military and economical sources in the CSDP. However, the UK will be able to participate in the civil or military missions trough a logical of case by case, like other no EU-Members do across the Athena mechanism.¹

In the political level, the UK will not have a permanent participation in the European Council, the UK will only participate in specific cases where cooperation will be necessary to maintain the security of the UK and the EU. So the UK will loose the capacity to influence the direction of the European Council. In this scenario, it will be easier that some agenda items reappear.

The UK will participate permanently in a ministerial dialogue with the High Representative of Foreign Affairs of the EU where they will exchange each other information and will make their external policies compatible.

The third scenario, the UK as a Detached observer. The UK will be separated and independent of the EU and the CSDP. The EU will loose all of the military support of the UK and the economical support through the Athena Mechanism.

Under this model, the UK will take preference for the bilateral agreements between European States Members but not with the EU. As I said, the British Security and Defence policy has never been solely pursued through EU, so the UK probably, in this scenario, will strengthen its relations with other actors like the USA and NATO.

Whatever the scenario, what is certain is the European Security will never cease to be a preoccupation for the UK. Due to its proximity both geographical and cultural.

¹ Athena mechanism is a budget that covers the EU military operations and EU military actions. Also third States or Organizations can participate.

Possible Scenarios

| Status | Participation in the European Council | Participation in the Military and Civil Operations | Economically support to the CSDP operations |
|--------------------------|--|---|--|
| Special Status | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Associated Player | Case by case | Case by case | Yes, Athena Mechanism |
| Detached Observer | No | No | No |

Source: Richard G, *The UK and EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after Brexit: Integrated, Associated or Detached?* Own Development.

5. Conclusions.

Even if the United Kingdom is one of the most powerful members in terms of military capabilities, the UK is not one of the most participation European Members in the military and civil missions of the EU in terms of personnel.

The UK is not interested in this operations, this country always pursues an harmonisation of the defence policies but it considers that the military operations are responsibility of other organizations like the United Nations or the NATO. One example of harmonisation is the proposal of a single market logic to the defence industry: the UK is a great supporter of this proposal to unified the programmes research and increase the competition with the no EU-Members.

In my opinion, the UK and the EU will be more probably, in a near future, in the third scenario, the UK as a detached observer. In terms of political costs, the other scenarios are not assumable for any of the two actors.

The government of the UK can not say to the people who support Brexit that the UK will participate in more or less equal form in the Security Sphere. In addition, the Security direction

of the European Union will probably take a path that will not supported by the English politicians: more integration in defence field and less dependence of the NATO. Is true that that will take the European Security is very linked to the sooner political changes that maybe will take place in France, Germany or other European States Members.

In the other hand, the European Union can not assume to open the door to this country to participate in the European Council and influence more or less in the direction of European Security.

This is due to different reasons: the historically English scepticism in the direction of the European Defence, the traditionally British low participation in the military and civil missions, instead of the resources of the UK (Whitman, 2016), the aim of some European Members to move forward a more integrated Defence field.... I think that the European Union and the United Kingdom are nearest to the third scenario in which UK will not participate in the European Council.

What I am sure is that the UK will sign a lot of treaties of cooperation between EU and its European Members. Maybe UK will participate in some missions but not with a lot of resources, like it traditionally has done, to not weaken too much the European Union Security and the UK security itself. We have to remember that it is a great contributor in economical terms.

To sum up, the consequences of Brexit for the European Union and the United Kingdom are more linked to the political consequences than military. The UK will loose its capacity to influence the political security strategy of the EU because British will not participate in the European Council and its working groups, so EU will be able to develop its agenda issues that have been vetoed by UK; the UK will seemly have a weakness image; the debate of the process integration of the EU; a new possible Security Strategy of the EU... This political changes will involve a role change to the NATO.

Finally, I think that the European Security will continue to be a concern for the UK because of the cultural and geographic proximity. The UK will use the platform that the NATO organization offers to protect the European Security while protecting its own Security. Maybe, for that reason, the roles between these three actors will change, the NATO will be now the

bridge between EU and UK rather than the UK a bridge between NATO and the European Union.

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