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## **EU foreign policy towards Georgia: Just for the energy?**

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### **Abstract**

The paper analyses how the EU foreign policy towards Georgia changed after the Rose Revolution, reaching greater levels of involvement and assistance. It is argued that the pro-western and reformist new government in Georgia triggered a new orientation in the EU foreign policy towards the country based on a logic of appropriateness, that is EU's values, in addition to energy interests. Comparative analysis in the Southern-Caucasus and other Eastern-European countries shows how reformist and pro-EU governments receive more EU support and assistance. This does not mean that material interest do not play an important role. However, the EU seems to be coherent with its values when regarding the European neighbourhood.

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## INTRODUCTION\*

The Rose Revolution of November 2003 in Georgia brought the country into a new scenario. After years of frustrated expectations, mass demonstrations triggered a change of government. The final outcome was the outset of a new period of reforms and liberalisation under the guide of a new democratically elected pro-western government. This is the official history for both the European Union (EU) and the government of Georgia. The real history is, of course, fuzzier than an official-transcript about an epical and velvet revolution that led the country towards the democracy and transparency. Nonetheless, some things undoubtedly changed. The new government was and still is clearly reformist. The official rhetoric turned openly pro-western and oriented towards a hypothetical accession into the NATO and the EU. A rally against corruption and for the enforcement of the state authority over its territory was initiated, while more comprehensive measures for the resolution of the so-called frozen conflicts in Georgia have been taken. Moreover, Georgia has become an important energy corridor for EU's imports of Caspian oil and gas, which makes the EU less dependant on imports from Russia and the Middle East. Georgia will share sea frontiers with the EU when Romania and Bulgaria accede in 2007 and will be a neighbour country if Turkey finally accedes to the EU. In fact, the Southern Caucasus was considered as a neighbour region in the European Security Strategy and was included in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. With these prospects, the EU increasingly targeted Georgia after the Rose Revolution.

The paper argues that values have been an important factor to explain the EU's foreign policy towards Georgia after the Rose Revolution. That means that although material interests are an important driving force for any foreign policy as IR dominant paradigms would predict, values and identity can have an important role to define the EU's foreign policy. EU's values, such as democracy; the rule of law; respect for human rights; or adoption of the *acquis communautaire* (a kind of Europeanization) and a sense of shared identity, can be important elements to configure the EU's foreign policy in its neighbourhood. Thus, it will be analysed if the EU's approaches towards Georgia and extensively Eastern Europe can also be explained by a logic of appropriateness, that is by values and identity, in addition to material interests. The hypothesis and the explanation of values and identity as independent variables will be presented in the second part of the paper. Previously, the situation in Georgia since its independence in 1990 and the EU's foreign policy towards Georgia before and after the Rose Revolution will be depicted.

### 1. EUROPEAN UNION'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS GEORGIA. A NEW BEARING?

What was then the reaction, if any, of the EU regarding the new situation brought by the Rose Revolution? The purpose of this chapter is to show the new bearing adopted by the EU towards Georgia after the new reformist and pro-western government took control of the country. The variation or change of the EU foreign policy towards Georgia will allow us to look into the different characters that this policy may adopt according to which circumstances and which countries are involved. The first section will show briefly the EU foreign policy towards Georgia since the independence of the country until the Rose Revolution. The final section examines the change in the EU foreign policy towards Georgia once the new government came into power in 2004.

#### The EU and Georgia between 1990 and 2003

##### *The Chaos years, 1990-1995*

A new international order emerged at the beginning of the nineties when the Cold War came to an end. The Soviet Union collapsed and a myriad of new states rose from its ashes; after the

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communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe fell apart, the world was still focusing on the recent Second Gulf War and soon after, Yugoslavia exploded while a new European Union was in the making. Who could keep their eyes on the Southern Caucasus with such events taking place? The rapid breakdown of the Soviet Union was especially tragic in the Southern Caucasus. In Georgia and Armenia, wide nationalist movements though dispersed within many different groups, seized the power. In Azerbaijan, after the Red Army's violently repressed public demonstrations for independence, a referendum led the country towards independence and a less powerful nationalist movement than in Armenia and Georgia took control of the country<sup>1</sup>. The disappearance of central authority of the soviet structures and the hegemony of extremist nationalist forces led the region into chaos, especially in Georgia. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan for the control over the mainly Armenian-inhabited Nagorno Karabakh territory in Azerbaijan began in 1991, while Georgia gradually broke up. The Georgian aggressive and romantic-inspired nationalist movement, leaded by the imprudent and extremist Zviad Gamsakhurdia<sup>2</sup>, aimed to 'georgianize' all aspects of the newly born state, especially the language<sup>3</sup>. This could only lead to tensions between Georgian nationalists and minorities, see table 1 and 2. The first conflict arose in South Ossetia, Autonomous Oblast within the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, when the nationalist majority in the Georgian Parliament abolished the Ossetian autonomy in November 1990 (even before the independence of Georgia).

**Table 1. Ethnic groups in Georgia (2002)**

Ethnic Groups	Percentage of the population in Georgia
Georgian	70.1%
Armenian	8.1%
Russian	6.3%
Azeri	5.7%
Ossetian	3%
Abkhaz	1.8%

Source: European Commission 2003. *TACIS National Indicative Programme 2004-2006. Georgia Country Strategy Paper 2003-2006.*

**Table 2. Ethnic groups in Abkhazia before the war**

Ethnic Groups	Percentage of the population in Abkhazia
Georgian	47%
Armenian	18%
Abkhaz	17%
Russian	13%

Source: SAINZ, Nora 2004. "Los conflictos de Osetia del Sur y Abjazia". In Ruth Ferrero (ed.) *Nacionalismos y minorías en Europa Central y Oriental*. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials de Barcelona, p. 221.

The despotic government of Gamsakhurdia, together with the defeats in Ossetia and the incipient conflict in Abkhazia resulted in a violent *coup d'état* just few months later, in January 1992, and was formed a Military Council. This situation led to a civil war between Georgian supporters of Gamsakhurdia and the Georgian factions now governing in Tbilisi, the capital. Meanwhile, due to the extremely difficult situation of the country, the leaders of the Council (the commanders of the National Guard and the strongest paramilitary group) called Eduard Shevardnadze to obtain international recognition and legitimacy to develop a viable state. A new state council was formed, in fact a triumvirate, which appointed a new Parliament and led to international recognition thanks to Shevardnadze, but not to stability. The situation in Georgia was unstable due to various reasons; firstly, the Gamsakhurdia's supporters (*Zviadists*) controlled an extensive region in the north-east of the country. Secondly, the new government

was not able to control their own different armed factions. Thirdly, the Ossetian, backed by the Russians, finally controlled South Ossetia and agreed on a cease-fire with the Georgian government in July 1992<sup>4</sup>. To make things worse, the conflict in Abkhazia finally exploded just one month later<sup>5</sup>. Again, Russia backed the Abkhaz to get leverage over the Georgian government<sup>6</sup>, who unable to defeat *Zviadists* and Abkhaz agreed to a cease-fire in Abkhazia in the beginning of 1994<sup>7</sup>. Part of the agreement was to get Russian support to defeat the *Zviadists*, which was quickly achieved<sup>8</sup>. The final result of the battles was thousands of deaths, 250.000 Georgian refugees fled from Abkhazia (the entire Georgian population in Abkhazia) and the social and economic decomposition of the country<sup>9</sup>, see table 3. On the other hand, Shevardnadze finally got control over the country and legitimated his power through democratic elections in 1995<sup>10</sup>. However, Georgia remained a weak state<sup>11</sup>.

**Table 3. Economic developments in Georgia 1989-2003**

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Real GDP growth (index, 1989 = 100)	100.0	87.6	69.6	38.4	28.6	25.4	26.0	28.7	31.8	32.7	33.7	34.3	35.9	37.9	41.2
Annual change in GDP (%)	-	-12.4	-20.6	-44.8	-25.4	-11.4	2.4	10.5	10.6	2.9	3.0	1.9	4.7	5.6	8.6
Annual inflation rate	-	3.3	79.0	887.4	3.125.4	15.606	162.7	39.4	7.1	3.6	19.2	4.1	4.6	5.7	4.9
Employment ratio (employed as % of population aged 15-59)	82.0	83.6	76.0	60.4	57.4	59.2	67.2	72.7	81.4	74.6	74.7	75.3	75.9	69.4	67.3
Registered unemployed aged 15-24	-	-	12.2	29.1	12.5	9.5	7.1	3.6	15.4	35.0	32.8	38.3	36.6	13.1	11.3
Real wages (base year = 100)	100	111.2	76.5	50.5	24.1	33.5	28.2	44.0	59.6	74.9	76.6	78.8	98.9	111.8	118.2

Source: TransMONEE 2005 Database, UNICEF, IRC, Florence

With these prospects, how did the EU act in thatto the situation? When the communist regimes in Europe fell apart and the Soviet Union collapsed, the EU was still immersed in the process of reform that led to the Maastricht Treaty. Thus, the EU had to cope with the transformation within the intergovernmental European Political Cooperation (EPC), the precedent of the CFSP. The EPC was hardly more than a simple coordination between the member states, although it had already the possibility to undertake joint actions which later became the core of the CFSP. As a result, the main actions towards the former Soviet Union were technical and regional cooperation, using the existing instruments of the European Community. Technical help concerned basically to the safety and supervision of the nuclear weapons, nuclear plants and the reorientation of the Community of Independent States scientific staff. Due to logistic and distribution problems in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union, they received medical and humanitarian assistance from the EU<sup>12</sup>. Apart from technical and humanitarian help, the EU established the TACIS regional programme addressed to the former Soviet Union in 1992 with the aim of contributing to the transition towards a market economy. In the case of Georgia, the TACIS programme allocated 23 € million, see table 4. Undoubtedly, the presence of Eduard Shevardnadze in the Georgian government, first as chairman of the Parliament and then elected as President, was a crucial factor for the EU to deliver further help. The tragic situation of Georgia and the presence of Shevardnadze made it eligible for considerable amounts of humanitarian help (ECHO) and for the Food Security Programme (FEOGA). The entire help from the EU from 1992 to 1996 to Georgia was of 127 millions €.

During this period the EU policy towards the Caucasus, and basically towards all the post-soviet space, was subdivided into a key number of sub-policies: macro-financial assistance; humanitarian aid; rehabilitation assistance and special programmes<sup>13</sup>. These programmes are

the aforementioned TACIS regional programme and the TRACECA regional programme. The latter is a programme within the framework of TACIS for regional cooperation in the fields of energy, transport and telecom networks. It provides technical support from the European Commission assisting the partner states (Ukraine, Moldova, Southern Caucasus and Central Asia) to identify and pursue actions which are best undertaken on a multi-country level. The aim of TRACECA is to create a transport corridor between Central Asia, the Caucasus and Europe, by promoting a secure and effective network for trade and energy transport together with the promotion of regional cooperation. The results have been scarce, although the last two years produced a revival of the project and more resources and means have been allocated by the EU.

**Table 4. EU aid for Georgia 1992-1995**

	1992	1993	1994	1995
<i>ECHO</i>		11.78	17.81	27.45
<i>FEOGA</i>				41
<i>Exceptional Humanitarian Aid</i>		6		
<i>TACIS National</i>	9	4	4	6
<b>Total M€</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>21.78</b>	<b>21.81</b>	<b>74.45</b>

Source: European Commission 2003, *op.cit.*

However, the main interest of the EU towards the Caucasus was undoubtedly the energy sector. The independence of the former Central Asian and Caucasian Soviet Republics opened up their oil and gas production to the international market. Although the Russian companies first controlled that production, western companies, mainly British and North-American, soon reversed the situation. Thus, member states saw the opportunity to secure energy access to what was thought to be the third largest oil and natural gas reserves after the Gulf region and Siberia<sup>14</sup>. Although the aim was to stabilize the region in order to have secure access to energy and trade flows, the first EU actions towards the Caucasus, as seen before, were addressed to solve the humanitarian crisis of the zone.

#### *Stability without progress 1996-2003*

During the mid-nineties the Caucasian states reinforced their international legitimacy and set the basis for some stability in their governments. At the same time, fights stopped and the regional conflicts were literally “frozen”, that is no fighting but also no resolution. In 1995, Shevardnadze could issue a new constitution and reaffirm his presidential powers through democratic elections, which were not fully clean but accepted by the EU and the OSCE.

With this scenario of an incipient stability in the region, the EU issued in 1996 the Joint Action Plan for Russia and the Caucasus. At the same time, the EU offered the Post-Soviet Republics the prospects of Cooperation and Partnership Agreements. These two milestones illustrate three important points of the EU’s approach towards the Caucasus during the nineties and the beginning of the two thousands. Firstly, they reveal the lack of regional differentiation of the EU towards the post-soviet space. In other words, the EU had the same approach for Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Secondly, the main aim was to promote stabilisation and the territorial integrity of these countries, their economic development and to strengthen the political dialogue through annual meetings in Brussels in order to monitor the implementation of the agreements. Finally, regarding the Southern Caucasus, the Joint Action Plan aimed to stabilise the region in order to secure the main objective of exploiting the Caucasus energy corridor. The establishment of the INOGATE regional programme in 1996 was one of the consequences of this goal. The purpose of INOGATE is to develop a co-operation programme for enhancing security of energy supply in the EU and participating

countries in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia<sup>15</sup>. It promotes regional integration of the pipeline systems and facilitates the transport of oil and gas both within Central Asia and the Caucasus and towards the markets of Europe; and attracts private investors and international institutions to the pipeline projects. The role of the European Commission is to coordinate, promote, give assistance and finance some projects. These more modest goals than those of TRACECA have been more effective and easier to be operationalized. As a result, the programme has been quite successful, especially promoting regional cooperation. Regarding Georgia and Azerbaijan the frame has been especially fruitful, not only in the case of bilateral cooperation, but also in the case of the successful completion of the Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the parallel gas pipeline.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Georgia entered into force on 1 July 1999 and has been since then the basis of the relationship between the EU and Georgia. In spite of the focus on trade and technical elements, PCAs introduce some conditionality, such as respect for democracy and human rights, through the titles II and XI. Specifically, PCAs for the three South Caucasus countries establish a cooperation council which meets once a year at ministerial level<sup>16</sup>. However, this political dialogue has been scarce and has not given the EU effective elements of analysis and information in order to set up a definite strategy. In any case, the EU was not interested in a great involvement in the region due to three main reasons. Firstly, the EU considered Southern Caucasus a Russian backyard and the relationship with Russia was obviously in first line of priorities in contrast to Georgia. Moreover, the Caucasus was seen as a 'grey zone'<sup>17</sup> not near enough to the EU and a peripheral region in the international system to become a priority. Secondly, the region was crowded by international organizations and the influence of great powers; UN is monitoring the cease-fire line in Abkhazia; the OSCE is in charge of the conflict-resolution tasks in South-Ossetia; the influence of Russia is decisive<sup>18</sup>; and the presence of the United States has had more leverage in Georgia than that of the EU<sup>19</sup>. Finally, energy was the EU primary interest in the South Caucasus.

As a consequence, the EU engaged in a low-profile intervention in the region<sup>20</sup>. This does not mean no action. The EU agenda was broadening and the CFSP, which came to life with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, was developing and new instruments were at EU's disposal. The EU, as a consumer of security from Georgia, tried to help the Georgian government to overcome humanitarian crisis and to enforce the rule of law, and on the other hand, to prevent the spread of criminality and traffic of drugs. But, all in all, the EU involvement was of low profile in order to avoid annoying Russia and to prevent breaking the fragile equilibrium in the region. Sweden tried to change this situation during its 2001 presidency of the EU. For the first time, the EU moved to defy the status quo in Georgia; governments in Sweden and Finland together with green and leftist European movements tried to "unfreeze" the conflicts in Georgia and to push the EU to a major implication in the South-Caucasus. Sweden even brought twice the Abkhaz conflict resolution to the Security Council, but nothing could be achieved without the support of Russia and the efforts failed<sup>21</sup>. The EU only accepted more implication on reinforcing the Georgian Border Guard along the out-of-state-control border with Chechnya to prevent further destabilization of the region<sup>22</sup>, and on peace-building measures and more assistance to stabilise the country (humanitarian and macro-financial support), see table 5. However, those efforts were not continued by the following EU presidencies or by the Georgian government itself.

Although Shevardnadze made a big effort to drive Georgia to western standards and to international institutions, the weakness of the state was never overcome. Georgia certainly is a member of the Council of Europe since 2001, member of the WTO, partner of the NATO and signer of mostly every international treaty, but it is also true that Shevardnadze failed to construct a state and a national project. Shevardnadze fell into authoritarianism and favoured his clan<sup>23</sup>, turning Georgia into a mafia-dominated state<sup>24</sup>. What is more, corruption became rampant, reaching unsustainable levels in the two-thousands. At the same time, the outcomes of presidential and parliamentary elections were increasingly manipulated by the government. However, civil liberties and freedom for the establishment of NGOs, civil organisations and political parties were kept, probably due to the weakness of the Georgian state. This relative openness was crucial for the social mobilisation and denounces before and during the Rose Revolution<sup>25</sup>.

**Table 5. EU aid for Georgia 1996-2002**

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
<i>ECHO</i>	10.2	5.8	6.41	6.93	2.62	1.05	2
<i>FEOGA</i>	21.55						
<i>Exceptional Humanitarian Aid</i>							
<i>Aid against Russian crisis</i>				4			
<i>FSP</i>	18.25	16	14	12		25	
<i>TACIS National</i>	8	8	8	8	11	4	7
<i>Rehabilitation of conflicts zones</i>		3.5	6.5	7.5		10	
<i>Financial assistance</i>			10	9		6	
<i>CFSP</i>					1.09	0.25	0.1
<b>Total M€</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>33.3</b>	<b>44.91</b>	<b>47.43</b>	<b>14.71</b>	<b>46.3</b>	<b>9.1</b>

Source: European Commission 2003, *op.cit.*

The trend towards authoritarianism, clientelism and uncontrolled corruption led the EU to re-examine the situation, 2003 being a milestone in the relations between the EU and Georgia. Various elections were expected to be celebrated that year in the Southern Caucasus and they were seen as a window of opportunity, especially in Georgia as the political openness was higher. Nonetheless, the EU did not have a clear idea of the panorama<sup>26</sup>. Therefore, an EU Special Representative, the Finnish Heikki Talvitie, was appointed in order to fully examine the situation in the region and to make the necessary contacts for an effective EU influence<sup>27</sup>. Soon after, a very critical reassessment of the TACIS National Indicative Programme for 2004-2006 was issued. The EU suffered the 'Caucasian fatigue': years of assistance have had no effect in the economic and democratic progress of the country<sup>28</sup>.

### **The EU's foreign policy towards Georgia after the Rose Revolution, 2004-2005**

As seen before, during 2003 the EU 'threw up the sponge' with Georgia. Undoubtedly, Shevardnadze was decisive for ending the chaos in Georgia during the nineties and to obtain international legitimization for the Georgian state. Rhetorically a reformer and a pro-western President, at the end of the day Shevardnadze bandwagoned Russia and the reforms were only legislative; they were never put to practice. The expected scenario of mass manipulation of the November 2003 parliamentary elections did indeed become a reality<sup>29</sup>, which provoked mass protests all over the country<sup>30</sup>. Finally, Shevardnadze resigned and Presidential elections were held in January 2004 resulting in the victory of Mikhail Saakashvili. These elections were qualified as the cleanest elections in the Georgian history by the OSCE and the Council of Europe in spite of some irregularities. Equally democratic parliamentary elections were also held in May 2004 with the same winning results for Saakashvili's party. Suddenly, the scenario had changed radically: a new young and reformist government educated in western countries

came to power. Moreover, this time the pro-western orientation was stronger and Saakashvili aims to situate the country in the Euro-Atlantic sphere and release it from the Russian influence. Things started to change within the EU when the South Caucasus was considered a neighbouring region in the European Security Strategy issued in December 2003<sup>31</sup>. Later, in February 2004, the European Parliament presented to the Council and the Commission a report on the South Caucasus, lobbying for a more active and decisive policy towards that region and for its inclusion in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)<sup>32</sup>. Thus, 2004 witnessed a new bearing in the relationships between Georgia and the EU<sup>33</sup>. The desire to reform and the success of the new Georgian Government in its anticorruption drive were seen as an opportunity for the EU to reverse the bad situation in Georgia. Indeed, the achievements of the Saakashvili administration have been quite impressive, considering the initial point of departure. Progress in tackling corruption and reforming the state administration has been attained. Of great importance was the capability of the new administration to strengthen the state and regain control over the entire Georgian territory, especially Adjara, with the exception of the break-away *de facto* states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The army and police have been reformed<sup>34</sup> and economic reforms have been equally impressive<sup>35</sup>. Although reforms in the areas of justice and enforcement of democracy have been slow, the extremely difficult situation in other areas in 2003 and the inherited decrepit administration must be taken into account<sup>36</sup>.

In any case, the EU intensified its help and efforts towards Georgia. As Heikki Talvitie declared: "...suddenly the Rose Revolution happened in Georgia and this accelerated things a lot. Georgia become [a] focus [for] international politics; Georgia got the priority on the agenda of many countries –including the US, Russia, Turkey, the EU, among others, and our member states. This meant that there was a sort of a push to our relations with the South Caucasus"<sup>37</sup>. Thus, Georgia and the South-Caucasus were included in the ENP the 14 June 2004 as a 'reward' for the changes in Georgia<sup>38</sup>. One year before, Southern Caucasus had been excluded from the ENP. At the same time, the EU's assistance was increased reaching €137 million for the period 2004-2006, see table 6. In June 2004, an International Donors Conference held in Brussels under the auspices of the European Commission and the World Bank pledged €800 million for Georgia from 2004 to 2006<sup>39</sup>. In July, the EU launched the EUJUST-THEMIS Rule of Law mission (the first civil mission of the European Defence and Security Policy) for the reform of the criminal justice system. In addition, the EU has been increasingly involved in the resolution of the South Ossetia conflict, and has supported the Georgian plan for conflict resolution<sup>40</sup>. Last but far from least, the Baltic States and Poland have been especially active in supporting Georgia and present a new force within the EU for channelling attention towards this country. For example, these countries together with Romania and Bulgaria, which will access the EU in 2007, have established an informal group of friends of Georgia. The EU has gone from the "Caucasian fatigue" clearly expressed in 2003 along the Georgia Country Strategy Paper for 2004-2006 to visibly support the new Georgian government. The new attitude of the EU towards Georgia can be summarised by the fact that this country receives the biggest amount of assistance in euros per capita from the EU in the post-soviet space, see table 7.

**Table 6. EU projects between May 2004 and 2005**

Programme	Amount in €
EIDHR (assistance for fostering human rights and democracy)	6,114,430
Co-financing NGOs	452,009
Alimentary help (2004)	12,000,000
TACIS	35,328,287
Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)*	7,320,924
ECHO	3,735,000
TOTAL	64,950,650

Source: European Commission Delegation to Georgia, <http://www.delgeo.cec.eu.int>

\*RRM includes confidence building measures in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and technical and financial assistance for the reform of the Ministry of Justice, the Georgian Parliament and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

- **Regional programmes:**

**Traceca** 1,880,000 €

**Inogate** 5,589,950 €, from them 2,400,000 in the Georgian station of Gweletti

**Tacis Regional** 5,500,000 €, from them 3,500,000 € addressed to reduce drugs trafficking in the South Caucasus and 2,000,000 € to update the Caucasian motorway

- **EUJUST THEMIS Mission:** 2,000,000 €

**Table 7. EU per capita assistance towards the post-soviet space**

	Population	Assistance in €	Ratio per inhabitant in €	Period
<b>Georgia</b>	<b>5,100,000</b>	<b>137,000,000</b>	<b>26.86</b>	<b>2004-2006</b>
Moldova	4,267,000	87,000,000	20.39	2004-2006
Armenia	3,061,000	55,000,000	17.97	2004-2006
Ukraine	48,523,000	400,000,000(estimated)	8.24	2004-2005
Tajikistan	6,245,000	51,000,000	8.17	2004-2006
Kirguiztan	5,100,000	37,000,000	7.25	2004-2006
Azerbaijan	8,370,000	30,000,000	3.58	2004-2006
Russia	143,000,000	392,000,000	2.74	2005-2006
Belarus	9,895,000	16,000,000	1.62	2004-2005
Uzbekistan	26,093,000	30,000,000	1.15	2004-2005
Kazakhstan	15,433,000	13,000,000	0.84	2004-2005
Turkmenistan	4,867,000	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.

Source: European Commission

## 2. WHAT EXPLAINS THE EU'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS GEORGIA

As seen above, the EU approach to Georgia has experienced different intensities in their relations during the last fifteen years. The Rose Revolution and the following election of a reformist and a pro-western government seemed to trigger a EU response to the new situation through increasing technical and financial help, together with supporting statements<sup>41</sup>, see table 8.

**Table 8. Declarations, meetings and visits of Solana from January 2004 to June 2005**

	Meetings of Solana with the President	Meetings of Solana with the Prime Minister	Meetings of Solana with the Foreign Affairs Ministry	Meetings of Solana with other ministries	Meetings of Solana with the Parliament President	Visits of Solana to the Country	Statements, declarations or writings about the country
Georgia	1	2	4		1	1	9
Armenia	1		1				0
Azerbaijan	1		1				0
Ukraine		1	1			4	17
Moldova	1	1	1				5

Source: Author's elaboration from documents available on the High Representative's website <http://ue.ue.int>

Once it has been shown how the EU considerably increased its cooperation and assistance towards Georgia since 2004, this part will try to disentangle the character of the EU foreign policy towards Georgia. In other words, which are the factors that could explain the change of the EU foreign policy after the Rose Revolution? Since then, similar processes of change have happened in the new EU eastern neighbourhood after the last enlargement, namely in Ukraine through the Orange Revolution in December 2004 and a dramatic change towards pro-EU positions in Moldova since 2003, a country which shares with Georgia many similarities in its problems. On the contrary, Azerbaijan and Belarus have both enforced their authoritarian rules. Armenia, for its part, has not embarked in a process of reforms and of approximation to the EU. This is due to the big leverage of Russia towards the country, which suffers a complete blockade of its frontiers to Azerbaijan and Turkey since the end of the war for the Karabakh, Georgia and Iran being its only way out. Armenia depends on the Russian supplies of energy and many other products<sup>42</sup>. This is an important reason to understand why Armenia cannot drive an explicit pro-western policy as Georgia, without forgetting the pro-Russian feelings of the Armenian population. This variation of situations in Eastern Europe allows us to depict some trends, although not conclusively, of the EU foreign policy in the region.

### **Explanations for the EU foreign policy towards Georgia. Hypothesis**

According to H. Sjursen, an analytical distinction could be made between three different categories of arguments to justify the latest EU's enlargement: pragmatic arguments, ethical-political arguments and moral arguments<sup>43</sup>. The first argument has much in common with the concept of logic of consequence, and the second and third with the concept of logic of appropriateness<sup>44</sup>. The former implies finding efficient solutions regarding ones own interests, while the latter refers to policies that are legitimated through values and rights<sup>45</sup>. This framework was used to analyse why some countries in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) were prioritized during the last enlargement process and the differentiated support, in their favour, in comparison to Turkey. The theoretical framework was further developed by H. Sjursen and K. E. Smith<sup>46</sup> in order to analytically identify the EU's foreign policy *raison d'être*<sup>47</sup>. Extending the previous argument, the EU would legitimize its foreign policy through three different logics of action: the logic of consequences, the logic of appropriateness and the logic of moral justification<sup>48</sup>. The first is identified by the criteria of *utility*, where "actors in the international system seek to develop policies that allow them to maximise their own interest"<sup>49</sup>. The second is characterised by the criteria of *values*, where policy is "legitimised through what is considered by a particular group's conception of itself and what it represents"<sup>50</sup>, in other words perceptions of common principles or cultural identity within a group, in this case the EU. Finally, the third refers to the criteria of *rights* or when policy can be "legitimised with reference to principles that can be recognised as just by all parties, irrespective of their particular interest"<sup>51</sup>, that is to say universally shared principles as for example environment protection or, to some extent, respect for human rights.

This approach was used to analyse if the EU's foreign policy could be characterised by further explanations than those of collective or individual interests of EU member states, that is, the explanations from dominant IR paradigms neorealist and institutional-liberalism theories or rational-actor oriented approaches. The enlargement process towards CEEC was used as a case study, especially the different support and legitimisation that has had within the EU the same process regarding Turkey. Values and a common sense of identity, if not resolutely, had an important role in the last enlargement process. Therefore, in relation to Georgia this approach can be used to grasp if values and identity have played a role in the increasing support of the EU towards Georgia after the Rose Revolution. It is not tested the logic of moral justification since the concern of the paper is to disentangle the role, if any, of values in addition to material interests. This approach can be narrower but it will allow us to focus on values and interests keeping constant the logic of moral justification.

#### *Ideas and values*

Undoubtedly, the very existence of a European identity is a controversial matter, although the failed Treaty for a European Constitution explicitly introduced this idea. Some reference to that European identity has been traditionally mentioned by statements and documents from the

Commission, the High Representative or from European heads of governments, prime ministers, personalities and so on. It would be more accurate, however, to talk about an EU identity rather than a *European* one since those statements, declarations and documents refer to a common shared vision and to an identity *within* the EU. A cornerstone in that sense was the Commission report to the June 1992 Lisbon European Council where three basic conditions for membership were stated: European identity, democratic status and respect for human rights<sup>52</sup>. These conditions were further developed and finally the Copenhagen Summit Declaration established the membership conditions: a functioning market economy; stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; and be able to take on the obligations of EU membership. The Copenhagen criteria were subsequently formalised in the Treaty of Amsterdam as the political conditions of membership, which were stated in the article 6 as follows: "The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States"<sup>53</sup>. This was a keystone because these conditions explicitly established the common values of the member states. Although the protection of minorities' condition was excluded in the Treaty, this element has guided the external action of the EU as an important factor for conditioning its assistance, and obviously a key condition for membership. Therefore, the EU's foreign policy reflects the sense their institutions and member states consider appropriate. Participants in the policy-making decision process not only take into account their own interests, but also which their role is in a given situation and what sort of response is awaited from them. Thus, if this is true, different responses and degrees of assistance are to be encountered from the EU regarding to the "Europeanness" of a country and its engagement with the EU values.

Another factor emerged from the previous conditions which has been technically the most powerful instrument to measure to what extent a country was moving towards the EU: the *acquis communautaire*. Not only a compulsory condition for membership, the adoption of the *acquis* is a major instrument for the EU to achieve a stable neighbourhood. In other words, the EU has tried to encourage neighbours to adapt their legislation and ways of acting to that of the EU, normally through incentives or stick and carrot strategies. That means, the more you move towards EU's standards the more help and support you will receive. This condition has been linked to that of "good neighbourliness", explicitly stated as an objective in the ENP, that is: the EU aims to develop a ring of well governed neighbours in order to share a space of stability and prosperity, which is clearly intended to get security and stability for the EU through incentives (stick and carrot). As a consequence, the adoption of EU's standards is clearly a way of measuring to what extent a country is accepting the EU's influence<sup>54</sup> and therefore, to what extent the EU's interests are favoured.

### *Interests*

Defining EU's interests in its external action can be misleading. One can be tempted to think that the Council has the primary role in conducting or deciding the EU external action. This is probably true within the context of the CFSP, the reality though being more complex than that. Indeed, even the second pillar, which deals with the traditional essences of national sovereignty, foreign policy, has increasingly experienced a process of "Brusselisation". That means that the formulation and implementation of the EU's external action is increasingly in hands of EU's officers and member states permanent services in Brussels<sup>55</sup>. In addition, if we adopt the approach of considering the EU's foreign policy as a system where the three pillars are interconnected, the process of decision making is even fuzzier. The intergovernmental sphere and Brusselisation interplay with the European Commission and the European Parliament. Although member states interests and therefore the Council, are the main driving force in developing external actions, interests at EU level also exist. Both the Commission and the Council discuss and interact together with the Parliament, resulting sometimes in characterising EU strategies, responses, common actions and thus, EU interests. Undoubtedly, energy has been a great important interest in relation to Eastern Europe. In the case of Southern Caucasus, as we have seen before, it has been a primary interest. In this case, cooperation of a country in terms of allowing EU's investments and a stable and secure energy supply, it is a measure of to what degree the EU's interests are favoured.

To sum up, aims and interests of the EU can be summarised in a statement issued by the General Affairs and External Relations Council:

'The Council stresses that the ENP action plans to be negotiated with each of the partners will be on a level of intensity and ambition reflecting the real extent to which common values are shared, the states of relations with each country, its needs and capabilities, and common interests [...] With regard to the South Caucasus countries, particular attention will be paid to encouraging regional cooperation and progress in conflict resolution'<sup>56</sup>.

### Testing the hypothesis in Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus

Since 2004, the EU's approach to its neighbourhood is grounded on the ENP, which in the case of Eastern Europe is conducted through the legal frameworks of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements<sup>57</sup> (PCA). PCAs established conditionality regarding respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law in order to develop them. The ENP defines common points of departure but differentiation in the relationships are possible, depending on commitments to shared values and regional cooperation<sup>58</sup>. Therefore, the EU's approach has been different depending on the conditions of each country. This section aims to identify to what extent these different approaches are due to interests, shared values or some European identity.

Though economic interests are a primary driving force in the EU's external action towards Eastern Europe, other factors can be important in understanding the EU's foreign policy. Comparison between the EU's approach towards the Southern Caucasus states will be the primary analysis, while references to the EU's approaches towards Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine will serve to give us further evidences supporting the hypothesis. Variables taken into account for the analysis are those defined in the previous section, and data regarding democracy and political rights have been extracted from Freedom House "Nations in Transit 2005" reports and databases<sup>59</sup>.

Azerbaijan is a key EU partner for oil and gas supply. What is more, this country has allowed and facilitated the presence and investment of European companies in the energy sector. Not only is Azerbaijan an oil and gas producer as its capital, Baku, is an important port in the Caspian Sea, from where the Kazakh oil and gas can be connected to Europe. The main pipeline for exporting the Azerbaijani oil and gas to Europe crosses Georgia and avoids passing through Armenia and Russia. These oil and gas pipelines are the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) pipelines respectively, see maps 1 and 2. The BTC oil pipeline will deliver 1 Million barrels/day when it operates to full capacity. That means that Georgia has become a strategic energy corridor as the BTC pipeline together with other oil pipelines crossing Georgia may deliver 1.5 Million barrels/day, see table 9. This volume represents a 10% of the EU's daily oil needs. Thus, Azerbaijan and Georgia form a tandem as Euro-Atlantic partners<sup>60</sup>. Both BTC and BTE pipelines have been projects primarily in charge of European companies, especially the British BP, and therefore European governments and the EU have strong material interests in the region. The EU proposed both oil and gas routes as priority axes of energy supplies in the 2001 communication of the European Commission on a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply<sup>61</sup>.

**Table 9: UE Oil Imports during 2004**

Origin	Volume (1000 Barrels)	Total value (\$ 1000)	Price/Barrel (\$/Brl)	Total share from imports in %
Russia	973590	33344115	34.25	25.92
Norway	752026	29095466	38.69	20.02
Saudi Arabia	480068	17044564	35.50	12.78
Libya	358582	13860702	38.65	9.55
Iran	245982	8475382	34.46	6.55
Kazakhstan	139571	5330258	38.19	3.72
Algeria	137757	5413503	39.30	3.67
Nigeria	116009	4661710	40.18	3.09

Iraq	99008	3408795	34.43	2.64
Mexico	63390	1935161	30.53	1.69
Syria	62374	2184568	35.02	1.66
Other former USSR	48534	1848199	38.08	1.29
Kuwait	42690	1422036	33.31	1.14
Azerbaijan	40109	1582688	39.46	1.07
Other Africa	32392	1250529	38.61	0.86
Cameroon	29386	1172931	39.91	0.78
Angola	28091	1146845	40.83	0.75
Venezuela	23970	604795	25.23	0.64
Other Europe	19796	697373	35.23	0.53
Egypt	19233	657299	34.18	0.51
Tunisia	12747	522739	41.01	0.34
Brazil	11640	382543	32.86	0.31
Canada	4484	174103	38.82	0.12
Ukraine	3838	150893	39.32	0.10
Neutral Zone	3568	131030	36.72	0.09
Gabon	2630	94364	35.88	0.07
Congo	2451	92364	37.68	0.07
Yemen	1523	64948	42.65	0.04
Zaire	455	18172	39.92	0.01
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,755,894</b>	<b>136,768,078</b>	<b>36.41</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Eurostat

Azerbaijan has however, increasingly taken the path towards authoritarianism. The former president Heydar Aliyev, who ruled the country since 1993, collapsed before the October 2003 presidential elections and passed away in November 2003. His government brought political and economic stability in spite of shortcomings in democracy and in political and social liberties. He managed to plan a dynastic succession and his son, Ilham Aliyev, who won the October 2003 elections under widespread fraud according to OSCE observers, is currently the president. During 2004, Ilham Aliyev consolidated his rule and political rights have worsened to the extent that Freedom House qualified the country as not free in 2005, specifically as a semi-consolidated to consolidated authoritarian regime. Armenia, for its part, has become an autocracy and according to Freedom House; Armenian cannot change their government democratically. However, in contrast to Azerbaijan, civil society is still able to express itself, although the government usually represses public demonstrations. In spite of the existence of some civil liberties, opposition has not been able to articulate mass protest nor to unify forces. Some intentions for replicating the Rose Revolution failed in 2004. Armenia experienced strong struggles between governing forces and opposition movements, which were unable to coordinate effective actions. The Council of Europe has denounced the lack of advance towards democracy in Armenia and Freedom House qualified the country as partial free and as a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime. On the other hand, Freedom House qualifies Georgia as a partial free country and a transitional government or hybrid regime which has shown some progress during 2004, stating that Georgians can change their government democratically. We can conclude that the EU has similarly important material interests in Azerbaijan and Georgia while in Armenia security, democratisation and humanitarian issues are the only concerns of the EU. The three countries have unresolved conflicts and equal social and poverty problems, but Georgia receives more EU's assistance than Armenia and Azerbaijan. If stakes and interests remain the same before and after the Rose Revolution, it can be conjectured that a logic of appropriateness is playing an important role in EU's actions towards Georgia.

It is interesting to observe the EU position regarding the reforming will of governments. The Communication from the Commission to the Council on the ENP recommendations for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia expresses a slight difference in statements on this issue that are, however, significant enough. In the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan recommendations, the Communication states that the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments declare their

determination to address conflict resolution, to develop relations with the EU and to integrate further in European structures<sup>62</sup>. In the case of Georgia, the Communication states that the Georgian government is committed to address those challenges<sup>63</sup>. The use of *committed* instead of *declared* clearly shows the different EU's consideration towards the reforms process in Georgia and its Caucasian neighbours. The Saakashvili's administration has put into practice the always present rhetoric in Georgia of accession to Euro-Atlantic structures, namely the EU and NATO. The EU accession being a science-fiction scenario, Saakashvili's main objectives are NATO accession and conflicts resolution. In addition, the Georgian government is trying to improve the attraction of the country to foreign investment and aims to move the country to EU's standards of governing. Accordingly, a ministry for integration into Euro-Atlantic structure was appointed; harmonization of Law and procedures towards the EU's *acquis* is being implemented; the Georgian government has requested and obtained EU's assistance for reforming the Parliament and the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Justice; and a National Security Strategy has been issued establishing the move towards Euro-Atlantic as a primary goal<sup>64</sup>. Thus, Georgia seems to be working to adopt EU values in terms of regional cooperation, peaceful settlement of conflicts in Abkhazia and Ossetia and assuming the *acquis communautaire*. The Georgian government views the ENP as a keystone to get those objectives. Moldova and Ukraine are effectively implementing their action plans<sup>65</sup> and therefore obtaining more EU's assistance and support. In fact, both action plans for Ukraine and Moldova establish that by fulfilling the objectives of the action plans "consideration will be given of a new contractual relationship<sup>66</sup>", which means Association Agreements and maybe long term prospects for accession to the EU. The EU is trying to attract those countries to its sphere. The message is clear; approximation to EU legislation and values means more EU's assistance and support for further integration to Euro-Atlantic structures. For example, the EU has established a border monitoring mission under the ESDP framework in Moldova, which is a measure to solve the Transnistria conflict. Given these prospects, the Georgian government is working to accomplish the EU requirements, while Azerbaijan and Armenia are not taking this path of reforms. The situation is translated in terms of EU's assistance. Belarus and Azerbaijan are both authoritarian regimes. The former hardly receives EU's assistance while the latter is a strategic partner, although it does not receive the same amounts of EU's assistance as Georgia or Armenia. Clearly, the EU has rewarded Georgia with its assistance and support since 2004.

It is interesting to observe how similar authoritarian regimes at the southern Mediterranean shore receive considerable amounts of EU's assistance while Belarus is under EU's sanctions. Energy interests may be important, but in the case of Tunisia there are not crucial material interests at stake while Belarus is still an energy corridor for Russian oil and gas transit towards the EU. Nonetheless, Tunisia received € 300 Million for the period 2000-2004<sup>67</sup> and the EU's assistance to Belarus is unnoticeable, see table 12. Thus, a logic of appropriateness could be in action in this case as the EU cannot accept a dictatorship in Europe and therefore sanctions the Belarus regime<sup>68</sup>. The EU appears to be coherent with its expressed values in Europe, while the same is not occurring in the southern Mediterranean shore.

**Table 10. EU's assistance to Azerbaijan 1992-2006 (€Million)**

	1992-1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002-2003	2004-2006
Tacis National Allocations	20.50	6.00	8.00	8.00	8.00	8.00	7.00	7.00	14.00	30.00
Exceptional Assistance					10.00	10.00	10.00			0
ECHO	31.09			28.82	9.7	6.10	9.66	5.15	1.5	0
FEOGA		43.0	22.65							
Food security			15	16	14.0	12.0			20.0	(30.0)*
Rehabilitation			3.0	4.0	4.5	3.2	3.67			
Exceptional		8.0						1.5		

Humanitarian Aid											
<b>Total</b>	<b>51.59</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>48.65</b>	<b>56,82</b>	<b>46.20</b>	<b>39.30</b>	<b>30.33</b>	<b>13.65</b>	<b>35.5</b>	<b>30 + (30)</b>	

Source: European Commission 2005. Annex to European Neighbourhood Policy. Azerbaijan Country Report. COM(2005) 72 final

\*Assistance under evaluation

**Table 11. EU's assistance to Armenia 1992-2006 (€Million)**

	1991-1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002-2003	2004-2006
Tacis National Allocations	28.90	-	6.00	14.00	-	10.00	-	10.00	-	10.00	20.00
Nuclear Safety	-	-	-	10.00	1.00	-	-	11.00	-	-	7
ECHO	10.40	19.90	23.96	4.97	1.96	1.60	2.30	1.10	2.10	0.5	-
EAGGF	-	-	34.00	13.20	-	-	-	3.00	-	-	-
FSP	-	-	-	13.00	6.00	12.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	20.30	21.00
Macro financial assistance (disbursed)	-	5.70	-	-	-	8.00	4.00	-	-	11.00	7.00
Aid against effects of Russian financial crisis	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.50	-	-	-	-
<b>Total (M€)</b>	<b>38.30</b>	<b>25.60</b>	<b>63.96</b>	<b>55.17</b>	<b>8.96</b>	<b>31.60</b>	<b>17.80</b>	<b>35.10</b>	<b>12.10</b>	<b>41.80</b>	<b>55.00</b>

Source: European Commission 2005. Annex to European Neighbourhood Policy. Armenia Country Report. COM(2005) 72 final

**Table 12. EU's assistance per capita 1992-2003 in €**

	Population	Total EU financial assistance 1992-2003	Ratio assistance/ per capita	Per capita annual assistance
Armenia	3,061,000	331,390,000	108.26	9.02
Azerbaijan	8,370,000	379,040,000	45.29	3.77
Belarus	9,895,000	210,000,000	21.22	1.77
<b>Georgia</b>	<b>5,100,000</b>	<b>362,000,000</b>	<b>70.98</b>	<b>5.92</b>
Moldova	4,267,000	252,000,000	59.06	4.92
Ukraine	48,523,000	1,773,000,000	35.73	2.75

Source: European Commission, External Relations [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations)

**Table 13. EU's assistance per capita 2004-2006**

	Population	Assistance	Ratio	Per capita annual assistance
<b>Georgia</b>	<b>5,100,000</b>	<b>137,000,000</b>	<b>26.86</b>	<b>8.95</b>
Moldova	4,267,000	87,000,000	20.39	6.80
Armenia	3,061,000	55,000,000	17.97	5.99
Ukraine*	48,523,000	400,000,000 (estimated)	8.24	2.90
Azerbaijan	8,370,000	30,000,000	3.58	1.19
Belarus	9,895,000	16,000,000	1.62	0.54

Source: European Commission, External Relations [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations)

\*The Orange Revolution took place in December 2004. Tacis allocations were €70 Million in 2004 and €100 Million for 2006


## CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this paper was to discuss the reasons for the change in the EU's foreign policy towards Georgia after the Rose Revolution of November 2003. Following the theoretical framework developed by H. Sjursen and K. E. Smith to characterise the EU's foreign policy related to the 2004 enlargement, three logics can explain the EU's foreign policy: a logic of consequences, the self-interest being the primary goal. This is the rational-actor centred neorealist and institutional-liberalism IR theories; a logic of appropriateness, or shared and expected values within the EU, which is a more constructivist and cognitive approach; and a logic of moral justification, or possible universal shared values. This framework can be adopted to analyse the EU's external action towards other regions or countries. In this paper the case of Georgia, and extensively Eastern Europe, has been studied in order to compare different EU's approaches towards the countries of this region and disentangle the role of the logics of consequences and of appropriateness. For this reason, the logic of moral justification has not been considered, being treated as a constant. Thus, EU's values and a sense of Europeanness, together with material interests have been used as independent variables for explaining different EU's approaches equal in terms of financial and technical assistance and political support.

As dominant IR paradigms could predict, EU's material interest, basically regarding energy and security, have been a primary factor in order to explain the EU's foreign policy towards Eastern Europe. However, the logic of appropriateness has played an important role to conform a new EU's foreign policy towards Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In this respect, some findings and data from the paper can illustrate such an explanation. Firstly, thanks to the Rose Revolution, Georgia—and extensively Armenia and Azerbaijan— was offered the opportunity to be included in the ENP. Secondly, the TACIS budget to Georgia for the period 2004-2006 was doubled in 2004, and other assistance from other EU's instruments was increased as well. This includes: the Rapid Reaction Mechanism for improving the Georgian institutional records such as assistance to reform the Parliament and the Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs or for enhancing measures for peace-building in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; the EIDHR programme for enforcing democracy; and NGOs assistance. In addition, the EU established in June 2004 the first ESDP civil mission for the reform of the judiciary system in Georgia, the EUJUST-THEMIS mission. On the contrary, Armenia and Azerbaijan have received basically humanitarian and TACIS assistance during the period 2004-2006. Thirdly, the EU has increasingly been more involved in the 'frozen' Georgian conflicts, especially in South Ossetia. Fourthly, the EU has been supporting politically the Saakashvili administration and his reforms,

especially the European Parliament. Finally, new EU members such as the Baltic States and Poland and the accession countries of Romania and Bulgaria have pushed the EU attention towards Georgia and Eastern Europe. They have established a group of friends of Georgia and assist it in several issues as defence, institutional enforcement, transition to a market economy and approximation to EU structures. Although material interests are at stake, especially regarding Georgia as an energy corridor, the fact that Georgia has moved towards Euro-Atlantic positions and is trying to 'Europeanise'<sup>69</sup> its institutions and legislation has prompted the EU to back Georgia in its process of reforms. Moreover, as later was proved in Ukraine, the Georgian democratisation could be a starting point and one example to follow in the rest of the post-soviet space. Similar actions in Moldova and Ukraine have been rewarded by the EU. The EU has not only acted in line with the Georgian reformists' expectations, but also with a logic of appropriateness within the EU itself. On the other hand, Belarus has suffered a 'pariah' treatment and has been excluded from the ENP in spite of still being an important energy corridor, while other non-European autocracies are invited to join the ENP. An example would be the case of Tunisia, where the EU has no very important material interests at stake, but enjoys considerably EU's assistance. Thus, values have an important element in the EU's external action, especially regarding Eastern Europe. As Sjusen and Smith concluded when analysing the 2004 enlargement, values and a sense of a European identity played an important role to speed up the process and to prevent, momentarily, the accession of Turkey. In the case of Georgia, material interests since the nineties have been a very important factor to explain the EU's foreign policy towards the country, but 'values', and to a less extent 'European identity', have played a significant role.

Map 1: European priority axes for natural gas pipelines. Source: <http://www.inogate.org>



Map 2: European priority axes for oil pipelines. Source <http://www.inogate.org>



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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Soon after, the Armenian victories in the Nagorno-Karabakh war led to a revolt in Azerbaijan that brought back into power the old nomenklatura led by Heydar Aliyev, former first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, whose son, Ilham Aliyev, is now the President of the Republic.

<sup>2</sup> The first decision adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Georgia after the declaration of independence of the 9th of April 1991 was to block the railway communication between Russian and Georgia. Georgia was one of the most flourishing and richest republics in the Soviet Union, but its main industries; airplane components, mineral water, timber, agriculture and significantly tourism in Abkhazia, supplied the rest of the USSR. Gamsakhurdia also gave the slogan 'Georgia for Georgians'. See *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 221. According to Ghia Nodia, Georgia was the only Soviet Republic where the nationalist movements were dominated by radical groups. See NODIA, Ghia 1998. "Dynamics of State Building in Georgia". *Demokratizatsiya : The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, Vol. 6, n°1, p. 8.

<sup>3</sup> SAINZ, Nora, 2004. "Los conflictos de Osetia del Sur y Abjazia", in Ruth Ferrero (ed.) *Nacionalismos y minorías en Europa Central y Oriental*. Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials de Barcelona, p. 221.

<sup>4</sup> Since then the cease-fire line is monitored by a joint force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Georgian and Ossetian forces. The 'CIS forces' is just a euphemism because the guarantor of an unstable cease-fire is Russia. See URJEWICZ, Charles, "Tipología de los conflictos post-soviéticos", *Anuario Internacional CIDOB 1994*. Barcelona: Fundació CIDOB. See also *SIPRI Yearbook 2005*, p. 71, where Abkhazia and South Ossetia are described as *de facto* Russian controlled territories.

<sup>5</sup> Troops sent by the State Council to control the Abkhazian territory simply surrendered to disorder and destroyed and demolished Abkhazian symbols and institutions in Bakhumi, the capital.

<sup>6</sup> DAMOISEL, Matilde 2003. "Ni Guerre ni paix en Abkhazie". *Le Monde Diplomatique*, October 2003.

<sup>7</sup> The cease-fire was signed in Moscow the 14th of April 1994 and at the same time was established the monitoring peace-force and the political directives to solve the conflict, not yet achieved. See ZVEREV, Z. 1996. "Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus, 1988-1994". In B. Coppieters (ed.) *Contested Borders in the Caucasus*. Brussels: VUP Press.

<sup>8</sup> Of course, this support was not for free. Four Russian bases were established in Georgia, and this country joined the CIS, one thing that Shevardnadze wanted to prevent. Currently, there are still two Russian garrisons, although of little importance, in addition to the peace-keeping forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia's leverage in Georgia is still decisive, exploiting the area's ethno-territorial conflicts and energy dependence. See CORNELL, Svante E. 2003. "Strategic Security Dilemmas in the Caucasus and Central Asia". *National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Analysis*, vol. 14, n°3, p. 12-13.

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<sup>9</sup> Not only Georgia lost control over two regions but the authority of the state was weak away from the capital. The most extreme case was the semi-independence of Adjara until that the new government after the Rose Revolution took the control of the territory back in 2004. The Mkhedrioni, the strongest paramilitary force, controlled western Georgia as a private fiefdom until Shevardnadze disbanded them in 1995. The Armenian populated region in the south-west of the country was as well out of control, until 2004. See CORNELL, Svante E. 2003. "The Growing Threat of the Transnational Crime". In Dov Lynch (ed.) *The South Caucasus: a Challenge for the EU*, Chaillot paper n° 65. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, p. 26-27 and DEMETRIOU, Spyros 2002. "The (Re) Birth of the Georgian State". *Development and Change*, Special Issue: State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction, Vol. 33, n°5. Moreover, the main fidelity for the Georgians was first the family, then the ethnic group, over communal affairs. David Darchiashvili calls it "amoral familiarism". See DARCHIASHVILI, D. 2003. "Georgian Security Problems and Policies". In Dov Lynch (ed.) *The South Caucasus: a Challenge for the EU*, op. cit. p. 115.

<sup>10</sup> During 1994 and 1995 Shevardnadze consolidated his power. To begin with, he removed brilliantly and patiently other leaders from power. Then, he disbanded the numerous paramilitaries groups although the state never fully accomplished the monopolization of the means of violence due to its weakness. Finally, Shevardnadze created a broad political party as a mean to retain legitimate power through democratic elections, although the electoral processes became increasingly controlled by the state culminating in the mass irregularities that led to the Rose Revolution.

<sup>11</sup> Robert Rotberg still categorized Georgia as a weak state in 2003. See ROTBERG, Robert 2003. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 48.

<sup>12</sup> Conclusions of the European Council held in Lisbon (1992).

<sup>13</sup> WINN, Neil and LORD, Christopher 2001. *EU Foreign Policy Beyond the Nation-State, Joint Actions and Institutional Analysis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy*. London: Palgrave.

<sup>14</sup> Western European Union 1998. 'Report on the Central Asia and the Caucasus'. Brussels: WEU. Evaluations were probably overestimated and the actual reserves of oil and gas seem to be lower in the Caspian Sea region, although still are considerable and obviously very lucrative.

<sup>15</sup> INOGATE participating countries are Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Moldova, Ukraine, and Southern-Caucasus and Central Asia states.

<sup>16</sup> Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the Community and Georgia. Available at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/ceeca/pca/index.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/pca/index.htm), (November 2005).

<sup>17</sup> WALLACE, William 2003. 'Looking After the Neighbourhood: Responsibilities for the EU-25', Notre Europe, policy paper n° 4. Paris: Notre Europe, p. 10.

<sup>18</sup> Russia is decisive mainly because it has leverage on energy supplies to Georgia and Armenia and the key to solve the conflicts of the region.

<sup>19</sup> The US has provided to Georgia nearly \$774 million in assistance since 1992. In addition, the US has provided important military assistance too, especially since the 11-S (\$60 million only in 2005 for example). The US trains Georgian special forces and maintains a little military detachment in Tiflis. See <http://georgia.usaid.gov> and US state department website: <http://www.state.gov> (march 2006).

<sup>20</sup> COPPIETERS, Bruno 2005. "The Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict". In *Europeanization and Conflict Resolution*. Gante: Academia Press.

<sup>21</sup> During the Swedish presidency a ministerial troika visited the Southern Caucasus and Sweden aiming at reinforcing the EU policy towards the region and tried to push a conflict settlement in Abkhazia. See Council of the European Union 2001. 'Statement on the 2331st Council Meeting-General Affairs'; and UN Security Council Private meeting on Georgia' *European Foreign Policy Bulletin*, <http://www.iue.it/EFPB> (July 2005).

<sup>22</sup> Chechnyan guerrillas found protection in the Georgian Pankisi gorge, a zone out of control from the Georgian administration, and the Russian often raided the area.

<sup>23</sup> Shevardnadze not only favoured his family, but also people from his region; 41% of the civil servants in 1999 were from his natal region (Guria), whose population were only a 3% of the country. See International Crisis Group 2003. 'Georgia: What now?' *ICG Europe Report* n° 151. Tiflis/Brussels: available on <http://www.crisisweb.org> (August 2005).

<sup>24</sup> CORNELL, Svante E. *op.cit.*, p. 34; DARCHIASHVILI, David, *op.cit.*, p. 114.

<sup>25</sup> ALIEVA, Leila 2004. 'South Caucasus: Going West'. In Ronald D. Asmus, Konstantin Dimitriv and Joerg Forbrig (eds.) *A New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region*. Washington: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, p. 71.

<sup>26</sup> Interview with a European Commission Officer.

<sup>27</sup> The first EU's special representative for the South Caucasus said in 2004: "Basically, when I started [July 2003] we had on the agenda, How to develop these relations [with] the South Caucasus?" see LOBJAKAS, Ahto 2005. 'Caucasus: EU increasingly Targeting Georgia Over Conflict-Stricken Armenia, Azerbaijan'. In *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. <http://www.rferl.org> (August 2005). Objectives of the special representative for the South Caucasus were: developing contacts with governments, parliaments, judiciary and civil society; fostering regional cooperation between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia; contributing to conflict-resolution in the region and assisting the OSCE and UN in their tasks of peace-building and conflict-resolution.

<sup>28</sup> European Commission 2003. *TACIS National Indicative Programme 2004-2006. Georgia Country Strategy Paper*. Brussels: European Union, <http://europa.eu.int/comm>, p. 21.

<sup>29</sup> See the joint report of the OSCE, UE and Council of Europe about the parliamentary elections of 2 November 2003, *Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions*, OSCE/ODIHR, OSCE PA, Council of Europe PA, European Parliament. Tiflis, November 2003:

<http://www.europeanmovement.org/downloads/elections.pdf>, (October 2005); and FAIRBANKS JR., Charles H, 2004. "Georgia's Rose Revolution", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 15, n° 2, p. 114-117.

<sup>30</sup> Three different dynamics prepared the field for the Rose Revolution. Firstly, the opposition prepared a post- Shevardnadze scenario: M. Shaakashvili (former reformist and resigned minister of Justice, leader of the main opposition party, the National Movement), Z. Zhvania (former president of the Parliament and well connected with European green movements, leader of the United Democrats Party) and N. Burjanadze (president of the Parliament and leader of Burjanadze-Democrats, allied with Zhvania) built cohesive groups and were united against Shevardnadze. This triumvirate led, in fact, the country after the Revolution. Secondly, civil-society movements and some NGOs played a fundamental role, spreading the protests against Shevardnadze all over the country, especially 'Kmara' ('enough' in Georgian) which had connexions with 'Otpor' (the movement that led the protests against Milosevic in Serbia) and other NGOs supported by the Open Society Foundation. Thirdly, the EU and the US were positive to these opposition movements and Russia even accused the EU and the US to have supported them. See GAHRTON, Per 2005. 'After the sudden Death of the Reale of the Rose Revolution, will Georgia Collapse Again?' The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research. Available on:

[http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/2005/gahrton\\_zhvania.html](http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/2005/gahrton_zhvania.html) (October 2005). Per Gahrton is member of the European Parliament responsible for the South Caucasus. See also *SIPRI Yearbook 2005*, *op.cit.*, p. 70; and LOMSADZE, Giorgi 2003. "Amid Controversy, Georgian Student Protest Movement Grows" <http://www.eurasianet.org> (October 2005).

<sup>31</sup> See *A secure Europe in a better World, European Security Strategy*, available on:

<http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, (May 2005).

<sup>32</sup> European Parliament resolution of 26 February 2004 on "EU policy towards the South Caucasus".

<sup>33</sup> Council of the EU, 2559th meeting on General Affairs-External Relations- of 26 January 2004.

<sup>34</sup> Armed corps were reduced from seven to three: the army, police and the Border Guard. The latter was an independent force under the times of Shevardnadze and now transferred to the control of the Internal

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Affairs Ministry. Likewise, the army and the defence Ministry are being deeply reformed in order to accomplish the requirements to join NATO. The Baltic countries, Romania and Bulgaria are helping and assisting Georgia in this reform. Of course, assistance from the US has been very important. Georgian elite troops are serving in Iraq.

<sup>35</sup> According to World Bank, Georgia has been the second most reforming country all over the world during 2004. See *doing business* report available on <http://www.doingbusiness.org>

<sup>36</sup> Interview with a Commission officer.

<sup>37</sup> LOBJAKAS, Ahto, *op.cit.*

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* See also GRABBE, Heather 2004. "How the EU Should Help its Neighbours". *Centre for European Reform Policy Brief*, June 2004.

<sup>39</sup> European Commission press release of 16 June 2004, <http://europa.eu.int/comm>

<sup>40</sup> Georgia aims to internationalise the resolution of the Abkhaz and Ossetian conflicts. The EU considers that the South-Ossetian conflict has possibilities to be settled since the fights were not as brutal as in Abkhazia and the conflict has not ethnic or religious basis and supports the latest Georgian resolution plan of 2004. The case of Abkhazia is more complicated since ethnic and nationalist differences are more difficult to overcome and Russia has economic interests there. The final status of Abkhazia probably depends on the sort of solution agreed for Kosovo. (Interview with a Commission officer).

<sup>41</sup> See for example: SOLANA, Javier 2004. Speech before the European Parliament on Middle East and Georgia S0724/04, Brussels, October 2004; SOLANA, Javier. "Shaping an effective EU foreign policy", speech at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Brussels 24th January 2005; SOLANA, Javier 2005. "Europe's leading role in the spread of democracy", *Financial Times*, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2005; interview to Javier Solana in Interfax, <http://www.interfax.com>, 11th May 2005.

<sup>42</sup> Armenia also enjoys an important support from the Armenian lobby in the US Congress which has successively blocked the projects of the Department State to increase the assistance towards Azerbaijan, which is an important partner of the US in the strategic concept of wider Middle East. The monetary transfers from the Armenian Diaspora are also extremely important.

<sup>43</sup> SJURSEN, H. 2002. "Why Expand? The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy". *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, n°3, p. 494.

<sup>44</sup> These concepts have been developed by new institutionalists, especially by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen. Although they adapted this concept to IR literature (see MARCH J. G and OLSEN J. P 1998. "The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders". *International Organization* 52, 4) in order to disentangle the dynamics of social and political action in international orders from a institutionalist point of view, I prefer to use the H. Sjursen's approach since she focuses the logic of appropriateness on shared values and identities.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 494-495.

<sup>46</sup> SJURSEN, H and SMITH, K. E. 2004. "Justifying EU Foreign Policy: the Logics Underpinning EU Enlargement". In Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen (eds.) *Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 126.

<sup>48</sup> This logic was first suggested by E. O. Eriksen. See ERIKSEN, E.O. 1999. "Towards a Logic of Justification. On the Possibility of Post-national Solidarity". In M. Egeberg, and P. Laegreid (eds.) *Organizing Political Institutions. Essays for Johan P. Olsen*. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.

<sup>49</sup> SJURSEN, H and SMITH, K. E. 2004, *op.cit.*, p. 127.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

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<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> European Commission 1992. "Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement". EC bulletin Supplement 3/92.

<sup>53</sup> See European Union Consolidated Treaty 2002. Official Diary of the European Communities C325/13, available on <http://eu.ue.int>

<sup>54</sup> Mark Leonard calls the EU's capacity to influence other countries *Transformative Power*. "Each element of European 'weakness' is in fact a facet of its extraordinary transformative power [...] By creating common standards that are implemented through national institutions, Europe can take over countries without necessarily becoming a target for hostility [...] The strength of Europe is broad and deep: once sucked into its sphere, countries are changed forever ('Eurosphere'). See LEONARD, Mark 2005. "Europe's Transformative Power". *CER Bulletin*, Issue 40. Perhaps a little bit 'epic', the article captures the idea of what sort of influence seeks the EU, or perhaps, in terms of Robert Kagan, what sort of policy *can* pursue.

<sup>55</sup> BARBÉ, Esther 2004. "The Evolution of CFSP Institutions: Where does Democratic Accountability Stand?". *The International Spectator* 2/2004, p. 48.

<sup>56</sup> Council of the European Union 2005. General Affairs and External Relations, press release 8035/05. Luxembourg, 25 April 2005.

<sup>57</sup> Before the ENP all the former "non-Baltic States" Soviet Republics were treated equally under the same legal basis: TACIS programme and PCAs. However, Russia had a special treatment and both Russia and Ukraine were issued a Common Strategy by the EU.

<sup>58</sup> European Commission 2004. "European Neighbourhood Policy, Strategy Paper". Communication from the Commission COM(2004) 373 final, p. 8.

<sup>59</sup> Available at Freedom House <http://www.freedomhouse.org>; and Freedom House 2005. *Nations in Transit 2005, Democratisation in Central Asia and Eurasia*. Washington: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers and Freedom House.

<sup>60</sup> CORNELL, Svante E., TSERETELI, Mamuka, SOCOR, Vladimir 2005. "Geostrategic Implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline". In S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell (eds.) *The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West*. Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, p. 24.

<sup>61</sup> European Commission 2001. *Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply*. COM(2000) 769 final, Brussels, November 2000.

<sup>62</sup> European Commission 2005. *Communication from the Commission to the Council on the European Neighbourhood Policy. Recommendations for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and for Egypt and Lebanon*. COM(2005)72 final, p.3-4.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>64</sup> National Security Council of Georgia, National Security Strategy Concept for Georgia, [http://www.nsc.gov.ge/download/pdf/NS\\_Concept\\_EN.pdf](http://www.nsc.gov.ge/download/pdf/NS_Concept_EN.pdf)

<sup>65</sup> Interview with a Commission officer.

<sup>66</sup> European Commission 2005. Proposed EU/Moldova Action Plan, p. 2.

<sup>67</sup> European Commission, country overview available on: [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/tunisia/intro/index.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/tunisia/intro/index.htm)

<sup>68</sup> The EU has even organised a sort of a European Liberty Radio and TV to broadcast in Belarus.

<sup>69</sup> Europeanization in the sense of exporting forms of political organization, laws and governance that are typical and distinct for the EU beyond its territory. See OLSEN, Johan P. 2002. "The Many Faces of Europeanization", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, n° 5, p. 924.