Bayesian nash equilibrium in ''linear'' cournot models with private information about costs

Fecha:	2013
Descripción:	15 p.
Resumen:	Calculating explicit closed form solutions of Cournot models where firms have private information about their costs is, in general, very cumbersome. Most authors consider therefore linear demands and constant marginal costs. However, within this framework, the nonnegativity constraint on prices (and quantities) has been ignored or not properly dealt with and the correct calculation of all Bayesian Nash equilibria is more complicated than expected. Moreover, multiple symmetric and interior Bayesianf equilibria may exist for an open set of parameters. The reason for this is that linear demand is not really linear, since there is a kink at zero price: the general ''linear'' inverse demand function is P (Q) = max{a - bQ, 0} rather than P (Q) = a - bQ.
Derechos:	L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons:
Lengua:	Anglès
Colección:	Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers
Colección:	Working papers ; 924.12
Documento:	Working paper
Materia:	Cournot, A. A. (Antoine Augustin), 1801-1877 -- Teoria econòmica ; Jocs, Teoria de

15 p, 175.4 KB

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