||Theories of rationality should ideally provide us with tools for a number of important tasks: We want to avoid irrationality, or aim at justifying our beliefs and decisions by certain standards of rationality. We want to be clear about whether the reasons for our beliefs and actions are valid or reasonable. Furthermore, we often have to communicate with others about our beliefs and decisions, such as in scientific, ethical, or political contexts, and so we try to convince them using language. But what do we mean when we say that something, or someone, is rational (or irrational)? What are the normative standards of rationality? How is rationality related to language? How should a theory of rationality be built? What are its presuppositions, its potentials and limits? In the answers to such questions, different thinkers have introduced a bewildering variety of distinctions - such as theoretical versus practical, instrumental versus non-instrumental, individual versus collective, formal versus content-based, or optimizing versus "bounded" concepts of rationality. Similarly, different ideas of language and its functioning have been in the background of many of these debates. The course presents a survey of both classical and current debates in which such understandings of rationality and language emerge. To do so, the course will deal with two major topics: (I) The philosophy and psychology of epistemic rationality (taught by Thomas Sturm); (II) normativity and intentionality in language (taught by Antoni Defez).