| Date: |
2014 |
| Abstract: |
Extortion is a unique crime in that it involves a long-term interaction between the victim and the perpetrator. It is also an interesting crime in that it seems to afflict whole communities, cities or even countries. Extortion is often modelled as an interdependent choice between extorter and extortee using a game theoretic framework. Although a game theoretic model takes into account the first uniqueness of a long-term relationship but leaves out the social influence factors that can make extortion endemic within a social group or society. In this paper we present an agent-based model which looks at the decision making of extortees from a social perspective, transforming the traditional extortion game into a collective problem. |
| Rights: |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades.  |
| Language: |
Anglès |
| Document: |
Comunicació de congrés |
| Published in: |
Social Simulation Conference. Bellaterra, Cerdanyola del Vallès, 1a : 2014 |
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