Per citar aquest document: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/142910
Stability and voting by committees with exit
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica)
Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis (Argentina))
Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona. Departament d’Economia)
Bergantiños Cid, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo)

Data: 2004
Resum: We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder’s sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.
Nota: James Schummer, and Tayfun Sönmez for their helpful comments and suggestions. The work of D. Berga, G. Bergantiños, and J. Massó is partially supported by Research Grants AGL2001-2333-C02-01, BEC2002—04102-C02-01, and BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, respectively. The work of A. Neme is partially supported by Research Grant 319502 from the Universidad Nacional de San Luis. The work of D. Berga is also partially supported by Research Grant 9101100 from the Universitat de Girona. The work of G. Bergantiños is also partially supported by Research Grant PGIDT00PXI30001PN from the Xunta de Galicia. The work of J. Massó is also partially supported by Research Grant 2001SGR-00162 from the Generalitat de Catalunya. The paper was partially written while A. Neme was visiting the UAB under a sabbatical fellowship from the Generalitat de Catalunya
Nota: Número d'acord de subvenció MICINN/BEC2002-04102-C02-01
Nota: Número d'acord de subvenció MICINN/AGL2001-2333-C02-01
Nota: Número d'acord de subvenció MICINN/BEC2002-02130
Nota: Número d'acord de subvenció PGIDT00PXI30001PN
Nota: Número d'acord de subvenció 2001SGR-00162
Nota: Número d'acord de subvenció 9101100
Drets: Tots els drets reservats
Llengua: Anglès
Document: article ; recerca ; submittedVersion
Matèria: Vot ; Models matemàtics ; Elecció social
Publicat a: Social choice and welfare, Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (October 2004) , p. 229-247, ISSN 0176-1714

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6


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