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Página principal > Artículos > Artículos publicados > Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues |
Fecha: | 1997 |
Resumen: | In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. We explicitly study the consequences for stability when the composition of one's coworkers or colleagues can affect the preferences over institution. |
Nota: | Altres ajuts: DGICYT/PB92-0590 |
Nota: | Altres ajuts: CIRIT/GRQ93-2044 |
Derechos: | Tots els drets reservats. |
Lengua: | Anglès |
Documento: | Article ; recerca ; Versió sotmesa a revisió |
Materia: | Jocs, Teoria de ; Matching model |
Publicado en: | Journal of economic theory, Núm. 75 (1997) , p. 464-475, ISSN 1095-7235 |
Preprint 16 p, 177.6 KB |