Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal. Département de Sciences Économiques.)
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)

Data:	2007
Resum:	We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truthtelling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observations of Roth and Peranson (1999) in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the United States: (i) the cores of the profiles submitted to the clearinghouse are small and (ii) while truth-telling is not a dominant strategy most participants of the NRMP truthfully reveal their preferences.
Drets:	Tots els drets reservats.
Llengua:	Anglès
Document:	Article ; recerca ; Versió sotmesa a revisió
Matèria:	Matching market ; Incomplete information ; Singleton Core
Publicat a:	Journal of economic theory, Núm. 136 (2007) , p. 587-600, ISSN 1095-7235

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007

Preprint 27 p, 240.7 KB

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