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Página principal > Artículos > Artículos publicados > On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness |
Fecha: | 2011 |
Resumen: | We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints. |
Derechos: | Tots els drets reservats. |
Lengua: | Anglès |
Documento: | Article ; recerca ; Versió sotmesa a revisió |
Materia: | Elecció social ; Models matemàtics ; Strategy-proofness ; Single-peaked preferences ; Median voter ; Feasibility constraints |
Publicado en: | Games and economic behavior, Vol. 72 Núm. 2 (2011) , p. 467-484, ISSN 0899-8256 |
Preprint 34 p, 343.2 KB |