Per citar aquest document: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143818
Weighted approval voting
Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica)
Vorsatz, Marc (Maastricht University)

Data: 2008
Resum: To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a strictly positive and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects the alternative for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. If the product is maximal for more than one alternative, a pre-specified tie-breaking rule is applied. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this family of voting procedures.
Nota: We thank Salvador Barberà for his helpful comments at early stages of this research. We also thank Miguel Ángel Ballester, Steven Brams, Antonio Nicolò, Pedro Rey, Arunava Sen, John Weymark, and the participants of the UAB Lunch Seminar on Game Theory and Social Choice for their useful comments and suggestions. The work of Jordi Massó is partially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia through grant SEJ2005-04081 and by the Generalitat de Catalunya, through the Barcelona Economics Program (CREA) and the grant SGR2005-00454.
Nota: Número d'acord de subvenció MEC/SEJ2005-04081
Nota: Número d'acord de subvenció AGAUR/2005/SGR-00454
Drets: Tots els drets reservats
Llengua: Anglès
Document: article ; recerca ; submittedVersion
Matèria: Vot ; Approval voting ; Neutrality
Publicat a: Economic theory, Vol. 36 Núm. 1 (July 2008) , p. 129-146, ISSN 0938-2259

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0263-2


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