On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness
Massó, Jordi
Chatterji, Shurojit

Imprint: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2015
Description: 30 p.
Abstract: We consider strategy-proof social choice functions operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the social choice function satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We do so by deriving from the social choice function an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the notion of a semilattice single-peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well-known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof social choice functions are admissible are semilattice single-peaked domains.
Rights: L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons: Creative Commons
Language: Anglès
Series: Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica / Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). Working papers
Series: Working papers ; 952.15
Document: Working paper
Subject: Elecció social ; Models matemàtics ; Strategy-proofness ; Single-peakedness ; Anonymity ; Unanimity ; Top-onlyness ; Semilattice



30 p, 259.5 KB

The record appears in these collections:
Research literature > Working papers > Fundamentals Unit of the Economic Analysis. Working papers

 Record created 2016-03-03, last modified 2022-07-09



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