Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities
Barberà, Salvador 1946-
(Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica)
Bossert, Walter (University of Montreal)
Suzumura, Kotaro (Waseda University)
| Publicación: |
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2019 |
| Descripción: |
29 pàg. |
| Resumen: |
Pierre Daunou, a contemporary of Borda and Condorcet during the era of the French Revolution and active debates on alternative voting rules, proposed a rule that chooses the strong Condorcet winner if there is one, otherwise eliminates Condorcet losers and uses plurality voting on the remaining candidates. We characterize his rule which combines potentially conflicting desiderata of majoritarianism by ordering them lexicographically. This contribution serves not just to remind ourselves that a 19th-century vintage may still retain excellent aroma and taste, but also to promote a promising general approach to reconcile potentially conflicting desiderata by accommodating them lexicographically. |
| Ayudas: |
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad SEV-2015-0563
Agencia Estatal de Investigación ECO2017-83534-P
Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca 2017SGR0711
|
| Derechos: |
Tots els drets reservats.  |
| Lengua: |
Anglès |
| Colección: |
BSE working paper ; 1107 |
| Documento: |
Working paper ; recerca ; Versió publicada |
| Materia: |
Voting rules ;
Daunou's method ;
Condorcet criterion |
| Publicado en: |
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2019 |
Adreça alternativa: https://bse.eu/research/working-papers/daunous-voting-rule-and-lexicographic-assignment-priorities
El registro aparece en las colecciones:
Documentos de investigación >
Working papers
Registro creado el 2024-01-30, última modificación el 2024-05-04
visitante ::
identificación
