000090477 001 __ 90477
000090477 005 __20141007063514.0
000090477 024 8_ $9 primocentral $9 driver $a oai:ddd.uab.cat:90477
000090477 035 __ $a oai:www.recercat.cat:2072/196239
000090477 041 __ $a eng
000090477 100 1_ $a Barberà, Salvador, $d 1946-
000090477 245 10 $a Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness : $b on what domains are they also sufficient?
000090477 260 __ $c 2012
000090477 300 __ $a 30 p.
000090477 520 __ $a A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of definition. For the same reason, different conditions may be equivalent for functions defined on some domains, while different in other cases. Understanding the role of domains is therefore a crucial issue in mechanism design. We illustrate this point by analyzing the role of different conditions that are always related, but not always equivalent to strategy-proofness. We define two very natural conditions that are necessary for strategy-proofness: monotonicity and reshuffling invariance. We remark that they are not always sufficient. Then, we identify a domain condition, called intertwinedness, that ensures the equivalence between our two conditions and that of strategy-proofness. We prove that some important domains are intertwined: those of single-peaked preferences, both with public and private goods, and also those arising in simple models of house allocation. We prove that other necessary conditions for strategy-proofness also become equivalent to ours when applied to functions defined on intertwined domains, even if they are not equivalent in general. We also study the relationship between our domain restrictions and others that appear in the literature, proving that we are indeed introducing a novel proposal.
000090477 540 __ $a Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original, la universitat, la unitat i l’institut i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús $u http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/
000090477 546 __ $a Anglès.
000090477 650 _4 $a Elecció social -- Models matemàtics
000090477 655 _4 $a info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
000090477 700 1_ $a Berga, Dolors
000090477 700 1_ $a Moreno, Bernardo
000090477 710 1_ $a Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. $b Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
000090477 710 1_ $a Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
000090477 762 18 $w hdl_2072_1749
000090477 830 __ $a Working papers ; $v 892.11
000090477 856 40 $p 30 $s 388414 $u http://ddd.uab.cat/pub/worpap/2012/hdl_2072_196239/89211.pdf
000090477 856 42 $3 Adreça alternativa $u http://hdl.handle.net/2072/196239
000090477 980 __ $a WORPAP $b UAB