Working papers de la UAB

Working papers de la UAB Encontrados 2,684 registros  anterior11 - 20siguientefinal  ir al registro: La búsqueda tardó 0.00 segundos. 
11.
31 p, 366.1 KB Top monotonicity : a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.) ; Moreno, Bernardo (Universidad de Málaga)
When members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, pair-wise majority voting equilibria (Condorcet winners) always exist. Moreover, they coincide with the median(s) of the voters' most preferred alternatives. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2010 (BSE working paper ; 297)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2010  
12.
39 p, 256.9 KB On the rule of k names / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Coelho, Danilo (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
The rule of k names can be described as follows: given a set of candidates for office, a committee chooses k members from this set by voting, and makes a list with their names. Then a single individual from outside the committee selects one of the listed names for the office. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2007 (BSE working paper ; 264)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2004  
13.
10 p, 205.3 KB A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Gerber, Anke (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Grup de Recerca Coalicions, Incentius i Xarxes en la Presa de Decisions Col·lectives) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
We show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as "resting points" in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2005 (BSE working paper ; 248)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2005  
14.
17 p, 184.9 KB Preference for flexibility and the opportunities of choice / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Grodal, Birgit (Københavns Universitet) ; Centre de Referència en Economia Analítica
A decision-maker exhibits preference for flexibility if he always prefers any set of alternatives to its subsets, even when two of them contain the same best element. Desire for flexibility can be explained as the consequence of the agent's uncertainty along a two-stage process, where he must first preselect a subset of alternatives from which to make a final choice later on. [...]
Barcelona School of Economics, 2003 (BSE working paper ; 2)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2003  
15.
27 p, 610.4 KB Order-k rationality / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; de Clippel, Geoffroy (Brown University) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis) ; Rozen, Kareen (Brown University)
A decision maker (DM) may not perfectly maximize her preference over the feasible set. She may feel it is good enough to maximize her preference over a sufficiently large consideration set; or just require that her choice is sufficiently well-ranked (e. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2019 (BSE working paper ; 1130)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2019  
16.
29 p, 333.4 KB Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Bossert, Walter (University of Montreal) ; Suzumura, Kotaro (Waseda University)
Pierre Daunou, a contemporary of Borda and Condorcet during the era of the French Revolution and active debates on alternative voting rules, proposed a rule that chooses the strong Condorcet winner if there is one, otherwise eliminates Condorcet losers and uses plurality voting on the remaining candidates. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2019 (BSE working paper ; 1107)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2019  
17.
25 p, 236.6 KB Designing decisions rules for transnational infraestructure projects / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.) ; Centre de Referencia en Economía Analítica
Washingtong,D.C. Inter-American Development Bank, 2003 (BSE working paper ; 61)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2003  
18.
30 p, 2.9 MB El proceso de muestreo en el proyecto "Capital social y entorno residencial en la población joven con riesgo de exclusión laboral: un estudio de casos." / Eixarch, Adriana (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Centre d'Estudis Sociològics sobre la Vida Quotidiana i el Treball (QUIT)) ; Verd Pericàs, Joan Miquel (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Centre d'Estudis Sociològics sobre la Vida Quotidiana i el Treball (QUIT)) ; Barranco Font, Oriol (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Centre d'Estudis Sociològics sobre la Vida Quotidiana i el Treball (QUIT)) ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Centre d'Estudis Sociològics sobre la Vida Quotidiana i el Treball
2024 (QUIT working papers series ; 30)
QUIT working papers series, Núm. 30 (2024)  
19.
30 p, 346.0 KB Compromising on compromise rules / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.) ; Coelho, Danilo (IPEA) ; Barcelona Graduate School of Mathematics (BGSMath)
We propose three mechanisms to reach compromise between two opposing parties. They are based on the use of Rules of k Names, whereby one of the parties proposes a shortlist and the other chooses from it. [...]
2021 (BSE working paper ; 1263)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2021  
20.
35 p, 279.5 KB Identifying strong voter support : Condorcet and Smith revisited / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa) ; Bossert, Walter (University of Montreal)
The conditions of strong Condorcet winner consistency and strong Condorcet loser consistency are, in essence, universally accepted as attractive criteria to evaluate the performance of social choice functions. [...]
Barcelona : Barcelona School of Economics, 2023 (BSE working paper ; 1380)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2023  

Working papers de la UAB : Encontrados 2,684 registros   anterior11 - 20siguientefinal  ir al registro:
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