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16 p, 177.6 KB Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues / Dutta, Bhaskar (Indian Statistical Institute) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents (the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions to which they can be matched. [...]
1997 - 10.1006/jeth.1997.2291
Journal of economic theory, Núm. 75 (1997) , p. 464-475  

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