Resultats globals: 4 registres trobats en 0.02 segons.
Articles, 2 registres trobats
Documents de recerca, 2 registres trobats
Articles 2 registres trobats  
1.
23 p, 427.0 KB Stable Partitions in Many Division Problems : The Proportional and the Sequential Dictator Solutions / Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés (University of Oxford) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. [...]
2015 - 10.1007/s11238-014-9467-7
Theory and decision, Vol. 79, Núm. 2 (2015) , p. 227-250  
2.
34 p, 343.2 KB On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés (London School of Economics)
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. [...]
2011 - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.001
Games and economic behavior, Vol. 72 Núm. 2 (2011) , p. 467-484  

Documents de recerca 2 registres trobats  
1.
17 p, 187.1 KB Stable partitions in many division problems : the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions / Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Massó, Jordi ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés ; Neme, Alejandro ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica
We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. [...]
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica 2013 (Working papers ; 941.13) (Barcelona GSE Working Paper Series ; 739)  
2.
32 p, 302.3 KB On Strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness / Massó, Jordi ; Moreno de Barreda, Inés ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. [...]
2010 (Working papers ; 809.10)  

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