Resultats globals: 10 registres trobats en 0.02 segons.
Articles, 1 registres trobats
Documents de recerca, 9 registres trobats
Articles 1 registres trobats  
1.
27 p, 614.3 KB Group strategy-proofness in private good economies / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona) ; Moreno, Bernardo (Campus de El Ejido)
Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategyproof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. [...]
2016 - 10.1257/aer.20141727
American Economic Review, Vol. 106 Núm. 4 (2016) , p. 1073-1099  

Documents de recerca 9 registres trobats  
1.
21 p, 257.6 KB Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness : the case of single-dipped preferences / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona) ; Moreno, Bernardo (Campus de El Ejido) ; MOVE- Markets, Organizations and Votes in Economics
We characterize the set of all individual and group strategy-proof rules on the domain of all single-dipped preferences on a line. For rules defined on this domain, and on several of its subdomains, we explore the implications of these strategy-proofness requirements on the maximum size of the rules' range. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2009 (BSE working papeR ; 418)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2009  
2.
31 p, 366.1 KB Top monotonicity : a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.) ; Moreno, Bernardo (Universidad de Málaga)
When members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, pair-wise majority voting equilibria (Condorcet winners) always exist. Moreover, they coincide with the median(s) of the voters' most preferred alternatives. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2010 (BSE working paper ; 297)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2010  
3.
44 p, 565.3 KB Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona) ; Moreno, Bernardo (Campus de El Ejido) ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Consorci Markets, Organizacions and Votes in Economics (MOVE)
We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. We show that when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant mechanisms can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold for mechanisms with two alternatives in the range. [...]
2020 (BSE working paper ; 1024)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2020  
4.
25 p, 315.9 KB Arrow on domain conditions : a fruitful road to travel / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona) ; Moreno, Bernardo (Universidad de Málaga)
We stress the importance that Arrow attached to studying the role of domain conditions in determining the validity of his impossibility theorem, a subject to which he devoted two chapters of Social Choice and Individual Values. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2019 (BSE working paper ; 1095)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2019  
5.
28 p, 376.8 KB Immunity to credible deviations from the truth / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona) ; Moreno, Bernardo (Universidad de Málaga)
We study a notion of non-manipulability by groups, based on the idea that only some agreements among potential manipulators may be credible. The derived notion of immunity to credible manipulations by groups is intermediate between individual and group strategy-proofness. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2016 (BSE working paper ; 893)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2016  
6.
52 p, 488.9 KB Pairwise justifiable changes in collective choices / Barberà, Salvador 1946- (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Berga, Dolors (Universitat de Girona) ; Moreno, Bernardo (Universidad de Málaga) ; Nicolò, Antonio (University of Padova)
Consider the following principle regarding the performance of collective choice rules. "If a rule selects alternative x in situation 1, and alternative y in situation 2, there must be an alternative z, and some member of society whose appreciation of z relative to x has increased when going from situation 1 to situation 2. [...]
Barcelona Barcelona School of Economics, 2022 (BSE working paper ; 1256)
BSE Barcelona School of Economics Working Papers, 2022  
7.
30 p, 379.3 KB Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness : on what domains are they also sufficient? / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- ; Berga, Dolors ; Moreno, Bernardo ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
A social choice function may or may not satisfy a desirable property depending on its domain of definition. For the same reason, different conditions may be equivalent for functions defined on some domains, while different in other cases. [...]
2012 (Working papers ; 892.11)  
8.
22 p, 195.6 KB Group strategy-proof social choice functions / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- ; Berga, Dolors ; Moreno, Bernardo ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. [...]
2011 (Working papers ; 853.10)  
9.
32 p, 330.9 KB Individual versus group strategy-proofness : when do they coincide? / Barberà, Salvador, 1946- ; Berga, Dolors ; Moreno, Bernardo ; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica ; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. [...]
2009 (Working papers ; 761.09)  

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