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# alert 2006

Report on conflicts,  
human rights  
and peace-building



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## Sumario

**Alerta 2006: informe sobre conflictos, derechos humanos y construcción de paz** es un estudio que anualmente realiza la Unidad de Alerta de la *Escola de Cultura de Pau* de la *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*, y que sintetiza el estado del mundo al finalizar el año a partir del análisis de varios indicadores. Para hacer el informe se han utilizado 29 indicadores, agrupados en nueve grandes apartados: conflictos armados, situaciones de tensión y disputas de alto riesgo, procesos de paz, rehabilitación posbélica (acompañamiento internacional), crisis humanitarias, militarización y desarme, derechos humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario, desarrollo y dimensión de género en la construcción de paz. La descripción y el análisis de lo que ha ocurrido en el mundo a lo largo del año a través de estos indicadores puede ayudarnos a conocer mejor los avances, los retrocesos y las dinámicas de diversa índole que afectan al conjunto de la humanidad. La mayoría de estos indicadores, una vez entrecruzados, pueden ayudarnos también a comprender las influencias de unos factores sobre otros. La comparación de estos datos con los de años anteriores da al informe un carácter de alerta preventiva sobre algunas tendencias generales o sobre la situación de determinados países, lo que puede resultar útil, entre otras cosas, para el rediseño de las políticas exteriores, de cooperación al desarrollo y de transferencias de armas, así como para elaborar políticas de prevención de conflictos armados y que permitan consolidar procesos de paz y de rehabilitación posbélica en el mundo.

## Sumari

**Alerta 2006: informe sobre conflictes, drets humans i construcció de pau** és un estudi que anualment realitza la Unitat d'Alerta de l'Escola de Cultura de Pau de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, i que sintetitza l'estat del món al finalitzar l'any a partir de l'anàlisi de diversos indicadors. Per a fer l'informe s'han utilitzat 29 indicadors, agrupats en deu grans apartats: conflictes armats, situacions de tensió i disputes d'alt risc, rehabilitació postbèlica (acompanyament internacional), processos de pau, crisis humanitàries, militarització i desarmament, drets humans i Dret Internacional Humanitari, desenvolupament i dimensió de gènere en la construcció de pau. La descripció i l'anàlisi del que ha ocorregut en el món al llarg de l'any a través d'aquests indicadors, pot ajudar-nos a conèixer millor els avenços, els retrocessos i les dinàmiques de diversa índole que afecten al conjunt de la humanitat. La majoria d'aquests indicadors, una vegada entrecreuat, poden ajudar-nos també a comprendre les influències d'uns factors sobre uns altres. La comparació d'aquestes dades amb les dels anys anteriors dona a l'informe un caràcter d'alerta preventiva sobre algunes tendències generals o sobre la situació de determinats països, la qual cosa pot resultar útil, entre d'altres, per a redissenyar polítiques exteriors, de cooperació al desenvolupament i de transferències d'armes, així com per a elaborar polítiques en termes de prevenció de conflictes armats i que permetin consolidar processos de pau i de rehabilitació postbèlica arreu del món.

## Summary

**Alert 2006: report on conflicts, human rights and peace-building** is a study carried out annually by the Alert Unit at the *School of Peace Culture* at *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*, providing an overview of the world situation at the end of the year on the basis of an analysis of various indicators. 29 indicators have been used in the preparation of this report, divided into nine large groups: armed conflicts, situations of tension and high risk disputes, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation (international involvement), humanitarian crises, militarisation and disarmament, human rights and International Humanitarian Law, development and gender issues in peace-building. A description and analysis of what has happened in the world throughout this year, based on these indicators, helps to provide a greater knowledge of the advances, reverses and dynamics of various kinds that affect the whole of humanity. The majority of these indicators, once cross-referenced, can also help us to understand the influence of some factors on others. Comparing this data with the information gathered during the previous years means that the report can act as a preventive warning of certain general tendencies or a particular situation in individual countries, something that may be useful, among other things, for the rethinking of foreign policy, development cooperation and arms transfers, as well as for the development of policies aimed at preventing armed conflicts and facilitating the consolidation of peace processes and post-war rehabilitation throughout the world.

## Sommaire

**Alerte 2006: rapport sur les conflits, les droits de la personne et la construction de la paix** est un rapport annuel réalisé par l'Unité d'Alerte de l'École de Culture de la Paix de l'Université Autonome de Barcelone, qui synthétise l'état du monde de l'année à partir de l'analyse de plusieurs indicateurs. Pour élaborer ce rapport, 29 indicateurs, regroupés en neuf grands chapitres, ont été utilisés. À savoir, les conflits armés, les situations de tension et les disputes de haut risque, les processus de paix, la réhabilitation d'après-guerre (accompagnement international), les crises humanitaires, la militarisation et le désarmement, les droits de la personne et Droit International Humanitaire, le développement, la perspective de genre dans la construction de la paix, et le comportement des pays face à la communauté internationale. La description et l'analyse, par moyen de ces indicateurs, des événements qui se sont produits dans le monde tout au long de l'année peut nous aider à mieux connaître les progressions, les reculs, et toute autre tendance touchant l'ensemble de l'humanité. La plupart de ces indicateurs, une fois superposés, peuvent aider aussi à comprendre les interdépendances entre certains facteurs. La comparaison de ces données avec celles des années précédentes fait de ce rapport une mise en garde préventive sur certaines tendances générales ou sur la situation de certains pays. Cet instrument peut donc être utile, entre autres, à la redéfinition des politiques extérieures, de coopération au développement et de transferts d'armes, ainsi qu'à l'élaboration des politiques de prévention de conflits armés qui permettent d'assurer la consolidation de processus de paix et de réhabilitation d'après-guerre dans le monde.

## List of indicators

### 1. ARMED CONFLICTS

1. Countries in armed conflict

### 2. SITUATIONS OF TENSION AND HIGH-RISK DISPUTES

2. Situations of tension and high-risk disputes

### 3. PEACE PROCESSES

3. Countries with formal peace or negotiating processes or talks in an exploratory phase

### 4. POST-WAR REHABILITATION (INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT)

4. Countries that receive international aid for post-war rehabilitation

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### 9. GENDER AND PEACE-BUILDING

29. Countries with serious gender inequalities according to the Gender-related Development Index (GDI)

# Glossary

- ACH:** Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities  
**ACP:** Asia, Caribbean, Pacific  
**ADF:** Afghanistan Development Forum  
**AF:** Government Armed Forces  
**AI:** Amnesty International  
**AIG:** Armed Islamic Group  
**AMIB:** African Mission in Burundi  
**ANA:** Albanian National Army  
**APHC:** All Parties Hurriyat Conference  
**AU:** African Union  
**AUC:** Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia)  
**BICC:** Bonn International Centre for Conversion  
**BONUCA:** United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in the Central African Republic  
**BRA:** Bougainville Revolutionary Army  
**CAEMC:** Central African Economic and Monetary Community  
**CAP:** United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals Process  
**CARICOM:** Caribbean Community  
**CAR:** Central African Republic  
**CAVR:** Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation  
**CFSP:** Common Foreign and Security Policy  
**CIS:** Commonwealth of Independent States  
**CODHES:** *Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento* (Advisory Council for Human Rights and Displacement)  
**CPA:** Coalition Provisional Authority  
**CPI:** Corruption Perception Index  
**CPLA:** Cordillera People's Liberation Army  
**CPN:** Communist Party of Nepal  
**DAC:** Development Assistance Committee  
**DDR:** Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration  
**DFID:** Department for International Development  
**Dollars:** US dollars  
**DRM:** Democratic Republican Movement  
**GDP:** Gross Domestic Product  
**ECHA:** Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs  
**ECHO:** European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office  
**ECOMOG:** Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group  
**ECOSOC:** United Nations Economic and Social Council  
**ECOWAS:** Economic Community of West African States  
**EEBC:** Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission  
**ELN:** *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (National Liberation Army)  
**ESCR:** Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
**ESDP:** European Security and Defence Policy  
**EU:** European Union  
**EU BAM Rafah:** EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah  
**EUFOR ALTHEA:** EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
**EUJUST LLEX:** Integrated EU Mission for the Force of Law in Iraq  
**EUJUST THEMIS:** EU Mission to reform the justice system in Georgia  
**EUPAT:** EU Police Advisory Team in Macedonia  
**EUPM:** EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
**EUPOL COPPS:** EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories  
**EUPOL – KINSHASA:** EU Police Mission in Kinshasa  
**EUPOL Proxima:** EU Police Mission in Macedonia  
**EUSEC RD Congo:** EU Security Reform Aid Mission in DR Congo  
**EZLN:** *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (Zapatista Army of National Liberation)  
**Fad'H:** *Forces Armées d'Haiti* (Haiti Armed Forces)  
**FAO:** United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation  
**FARC:** *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)  
**FATF:** Financial Action Task Force  
**FDD:** *Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (Forces for the Defence of Democracy)  
**FDLR:** *Forces Démocratiques de Libération de Rwanda* (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)  
**FLEC-FAC:** *Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda – Forças Armadas de Cabinda*  
**FKM:** *Front Kedaulatan Maluku* (Moluccan Sovereignty Front)  
**FLEC:** *Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda* (Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front)  
**FNL:** *Forces Nationales de Libération* (National Liberation Force)  
**GAM:** *Gerakin Aceh Merdeka* (Movement for Free Aceh)  
**GDI:** Gender-related Development Index  
**GEMAP:** Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme  
**GPP:** *Groupement Patriotique pour la Paix* (Patriotic Grouping for Peace)  
**GSPC:** Salafist Group for Call and Combat  
**HDI:** Human Development Index  
**HIPC:** Heavily Indebted Poor Countries  
**HIV/AIDS:** Human Immunodeficiency Virus /Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome  
**HRW:** Human Rights Watch  
**IANSA:** International Action Network on Small Arms  
**ICBL:** International Campaign to Ban Landmines  
**ICC:** International Criminal Court  
**ICO:** Islamic Conference Organisation  
**ICRC:** International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent  
**IDF:** Iraq Development Fund

**IDP:** Internally Displaced People

**IEMF:** Interim Emergency Multinational Force

**IFM:** Isatubu Freedom Movement

**IGAD:** Intergovernmental Authority on Development

**IHL:** International Humanitarian Law

**IISS:** International Institute for Strategic Studies

**IMF:** International Monetary Fund

**IOM:** International Organisation for Migration

**IRIN:** United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network

**IRIS:** *Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques* (Institute for International and Strategic Relations)

**ISAF:** International Security Assistance Force

**ISDR:** International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

**JEM:** Justice and Equality Movement

**JKLF:** Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

**KANU:** Kenya African National Union

**KFOR:** NATO Kosovo force

**LDC:** Least Developed Countries

**LIPRODHOR:** Rwandan League for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights

**LRA:** Lord's Resistance Army

**LTTE:** Liberation Tigers Tamil Eelam

**LURD:** Liberians United for Reunification and Democracy

**MDC:** Movement for Democratic Change

**MDJT:** *Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad* (Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad)

**MDF:** Meckaunvi Defence Force

**MDG:** Millennium Development Goals

**MERCOSUR :** *Mercado Común del Sur* (Common Latin American Market)

**MFDC:** *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (Casamance Democratic Forces Movement)

**MILF:** Moro Islamic Liberation Front

**MINUCI:** United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire

**MINURSO:** United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

**MINUSTAH:** United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti

**MJP:** *Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix* (Movement for Justice and Peace)

**MLC:** *Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo* (Congo Liberation Movement)

**MODEL:** Movement for Democracy in Liberia

**MONUC:** United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

**MPCI:** *Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement)

**MPIGO:** *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest* (Ivorian Popular Movement for the Far West)

**MPLA:** Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola

**MSF:** *Médecins Sans Frontières* (Doctors without Borders)

**NAFTA:** North American Free Trade Treaty

**NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

**NDC:** National Democratic Congress

**NDFB:** National Democratic Front of Bodoland

**NEPAD:** New Economic Partnership for African Development

**NGO:** Non-Governmental Organisation

**NLA:** National Liberation Army

**NLD:** National League for Democracy

**NLFT:** National Liberation Front of Tripura

**NMRD:** National Movement for Reform and Development

**NPA:** New People's Army

**NPP:** New Patriotic Party

**NRC:** Norwegian Refugee Council

**NSCN (IM):** National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak - Muivah

**OAS:** Organisation of American States

**OCHA:** United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

**ODA:** Official Development Aid

**OECD:** Organisation for Economic Trade and Development

**ONUB:** United Nations Operation in Burundi

**ONUB:** United Nations Mission in Burundi

**ONUGBIS:** United Nations Office in Guinea-Bissau

**OPM:** *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (Free Papua Movement)

**OSCE:** Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

**PAC:** *Patrullas de Autodefensa Civiles* (Civil Defence Patrols)

**PAIGC:** African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde

**PCT:** Congolese Workers' Party

**PDP:** People's Democratic Party

**PIC:** Peace Implementation Council

**PIOOM:** The Interdisciplinary Research Program on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations

**PNA:** Palestinian National Authority

**PRIO:** Peace Research Institute of Oslo

**PWG:** People's War Group

**RAMSI:** Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands

**RCD-Goma:** *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma* (Congolese Rally for Democracy - Goma)

**RCD-K-ML:** *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement pour la Libération* (Congolese Rally for Democracy - Movement of Liberation)

**RCD-N:** *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-National* (Congolese Rally for Democracy - National)

**RDL:** *Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et la Liberté* (Rally for Democracy and Liberty)

**RFTF:** Results Focused Transnational Framework

**RRI:** Reproductive Risk Index

**RSM:** *Republik Maluku Selatan* (Republic of South Moluccas)

**RUF:** Revolutionary United Front

**SADC:** South African Development Community

**SFOR:** Stabilisation Force

**SIPRI:** Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

**SLA:** Sudan Liberation Army

**SPLA:** Sudanese People's Liberation Army

**TNG:** Transitional National Government

**UAB:** *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona* (Autonomous University of Barcelona)

**ULFA:** United Liberation Front of Assam

**UN:** United Nations

**UNAIDS:** United Nations Programs on HIV/AIDS

**UNAMA:** United Nations Aid Mission in Afghanistan

**UNAMIS:** United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan

**UNAMSIL:** United Nations Mission for Sierra Leone

**UNCTAD:** United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

**UNDG:** United Nations Development Group

**UNDOF:** United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

**UNDP:** United Nations Development Programme

**UNEP:** United Nations Environmental Programme

**UNESCO:** United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation

**UNFICYP:** United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

**UNFPA:** United Nations Population Fund

**UNHCHR:** United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

**UNHCR:** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

**UNHRC:** United Nations Human Rights Commission

**UNICEF:** United Nations Children's Fund

**UNIDIR:** United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

**UNIFEM:** United Nations Development Fund for Women

**UNIFIL:** United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

**UNIKON:** United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission

**UNITA:** *União para a Independência Total de Angola*

**UNMA:** United Nations Mission in Angola

**UNMEE:** United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

**UNMIBH:** United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

**UNMIK:** United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

**UNMIL:** United Nations Mission in Liberia

**UNMIS:** United Nations Mission in Sudan

**UNMISSET:** United Nations Mission of Support in Timor-Leste

**UNMOGIP:** United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

**UNMPO:** United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka

**UNMOVIC:** United Nations Monitoring and Verification of Inspections Commission

**UNO:** United Nations Organisation

**UNOCI:** United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

**UNOGBIS:** United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau

**UNOL:** United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia

**UNOMIG:** United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

**UNOTIL:** United Nations Office in Timor-Leste

**UNPOS:** United Nations Political Office for Somalia

**UNPPB:** United Nations Political and Peace-Building Mission

**UNRWA:** United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

**UNSCO:** Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Middle East

**UNTOP:** United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-building

**UNTSO:** United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation

**USAID:** United States Agency for International Development

**WB:** World Bank

**WFP:** World Food Programme

**WHO:** World Health Organisation

**WTO:** World Trade Organisation

**ZANU-PF:** Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front

# Introduction

"Alert 2006: report on conflicts, human rights and peace-building" is a study carried out annually by the Alert Unit at the *School of Peace Culture at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*, providing an overview of the world situation at the end of the year on the basis of an analysis of various indicators. The Alert Unit also publishes a weekly newsletter, "*Semáforo*" containing information on the current international situation. This information is compiled in turn in the quarterly publication "*Barómetro*".<sup>1</sup>

29 indicators have been used in the preparation of this "Alert 2006" report, divided into nine large groups: armed conflicts, situations of tension and high-risk disputes, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation (international involvement), humanitarian crises, disarmament, human rights and International Humanitarian Law, development and gender aspects in peace-building. A description and analysis of what has happened in the world throughout the past year, using these indicators as a base, helps to provide greater insight into the advances and reverses experienced and the dynamics that generally affect the whole of humanity. The majority of these indicators, once cross-referenced, can also help us to understand the influence of some factors on others. Comparing this data with the information gathered during previous years means that this report can act as a preventive warning of certain general trends or particular situations in individual countries, something which is undoubtedly useful, among other things, for the rethinking of foreign policy, development cooperation and the control of arms transfers, as well as for the development of specific policies aimed at preventing armed conflicts and facilitating the consolidation of peace processes and post-war rehabilitation throughout the world.

As can be observed from the conclusions set out at the end of this annual report, some of the quantitative data relating to the number of armed conflicts, situations of tension, peace processes and people currently involved in demobilisation processes may give the impression that conditions around the world have improved over the last year. A detailed qualitative analysis of the indicators, however, leads to a less optimistic (or, at least, more critical) reading of some of the trends that have emerged in recent years, such as the enormous difficulties involved in the rehabilitation and rebuilding of structural elements in countries that have recently endured armed conflicts, the overwhelming nature of humanitarian crises like the one currently affecting the region of Darfur (Sudan), the neglect of contexts in which the general population is in danger because their basic needs are not being attended to, the increased military spending on an international scale, the threats to the global human rights system as a result of anti-terrorist strategies, the failure to advance towards the Millennium Development Goals and the limited attention being paid to the gender dimension in issues relating to peace-building. In short, there are too many omissions in areas that are vital to development and the future well-being of ordinary people, society in general and the generations to come.

One of the consequences of the gravity of recent catastrophic natural events has perhaps been to create a greater awareness on all the world's continents of just how fragile the human race is, particularly if we fail to observe the world's natural cycles and continue to abuse some of our less abundant natural resources. Increasing references are being made to the end of the petroleum era and the need for responsible consumption, to give just two examples of our growing ecologic awareness. Nevertheless, we are still a long way from achieving a more global awareness that takes in the whole gamut of economic, political, cultural and social issues which in one way or another affect the whole of humanity, or at least the vast majority, in a way that will lead us to take responsibility for everything that affects us and that will allow us to make advances in some areas without weakening or disregarding others that are equally vital.

Vicenç Fisas  
Director of the *School of Peace Culture*

1. Both the weekly newsletter *Semáforo*, and the quarterly publication *Barómetro*, can be consulted at the following web site: <<http://www.escolapau.org>>.




# 1. Armed conflicts

This section contains an analysis of the armed conflicts that broke out or continued around the world during 2005 (indicator no. 1). The chapter is divided into three sections: the first offers a definition and classification of the different armed conflicts currently in course, the second discusses the way they have evolved over the past year, with special emphasis on the status of each one at the end of the year, and the last section refers to some of the more notable events that have occurred in relation to this subject. The chapter also includes a map showing the armed conflicts in the world at the end of 2005.

## 1.1. Armed conflicts: definition and classification

An **armed conflict** is considered to be any confrontation involving armed groups of regular or irregular forces of various kinds which, in an organised way and using arms and other destructive methods, claim more than 100 victims per year. This figure of 100 deaths should be seen in relation to other elements, such as the total population of the country and the geographical extent of the armed conflict, the level of destruction caused and the enforced displacements created. There may be more than one armed conflict in the same country. Figure 1.1 shows the sequence usually followed by armed conflicts, as summarised by the first four chapters of this report.



The armed conflicts currently being fought are characterised by the fact that most of them are internal, i.e. happening within the borders of a particular individual state. Very few are actually being fought between two states<sup>1</sup>. However, the majority of these armed conflicts involve a significant regional or international dimension and influence, due among other things to the flows of refugees that they provoke, the arms trading that results, the financial interests (such as the illegal exploitation of resources) or political interests that neighbouring countries may have in the conflict, or the fact that armed opposition groups seek refuge or establish bases in neighbouring countries and receive logistical or military support from neighbouring governments.

1. No armed conflicts were fought between states began during 2005, since Palestine has not yet been declared an independent state, and in other cases such as Afghanistan and Iraq, although they could originally have been called inter-state conflicts, the involvement of foreign forces (within the framework of international coalitions) has occurred through collaboration with the governments that have been established (with greater or lesser legitimacy) following the overthrow of the original regimes.

In the majority of these armed conflicts, the opposing **parties** tend to be, on the one side, the country's Government or its Armed Forces, and on the other, one or more armed opposition groups. However, there are other cases in which confrontations can arise between clans, guerrillas, warlords, opposing armed groups or ethnic or religious communities. Although conventional weapons are the most commonly used in the majority of conflicts, particularly small arms (which cause 90% of the deaths in conflicts, the victims being mainly women and children), other weapons are used on many occasions, such as suicide attacks, terrorism and sexual violence.<sup>2</sup>

The most common **causes** of the main armed conflicts can be arranged into the following groups: **1)** disputes relating to **political power** (where difficulties are observed in the handover of power, the fragility of the democratic system and, in short, the struggle for political power); **2)** disputes relating to the dual issues of **autonomy and independence**, which involve the existence of minority groups (or in some cases, majority groups) with claims on and aspirations towards political power based on individual affirmations that have not been satisfied; and **3)** disputes relating to **resources, land and population** (inter-community confrontations, fighting for the control of natural resources, conflicts resulting from regional marginalisation or the demographic colonisation of one community by another). In the majority of cases, however, these causes do not arise in isolation but are instead inter-related.

## 1.2. Evolution of armed conflicts

At the end of 2005, there were **21 armed conflicts around the world, four fewer than in 2004, following the falling trend in the number of armed conflicts that has been recorded over recent**

**At the end of 2005, there were 21 armed conflicts around the world, four fewer than in 2004, following the falling trend in the number of armed conflicts that has been recorded over recent years.**

**years.** In addition, the cessation of hostilities in both Sri Lanka and between the Philippine Government and the MILF armed opposition group remained in place. The gradual reduction in violence during 2005 and the previous year in both **Haiti** and **Liberia** meant that both contexts are no longer classified as armed conflicts, and the inter-community fighting in **Central and Northern Nigeria** has also been removed from this list as a result of its reduction over the last two years<sup>3</sup>. In the **Aceh** region in **Indonesia** (in the north of the island of Sumatra), the informal ceasefire and negotiations that began

**between the Indonesian Government and the GAM armed opposition group** following the tsunami in December of last year led to the establishment of a peace process that **culminated** in August with **the signing** in Helsinki of a **peace agreement** that put an end to almost 30 years of conflict. No notable violations of the ceasefire have been recorded since then.

**Chart 1.1. Armed conflicts in 2005\***

<b>Africa</b>	Algeria, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, <i>Liberia</i> , <i>Nigeria (central and northern parts of the country)</i> , Nigeria (Niger Delta), DR Congo (Kivu and Ituri), Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), Uganda
<b>America</b>	Colombia, <i>Haiti</i>
<b>Asia</b>	Afghanistan, India ( <i>Assam</i> ), India (Jammu and Kashmir), <i>Indonesia (Aceh)</i> , Nepal, Philippines (Abu Sayyaf), Philippines (MILF), Philippines (NPA), Sri Lanka, Thailand
<b>Europe</b>	Russia ( <i>Chechnya</i> )
<b>Middle East</b>	Iraq, Israel-Palestine

\*The conflicts that ended during 2005 are shown in italics.

As regards the evolution of these conflicts, **the situation worsened during the course of 2005 in six contexts - Algeria, Sudan (Darfur), Uganda, Afghanistan, Russia (Chechnya) and Iraq - while**

2. In preparing this chapter, account was taken of incidents which were not perpetrated using conventional forces but which nevertheless led to the deaths of a number of people through the use of a deliberate and systematic process of destruction.

3. They remain, however, classified as situations of tension (see the chapter on tensions).

improving in another three - Burundi, India (Jammu and Kashmir) and Nepal. The remaining 10 conflicts saw no notable change in comparison with the situation at the beginning of the year. Turning to a regional analysis of the situation, the continent of Asia was where the most notable change in trends was seen, while, in absolute terms, Africa experienced the greatest reduction in the number of armed conflicts that it has seen in the last two years: Sudan (SPLA), Liberia and Nigeria (central and northern parts of the country).

## Africa

Eight armed conflicts are still being fought on the African continent following the reduction in violence in Liberia and Nigeria (central and northern parts of the country). The main reasons behind these conflicts were the struggle for political power (democratic fragility, often a legacy of the colonial and post-colonial period) and the fight to control natural resources, both of which are inter-related. A large number of these involve a **significant regional dimension**, and there is a **multiplicity of armed groups** involved in the evolution of these conflicts. The main changes to be seen during 2005 happened in Burundi, with the formation of the new Government following elections in the country, though the issue of A. Rwasa's FNL remains unresolved.

<b>Armed conflicts (beginning)</b>	<b>Main armed participants<sup>4</sup></b>	<b>Main causes</b>	<b>Situation compared with January 2005</b>
<b>Algeria (1992)</b>	Government, GIA, GSPC	Political and economic control (natural resources) by the army against the Islamic opposition, religious and ethnic confrontation	Increase in hostilities
<b>Burundi (1993)</b>	TNG, A. Rwasa's FNL	Political control by an ethnic minority and difficulties in the handover of power	Reduction
<b>Côte d'Ivoire (2002)</b>	Government, Forces Nouvelles	Marginalisation of certain regions, democratic fragility, political exclusion, religious confrontations	Stalemate
<b>DR Congo (1998)</b>	TNG, factions of armed groups included in the TNG, Mayi-Mayi militias, armed Ituri groups, FDLR	Control of political power, difficulties in the handover of power and control of natural resources	Stalemate
<b>Nigeria (Niger Delta) (2003)</b>	Government, militias from the Ijaw, Itsereki and Urhobo communities, private armies	Control of political power and natural resources, social and political exclusion	Stalemate
<b>Somalia (1988)</b>	Various	Absence of practical democracy, struggle for regional political power, confederation v. federation	Stalemate
<b>Sudan (Darfur)(2003)</b>	Government militias, SLMA, JEM, NMRD	Regional and political marginalisation	Increase in hostilities
<b>Uganda (1986)</b>	Government, LRA	Messianic religion and regional marginalisation	Increase in hostilities

### a) West Africa

During 2005, **Côte d'Ivoire** experienced a **stalemate in its peace process and an increase in political tensions**. There were also several outbreaks of fighting and a number of ceasefire violations, the most notable being the incident in May between different ethnic communities in Duékoué (in the west of the country), which left more than 100 dead and caused the displacement of around 10,000 people. United Nations reported a general increase in human rights violations (including summary executions, politically motivated arrests and torture) in a climate of complete impunity, mainly affecting women and children. In

4. The term "government" includes the different state security forces involved in the armed conflict.

spite of the signing in Pretoria (South Africa) of another peace agreement in April (the third since the dispute began in 2002), an event that seemed to lead to a relative improvement in the situation, the constant delays in introducing the DDR process and the permanent climate of tension and polarisation led to the postponement of the elections that should have been held on 30 October. The United Nations and the AU backed the extension of the transitional phase for a year (a move approved by the Security Council) and the replacement of the Prime Minister with a candidate chosen by consensus between the PDCI and the *Forces Nouvelles* opposition coalition.

Sporadic outbreaks of violence continued in the **Niger Delta** region in the south of **Nigeria**, as a result of **disputes over land ownership** and the battle for both political and economic control over the region between the different Delta communities and between these communities, Government Armed Forces and paramilitary groups. There were also attacks on transnational oil companies. Particularly notable was the increased political violence and the presence of Armed Forces in the state of Bayelsa following the dismissal of the state governor. Elsewhere, the arrests of R. Uwazurike, the leader of the MASSOB pro-independence group, and the leader of the NDPVF, A. M. Dokubo-Assari, fuelled the increase in tensions and the destabilisation of the region, giving rise to a number of confrontations that left several people dead. The national conference for political reforms called by President O. Obasanjo was indefinitely suspended in July due to the impossibility of reaching agreement on the distribution of profits from oil and the issue of the President's re-election.

## b) Horn of Africa

In **Somalia**, the divisions that currently exist in the heart of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) between those who support its provisional establishment for security reasons in Jowhar (led by the President and Prime Minister) and those who support its move to Mogadishu (led by the Speaker of the country's Parliament and around one hundred members and ministers of the TFG, including several of the capital's warlords), have led to the **stagnation of the peace and reconciliation process** and halted the work of the TFG's institutions. However, during the last few months of the year both sides indicated a desire for rapprochement. They remained in dispute, however, about the composition of the future IGAD peace mission (IGASOM), which meant that the mission's deployment was halted. This consequently contributed to a prevailing lack of security in a large part of the country, with outbreaks of violence throughout the year. This was illustrated by the failed attacks on the Prime Minister in Mogadishu in May and November, which left dozens dead and injured, and the fighting in the central region of Mudug at the beginning of the year, which caused around 200 deaths and led to the displacement of thousands of people as the result of a dispute over land ownership. IGAD asked the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo imposed on Somalia so that the TNG could proceed with the establishment and training of security forces and institutions in the country, though there were continuing suspicions that the embargo was being violated.

Turning to the armed conflict that began in February 2003 in the Sudanese region of **Darfur**, **particular mention should be made of the upsurge in violence recorded during the last months of the year**, which reversed the improved security situation reported during the course of 2005. The magnitude of the tragedy, which to date has claimed 300,000 lives and left two and a half million people displaced, is **clear evidence of the inadequacy of both the size and mission of the AU force** (currently 7,000 members, with support from NATO in its first mission on African soil) **and the inability of the international community to confront the situation**. There was an increase in both acts of looting and attacks on humanitarian staff, the nomadic Arab communities, the civilian population and AMIS troops, attacks which were perpetrated by the Government itself, the pro-government Janjaweed militias and armed opposition groups. The Government continued to fail to meet its undertaking to disarm the Janjaweed, in spite of threats from the UN Security Council. There was also an increase in the number of confrontations between the two armed groups present in Darfur, the SLA and the JEM, in spite of the fact that they are fighting for similar aims, and a division emerged at the heart of the SLA which was evident during the negotiations process. The NRMD armed opposition group, which has broken away from the JEM, also engaged in acts of violence in order to claim a role in these peace negotiations.

## Chart 1.2. The role of the civilian population in armed conflicts

The civilian population is not necessarily just a passive and vulnerable onlooker in today's armed conflicts, it actually performs a number of important roles that should not always be seen as the result of negative effects or vulnerability. These are not the result of coincidence but rather a direct consequence of the way in which civilians are involved by the warring parties themselves, on the side of both the state and the various armed opposition groups.

The civilian population may support a particular armed group in order to obtain benefits of various kinds, or it may be forced into giving this support. The roles performed by or allocated to civilians in armed conflicts are often viewed in different ways:

- from the point of view of the international community (where they are seen as victims of violence and the target of the warring parties in the conflict, classified as vulnerable people and the recipients of humanitarian aid), or
- from the point of view of the armed groups, where, in addition to the ways mentioned above, they may be seen as potential occasional fighters, a political support base (followers or supporters of a specific party or policy), military targets or enemies (because they represent the political support base for an opposition party or armed group), players or leaders who represent the community or civilian society, labourers, messengers, people who can carry out logistical duties and the providers of refuge and supplies, among other things.

This dividing up and pigeon-holing of roles that is so often observed in the different forums dealing with this issue clearly has a bearing on the methods and mechanisms used by the international community when intervening in such conflicts. This reflection regarding the civilian population can also be applied to the different preconceptions of the roles played by men, women and children.

### c) Great Lakes and Central Africa

In **Burundi**, the transitional process that began in 2000 on the back of the Arusha Agreement was brought to a successful conclusion with the holding of a referendum that approved the post-transition Constitution. This involves sharing political and military power between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis, whose leaders have held power since the country's independence. The various electoral processes were held between June and September against a background of tension and political violence, resulting in victory for the Hutu former armed opposition group, the CNDD-FDD, led by P. Nkurunziza. The new Government of national unity, legitimised by the elections and recognised by both the country's political authorities and the international community, still has to deal with the last remaining armed opposition Hutu group in the country, A. Rwasa's FNL, which continues to engage in **armed operations** against the civilian population and the new security forces in the provinces of **Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza**. The security forces have themselves been responsible for human rights violations against the civilian population during their operations against the FNL, which refused to open negotiations in spite of increasing military and diplomatic pressure and threats from the UN Security Council that it would reduce ONUB by 2,000 soldiers (40% of its contingent).

The situation in **DR Congo** was marked by the **persistent violence and lack of security** in all regions around the country, mainly due to the **offensive led by the country's Armed Forces and MONUC against some sectors of the Rwandan Hutu armed opposition group, the FDLR**<sup>5</sup>. The 30 September deadline for the voluntary disarmament of armed groups, mainly the FDLR, did not bring any great changes, since disagreements on this issue within the Transitional National Government (TNG) itself impeded the adoption of a clear and unified position. The continuing violence, the humanitarian crisis and the enforced displacement of the civilian population, especially in the north-eastern district of Ituri (Orientale province) but also in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Katanga, combined with poor management, corruption, tensions within the TNG and the slow pace of reforms in the transitional process made it impossible to hold the elections planned for June, so the transitional phase was extended for another year. This decision led to a number of incidents provoked by opposition members who do not have a presence in the TNG. December saw the holding of a **referendum that ratified the post-transition Constitution** in a process marked by low turnouts and a number of incidents, mainly in eastern and south-eastern parts of the country. These were caused by a variety of factors, including the current lack of security, a widespread ignorance regarding the Constitution's content and a call for a boycott by E. Tshisekedi, leader of the UPDS.

The armed conflict affecting the north of **Uganda** ended 2005 in the same way that it ended the previous year, with an offer from the LRA armed opposition group to hold peace talks against the background of a serious upsurge in violence. Although it was reported that around **1,000 people displaced by the armed**

5. See the chapter on peace processes.

**conflict are dying every week** as a direct or indirect result of the violence, for which the **LRA** and the **Armed Forces** are responsible, the UN Security Council did not adopt any kind of sanctions against the Ugandan Government in order to deal with the situation. However, in contrast to the situation that gave rise to the peace proposal of November 2004, marked by an offensive by the Ugandan army and the supposed weakening and surrounding of the LRA in southern Sudan, the situation in 2005 was preceded by new elements, such as the death of J. Garang, the former leader of the Sudanese SPLM/A armed group. This event apparently represents a reprieve for the LRA, given the Sudanese leader's firm commitment to fight the Ugandan armed group in support of his ally, Ugandan President Y. Museveni. J. Garang's successor, S. Kiir, had set the LRA a deadline of the end of the year to enter into peace negotiations, and the Ugandan and Sudanese Governments agreed that Ugandan Armed Forces would be allowed to pursue the LRA into Sudan. The **International Criminal Court also announced arrest warrants** for the five main leaders of the LRA, a fact that is seen to have impeded the work of the mediators and was accompanied by an **unprecedented upsurge in violence** by the LRA on both sides of the border.

#### d) Maghreb and North Africa

In **Algeria**, violence increased during the second half of the year in the armed conflict that has afflicted the country since 1992, with sporadic fighting between the country's Armed Forces and the GSPC armed opposition group. During the course of last year, this group extended its area of operations towards Mali and Mauritania, both as a result of the pressure that it has been put under (it may already have bases in both countries) and as a consequence of its desire to interfere in political events in neighbouring countries, particularly Mauritania. The **referendum called by President A. Bouteflika on 29 September approved a Charter for National Peace and Reconciliation** and the establishment of a **general amnesty with 97.4% of the vote**. However, it was **rejected by a number of human rights organisations** as its approval will mean that acts of violence committed by both the Armed Forces and the armed opposition groups since 1992 will go unpunished. Furthermore, even though thousands of prisoners were released on 1 November as a result of the plan, there was no reduction in levels of armed violence.

#### America

Turning to the American continent, the only armed conflict that currently remains ongoing is the one in Colombia, following the end of the armed conflict in Haiti at the beginning of 2004.

**Table 1.2. Armed conflicts in America during 2005**

Armed conflicts (beginning)	Main armed participants	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2005
<b>Colombia (1964)</b>	Government, FARC, ELN, AUC paramilitaries	Historical political exclusion, social injustice, control of natural resources and deterioration in the conflict resulting from drug-trafficking	Stalemate

The situation in the armed conflict in **Colombia** has, to a great extent, remained unchanged during the last two years. Although the AUC continued with the demobilisation process that began back in 2003, the huge number of difficulties with the process (breach of the cessation of hostilities, institutional fragility, lack of trust, etc.) prevented demobilisation from being completed in December 2005, as the Santa Fe del Rialto Agreement had stipulated (July 2003). For their part, after two and a half years of military offensives from Government Armed Forces, the FARC went on the counter-offensive, engaging in armed actions of considerable importance that had a strong impact on both the ordinary population and the country's media throughout the country, in an attempt to show that they remained a force to be reckoned with. However, for the first time in 40 years of conflict, two guerrilla leaders were extradited to the USA. Finally, the ELN appeared to be concentrating more on an internal debate over initiating talks with the Government and less on the military side, in which it suffered a number of setbacks (the detention of some medium-ranking officers, losses in the field, desertions, etc.). The government policy of *democratic security* succeeded in reducing the number of political murders and kidnappings, though the humanitarian crisis remains extremely serious.

## Asia and the Pacific

The continent of **Asia** is currently afflicted by nine armed conflicts, the causes of which are, in the main, **demands for independence by certain regions within a particular country and religious confrontation**. These conflicts involve a strong ideological content and are also closely linked to control over land. The Philippines and India account for five of these nine conflicts, the common thread being problems of governance that result in demands for greater self-government by some regions. The exploitation of natural resources, religion and the marginalisation of the area in which the conflict is taking place are additional elements that fan the flames. Compared with the situation in Africa, the United Nations has a much smaller presence in this region.

**The causes of asian conflicts are, in the main, demands for independence by certain regions within a particular country and religious confrontation.**

<b>Armed conflicts (beginning)</b>	<b>Main armed participants</b>	<b>Main causes</b>	<b>Situation compared with January 2005</b>
<b>Afghanistan (2001)</b> <sup>6</sup>	Government, USA, Taliban militias and various groups	Democratic fragility, struggle for political power and ethnic confrontations	Increase in hostilities
<b>India (Assam) (1989)</b>	ULFA, NDFB	Autonomy v. independence, and control of economic resources	Stalemate
<b>India (Jammu and Kashmir) (1989)</b>	JKLF, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	Autonomy v. independence and religious confrontation	Reduction
<b>Nepal (1996)</b>	Government, CPN	Control of political power and democratic fragility	Reduction
<b>Philippines (1969)</b>	Government, NPA	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious confrontation	Stalemate
<b>Philippines (1978)</b>	Government, MILF	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious confrontation	Temporary suspension of hostilities
<b>Philippines (1990)</b>	Government, Abu Sayyaf	Autonomy v. independence, marginalisation of some regions and religious confrontation	Stalemate
<b>Sri Lanka (1983)</b>	Government, LTTE	Autonomy v. independence, religious confrontation	Temporary suspension of hostilities
<b>Thailand (2004)</b>	Government, Muslim community militias	Autonomy v. independence, religious confrontation	Stalemate

### a) South Asia

The situation in **Afghanistan** was marked by a **significant upsurge in violence and attacks** by Taliban militias and increased operations by the Afghan Armed Forces and US troops against these militias, along with a rise in the number of suicide attacks. By the middle of November, local sources were reporting that more than 1,400 people had died during the course of the year as a result of the violence. This situation was accentuated during the general elections (held in mid-September), the first to be held for 30 years. The actual elections took place against a background of violence, with low turnouts and calls for a boycott from Taliban militias<sup>7</sup>, while HRW reported that 60% of those elected may have links with warlords. President H. Karzai called on the USA to stop engaging in any military operations that did not have the consent of his Government, indicating that Afghans should gradually become responsible for security, though he underlined that the country would continue to require an international presence. **NATO continued its expansion** of the **ISAF** (which suffered an attack that cost the mission's first lives) towards the west,

6. The current phase of the armed conflict in this country began with the attack by the USA and the United Kingdom in October 2001, though the country has actually been in a situation of armed conflict since 1979.

7. See the chapter on post-war rehabilitation.

increasing the size of the contingents from Spain, Italy and Lithuania and establishing an effective presence in 50% of the country. It plans to extend southwards during the course of 2006. Finally, in the Pakistani regions of North and South Waziristan, close to the Afghan border, there was increased fighting between Pakistani Armed Forces and members of the Taliban militias supported by other militias connected with tribal groups in the region. There was also increased activity from US forces, which provoked a great deal of opposition in a region in which the Pakistani State has no presence.

The situation has been examined in two contexts of violence in **India**. In the state of **Jammu and Kashmir**, confrontations between Government Armed Forces and Kashmiri independence groups continued throughout the year. The peace process between India and Pakistan<sup>8</sup> continued to register advances however, and the **earthquake that struck Pakistani Kashmir in October led to further rapprochement between the two countries**, ending with the armed opposition groups operating in Indian-administered Kashmir declaring a unilateral ceasefire while reconstruction work to repair the damage caused by the earthquake was being carried out. Although acts of violence were still reported, the earthquake also resulted in crossing points being opened along the Line of Control between the two parts of Kashmir to allow humanitarian work to be carried out. In the state of **Assam**, a number of armed groups remain in dispute with the Indian authorities in an issue over independence and the defence of the rights of local communities that dates back decades. Fighting between Indian security forces and the ULFA armed opposition group diminished during the course of the year, while a series of contacts between the Indian Government and a delegation appointed by the ULFA continued. Nevertheless, fighting broke out between members of opposing tribal communities, the Dimasa and the Karbi, leading to the deaths of more than 70 people in September and October.

Turning to **Nepal**, the **armed conflict in the country underwent some important changes**. At the beginning of the year, the situation deteriorated to unprecedented levels as a result of the coup d'état perpetrated by King Gyanendra, which led to the establishment of a state of emergency from February to April, systematic detentions, summary disappearances and an upsurge in fighting between the country's Armed Forces and the Maoist armed opposition group, the CPN, the main victims being the civilian population. However, these events served as a **catalyst for a rapprochement between the CPN and the coalition of parties opposed to King Gyanendra**, which culminated at the beginning of September with a unilateral **ceasefire declaration** for a period of three months (extended for a further month), aimed at reaching agreement with the opposition coalition. This temporary decision from the CPN meant a reduction in the violence and confrontations between this group and Nepalese Armed Forces, though it continued to carry out abductions. The CPN's renunciation of violence had been the condition imposed by the coalition in order to begin talks with the group aimed at creating an alliance to bring down the King. In November, the CPN announced that it was ready for this move and stressed that it was willing to return once again to political moves to resolve the armed conflict.

## **b) Southeast Asia and Oceania**

There are currently three different contexts of armed conflict in the **Philippines**, which have caused the deaths of around 3,000 soldiers and rebels during the course of the year, according to official sources. The **MILF** armed opposition group maintained the ceasefire that has been in place with Government Armed Forces since July 2003, continuing to hold peace talks throughout the year. A report by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) indicated that these developments had allowed the majority of the internally displaced, estimated at 400,000 people in 2003, to return to their homes. However, the presence of other armed groups in the region of Mindanao has caused the displacement across the whole country (but particularly in Mindanao) of around 160,000 people since the beginning of 2005. Elsewhere, fighting between Government Armed Forces and the **NPA** armed opposition group continued throughout the year with an upsurge in October following the NPA's refusal to return to the negotiating process that had been at a standstill since August, a move that led the Government to suspend the agreement on security and immuni-

ty guarantees (JASIG) for members of the political wing of the NPA. Finally, confrontations continued throughout the year between the **Abu Sayyaf** armed opposition group and Philippine Armed Forces (supported by the USA) in provinces in the south of the country (mainly Basilan and Sulu).

In the predominantly Muslim southern provinces of **Thailand**, which have endured a serious situation of violence and insecurity since the beginning of 2004, **attacks continued against both the security forces and the civilian population** (particularly the teaching community). In November, the Government once again extended the state of emergency imposed on the region (renewed every three months), due to the persisting violence which has left more than 1,100 dead and 1,700 injured since January. This decision was criticised because it is widely thought that the measure has not been effective in reducing levels of violence and merely increases mistrust of the Government by the local population. The state of emergency allows the Government to order curfews, detain suspects without charge, prohibit demonstrations and publications and grant immunity (civil, criminal and disciplinary) to functionaries in the performance of their duties. The broad majority won by the Thai Rak Thai party, led by current Prime Minister T. Shinawatra, in the February elections led to fears of an increase in the government's authoritarian approach, though the situation remained unchanged.

## Europe

There was an upsurge in violence in Chechnya during the course of the year, and the impact and regional effect of the conflict continued to widen to other republics in the central and eastern Caucasus.

<b>Armed conflicts (beginning)</b>	<b>Main armed participants</b>	<b>Main causes</b>	<b>Situation compared with January 2005</b>
<b>Russian Federation (Chechnya) (1991)</b>	Russian Government and the pro-Russian administration in Chechnya, Chechen armed opposition groups	Autonomy v. independence	Increase in hostilities

The most notable event this year in the Transcaucasian Republic of **Chechnya (Russia)** was the **assassination in March of the former Chechen President and independence leader, A. Maskhadov**, at the hands of the Russian secret service. He was replaced by Chechen leader, A. K. Sadulayev (his stand-in for the last two years), who announced the withdrawal of Maskhadov's offer to Russia to open peace talks. This led to an increase in the number of attacks by Chechen groups against Russian Armed Forces, with an intensification of the violence in the neighbouring regions of Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria and persistent complaints about the human rights violations being committed by Russian security forces in the region. The killing of A. Maskhadov follows the death of another Chechen commander, A. Avdorkhanov, who also represented the moderate side of Chechen opposition, and Moscow's strategy may be to silence the moderate sectors of Chechen opposition in order to remove any kind of legitimacy from Chechen claims and reduce them to their most violent and radical form. This was illustrated by the appointment of S. Basayev, the representative of the most hard-line sectors of Chechen resistance, as Prime Minister and number two in the political and military structure that is opposing the republic's occupation. Parliamentary elections held in the republic in November were classified as fraudulent by the EU, human rights groups and Chechen separatist spokespeople.

**Moscow's strategy may be to silence the moderate sectors of Chechen opposition in order to remove any kind of legitimacy from Chechen claims.**

## Middle East

The two conflicts affecting this region have important repercussions on the international political stage. In the **Palestinian case**, the injustice that the Palestinian people continue to suffer is clear, and both sides are affected by the violence, though to very different degrees. There is also a clear inability and lack of political

will among the international community to resolve a conflict that has endured for more than 50 years. Elsewhere, the situation surrounding the USA's preventive war in Iraq continued to degenerate, demonstrating Washington's inability to control events.

**Table 1.5. Armed conflicts in the Middle East in 2005**

Armed conflicts (beginning)	Main armed participants	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2005
<b>Iraq (2003)</b>	Transitional Government, USA/ United Kingdom coalition, internal and external armed opposition groups	Struggle for political power and opposition to the presence of foreign troops, access to oil resources and US military strategy	Increase in hostilities
<b>Israel-Palestine (2000, II Intifada)<sup>9</sup></b>	Israeli Government, settlement militias, PNA, armed wings of the Hamas and Islamic Jihad organisations, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, PFLP, DFLP	Occupation, colonisation and control over land, religious confrontation, security problems and political recognition	Stalemate

In the conflict between **Israel** and **Palestine**, the state of insecurity and chaos increased throughout the year in the occupied territories. In August, **Israeli Armed Forces evacuated the settlements located in the occupied territories on the Gaza Strip**. This operation, part of the Unilateral Disengagement Plan, was completed in spite of opposition from important sectors of Israeli society and settler groups. Elsewhere, the Israeli Government, which resumed its policy of **selectively assassinating Palestinian leaders and activists**, approved a new route for the Wall in Jerusalem, which cuts off more than a quarter of the city's Palestinian population (a total of around 230,000 people) from the rest of the city. It continued to extend the Wall throughout the rest of the West Bank. Following pressure from the United States, Israel agreed to open the border between Egypt and Gaza from 25 November, and although it will continue to monitor the crossing point with closed-circuit TV cameras, it will not have the power to order EU agents supervising the border to detain Palestinians suspects. At the end of the year, Hamas declared an end to the informal and unilateral ceasefire that had been in place for a year, as the Israelis had not met any of the undertakings required by the PNA in Cairo (an end to all forms of aggression in Palestinian territories and the release of prisoners and detainees). Israel found itself thrown into new elections in March 2006 following the breakdown in the coalition between Likud and Labour and the formation of a new political party, Kadima, by A. Sharon, with support from S. Peres. The fragile state of A. Sharon's health at the end of the year created a climate of uncertainty regarding his participation in the electoral process.

The situation in **Iraq** during 2005 was marked by **persisting high levels of violence** by Iraqi insurgent groups fighting the occupying forces and Iraqi security forces in almost all parts of the country, particularly Baghdad and Basra, and by counter-insurgency operations by the USA. In total, the conflict has now left around 30,000 civilians and 2,000 members of the US military dead since it began in 2003. Particularly notable was the US offensive against the Iraqi city of Tal Afar, which left hundreds of people dead and caused the displacement of thousands of civilians. Violence increased as the parliamentary elections of 15 December approached<sup>10</sup>. Two months earlier, the Iraqi Constitution was approved amid complaints from the Sunni community of irregularities in the process. The rejection of the Constitution by two thirds of voters in two Sunni provinces was not enough to prevent its approval, as a two thirds majority was required from a third province in order for approval to be blocked. Throughout the year, the USA repeatedly pressed the new Government to include representatives from the Sunni community, in an attempt to confirm the system of ethnic and religious division that the USA wants to see as part of Iraq's political future. **Confrontation between the various Iraqi communities is being encouraged from a number of directions**, as illustrated by the first open clashes between Shiite and Sunni militias.

9. Although the armed conflict began in 1948, this report only examines the most recent phase of the conflict relating to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Intifada, which began in September 2000.

10. See Appendix IV.

## 1.3. Other issues linked with armed conflicts

The following is an analysis of two issues connected with the armed conflicts currently underway around the world, these being a) the role and nature of non-state armed actors, and b) the UN Security Council.

### a) The role and nature of non-state armed actors

The multiplicity of non-state armed actors (which include liberation movements, insurgent groups, guerrillas, militias, paramilitaries, civilian self-defence groups, warlords, mercenaries, terrorist groups, etc.) has increased over time and become ever more complex in today's armed conflicts. This section is intended to offer an analysis of the different kinds of armed fighters that have become involved in the armed conflicts currently being contested around the world, and the characteristics that identify them<sup>11</sup>. These characteristics determine the way that the armed conflicts in which they are involved will develop and the form that they will take, as well as affecting the peace agreements that are established, among other factors. It should also be stressed that the phenomenon of **terrorism**, which has taken on enormous importance since 9/11<sup>12</sup>, must form part of any generic analysis of the nature of non-state armed groups, given the distortion and contamination that this phenomenon has created in our understanding of today's armed conflicts, and given that it has led to a new reading of international relations and the delegitimising and simplification of other discourses from armed opposition groups who use violence to achieve specific political objectives. At the same time, it has meant that security has taken priority over justice, freedom and a respect for human rights, a direct result of the fight to combat the phenomenon of global terrorism.

A non-state armed actor is understood to be any armed body that uses force to achieve its objectives and is not under the control of the state<sup>13</sup>. This is a useful definition, as it avoids politically charged terms such as "terrorist" or "liberation movement", and does not enter into any examination of the dynamics of the armed conflict itself. The general characteristics of such bodies are set out below.

#### Chart 1.3. General characteristics of non-state armed actors<sup>14</sup>

1) A non-state armed actor generally has some kind of **basic command structure**, though this may not necessarily be unified. The effectiveness of the control system and basic command structure is demonstrated by the level of discipline among combatants, an issue that takes on great importance when engaging in peace negotiations and ensuring respect for International Humanitarian Law. This is demonstrated by the divisions and internal struggles that arise within groups, the respect shown for the terms established in a peace agreement and, above all, respect for cessations of hostilities and ceasefires, the steps that precede the achievement of final agreement.

2) The **level of independence from state control** is a highly important question, as some armed groups operate as an extension of, in collaboration with or under the orders of the Government of the country in which they are active, such as the pro-Government Janjaweed militia in Darfur (**Sudan**), the Guardians of the Peace (**Burundi**), the people's defence groups (**Nepal**), the Interahamwe militias (**Rwanda**) and the Mai Mai militias (**DR Congo**), to give just a few examples. The phenomenon of paramilitarism is characterised by the fact that it takes place outside the law, and the State's involvement is often obvious but not officially acknowledged.

3) The **use of violence to achieve certain political objectives**, given that in some cases these political objectives are not clearly defined, and in other cases the armed struggle is aimed at the installation of a regime based on conditions of social justice. This aim is often pushed to one side, and there is no guaranteed protection for the civilian population whom the armed group is sup-

11. Several studies have examined this issue in depth, including Conciliation Resources, *Choosing to engage: Armed groups and peace processes*, 2005; Petrusek, D., *Ends and Means: Human Rights Approaches to Armed Groups*, International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2001; <<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/EndsandMeans.pdf>>; Glaser, Max P., *Humanitarian Engagement with Non-State Actors*, Humanitarian Policy Group, 2005; Watkin, K., *Warriors without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy*, 2005; Policzer, P., *Neither terrorists nor freedom fighters*, 2004.

12. Although earlier signs had already been seen with the attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (1998) and the attack on the American warship USS-Cole in Yemen (2000).

13. See Petrusek, D., *End and Means: Human Rights Approaches to Armed Groups*, International Council on Human Rights Policy, 2001.

14. See Glaser, Max P., *Humanitarian Engagement with Non-State Actors*, Humanitarian Policy Group, 2005.

posed to represent and whose living conditions are used to justify the continuation of the armed violence. However, the fact that a group represents a non-state body does not necessarily mean that its claims are illegitimate, nor that all the actions carried out by State bodies (State security forces, i.e. the Armed Forces or the police) are legitimate.

4) **Effective control over a particular population or territory.** This characteristic is not common to all armed groups and shows the degree to which non-state armed actors depend on support from the civilian population. Control over a particular territory or an effective presence there is not a synonym for having clearly defined borders, it merely means that the group controls this territory as a result of its military operations (radius of action), tactical strategies, supply system or extortion. Its presence in or occupation of the territory may not be permanent. It can be intermittent (as with the LRA in the north of **Uganda**), remote, or act through representation (A. Rwasas's FNL in various provinces in **Burundi** has created a structure that is parallel to that of the Government). Likewise, effective control over the population should not be interpreted as meaning that these civilians identify with or support the aims of the armed group (militias and political parties in the Niger Delta in **Nigeria**), since control may be exercised through abuse, intimidation, propaganda or irregular hostile action, aimed at preventing these areas and their people from falling into the hands of the armed group's rivals (Darfur, in **Sudan**). However, such support will in the majority of cases be invisible or expressed in ambiguous terms, and any lack of support, criticism or opposition will also be kept quiet.

However, these characteristics preclude criminal activity in the broadest sense of the term (criminal groups do not aspire to gain control over the population or territory but instead use extortion and violence to achieve financial rather than political objectives), terrorist organisations (an ambiguous term since terrorism is increasingly being used as a tactic of war, though as we have mentioned, it is also aimed at delegitimising certain groups) and private commercial actors (private security companies and mercenaries, whose use and involvement in today's Armed Forces is becoming increasingly important). However, the dividing line between non-state armed actors and this type of group is becoming increasingly blurred in a number of contexts.

## b) The UN Security Council and armed conflicts

The establishment of resolutions and sanctions by the UN Security Council, whose main task is to **maintain international peace and security**, has been very uneven during the last four years. The arbitrary and selective way in which the Council has worked since its inception, due to the existence and abuse of the right of veto exercised by its five permanent members when the Council discusses measures to deal with situations that represent a threat to international peace and security, has weakened the legitimacy and manoeuvrability of a body that ought to be the guarantor of peace and security without exclusion or restriction.

Of the 32 armed conflicts that broke out during the period from 2002 to 2005, resolutions have only been passed in 16 cases<sup>15</sup>. The existence of a resolution in each context will have a specific reading, though it does at least mean that more attention is being paid to the situation by the international community. If one makes a region by region analysis, one can see that the Council made no pronouncement in relation to 8 of the 15 armed conflicts suffered by Africa during the period in question, despite the number of deaths caused. On the American continent, Haiti was protected by the international community, as it had been during the 1990s, though Colombia was not. Of the 12 armed conflicts seen in Asia during this period, the Council only got involved in the case of Afghanistan (except for the attack on Bali, Indonesia), particularly following the attack on the Twin Towers in the USA. Russia, another of the Council's permanent members has not allowed any pronouncement on the serious human rights violations being perpetrated in Chechnya, in contrast to the two armed conflicts in the Middle East, which are among the situations that have given rise to most resolutions in the organisation's history.

15. In another three cases, Colombia, Indonesia (three conflicts) and Russia, a number of resolutions have been passed in relation purely to isolated attacks, but these make no reference whatsoever to the existing armed conflict, meaning that there are really 21 unresolved armed conflicts for which no resolution has been passed, rather than the 16 quoted.

**Table 1.6. Armed conflicts and Security Council Resolutions between 2002 and 2005\***

<b>Africa (8/15)</b>	<b>Algeria</b> (1992) (0), <b>Burundi</b> (1993) (6), Central African Republic (2002-2003) (0), Congo (1998-2003) (0), <b>Côte d'Ivoire</b> (2002) (9), <b>DR Congo</b> (1998) (11), Liberia (1998-2005) (14), Nigeria (central and northern regions) (2003-2005) (0), <b>Nigeria (Niger Delta)</b> (2003) (0), Nigeria (Kaduna) (2002) (0), Senegal (Casamance) (1982-2003) (0), <b>Somalia</b> (1988) (7), Sudan (SPLA) (1983-2004) (8), <b>Sudan (Darfur)</b> (2003) (8), <b>Uganda (LRA)</b> (1986) (0)
<b>America (2/2)</b>	<b>Colombia</b> (1964) (1), Haiti (2004-2005) (4)
<b>Asia (1/12)</b>	<b>Afghanistan</b> (2001) (12), <b>India (Assam)</b> (1989) (0), India (Gujarat) (2002-2002) (0), <b>India (Jammu and Kashmir)</b> (1989) (0), Indonesia (Aceh) (1976-2005) (0), Indonesia (Irian Jaya) (1963-2004) (0), <b>Nepal</b> (1996) (0), <b>Philippines (Abu Sayyaf)</b> (1991) (0), <b>Philippines (MILF)</b> (1978) (0), <b>Philippines (NPA)</b> , (1969) (0), <b>Sri Lanka</b> (1989) (0), <b>Thailand</b> (2004) (0)
<b>Europe (1/1)</b>	<b>Russia (Chechnya)</b> (1991) (1)
<b>Middle East (2/2)</b>	<b>Iraq</b> (2003) (14), <b>Israel-Palestine</b> (2000) (12)

\* The figures shown in brackets after each country indicate the year in which the armed conflict in question began and ended, and the number of resolutions passed. Armed conflicts still ongoing at the end of 2005 are shown in bold. The numbers shown in brackets after the region are the number of countries for which resolutions were passed during the conflict and the total number of conflicts.




## 2. Situations of tension and high-risk disputes

This chapter identifies and analyses the different contexts of tension seen around the world during 2005, distinguishing between those which require particular attention as a result of the increased possibility that they may escalate into a situation of armed conflict (a total of 23) and those in which tensions are somewhat less intense (a total of 33). A map detailing the various areas of tension is included at the end of the chapter.

### 2.1. Situations of tension: definition and characteristics

The following chapter contains an analysis of the situations of tension and disputes considered to be high-risk during 2005 (indicator no. 2), bearing in mind that the great majority of them have their origins in previous years. **Situations of tension and high-risk disputes** are understood to be contexts in which there are serious situations of social and political polarisation, with confrontations between political, ethnic or religious groups or between these groups and the state, which involve alterations in the operation of the state's own institutions (coups d'état, curfews and States of Exception or Emergency<sup>1</sup>), and in which there are significant levels of destruction, death or enforced displacement. It is possible that increased tensions in these contexts may, in the short or medium term, eventually explode into armed conflict (Table 2.2). We have also examined those contexts in which the situation of tension is **less intense** and, therefore, less likely to lead to armed conflict in the short or medium term, even though such situations nevertheless require particular monitoring and attention (Table 2.3)<sup>2</sup>.



At the end of 2005 **there were 56 contexts of tension in all**. It should be borne in mind that some countries may be involved in several of these situations (in the case of Uganda, India and Lebanon), while more than one situation of tension may exist within a single country (in the case of Sudan and Indonesia). There was little change from the previous year's total figure of 58. The variation in actual cases, as can be seen from the following table 2.1, resulted from the inclusion of ten new contexts of tension, the majority in Africa, and the removal of 12 contexts no longer classified as situations of tension, the majority of which were once again in Africa<sup>3</sup>.

1. For the purposes of this report, a state of emergency is understood to mean a situation in which constitutional order is disrupted with the restriction of certain basic freedoms. This term is used differently in different legislatures, such as, for example, State of Exception, interior disturbance, State of National Disaster, etc.

2. Both types of context (tension and reduced tension) include situations in which peace agreements have at some time been signed between opposing parties, though difficulties have been experienced in their implementation.

3. Mention should be made of the case of the countries in the Great Lakes Region (DR Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda), as the tensions between Uganda and Rwanda were treated as a separate case in 2004, while this year we have adopted a regional approach which, given the evolution of the situation in question, allows for a better analysis of the situation.

**Table 2.1. Situations of tension in 2004 that were no longer classified as such in 2005 and new situations of tension**

Continent	Situations of tension in 2004 that were no longer classified as such in 2005 <sup>4</sup>	New situations of tension in 2005 <sup>5</sup>
<b>Africa</b>	Angola (Lundas)–DR Congo, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire–Burkina Faso, Ghana (Dagbon), Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal (Casamance)	Ethiopia (Ogaden), Liberia, Nigeria (central and northern regions), Sudan (East), Tanzania (Zanzibar), Togo
<b>America</b>	Brazil (Rio)	Haiti
<b>Asia</b>	India (Gujarat), India (Manipur)	Myanmar
<b>Middle East</b>	Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen	Lebanon, Egypt

## 2.2. Evolution of situations of tension

The following sections contain an analysis of the 23 contexts of tension reported during 2005 that are regarded as having the potential to escalate into armed conflict in the short or medium term. By continent, Africa has the highest number of such contexts, and it should be particularly noted that two of these situations threaten the stability of a number of countries. Central Asia and the Caucasus are the scene of four situations of tension, while both Asia and Latin America have three.

**Table 2.2. Tensions during 2005**

<b>Africa</b>	Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea – Ethiopia, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Great Lakes Region, Manu River Region, Togo, Zimbabwe
<b>America</b>	Bolivia, Ecuador, Haiti, Peru
<b>Asia</b>	Philippines, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
<b>Europe and Central Asia</b>	Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan
<b>Middle East</b>	Egypt, Lebanon, Syria

### Africa

Nine situations of tension have been analysed on the continent of Africa, of which two relate to geographical regions that each cover four countries (the Great Lakes and the Manu River). A number of the contexts analysed are characterised by the fact that they are or have been involved in electoral processes, particularly notable of which are the first democratic elections in Ethiopia and the election of a female President in Liberia. In addition, a number of the contexts analysed are notable for the presence of armed groups in neighbouring territories, a fact that plays an important part in regional destabilisation.

#### a) Southern Africa

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2005
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	Democratic fragility (political and economic crisis)	Increased tension

**Zimbabwe** once again suffered significant periods of tension throughout the year that continued to place the country in a perilous state. Firstly, the two sets of elections held during the year (for Parliament in March and the Senate in November) led to a worrying **weakening of the main opposition group, the MDC**. While the parliamentary elections ended in the party's crushing defeat by the governing ZANU-PF, the prob-

4. None of these tensions have escalated into armed conflict. In addition, peace negotiations have begun in Senegal (Casamance).

5. The tensions in central and northern parts of Nigeria are the consequence of a situation of armed conflict.

lems in November resulted from a dispute within the opposition party which resulted in predictions of a split in the group. Secondly, the **campaign of mass evictions by R. Mugabe's regime** (known as "Operation Restore Order"), which was supposedly aimed at removing dwellings regarded as unhealthy in the suburbs of the larger cities and which left more than 700,000 people homeless, **resulted in the country being further isolated by the international community**. In this regard, a number of governments around the world threatened to extend their current sanctions against the regime in Harare. Meanwhile, opposition groups and ordinary civilians complained about the passive stance taken by the international community, while attempts by several countries (particularly South Africa) to mediate an end to the unending climate of political tension were repeatedly rejected by the parties involved.

## b) West Africa

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2005
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	Democratic fragility (institutional and political instability)	Stalemate
<b>Manu River region (Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Guinea)<sup>6</sup></b>	Widespread destabilisation due to forced displacement and the flow of arms and mercenaries	Stalemate
<b>Togo</b>	Political and institutional crisis	Stalemate

The situation in **Guinea-Bissau** worsened seriously at the end of 2005, leading to renewed fears of an outbreak of violence. The event that influenced developments throughout the year was the **holding of presidential elections** in June and July, which for the international community symbolised a final turning point in the country's stabilisation following the coup that brought down President K. Yala in September 2003. The violence between supporters of the different political factions that proceeded the elections did not reflect the general workings of the voting process, **which in the end took place in a climate of relative normality**, supervised by a group of international observers. Nevertheless, **the victory achieved by the controversial former soldier and one-time leader of the country, J. B. 'Nino' Vieira**, led to a complex situation, with the enforced co-existence of the new President and the Prime Minister at the time, C. Gomes Junior, who belonged to one of the country's main parties, the PAIGC. Citing his inability to deal with the main problems facing the former Portuguese colony, the new President dismissed C. Gomes Junior at the end of October, shortly after taking power. He appointed A. Gomes as his new Prime Minister, without gaining any consent or consensus from all the different political groups, thus creating a new atmosphere of uncertainty.

The situation in the so-called **Manu River** region continued to depend on developments in the various contexts of conflict taking place there. **Liberia** entered a more promising phase with the **election in November of E. Johnson-Sirleaf as the country's new President**. However, quite apart from the huge number of challenges that remain to be faced by the country, the figure of former leader C. Taylor, who has been in exile in Nigeria since the end of the armed conflict in 2003 and whom the Special Court for Sierra Leone wants to put on trial for war crimes, still represents a cause for concern, not only for Liberia's own future but also for other countries in the region. Elsewhere, the **failure of the disarmament and demobilisation process that should have led to general elections in Côte d'Ivoire** made this country the main destabilising element in the region. Although no significant incidents were reported in either **Sierra Leone** (from which UNAMSIL withdrew at the end of the year after a stay of almost six years) or **Guinea** (awash with rumours of a coup d'état), a number of reports throughout the year warned of the **links between armed groups, the constant flow of weapons and the enforced recruitment of children by the warring parties**.

**Togo** was one of the main contexts of tension on the continent of Africa. The **death in February of the long-standing dictator, G. Eyadema**, after 40 years in power, and the subsequent **attempt by the**

6. The Manu River region covers Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. However, the situation in Côte d'Ivoire is also taken into account here, given its proximity and its influence on the surrounding area. The situation of tension between the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso will also be analysed within the framework of this region.

**Armed Forces to replace him with his son, F. Gnassingbé, led to a wave of protests and confrontations** that left between 150 and 400 people dead. The intense pressure imposed by the international community, and particularly by organisations and countries in the region, finally forced the holding of **elections in April, which F. Gnassingbé won with 60% of the vote, amid accusations of fraud** though with the blessing of a controversial internal observer group. However, the refusal of the opposition and civilian groups to accept the result of the elections has left the country in a situation that could break out into conflict.

### c) Horn of Africa

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2005
<b>Eritrea and Ethiopia</b>	Territorial disputes	Increased tension
<b>Ethiopia</b>	Democratic fragility and problems of governance	Increased tension

Throughout the year, **Eritrea** and **Ethiopia** saw an increase in tensions as the result of the stalling of the border demarcation process and the absence of any dialogue between the two countries. This situation became evident following the **movement of troops in November to the border area** close to the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) supervised by UNMEE, **leading to fears of a resumption of hostilities** between the two countries. UNMEE reported that the military situation in November was tense and potentially volatile, and the international community called on both countries to contain the situation. The restrictions placed on UNMEE's aircraft by Eritrea from October onwards, in an attempt to force the international community to put pressure on Ethiopia (which is responsible for the halt in the demarcation process), seriously restricted UNMEE's ability to supervise the TSZ. The UN Security Council asked Eritrea to end its restriction, calling on both parties to show moderation and refrain from their mutual threats to use force. It also gave them 30 days to return to their deployment levels of December 2004 (a move that was partially successful), threatening to impose sanctions. Eritrea accused the Security Council of bias, since it had not penalised Ethiopia for its failure to implement border demarcation.

In addition, mention should be made of the violence that broke out in **Ethiopia** following the **rejection by opposition parties of the results of the first democratic elections in the country's history**, held in May. Repressive action by the security forces in the capital and other cities left 42 people dead in June and 46 in November, and led to the arrest of more than 10,000 people, including opposition leaders and a number of journalists. In addition, the Government decided to try leaders of the opposition CUD party for treason as a result of their boycott of the new Parliament and their attempts to instigate a revolt to bring down the Government. **The USA and the EU called on the Government to end its actions against opposition leaders** and ordered compliance with a number of demands, including the lifting of restrictions on opposition leaders, the release of those detained for political reasons and the reopening of private media organisations that had been closed down. The donor community announced that it was reviewing its cooperation with the country in order to prevent the partisan distribution of aid.

### d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2005
<b>Chad</b>	Struggle for political power, democratic fragility, destabilisation caused by forced displacements resulting from the conflict in Darfur	Increased tension
<b>Central African Republic</b>	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	Increased tension
<b>Great Lakes region (DR Congo – Burundi – Rwanda – Uganda)</b>	Control of natural resources, search for border security	Stalemate

The situation in **Chad** deteriorated seriously throughout the year to a point where it seemed to be preparing for war with Sudan, while a number of factors **put the survival of the governing regime in danger**.

At the end of the year, the Government declared that it was at war with Sudan following the attacks carried out in December by the armed opposition group “Rally for Democracy and Liberty” (RDL) in the border town of Adre, which left between 100 and 300 people from both the RDL and the Chadian Armed Forces dead. Chad believes that this group is being armed and run by the Sudanese Government, an accusation that the group itself denies. Chad’s declaration of war was also aggravated by the fact that the **Sudanese pro-government Janjaweed militias continued to carry out incursion and attacks** throughout the year against the constant flow of refugees in the east of the country, leading to confrontations between these militias and Chadian Armed Forces. The RDL, which emerged following the desertion in October of dozens of Chadian soldiers (who moved to the east of the country), claims to have some 4,000 troops, and it is calling for the President’s resignation as a prior step to entering negotiations. This situation was preceded by a rebellion in the Armed Forces that was put down by the Government in 2004. The rebels wanted Chad to do more to support the rebellion in Darfur, where the people form part of the same Zaghawa community that is prominent among the country’s political and military organisations. President I. Déby also dismissed the presidential guard, a decision seen by some analysts as an attempt to save his Government. Finally, the Government decided to **repeal part of the law on profits from oil** which required it to reserve some of the profits from its oil business to provide for the welfare of future generations.

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In the **Central African Republic, fighting broke out between the Armed Forces and a number of militias** and unidentified armed groups in the north of the country. This has led, since June, to the enforced displacement of thousands of people to neighbouring Chad (45,000 Central African refugees). According to UNHCR, **rapes, looting and other acts of violence were perpetrated against the civilian population**. It is difficult for the United Nations and humanitarian NGOs to gain access to the north of the country, due to the current lack of security. UNHCR representatives in the south of Chad stressed that the situation involves much more than just simple acts of looting. In an attempt to maintain security along their border, both Chadian and Central African Armed Forces carried out joint military operations in the region. CEMAC troops were deployed in the north-east of the country in October in an attempt to improve the security situation. **The United Nations warned that the Central African Republic could enter a new phase of violence** if the international community did not provide the assistance required in order to deal with the humanitarian crisis and the current lack of security.

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Turning to the tensions between **DR Congo, Uganda and Rwanda**, the announcement by the **Rwandan armed opposition group, the FDLR, that it was abandoning the armed struggle against Rwanda and that it condemned the genocide of between 500,000 and a million people in Rwanda by its members in 1994** (an event that could bring an end to the armed conflict and the tensions that have arisen since 1994 between DR Congo and Rwanda) did not lead to any change of approach from Rwanda or any significant advance during the course of the year. Following the expiry of the 30 September deadline for the voluntary disarmament of the armed groups operating in the east of the country, Congolese Armed Forces began military operations against sections of the FDLR in November<sup>7</sup>. The group has been living in the east of DR Congo since 1994, and from there has launched regular attacks against Rwanda, a situation that has led to a number of disputes and incursions into Congolese territory by Rwandan Armed Forces. Elsewhere, the Ugandan armed opposition group, the LRA, temporarily entered north-eastern DR Congo from the south of Sudan, leading to a rise in tensions between the two countries and threats from Uganda that it would once again invade DR Congo. Uganda has around 10,000 troops ranged along this border.

7. See the chapter on armed conflict.

## America

Four contexts of tension are examined on the American continent. One of these is in the Caribbean, Haiti, which is still suffering problems of security and governance. The remainder are in South America and are all characterised by the fact that they have suffered periods of institutional instability (the resignation or overthrow of their Presidents, or calls for their resignation) while simultaneously undergoing various periods of socio-economic and political crisis.

### a) North and Central America and the Caribbean

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2005
Haiti	Political and economic breakdown and social polarisation	Stalemate

In **Haiti**, the parliamentary, presidential and regional **elections** planned for the last three months of the year had to be **postponed on several occasions** due to the many financial and logistical problems encountered by the electoral authorities, in addition to the **precarious security situation**. In addition, in

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spite of the almost complete deployment of the United Nations peace-keeping mission (MINUSTAH) and increased operations against the large number of armed gangs operating in the country, **high levels of violence and criminality** were still recorded throughout the year, mainly in the poorest and most densely populated districts of **the capital**. However, there was a positive **reduction in the potentially destabilising factor represented by former members of the military**, who until the middle of the year were still in *de facto* control of a number of northern regions and frequently engaged in acts of violence and intimidation as part of their claims for the reestablishment of the Armed Forces, the payment of back salaries and access to membership of state bodies.

### b) South America

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2005
Bolivia	Problems of governance	Increased tension
Ecuador	Problems of governance	Increased tension
Peru	Problems of governance	Increased tension

In **Bolivia**, the **prolonged and huge demonstrations** seen during the first part of the year heightened the serious governance problems affecting the country, eventually forcing the **resignation of C. Mesa** and the subsequent **election of E. Rodriguez as provisional President**. The numerous protests, led mainly by the MAS, the coca-growers movement and some peasant and indigenous organisations, centred principally on the Government's **anti-drugs** and energy policies (particularly the degree to which **hydrocarbon fuels are nationalised**), the neo-liberalist policies adopted by the Bolivian Government during recent years, the **marginalisation** suffered by some **regions** of the country and the claims for **autonomy** voiced by others, and recognition of indigenous rights. The situation was further aggravated by the **declaration of a transitional autonomous Government in the Santa Cruz administrative region, the largest and richest in the country**. In spite of the fact that the new President partially succeeded in quelling the protests, the provisional Government had to deal with an institutional crisis caused at the end of the year by the distribution of parliamentary seats among the different administrative districts, along with the increased tensions caused by the campaign preceding the presidential elections, which MAS leader E. Morales won by a large margin.

In **Ecuador**, the **removal of L. Gutierrez** as President in April and the appointment of A. Palacio in his place ended **many months of mass protests against the government's management of the country**

**and the restructuring of a number of judicial bodies** (particularly the Supreme Court of Justice), which had been unilaterally ordered by the government-controlled Congress in December 2004. However, only weeks after leaving the country, L. Gutierrez refused the diplomatic asylum offered by Brazil and subsequently by Colombia, **returning to Ecuador**. Although imprisoned, he claimed he was the country's legitimate president and **announced that he was willing to regain leadership of the country by peaceful means**. However, some sources warned of acts of destabilisation that were being orchestrated by some groups linked with the former president. Elsewhere, A. Palacio's Government imposed a **state of emergency in some Amazon regions** in order to control **protests against the US oil company OXY**, and at the end of the year it had to deal with a serious **institutional crisis** between the Executive and the Legislature over disagreements relating to the mechanisms required for the reform of the Constitution.

In **Peru**, the **political crisis** that has afflicted the country in recent years and the **fragility of A. Toledo's Government** worsened throughout the year due to accusations of corruption and constant **demands for the president's resignation**. Other factors include the frequent cabinet crises and reshuffles, the interference in the country's political affairs by former president A. Fujimori and the numerous **mass demonstrations** by different groups which have on occasion interrupted basic services and brought the country's economy to a standstill. In addition, to mark the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the so-called "people's war" by *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) and the opening of the trial of its leader, **the group carried out armed incursions and propaganda campaigns** during the course of the year in some of the forest regions where it had been most active during the armed conflict and where the Government had stepped up its security presence. Finally, it should be mentioned that the end of the year saw the opening of the trial of 160 soldiers who rebelled for a number of days at the beginning of the year, leaving around twenty people dead or injured. The Government also experienced a serious crisis and there was a notable increase in political tension in the country.

### Chart 2.1. The United Nations and conflict-prevention in 2005

During 2005, the United Nations reaffirmed the need to increase global efforts aimed at conflict-prevention, recognising the enormous human cost and great material losses caused by conflicts the world over. The points raised in connection with this issue focus on three main areas. Firstly, a strong emphasis is placed on the **role of the Security Council and the need to increase its effectiveness** in the area of prevention, particularly in Africa. In this regard, Security Council Resolution 1625 from September 2005 encourages the strengthening of diplomatic initiatives for prevention, early warning systems, the promotion of transparency in electoral processes and actions to combat the illegal exploitation and trafficking of natural resources, among other measures. However, in respect of the approval of this resolution, mention should be made of the express claim by African states for permanent representation on the Security Council, given that, in spite of the fact that a large number of the world's contexts of tension and conflict are to be found on the continent, it does not have the corresponding decision-making capacity in the international arena.

Secondly, the United Nations acknowledged the **important role played by civil society** in the area of conflict prevention. As a result, the first Global Conference on the Role of Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflict and Peace-Building, held in New York in July 2005, set out the need to strengthen civil organisations, given their comparative advantages in a huge number of areas relating to prevention, such as their presence on the ground, their experience and their knowledge and abilities at a local level, as well as their links with and influence over local communities and their resulting potential as facilitators between opposing groups.

Finally, mention was made of the **need to strengthen regional and local organisations** in their conflict-prevention activities. Security Council Resolution 1631 of October 2005 called for the strengthening of cooperation between the United Nations and these organisations (particularly within the framework of the Standing Agreements System), urging member states to provide them with technical and financial assistance as well as staff. Particular reference was also made to the important role of regional and sub-regional organisations in the fight against the illegal trafficking of small arms and light weapons, and the subsequent need to deal with crossover issues such those as part of conflict-prevention. Indeed, the approach of the United Nations, which has been reinforced in recent years, is to regard the definition of conflict-prevention in its widest sense, taking account of the basic causes and not just the sparks that finally ignite the conflict. This has led it to take an endless series of structural measures on board.

In addition to the aspects mentioned above, while discussing the issue of conflict-prevention within the United Nations we should not forget the recently created **Peace-Building Commission**, whose duty is to prevent the resumption of armed conflicts once they have ended, following the observation that during the last 20 years, around 50% of conflicts have resumed within 5 years of a peace agreement being signed.

## Asia

Three situations of tension are analysed in Asia. Both Pakistan and the Philippines are the scene of more than one context of tension. In both Sri Lanka and the Philippines, the presence and involvement of armed opposition groups has defined the current political situation and affected security conditions in the country in question, this being particularly the case with the ceasefire declared in Sri Lanka.

### a) Southern Asia

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2005
<b>Pakistan</b>	Religious confrontation, the fight against terrorism	Increased tension
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	Autonomy v. independence, religious differences	Increased tension

**Pakistan** experienced an increasing number of episodes of violence throughout the year in the different contexts of tension around the country. On the one hand there were **armed confrontations in the region of Waziristan**, close to the border with Afghanistan, which involved combatants allegedly linked with the Taliban militias and Al-Qaeda and which left dozens dead during the course of the year. On the other, there were **religious attacks in different cities around the country** which on a number of occasions sparked off violent riots and fighting between the Sunni and Shiite communities in Karachi and Islamabad, among other places. During the last part of the year, the city that witnessed the worst episodes of violence was Gilgit, where a curfew was imposed following fighting between civilians and the security forces which left 12 people dead and 100 people in detention.

2005 was marked by a deterioration in the security situation in **Sri Lanka**, as a result of **increased violations of the ceasefire signed by the Government and the LTTE armed opposition group**. The most significant event was the assassination of the Foreign Minister, L. Kardigamar, which was overwhelmingly attributed to the LTTE (though the armed group itself denies that it was behind the attack) and which led to an announcement from the EU that none of its member states would receive any delegation from the armed group that travelled to Europe. For its part, the Government experienced several moments of crisis as a result of internal differences between the parties forming the governing coalition. **Prime Minister M. Rajapakse emerged as the winner in the presidential elections held in November** (which was affected by a boycott called by the LTTE), beating his main rival, R. Wickremesinghe, and **giving rise to further uncertainties as regards the future of the peace process**.

**2005 was marked by a deterioration in the security situation in Sri Lanka, as a result of increased violations of the ceasefire signed by the Government and the LTTE armed opposition group.**

### b) Southeast Asia and Oceania

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2005
<b>Philippines</b>	Democratic fragility	Increased tension

In the **Philippines**, **fighting at the beginning of the year between the Armed Forces and a break-away faction from the MNLF armed opposition group** left 125 dead and caused the displacement of tens of thousands of people in the **Sulu archipelago** (in the south). Following these events, the **Government**, which claimed that the MNLF faction had been supported by the Abu Sayyaf armed opposition group, deployed thousands of additional forces in the south of the country and announced its **intention to fully implement the 1996 peace agreement**. Elsewhere, **President G. Macapagal Arroyo** faced a large amount of political pressure and **continuing mass demonstrations calling on her to resign**, following information about an alleged attempt to manipulate the 2004 elections and a number of cases of corruption involving some of her family and close friends. These mass demonstrations continued even after the country's Parliament had rejected the accusations and the President had called for reconciliation

and national unity in order to overcome **one of the country's worst political, economic and social crises in recent years**.

## Europe and Central Asia

Tensions in this region are centred on four different contexts: two in the Caucasus (Azerbaijan and Georgia) and two in Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan). The first two are notable for the democratic fragility of their regimes and, in the case of Georgia, the existence of two separate claims for independence. The situation in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan was marked by political change, the former with its "tulip revolution" and the second with brutal episodes of repression that led to unanimous condemnation from the international community.

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2005
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	Unequal distribution of resources, democratic fragility	Increased tension
<b>Georgia</b>	Democratic fragility, problems of governance, independence of the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia	Increased tension
<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	Independence of the Ferghana Valley, democratic fragility	Increased tension
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	Independence of the Ferghana Valley, problems of governance	Increased tension

In the southern Caucasus, **Azerbaijan** experienced a period of serious tension in the midst of a **wide-spread atmosphere of political repression, particularly during the parliamentary elections held in November**. The pre-election period saw demonstrations by opposition groups and the detention of members of parliament accused of planning a coup d'état. After the elections were over there were widespread accusations of fraud against President I. Aliyev's Yeni Azerbaijan party, which had emerged victorious.

Turning to **Georgia**, in spite of the welcome given by parts of the international community to the agreement reached with Russia for the withdrawal of the latter's military bases from the country by 2008, together with the attempts at internal stabilisation, the situation remains one of **democratic fragility**, as demonstrated by the government's scant toleration of any form of dissidence, a fact repeatedly denounced by the opposition. There has also been an **increase in tensions in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia**. At the beginning of the year, Abkhaz and Osseti leaders rejected the Georgian President's offer to grant broad autonomy to both regions, as they believed that the arrangement allowed no room for the possibility of independence. Subsequently, **Georgia set out a peace plan that provided for gradual demilitarisation, improved economic cooperation and political dialogue to establish the status of South Ossetia**. Armed attacks by supporters of Osseti independence were reported during the month of September in a number of Georgian cities, along with armed assaults on Osseti civilians coming from Georgia. Georgia's attempts to include the OSCE, the EU and the USA in peace negotiations had not yet borne any fruit by the end of 2005, and calls on Russia to withdraw its peace-keeping forces from the two regions went unheeded.

In the five countries in Central Asia, democratic fragility, the infringement of fundamental freedoms and institutional repression, combined with problems associated with border demarcation and attacks allegedly perpetrated by the Islamist Hizb-ut-Tahrir armed group characterised the situation in the region during 2005. In **Kyrgyzstan, President A. Akayev (who had been in office for 14 years) was forced to leave the country in March** and flee to Russia due to the **numerous demonstrations and protests complaining about the repression of opposition candidates during the elections held at the beginning of the year**. During this process, dubbed the "**Tulip Revolution**", former opposition leaders K. Bakiev and F. Kulov were respectively appointed President and Prime Minister of the country. However, the change of Government was followed by the murder of politicians, subsequent protests, prison uprisings that were violently put down and the alleged involvement of foreign mafias in criminal acts in the country. In **Uzbekistan**, events were clearly marked by the **demonstration organised in Andijan in May and**

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**the subsequent acts of repression by the authorities** which, according to human rights groups, caused the deaths of several hundred people. Events were sparked off when a group of demonstrators were protesting about the detention and trial without the proper guarantees of 23 people accused of links with terrorist groups. The Uzbek regime was unanimously condemned by the international community for its actions in Andijan, in a climate of growing tension both internally and outside the country. The situation was further aggravated by complaints of false trials being heard against those accused of causing the uprising, the sanctions imposed by the EU on the Uzbek regime and the demand from the Government for the closure of US

and NATO bases still operating from inside Uzbekistan, followed by the establishment of a strategic agreement with Russia.

## Middle East

Tensions in the Middle East during the course of 2005 involved Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. After nearly 30 years of maintaining a military presence in Lebanon, Syria finally brought an end to its formal protection of the country, though this did not prevent it from continuing to interfere in the country's internal affairs, leading to significant international pressure being brought to bear on Syria by the international community.

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2005
<b>Egypt</b>	Political and social tensions, repression	Increased tension
<b>Lebanon</b>	Internal political tension, fragility of the system	Increased tension
<b>Syria</b>	International pressure, internal political tension	Increased tension

In **Egypt**, the **Movement for Change**, a group of organisations from different sectors of the opposition acting under the banner *Kefaya* ("Enough"), organised **protests throughout the year expressing popular opposition to the repression, lack of freedom and corruption caused by H. Mubarak's regime.**

The decision to put an end to the single candidate system in the presidential elections in May (seen as an attempt by H. Mubarak's regime to allow him to be succeeded by his son) and to reform the constitution to

extend the presidential mandate provoked a storm of protests, heavy police repression and a number of detentions. The three opposition groups (al-Wafd, Tagamu and the Nasserite Party) and the Muslim Brotherhood called for the referendum to be boycotted. The **parliamentary elections** held between November and December resulted in a significant increase in tensions due to protests by opposition groups complaining about widespread fraud following the victory of H. Mubarak's PND party. Finally, independent candidates connected with the **Muslim Brotherhood obtained a strong presence**, polling

the second highest number of votes. Elsewhere, **attacks on the Sinai Peninsular** led to increasing controls being placed on activists allegedly associated with Islamist groups, resulting in a total of 3,000 detentions.

**In Egypt, the Movement for Change organised protests throughout the year expressing popular opposition to the repression, lack of freedom and corruption caused by H. Mubarak's regime.**

**Lebanon** underwent a significant political change in April when **15,000 Syrian troops pulled out of its territory after spending nearly 30 years in the country.** This represented the culmination of the tensions and pressures unleashed by the **assassination of Prime Minister R. Hariri** in February. Senior Syrian officers and members of the Lebanese security forces were involved in the incident, according to a report published by the United Nations in October. The storm of popular protests at R. Hariri's death also led to the calling of parliamentary elections in June. These led to the first National Parliament with a majority of parties opposing links with Syria, led by a Sunni majority under S. Hariri (son of R. Hariri), in coalition with the Druze, W. Yumblat, and significant representation from the Shiite community through Hezbollah and Amal, along with representatives from Christian political groups. The murder in December of G. Tueni, an openly

anti-Syrian Member of Parliament and journalist, led to a new wave of accusations about the Syrian secret service's alleged involvement in his death. Elsewhere, **external pressure for the demilitarisation of Hezbollah continued, above all from the USA and France**, within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1559.

Following the **death of R. Hariri and, subsequently, G. Tueni, Syria was subjected to significant international pressure due to the alleged involvement of senior Syrian officers** in both murders. This pressure, which came particularly from the USA and France, was also aimed at bringing an end to Syria's alleged assistance for Palestinian groups and other militias in Lebanon, as well as for foreign fighters forming part of the Iraqi resistance. The *Syria Accountability Act and Lebanon Sovereignty Act*, passed by the US Congress in December 2003, and UN Security Council Resolution 1159, approved in September 2004, were used throughout the year as a method of threatening B. al-Assad's regime in Syria. At the same time, **Syrian leaders continued to face periods of internal protest**, such as those led by the Kurdish minority and forces of the political opposition. As a result, the former head of Syrian security and close relative of B. al-Assad, who had been in exile since the 1980s, returned to Damascus and threatened to take power. A number of violent incidents were reported in the middle of the year between the security forces and an alleged Islamist group known as the Organisation of Soldiers of the Levante.


## 2.3. Lesser situations of tension

The following are the 33 situations of tension that are regarded as being of lesser intensity. 16 of these are in Africa, though several relate to different contexts of tension within the same country, a situation also seen in Asia, where there are six contexts of tension in four different countries. Three contexts of tension are reported in America, seven in Europe and Central Asia and one in the Middle East.

Table 2.3. Contexts of reduced tension		
Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2005
<b>AFRICA</b>		
<b>Angola</b>	Political violence, social frustration	Stalemate
<b>Angola (Cabinda)</b>	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate
<b>Congo</b>	Political control over different ethnic groups and democratic fragility	Stalemate
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	Democratic fragility (institutional and political instability)	Stalemate
<b>Ethiopia (Gambella)</b>	Demographic colonisation and control of natural resources	Reduced tension
<b>Ethiopia (Ogaden)</b>	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate
<b>Guinea</b>	Democratic fragility, governance problems, impact of regional crises	Stalemate
<b>Liberia</b>	Control of natural resources, ethnic divisions and struggle for political power, impact of regional crises	Reduced tension
<b>Mauritania</b>	Democratic fragility, governance problems	Stalemate
<b>Nigeria</b>	Democratic fragility (political instability)	Stalemate
<b>Nigeria (central and northern regions)</b>	Control over natural resources and religious differences	Reduced tension
<b>Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland)</b>	Territorial disputes	Stalemate
<b>Sudan (East)</b>	Marginalisation of the region	Increased tension
<b>Sudan (South)</b>	Autonomy v. independence, religious conflict, control of resources	Stalemate
<b>Tanzania (Zanzibar)</b>	Struggle for political power	Increased tension
<b>Uganda-Kenya (Karamoja-Turkana)</b>	Governance, regional marginalisation, inter-community confrontations over natural resources	Stalemate

Situation of tension	Main causes	Situation compared with January 2005
<b>AMERICA</b>		
<b>Guatemala</b>	Political and historical exclusion, social injustice, failure to comply with peace agreements, impunity and organised crime	Reduced tension
<b>Mexico (Chiapas)</b>	Exclusion and economic inequalities	Reduced tension
<b>Venezuela</b>	Problems of governance	Reduced tension
<b>ASIA</b>		
<b>India-Pakistan</b>	Territorial disputes	Reduced tension
<b>India (Tripura)</b>	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate
<b>Indonesia (West Papua)</b>	Autonomy v. independence, religious disputes, demographic colonisation and control of natural resources	Stalemate
<b>Indonesia (Moluccas)</b>	Religious differences, democratic colonisation, autonomy v. independence	Stalemate
<b>Indonesia (Sulawesi)</b>	Religious differences, democratic colonisation	Stalemate
<b>Myanmar</b>	Democratic fragility and ethnic confrontations	Stalemate
<b>EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA</b>		
<b>Armenia</b>	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	Stalemate
<b>Belarus</b>	Democratic fragility (repression of political opposition)	Stalemate
<b>Moldova, Rep.</b>	Democratic fragility, independence of the Dniester region	Stalemate
<b>Serbia and Montenegro</b>	Democratic fragility, struggle for political power	Stalemate
<b>Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)</b>	Autonomy v. independence	Stalemate
<b>Turkmenistan</b>	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	Stalemate
<b>Ukraine</b>	Democratic fragility, problems of governance	Stalemate
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>		
<b>Lebanon-Israel</b>	Territorial disputes, impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict	Increased tension

## Situations of tension and high-risk disputes





## 3. Peace Processes

This chapter contains an analysis of conflicts in which negotiations to seek a peace agreement are currently underway (indicator no. 3), regardless of whether these are formal negotiations or currently in an exploratory phase, or whether they are proceeding in a satisfactory way or currently stalled. The majority of negotiations relate to armed conflicts, but this chapter also contains an analysis of some contexts in which, while there are currently no armed confrontations to speak of, the parties involved have not yet reached any agreement that might bring a definitive end to hostilities and their as yet unresolved differences. The first part of this chapter contains a definition of the concepts used, the second examines the progress made in negotiations throughout the year, and the third includes a graph showing the “peace temperature”, which reflects the monthly state of all current negotiations separately for Africa and Asia.

### 3.1. Peace processes: definition and classification

**Negotiation** is understood to mean a process in which two or more opposing parties agree to discuss their differences within an agreed framework in order to find a satisfactory solution. Negotiations may be held directly or with facilitation from third parties. Usually, formal negotiations include a prior or exploratory stage which is used to establish the framework (format, place, conditions, guarantees, etc.) for the future negotiating process. A **peace process** is understood to mean the consolidation of a negotiated plan, once the agenda, the procedures to be followed, the timetable and facilitation have been agreed.

Depending on the eventual aims sought and the dynamics experienced in the different negotiating phases, the majority of peace processes can be classified under one of these five **categories or models**:

- a) Demobilisation and Reinsertion
- b) Sharing of political, military or economic power
- c) Exchange (peace for democracy, peace for land, peace for the recognition of rights, etc.)
- d) Trust-building measures
- e) Formulas for self-government or an “intermediate political architecture”.

### 3.2. Evolution of peace processes

2005 will be seen as an historic year for peace processes as a result of the end of one of the most deadly armed conflicts in modern times, the conflict that has affected the south of Sudan for more than 20 years. In January, **the Sudanese Government and the SPLA signed a definitive peace agreement**, after three years of negotiations in Kenya. The other notable event was the rapid and surprising **end to the conflict in the Indonesian region of Aceh**, thanks to the good offices of Finland, which led to the GAM's disarmament as the year ended. Given its symbolic effect in Europe, mention should also be made of the **renunciation of the armed struggle by the IRA, and the organisation's subsequent disarmament**, which brought an end to the conflict in Northern Ireland.

2005 also saw new opportunities open up in Algeria, Burundi, India and Nepal, though for the great part these were not real peace processes but instead involved exploratory moves relating to proposals made by governments, political factions or armed opposition groups. As a result, **2005 ended with 35 sets of negotiations underway**, though attention will be focused in this chapter on those for which there is sufficient information to be able to track some kind of evolution throughout the year. Of the 26 negotiating processes examined, 18 relate to armed conflicts, 8 to unresolved conflicts (shown in italics) and two to conflicts that have ended (also in italics). In December, bearing in mind the two processes currently in their final stages, 23% of processes were going

**Negotiations are currently underway in two out of every three armed conflicts.**

well, 38% were in difficulties and a similar percentage were going badly. Finally, it should be mentioned that **negotiations are currently underway in two out of every three armed conflicts.**

**Table 3.1. State of negotiations at the end of 2005**

Going well (3)	In difficulty (10)	Going badly (8)	At an exploratory stage (3)	Ended
<i>Armenia-Azerbaijan</i>	Algeria	Burundi (FNL)	Colombia (ELN)	<i>Indonesia (Aceh)</i>
India (ULFA)	Colombia (AUC)	Congo, DR	Nepal	<i>Sudan (SPLA)</i>
India-Pakistan	Côte d'Ivoire	<i>India (CPI)</i>	Uganda (LRA)	
	<i>DPR Korea-USA</i>	Iraq		
	<i>Georgia (Abkhazia)</i>	Israel-Palestine		
	<i>India (NSCN-IM)</i>	Philippines (NPA)		
	India (NDFB)	Sri Lanka		
	Philippines (MILF)	<i>Western Sahara</i>		
	Somalia			
	Sudan (Darfur)			

(The contexts shown in italics are armed conflicts that ended during the course of the year and non-armed conflicts in which negotiations are taking place).

## Africa

### a) West Africa

The prevailing situation in **Côte d'Ivoire** remained unstable during the first months of 2005, due to the lack of trust between the *Forces Nouvelles*, the coalition of armed groups that rebelled against the Government in 2002, and the country's President L. Gbagbo. The armed groups forming this coalition accused the Government of failing to comply with the agreements that led to the creation of a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation. South Africa mediated in the dispute, with a mandate from the AU, in an attempt to persuade the members of the *Forces Nouvelles* who had been appointed as ministers to return to their seats on the transitional Government. However, the peace process was complicated half-way through the year as a result of a number of disturbances between different communities, threats from the opposition that it would not take part in the elections if it was not allowed to assist in their preparation, the **reluctance of the *Forces Nouvelles* to disarm** and accusations against the President from this group. A second phase of negotiations began at the end of June in Pretoria, in which the parties agreed to the definitive introduction of the process to disarm the pro-government militias from 20 August, an agreement that was eventually not honoured. In November, the International Task Force (ITF) created to drive the peace process forwards, comprising members from the AU, ECOWAS, the EU, France and the USA among others, met to set out an electoral timetable and decide on the appointment of a new Prime Minister. In December, finally, African mediators named C. Konan Banny (until then the governor of the Central Bank of West Africa) as the country's new interim Prime Minister, with the difficult task of arranging the disarmament of all groups within one year.

**Nigeria** continues to feel the effects of confrontations between communities in the Niger Delta which, in addition to attacks by individual communities on oil companies operating in the region, left around a hundred people dead during the course of the year. Particular mention should be made of the Conference held during the first part of the year, in which more than 400 delegates gathered to begin discussing reform of the country's Constitution. At the end of May, the Government appointed the Nigerian Catholic priest M. Kukah as an independent mediator to facilitate negotiations between the *Royal/Dutch/Shell* company and activists from the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), together with other Ogoni leaders. At the end of the year, the Government ordered the deployment of the army as a preventive measure, given the sharp increase in tensions in the region.

In **Senegal**, during the month of June a breakaway section of the MDFC armed opposition group assumed responsibility for attacks in the Casamance region, meaning that a definitive peace has not yet been achieved in this region.

## b) Horn of Africa

At the beginning of the year, the peace process in **Somalia** was moving forward but with some difficulty. Problems centred around the design of the AU's future peace-keeping force, the potential presence of troops from Ethiopia and other countries in the region being a particular sticking point. In February, the AU entrusted the task of preparing the mission's deployment (comprising some 10,000 troops) to the regional organisation IGAD, though this decision was criticised by the majority of Ministers in the new Government. A short while later, IGAD announced that it intended to deploy a peace-keeping force in Somalia (IGASOM), which would be replaced by an AU force after nine months. In mid-June, the Transitional Federal Government began its move from Nairobi to the Somali city of Jowhar. In addition, the **Government appointed its first two ambassadors (to the United Nations and China), approved its first budget** (in the amount of 229 million euros) and began reconciliation conferences in each of Somalia's 93 districts. The Deputy Defence Minister announced the re-establishment of the country's Armed Forces. During the third quarter of the year, some "warlords" threatened to return to arms if the Government did not install itself in the capital, and many Ministers and members of parliament warned that President A. Yusuf Ahmed was preparing to resume confrontations on a grand scale. In November there was an attack on the Prime Minister's motorcade in which nine people died, though the Prime Minister himself was not injured. Shortly afterwards, members of parliament based in Mogadishu began talks with other members of the Government in an attempt to overcome their differences. There was also a meeting in Nairobi (Kenya), at which more than one hundred representatives of Somali organisations and representatives from the international community met to plan the country's reconstruction and schedule a donor conference, which is planned for 2006. At the end of the year there were signs that things were to a certain degree returning to normal with the opening by the TFG's Prime Minister of the country's first police academy for a number of decades.

Turning to the process between the Government of **Sudan** and the **SPLA**, a definitive peace agreement was signed in Nairobi (Kenya) in January, bringing an end to 22 years of fighting. At the end of July, the south of the country became an autonomous region, the plan being to hold a referendum on self-determination after a period of six years has elapsed. In April, a large delegation from the SPLA visited the capital for the first time in order to begin the official implementation of the agreement, which had been delayed. The first Donor Conference was held in Oslo, resulting in promises of funds totalling 4,500 million dollars. The new United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) also began its deployment in April, involving more than 10,000 troops who will remain in the country for a period of seven years at an annual cost of more than 1,000 million dollars. In May, the Government and the SPLA began work on the preparation of a new Constitution while the first meeting of the Joint Military Coordinating Committee (JMCC) was held. The most significant event during the third quarter of the year was the death in an aircraft accident of the SPLA leader and recently appointed Vice President of the country, J. Garang, which led to serious confrontations in the capital and a great amount of speculation as to the causes of the accident. His successor, S. Kiir, formally established the autonomous Government in the south of the country, which will govern a large proportion of public issues. At the end of the year, however, there was concern over the growing tensions resulting from the spontaneous return to the south of the country of thousands of people displaced throughout the long years of conflict, as well as over the slow speed at which the agreement was being implemented.

**Turning to the process between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA, a definitive peace agreement was signed in Nairobi (Kenya) in January, bringing an end to 22 years of fighting.**

By contrast, the situation in the Sudanese region of **Darfur** and the talks between the Government and the SLA and JEM armed opposition groups remained at stalemate during the first few months of the year. The armed groups refused to resume negotiations with the Government unless those responsible for war crimes were tried by an international court. In this connection, at the end of March the UN Security Council decided to authorise the chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Court to pursue the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Darfur. In mid-April, the Government of Chad suspended its position as mediator in the peace negotiations as it believed that the Sudanese Government was supporting members of armed opposition groups in Chad. In May, both parties were invited to Libya by M. Gadaffi, to sign a

ceasefire agreement that would facilitate the supply of humanitarian aid to the region. Subsequently, in the middle of June, the Government and the two armed groups met in Abuja (Nigeria) to begin a new round of direct contacts (after a six month break), with mediation from the AU under its special envoy, S. Ahmed Salim. At the end of June there were serious tensions among the negotiating teams from the two armed groups, as they both suffered splits and leadership battles. In mid-September, the Sudanese Government and the two armed groups began their sixth round of peace talks in Abuja (Nigeria), focusing on issues relating to power-sharing and resources, along with the maintenance of security. **The seventh round opened in Nigeria in November, and was notable for the presence of a unified team from the SLA,** though it included representatives from both opposing factions. Progress was made in the area of protecting civilians and providing access to victims, and attempts were made to reach agreement on power-sharing, the management of resources and security issues.

### Chart 3.1. The main reasons behind crises in negotiations during 2005

#### Most frequent cases

- Rejection of or disagreements regarding the people or bodies charged with mediating
- Divisions and disagreements within armed groups
- Difficulties in participating in the electoral process
- Delays in disarmament and demobilisation processes
- Accusations of violating ceasefires
- Demand for prior conditions (ceasefire, etc)

#### Other regular cases

- Lack of trust between parties
- Breach of prior agreements
- Threat of sanctions
- Disagreements regarding the make-up of peace-keeping forces
- Lack of security for negotiators
- Lack of security in the country as a whole, attacks
- Disagreements over the format that talks should take
- Lack of financial resources
- Divisions within Government
- Disagreements over the role of the international courts or the legal framework to be applied
- Banning of armed groups or their political wings
- Use of the lists of terrorist groups
- Problems of communication
- Selective assassinations
- Accusations of links with terrorist groups
- Government lacking in legitimacy
- Lack of respect for or trust in the process

### c) Great Lakes and Central Africa

As regards contacts between the Government of **Burundi** and the FNL armed opposition group, which has its bases in DR Congo, mention should be made of Tanzania's efforts to encourage peace talks. In February, the FNL announced that it was willing to begin negotiations without any prior conditions, though it rejected mediation from both South African Vice President and official mediator J. Zuma (whom it accused of not being neutral) and Ugandan President and leader of the regional peace initiative, I. Museveni. The President of Burundi's Transitional National Government (TNG), D. Ndayizeye, and the leader of the FNL, A. Rwaswa, agreed in May to cease hostilities and begin peace talks. The UN Secretary General's Special Representative in the country, C. McAskie, welcomed these talks and undertook to support the process, principally in respect of the issues relating to the disarmament of the FNL. In spite of this, and despite invitations from the new Government led by the Hutu CNDD-FDD party, attempts to begin formal negotiations have not been successful for the moment. **The FNL announced that they did not recognise the current administration led by P. Nkurunziza, regarding it as a Government imposed by the international community.** In mid-October, the FNL suffered an important dispute when 260 of its supposed troops announced that they were rejecting the authority of the group's historic leader, A. Rwaswa, whom they accused of numerous human rights violations, and that they were in favour of talks with the Government. This faction is led by

J.B. Sindayigaya. Finally, the UN Secretary General announced at the end of the year that the number of UN troops in the country (ONUB) was to be reduced, though he indicated that they would remain deployed in areas in which the FNL has a presence. Burundi's Defence Minister declared during December that the FNL's strength had been seriously reduced following recent military offensives.

The situation of conflict in **Congo**, in which the Ninja militias have been fighting the Brazzaville government's forces since 2003, reached a residual stage. In May, the leader of the militias, Reverend Ntoumi, decided to convert his movement into a political party, the National Resistance Council (CNR), so that he could stand in the July elections. He also undertook to bring peace to the Pool region and disarm the militias that had not yet been brought under control. However, this undertaking was conditional upon the formation of a new Government of national unity. In October, Government troops expelled the Ninja militias who were living in the capital after a number of confrontations that left several people dead and led to accusations that Government troops had kidnapped members of the Ninja militias. At the end of the year, former Ninja leader B. Kolélas was granted an amnesty, and the EU awarded a significant amount of aid for the building of a road to link the capital and the Pool region.

Turning to the conflict affecting a number of provinces in **DR Congo**, the year started with the demobilisation of 6,000 troops from one of the six armed groups operating in the Kivu and Ituri districts, the FAPC. MONUC became involved in armed confrontations with a number of groups, dismantling four militia camps, and in April it began to search for members of the FRPI armed opposition group who were also operating in the Ituri district. The mission expressed its concern at the delay in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, though **by the beginning of June 14,000 of the 15,000 militia fighters estimated to be operating in Ituri had been demobilised**. Some factions of the Mai Mai militias based in the province of Katanga also agreed to disarm.

As regards tensions between **DR Congo and Rwanda**, February saw the entry into force of a joint verification mechanism for their common border. This was agreed by both sides in an attempt to end territorial violations. It should be stressed that during March the Rwandan FDLR armed opposition group announced that it was abandoning the armed struggle against Rwanda, condemning the 1994 genocide. This group, which has at least 14,000 troops, has been based in DR Congo for the last 10 years and has launched regular attacks on Rwanda. The process aimed at reaching an initial agreement on the disarmament of the FDLR involved input from the Community of Saint Egidio. This agreement led to the **intensification of internal divisions within the FDLR, and a number of groups continued to attack the civilian population**. Given the lack of progress, the Congolese, Rwandan and Ugandan Ministers for Regional Cooperation met in Kigali with facilitation from the USA and gave the FDLR until the end of September to disarm its forces completely, a demand that was not met.

A process is currently underway in **Uganda** which is aimed at reaching an agreement with the LRA armed opposition group. The government's peace commissioner, B. Bigombe, met leaders of the group on a number of occasions. In June, Ugandan President I. Museveni announced that he would grant amnesty to the LRA's leader, J. Kony, in the event that he brought the armed struggle to an end, though he also indicated that he was not in favour of negotiating with terrorist groups. During August, the commissioner confirmed that the LRA had contacted her by phone and that both parties had indicated their desire to resume the peace talks that has been suspended the previous year. In October, the **International Criminal Court (ICC) announced arrest warrants for the five main leaders of the LRA**, leading to increased concerns about the way that this might affect the negotiating process. However, some weeks later, the Deputy Commander of the LRA, V. Otti, asked the Government to begin peace talks, adding that he was willing to appear before the ICC. At the end of the year, the presence of members of the LRA in the east of DR Congo was causing concern that the conflict might extend to the Ugandan region of Western Nile.

#### **d) Other areas of Africa**

In spite of the fact that the conflict between the Government and the FLEC armed opposition group in **Angola (Cabinda)** had been regarded as almost over at the beginning of the year, fighting broke out once

again between the FLEC and members of the country's Armed Forces during the second quarter. Although a number of civilian groups called on the Government to enter negotiations, a situation of tension and insecurity remained in Cabinda during the second half of the year, with the Armed Forces mounting attacks against the FLEC. This meant that the attempt to restart peace negotiations was viewed as having failed.

No progress was made in attempts at rapprochement between the POLISARIO Front and the Government of Morocco in **Western Sahara**. In April, the UN Secretary General presented a report in which he underlined the lack of improvement in political negotiations, while the Security Council called on the parties to find a way to unblock the situation. The UN Secretary General relieved his Special Representative for Western Sahara, A. de Soto. Only days later, members of the Saharai people demonstrated in El Ayun in favour of independence. Though violently put down by Moroccan Armed Forces, demonstrations continued throughout the year. Given the **current stalemate**, the President of the Democratic Saharai Arab Republic, M. Abdelaziz, announced at the end of the year that if Morocco did not accept international law, and if the United Nations efforts failed, the POLISARIO Front might return to armed conflict.

Turning to the conflict in **Algeria**, while there is no actual peace process to speak of, President A. Buteflika called a referendum at the end of September in order to gain approval for the so-called Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. This official plan provides for a partial amnesty for both arrested Islamists and members of the Armed Forces, and it received broad backing in the polls, in spite of the fact that the main human rights organisations denounced it because its approval will allow the serious human rights violations committed by the opposing parties during the armed conflict to go unpunished.

## America

In **Colombia**, facilitation from Mexican ambassador A. Valencia continued at the beginning of the year, in an attempt to achieve rapprochement with the **ELN** guerrilla group. Half-way through the year, however, the ELN dispensed with his facilitation services, claiming that Mexico had disqualified itself by voting against Cuba on the UN Human Rights Commission. Exploratory talks subsequently continued between the ELN and the Government in relation to the government's proposal to set up an **external rapprochement process** (for a short and fixed period) and its suggestion of international involvement. In September, President A. Uribe authorised the release from prison for three months of the ELN's spokesman, F. Galán, in an attempt to advance discussions with all sections of Colombian society at the so called "Casa de la Paz" in Medellin, and in response to a citizens' initiative that was also approved by the ELN. Days before the end of

this three month period, the Government extended his release for a further three months and reached an agreement with the ELN to begin formal exploratory talks in Cuba during December, with involvement from Spain, Norway and Switzerland.

**The Government extended his release for a further three months and reached an agreement with the ELN to begin formal exploratory talks in Cuba.**

Turning to the **FARC**, in February the UN Secretary General suspended his goodwill mission to seek rapprochement with the guerrilla force after six years' work, acknowledging the impossibility of continuing

this mission and maintaining direct contact with the guerrilla leaders. The Government announced a number of proposals relating to a potential agreement on humanitarian issues, but these were rejected by the FARC, which insisted on holding meetings in two towns from which the security forces were to pull out for a month while talks were being held, with the aim of guaranteeing the security of the negotiators. This condition was not accepted by the Government. In mid-December, however, the Government accepted a **proposal made by the Exploratory Technical Committee**, comprising representatives from the Governments of Spain, France and Switzerland, which suggested a security system that would allow representatives of both the Government and the FARC to meet in a 180 km<sup>2</sup> area in Pradera (Valle). As far as the demobilisation of the United Self-Defence Force of Colombia (**AUC**) is concerned, the process came to a standstill due to disagreements over the legal rules that would apply to former combatants. President A. Uribe approved the Justice and Peace Law, a month after it had been approved by Congress and after several months of intense argument at both a domestic and an international level. Under this Law, the Gov-

ernment established a Victim Compensation Commission for those who have suffered from the actions of illegal groups. The end of the year saw a further crisis in this process with the resulting halt to demobilisations. Finally, the President agreed to extend the time period originally provided for the completion of demobilisation (end of December), allowing it to be completed during the first three months of 2006. For its part, the OAS increased its budget and the teams of people charged with verifying the demobilisation process. **By the end of December, 15,600 members of the AUC had been demobilised.**

### Chart 3.2. Some positive and symbolic milestones achieved in the various processes in 2005

- The Somali Government appointed its first ambassadors, approved its first budget and inaugurated its first police academy.
- The Government of Burundi approved the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
- DR Congo and Rwanda established a joint verification mechanism for their common border.
- The POLISARIO Front released more than 400 Moroccan prisoners.
- The Colombian President authorised the release of the ELN’s spokesman from prison, so that he could go on to assist the civilian population in the so-called “Casa de la Paz”.
- Switzerland, France and Spain formed an Exploratory Technical Committee to seek a humanitarian agreement between the Colombian Government and the FARC.
- In India, the ULFA armed opposition group appointed a people’s declaration or People’s Consulting Group to maintain contacts with the Government.
- Also in India, the NSCN (IM) group held consultational talks with various NGOs.
- The Indian Government invited the President of Pakistan to attend a cricket match between the two countries.
- In Nepal, the Maoist CPN group announced that it was willing to lay down its arms, signing an agreement with the opposition parties.
- A delegation from Sri Lanka’s LTTE toured a number of European countries and South Africa, where it met the Nobel Peace laureate, Desmond Tutu.
- The two Koreas agreed to participate jointly in the forthcoming Olympic and Asian Games, under a single flag.
- The leader of the Taiwanese nationalist party visited China.
- The Philippine’s MILF called a huge assembly to discuss the main issues on its agenda, attended by half a million people.
- The Swiss organisation “Geneva Call” organised a course on IHL, anti-mine legislation and the protection of children for a number of the MILF’s leaders.
- The Governments of Jordan, Israel and the PNA signed an agreement to study the creation of a canal to link the Red Sea with the Dead Sea, at a cost of 3,500 million dollars.

## Asia and the Pacific

### a) South Asia

Among the processes currently underway with various armed groups operating in several regions of **India**, peace talks with the Maoist CPI (formerly the PWG) in the state of **Andhra Pradesh** broke down at the beginning of January following the death of one of its leaders at the hands of the police and the detention of several others. In March, the Government announced that it wanted to resume talks, and the President of the Congress Party, S. Gandhi, called on the CPI to reopen negotiations. However, the possibility of resuming talks with this group remained stalled during the first half of the year, and it was banned by the Government in August following an attack that was attributed to the organisation.

Several attempts were made to establish formal talks with the ULFA armed opposition group in the state of **Assam** during the course of the year, though fighting between the group and Government Armed Forces continued. In September, **the ULFA announced the appointment of a delegation of eminent citizens that it trusted (or “People Consultative Group”) to maintain contacts with the Indian Government.** This Consultative Group promised to consult the ordinary people and present its conclusions to the Government. India’s Prime Minister, M. Singh, undertook to suspend armed operations against the ULFA, and Assam’s Prime Minister, T. Gogoi, indicated at the end of the year that the security of the ULFA delega-

tion attending future negotiations would be guaranteed, and that these negotiations could be held anywhere. As far as the other armed groups are concerned, rounds of talks were held at the beginning of the year with the DHD armed opposition group. In mid-June, the DHD and the UPDS, which are fighting one another, announced that they would soon be holding a new round of peace talks with the Indian Government. Each group met the Government separately. In October, however, these two groups were still fighting, with more than a hundred people reported dead. Turning to the NDFB armed group, which also operates in the state of Assam, although contacts were impeded during the first part of the year due to delays in the appointment of envoys and communications problems, talks between three NDFB representatives, the Indian Government and the Government of the state of Assam began in May with the agreement of a ceasefire.

In the state of **Nagaland**, talks continued with the NSCN (IM) armed opposition group, whose leaders travelled from the Netherlands to New Delhi to negotiate with the Government. The last of the three rounds of talks with the Government was held in December in Bangkok, where a number of consultative rounds of talks had already been held with different NGOs, resulting in a proposal for the establishment of "federal relations" with India, the creation of joint Armed Forces, the integration of areas with a Naga population and the use of the region's own flag. The next round of talks will be held in March 2006. The Dutch organisation Kreddha is taking part in these talks. This organisation is formed from analysts specialising in conflict-resolution, and it is led by M.C. Van Walt, former Secretary General of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO). Turning to the state of **Tripura**, while there was speculation half-way through the year that the BNLF armed opposition group (which also operates in the states of Assam and Mizoram) might hand in its weapons, no progress had been made by the end of the year in this regard. Elsewhere, the leader of a faction of the NLFT (NB) armed opposition group broke away to form a new armed group, the IFMOT. This meant the end of the peace process that had begun with the Indian Government, which accused Bangladesh of supporting the new group. The Indian Government announced that it would allocate more funds for the reinsertion of members of the NLFT (NB) in the demobilisation process.

Turning to the dispute between **India** and **Pakistan** over the region of Kashmir, both countries **continued to intensify the trust-building measures they began two years ago**, and these have now led to talks on proposals for the demilitarisation of Kashmir and the introduction of self-governance in the region. There were reciprocal visits by Foreign Ministers, a bus service between the two halves of Kashmir resumed (it had been suspended 60 years previously), the release of more prisoners was agreed and trade exchanges increased, as did collaboration on drug-trafficking, maritime routes and other financial, political and humanitarian issues. Representatives of the APHC (the coalition of the main Kashmiri independence parties) met Pakistani President P. Musharraf and the Indian Prime Minister, M. Singh, during the former's visit to Delhi, with results that were said to be satisfactory for both sides. The Indian Prime Minister also accepted an invitation to visit Pakistan. Also notable was the announcement by the Pakistani President to the effect that the dispute over control of Kashmir could be resolved by granting greater autonomy to the region, which coincided with statements by the Indian Prime Minister indicating that a Kashmir without defined borders along with greater autonomy for the Indian-administered parts of the region were measures that might help to resolve the conflict, thus reducing the importance of the border demarcation issue. In October, as a reaction to the dramatic humanitarian situation caused by the earthquake that affected Pakistan-administered Kashmir, the local population were allowed to cross the Line of Control (the *de facto* border between the two countries) in order to facilitate communication between affected families and access by humanitarian organisations. Telephone communications, cut off for the last fifteen years, were also re-established. In December, the main armed opposition group operating in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in India, Hizbul Mujahideen, asked the EU to review its decision to include it in the list of terrorist organisations. The Leader of the APHC announced that the Pakistani President had offered his support for the creation of a united states of Kashmir, in which members of the legislative assembly for each of the Kashmirs would elect representatives of a third assembly who would in turn take the necessary decisions to bring a final end to the conflict.

In **Nepal**, given the absence of any negotiations between the new Government and the CPN armed opposition group, Assistant UN Secretary General K. Chandra, speaking at the beginning of the year, indicated

greater leadership was needed from the United Nations if a resolution to the conflict was to be found. The leader of the CPN, Prachanda, in an announcement timed to coincide with the arrival in the country of the UN Secretary General's Special Adviser, L. Brahimi, stated that his group was willing to hold talks with the United Nations or other parties in order to promote peace and democracy. In July, seven opposition parties announced that they were preparing to talk to the CPN, which in turn responded by declaring a unilateral ceasefire for a period of three months from September. The group reiterated its peace proposal based on the formation of a constituent assembly, followed by a Government formed from all the political parties and the declaration of a democratic republic. At the end of November, the CPN made the surprise announcement that it was willing to lay down its arms and join the process of political normalisation, after reaching a twelve-point political agreement with the parliamentary opposition, the original governing party which was ejected from power by King Gyanendra and which continues in its attempts to bring an end to the King's absolute power. **The Maoist CPN committed itself to democracy, human rights, a free press and the calling of elections supervised by the United Nations.** Days later, it extended its unilateral ceasefire by a further month. At the end of the year, US President George Bush called for the first time on King Gyanendra to hold meetings with the political parties, and the United Nations Office in Nepal welcomed the announcement by the Maoists that they would cooperate with bilateral agencies and the United Nations and that they would adhere to their Basic Operational Guidelines for development aid.


**The CPN made the surprise announcement that it was willing to lay down its arms and join the process of political normalisation, after reaching a twelve-point political agreement with the parliamentary opposition.**

In **Sri Lanka**, contacts between the Government and the LTTE armed opposition group were affected by the tsunami in December 2004. At the beginning of the year, the LTTE informed the Government that it was willing to cooperate in the creation of a joint mechanism for the distribution of aid to people left homeless by the catastrophe. Weeks later, paramilitary groups murdered five LTTE leaders. During March, an LTTE delegation visited Europe to seek aid for the survivors of the tsunami. In spite of some promising signs, the process continued to encounter some difficulties during the second half of the year, due to the mutual lack of trust between the parties, the temporary suspension of the joint management of humanitarian aid by the Supreme Court in July, the climate of suspicion following the assassination of the Foreign Minister in August and questions surrounding Norwegian mediation. The Sri Lankan President called on the UN Secretary General's Special Adviser, L. Brahimi, to reactivate the process and increase the commitment of the United Nations without replacing Norway in its role as mediator. Finally, due in great part to the boycott by the LTTE, the November elections were won by M. Rakapakse, who called for the entire peace process to be reviewed. A few days earlier, the head of the Sri Lankan delegation negotiating team, J. Dhanapala, had resigned. Nevertheless, the new President said that he was willing to hold direct peace talks with the LTTE, setting out a territorial formula based around a single state and appointing a new Prime Minister, R. Wickremanayake, seen as a hard-liner as regards the LTTE. In December, several parties allied to the new Government pressed for Norway to be replaced by India as facilitator in the process, given the stalemate encountered since April 2003, and Japanese peace envoy Y. Akashi said that his country would host any new talks between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE, with the aim of salvaging the ceasefire which was threatened by increasing levels of violence at the end of the year. This proposal was initially accepted by the LTTE, which has always asked for talks to be held outside the country, though a few days later it rejected the idea, preferring to **maintain the initial format for the talks, facilitated by Norway.** In spite of these issues and the insistence among some political circles that India should play a greater role in the process, in mid-December the new President invited Norway to continue in its position as facilitator in the negotiations.

## **b) East Asia**

Negotiations between **DPR Korea** and the USA to agree the denuclearisation of the former country in exchange for a non-aggression pact from the USA remained at a standstill at the beginning of the year, and various obstacles prevented the resumption of six-sided talks (involving (DPR Korea, the USA, Russia, Japan, China and the Republic of Korea). In June, North Korean leader K. Jong Il promised to dismantle his medi-

Chart 3.2. External facilitation in Asia



(India's inclusion in this chart results from its desire to play an active role in any future processes in Sri Lanka and Nepal)

um- and long-range missiles if the USA established diplomatic links with his country, adding that he was willing to return to the six-sided talks so long as his country was treated with respect. As a result, a new round of multilateral six-sided talks began in July in China. In September, **DPR Korea promised to abandon all its nuclear weapons programmes and return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**, while the other countries undertook to supply it with oil and energy. Finally, in November, the fifth round of six-sided talks got underway, and DPR Korea asked for a global commitment to denuclearisation.

### c) Southeast Asia

A number of processes remain ongoing in the **Philippines**. At the beginning of the year, talks between the Government and the **MILF** armed opposition group continued to show progress, though factions of the armed group were accused of maintaining links with Jemaah Islamiya, an organisation that is in turn accused of links with Al-Qaeda. Talks continued during the second quarter of the year with mediation from Malaysia, and important advances have been made on social, economic and political issues, particularly as regards the delicate subject of ancestral lands and the management of natural resources. **The MILF were ready to renounce independence, but at the same time demanded self-government formulas that would provide a greater degree of autonomy** than is offered by the current Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In May, the MILF held a large assembly in the south of the country which was attended by more than half a million people. The assembly acted as a forum for its members and sympathisers to discuss the principle challenges facing the Bangsamoro people and the strategies to be adopted in the search for solutions. In September, the Government and the MILF began a new informal round of talks in Malaysia, dealing with issues such as governance and the ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro people and postponing other questions such as the extent and type of autonomy to be granted to Mindanao and the role of the police and Armed Forces. The definitive peace agreement which the parties had hoped to sign at the end of 2005 may finally be agreed towards the middle of 2006. In December, the Swiss organisation Geneva Call organised a course for several dozen MILF members in International Humanitarian law, anti-mine legislation and the protection of children in armed conflicts.

Turning to the rapprochement process between the Philippines Government and the **NPA** armed opposition group and its political wing, the NDF, a crisis arose during the exploratory process held in July, when the leader of this last group (in exile in the Netherlands) announced that the NDF felt there was no point in continuing negotiations with a Government that was in crisis and lacking in legitimacy, calling for a Government of Transition. At the beginning of August, the Philippine Government announced that it would suspend the immunity that had been agreed for the NDF's negotiators (on the basis of a prior agreement relating to security guarantees) unless negotiations were resumed within a period of 30 days. The NDF responded by postponing formal talks with the Government, though it added that this did not mean ending peace negotiations as the negotiating panels and their advisers and teams would continue their work. In September, following an informal meeting in Oslo with mediation from the Norwegian Government, the Philippine Government momentarily back-pedalled on their suspension of immunity for the negotiating team and called on the NPA to declare a ceasefire once formal negotiations had started. In mid-October,

**the Government decided once again to suspend the joint agreement on security and immunity guarantees (JASIG) for the NPA's negotiators**, and the latter group made its ceasefire conditional once more on being removed from the list of terrorist organisations, increasing its attacks on the Armed Forces. At Christmas, the Government announced a four-day ceasefire, though the NPA rejected the idea, and for the first time since 1986 accused the Government of insincerity in the negotiations, citing its continuing human rights abuses.

Turning to the conflict in **Indonesia (Aceh)**, the tsunami which struck at the end of 2004 brought an end to the fighting that had been going on for almost a year and a half between Government Armed Forces and the GAM armed opposition group, leaving the way clear for a new and unexpected attempt at talks. In January the Government expressed an interest in meeting the GAM, which had declared an informal ceasefire in order to allow humanitarian work to continue in the region. An agreement was reached a short time later for a delegation of members from both the GAM and the Indonesian Government to fly to Finland with the aim of initiating peace talks chaired by the *Crisis Management Initiative*, an organisation led by the former Finnish Prime Minister, M. Ahtisaari. The fifth and final round of negotiations was held between 12 and 14 July, leading to the signing of a peace agreement between the GAM and the Indonesian Government in the middle of August, bringing an end to 20 years of armed conflict in Aceh. The agreement is based on an end to hostilities and the disarmament of the GAM, the withdrawal of Government Armed Forces and police from Aceh, an amnesty for GAM members and the group's participation in the political arena, the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the creation of a monitoring mission by the EU and ASEAN.

**Signing of a peace agreement between the GAM and the Indonesian Government in the middle of August, bringing an end to 20 years of armed conflict in Aceh.**

### Chart 3.3. Summary of the peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the GAM, 15-08-2005

#### 1. Government of Aceh

- A new law on the Government of Aceh will be enacted before the end of March 2006
- Aceh will have authority in all public affairs except foreign relations, foreign defence, national security, currency, tax affairs, justice and freedom of religion
- All national and international agreements signed by the Indonesian Government that affect Aceh must have the consent of the Aceh legislative assembly
- Aceh has the right to use its own regional symbols, including a flag and a national anthem
- Political parties will be allowed to have their headquarters in Aceh
- Elections will be held in April 2006 with international observers
- All inhabitants of Aceh will have their own identity card
- Aceh will have the right to apply for foreign loans and raise taxes
- Aceh will have jurisdiction over its natural resources and territorial waters
- Aceh can retain 70% of the revenue earned from its natural and energy resources
- Aceh will administer its own ports and airports
- An impartial judicial system will be established in Aceh, within the Indonesian judicial system
- The chief police and public prosecutor will be approved by Aceh's highest authority

#### 2. Human rights

- A Human Rights Court will be set up in Aceh along with a Truth and Reconciliation Commission

#### 3. Amnesty and reintegration

- An amnesty will be granted for all people who have taken part in GAM activities, and all political prisoners will be released
- Once the agreement is signed GAM personnel may not use weapons
- Anyone who renounced Indonesian nationality during the conflict may recover it
- A Reintegration Fund will be created for former combatants and political prisoners
- The Indonesian Government will provide land for the reintegration of former combatants
- GAM combatants will have the right to join the military forces or police in Aceh

#### 4. Security aspects

- The GAM will demobilise its 3,000 troops
- The GAM will collect and hand over the 840 weapons that it claims to possess, prior to the end of the year
- There will be no significant military movements after the agreement is signed

#### 5. Establishment of the Aceh Observer Mission (AMM)

- The countries of the EU and ASEAN will set up an observer mission with the mandate to oversee compliance with the agreement
- The AMM will be responsible for overseeing the GAM's demobilisation and the handover of its weapons, the withdrawal of Government military forces and the process for the reintegration of GAM members
- Any weapons and munitions collected will be destroyed

**The disarmament of the GAM and the withdrawal of Indonesian troops was properly completed according to the agreed schedule**, as was the beginning of the process for the reintegration of former combatants, even though the GAM refused to hand over a list of its members' names until the process had advanced further, with the aim of preventing acts of revenge and violence. The challenges that remain pending during the coming months include the reintegration of GAM members in their original communities, the transformation of the GAM into a political party, the approval of the new legislation for Aceh and the holding of elections in April.

The situation in **Myanmar** deteriorated following the Military Junta's purge of supporters of talks and democratisation from among its own ranks in January, added to the fact that Nobel Peace Prize laureate A.S. Suu Kyi remained in detention throughout the year. In April, the UN Secretary General called on the Junta to clarify its position in respect of the "road map" for the country's democratisation, following the government's decision to suspend the National Convention process. In October, spokespersons for three armed opposition groups (NMSP, KIO and DKBA) which have observed a ceasefire for the last ten years indicated that they would not hand in their weapons to the military Government, and a new stage in the National Convention process began in December. This is aimed at preparing a new Constitution in what has been referred to as a "disciplined democracy".

Finally, although there is currently no formal negotiation process in **Thailand**, it should be noted that the tensions and violence in the south of the country have not diminished, in spite of the promise from Prime Minister S. Thaksin that there would be no increase in military pressure and that he would implement the educational reforms begun by the Government in the Muslim provinces, which recognised the cultural and religious identity of the region. At the same time, the Government announced that it was preparing a long-term strategy (between 20 and 30 years) to deal with the violence in the south of the country, though some months later it announced an extension of the state of emergency in the three southern provinces with Muslim majorities.

## Europe and Central Asia

Turning to the dispute between **Armenia and Azerbaijan** over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, contacts aimed at resolving the conflict continued between representatives of the two countries as part of what has become known as the "Prague Format", with specific meetings arranged for both sides to set out their points of view. Half-way through the year, following a meeting held by the Presidents of both countries in Warsaw, the two governments indicated the possibility of reaching an agreement before the end of 2005, which would involve Armenia returning control of five of the seven districts in Nagorno-Karabakh currently controlled by Armenian forces to Azerbaijan, along with the deployment of an OSCE peace-keeping mission, though without the participation of the Minsk Group. Under this agreement, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh would then be consulted in a referendum when between 10 and 15 years have elapsed. At the end of the year, the Russian mediator declared that both Armenia and Azerbaijan had reached an agreement on the deployment of UN troops in the region, while **OSCE mediators said that they were confident of reaching a definitive agreement during 2006** and had positive expectations of the results from the meeting between the Presidents of the two countries planned for the end of January 2006.

As regards the tensions that have arisen in **Georgia** over the status of the region of **Abkhazia**, President M. Saakashvili began the year with a reiteration of his offer to negotiate. The Georgian President proposed the establishment in Abkhazia of a form of autonomy based on the Italian model in the Alto Adige region, which until 1972 was under Austrian control. During the second quarter of the year, the parties engaged in

a number of **trust-building and détente measures**, stating that they wished to work jointly on issues such as security, political affairs and economic cooperation, as well as resolving the problem involving people who had been displaced by the conflict. In the middle of the year, both parties agreed to exchange proposals in a joint document, with mediation from the UN Secretary General's Special Representative, H. Tagliavini. In September, the Georgian President announced an international conference for the parties involved in the conflict, the OSCE and the USA, and at the end of the year he announced that he would be willing to hold a face-to-face meeting with the Abkhaz leader in Geneva in mid-January. At the same time, the Georgian Foreign Minister called on the OSCE to play a more active role.

As far as events in the disputed region of **South Ossetia** were concerned, the Georgian President's proposal regarding autonomy was rejected by the region's leader, though an agreement for the demilitarisation of the region was nevertheless reached in March. The first stage involved dismantling trenches and fortifications, followed by steps towards economic cooperation. However, tensions increased in August due to a rising lack of security. The Georgian Government also expressed its disagreement with the format of the peace talks, viewing them as ineffective. At the end of the year there were discussions over the Georgian proposal to include the OSCE, the EU and the USA in peace negotiations, and the leader of the Republic of South Ossetia, E. Kokoity, put forward a **three-step peace process**: demilitarisation of the area, social and economic rehabilitation of the region and the establishment of relations between the Republic and Georgia. Both Russia and Georgia welcomed the proposal.

Turning to the process in **Northern Ireland**, at the beginning of April (coinciding with the beginning of a general election campaign in the United Kingdom) Sinn Fein Leader G. Adams called on the IRA to give up the armed struggle, disarm and enter the democratic process. The IRA replied that it would consider Sinn Fein's request, and in July it ordered an end to all armed activities, stating that it would in the future use only democratic, political and peaceful means to achieve its aims. However, the group would not disband. A few days later, the British Government undertook to demilitarise Northern Ireland, setting up a programme to withdraw its troops and dismantle military installations. London plans to reduce its presence to around 5,000 troops by 2007, ending the support given by British soldiers to the Northern Ireland Police and abolishing the special courts that deal with cases relating to acts of terrorism. Finally, in September, the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning in Northern Ireland confirmed that the IRA had decommissioned all of its arsenals of weapons. This announcement represented the culmination of the Good Friday peace agreement signed in 1998.

**The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning in Northern Ireland confirmed that the IRA had decommissioned all of its arsenals of weapons. This announcement represented the culmination of the Good Friday peace agreement signed in 1998.**

## Middle East

The conflict between **Israel and Palestine** took a positive turn following the victory of M. Abbas in the Palestinian presidential elections and the subsequent opening of direct contacts with the Israeli Government. The new Palestinian President introduced an internal plan to update the restructuring of the Palestinian security forces, as required under the Road Map. A month-long ceasefire was announced by armed Palestinian groups in January, conditional upon Israel undertaking to release Palestinian prisoners and detainees, ending its selective assassinations and withdrawing its troops from the occupied territories. Hamas announced that it would participate for the first time in the parliamentary elections in July in the Palestinian Autonomous Zones, indicating that it wanted to join the PLO. The PLO itself joined Islamic Jihad and another 11 radical Palestinian factions in agreeing in Cairo to an informal ceasefire for 2005. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades announced in April that they were ending the period of non-aggression agreed with the PNA following the assassination of one of its members by the Israeli army.

The parliamentary elections planned for July were eventually postponed by the PNA, a decision that was interpreted by Hamas as a move by al-Fatah (the majority group led by the PNA's President) in response to

the favourable predictions regarding Hamas, and it indicated that it would enter talks with any country except Israel so long as the military occupation continued. During the third quarter of the year, events in this conflict were focused around the evacuation of the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories in the Gaza Strip, which took place amid objections from important sections of Israeli society as well as from settler groups. Israel promised that its troops would be withdrawn from the Palestinian-Egyptian border in part of Gaza and replaced with Egyptian soldiers. In October, a decision by the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) forced the resignation en masse of the Government of Prime Minister A. Qure'a, due to the executive's inability to control instability in Gaza. Speaking after one of its leaders had been assassinated, Hamas announced that it would not renew the informal ceasefire that it had maintained during the previous nine months, unless Israel put an end to its attacks and released Palestinian prisoners. In November, the Israeli Government and the PNA reached an **historic agreement on the Egyptian border in Gaza**, which allowed access to be opened up between the two territories. At the end of the year, however, there were further suicide attacks by Islamic Jihad, and participation by Hamas in the parliamentary elections in January remained the subject of disagreement, especially following the group's triumph in the municipal elections during December, leading to a request from members of the Palestinian Government for the elections to be postponed, given the weakening position of the ruling party.

Turning finally to the conflict in **Iraq**, there were strong calls for national reconciliation at the beginning of the year, both from the interim Government and Iraqi Kurds and Shiites who had emerged victorious in the elections, and from the US administration. This resulted in the establishment of formal contacts with Iraqi political and social groups who were against the occupation and had boycotted the election. Official Iraqi sources revealed in April that attempts were still being made to open up communications with the leaders of nationalist groups and members of the Baathist resistance, with a view to reaching some kind of agreement that would lead to the demobilisation of the Iraqi insurgency. The Baath Arab Socialist Party, the Iraqi Patriotic Alliance and the Association of Intellectuals against the Occupation signed a joint declaration in September, stressing the need for open dialogue between all political groups in the country as the only way to resolve political differences and ensure international recognition of the legitimate resistance in Iraq to foreign occupation. A conference was held in Cairo in November with more than a hundred Iraqi representatives from different political groups, in an attempt to involve the Sunni community in the elections after its exclusion following the boycott that it called during the January elections. Finally, President J. Al-Talabani said that he was willing to **negotiate with the Iraqi insurgency if it offered to lay down its arms and participate in the political process**. Parliamentary elections were held at the end of the year, with a good voter turnout. The interim Prime Minister and representative of the secular Shiite sectors, I. Allawi, made a call for national reconciliation, promising to tackle the Islamic militias who were threatening to plunge the country into civil war.

### 3.3. The "peace temperature" during 2005

For two years now, the School of Peace Culture has drawn up a monthly indicator of the current state of peace negotiations around the world with a view to analysing the general dynamics of these processes. The indicator is currently based on a total of 25 sets of negotiations, 17 of which relate to situations of armed conflict<sup>1</sup> while 8 relate to unresolved conflicts<sup>2</sup>. Two of the latter (Indonesia-Aceh and Sudan-SPLA) will not be included from January 2006 onwards as they are now classified as resolved conflicts and are therefore no longer involved in peace negotiations.

The indicator shows an average score, calculated by awarding three points to processes that have gone well during the previous month, one point to those that are at a standstill or have not seen any new develop-

1. Algeria, Burundi, Colombia (AUC, ELN and FARC), DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Philippines (MILF and NPA), India (ULFA, NDFB and Jammu Kashmir), Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan (Darfur) and Uganda.


2. Armenia-Azerbaijan, DPR Korea-USA, Georgia (Abkhazia), India (CPI and NSCN-IM), Indonesia (Aceh), Western Sahara and Sudan (SPLA).

ments and no points to processes that have experienced problems. Thus, the maximum score would be 3 while the average would be 1.5.


As shown in the following figure, the year ended with a monthly average of just 1.3 points (1.4 in 2004) and only three months in which an average score of 1.5 or more was recorded (4 months the previous year). Curiously, in both 2004 and 2005 March was the most critical month and the first quarter was the one that showed the most marked reduction in the score. In any case, this indicator helps to highlight the difficulties in keeping the majority of processes on a positive course in any sustained way. The processes underway on the continent of Asia have advanced in a considerably more positive way (an average of 1.5) than those in Africa (an average of 1.1). Processes in Africa have, furthermore, tended to deteriorate.

**The processes underway on the continent of Asia have advanced in a considerably more positive way than those in Africa.**

**Figure 3.1. Evolution of negotiations during 2005**



Peace processes



## 4. Post-war rehabilitation and international involvement

The following chapter contains an analysis of developments in the **post-war rehabilitation processes**<sup>1</sup> currently underway in 19 countries and territories around the world, based on the criteria referred to in indicator no. 4, which divides them up into three groups of countries. Firstly there are those in which a cessation of hostilities has been reached (either because one of the sides has emerged victorious or due to mediation from third parties), along with those in which a peace process is giving reasonably good results, a total of nine countries (G1). Secondly there are those in which a cessation of hostilities or peace agreement has been signed but is going badly and impeding post-war rehabilitation work, a total of seven (G2). Finally there are the countries and territories that remain in a state of war but are nevertheless receiving a considerable amount of international aid of a post-war nature, offered in many cases as an incentive to assist the pursuit of or compliance with an agreement that will bring hostilities to an end, a total of three (G3). A section with the most prominent international initiatives in this area is being included. The chapter closes with a summary and a map showing the countries analysed.

Given that post-war rehabilitation processes happen over a long period of time, the countries analysed here have been divided up into those in which the process began during the last five years (regarded as being in a transitional phase) and those in which it began more than five years ago (classed as being in a rehabilitation phase). According to the United Nations, the **transition** phase represents the period in a crisis in which agreements with the international community are crucial in order to support and strengthen ceasefire and peace agreements that are as yet fragile, creating the necessary conditions for political stability, security, justice and social equality<sup>2</sup>. After the **transition** phase, **rehabilitation** seeks not only to reinforce pre-existing humanitarian programmes but also to stimulate sustainable growth in order to ensure that any changes introduced become a real resource for development<sup>3</sup>.

Transitional phase	Indicator	Date on which rehabilitation began	Evolution over the year
Afghanistan	G3	2001	Stalemate
Angola	G2	2002	Progress
Congo	G2	2003	Stalemate
DR Congo	G3	2003	Progress
Côte d'Ivoire	G2	2003	Progress
Eritrea	G2	2000	Deterioration
Haiti	G2	2004	Stalemate
Iraq	G3	2003	Deterioration
Liberia	G1	2003	Progress
Macedonia, FYR	G1	2001	Progress
Sierra Leone	G1	2001	Progress
Sudan (South)	G2	2004	Progress
Rehabilitation phase	Indicator	Date on which rehabilitation began	Evolution over the year
Bosnia and Herzegovina	G1	1996	Progress
Guatemala	G1	1996	Progress
Guinea-Bissau	G2	1999	Progress
Rwanda	G1	1994	Stalemate
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)	G1	1999	Progress
Tajikistan	G1	1997	Stalemate
Timor-Leste	G1	1999	Progress

Indicator no. 4: Group 1, G1; Group 2, G2; Group 3, G3

1. Post-war rehabilitation is understood to mean the coordinated actions of various primary, secondary and tertiary agents, with or without an international mandate or leadership, aimed at tackling: the security of the ordinary population; addressing priorities of a humanitarian nature and the resettlement of refugees or displaced people; physical reconstruction and the reconstruction of basic institutions; the resolution of basic incompatibilities (i.e. social, economic, democratic and institutional normalisation); reconciliation, respect for human rights and the fight against impunity; regional stability and reintegration in international forums and bodies; and the empowerment of civilian society and the construction of good governance through international involvement.

2. Report by the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on transition issues. February 2004. See:

<[http://www.peacebuild.ca/dw/documents/3330-UNDG\\_ECHA\\_WG\\_on\\_Transition\\_Issues\\_\\_Report\\_-\\_Final\\_Report.doc](http://www.peacebuild.ca/dw/documents/3330-UNDG_ECHA_WG_on_Transition_Issues__Report_-_Final_Report.doc)>.

3. Quoted in the UNDG/ECHA Working Group report, *op.cit.*

## 4.1. Countries in a transitional phase

The following sections contain a description of the contexts currently classified in this way, broken down into continents and regions. These contexts are mainly characterised by the fact that action aimed at dealing with the emergency situation is being carried out simultaneously with work that is more specifically geared towards rehabilitation. During this phase, the prevailing instability and risk that armed confrontations may be resumed mean that any intervention strategy established by the international parties involved must be quite flexible.

### Africa

In Africa, insecurity, the partisan interests of transitional Governments and the difficulties encountered in some contexts in the organisation of both DDR processes and elections are the main factors characterising developments in the 8 countries classified as being in a transitional phase on the continent.

#### a) Southern Africa

In **Angola**, the year ended **without a definitive date being set for the elections**, the first since 1992, though all the signs point to the fact that they will be held during 2006. The main reason for this is the delay in the creation of the institutional and governmental organisations that will be responsible for seeing the process through. As regards **humanitarian requirements**, around 100,000 internally displaced people remained unable to return to their places of origin, due mainly to the poor state of the country's infrastructure, the absence of state administrative bodies and the number of landmines<sup>4</sup>, according to a joint assessment made by the United Nations and the Luanda Government. This same report also indicated an increase in violence between local communities and recently returned displaced people. As regards the UNHCR's **repatriation programme**, although the agency had planned to complete it during 2005, it will now be extended to March 2006. Finally, it should be mentioned that President J. E. Dos Santos continued to call for a **donor conference**, seeking help from the EU. The European Commission **finally rejected this possibility** on the basis that the country's own natural resources should be sufficient for it to finance its own reconstruction.

#### b) West Africa

In relation to **Côte d'Ivoire**, the UN Security Council passed resolution<sup>5</sup>, in which it **agreed to postpone for a year the elections originally planned for October 2005**. This decision was due to the **impossibility of beginning the disarmament and demobilisation process** due to the lack of agreement on the timing and conditions of DDR. One of the conditions for agreeing to this postponement was the replacement of Prime Minister S. Diarra with someone appointed by consensus<sup>6</sup>, though it should be stressed that the ability of recently elected Prime Minister C. Konan Bany to act will depend on the willingness of President L. Gbagbo to grant him executive powers, something which he has to date been reluctant to do. The situation throughout the year was characterised by **violence and insecurity and by an increasing lack of trust between the parties**, a situation which in turn had a direct effect on **donors** who were **unwilling to contribute the money requested** by humanitarian agencies. This lack of funds impeded the efforts of organisations working in the country and the implementation of projects already planned.

In **Liberia**, the year ended with **victory in the elections for E. Johnson-Sirleaf, leader of the Unity Party**, making her the first woman leader of an African country. Another notable event was the holding in Copenhagen of the second **technical meeting** organised by the **UNDP** and the **World Bank**, at which

4. It is estimated that between six and eight million mines remain active.

5. See S/Res/1633 of 21 October 2005, at:

<<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/564/38/PDF/N0556438.pdf?OpenElement>>.

6. See the chapter on peace processes.

representatives from the Liberian Government, financial institutions, donor countries and other UN agencies met to discuss the results achieved so far in respect of the aims set out in the transitional framework (RFTF). This review of the RFTF<sup>7</sup> pointed to economic governance as one of the main problems. The meeting included a discussion about the potential ways of strengthening **accountability**, and in this connection the new Government (which will take power at the beginning of 2006) announced the adoption of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP). Agreed by the Transitional National Government and the International Contact Group for Liberia<sup>8</sup> during the course of the last year, the GEMAP was slightly modified as it would have conflicted with the country's constitutional and judicial system. Finally, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1626<sup>9</sup>, in which it extended UNMIL's mandate until March 2006 and authorised an increase in the mission's military contingent.

### Chart 4.1. The improvement of economic management in Liberia under the GEMAP

The **aim** of the programme is to ensure that any income obtained by the state is used to the direct benefit of the people of Liberia.

#### Resources

- International experts with the power to make binding decisions will be given positions in some key state institutions in order to oversee tax collection and the preparation of budgets and implementation processes, and to supervise the Central Bank's internal controls and audits.

#### Results

- The improved management of income and costs with the introduction of an Integrated Financial Management Information System.
- The implementation of an independent Anti-corruption Commission with legal powers, comprising both Liberian and international members, to deal with cases of fraud, corruption and financial offences.
- The development of the local financial management skills required to provide responsible governance in the financial arena.

#### Advantages

- Donors undertake to guarantee continued international support for the rehabilitation programme during the 36 months of the programme.
- The programme will help Liberia to meet the necessary requirements for the lifting of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council in Resolution 1521 of 2003<sup>10</sup>.

In **Sierra Leone**, the transition to a rehabilitation phase began, at least in structural terms, as shown on the one hand by the **replacement of UNAMSIL** (after six years in the country) by a United Nations integrated office, **UNIOSIL**, and on the other by the creation of a Trust Fund to help achieve the goals set out in the Poverty Reduction Strategy, a document published by the Government during the course of the year. This Fund will be managed by the World Bank and has the support of the Consultative Group for Sierra Leone<sup>11</sup>. Chief among the **principal challenges** remaining are: job creation (it is estimated that 70% of the population live below the poverty line); improved Government management; the fight to combat corruption and food security. Finally, particular mention should be made of the government's poor response to the requirements set out in the final report by the **Truth and Reconciliation Commission**. The only action it took was to publish a document entitled "Draft bill on the truth and reconciliation project", which either ignored or glossed over many of the recommendations made by the Commission. This caused great unease among the human rights organisations and civilian groups involved in the process.

7. The RFTF is a strategic document that sets out the objectives for transition on the basis of an evaluation of requirements identified in January 2004. For more information, see: <<http://www.lr.undp.org/docs/RFTFRevision.pdf>>.

8. This group comprises ECOWAS, the EU, the AU, the World Bank, the United Nations, the USA, Nigeria, Ghana, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden.

9. See S/Res/1626 of 19 September 2005 at: <<http://www.unmil.org/documents/resolutions/reso1626.pdf>>.

10. See Resolution 1521 of 22 December 2003 at:

<<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/669/63/PDF/N0366963.pdf?OpenElement>>.

11. The Consultative Group includes more than 25 donor countries and is co-directed by the World Bank, DFID, the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations.

### c) Horn of Africa

**Ethiopia's rejection to apply the Boundary Commission decision has contributed to the deterioration of the rehabilitation process in Eritrea.**

In **Eritrea**, the post-war rehabilitation process **deteriorated**, due chiefly to the failure by Ethiopia to implement the border demarcation suggested by the Independent Border Commission for Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2002. This once again resulted in the **Eritrean Government restricting UNMEE troop movements** (something it has been doing on and off for the past eighteen months). This made it impossible for UNMEE to carry out its duties and caused members of the mission to leave the country temporarily<sup>12</sup>. It should also be noted that the lack of trust between the two sides meant that some key aspects of rehabilitation, such as reconciliation, have not even begun. On the other hand, Eritrea continued to maintain **strict control over the media**. Likewise, during the course of the year, the Government implemented a **process for the registration of NGOs present in the country** and the requirement that they pay tax on imports of humanitarian aid. The purpose of this move is to control who receives aid and prevent the international agencies from directly financing local NGOs.

After the signing of the peace agreement in the **South of Sudan** on 9 January<sup>13</sup>, the United Nations deployed its UNMIS mission with an initial mandate for six months, which was subsequently extended in UN Security Council Resolution 1627 until March 2006<sup>14</sup>. The **UNMIS mandate** includes verification of the ceasefire, support for the DDR process and the promotion of national reconciliation and human rights. The main difficulties faced by the mission were the **lack of infrastructure** and the delayed arrival of troops promised by the various countries contributing to the mission. The United Nations underlined the importance of support from donors for the **revised Working Plan presented for 2005**, given the positive message that the success of these programmes could send to the other conflicts currently underway around the country. In this regard, a **donor conference** in Norway attracted more funds than were actually requested. As far as the democratisation process is concerned, **an autonomous Government was formed in the south**, to remain in place until a referendum on independence is held in six years' time, while a **Government of National Unity** was formed after a number of disagreements between the parties in connection with the appointment of ministers. The Constitution was finally approved, an important milestone in the future implementation of the peace agreement, though the formation of legislative assemblies still remains pending, among other issues. However, the **security situation** worsened as a result of attacks on humanitarian personnel by members of the LRA.

### d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

In **Congo**, the Pool region suffered **high levels of violence and insecurity** which impeded the work of humanitarian agencies and, above all, the disarmament of the Reverend Ntuomi's Ninja militias, both of which are key to the advancement of the rehabilitation process. Humanitarian organisations present in the country denounced the **lack of protection offered to inhabitants of the Pool region**, the epicentre of the conflict in recent years. In spite of this, the **National Election Commission** announced that the region now enjoyed the security conditions required for elections to be held. Elections were duly called to renew half the seats on the Senate<sup>15</sup>, in which the Congolese Working Party (PCT) led by President D. Sassou-Nguesso won 21 seats, and an extra 2 were won by the PCT's conservative wing which stood independently. Finally, the **project for the integration of former combatants** run by the Trust Fund for Human Security and managed by the UNDP received support from the Japanese Government and the United Nations.

12. See the chapter on tensions and high-risk disputes.

13. For more information on the agreement, see the chapter on peace processes in Barometer 7.

14. See Resolution 1627 of 23 September 2005 at:

<<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/521/60/PDF/N0552160.pdf?OpenElement>>.

15. The Congolese Senate is made up of 60 Senators, each with a six-year mandate. Half the Senate is re-elected every three years, as provided for in the Constitution approved in 2002.

In **DR Congo**, the constant arguments that arose throughout the year in the heart of the Transitional National Government **prevented the general elections from being held** as planned. As far as the targets set at the beginning of the year are concerned, a Constitution was finally drawn up and submitted to a referendum at the end of December, which saw a good voter turnout. Turning to the issues of **disarmament and security**, progress was made in respect of the integration of former combatants into military units and a national Congolese police force, though a number of armed groups remained active in the east of the country. This will be one of the main challenges for 2006, and in this connection it is important to mention that the **EU reiterated its commitment to the transition process** with the deployment of its EUSEC and EUPOL-Kinshasa missions. These two organisations will respectively play a part in security sector reform and the preparation of the new integrated police forces, working to international standards.

## America

Lack of security was the prevailing issue in the post-war rehabilitation process that began in **Haiti** in 2004. In spite of this, the Provisional Government began a **National Dialogue** process with the aim of achieving national reconciliation and seeking **participation** from all sectors that **reject violence and accept democracy**. A law was also enacted during the course of the year that would govern the holding of elections, though they were eventually postponed due to the absence of suitable conditions. The **government's efforts** were criticised by various sectors of the population, which accused the Government of G. Latortue of incompetence and political bias. The **disarmament process** could not be implemented due to the continuing armed violence in which MINUSTAH was also involved. Finally, three **donor conferences** were held (Guyana, Canada and Belgium) during the course of the year in an attempt to speed up funding and guarantee support for the electoral process and the election of the next Government.

## Asia and the Pacific

The year in **Afghanistan** was characterised by **violence and a lack of security**<sup>16</sup>, a situation caused to a great extent by the Taliban militias and one that is having a direct influence on the remaining aspects of post-war rehabilitation. The **disarmament and demobilisation phase** (around 60,000 combatants) came to an end and the programme for "Disbanding Illegal Armed Groups" (which number around 1,800) got underway. **Elections** were also held during the course of the year for seats in the national Parliament and the Provincial Councils, though they took place against a background of extreme insecurity and coercion. In spite of their importance in the decentralisation process, since they will be the organisations charged with providing a bridge between regional and central Government, turnout for the election of these bodies was lower than for the presidential elections. The money promised to Afghanistan by **donors** for 2004-2005 was 600 million dollars up on previous years, and the difference between money promised and amounts actually handed over also increased. This was due to a lack of confidence in the government's powers and the persistent security problems in the country. As regards the presence of international bodies, the Government introduced legislation aimed at channelling donations and regulating the work of the **humanitarian agencies**, which it accused of misappropriating the resources at their disposal. As far as **opium production** is concerned, a report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime revealed a 21% fall over the course of the year, though it warned of farmers' dissatisfaction with the opium eradication and development aid they are receiving which, combined with corruption, could put efforts in this area at risk.

**The Government of Afghanistan enacted legislation aimed at channelling donations and regulating the work of humanitarian organisations, which it accused of misappropriating the resources at their disposal.**

16. One month before the year ended, the number of people killed as a result of the armed violence totalled 1,400, according to local sources.

## Chart 4.2. The nature of aid in Afghanistan

The majority of the aid received by Afghanistan is devoted to humanitarian assistance instead of rehabilitation work or the construction of democratic political institutions, as reflected in the way the 1,400 million dollars invested through the United Nations System was distributed between January 2002 and December 2004:

- Humanitarian assistance – 73%
- Support for the political process – 10%
- Governance and skill-building programmes – 7%
- DDR Programme – 6%
- Interim Authority Fund (payment of the salaries of state functionaries during the first six months of 2002) – 4%

One particular characteristic of the external aid reaching Afghanistan is that the majority of this aid is channelled through the United Nations System, NGOs and private companies. As a result, the Afghan Government distinguishes between its normal state budgets and what it calls the “external national development budget”, which is much higher than the domestic budget and which the Government has no control over as it is sent directly to the various international bodies involved.

By way of example, 71.5% of the 3,000 million dollars of international aid awarded during the period from 2002 to 2004 was managed via the “external national development budget” instead of via the government’s ordinary budget. This is a sign of the donors’ lack of confidence in the government’s capacity to manage its funds and oversee the implementation of programmes on a grand scale. However, it is hoped that this situation will gradually be resolved during the coming years.

Source: Afghan Finance Ministry and the Second Report on the Evolution of the MDG, United Nations.

## Europe

In **FYR Macedonia**, all the **legislative reforms**<sup>17</sup> set out in the Ohrid Agreement were approved during the course of the year. This made it possible for **Macedonia to become a prospective candidate for EU membership** and, as a result, begin negotiations with Brussels to sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Implementation of these reforms, particularly as regards the decentralisation process<sup>18</sup> and the use of local symbols gave rise to a number of disputes, leading to the extension of the mandate of the **special EU mission, EUPOL-PROXIMA**<sup>19</sup> until the end of the year, when it will be replaced by a team of EU advisers, EUPAT, whose job will be to cooperate with the local authorities in the ongoing processes aimed at reforming the police force. The **EU also appointed a Special Representative** for the country, E. Fouéré, to give the necessary political support in the event of any incident that may threaten the country’s stability, which remains fragile. Particular mention should be made of **some of the challenges** facing the Government over the coming months, such as the implementation of a decentralisation process, which will involve a series of changes that the general population has not yet been sufficiently informed about, due, say some analysts, to the speed of their approval in the government’s attempts to please the EU.

2005 ended with all the countries and territories currently involved in post-war rehabilitation processes in the West Balkans signing up to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. The Commission put this mechanism in motion at the Zagreb summit in November 2000 with the aim of stabilising the region and promoting European standards.

17. During the four years in which the Ohrid Agreement has been in force, the Parliament has adopted 15 amendments to the Constitution and 70 new and revised laws.

18. The decentralisation process includes a new demarcation of regional borders, reducing the number of regions from 123 to 76 by 2008, with the decentralisation of powers in the areas of education, health and the economy.

19. The end of PROXIMA’s mandate marks the end of the EU’s crisis management missions in the country, part of the Commission’s Security and Defence Policy.

### Chart 4.3. EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the West Balkans

This Agreement represents a long-term commitment to the region by the EU, both in political terms and with regard to financing and human resources. Under the Agreement, signatory countries will enter into a formal association with the EU after completing a transitional process during which they will gradually implement the reforms required in order to ensure respect for democratic principles and the observation of certain European standards, the principal basis for the common European market. It is interesting to note that the process is adjusted to the level of development displayed by each of the countries involved, thus allowing them all to advance at their own pace. The capacity and willingness of these countries to form closer relationships with the EU is assessed each year in an annual report on the association process. This document includes the processes undertaken by each country during the period indicated, monitoring the evolution of regional cooperation and assessing the effects of the different stabilisation and association instruments. With this Agreement, the EU has awarded 4,600 million euros for a period of six years (200-2006) in a community reconstruction, development and stabilisation assistance programme, with a view to achieving the following objectives:

- Reconstruction, democratic stabilisation, reconciliation and the return of refugees.
- Institutional and legislative development in accordance with EU standards, in order to encourage democracy and the state of law, human rights, civil society, the development of an independent media and the capacity to operate a market economy.
- Sustainable social and economic development, along with the structural reform that this requires.
- The promotion of regional relationships and closer cooperation both among the countries themselves and between them, the EU and the candidate countries from Central Europe.

## Middle East

Turning to the rehabilitation process in **Iraq** particular mention should first be made of the **situation of violence and armed confrontations** that the country is still suffering<sup>20</sup>. With the aim of handing responsibility for the reconstruction process formally over to an elected Government, in spite of the continuing hostilities, the international community has held **three election processes** during the course of the year. The first was to elect the members of the National Transitional Assembly, responsible for drawing up a new Constitution for Iraq. In wording the new constitutional text, Assembly members placed much more emphasis on ensuring future power bases (through the formation of a federal state to the detriment of a strong centralised Government) than on ensuring the future governance of the country, a move that will have a decisive influence on the country's political future<sup>21</sup>. The second electoral process was the constitutional referendum, in which 73% of the Iraqi people ratified the Constitution<sup>22</sup>, while the third was the general election, held at the end of the year to elect a permanent legislative assembly. During the course of 2005, the international community expressed its support for the process currently underway in Iraq, as demonstrated by the **conference** held in Brussels and convened by the EU with support from the USA. At this conference, the EU endorsed the current political process in Iraq, after the majority of member states had individually expressed their objection to the USA's intervention. The other event that focused the attention of international donors was the **fourth meeting of the Iraq Reconstruction Facility**<sup>23</sup> (IRRFI), held in Jordan and hosted by the Government of Canada with more than 60 donor countries in attendance, along with the United Nations Development Group, the World Bank and the IMF. At this meeting, donors confirmed the financial undertakings they had made to the country. Elsewhere, it should be remembered that a large number of the **audits** carried out during the course of the years on the **funds** allocated for the reconstruction of Iraq uncovered cases of corruption and misappropriation. Mention should also be made of the fact that a large proportion of the money allocated for reconstruction projects, around 25% of the total, is diverted to security work. Meanwhile, public services, employment and health, identified as the services that the ordinary people of Iraq needed most, suffered huge problems throughout the year. Finally, the trial of former leader S. Hussein got underway during 2005.

20. See the chapter on armed conflicts.

21. The text submitted for referendum was not approved by the 15 Sunni members of the parliamentary committee charged with drawing up the Constitution, and in order to avoid the risk that Sunni and Shiite members of M. Al-Sader's faction might cast their votes against, it was not put to the vote in parliament.

22. For more information, see Barometer 9.

23. The IRRFI was created by the United Nations at the end of 2004 to help donor governments channel their resources and coordinate their support for Iraq's reconstruction. The IRRFI handles the World Bank's trust fund for Iraq as well as the UNDG's trust fund for the country.

## 4.2. Countries in an advanced phase of rehabilitation

This section gives a country by country analysis of the contexts which have completed the transitional phase. The objective during this second phase is to advance and consolidate the achievements of the previous phase, in which certain key rehabilitation factors (e.g. reconciliation) take a back seat while more urgent issues are resolved. It is still very important during this phase to supervise the actions of the elected Government, and international involvement is therefore essential, both through governmental organisations and through regional bodies and financial institutions. The timescale for this phase is relatively long, which underlines the importance of ensuring that the undertakings obtained from countries coming out of an armed conflict are lasting and continuous and not motivated by headline-seeking.

The **tenth anniversary of the Dayton Agreement**, which brought an end to the armed conflict in **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, marked the beginning of the first attempt to transform the Agreement. It is interesting to note that both the signing of this agreement ten years ago and the opening of talks between the country's tripartite presidency have taken place in the USA, a fact that indicates international support for the direction that the country should take from now on. This was undoubtedly helped by the **reforms** carried out during the course of the year, allowing the country to **join the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU** (talks for which have already begun) as well as **NATO's Partnership for Peace**. These reforms involved, on the one hand, introducing measures to **transform the Armed Forces**, in order to create a future unified, multi-ethnic and professional army under one sole Defence Ministry, and on the other, creating a **unified police force** that would be controlled by the central Government in Sarajevo. Among the reforms still pending in the country, mention should be made of the requirement to cooperate with the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia and hand over R. Mladic and R. Karadzic (accused by the Court of crimes against humanity dating back almost ten years), as well as reform of the law governing the media.

### Chart 4.4. Dayton, 10 years on

Ten years on from its signing, the generally held view (shared by its original broker, R. Holbrooke) is that both the Dayton Agreement and the Constitution represent an obstacle to the country's development and the formation of a stable and democratic Government.

The Dayton agreement is crammed with paradoxes. On the one hand it recognises the division of the country into two separate entities: on the one side is the R. Srpska, a territory created with an ethnic conception imposed from Belgrade and with the support of Bosnian Serbs under the command of war criminals R. Karadzic and R. Mladic, which thus boasts a Serbian majority, while on the other is the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which enjoys a Croatian and Bosnian majority. On the other hand, however, it grants refugees and people displaced by the war the right to return to their places of origin, with the aim of destroying some of the consequences of "ethnic cleansing" and restoring the multi-ethnic population that had existed previously.

The co-existence of these two sides has resulted in a dual system of Government that has led to many decisions being blocked. This obstacle was only overcome when the Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia (PIC<sup>24</sup>), an *ad hoc* body created to supervise implementation of the peace process, decided in 1997 to invest the High Representative with the Bonn Powers. These powers entitle him to impose legislative measures and dismiss politicians who obstruct the reforms proposed for the country's rehabilitation. The Bonn Powers are especially significant as they demonstrate the powerlessness of Government politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It should be reported in this regard that Government political forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina mostly pursue nationalist ethnic causes instead of seeking democracy and citizenship. This points up their inability to work for the common good and leave their nationalist interests aside, though it does not stop them from being re-elected by the voters.

In this connection, it will be particularly interesting to note the attitude of politicians from R. Srpska regarding the constitutional changes that may be introduced during the forthcoming debate on constitutional reform. It should be pointed out that any change to the Constitution would mean the disappearance of this entity. The proposed reforms have to be presented before March 2006, in time for the general elections which will take place in October next year. However, some analysts have already indicated that if these changes depend solely on the politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina they will probably never happen, leading them to call for greater involvement from the international community.

24. The PIC is the body ultimately in charge of overseeing the Dayton peace agreements of 1995 and it comprises representatives from 55 countries and international organisations.

As the year ended, **Guatemala** was suffering the effects of cyclone Stan, whose devastating aftermath was similar to that of hurricane Mitch in 1998. The renewed international attention that resulted from the disaster should be used not only for the reconstruction of the country's physical infrastructure but also as an opportunity to build new social structures. As regards the **fundamental problems afflicting the country**, it is important to mention the levels of violence and criminality that characterised the situation during the course of the year. **A human rights office was finally established in the country**, the third office to be opened by the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Latin America (the other two are in Colombia and Mexico). It will be headed up by the Swede, A. Kompass, who has previously been in charge of the other two offices. The programmes run by the office include the training of judges and lawyers and assisting the Government in public education issues.

The situation in **Guinea-Bissau** during the course of the year was marked by instability and a fragile peace. J.B. "Nino" Vieira and his PAIGC party emerged victorious in the elections, and once installed as President he dismissed the country's Prime Minister, C. Gomes Junior, further increasing the climate of uncertainty. In spite of this, the holding of the elections **officially completed the final phase of the transition process** in the eyes of the United Nations. As a result, UNOGBIS began a transformation process that would allow it to assume the role of facilitator in the development of sustainable national peace-building mechanisms. The country also suffered an **unfavourable economic and financial crisis**, due mainly to a lack of funds, both internal and external. In this regard, positive results were expected from the **donor** conference planned for November, though this was eventually postponed due to a lack of institutional stability and donor interest, both of which had been set as conditions for the event to be held. **Security sector reform also remained pending**, though the United Kingdom promised to work with the Government in designing a road map to implement the process. Finally, the UN Economic and Social Council **extended the mandate of the ad hoc Group for Guinea-Bissau** for a further year.

**The security sector reform is still pending in Guinea-Bissau.**

The most notable event in **Rwanda** was the **official inauguration of the traditional Gacaca courts**, formed to judge crimes committed during the 1994 genocide. Their suitability was questioned by human rights organisations, which cited the absence of guarantees for a fair trial offered by these courts, given their members' lack of training and the possibility that they may be used by some to seek revenge. In this connection, the hard line adopted by the Government on issues relating to the genocide is an example of the political dividends that can be obtained from what has been referred to as P. Kagame's "genocide credit", given that these traditional courts are being used to uncover evidence of guilt. The *Gacaca* have thus created a climate of fear among the general population, a fact dramatically highlighted by the flight, in the middle of 2005, of thousands of Rwandans to neighbouring Burundi. It is interesting to note how P. Kagame's Government succeeded in persuading the Burundi Government to classify them as economic immigrants, thus preventing them from being granted asylum, in blatant violation of the principles of the Refugees' Statute, a situation denounced by the UNHCR. Finally, mention should be made of the **restrictive policies that P. Kagame's Government** continued to apply on media groups and organisations that would not toe the government's line, culminating with the closure of LIPRODHOR, one of the oldest and most respected human rights organisations in the country. Finally, the International Criminal Court for Rwanda began to hear evidence from Colonel T. Bagasora, accused of being the brains behind the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

In **Kosovo**, the report<sup>25</sup> presented by the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy, K. Eide, who is responsible for assessing the **degree of compliance with the eight standards** established by the international community (relating to economic, political and social development and human rights), indicated that these standards had not been applied evenly. In spite of this, the UN Security Council decided to set a date of January 2006 for the official opening of talks on the status of Kosovo. This offers a view of how the political situation and real events in the territory are currently travelling parallel paths, as demonstrated by the fact that

25. See the report detailing a broad examination of the situation in Kosovo, at: <<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/540/72/PDF/N0554072.pdf?OpenElement>>.

there are still Serbian enclaves in Kosovo that require permanent surveillance from KFOR in order to prevent any incidents from occurring. Among his proposals, K. Eide set out the need for the EU to develop closer links with Kosovo and suggested that a High Representative from the international community be appointed with powers similar to the Bonn Powers held by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, to deal with problems relating to the various ethnic groups. This proposal is in contrast to the situation currently seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is now in the process of changing a system that has led to stalemate and the renunciation of responsibility by those in political charge, who leave any politically compromising decisions in the hands of the High Representative in order to avoid defeat during the elections.

The Democratic People's Party, the ruling party in **Tajikistan**, won more than 70% of the seats in the parliamentary elections held during the course of the year. The election process was not held in accordance with international standards, according to international observers present. The government's **strict control over the independent media** during the year, a situation denounced by the OSCE, is a good example

### The Tajikistan Government kept exerting a tight control over the independent media.

of the restrictions suffered by any voice that dissents against the regime of President E. Rakhmonov. It is therefore interesting to note the attention paid during the course of the year by some **international financial organisations** like the IMF, the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, whose representatives were in contact with the leader of the Government to analyse

future potential for collaboration, an undoubted sign of the country's definitive entry into the final phase of the rehabilitation process. However, it is necessary to emphasise the fact that these promising economic prospects (which are very necessary in a country where poverty is endemic and that occupies 122<sup>nd</sup> place in the HDI) should not divert attention away from important post-war rehabilitation issues, such as support for the democratic process through the training and consolidation of a plural party base, the development of a state of law and the protection of human rights. With this in mind, the UN Security Council agreed to extend the mandate of the **United Nations** peace-building mission, UNTOP, until June 2006.

In **Timor Leste**, there were three events during the year that will have a bearing on the country's future development. Firstly, an **agreement to extract oil from the Timor sea** was signed with the Australian Government. This agreement offers a ray of hope for the country's future development given the profits that will presumably come from the wells, though it is vitally important that the Government look into other possible sources of income if it doesn't want the country to be entirely dependent on oil, a factor that has too often brought more problems than benefits (as in Angola and Nigeria). Particular mention should also be made of UNMISSET's exit and its replacement by a United Nations Office (UNOTIL). UNOTIL will principally concentrate its efforts on **three programmes**; one in support of the public authorities and the justice system in the area of serious crime, another in support of compliance with the law and the third in support of security and stability in the country. Finally, the **Commission for Acceptance, Truth and Reconciliation** (known by its Portuguese acronym, CAVR) completed its report, in which it set out the conclusions it had reached on the human rights violations committed in Timor Leste during the period of Indonesian occupation. Some members of the media have had access to the report, which indicates that at least 183,000 people were assassinated in Timor-Leste during the 24 years that the occupation lasted. 70% of deaths are attributed to the Armed Forces and pro-Indonesian militias. A decision on whether the report should or should not be published officially may have an influence on the future path of reconciliation in the country.

## 4.3. Other items on the agenda

This section looks at theoretical and analytical aspects, in an attempt to improve the capabilities of an international response. This includes the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, approved at the end of the year by the United Nations. This is an unprecedented development that offers a response to an issue that has been of great concern to the organisation in recent years. The United Nations itself has thus acknowledged that it needed a predetermined structure to respond to problems arising during the transition between emergency and development, in the way that it has in the event of emergencies, for which there are well established response mechanisms and structures.

## The Peacebuilding Commission

The seed for this Commission was planted in the UN Secretary General's proposal to member states in his report "In larger freedom; towards development, security and human rights for all"<sup>26</sup>, which called for the establishment of an inter-governmental consultative body for Peacebuilding<sup>27</sup>. Support for this proposal was obtained before the year's end with the adoption by the UN General Assembly and Security Council of Resolution 1645<sup>28</sup>, in which both bodies approved the establishment of this new inter-governmental UN organisation along with a Peacebuilding Support Office.

Behind the creation of this new consultative body lies the need, so often stated by the United Nations, to "[...] apply a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace [...]"<sup>29</sup>. For the UN Secretary General, the Commission responds to this identified need as a forum in which all the relevant parties can meet and exchange information and develop a common strategy that will prevent the resumption of conflict in contexts in which peace is fragile.

The Commission's main objective will be to assist countries emerging from conflict to make the transition from armed confrontation to positive peace by providing advice on rehabilitation, reinforcing the efforts of all the interested parties in this working environment and ensuring the extension of the time limits that the international community unconsciously places on post-war rehabilitation processes.

### Chart 4.5. Composition of the Organising Committee for the Peacebuilding Commission

Origin	
UN Security Council	– Seven members, including the permanent members, chosen in accordance with the rules by which the members of the Council itself are chosen.
Economic and Social Council	– Seven members elected from among the regional groups. Special attention will be paid to those that have previously been engaged in armed conflicts.
Countries that contribute to the United Nations budgets	– Five members from countries that have made the highest contributions to UN budgets and made the largest contributions to voluntary funds, including the peacebuilding fund, where they are not included in the two previous groups.
Countries that provide troops and police personnel for United Nations missions	– Five members from countries that have provided the largest number of troops and civilian police to United Nations Missions, where they are not included in the three previous groups.
Regional groups and countries that have experienced situations of recovery after an armed conflict	– Seven additional members, chosen in accordance with the rules and procedures used to decide membership of the UN General Assembly.

In addition, when the Commission meets to discuss specific countries, the Organising Committee may invite representatives from that country and others in the region to attend, along with delegates from the relevant regional and sub-regional organisations, the main providers of financial aid, troops and police, the highest ranking UN representative in the area in question and representatives from associated regional and international financing organisations.

The Resolution also provided for the creation of a Peacebuilding Support Office to provide the Commission with assistance and support. It is recommended that this Office, which will report directly to the Secretary's Office, be created using funds and resources that are currently available.

26. See the complete report at: <<http://www.un.org/spanish/largerfreedom/>>.

27. For more details on the creation of this new body, see Barometer 9.

28. See Resolution 1645 of 20 December 2005 at: <<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/654/20/PDF/N0565420.pdf?OpenElement>>.

29. Ibid.


## Chart 4.6. Duties of the Peacebuilding Support Office

- To design coherent peacebuilding strategies that will then be presented to the Commission.
- To assess the coordination on the ground of all peacebuilding work.
- To oversee financing, taking a global overview of all the amounts donated to a particular rehabilitation process and, through the UN Secretary General, ensure the continuation of these sources of financing.
- To gather information in a systematic way on the lessons learned and the best practices put in place.
- To perform any duty required of it by the Commission and advise the UN Secretary General regarding the contexts in which the Commission's intervention is required.

Although the creation of this Peacebuilding Commission can only be good news, some caution should be exercised until it has been seen just how and to what extent the new body will be able to contribute to post-war rehabilitation. For the moment, the fact that it does not actually have its own funding but instead depends on voluntary financial contributions is not a very promising sign, given that this could restrict its capacity to act. In this regard, it is interesting to note the similarities between the creation of this new United Nations Office and the origins of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA emerged as a response to member states' concerns about the inability of the United Nations system to respond to the humanitarian crises that were occurring during the 1990s. UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182<sup>30</sup>, which approved the creation of OCHA, also set out the need to create a complimentary central financing mechanism that would guarantee a rapid response and reaction from the United Nations system. This open-ended fund initially amounted to 50 million dollars, all provided by voluntary donation. Now, having assumed more responsibilities in addition to its coordination of the humanitarian response to individual emergencies, the total amount in the fund has increased to 500 million dollars.

Finally, it is important to underline the shortage of funds allocated to specific activities within the post-war rehabilitation process, such as the reintegration of former combatants, refugees and the internally displaced, reconciliation processes or the training of public sector employees, to name but a few. This shortage of funds and, above all, donor fatigue, represent a threat to the advance of post-war rehabilitation processes, which generally require extremely long-term commitment.

## Post-war rehabilitation international involvement





## 5. Humanitarian crises and humanitarian action


This chapter contains an analysis of the situation relating to contexts of humanitarian crisis and humanitarian action. The first part deals with the definition of the term “humanitarian crisis” and analyses the indicators that help to identify which countries have undergone a situation of crisis during 2005. The second part examines the evolution of each of the contexts of humanitarian crisis on a region by region basis. The third and final part reviews some of the more important events relating to humanitarian action, and the chapter ends with a map showing the humanitarian crises around the world.

### 5.1. Humanitarian crises: definition and indicators

The term “**humanitarian crisis**”<sup>1</sup> is understood to mean any situation in which there is an exceptional and widespread threat to human life, health or subsistence. Such crises tend to occur in situations of poverty, fragile Government and scarcity of food, in which a natural disaster or armed conflict lead to the appearance of a food crisis, disease and the enforced displacement of the population, either within or outside the country, along with an important mobilisation of international resources in the form of aid.

Since the end of the Cold War, a certain type of humanitarian crisis known as a “complex emergency” has proliferated. Such phenomena, also known as **complex political emergencies**, are man-made situations in which people fall victim to the effect of armed conflict, displacement and famine, combined with the weakening or total collapse of economic and state structures, with the potential occurrence of a natural catastrophe. Emergencies are different from crises because they last over long periods of time and because they have fundamentally political origins and give rise to more serious humanitarian consequences. Although some of the contexts analysed in this report fall within the definition of complex emergencies, there are others that do not meet all the requirements, so we have opted for a broader concept that covers all the scenarios analysed below.

Figure 5.1. Appearance of a humanitarian crisis




This section uses **four indicators to identify the countries that faced a situation of humanitarian crisis during 2005**. Firstly, the reports published periodically by the FAO indicate that there were 45 countries in which a **food emergency** occurred during the course of 2005 (**indicator no. 5**). Of this total, 28 experienced a very serious and continued shortage of food. More than half of these contexts (26) were in Africa, while the remainder were in Asia (11 countries), Central America and the Caribbean (6), Europe and Central Asia (1) and the Middle East (1). It should be mentioned that the FAO classified

1. The expression “humanitarian crisis or emergency” is not correct from a grammatical point of view, as the correct term is “human crisis”. However, this is a term that has been coined and is now habitually used in the literature dealing with this subject.

41 countries in this way in 2004 and 38 in 2003, thus indicating an upward trend as far as food crises are concerned.

Secondly, an analysis is made of the evolution of **internal displacements (indicator no. 6)**, i.e. displacements that occurred within the borders of a single country. In this regard, reports issued by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre indicated that 49 countries reported internally displaced people during the past year, and that at least one in every hundred people was affected in 26 of these. Sudan, where more than 15% of the population is classified as being displaced, was the country that showed the highest increase as a result of armed fighting in the Darfur region. Looking at the situation by region, Sub-Saharan Africa (17 countries), Europe and Central Asia (12) and Asia (9) were once again the worst affected. Although some countries such as Sierra Leone and the Republic of Moldova managed to complete their return processes during 2005, the number of countries in which internal displacements have been reported has remained more or less the same during the last two years (50 in 2003 and 48 in 2004).



Source: the authors from *Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre*, <<http://www.internal-displacement.org>>.

Thirdly, we have examined the **number of refugees (indicator no. 7)** recorded by UNHCR, which indicated that this phenomenon was seen in 66 countries, three fewer than the previous year. In a quarter of these (16) the refugee population exceeded 1% of the total population. However, it should be pointed out that the total number of people for whom UNHCR is responsible (not only refugees but also the internally displaced, asylum seekers and others) has risen once again (after a notable fall was recorded last year) to 19.2 million people, an increase of 13%. This is due chiefly to the number of internally displaced that the agency is now assisting in Colombia and Sudan. The regions of Central Africa and the Great Lakes, together with East Africa and the Horn of Africa, generated the highest number of refugees, with West Africa showing the most noticeable fall (see Table 5.1). Afghanistan, Sudan, Burundi and DR Congo were the countries that once again suffered most from this phenomenon.

Finally, the fourth indicator used is the **Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP)** (Indicator no. 8), through which the United Nations seeks funds for the humanitarian crisis situations that it considers most serious or

**Table 5.1. Refugee population according to UNHCR**

Region	Beginning 2004	Beginning 2005	Change
Central Africa and the Great Lakes	1,257,900	1,267,700	0.8%
East Africa and Horn of Africa	768,100	770,500	0.3%
Southern Africa	306,200	245,100	-20%
West Africa	531,200	465,100	-12.4%
Whole of Africa *	2,863,400	2,748,400	-4.0%
CASWANAME**	2,827,300	2,735,200	-3.3%
America	623,900	598,400	-4.1%
Asia and the Pacific	823,600	836,700	1.6%
Europe	2,454,800	2,317,800	-5.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,593,000</b>	<b>9,236,500</b>	<b>-3.7%</b>


\*Excludes North Africa; \*\*Central Asia, Southeast Asia, North Africa and the Middle East.

Source: UNHCR.

that require more international aid<sup>2</sup>. The CAP for 2006 called for a total of 5,466 million dollars, to bring assistance to 31 million people in 41 different countries<sup>3</sup>, more than two thirds of which are in Africa (See Graph 5.2.). This figure is three times the amount called for in 2005 (1,700 million dollars) and is back to the magnitude of the amounts called for in 2002 and 2003. This extraordinary increase is down to the significant amounts allocated to Sudan and DR Congo, countries which are facing serious humanitarian crises, and Pakistan, which at the end of 2005 suffered an historic earthquake that left more than 85,000 dead. Zimbabwe, Uganda, the Palestinian occupied territories and the countries affected by the tsunamis (mainly Sri Lanka and Indonesia) are the other contexts that are accounting for large levels of resources.

**CAP for 2006 called for a total of 5,466 million dollars, three times the amount called for in 2005.**

**Graph 5.2. United Nations Humanitarian Appeals for 2006 (millions of dollars)**



Source: United Nations

(\*) Flash Appeals that continue as part of the CAP for 2006.

(\*\*) Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone.

(\*\*\*) Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda.

2. The second section of this chapter contains an analysis of the financing trends among donor countries, both within the framework of the CAP and in relation to overall humanitarian assistance.

3. This figure also includes the Flash Appeals that will remain valid as part of the CAP framework during 2006. In addition, this chapter deals with all the countries involved, even when they form part of a regional appeal.

Bearing these 4 indicators in mind, and weighing up the impact that each of them has had in different contexts<sup>4</sup>, **43 countries are regarded as having suffered a humanitarian crisis during 2005**, one fewer than the year before. This slight fall is due to the fact that Mozambique, Senegal and Zambia are no longer classified as contexts of humanitarian crisis, given the considerable improvement in food supplies experienced during 2005. By contrast, two Asian countries, Nepal and Pakistan, have been included in the list as a consequence of the armed conflict in the former and the earthquake that struck the latter in October.

## 5.2. Evolution of humanitarian crisis situations<sup>5</sup>

Although **Africa** remained the **continent on which more than half of the humanitarian crises were concentrated** (58% of these crises), Asia experienced a considerable increase in comparison with the previous year, due mainly to the impact of natural disasters in countries like Indonesia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The continent experienced 21% of the world's humanitarian crises as compared with 16% in 2004. The regions of Europe and Central Asia (11%), America and the Caribbean (5%) and the Middle East (5%), all of which showed no change from the previous year, completed the map of humanitarian crises for 2005.

As regards their **evolution**, some crises **improved considerably in comparison with 2004**, such as **Angola** in southern Africa, which was not included among the United Nations annual appeals process for the first time since 1993, **Sierra Leone** in West Africa, **Kenya, Rwanda** and **Tanzania** in the Great Lakes region, and **Kosovo** (Serbia and Montenegro), in Europe. However, 2005 also saw a **deterioration** in some crisis areas (mainly **Niger, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Uganda, Colombia, Indonesia** and **Iraq**), and the **emergence** of others like **Nepal** and **Pakistan**. A summary of the way these situations have evolved is given below.

### Chart 5.1. Regional overview of the most important humanitarian crises during 2005

#### AFRICA

- **Niger:** almost a third of the population (around four million people) were faced by an extreme food crisis caused by the plague of locusts that affected the Sahel region.
- **DR Congo:** The United Nations announced that more than a thousand people were dying every day in the country as a result of the armed conflict and the worsening humanitarian crisis.

#### AMERICA

- **Colombia:** the strategy of enforced displacement used by armed groups has led to the internal displacement of more than three million people.

#### ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

- **Nepal:** the worsening hostilities have led to a crisis that affects a large proportion of the population, particularly the more than 200,000 people displaced by the conflict.
- **Pakistan:** the earthquake that struck in October led to another historic humanitarian catastrophe on the Asian continent with more than 85,000 people dying.

#### EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

- **Caucasus:** hundreds of thousands of people displaced by the numerous conflicts afflicting the different parts of this region have no access to the most basic services.

#### MIDDLE EAST

- **Iraq:** the constant situation of violence facing some parts of the country continued to make the humanitarian situation increasingly acute for millions of people.

4. The criteria used were, firstly, that 3 or 4 of the indicators considered come together in a single country, and secondly, that one of these indicators has significant repercussions on its own in generating a situation of humanitarian crisis, as is the case in Lesotho, Madagascar, Swaziland, Haiti, DPR Korea and the countries in the Caucasus region.

5. Only those contexts of humanitarian crisis in which significant events have occurred during 2005 are analysed here.

## Africa

The persistence of around ten **armed conflicts**, the volume of **enforced displacements**, the impact of **natural disasters** (mainly **droughts**) and the virulence of **HIV/AIDS** were the **main reasons behind the crisis scenarios** on the continent of Africa. In this connection, the United Nations gave several warnings during the course of the year regarding the increase in malnutrition and its consequences for stability in the region. In addition, humanitarian organisations expressed their concern about the alarming **shortage of funds**, exacerbated by the diversion of resources to the crises in Iraq and the countries affected by the tsunamis. One **positive aspect** was the **immunisation campaign against polio and malaria** which was implemented in various parts of the continent.

### a) Southern Africa

Countries	Causes of the crisis
<b>Angola</b>	Return and resettlement process
<b>Lesotho</b>	Drought, HIV/AIDS
<b>Madagascar</b>	Drought, HIV/AIDS
<b>Malawi</b>	Drought, HIV/AIDS
<b>Swaziland</b>	Drought, HIV/AIDS, political crisis
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	Drought, HIV/AIDS, political and economic crisis, international isolation

Although the situation in **Angola** continued to stabilise, and the process for the return of refugees and the internally displaced showed notable progress, the appearance of so-called Marburg fever (a virus similar to Ebola) at the beginning of the year set the alarm bells ringing, given its virulence (more than 330 people died in just a few months) and its potential to spread. However, the rapid response from humanitarian bodies succeeded in containing the effects of the virus, which by the end of the year was regarded as being fully under control.

As in previous years, the food crisis continued to affect a number of countries in the region, especially **Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Swaziland** and **Zimbabwe**. Some contexts, such as Malawi, in which more than half the population found themselves relying on international aid, were even forced to declare national states of emergency. The main reason for this situation, which has affected the lives of millions of people in the region for more than a year now, was once again a combination of the prolonged drought, chronic poverty, the precarious agricultural situation and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In addition, the political and economic crisis that has affected Zimbabwe for some years once again led to a further deterioration in humanitarian conditions. Particular reference should be made in this regard to the mass eviction (called "Operation Restore Order") undertaken by the Zimbabwean Government in the middle of the year, which according to the United Nations left more than 700,000 people homeless.

### b) West Africa

Countries	Causes of the crisis
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people
<b>Guinea</b>	Impact of regional conflicts, volume of enforced displacements
<b>Liberia</b>	Impact of regional conflicts, volume of enforced displacements
<b>Sahel (Mauritania, Mali and Niger)</b>	Drought, impact of plague of locusts
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	Impact of regional conflicts, volume of enforced displacements

Two contexts stood out in this part of Africa. On the one hand there was the crisis in the Sahel region (mainly **Niger** and **Mali**, and to a lesser extent **Mauritania**), where millions of people faced an extreme food crisis that required a great deal of attention and a significant response from international organisations. The effects of the drought and, in particular, the impact of the plague of locusts in 2004 devastated a great deal of the harvest, forming the ingredients for what many commentators are now classifying as a famine.

## Chart 5.2. Behind the famines in Sub-Saharan Africa

The serious food situation suffered by countries like **Malawi, Mali and Niger** during 2005 once again revealed certain issues that deserve more attention in respect of the way such crises are handled and the attitude of the international community under these circumstances:

- 1) African crisis scenarios continue to **attract the attention of the international community and its media in a selective way** for one reason or another. Although millions of people are chronically affected by the threat of hunger right across the continent, only some cases receive the rapid and specific attention that turns them into a news story and a cause for concern for a few weeks (as was the case with Niger in mid-2005), though they subsequently return to the obscurity suffered by the majority of crises experienced on the continent as a whole.
- 2) Once again, the **problem of hunger in Africa has been presented as an endemic issue**, the result of the incompetence of the continent's governments and their people, and there has been no in-depth analysis of the detailed political and economic reasons that lie hidden behind this phenomenon, or the interests and attitudes of the international community, which are also a determining factor.
- 3) Once again, **African peoples have been seen as passive**, dependent on international aid, incapable of facing up to their adversities if it weren't for the presence of humanitarian organisations. This disregards the existence and development of local strategies to deal with the situation and alternative ways of coping with the shortage of food.
- 4) Finally, the **international community has once again set out action plans** based on short-termism, an absence of prevention and a lack of willingness to respond to the repeated calls made by humanitarian organisations on the ground, all of which is evidence of the gaps in the current humanitarian response system.

A second scenario that must be mentioned is the one affecting the Manu River region (formed by **Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone**). Although progress was made in the process for the return of displaced people in Liberia and Sierra Leone, there was a worrying deterioration in the situation suffered by half a million displaced people in Côte d'Ivoire as a result of the worsening of the armed conflict. In addition, the cholera epidemic and the powerful floods experienced in some parts of these countries contributed to the general deterioration in the overall situation.

### c) Horn of Africa

Countries	Causes of the crisis
<b>Eritrea</b>	Border conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought
<b>Ethiopia</b>	Border conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought
<b>Somalia</b>	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought
<b>Sudan</b>	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought

The persistent drought, combined with the worrying stalemate in the peace process between **Eritrea** and **Ethiopia**, led to a deterioration in the crisis facing both countries. Similarly, **Somalia** was affected by increased violence at various points during the year, as well as by the aftermath of the tsunamis which devastated several countries in Asia at the end of 2004 and also struck parts of the Somali coast. Mention should also be made of the prevailing shortage of funds reported by humanitarian organisations and the seizure of important humanitarian supplies by organised gangs at various times during the year.

In **Sudan**, the promising peace agreement signed at the beginning of the year in the **south of the country** opened the way for the return of more than four million internally displaced people and a further half a million refugees. Although it was reported that a number of groups had returned spontaneously, the return process and the management of the peace process were still facing a number of challenges at the end of the year. Meanwhile, in the **Darfur** region, although the food situation stabilised in general terms, the increased violence and deteriorating security situation impeded access by humanitarian organisations to the affected population. In this connection, dozens of humanitarian workers were kidnapped and even killed by armed groups during the course of the year, while the attentions of the international community diminished after a great deal of institutional assistance and media coverage had been seen during the course of 2004.

## d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Countries	Causes of the crisis
<b>Burundi</b>	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people
<b>Central African Republic</b>	Internal armed disputes, volume of internally displaced people
<b>Congo</b>	Volume of enforced displacements
<b>DR Congo</b>	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements
<b>Kenya</b>	Volume of internally displaced people, drought
<b>Rwanda</b>	Impact of regional conflicts, volume of enforced displacements
<b>Tanzania</b>	Volume of refugees, drought
<b>Uganda</b>	Armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements, drought

Although the food situation showed considerable improvement in **Rwanda, Tanzania** and particularly **Kenya**, the food shortages mainly caused by the drought continued to affect thousands of people in all three countries. Instability and an internal lack of security made humanitarian work difficult in both the **Republic of Congo** and **Burundi**, with reports of actual attacks on humanitarian personnel.

The two crisis scenarios on the African continent that unquestionably showed the most notable deterioration in addition to the Sudanese region of Darfur were **DR Congo** and **Uganda**. In the former, the increasing lack of security, particularly in the east of the country, led to numerous acts of aggression against humanitarian organisations. The United Nations also pointed on a number of occasions to the shortage of funds required to deal with a crisis that, according to the UN, is leaving more than 1,000 people dead every day and affecting 70% of the population. Similarly, inter-governmental organisations in Uganda reported that more than a thousand displaced people were dying each week in the country due to the upsurge in violence and, in the main, diseases such as malaria and HIV/AIDS. As a result, various reports reiterated the fact that the number of displaced people had reached two and a half million in each of the two countries. Finally, in the **Central African Republic**, the United Nations warned at the end of the year that the country risked a new upsurge in violence unless the international community provided the assistance requested to deal with the crisis.

**The two crisis scenarios on the African continent that unquestionably showed the most notable deterioration in addition to the Sudanese region of Darfur were DR Congo and Uganda.**

## America

Countries	Causes of the crisis
<b>Colombia</b>	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people
<b>Haiti</b>	Natural disasters, political and economic crisis

Two countries continued to suffer humanitarian crises in Latin America and the Caribbean. On the one hand, there is the situation in **Colombia**, where the number of people displaced internally by the armed conflict passed three million. While suffering an increasing number of deliberate attacks from different armed groups, the country's civilian population found no help from A. Uribe's Government, which is accused of failing to provide assistance for more than 80% of the displaced population. The upsurge in violence along the border with Ecuador has also led to a notable increase in the number of people fleeing to the neighbouring country.

### Chart 5.3. Who protects the internally displaced?

The problem of internal displacement continues to generate huge **uncertainties and concerns** among the humanitarian community. The **absence** (in contrast to the situation relating to refugees) **of any legal framework** which would offer a way of protecting the almost **25 million internally displaced people** spread around 50 different countries (three times the number of refugees) has given rise to numerous reports and proposals aimed at trying to remedy this situation. Many commentators agree on the need to **underline three aspects**: **1)** Governments, donors and NGOs should **apply the concept of sovereignty** in such a way that it represents a “responsibility to protect” in cases of prolonged internal displacement; **2)** Governments, international organisations and NGOs should increase their **efforts to implement the so-called “guiding principles for internal displacement”**, the only international protection instrument that is not actually binding; and **3)** **the United Nations should restructure its response** to the displaced population by nominating the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to take charge of this issue or by creating an agency to take responsibility for and manage internal displacement crises as they arise.

As far as **Haiti** is concerned, the constant lack of security in some parts of the country, particularly in the suburbs of the capital, Port au Prince, impeded any regular access by humanitarian organisations to the people affected by the crisis. Incidents arose involving humanitarian personnel, prompting some organisations to restrict the movements of their own staff. As in previous years, natural disasters once again wreaked havoc on this Caribbean country, which bore the brunt of cyclones *Dennis*, *Emily* and *Alpha*, among others, leaving hundreds dead and thousands homeless. Hurricane *Stan* also took its toll on a number of countries in Central America, particularly Guatemala, while hurricane *Katrina* left serious damage in its wake along the southern seaboard of the USA.

### Asia and the Pacific

Countries	Causes of the crisis
<b>Afghanistan</b>	Drought, armed conflict, return and resettlement process
<b>Bangladesh</b>	Floods
<b>DPR Korea</b>	Economic, food and health crises
<b>Indonesia</b>	Tsunami, armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements
<b>Maldives</b>	Tsunami
<b>Myanmar</b>	Volume of internally displaced people
<b>Nepal</b>	Armed conflict
<b>Pakistan</b>	Earthquake
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	Natural disasters, armed conflict, volume of enforced displacements

#### Pakistan, the death toll from the earthquake which struck in October had reached 85,000 by the end of the year.

The situation in **Afghanistan** was characterised once again by the serious lack of security endured by humanitarian personnel, which resulted in the murder of numerous members of local and international organisations during the course of the year and increased the difficulties encountered in reaching the civilian population. In addition, floods and low temperatures left dozens dead in some parts of the country. Turning to **Pakistan**, the death toll from the earthquake which struck in October had reached 85,000 by the end of the year. The disaster also left 69,000 people injured and almost three and a half million homeless in what the United Nations has labelled the most devastating natural disaster ever seen on the Asian subcontinent.

The upsurge in hostilities in **Nepal** during the first half of the year led to a serious deterioration in the humanitarian crisis afflicting the ordinary population, particularly the 200,000 people so far displaced by the conflict. At the same time, humanitarian organisations warned of the consequences of the code of conduct approved by the Nepalese absolutist regime, which is aimed at regulating humanitarian activities in the country. **Bangladesh** continued to suffer from heavy flooding, while a number of organisations in **Myanmar** revealed the alarming conditions in which more than half a million internally displaced people have been living for several years. In **DPR Korea**, the lack of funds and humanitarian problems caused by

the tension between the Government in Pyongyang and the international community continued to fuel the crisis facing the country.

Finally, mention should be made of the historic humanitarian consequences suffered in several countries in the region especially **Indonesia, Maldives** and **Sri Lanka**, following the tsunamis at the end of 2004, which left some 280,000 people dead. Although the international response was unprecedented (by December 2005 the aid contributed had exceeded 12,000 million dollars), an assessment of reconstruction work one year on from the tragedy gives a more ambivalent picture. While some sectors signalled significant and satisfactory progress, other commentators, some from inside the United Nations itself, denounced the worrying conditions in which tens of thousands of people were still living, along with the lack of coordination between the difference parties involved and the persistent irregularities in the management of aid by some governments.

### Chart 5.4. The lessons of the tsunami

The spectacular and massive influx of funds and organisations to deal with the humanitarian crisis in southern Asia awakened **new and important dilemmas in the heart of the humanitarian community**, which, following a number of **meetings and reports**, has led to the learning of certain **lessons**:

1. The importance of **greater accountability** among public and private donors in respect of the people they are assisting.
2. **A more proactive role from the governments involved** in reconstruction efforts, particularly as regards the provision of homes and the restoration of living conditions.
3. The urgent need to **develop mechanisms** that: a) guarantee **transparency** and accountability in the handover of funds; b) allow **supervision of all the parties** involved in assisting rehabilitation; c) allow the **survivors to participate in the planning** and implementation of reconstruction; d) guarantee that, within settlement areas, **women have equal rights** to land ownership and housing; and e) provide **access to systems of justice** and restitution.
4. Concerted efforts must be made to **ensure that political interests do not threaten rehabilitation work**, particularly in areas affected by armed conflict. Dignity, gender equality and the guarantee of proper living conditions should guide efforts in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process

## Europe and Central Asia

Countries	Causes of the crisis
<b>Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)</b>	Volume of internally displaced people, political and economic crisis
<b>Russia (Chechnya)*</b>	Armed conflict, volume of internally displaced people
<b>Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo)</b>	Internal civil disputes, volume of internally displaced people

\* Neighbouring Republics (Dagestan, North Ossetia and Ingushetia)

The delicate situation faced by tens of thousands of internally displaced people is the common element in the humanitarian crises suffered in this entire region. As far as the region of the **Caucasus** is concerned (mainly **Armenia, Azerbaijan** and **Georgia**), mention should be made of the deteriorating conditions in which almost a million displaced people are living as a consequence of worsening armed conflicts and the scant efforts being made at both a domestic and international level to deal with this issue. Several humanitarian organisations threatened to withdraw given the persistent lack of funds. Meanwhile, in **Chechnya**, some organisations denounced the pressure brought to bear by the Russian Government in an attempt to force the return of thousands of displaced Chechens in other parts of the Caucasus, who were also suffering problems associated with a lack of access to basic services and lack of security.

Finally, as regards the status of the 250,000 displaced people in the autonomous province of **Kosovo** (mainly ethnic Serbs and Roma who fled from the province in 1999), the main concerns centre around the numerous obstacles faced by this group due to their worsening living conditions.

## Middle East

Countries	Causes of the crisis
<b>Iraq</b>	Armed conflict, drought
<b>Palestine</b>	Armed conflict, humanitarian isolation of the population

In spite of the significant resources provided by the international community for the crisis in **Iraq**, a considerable proportion of the population continued to lack access to the most basic services due to the constant episodes of violence reported in several parts of the country. In this regard, the attacks carried out by occupying forces during the course of the year also exacerbated the humanitarian situation, particularly the incursions into the town of Tal Afar, which left hundreds dead and thousands displaced. Mention should also be made of the trial involving several high-ranking members of the United Nations in relation to the "Oil for Food" programme.

Finally, the situation in the occupied territories of **Palestine** deteriorated further in a year marked by the disengagement from the Gaza Strip, an operation forced through by the Israeli Government. Some reports warned of an alarming increase in poverty during 2005 and the incessant weakening of the mechanisms put in place by the population to deal with the situation. Humanitarian organisations once again denounced the difficulties they were experiencing in gaining access to the necessary areas, due to restrictions imposed by the Israeli army. For its part, UNRWA (the United Nations agency formed to help the Palestinian population) asked for more than 1,000 million dollars in an attempt to improve living conditions for the more than four million Palestinian refugees.

### 5.3. Humanitarian action<sup>6</sup> during 2005

The following section contains an analysis of three issues that arose in relation to humanitarian crises and humanitarian action during 2005: a) the main difficulties faced by humanitarian organisations; b) the role played by donor countries; and c) the relationship between humanitarian action and peace construction.

#### a) The main difficulties facing humanitarian action

Humanitarian organisations once again faced important challenges during 2005. In recent years, the traditional neutrality of the humanitarian community has fallen victim to the politicisation of aid by donor countries and the linking of aid and military operations. This has principally had two significant results. Firstly, an increased **lack of security** and **reduced protection** for humanitarian staff, leading to attacks and the kidnapping and murder of dozens of mainly local humanitarian workers in a number of contexts. Particular mention should be made of the serious situation faced by the humanitarian community in the Sudanese region of Darfur, where they have been indiscriminately targeted by pro-government militias and other armed groups, and in Afghanistan, where members of humanitarian organisations were murdered at various times during the year by some of the warring factions. This tendency has led, on the one hand, to the **suspension or interruption of some humanitarian operations**, and even on some occasions to the withdrawal of these bodies, and on the other, to a **gradual prevention of these organisations from gaining access to the most vulnerable people**.

Another problem that continued to impede the management of crisis situations was the prevailing **lack of funds** caused by insufficient levels of aid being provided by donor countries, leading to the threat of suspension of humanitarian activities on several occasions during the year in countries such as DPR Korea, various parts of Africa and the Caucasus region. Finally, there is the way in which organisations **manage aid** and the fact that some circumstances may contribute to a worsening of the conflict or crisis situation. In

6. "Humanitarian action" is understood to mean the group of activities aimed at saving lives and alleviating suffering in situations of humanitarian crisis. These activities are guided by principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Humanitarian action also includes the protection of civilians and the provision of basic aid.

**Table 5.2. Main problems faced by humanitarian organisations during 2005**

Problems	Consequences	Contexts
<b>Insecurity and lack of protection</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Attacks on security personnel</li> <li>• Looting of aid</li> <li>• Reduction or indefinite suspension of aid</li> <li>• Withdrawal of organisations and humanitarian personnel</li> <li>• Increased vulnerability of the population affected by the crisis</li> </ul>	Afghanistan, Burundi, Chechnya, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Sudan, Uganda
<b>Lack of access to victims</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased vulnerability of the civilian population</li> <li>• Enforced displacement</li> <li>• Increased risk to humanitarian personnel</li> </ul>	Afghanistan, Haiti, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe
<b>Shortage of funds and resources</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Suspension of humanitarian supplies</li> <li>• Deterioration and perpetuation of the lack of attention paid to the crisis</li> <li>• Increased appeals and donor fatigue</li> </ul>	Angola, Bangladesh, Burundi, Caucasus, Côte d'Ivoire, DPR Korea, DR Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, PNA, Somalia, Uganda
<b>Poor management of aid</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased death rate</li> <li>• Lack of trust from donor countries</li> <li>• Reduction of humanitarian contributions</li> <li>• Political confrontations for control over aid</li> </ul>	Niger, Sri Lanka, Indonesia

this regard, some commentators denounced the terrible management of funds in Niger, where organisations were accused of wasting aid, while others criticised the corruption seen in governments like those of Sri Lanka and Indonesia following the tsunamis, a fact that once again highlighted the importance of accountability and transparency as essential principles in the area of humanitarian action.

## **b) The role of donors and humanitarian reform**

Although 2004 had seen a significant fall in the amount of humanitarian aid channelled via the United Nations following the gradual increase recorded during the first years of the decade, **2005 once again saw an extraordinary increase in humanitarian contributions**. The reasons for this recovery, which at 3,300 million dollars doubled the amount offered in 2004 and equalled the 2003 figure, can basically be found in the historic levels of humanitarian aid sent to assist the countries affected by the tsunamis in southern Asia, which accounted for almost a third of the total aid donated (see Graph 5.3) and in terms of overall humanitarian assistance reached a figure of 12,000 million.


Although the increase in aid in general terms should be seen as good news, more worrying is the potential **diversion of funds and attention** that the response to the crisis in southern Asia had on other humanitarian crises. Given the 2005 CAP balance sheet, it could be concluded that the tsunamis have at least led to a slowdown in contributions to many areas in crisis that have asked for aid, particularly on the African continent. Thus, a year after launching their appeals, countries such as Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia, Sudan and Nepal had not even received half of the funds required to deal with their various humanitarian crises.

As regards **contributions from donor countries**, the USA, Japan, the EU (ECHO), the United Kingdom and Norway were once again the countries that contributed most to the different crises<sup>7</sup>. Similarly, mention should be made of the increased number of donor countries (74 in 2005, as compared with 29 in 2001), demonstrating the greater roles played by countries such as China, India and Saudi Arabia. The **bodies that received the most financing** were the WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP and UNRWA, while chief among the **sectors** that attracted most funds were food, health and infrastructure (See Appendix V.1). Another equally notable tendency is the rapid response to so called **'Flash Appeals'** (10 during 2005)<sup>8</sup>, the

7. This does not take the size of their individual economies into account. If it did, countries such as the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark would head the humanitarian donor list.

8. Angola, Benin, cholera in West Africa, Djibouti, Guatemala, Guyana, Malawi, Niger, Tsunami and southern Asia.

**Graph 5.3. Evolution of humanitarian financing (2000-2005)**  
Humanitarian appeals: contributions and deficits (in millions of dollars)



Source: United Nations.

appeals put out by the United Nations in immediate response to a natural disaster. This mechanism, which is being increasingly used by the United Nations, though with certain conditions, has become a quick way of obtaining funds for specific crisis situations.

The numerous **dilemmas and reflections** that this issue has raised since the mid-1990s were once again the subject of intense debate during 2005. This is the second year that the principle of so-called **Good Humanitarian Donorship** has been applied, aimed at reversing the increasing trend for the politicisation of aid reported in recent years. However, the most important event was the request made by the UN Secretary General in which he called for improved strengthening of the capacity for humanitarian response, the development of financing mechanisms that would allow for an immediate response to crisis situations and the strengthening of humanitarian coordination. Two important initiatives were created in this connection: 1) the **Humanitarian Response Review**, to assess the response capacities of certain humanitarian organisations; and 2), the launch in December of the **Central Emergency Response Fund**, a 500 million dollar fund to finance rapid reaction to any emergency.

### c) Humanitarian crises and peace processes

The catastrophes that struck during the course of the year, mainly in parts of Asia, have aroused an interesting debate on the **opportunity offered by certain natural disasters for the peaceful resolution of**

**some armed conflicts** (See Appendix V.2). One example of this is the tragedy that resulted from the tsunamis in Sri Lanka and Indonesia, both of them countries that were involved in armed conflict in 2005. In **Sri Lanka**, although the consequences of the tragedy meant that the warring parties initially worked together, leading to greater access by humanitarian organisations to the people affected, the massive arrival of aid led to further conflict between the parties in respect of how it should be managed. In **Indonesia**, however, the catastrophe led to a rapid series of contacts between the Indonesian Government and the armed opposition group, culminating a few months later with a promising peace agreement between the parties. Another example is the attitude of the **Indian** and **Pakistani** governments following the earthquake that struck the disputed region of Kashmir in October. The devastating panorama left by the earthquake forced them to create a combined plan and led to new contacts with positive consequences for the continuing resolution of the dispute.

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
The question should also be asked whether there is a **formal link between humanitarian crises and peace processes**, two issues that at first glance would seem to be unconnected but which could have much closer links than might be imagined. Firstly, the evolution of certain peace processes during the course of the year (particularly the one between Eritrea and Ethiopia) has shown that poor progress in peace negotiations leads to a clear deterioration of humanitarian conditions in a country, as pointed to by a number of commentators during the last year. Secondly, it is probable that the worsening of any humanitarian crisis will have a specific impact on the evolution of a peace process that is underway in the same area.

#### Chart 5.5. Do humanitarian crises affect the advance of peace processes?

Although considered one of the many causes of crisis, breakdown or deterioration in current peace processes, dealing with humanitarian crises does not normally occupy a dominant position in the negotiating agenda. In this regard, the fact that such crises are principally regarded as one of the direct consequences of an armed conflict means that **an analysis of their actual influence on the negotiating process is not really taken into account**. However, the main point to be borne in mind is that **75% of peace processes that were going badly at some point during last year were in contexts affected by humanitarian crises**, while this figure falls to 65% in contexts in which there were exploratory talks, 58% in places where talks were in difficulty and 48% in places in which they were going well. Although this does not offer conclusive evidence, it does reflect the fact that the elements that characterise a humanitarian crisis (food emergencies, the mass displacement of people, increase in the death rate, manipulation of the civilian population, deliberate attacks on humanitarian personnel, lack of access to the affected population, cuts in international aid due to a lack of trust in the warring factions, etc.) can, on some occasions, really contribute to blocking any peace negotiations. This being the case, it is important to place aid for the population, the protection of civilians and the re-establishment of basic services at the top of any peace agenda, particularly in contexts in which an armed conflict has caused serious human harm.

Aside from the basic need for all international organisations to pay more attention to the influence of humanitarian crises on the evolution of peace processes, those responsible for humanitarian action are faced with the important challenge of clarifying their actual impact on each of the situations of conflict and peace-building contexts in which they intervene.

Humanitarian crises and humanitarian action



- Countries in a situation of humanitarian crisis
- 🏠➔ Countries facing food emergencies (indicator no. 5)
- 🏠👤 Countries facing enforced displacements (indicators no. 6 and no. 7)
- 🏠👤⑧ Countries in the CAP 2005 (indicator no. 8)

## 6. Disarmament

This chapter contains an analysis of the issues relating to disarmament. The analysis focuses mainly on the subject of conventional weapons and, more particularly, the issues associated with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, which have the greatest effect on human security. The chapter begins with an overview of the trends seen in the **arms cycle**. This is followed by a section looking at the issue of **arms control** from the point of view of arms embargoes, the principal international initiatives and the control of small arms. Finally, there is a section dealing with issues relating to **Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes** for former combatants. The map included at the end of the chapter refers to the **indicators** analysed in the first two sections: **military spending** (indicator 9), **heavy weapons imports as a percentage of GDP** (indicator 10), the **number of soldiers as a percentage of the population** (indicator 11), and arms **embargoes**, whether imposed by the UN Security Council (indicator 12), regional bodies or the EU and the OSCE (indicator 13)<sup>1</sup>.

### 6.1. The arms cycle

This first section is divided into two sub-sections. The first sets out current trends in the arms cycle, while the second pays particular attention to the issue of small arms.

#### a) Trends in the arms cycle


The methodology used here involves monitoring the various phases of the arms cycle. This process is useful not only because it shows the use to which weapons are put but also because it provides evidence of trends in military spending and the production and export of weapons. The data provided by the Swedish research centre SIPRI confirms that **world military spending** totalled 1,035,000 million dollars during 2004, an **increase of 6%** over the period between 2002 and 2004. This brings the figure once again up to the high levels seen during the Cold War, coinciding this time with the increasing intensity of the so-called “war on terror”, though there is as yet no evidence that would indicate that the military option represents the best way of combating this phenomenon. Though it should be said that this upward trend began before 11 September 2001, there has been a significant acceleration since that date. The UNDP also warned in its most recent human development report that, on average, ten times more money is invested in military spending than in humanitarian aid. The pointlessness of this circumstance is illustrated by the fact that governments themselves have increasingly come to acknowledge the links between world poverty and the threat to security.

The grouping arrangement shown in Graph 6.1 is the work of the Centre for Defence Information, a US organisation, and it involves the division of the main military powers into three large groups, plus the USA: the first group includes countries that are direct partners of the USA, the second involves other partners and military powers, while the third group contains countries that have no links with the USA. This clearly shows that the countries which the US administration points to as representing the greatest threat to international security have military budgets that are lower than the countries in the other groups. On this basis, we should ask ourselves who really represents a threat to international security.

As the graph shows, the **USA** accounts for the majority of worldwide military spending with 47% of the total, its budget exceeding those of all the countries of Africa, Latin America and Asia (except Japan) put together. The budget announcement for the 2006 financial year indicates that the country's military spending will be 455,000 million dollars, a **4.8% increase** on the previous year's figure. It should also be mentioned that this increase is one of the reasons why the country's budget deficit stands at 390,000 million

1. In previous years we have used the BIC3D index as an indicator, which is calculated by combining 4 categories of data: military spending, weapons reserves, Armed Forces personnel and people employed in the arms industry. We will not be giving this information this year as we will be focussing more on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

**Graph 6.1. Military spending during 2004**  
(in billions of dollars)



\* Sum of the various NATO member states: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey.

Source: Centre for Defence Information and SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2005*, Oxford University Press, 2005.

dollars. This figure, the highest ever recorded, raises questions as to just how far military spending can go, particularly if we bear in mind that the cost of military operations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan (estimated at 80,000 million dollars) are extraordinary amounts that are not included in the budget. A similar comparison to the one set out above reveals that the extraordinary payments made by the US administration during the last three years amounted to more than the overall military spending budget for just one year in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East combined.

The USA are followed in the list by **France** and the **United Kingdom**, each of which accounts for 5% of world military spending. In this connection, the British Defence Minister, J. Reid, called on EU countries to modernise their Armed Forces urgently by making greater investments in military equipment to assist in the war on terror. Another leading example is **China**, which accounts for 4% of world military spending and whose Government decided to buy fighter aircraft and submarines from Russia, increase its own research and development work and reorganise and reduce its Armed Forces. The struggle to have the arms embargo lifted is an important issue for the country and tied to an improvement in commercial relations, a circumstance that has not been welcomed by the USA.

As set out in Table 6.1, a regional analysis shows that the areas in which military spending has risen most are **North Africa, North America, the Middle East** and **Southeast Asia**, thus continuing the trend seen in the previous year and mirroring the regions in which most armed conflicts are to be found.

**Underline the tendency to reduce and realign military forces in order to achieve improved weapons capacity.**

These **rising figures** underline the tendency to reduce and realign military forces in order to achieve improved weapons capacity in a move away from the strategies more closely associated with the Cold War. One example of this is the policy pursued by the **USA**, which has announced the closure of 33 bases within its own borders. **Russia** also announced that it intended to modernise and improve its defence system using missiles. It would seem that this trend is going to continue during the coming years, particularly in some of the emerging

economies (**China, India**) and the main countries in North Africa (**Algeria** and **Morocco**) and the Sub-Saharan region (**Angola** and **South Africa**). Elsewhere, ambivalence is the term that could be used to

**Table 6.1. Estimated military spending by region (1995-2004)**  
(Figures are given in billions of dollars at constant 2003 prices)

Region	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	% 1995-2004
<b>AFRICA</b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>8.5</b>	<b>8.7</b>	<b>9.3</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>10.8</b>	<b>11.0</b>	<b>11.6</b>	<b>11.7</b>	<b>12.6</b>	<b>+43</b>
North	(3.4)	3.5	3.7	3.8	3.9	4.3	4.4	4.8	4.9	5.5	+65
Sub-Saharan	5.5	5.0	5.0	5.5	6.3	6.5	(6.6)	6.8	(6.8)	(7.1)	+29
<b>AMERICA</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>347</b>	<b>347</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>341</b>	<b>353</b>	<b>358</b>	<b>398</b>	<b>446</b>	<b>488</b>	<b>+33</b>
North	347	328	326	319	320	332	335	375	424	466	+34
Central	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.5	3.4	3.2	+2
South	17.2	15.6	18.1	17.4	17.0	17.9	19.9	19.6	18.4	18.6	+9
<b>ASIA and OCEANIA</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>(158)</b>	<b>(164)</b>	<b>+21</b>
Central Asia	0.4	0.5	0.5	(0.5)	0.5	—	(0.6)	—	(0.6)	(0.7)	+73
East Asia	113	119	115	111	112	121	124	123	(129)	(132)	+17
South Asia	13.4	13.6	14.2	14.4	15.5	16.2	16.8	17.0	17.5	20.0	+50
Oceania	8.7	8.6	8.8	9.1	9.6	9.5	9.9	10.3	10.6	11.0	+26
<b>EUROPE</b>	<b>237</b>	<b>236</b>	<b>237</b>	<b>234</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>244</b>	<b>250</b>	<b>256</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>+7</b>
Central and Eastern Europe	28.1	26.3	27.7	23.4	24.8	27.3	29.2	30.7	33.2	34.2	+22
Western Europe	209	210	209	211	214	216	215	220	223	220	+5
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>	<b>40.1</b>	<b>39.1</b>	<b>43.0</b>	<b>46.5</b>	<b>46.0</b>	<b>51.7</b>	<b>55.3</b>	<b>52.9</b>	<b>54.4</b>	<b>56.1</b>	<b>+40</b>
<b>TOTAL WORLD</b>	<b>789</b>	<b>772</b>	<b>774</b>	<b>765</b>	<b>773</b>	<b>806</b>	<b>819</b>	<b>864</b>	<b>927</b>	<b>975</b>	<b>+23</b>
<b>Change %</b>		<b>-2.3</b>	<b>+0.3</b>	<b>-1.2</b>	<b>+1.1</b>	<b>+4.2</b>	<b>+1.6</b>	<b>+5.4</b>	<b>+7.2</b>	<b>+5.3</b>	

Source: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2005*, Table 8.1

The figures shown in brackets indicated estimated data.

describe the most important European countries as some increase their spending (**France** and **Russia**) and other large powers reduce it (**Italy** and **Germany**).

Turning to an analysis of **military spending as a percentage of GDP** in each country (**indicator 9**), we should mention that this information was put together using data from the Swedish research centre SIPRI. Analysis in this area is impeded by the secrecy and concealment that characterises many of the activities associated with military issues. In this report we have decided to indicate the countries that, according to at least one of the two sources mentioned, show military spending in the amount of more than 4% of their GDP. This involves 21 countries, and a particular warning should be given in respect of eight of these in which military spending exceeds 6% of GDP, as shown in the following table:

**Table 6.2. Countries with high levels of military spending (exceeding 6% of GDP)**

Eritrea	Jordan	Oman	Syria
Israel	Kuwait	Saudi Arabia	Yemen

Once again, **arms production** is dominated by **Russia**, the **USA** and the countries of the **EU**. The persisting industrial concentration and the changes in growth and restructuring dynamics that have resulted from the sector's adjustment to cope with the requirements of today's scenarios have encouraged an increase in sales. This also once again highlighted the growing levels of concentration within the industry in terms of the sales percentages obtained by the main companies. At a time when the line between internal military security and national and international security is ever more blurred, the line between military and civilian production is also becoming increasingly less clear.

As regards **arms exports**, **Russia** was once again the largest exporter, both in 2004 and during the 5-year period from 2000, knocking the **USA** off the top of this cumulative list for the first time. However, we shall have to see how long this trend lasts, bearing in mind that Russia does not have any great capacity in terms of R&D and much of its equipment is obsolete. The main factor that would seem to be keeping it in this

position is the fact that the two highest importers in the world, **India** and **China**, are also two of the main customers in its portfolio.

**Table 6.3. Main arms exporters and importers during 2004**  
(Values are shown in millions of dollars at fixed 1990 prices)

Exporters	Value	Importers	Value
Russia	6,197	India	2,375
USA	5,453	China	2,238
France	2,122	Greece	1,434
Germany	1,091	United Arab Emirates	1,246
United Kingdom	985	Saudi Arabia	838
Canada	543	Korea, Rep.	737
Ukraine	452	Israel	724
Israel	283	USA	533
Italy	261	Singapore	456
Sweden	260	Turkey	418

Source: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2005*, Oxford University Press, 2005.

Turning to the information offered by the indicator on **imports of conventional heavy weapons as a percentage of GDP** (indicator 10), there are ten countries in which arms purchases exceed 0.5% of GDP, and in six of these the figure is more than 1% (**Armenia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Namibia** and **Sudan**). Although it is still very difficult to ascertain the overall amount spent by an individual state on acquiring military material, this indicator offers a warning regarding potential arms races at a regional level. One example of this is the situation in the Horn of Africa, where **Eritrea** and **Ethiopia**<sup>2</sup> have been showing high levels of arms acquisitions which have coincided with the restrictions placed on the movements of the UNMEE mission, the constant threat of deterioration in relations between the two countries and the possibility of a resumption of hostilities. However, we shall have to wait and see whether this trend continues, as a single year is not sufficient for one to state that an arms race is occurring.

Finally, as regards the **number of soldiers as a percentage of a country's total population** (indicator 11), there has been a marked fall worldwide, in line with the trend seen for a number of years now, due to the conversion of many countries' Armed Forces to full-time troops. Nevertheless, **in 14 cases the number of soldiers as a percentage of the total population is higher than 1.5%**. There is also evidence that the general fall in the number of regular troops is due to the increasing privatisation of the military sphere.

### Chart 6.1. Private security firms

Since the beginning of the 1990s there has been increasing concern over the **growth in the private security industry**. The **liberalisation of markets following the end of the Cold War**, the **fall in the number of regular Armed Forces** and the **increased privatisation of military arms production** (particularly in North America and Europe) may be the main reasons behind this phenomenon. A clear example of this that the 2004 list of the top 25 security companies in the military sector included four private security firms, whereas the list from the previous year had only included one. Given that more than **100 private security companies are operating in different countries around the world** in a variety of ways and contexts (Iraq being the most obvious case<sup>3</sup>), there is a clear absence of structures regulating legality, legitimacy and responsibility in this policy area. In short, although it would seem that private security companies offer a great opportunity, the legal vacuum in which they operate, the lack of respect for International Law in respect of essential issues such as the use of force, and, above all, the fact that it should be public forces who provide security within their own territory has turned this into a new **problem** in the current security context.

Source: Holmqvist, C.: *Private Security Companies. The Case for regulation*. (2005) *SIPRI Policy Paper 9*, SIPRI.

2. See the chapter on tensions and high-risk disputes.

3. See School of Peace Culture; *Alert 2005! Report on conflicts, human rights and peace-building*. Pub. Icaria, 2005.

## b) Small arms

The issue of small arms took on considerable international importance during the course of last year. The **UN Secretary General published a report**<sup>4</sup> in which he reflected on the initiatives that the Security Council could pursue with a view to slowing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons:

### Chart 6.2. Secretary General's report on small arms

- The creation of an international instrument that will allow individual states to identify and track illegal small arms and light weapons.
- Increased interaction with the General Assembly on the subject of small arms, in order to promote long-term strategies.
- A study of the links between the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons and the exploitation of natural resources and drug-trafficking, among other activities.
- Acknowledgement by the parties involved in a conflict of the importance of activities associated with DDR programmes following the conflict's end.
- Increased financing for DDR programmes by extending the scope of the measures included in budgets allocated for peace-keeping operations.
- Adoption of the legal measures necessary in order to ensure effective control over the export and trafficking of small arms and light weapons.
- The application of coercive measures against member states that deliberately violate arms embargoes.
- The encouragement of transparency in relation to arms issues, particularly through systematic and universal participation in the Conventional Weapons Register.

Elsewhere, the organisation **Small Arms Survey** published its yearbook in which it provided a summary of the use of small arms in armed conflicts around the world. According to this report, **trade in the seven main small arms and munitions-exporting countries, with the USA in first place, comes to an annual total of around 100 million dollars**. The report also points out that small arms are responsible for between 60% and 90% of all direct deaths in armed conflicts, more than any other type of weapon. The report also places particular emphasis on an issue that is overlooked by many: **munitions**.

It is currently estimated that **around 16,000 million rounds of ammunition are manufactured each year**, and these are not always taken into consideration when implementing the main control mechanisms, such as instruments covering marking and tracking. These are items that are entirely comparable with small arms, the main difference being that munitions may be used in a much shorter space of time. Furthermore, issues such as the fact that the availability of a particular kind of ammunition may encourage the choice of a particular weapon are not always given sufficient attention.

As regards the issue of **anti-personnel mines**, the **International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)** gave its annual assessment of the situation with the publication of *Landmine Monitor 2005*. This underlined the fall in the number of deaths during 2004 to between 15,000 and 20,000, and the increase to 400 million dollars in the mine-clearance budget, which was used to clear 135 Km<sup>2</sup>. On the negative side it should be mentioned that around 200,000 Km<sup>2</sup> remain to be cleared around the world, and the NGO Human Rights Watch warned that the **USA** had resumed production of this type of weapon under its so-called Intelligent Munitions System.

## 6.2. Arms control initiatives

To combat the frequently uncontrolled proliferation of weapons, a series of worldwide and regional initiatives needs to be introduced to ensure that the arms trade does not cause unnecessary damage. It is therefore necessary to analyse the current state of arms embargoes and the main initiatives introduced to regulate weapons, with particular emphasis on the issue of small arms.

4. To see the full text, go to <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/221/46/PDF/N0522146.pdf?OpenElement>.

## a) Arms embargoes

At the end of 2005 a total of **21 arms embargoes** were in place (see Table 6.4). For the countries of the EU, arms embargoes have a dual implication: not only is compliance compulsory, embargoes are also included under Criterion no. 1 of the Code of Conduct<sup>5</sup>.

**Table 6.4. Countries and armed groups embargoed during 2005**

Al-Qaeda	China	Myanmar	Tanzania (*)
Taliban groups (Afghanistan)	Congo, DR (*)	Rwanda (*)	Uganda (*)
Armenia	Côte d'Ivoire	RUF and other groups (Sierra Leone)	Uzbekistan
Azerbaijan	Iraq	Somalia	Yemen
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Liberia	Sudan	Zimbabwe
Burundi (*)			

(\*) These are arms embargoes on non-governmental forces in Rwanda, and on supplies to Burundi, DR Congo, Tanzania and Uganda where the weapons may be used in Rwanda.

There were no great changes as far as the **United Nations** was concerned, other than a strengthening of the embargoes imposed on **Somalia** (where there are suspicions that it is being violated) and **Sudan**, and the extension for a further year of the embargoes on **Côte d'Ivoire** and **DR Congo**. In all cases it has been seen that restricting embargoes to a specific country would not seem sufficient to ensure compliance, given the important regional factor and the constant flow of arms across borders. One factor that may explain this (see Table 6.3) is that the main exporters of conventional weapons include permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

Notable among the embargoes agreed by the **EU** is the arms embargo imposed on **Uzbekistan** following the violent repression of anti-government protests in the city of Andijan during May, when the police fired on civilians leaving many dead. The arms embargo on **China** also remains an interesting issue, following the visit by President H. Jintao to a number of European countries, during which he had talks on reaching various commercial agreements and also requested the lifting of this embargo. The debate surrounding this issue should not only focus on the original reason for the embargo (the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989) but should also take account of the country's human rights record. Questions should also be asked about the EU's arms embargo system, which might become more like that of the United Nations<sup>6</sup>. The possibility of imposing further arms embargoes is also the subject of debate.

## b) Main international initiatives

One event that could help to resolve some of these problems may be the approval of the **International Arms Trade Treaty**. This Treaty should be presented during the course of the **Conference for the Review of the Programme of Action to Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms**, to be held at UN headquarters in New York in the middle of 2006. 2005 saw the holding of the Biennial Meeting of States, at which 13 more governments expressed their support for the Treaty (International Arms Trade Treaty) bringing the current number to 44.

The main conclusion reported at the Biennial Meeting was satisfaction with the advances made, though there were calls for more measures to help meet the undertakings made in the Programme of Action.

5. The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was approved by the Council of Europe in 1998 and consists of eight criteria relating to the export of weapons to be implemented by member states. These criteria are based on not exporting to countries in which armed conflicts or clear human rights violations are taking place, among others.

6. For more information, see the chapter on Militarization and Disarmament in Barometer 7.

It should be mentioned in this regard that four years is not long enough for a Programme of Action like this to be fully implemented, though it is long enough for greater efforts to have been made than have actually been reported, particularly when this involves the approval of a Treaty that will regulate arms transfers at a world level. To assist this process, two Preparatory Conferences have been arranged before the Review Conference itself, one in January and the other at the end of March. This project is seen as ambitious, but the **Landmine Ban Treaty** of 1999 could serve as a leading point of reference (time periods, initial expectations and eventual results). As far as this Treaty is concerned, four more countries joined during 2005, though 40 countries have still not signed or ratified it, including the world's main producers, China, the USA and Russia.

Another step towards strengthening these initiatives has been taken by the European Parliament, which voted in favour of a request to make the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports legally binding. It is now to be known as the Common Position on Exports of Military Technology and Equipment (CEMTEQ<sup>7</sup>). This means that, as of now, any legislation or policy relating to arms exports by any EU member state must necessarily be in line with the Code of Conduct. The review of the Code also incorporated two new issues, though certain weaknesses remain to be resolved and the review is still pending approval by the Council of Europe:

**As of now, any legislation or policy relating to arms exports by any EU member state must necessarily be in line with the Code of Conduct.**

### Chart 6.3. Main new points in the Code of Conduct

The EU's Code of Conduct was the first code to be established at an international level in relation to the arms trade, and is one of the most extensive of its kind. However, the criteria on which it is based are not sufficiently clear and detailed, and they fail to attribute responsibility to individual states as far as international legislation is concerned. After this latest review, five years on from its adoption, the Code will now be known as the Common Position on Exports of Military Technology and Equipment (CEMTEQ). Although this represents a positive advance in certain ways, NGOs still classify it as timid. This review also represents another step towards the adoption of an International Arms Trade Treaty, and it can be summarised in the following way:

- **Clarification and expansion of the Code's reach**

- *Replacement of the terms "weapons" with "military equipment"*: This is more correct and more suited to the products included in the EU's List of Military Equipment (certain products, such as simulators and logistical and training equipment, while not actually weapons, should also be subject to control). This also includes intangible technology transfers (i.e. it regulates training and even the transfer of technological military know-how)
- *Regulation of production licences abroad*: in the case of European companies that operate in other countries.
- *Regulation of broking and transfers*: the Code of Conduct should apply to products that come from other countries but are traded within the EU, or to transactions in which companies or individuals from the EU are involved.

- **Strengthening human rights criteria**

- *Explicit establishment of respect for International Humanitarian Law in the country to which arms are to be sent.*

- **Requirement that member states publish national reports every year**

- *Requirement, under the terms of domestic legislation, that all EU countries publish an annual report detailing their arms exports.*

- **Compulsory regular review of the Code of Conduct**

- *The Code of Conduct should be reviewed and updated regularly.*

In short, the main advance introduced by this new Common Position is that it is binding and Countries must comply. However, it is to be regretted that the opportunity was not seized to take bolder and more specific steps forward, particularly as regards clarification of the actual concepts involved.

A similar initiative has taken in **Central America**, where countries in the region have approved the standardisation of processes involving the transfer of weapons, munitions and explosives. This will be implemented in the form of a legally binding regional Code of Conduct. A methodology was also proposed for the implementation during 2006 of an arms limitation and control programme, aimed at reaching a balance between forces in the region and encouraging stability, mutual trust and transparency.

### c) Control of the proliferation of small arms

The international arena and more specifically the **United Nations** formed the main platform for this issue, with a number of different events seen throughout the year. The most positive was the implementation of the first legally binding instrument in this area: the **Firearms Protocol**, which governs the production, export, import and transfer of small arms.

Elsewhere, the **First Committee of the UN General Assembly met in October to discuss various resolutions relating to the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects**. Debate centred around whether analysis should be limited purely to the illicit trade as such (a position argued by the **USA**), or whether the humanitarian and socio-economic effects of this trade should also be taken into account. A high level of abstention was recorded among Latin American and Caribbean countries on the issue of marking and tracking weapons, and there were complaints that this was not binding and that ammunition was not included. Agreement was reached on the prevention of the illegal transfer of portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) and the implementation of measures to destroy surplus arsenals of munitions, among other things.

Leaving Government initiatives to one side, particular mention should be made of the worldwide activities of **Control Arms**, a programme led by Amnesty International, IANSA<sup>8</sup> and Oxfam. During 2005, this campaign published an **analysis of the implementation of the Action Programme for each country**. The results indicated that governments are not making sufficient effort to tackle the proliferation of small arms. This is demonstrated by the fact that **many countries have inadequate or antiquated legislation** in respect of arms exports. More than 100 countries do not have any Government body to coordinate national action on small arms, and only 18 have made specific arrangements in this regard.

The end of June saw a **Week of Action** against small arms with more than 140 events in more than 45 countries around the world, accompanied by the publication of a number of reports on specific issues. One pointed to the need for an **international instrument on the marking and tracking of illicit weapons and munitions**, seen as an historic opportunity to take a firm stand against proliferation, a second dealt with the **harmful impact of the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms on women and young girls**, both in the home (domestic violence) and in situations of conflict (women and children are the groups most exposed to this kind of weapon), while a third dealt with the **forthcoming steps to be taken in the United Nations Action Programme**, the most important of which is the adoption of the International Arms Trade Treaty already mentioned in this chapter<sup>9</sup>.

As regards **regional initiatives**, there was continuing support from the United Nations for the regional moratorium imposed by **ECOWAS** in **Africa**. The UN helped to identify those who were breaching the arrangement and added its own embargo on **Côte d'Ivoire**, an move that was also helped by its creation of a legal structure aimed at slowing the illicit trade in small arms. If one country is to be picked out in this regard it is **South Africa**, where the six-month weapons amnesty resulted in more than 80,000 weapons being taken out of circulation (31% of which were illegal), along with more than a million rounds of ammunition. Also worthy of mention are **Ghana**, which signed up to the International Arms Trade Treaty, **Namibia**, which implemented a National Action Plan on this issue, and **Sudan** and **Uganda**, which introduced

8. IANSA (International Action Network on Small Arms) is a network of more than 700 NGOs operating in 115 countries around the world.

9. For more information and to see the reports mentioned, see the campaign we site at: <<http://www.controlarms.org/>>.

initiatives to disarm the civilian population. The illegal proliferation of small arms in the **Great Lakes** region, including the possible breach of the arms embargo on **DR RD Congo**, represent the most negative developments.

The most important developments on the American continent were seen in **Brazil**. As part of the process relating to the Disarmament Statute, the voluntary weapons handover period ended with a total of **484,000 weapons collected**, coinciding with the referendum on the ban on the sale of weapons to the civilian population. However, the law may not be successfully implemented due to the negative result of the referendum, which is analysed below:

#### Chart 6.4. The disarmament referendum in Brazil

The Disarmament Statute was a measure approved by the Brazilian Congress in December 2003 and which made it **illegal for many civilians to carry weapons**. It is also now more difficult to obtain a licence to carry arms (the minimum age has been increased and applicants must take an aptitude test and show a mental and physical health certificate, among other things). In addition, punishments for the illegal possession and use of weapons are heavier, all weapons and ammunition must be marked and a national database has been created to track weapons involved in criminal activity. One of the immediate consequences of the Statute's introduction was that **deaths in Brazil during 2004 fell by 8% from the previous year**. This is the first time the figure has fallen in 13 years, according to the Ministry of Health.

The **referendum for a ban on arms sales** across the country was one of the initiatives contained in the Statute, which denounced the fact that the main current source of weapons for criminals is the legal arms trade. Many criminals obtain their weapons by stealing or buying them from legal owners. A recent report by the Rio de Janeiro Government also showed that **72% of weapons used in criminal activity in Brazil were from legal sources**. As a result of the rejection of this white paper on the ban on arms sales in the country, **any person older than 25 in Brazil can now buy any amount of weapons and ammunition**.

At the same time it would seem that awareness of this issue is increasing across the American continent. In **Colombia**, a coalition of 35 NGOs introduced a project for the disarmament of the civilian population, while a new federal law was passed in **Chile** to regulate the acquisition, use and carrying of firearms throughout the country. The most negative development was seen in **Mexico**, where a study found that the traffic of small arms caused the second highest number of criminal deaths in the country.

In **Asia, Cambodia** approved a law limiting the use and export of weapons and munitions in an attempt to combat the high levels of criminality and violence in the country's border regions. In **Papua New Guinea**, a report confirmed that weapons intended for the military are being diverted from the government's arsenals and ending up in criminal hands, leading to an increase in armed violence in the country.

### 6.3. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes (DDR)

Several important initiatives were seen in this area during the course of 2005. At the **United Nations**, the various agencies involved in this type of programme set out an **integrated approach strategy for DDR programmes** in 30 different areas ranging from the strategic to the operational. The results of this programme should act as a guide for the policies, directives and procedures to be followed, with particular emphasis on the gender dimension and the child soldier issue. This strategy is currently under review and will begin to be made public at the beginning of 2006.

Among the **main challenges to be met** using this new approach are the need for integrated planning and effective decentralised implementation, activities that are clear, integrated and appropriate over time, the approval of a plan and its potential review and assessment by the various United Nations agencies in an integrated way, and the optimisation of the resources available in a joint financing strategy.

Since 2004, the Swedish Government has been organising what is known as the **Stockholm initiative**, bringing a number of different groups together (donors, international organisations, academics, etc.) with a view to identifying the **main failings of DDR programmes in the area of planning, coordination and implementation** and thus finding a way of ensuring that they take place under better conditions. To this end it has established three **working groups**: 1) peace agreements, negotiations and political processes; 2) financing mechanisms for the different stages of DDR; and 3) reintegration and peace-building.

The last of the meetings held to discuss the main points on which each of these working groups are to make their recommendations was held in mid-November. The **main proposals** included: the need to create a short-term security situation and basic conditions for long-term development; the inclusion of DDR in peace processes with flexible adjustment mechanisms; transparency in decision-making; taking account of the gender dimension; seeking social and economic reintegration; empowering domestic institutions; and seeking multiple donor formulas with guarantees that all the money promised will be handed over.

In addition to the debate as to how these types of process should be technically implemented, reference was made to need for a good **knowledge of each context and monitoring of each individual case**. The following table offers a synthesis of the current contexts in which DDR programmes are underway and indicates the most important elements in each case:

**Table 6.5. Main DDR initiatives currently underway**

Country	Organisations involved	Period (months)	Combatants to be demobilised		Programmes for vulnerable groups			Total budget (Millions of dollars)	Financing formulas		
			AF	OAG	C	W	D		WB	M	C
Afghanistan	M	36	–	63,000	•			174.3			•
Angola	D	48	33,000	105,000	•	•	•	248			•
Burundi	M	48	41,000	39,000	•			84.4	•	•	
Chad	D	60	9,000	.	–	–	–	10	•		•
Cambodia	M	38	30,000	.	•			42	•		•
Central African Republic	M	36	–	7,565	–	–	–	13.3			•
Colombia	D	25	.	20,000	•			261	•		•
Rep. Congo	M	36	–	30,000	•			31.8	•		•
DR Congo	M	48	38,000	112,000	•			200	•	•	
Eritrea	D	48	200,000			•	•	197.2	•	•	
Philippines (Mindanao)	M	96	–	25,000	•			75			•
Guinea-Bissau	M	60	10,544	2,051	–	–	–	26	•		•
Indonesia (Aceh)	D	9	–	3,000	•			8			•
Liberia	M	36	12,000	107,000	•			160			•
Rwanda	D	90	15,000	30,000	•	•	•	53.3	•	•	•
Sierra Leone	M	31	–	72,500	•			45.2			•
Somalia	M	18	–	53,000	•			23.3			•
Sudan	M	36	–	45,000	•	•	•	69.4			•

**Key:**

Organisations involved: **D**- Domestic / **Int**- International / **M**- Mixed

Forces to be demobilised: **AF**- State Armed Forces / **OAG** – Opposition Armed Groups

Vulnerable groups: **C**- Child soldiers / **W** – Women combatants / **D** – Disabled soldiers

Financing formulas: **WB** – World Bank / **M**- Multinational funds / **C**- Individual country funds

The most notable and positive events in this area during 2005 included the completion of the disarmament and demobilisation phases and the introduction of the weapons collection programme for illegal armed groups in **Afghanistan**, the demobilisation of the AUC paramilitaries in **Colombia**, and the introduction of a DDR processes in **Indonesia** (with the disarmament of 3,000 GAM combatants in return for an amnesty for political prisoners and the demilitarization of the Aceh region), the **Central African Republic** and


**Somalia** (in the Puntland region). New programmes are also planned for introduction during 2006 in the **Republic of Congo** and **Sudan**.

Not all developments have been positive. The protests by former combatants in **Burundi** and **Liberia** as a result of the failure to pay their promised allowances (due to improper planning and the incorrect initial calculation of the number of combatants to be demobilised), and the impossibility of introducing the programme planned for **Côte d'Ivoire**, due to continuing disagreement between the opposing parties over disarmament conditions and electoral legislation, were the main sticking points as far as DDR was concerned during 2005. Another negative element is the large number of complaints relating to the presence of **child soldiers** among the armed groups awaiting demobilisation, who are often unable to benefit from these programmes.

Seen from another angle, one could ask whether this type of process is appropriate in contexts in which there are high levels of armed violence. **Haiti** (with its great diversity of armed groups whose numbers, along with those of former members of the Armed Forces, are hard to assess) and **Ireland**, with the announcement by the IRA armed opposition group of its complete disarmament, could be seen as model cases. In these contexts, as in the others analysed above and other post-war scenarios in which DDR programmes may begin during the coming year, the main objective should be the reintegration of former combatants in civilian society in order to encourage reconciliation, though without forgetting (something which frequently happens) the administration of justice for any crimes that may have been committed.

In **conclusion**, the outlook as far as the **arms cycle** is concerned is clearly bleak. 11 years on from the publication of the UNDP's Human Security report, military spending has once again reached the levels seen during the Cold War, when this money could be better spent on much more needy causes. Given that debate at an international level is highly ethereal, steps should be taken to ground the arguments relating to **arms control**: a) **call on all states to meet international undertakings** that have already been established or remain pending, such as the International Arms Trade Treaty; b) **prohibit the transfer of weapons to non-state groups**; and c) **improve the definition of the criteria in the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports**, which is to become a Common Position for EU member states. Finally, on a more practical level, attention must be paid to the problem of the **proliferation of small arms**. Efforts must therefore be made to d) **strengthen disarmament initiatives, which are understood to assist the reduction of armed violence and aid peace-building**; and e) **encourage DDR programmes in post-war rehabilitation contexts, particularly as regards the financing of these programmes**. In addition, if these programmes are to be properly implemented we need to have a good knowledge of the context involved and be aware of the lessons learned and best practices developed in other contexts.

### Militarization and disarmament



- Embargoed governments
- Non-governmental actors
- \* Not attributed to any country on the case of Al-Qaeda
- Countries with high military spending
- Countries where the number of soldiers exceeds 2% of the population
- Countries with imports of heavy conventional weapons exceeding 1% of GDP

## 7. Human rights and International Humanitarian Law

This section contains an analysis of the situation relating to Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The **first part** relates to the issue of respect for the international instruments protecting human rights, and the violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms reported by non-governmental human rights organisations (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) and other international or inter-governmental organisations (the EU and the United Nations, with special emphasis, in the latter case, on the 61<sup>st</sup> period of sessions of the UN Human Rights Commission). The **second part** contains an analysis of issues relating to international law in situations of armed conflict and the use of child-soldiers. A map is included at the end of the chapter which summarises the human rights situation during 2005.

### 7.1. International human rights instruments (indicator 14)

Since the end of the Second World War and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1951, a series of legal instruments have been drawn up to protect human rights at both an international and a regional level.<sup>1</sup>

In this connection, indicator 14 is drawn up on the basis of the **main human rights treaties** that are legally binding for signatory states. The indicator comprises the two Covenants that govern human rights and fundamental freedoms in a generic way (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of 1966), plus the seven Conventions that relate to more specific issues such as genocide, the status of the refugee, racial discrimination, women's rights, the rights of the child, the rights of migrants and torture and other forms of cruel treatment. These nine instruments form the basis for the protection of human rights within the United Nations system.

**Table 7.1. Countries that had signed and ratified the main legal instruments protecting human rights by the end of 2005**

Legal instrument	S	R	R (2005)
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)	67	154	-
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)	66	151	-
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)	41	137	Bolivia
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)	19	143	Afghanistan
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1966)	84	170	-
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)	98	180	Monaco
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)	74	140	Nicaragua
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)	140	192	-
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (2003)	27	34	Algeria, Chile, Honduras, Lesotho, Nicaragua, Peru, Syria

Note: S: Signed; R: Ratified; R (2005): Ratified during 2005.

1. This internationalisation during the 20<sup>th</sup> century of the system for the protection of human rights put the emphasis on the responsibility of individual states to guarantee the protection and promotion of human rights under the supervision of the international community. Subsequently, more than 170 countries ratified the universality, indivisibility and inter-dependence of human rights at the International Conference in Vienna in 1993, an indication of the way human rights are now seen.

Only twenty or so states had ratified all nine of these treaties by 31 December 2005. This is due to the fact that to date not a single European country, nor the USA, Canada or Australia, have ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (2003), a factor that has further widened the gulf between the migrants' countries of origin and the countries to which they have flowed in large numbers. The vast majority of Latin American and African countries have signed this Convention.

The process of signing and ratifying international human rights treaties represents a first step towards compliance by individual states with their obligation to protect and promote human rights. Nevertheless, in 2005, the United Nations signalled a need to seek forms of effective implementation, underlining the great challenge facing the international community if we are to be able finally to speak about the actual application of these instruments following more than 60 years of discussions about their wording.

## 7.2. Human rights (indicators 15 to 19)

Human rights are the inherent rights and freedoms of all people. These rights are universal, inalienable and indivisible, and are generally divided into the following three categories: a) civil and political rights; b) economic, social and cultural rights; and c) rights linked with solidarity and peace. The 5 indicators forming this section refer specifically to civil and political rights, while economic, social and cultural rights will be dealt with later, in chapter 8 on Development. This section<sup>2</sup> reflects the complaints made about human rights abuses committed by Government agencies.

<b>Table 7.2. Types of human rights and their violation by governmental agencies</b>	
<b>Civil and political rights</b>	<b>Examples of abuse by governmental agencies and the international law that forbids such violations<sup>3</sup></b>
<b>The right to life</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <b>Genocide</b>, covered by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide</li> <li>– <b>Extra-judicial executions and summary disappearances</b>, covered by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.</li> <li>– <b>Death Penalty</b>, covered by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</li> </ul>
<b>The right to personal integrity</b>	– <b>Torture, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment and sexual violence</b> , covered in the Convention against Torture
<b>The right not to be arbitrarily detained or punished</b>	– <b>Arbitrary detentions and legal proceedings without guarantees</b> , covered in both cases by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
<b>The right not to be discriminated against and not to suffer a diminishment of one's rights and freedoms as the result of belonging to one of these groups</b>	<p><b>Groups discriminated against:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <b>Defenders of human rights</b>, covered in the Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of Individual Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms</li> <li>– <b>Women</b>, covered by the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women</li> <li>– <b>Children</b>, covered by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocols to this Convention</li> <li>– <b>Minority groups and indigenous peoples</b>, covered by the International Convention on the elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination</li> <li>– <b>Refugees, IDPs and asylum-seekers</b>, covered by the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the two Protocols to the Four Geneva Conventions</li> </ul>
<b>Fundamental freedoms</b>	– <b>Expression, Association, Conscience, Thought and Religion, and Participation</b> , all covered in the Universal Declaration and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

2. The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports is a regulation that was approved by the Council of Europe in 1998 and that consists of eight criteria relating to arms exports among EU member states. The criteria are based on not exporting to countries involved in armed conflict or countries that are perpetrating clear human rights violations, among others.

3. The basic protection of these rights is set out in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Indicators 15 to 17 refer to the situation relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms in the countries or territories examined, while indicators 18 and 19 refer to the application of the death penalty and the grant of asylum status. Only human rights violations committed by the State or by Government agencies have been taken into account<sup>4</sup>.

### a) Violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms

During the whole of the year NGOs were reporting that governments around the world were in breach of their undertaking to the international community to promote and protect human rights, engaging in global actions that failed to respect these internationally protected rights. This new agenda is informed by the war on terrorism, in which words such as 'freedom' and 'justice' are being misused to justify a one-sided view of 'security', while there is a simultaneous failure to respond properly to the humanitarian crises and the forgotten conflicts of the previous year. This situation is evident in places as varied as the Sudanese region of Darfur, Haiti, DT Congo, Afghanistan, Iran, Chechnya (Russia) and Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, thanks to the efforts of certain civilian groups, a number of initiatives have been launched this year aimed at protecting human rights, such as the campaigns calling for greater controls on the impact of transnational companies on human rights, the need to strengthen international justice and the introduction of debate relating to the United Nations' Human Rights Commission, which we will analyse later.

According to the situation described in the **annual reports from both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for 2005** (referring to events that occurred in 2004) (indicator 15), the following serious human rights violations were reported: a) systematic and widespread abuses relating to the right to life and personal security as a result of the actions or omissions of the State in 65 countries; b) torture and maltreatment in 115 countries; and c) serious infringements of fundamental freedoms in 88 countries, the most affected groups being defenders of human rights (in 37 cases) and people working in the communications media. These abuses are generally committed against a background of impunity.

The second indicator (16) refers to the countries listed in the European Union Annual Report on Human Rights 2005, issued by the **Council of Europe**<sup>5</sup>. This report, the seventh of its kind, offers an overview of all the policies adopted by the EU in the area of human rights, both from the point of view of the member states and from the perspective of the EU's relations with third parties in different international forums, such as the United Nations' Human Rights Commission.

This year, the report underlines the importance of remembering situations in which serious abuses were committed, such as the Srebrenica massacre, with a view to preventing and improving the response by European institutions in situations of crises relating to human rights issues. The report deals with the human rights situation in 55 countries, the majority in Asia, pointing to particularly serious abuses in DR Congo, Sudan and Zimbabwe (in Africa), Cuba and Colombia (in the Americas), DPR Korea, Myanmar and Nepal (in Asia), Belarus, Chechnya and Uzbekistan (in Europe and Central Asia), and Iran and Syria (in the Middle East). It indicates that all the EU's institutions should play a more active role in dealing with these human rights crises, and we should mention that M. Matthiessen was appointed in 2005 as the first Personal Representative for human rights issues by the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Finally, the third indicator in this section relating to human rights violations (indicator 17), is based on the reports presented to the **61<sup>st</sup> period of sessions of the United Nations Human Rights Commission** (UNHRC) by Independent Experts, Special Representatives and Rapporteurs working at country level, as well as on the Presidential Resolutions and Declarations adopted.

4. This Alert report appeals for State responsibility, meaning that the majority of the sources used for its indicators refer to violations committed by governments. The abuses perpetrated by other agents, such as armed opposition groups, are not considered, because International Human Rights Law only regulates the behaviour of States.

5. Council of Europe, *European Union Annual Report on Human Rights 2004*, Brussels, 13 September 2004. For more information, see <<http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/ENHR2004.pdf>>.

The **61<sup>st</sup> period of sessions of the Human Rights Commission** (Geneva, 14 March to 24 April 2005)<sup>6</sup> was one of the least conflictive as far as the debate on the situation in certain countries was concerned, mainly due to the fact that the agenda was marked by discussions on the need to reform the organisation itself. 2005 also marked a significant change of leadership in terms of the issues to be submitted for debate and resolution, as some South American countries joined Switzerland in playing very active roles in the presentation of the 116 resolutions adopted (in 2004 there were 131).

### Chart 7.1. Composition of the Human Rights Commission in 2005

The 53 member states with representatives on the Commission in 2005, organised by region, were as follows: **Africa (15 countries:** Burkina Faso, Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Mauritania, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo and Zimbabwe); the group of **Asian states (12 countries:** Bhutan, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Qatar, Rep. of Korea, Saudi Arabia and Sri Lanka); the group of **Eastern European states (5 countries:** Armenia, Hungary, Romania, Russian Federation and Ukraine); the group of **Latin American and Caribbean states (11 countries:** Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru); and finally, the group of **Western European and other states (10 countries:** Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom and USA).

The Commission's Board Members were M. Wibisono (Indonesia) (Presidency), M. S. Ould Mohamed Lemine (Mauritania), A. Zlenko (Ukraine), H. Escudero Martínez (Ecuador) (Vice Presidency) and D. Kent (Canada) as Rapporteur.

As regards the **situation in individual countries**, human rights NGOs complained that even during the first week of the period of sessions, many governments (including the EU, the USA and Canada) had already announced that they did not intend to present resolutions on the situation in certain countries like China, Iran, Chechnya (Russia), Turkmenistan or Zimbabwe, due to the difficulties experienced in attempting to achieve consensus. The resolution presented by the Cuban representative referring to the serious abuses being committed by the USA at Guantanamo was also unsuccessful, though the US Government agreed to allow the Commission's special representatives to enter its detention centres in **Guantanamo, Iraq** and **Afghanistan**. The Declarations by the Presidency on **Colombia** and **Afghanistan** were much criticised by civilian organisations, who considered that they did not reflect the real situation as far as human rights issues were concerned. On the positive side, it should be mentioned that Switzerland led the negotiations that ended in the Government of **Nepal** agreeing to the establishment of a Human Rights Office in the country to monitor the abuses being committed by all sides in the armed conflict, and that the EU and the AU agreed on a compromise text on the situation in Sudan, with support from the Sudanese Government, condemning the abuses being committed in connection with the armed conflict.

As regards **thematic issues**, the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on human rights and the fight against terrorism and the Secretary General's Special Representative on business and human rights (in spite of opposition from the USA and Australia) were the most significant events. Also worthy of mention is the resolution on torture, which for the first time included a text stating that people accused of links with groups classified as terrorist organisations should not be extradited to countries in which they may suffer this form of abuse (a measure which both the USA and certain European countries are beginning to implement). Progress on the issue of recognising measures favouring transitional justice processes, such as the right to reparation (a resolution presented by Chile) and the right to truth (a resolution presented by Argentina) was welcomed by human rights NGOs, which on the other hand criticised the resolution on human rights and responsibilities presented by China which indicated that citizens have a duty to their state if they want to gain proper guarantees for their rights.

This period of sessions once again highlighted the lack of effective action being taken by Governments to promote and protect human rights on an international scale, leading the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, L. Arbour, to state during the closing ceremony that the organisation could no

## Chart 7. 2. Two new special procedures

**The Special Rapporteur on human rights and the fight against terrorism.** Resolution 2005/80, entitled “the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism”, which was adopted by the Human Rights Commission on 21 April without being put to a vote, observed not only that terrorist attacks violated human rights but also that Governments should ensure that any measures they adopt to combat terrorism meet all the obligations that apply under International Law, and it was decided to appoint a special rapporteur for a period of three years with the mandate to: a) make specific recommendations on the protection of human rights in the fight against terrorism; b) hold meetings, request, receive and exchange information from all sources regarding alleged abuses; c) identify, exchange ideas on and promote best practices relating to measures to combat terrorism; d) work in close collaboration with all United Nations bodies; e) establish regular dialogue with all the parties involved; and f) give an annual account of his progress to the Human Rights Commission.

**The Special Representative to the UN Secretary General on business and human rights.** In resolution 2005/69, adopted by the Human Rights Commission on 20 April by 49 votes to 3 with one abstention and entitled “human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises”, the UN Secretary General was called on to appoint a special representative on human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises for an initial period of two years (presenting a provisional report to the Commission at its 62<sup>nd</sup> period of sessions and a final report at its 63<sup>rd</sup> period of sessions), with the following mandate: to outline rules to govern socially responsible behaviour and accountability; to specify the duties of the state in regulating business; to investigate and clarify the concepts of ‘complicity’ and ‘sphere of influence’; to develop methodologies to evaluate the impact of businesses on human rights; and to compile a compendium of best practices for both governments and businesses. Some NGOs criticised the resolution and invited the Commission to establish an open Task Force that would be charged with reviewing and improving the United Nations Draft Regulations that had been submitted to the Sub-Commission, believing that the establishment of a special representative took the issue backwards and represented the *de facto* suspension of the adoption of these regulations.

longer operate in its current form, expressing her support for the reforms put forward by the UN Secretary General. She stated that she believed that in terms of the application of human rights processes and the verification of the results of these processes, the Commission’s tools had become obsolete. This view was shared by the NGOs involved, though they also expressed their concern that any eventual reform may mean that civilian organisations would cease to have a role or provide any active input if the Commission no longer reported to ECOSOC.

## Chart 7.3. The proposed reforms

On 8 April 2005, as part of the 61<sup>st</sup> period of sessions in Geneva, the UN Secretary General put forward his proposal for the reform of the United Nations Human Rights Commission<sup>17</sup>. For K. Annan, it is not possible for states that lack any proven commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights to begin to establish rules to guarantee such rights. For this it would be necessary to increase the Commission’s current budget, which only accounts for 2% of the ordinary budget of the High Commissioner’s Office, and in the long term it is being suggested that the Commission could become a “Human Rights Council”, a body in its own right under the UN Charter and no longer subordinate to ECOSOC.

### Measures to be adopted:

- **Broadening membership** of the Commission to make it universal (which would then mean that debate could focus on the important issues and not just on who is allowed to take part in debates and who is allowed to vote).
- The **appointment by member states of independent experts** in the field of human rights, and the people to whom they would delegate duties.
- The establishment of an **advisory board or group** (made up of fifteen experts, three for each continent), to assist the Commission in its work.
- The High Commissioner’s Office should prepare an **annual report on the human rights situation around the world**.
- The UN Security Council should ask the High Commissioner to report to it regularly on **compliance with the provisions set out in the Security Council’s own decisions relating to human rights**, in order to monitor the implementation of these resolutions in an accurate and effective way.

L. Arbour responded to the UN Secretary General’s proposal with a **Plan of Action for the Reform of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights**, so that the suggested reforms

7. For more information about the report, go to <<http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf>>.

could begin shortly. These measures, on which consensus must be reached during the coming months between all the international groups working in the field of human rights, especially NGOs, are aimed at combating the problem of failure to implement human rights procedures. This can only be achieved through effective protection for everyone and the improvement of their access to and knowledge of the United Nations system, based on a five-point action plan:

#### Chart 7.4. The Five-Point Action Plan

1. Increase the presence of the Human Rights Office on the ground
2. Increase leadership from the Human Rights Office within the United Nations system
3. Improve dialogue and relations with civilian groups and NGOs
4. Improve dialogue and relations between the different UN agencies
5. Increase the Office's management and planning capacity

#### b) Other aspects worthy of special attention (indicators 18 and 19)

This section will deal specifically with the application of the death penalty and the issues relating to the granting of asylum status.

The existence and application of the **death penalty** (indicator 18) represents the denial of the most fundamental right: the right to life. In this regard, it should be mentioned that the death penalty remained on the statute books in almost half the countries in the world in 2005, in spite of the call for an international moratorium on executions and the existence of two instruments prohibiting the practice<sup>8</sup>. With the abolition of the death penalty in Mexico and Liberia during 2005, 86 countries have now abolished this punishment for all crimes, a figure which for the first time exceeds the number of countries that retain it (75).

In spite of the clear tendency towards its abolition throughout the world, many countries continue to apply the death penalty. According to data from Amnesty International, 3,797 executions were carried out in 24 countries during 2004, while at least 7,395 people were sentenced to death in 64 countries. These figures only include the cases that Amnesty International knows about, and the real figures are without doubt much higher. The most striking fact is that 94% of these executions took place in only four countries: China (3,400 known executions), Iran (159 known executions), Vietnam (64 known executions) and the USA (59 people executed). This confirmed number represents the highest figure for a decade and the second highest in the last 25 years, due in particular to the increased number of executions in China. It is to be regretted that executions were once again carried out by the Palestine National Authority and the Iraqi Government in 2005. On the positive side, it should be mentioned that in March the US Supreme Court banned the execution of minors.

This report has also considered the question of the **grant of asylum** (indicator 19). The grant of such status, though on occasion subject to restrictions of a national or international nature, implies recognition by the host Government of the fact that the safety and freedom of the applicant is under threat in his or her country of origin. It therefore represents Government recognition of some human rights violation in the country of origin and persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or the expression of political opinions, as set out in the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees. During 2004, a total of 676,000 asylum applications were made in 143 countries, 19% fewer than in 2003. Around 444,000 of these applications were made in Europe.

In its most recent report, UNHCR indicated that the number of applicants in industrialised countries fell by 22% during 2004, further accentuating the sharp fall from the previous year and reaching the lowest lev-

8. The Second Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Protocol no. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the latter permits the application of the death penalty in time of war or when there is imminent danger of war).

els in 16 years. In the EU, the number fell by 19%, while in North America applicants fell by 26% and in Australia and New Zealand by 29%. In Spain, the number of asylum seekers in 2004 fell by 9% from the previous year, while the country that received most applications was France, with an estimated 61,600 asylum seekers. The USA, which was the country that had received most applications the previous year is now in second place with 52,400. The United Kingdom has fallen to third place with 40,200 and Germany (the country that has received most applications in 13 of the last 20 years) dropped to fourth place with 35,600. Canada came fifth with 25,500. The countries of origin from which most applicants came in 2004 were Russia (30,100, the majority of them Chechens), followed by Serbia and Montenegro (22,300, many of them from Kosovo), China (19,700), Turkey (16,200) and India (11,900).

Based on an assessment of these 5 indicators (14 to 19), we have prepared a list that indicates those countries with very serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This also takes into account the two indicators relating to International Humanitarian Law, as discussed below, and this report thus concludes that very serious violations occurred in **45** countries during 2005.

**Table 7.3. Countries with serious human rights violations**

Afghanistan	DR Congo	Indonesia	Myanmar	Somalia
Algeria	Chad	Iran	Nepal	Sri Lanka
Bangladesh	Côte d'Ivoire	Iraq	Nigeria	Sudan
Belarus	Cuba	Israel	Pakistan	Thailand
Burundi	Eritrea	Jamaica	Palestine	Turkmenistan
Cambodia	Ethiopia	Lebanon	Peru	Uganda
China	Guatemala	Liberia	Philippines	Uzbekistan
Colombia	Haiti	Malaysia	Russia	Vietnam
DPR Korea	India	Mexico	Saudi Arabia	Zimbabwe

### 7.3. International Humanitarian Law o (indicators 20 and 21)

Finally, this section contains an analysis of two indicators relating to International Humanitarian Law (IHL). IHL is understood to refer to a group of international regulations intended for application in areas engaged in both international and internal domestic armed conflicts. The aim is to protect people who may become the victims of acts of war (whether they are actual combatants or not) and to restrict the means and methods of war used. IHL regulations have both moral and political force (giving rise to international responsibility), and their incorporation in a country's internal legislation involves legal responsibilities that particularly affect their governments as signatories to the different Conventions and Protocols<sup>9</sup>.

IHL was born in 1864 with the 1<sup>st</sup> Geneva Convention. At that time it represented a series of rules aimed at regulating hostilities between states.<sup>10</sup> This first document continued to evolve until it resulted in the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the additional Protocol on the protection of victims in international armed conflicts (Protocol I) of 1979. All of these texts refer to conflicts in which at least two states are in conflict.<sup>11</sup> Of all the United Nations member states, only Nauru is not a party to the Four Geneva Conventions, while the 1<sup>st</sup> Protocol has been ratified by 163 countries (Timor Leste ratified it in 2005) . In any case, the fact that armed conflicts are increasingly occurring within a single state and not between states<sup>12</sup>,

9. IHL only applies in the event of armed conflict. It does not cover situations involving tension and internal disturbance, such as isolated acts of violence. It is only applicable when a conflict has broken out and it applies equally to all parties.

10. There are texts that date from as far back as 1108 regulating the treatment of prisoners of war and the sick, but these involve specific proposals that were generally bilateral and so did not represent a framework for international application.

11. Geneva Convention (I) for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in Armed Forces in the field; Geneva Convention (II) for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of Armed Forces at sea; Geneva Convention (III) relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, and Geneva Convention (IV) relating to the protection of civilians in times of war.

12. See chapter 1 on armed conflicts.

coupled with the fact that civilian population is the group that suffers most<sup>13</sup>, enduring serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms<sup>14</sup>, has meant that IHL has had to continue to develop in order to adapt to new circumstances. This new type of armed conflict has also reawakened the debate on the role of new kinds of armed groups and the responsibilities that apply to them.

For this reason, the first indicator taken into account when preparing this section was constructed on the basis of the number of ratifications of the **Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions** of 12 August 1949, **relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts** (Protocol II)<sup>15</sup> of 1979 (indicator 20). By 2003, this 2<sup>nd</sup> protocol had been ratified by a total of 159 states.

However, although IHL is essentially contained in the four Geneva Conventions, supplemented by the two additional Protocols I and II, there are other legal instruments whose fulfilment has clear consequences for the application of IHL itself. This is the case, for example, with the regulations prohibiting the use of certain weapons or military tactics, such as the Ottawa Treaty on Landmines<sup>16</sup> or the International Criminal Court, and this even extends to laws protecting certain categories of people or goods. These last regulations have been particularly borne in mind in the preparation of this section, specifically the legal provisions relating to children and their participation in armed conflicts.

Indeed, the 4<sup>th</sup> Geneva Convention and the two additional Protocols I and II make specific provisions in favour of special protection for children. This was further supplemented by the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989 (see indicator 31) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on participation in armed conflicts in 2000. This Optional Protocol considers a child-soldier to be any «person under the age of 18 who voluntarily or forcibly joins the Armed Forces or armed opposition groups and participates directly in combat».<sup>17</sup> Signatory States undertake to impose criminal sanctions on such practices. The Optional Protocol came into force on 12 February 2002 and has been ratified by 101 countries.

The second and final indicator examined in this sub-section indicates those **countries in which Government Armed Forces or other armed groups recruit children as soldiers** (indicator 21). The NGO *Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers* and the UN Secretary General have presented annual reports on this issue to the UN Security Council since November 2001, the date on which the first resolution on children and armed conflicts was adopted.

Between 2001 and 2004, children younger than 18 played a direct role in hostilities in theatres of war including Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Guinea, India, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Indonesia, Liberia, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, Russia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.

In 2005, the United Nations indicated that the countries in which the situation had improved were Afghanistan, Angola, the Balkans region, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. By contrast, 54 armed groups and regular Armed Forces continue to recruit children in Burundi, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Myanmar, Nepal, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Sri Lanka and Uganda<sup>18</sup>.

13. See chapter 5 on humanitarian crises.

14. In contrast to IHL, many of the provisions relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms may be suspended in a situation of internal armed conflict.

15. Non-international armed conflicts are understood to be those in which the regular Armed Forces are in conflict with armed opposition groups, or armed groups are fighting each other, within the boundaries of an individual state. In these cases, a more restricted series of regulations applies, in particular the provisions of article 3, which are common to all four Geneva Conventions and the second additional protocol. Article 3 regulated armed conflicts within states until the publication of Protocol II.

16. See chapter 6 on disarmament.

17. See Articles 2 and 4 of the Optional Protocol of 2000. Until the adoption of this Protocol, a child was considered to be a boy or girl of 15 or under (including in the International Criminal Court).

18. For more information, go to <<http://www.child-soldiers.org/resources/global-reports>>.


### Chart 7.5. What is a child soldier?<sup>19</sup>

Although there is no precise definition of a child soldier, in this report we have followed the definition adopted during an international conference on child soldiers held in Cape Town (South Africa) in 1997, a definition which has been broadly accepted by UN agencies and a number of governments and NGOs. The Cape Town Principles classify a child soldier as «any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage». The term does not therefore refer solely to a boy or girl who has carried arms. Internationally, the definition is quite broad in order to be able to offer protection to as many children as possible and guarantee their inclusion in demobilisation and reinsertion programmes.

More than **500,000 children under the age of 18 are being recruited in around thirty countries throughout the world**, both by regular Armed Forces and by armed opposition groups. **Some 300,000 of these children play a direct role in armed fighting or perform logistical duties** (acting as spies, messengers, porters, slaves, etc.) in a number of ongoing armed conflicts, particularly on the continent of Africa, where it is estimated that there are more than 100,000 child soldiers. These young people also suffer serious human rights violations including sexual abuse, maltreatment and kidnapping.

2005 also marked a significant turning point in respect of this issue, with the UN Security Council's approval in resolution 1612 (26 July 2005) of a Plan of Action to eradicate the use of child soldiers, based on a proposal from the then UN Secretary General's Special Representative on children and armed conflicts, O. Otunnu. The basic elements of this campaign, known as the "era of application", are: investigate, name and list all the parties who commit serious violations of the rights of children; begin talks with the offending parties with a view to preparing and implementing plans of action to bring an end to serious abuses; implement a mechanism for supervision and the presentation of reports on serious violations of children's rights; and ensure accountability through the adoption of specific measures by the main bodies and organisations charged with formulating policy in this area.

19. "La caixa" Foundation, *Menores-soldado* (Child Soldiers), November 2005, at <<http://www.escolapau.org/>>.



## 8. Development

This chapter, which deals with development issues<sup>1</sup>, is divided into three sections. The first contains an analysis of seven indicators, the second deals with some of the most important issues on the development agenda during the last year, while the third includes a map showing the countries indicated in two of these indicators.

### 8.1. Analysis of indicators

The following section contains an analysis of seven indicators relating to poor Government practices in the areas of development and governance, and conditions of vulnerability and dependence.

#### a) Poor Government practices in respect of social development and governance (indicators 22 and 23)

On the subject of **public spending priorities** (indicator 22), there were 14 countries whose military spending was higher than the amounts spent on education and health during 2005 (see Table 8.1), while a further 29 countries devoted more resources to military-related issues than to one of the other two items. This data may indicate that spending on health and education is very low, or that military spending is too high, but it is nevertheless clear that the basic rights of the people are regarded as secondary to issues of defence and militarization in too many countries. This also indicates a strictly militarist approach to security which completely ignores the new paradigms for human security popularised more than ten years ago by the UNDP<sup>2</sup>, focusing on the satisfaction of the basic daily needs of the general population. Finally, it should be pointed out that only three of the 16 countries in the table shown below (Burundi, Israel and Sri Lanka) are currently involved in an armed conflict.

**Table 8.1. Countries spending more on military items than on education and health**

Angola	(3.7%)	Eritrea	(23.5%)	Jordan	(8.4%)	Rwanda	(3.3%)
Burundi	(7.6%)	Ethiopia	(5.2%)	Lebanon	(4.7%)	Sri Lanka	(3.1%)
Cambodia	(2.7%)	Guinea	(2.9%)	Oman	(12.3%)	Syria	(6.9%)
Ecuador	(2.8%)	Israel	(9.2%)	Pakistan	(4.7%)	Turkey	(4.9%)

Note: The figure in brackets shows the percentage of each country's GDP devoted to military spending.

In addition, the World Bank identifies 30 countries with poor **governance**<sup>3</sup> and a further 13 with very poor governance (indicator 23), figures that are significantly higher than the previous year. Governance is increasingly being viewed as significant in any sustainable development process, and aid agencies, international organisations and NGOs are increasingly taking note of good governance when forming their development policies, as they believe that this goes some way to guaranteeing the transparent and effective management of aid. Note that almost all of the countries with poor governance (Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, DR Congo, Iraq, Korea, Liberia, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have suffered or continue to suffer long and costly wars and are classed either as failed states or authoritarian regimes.

1. This chapter adopts the definition set out in the Declaration on the Right to Development declaration approved by the UN General Assembly in 1986, which defines development as "the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom". The declaration claims the right to an individual development process in which all human rights and basic freedoms can be fully enjoyed, but not economic development when it is accompanied by growing inequalities and an increasing concentration of wealth. This approach not only recognises development as an ongoing process, it also requires individual states to pursue specific policies, as it is they that "have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national development policies" to this end.

2. See UNDP, *Human Development Report, 1994*.

3. Governance is assessed by the World Bank on the basis of six variables: the control of corruption, accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, the effectiveness of Government, the rule of law and procedural guarantees.

## b) Conditions of vulnerability, inequality and dependence (indicators 24 to 28)

As regards the second group of indicators, it should be remembered that although it is the individual States themselves that must implement development policies, conditions of vulnerability, economic dependence and impoverishment do not just arise as a result of internal circumstances. Indeed, the structures and rules of the global economy, together with the development policies of international organisations, also play a fundamental role in this regard.

Indeed, some of the countries that suffer most badly from these conditions of vulnerability and poverty are the ones included in the indicator showing reverses in the **Human Development Index** (HDI) and the list of Least Developed Countries or LDC (indicator 24). As Table 8.2 shows, the majority of countries whose HDI is now lower than it was in 1990 are found in Sub-Saharan Africa and the countries of the CIS. In this latter group, the drop in the HDI occurred during the first half of the 1990s when their economies collapsed, though since then they have shown substantial improvements in respect of a number of social indicators. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa however, the fall in the HDI caused by the impact of HIV/AIDS has been continual and sustained over the last 15 years, and there are as yet no signs that there will be any reverse in this trend in the near future. By way of example, the effect of HIV/AIDS in Botswana has been to reduce life expectancy from 65 in 1988 to an estimated 35 by 2008, an impact that is far greater than any armed conflict: life expectancy in France fell from 51 to 35 during the course of the First World War.

**Table 8.2. Countries with a Human Development Index that is currently lower than it was in 1990**

Belarus	Côte d'Ivoire	Moldova	Tajikistan
Botswana	DR Congo	Russia	Ukraine
Cameroon	Kazakhstan	South Africa	Zambia
Central African Republic	Kenya	Swaziland	Zimbabwe
Congo	Lesotho	Tanzania	

The unprecedented stagnation and reverses suffered by the HDI during the 1990s was in sharp contrast to the growth seen in the preceding years and thus went against the natural and empirical tendency of countries to improve their performance in the three areas reflected in the HDI. It also confirmed that worldwide inequality was not just heightened in economic terms (income and poverty levels) but also in other areas of development such as life expectancy and infant deaths.

### Chart 8.1. Increasing divergence in human development

In a section of the Human Development Report 2005 entitled "The End of Convergence?", the UNDP warned that "for most of the past 40 years human capabilities have been gradually converging [...].developing countries as a group have been catching up with rich countries in such areas as life expectancy, child mortality and literacy. A worrying aspect of human development today is that the overall rate of convergence is slowing, and for a large group of countries divergence is becoming the order of the day." The UNDP also pointed out that: "In the countries of the former Soviet Union life expectancy has dropped dramatically [...]. In the Russian Federation life expectancy for males has dropped from 70 years in the mid-1980s to 59 years today—lower than in India".<sup>4</sup>

Particularly worthy of attention are the 50 countries included by ECOSOC in its **LDC** list. Some of the main characteristics displayed by the companies in this list include the fact that they are mainly to be found in Africa and Asia, that poverty is found across all sections of society and that they depend hugely on the export of primary products (particularly minerals) which have yielded greatly reduced incomes over the last twenty years. In spite of the fact that the Programme of Action for LDCs sets a target of increasing Official Development Aid (ODA) to LDCs to 0.15% of GDP and reducing extreme poverty rates by half by 2015, UNCTAD warns that the rate has doubled over the last 30 years and that there are now twice as many LDCs as there were in 1971, i.e. 50 as opposed to 25.

## Chart 8.2. Some links between human development and armed conflict

As the UNDP states, "violent conflict is one of the surest and fastest routes to the bottom of the Human Development Index (HDI) table - and one of the strongest indicators for a protracted stay there"<sup>5</sup>. Some data in this regard:

- 22 of the 32 countries with the lowest HDI suffered some form of armed conflict during the 1990s.
- Seven of the 10 countries with the lowest per capita GDP have suffered armed conflicts in recent years.
- Five of the 10 countries with the lowest life expectancy have suffered armed conflicts in the last 15 years.
- Eight of the 10 countries with the lowest levels of primary schooling suffered armed conflicts at some point during the 1990s.
- Nine of the 18 countries whose HDI decreased during 1990s suffered armed conflicts during the same period.

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2005

The indicator showing **inequalities in internal income** (indicator 25), which is calculated on the basis of the Gini coefficient<sup>6</sup>, indicates that 48 countries have high levels of inequality (above 40), while another 6 have very high levels (above 60). It is currently considered that the distribution of income is one of the most important elements in development, since it allows one to measure the extent to which the whole of society is benefiting from economic growth. Furthermore, high rates of inequality encourage instability and social exclusion and provoke various forms of violent protest.

## Chart 8.3. Inequality as a cause of armed conflict?

The many **studies**<sup>7</sup> that have dealt with the so-called link between inequality and armed conflict over past decades **have not yet demonstrated that there is a significant and fixed correlation between levels of inequality and the risk of suffering an armed conflict**. Although plausible conclusions have been drawn that indicate that the prolonged existence of armed conflict has a strong effect on the heightening of inequalities, and that inequality itself can generally be an unmistakable symptom of the increasing breakdown of social integration systems, some recent studies<sup>8</sup> (including those commissioned by the World Bank) have empirically shown that inequality does not increase the risk of an armed conflict breaking out, i.e. that inequality is an irrelevant variable when it comes to the causes of armed conflict. There is even some numerical data<sup>9</sup> that concludes that the relationship between inequality (in this case measured on the basis of the Gini coefficient) and the probability of the outbreak of an armed conflict is in inverse proportion: countries with the greatest levels of inequality (Gini coefficient of 75) are 85% less likely to suffer an armed conflict than countries with lower levels (Gini coefficient of 25). Similarly, other commentators have speculated about the directly proportional relationship between per capita income and the likelihood of armed conflict, indicating that "In a country in which per capita GDP is US\$ 250, the predicted probability of war (in a five-year period) is 15 per cent, while the probability is reduced by half for a country with per capita GDP of US\$ 600, and by half again (to 4 per cent) for a country with per capita GDP of US\$ 1,250."<sup>10</sup> One can therefore say that **there is no general agreement** on how the differing economic circumstances of individuals influence the emergence of armed conflicts.

However, a series of **criticisms** has appeared in recent years regarding the ways in which **inequality is perceived** and used in the majority of the aforementioned studies. These criticisms have mainly centred around the **individualist and economy-based approach** of showing inequality represented by the Gini Coefficient, and those voicing them propose a **much broader and multi-dimensional definition of inequality**, both in terms of the subjects examined (not just individuals but also communities or territories) and the **type** of inequality (not just in terms of income or consumption but also in relation to access to power or social and political resources). These sources argue that, given that a large number of **today's armed conflicts are inter-community phenomena** that often originate from discrimination between **different individual groups with a particular territorial base**, it is worth considering an approach to the inequality-conflict relationship that takes these aspects into account.

As a result, so-called **vertical inequality** (i.e. inequality based on economic imbalances between individuals) **is not a determining factor** (or even relevant) in explaining armed conflicts. Indeed, this type of inequality would seem to bear a **closer rela-**

5. UNDP, *op. cit.*, p. 176

6. The Gini Coefficient measures the level of inequality between income or consumption in an individual country. The value 0 represents perfect equality and 100 total inequality.

7. For a summary of the literature on this subject, see Gudrun, Ø., *Horizontal Inequalities and Civil War. Do Ethnic Group Inequalities Influence the Risk of Domestic Armed Conflict?*, Norwegian University of Science and Technology and PRIO, August 2003.

8. See Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A., *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, World Bank, 2002, at <<http://www.worldbank.org/research/>>.

9. Gudrun, Ø., *op. cit.*


10. UN *Report on the World Social Situation 2005: The Inequality Predicament* at <<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/media%2005/cd-docs/fullreport05.htm>>.

**relationship with criminality indices**, as shown by the fact that the continent with the highest Gini Coefficient (Latin America) is the one that also shows the highest levels of criminality and the highest number of homicides.

Secondly, analyses of armed conflicts that incorporate the idea of **horizontal inequalities**<sup>11</sup> seem to bring us a little closer to the issue being examined: **inequality becomes a reason for armed conflict when it coincides with lines of division and polarisation in society** and thus has the capacity to mobilise particular groups. In other words, inequality of access to political, economic and social resources among culturally defined groups helps to cause, encourage and explain some armed conflicts. As the United Nations has stated, " *When investigating the potential link between levels of inequality and the incidence or absence of conflicts, it should be kept in mind that the most important aspect of inequality in this context may not be inequality between individuals, but rather inequality between groups (horizontal inequality).*"<sup>12</sup>

Regardless of the different methodologies used to calculate inequality, the gap between the richest and poorest sections of the population at a world level continues to increase, while wealth is in turn becoming more and more concentrated. Levels of inequality remain very high in Latin America and have also grown to high levels in southern and eastern Europe and the countries forming the CIS. However, Africa remains the most unequal part of the world, housing the countries with the highest Gini coefficients: Botswana (63.0), CAR (61.3), Lesotho (63.2), Namibia (70.7), Sierra Leone (62.9) and Swaziland (60.9).

**Graph 8.1. Inequality (Gini coefficient) in the world by region**



Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2005

The percentage of ODA received as a proportion of total GDP is one of the main indicators used to measure the degree of **economic dependence** in a country (indicator 26). 14 countries have been identified as receiving ODA equivalent to more than 20% of their GDP (five more than last year), while this proportion is above 10% in another 20 countries. The majority of the countries indicated are in Africa, and the situation is particularly serious in those states in which more than a third of their GDP is represented by foreign aid: Burundi (37.6%), DR Congo (94.9%), Eritrea (40.9%), Guinea-Bissau (60.8%), Sao Tome and Principe (63.3%), Sierra Leone (37.5%) and Timor-Leste (44.2%). Looking beyond the positive impact that international cooperation could be expected to have, high levels of ODA as a proportion of GDP could point to three worrying aspects. The first is that an individual State could become accustomed to delegating services which are intrinsically its own responsibility to international cooperative efforts. Secondly, the growing politicisation of ODA could lead to excessive conditions being placed on the identification of development priorities and strategies. Thirdly, a country could encounter serious financial problems if the donor community were to decide to make a sudden change in its criteria for allocating funds or choosing the countries to which such aid is to be given.

11. This term was coined recently by commentators as a counterpart to the term 'vertical inequality'. Horizontal inequalities occur between "culturally defined groups" and include three large dimensions: the political, the economic and the social. The effects of these inequalities on the probability of the emergence of an armed conflict are greater when they act on one of the three areas that cause groups to become mobilised: identity, frustration and opportunity.

12. United Nations, *Op. Cit.*, p. 92.

The indicator relating to **foreign debt** (indicator 27) identifies 9 countries with levels of foreign debt in excess of their GDP, and a further 53 that pay more to service their debt<sup>13</sup> than they receive in ODA. Both of these items demonstrate the difficulties encountered by governments in financing other priorities relating to the country's development, and this also highlights the fact that on many occasions there is a net transfer of resources from impoverished countries to industrialised ones. The indicator also lists the 38 countries included in the list of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), since these are the countries that the World Bank indicates as having the most unsustainable levels of borrowing.

**Deforestation and the emission of pollutants** are the two environmental issues covered by indicator 28. 25 countries have been identified whose annual deforestation rates during the 1990s were greater than 1%, and this percentage rose to above 3% in a further 7. Note that the great majority of the countries identified are in West Africa (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togo), the Great Lakes (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi), Central America and the Caribbean (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Haiti and Jamaica) and Southeast Asia (Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Myanmar), all of them regions that fall between the two tropics. On a world level, a report by the FAO indicated that the annual deforestation rate between 2000 and 2005 was 7.3 million hectares (an area the size of Sierra Leone or Panama), while between 1990 and 2000 it was 8.9 million hectares. Latin America is the region with the worst record (an annual loss of 4.3 million hectares), followed by Africa (4 million). The current total area of forest is 4,000 million hectares, representing 30% of the world's landmass, though just 10 countries (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, DR Congo, India, Indonesia, Peru, Russia and the USA) account for two thirds of his.

#### Chart 8.4. Causes and effects of deforestation

Deforestation (principally caused by **urban development**, the transformation of forests into land for **agriculture and live-stock farming**, the activities of the **mining, oil and timber industries**, fires, or the construction of **infrastructure** such as roads, dams, oil and gas pipelines) has a significant effect in 4 ways. Firstly, because it both illustrates and **exacerbates levels of poverty** within a country, increasing **demographic pressure on natural resources**. This can also lead to various forms of **social instability** and can even result in increased levels of violence. Secondly, because it leads to soil erosion and thus increases a country's vulnerability to natural disaster. Thirdly, because it **alters the ecological balance** and does enormous damage to a country's biodiversity. Although forests only occupy 14% of the planet's surface, they contain 60% of the world's animal and plant species. Fourthly, because it often reflects a government's scant respect for the ancestral lands of indigenous peoples. The fact that such people are forced to move to more wooded areas leads in many cases to the total deforestation of these areas. Finally, it should be pointed out that the **responsibility** for a country's appearance in the list is not the exclusive domain of the governments involved, as it is often the **transnational companies engaged in extracting raw materials** that **cause** a country's **deforestation**.

As regards the emission of pollutants, four countries annually emit levels of carbon dioxide in excess of 10 tonnes per capita, and this figure rises to more than 15 tonnes in a further five, down a little lower on last year. The majority of these are highly industrialised countries or nations in which the hydrocarbon sector represents a large percentage of the economy. It is a well known fact that polluting emissions not only have an adverse effect on the global warming of the planet and the acceleration of climate change, they are also closely connected with deforestation. The industrialised countries emit some 2,200 million tonnes of carbon dioxide every year as a result of the burning of fossil fuels. It is also estimated that one hectare of tropical forest can neutralise around 10 tonnes of this gas. In this regard it should be remembered that the industrialised countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol have undertaken to reduce their emissions by more than 5% (calculated on 1990 levels) between 2008 and 2012. At a world level, according to the World Bank, emissions per person in high-income countries (12.4 tonnes) are more than 15 times higher the emissions recorded in low-income countries (0.8 tonnes).

13. Servicing debt includes the repayment of both the capital borrowed and the interest charged.

## 8.2. The development agenda during 2005

The following section contains a brief analysis of some of the most important events on the development agenda during 2005. Appendix X contains a more detailed look at these events.

### a) The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

The so-called World Summit 2005 was held in New York from 14 to 16 September. This event was attended by the largest number of heads of State and Government in history, and its main aim was to **assess the application and fulfilment of the results of the Millennium Summit** held in 2000, and to tackle future challenges in the following four areas: a) Development; b) Collective peace and security; c) Human rights and the rule of law; and d) The strengthening of the United Nations. However, given the wide ranging issues discussed at the Summit, the following section refers only to the **undertakings relating to development**.

#### Chart 8.5. Some of the undertakings relating to development at the Millennium +5 Summit

- Commitment by all developing countries to adopt national plans for achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2006.
- Additional US\$50 billion a year by 2010 for fighting poverty.
- Creation of innovative sources of financing.
- Liberalisation of trade and compliance with the Doha development programme.
- Launch of quick impact initiatives in areas such as education and health.
- Establishment of a World Solidarity Fund.
- Increased efforts to combat corruption and the illegal movement of capital.
- Analysis of initiatives aimed at achieving the long-term sustainability of borrowing levels through: increased financing based on donations; 100% condonation of multilateral and bilateral debt of the heavily indebted countries debt-relief or the restructuring of a considerable proportion of the money owed by low- and medium-income countries not included in the HIPC initiative; creation of a sustainability framework for borrowings in poor countries by the IMF and the World Bank.
- Encouragement of productive capacity in poor countries, with the aim of allowing LDCs access to industrialised markets without customs tariffs or set quotas.
- Access to financial services by the most vulnerable sectors (micro-financing and micro-loans).

The Summit ended with a **minimum agreement**<sup>14</sup> relating mainly to the issues discussed, and as sources within the United Nations itself admitted, this was a disappointing culmination to a series of initiatives that had been intended to make 2005 a turning point in the advancement of the MDGs. Of these initiatives, particular mention should be made of **two reports** which analysed the evolution and future of the MDGs (see Graph 8.2) and which had considerable **impact** on both governments and international organisations.

**The Summit Millennium +5 ended with a minimum agreement which was a disappointing culmination to a series of initiatives that had been intended to make 2005 a turning point in the advancement of the MDGs.**


The first report, prepared by the IMF and the World Bank<sup>15</sup>, makes a **positive assessment** of some of the **advances** reported in industrialised countries in the areas of **development cooperation** (increases in the amount, effectiveness and coordination of ODA) and **trading policy reforms** (greater access to the markets by poor countries), though at the same time it acknowledges that **progress is slower than anticipated**. Analysed by sector, poverty reduction has occurred very unevenly. Thus, while poverty indices grew during the 1990s in Sub-Saharan Africa (more than half the population currently lives

below the extreme poverty threshold), eastern and southern Asia have reached the target set as a result of the sustained growth being experienced in China and India. In China, for example, between 1981 and 2001 the percentage of people living in extreme poverty was reduced by 64% to 17%, meaning that 400 million people have statistically ceased to be classed as poor. Similarly, another country in the region, Vietnam, managed to reduce this figure from 51% to 14% between 1990 and 2002. As regards Health, the report

14. For more information on the Summit, go to <<http://www.un.org/summit2005/>>.

15. *Global Monitoring Report 2005. Millennium Development Goals: From Consensus to Momentum*.

warns that the majority of regions will not achieve most of the Goals, such as reducing infant mortality, women dying in childbirth or HIV/AIDS, and increasing the number of people who have access to basic healthcare.



Source: The authors.

**The second report, prepared by the Millennium Project<sup>17</sup>**, has been described as the most important intellectual contribution to the development issue in the last 20 years and is regarded by the United Nations as a **“road map” for the international community for the coming decade**. Broadly speaking, the report states that **meeting the MDGs by 2015 is entirely feasible** if the international community simply implements the undertakings acquired to date, particularly as regards development financing (the Monterrey Summit). It also points out that this is the **first generation in the history of humankind** that is **in a position to eradicate extreme poverty completely within the framework of the so-called 0.7%** in 1975, for example, meeting the MDGs would have required considerably more than 1% of the GDP of the world’s industrialised countries. Nevertheless, it also points out that if the international community does not immediately implement the necessary measures, the MDGs may not be entirely or partially met, which will lead to a crisis of both legitimacy and credibility for the international system that may be very difficult to overcome.

**Meeting the MDGs by 2015 is entirely feasible if the international community simply implements the undertakings acquired to date.**


16. For further information on the United Nations strategy regarding the Goals, see <<http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/>>, <<http://www.undp.org/mdg/campaign.html>> and <<http://www.millenniumcampaign.org/>>.

17. See *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*, at <<http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/>>.

## Chart 8.6. Some questions about the Millennium Development Goals

### How much will the MDGs cost?

The **estimated cost** of achieving the Millennium Development Goals for all countries is **189 billion dollars**. The majority of this amount (149 billion) will be devoted to low-income countries, with 10 billion allocated to medium-income countries and a further 31 billion used to achieve the MDGs at an international level (application of the Rio Conventions, technical cooperation with international organisations, etc.). This estimate presupposes that the low-income countries will increase their spending on the MDGs to 4% of GDP and that, despite this, they will continue to need external financing of between 10% and 20% of GDP. It is also assumed that **during the course of the coming 10 years several countries will cease to require international aid and in turn become donor countries**. The following table gives a breakdown of the cost of the MDGs, shown in thousands of millions of dollars.




Source: Millennium Project, *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*.

### What role does ODA play in financing the MDGs?

It is estimated that the **ODA required** to achieve the Goals will be **135 billion dollars in 2006 and 195 billion dollars in 2015**. In percentage terms, this is equivalent to 0.44% and 0.54% of the GDP of donor countries, which have undertaken to double the amount of aid provided between 2006 and 2015. However, these estimates do not include the financing of other equally important issues (climate change, reconstruction of countries in armed conflict, etc.) that do not form part of the Millennium Development MDGs framework. Three quarters of the resulting amount will be allocated to the MDGs and one quarter to other more traditional areas of development cooperation.

### And the 0.7%?

In 1970, the United Nations member states stated that by the middle of the decade they would assign 0.7% of their net GDP to ODA. More than three decades on, the average amount given by these countries is 0.23%, and only five countries (Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands and Sweden) have reached the promised percentage. However, at both the International Conference on Development Financing in Monterrey and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, both held in 2002, donor countries renewed their pledge to increase their aid gradually to the 0.7% figure. **Six countries** (Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland and the United Kingdom) have now set out their intention to **reach this figure before 2015**, while **half of the members of the OECD's DAC have also set out a timetable for its achievement**.



### What will be the "benefits" of achieving the MDGs?

Although some of the most important "benefits" of achieving the MDGs are difficult to quantify (such as the improvement of the environment, gender equality and the possibility of linking abstract issues such as sustainable human development with security and peace), the following table (8.3) illustrates the way in which the international community has the opportunity to improve many socio-economic indicators.

**Table 8.3. Millions of people suffering from malnutrition and lack of access to water in 2005 and 2015, whether or not the MDGs are achieved**

	Malnutrition			No acces to fresh water		
	2005	2015	2015 with Goals	2005	2015	2015 with Goals
Sub-Saharan Africa	288	255	155	280	270	230
Latin America & the Caribbean	49	38	38	49	16	16
South Asia	301	285	228	160	0	0
East Asia and the Pacific	162	65	65	388	305	299
Europe and Central Asia	52	61	20	69	73	32
Middle East and North Africa	32	46	14	80	84	61
TOTAL	824	749	520	2,481	2,172	1,827

Source: Millennium Project, *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*.

## b) Foreign debt

In July, the **G8** countries announced the **immediate and total cancellation of the foreign debt** owed by **18 countries** included in the **HIPC** initiative, with help from the IMF, the World Bank and the African Development Bank (ADB). This debt write-down, described by the G8 as **one of the greatest agreements yet seen for the alleviation of poverty in the world**, amounts to some 40 billion dollars and will benefit 14 African countries and four countries in Latin America<sup>18</sup>. The G8 also announced that **a further nine countries could benefit from debt write-downs** with the aforementioned institutions amounting to a further 11 billion dollars. Of the total amount of 55 billion dollars, 44 is owed to the World Bank, 6 to the IMF and 5 billion to the ADB. The G8 organisation, which includes the world's most industrialised countries, also called on some governments to cancel their bilateral debt with the most heavily indebted countries, and indicated that actual cancellation would be subject to the investment of the resources being released in social development, transparent management of the money involved and measures to fight both corruption and poverty.

**Some civilian organisations believe the initiative to be deceptive, conditioned and clearly insufficient.**

## Chart 8.7. The G8 initiative: all that glitters is not gold

In spite of the fact that the announcement of the G8's debt cancellation was welcomed both by the United Nations and by some African and Latin American governments, some **civilian organisations believe the initiative to be deceptive, conditioned and clearly insufficient**.


Firstly, some organisations view the initiative as **insufficient**, both in terms of the number of beneficiaries and in terms of its scope. These organisations estimate that **62 poor countries require 100% of their bilateral and multilateral debt to be cancelled if the Millennium Development Goals are to be achieved** within the planned timetable. They complain that the cancellation of part of the multilateral debt owed by these countries represents **2% of the total debt of poor countries** and 40% of the total debt of the beneficiary countries, and that over the last five years countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have paid 65,5 billion dollars just to service their debt, an amount that exceeds the total amount lent by the G8 countries. It is also worth remembering that African foreign debt alone amounts to around 300 billion dollars. In addition, several NGOs have complained that the initiative does not include multilateral banks such as the Inter-American Development Bank or the Asian Development Bank (which have lent significant amounts to countries such as Bolivia, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guyana, Vietnam and Laos), and they indicate that achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (specifically as regards poverty reduction) will require **further measures** which are even more necessary: **doubling ODA** in the coming years and **opening the markets** of the industrialised countries to products from poor countries.

Secondly, some civilian groups have criticised the **triumphalism** with which the initiative was announced (and received), claiming that the actual implementation of this initiative is subject to certain **IMF and World Bank imperatives** (such as stabilisation

18. Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

of the economy and the opening-up of markets) that will inevitably encourage privatisation, reduced public spending, the removal of tariffs and the freeing-up of the labour market. Thirdly, the G8 initiative has generated **comparative grievances** among highly indebted countries. As a result, the Government of Kenya complained that “those who pay their debts on time are ignored, while those who do not pay receive all the attention”<sup>19</sup>. Similarly, Intermon-Oxfam indicated that countries that have implemented proper policies in this area, such as Vietnam and Sri Lanka, have not been included in the initiative. Also excluded from the debt-cancellation process are countries such as Haiti (the cancellation of whose debt is being called for by a number of NGOs), Nigeria (which accounts for 20% of all Sub-Saharan foreign debt) and other countries with unsustainable levels of foreign debt that are suffering serious situations of tension. In this regard, it should be mentioned that **none of the countries suffering an armed conflict, except Uganda, appear in the G8’s list of beneficiary companies.**

**Graph 8.3. Comparison of the G8 initiative with other amounts**  
(thousands of millions of dollars)



Source: ATTAC, Mercosur and Revista del Sur.

The specific criticisms of the G8 initiative should be seen in the light of some more global reflections that certain organisations have been making for a number of years now. Firstly, it has been pointed out that the **payment and servicing of foreign debt** remains **unsustainable** and has mortgaged the development capacity of many countries. Since the debt crisis came to the fore at the beginning of the 1980s, **levels of both debt and its service have steadily increased**, either as a result of rising interest rates or due to requests for further loans, many used to pay off existing borrowings. The majority of countries have paid far more than the original amount borrowed and are obliged to keep diverting resources in order to meet their payment obligations. It should also be borne in mind that **debt-service payments** have frequently **encouraged the indiscriminate exploitation of natural resources**, as this is one of the few ways that countries can obtain sufficient foreign currency to pay off their debts.

Secondly, it has been shown that **foreign debt** is basically **arranged for financial and political reasons, and not with a view to social development**. In other words, there is no active policy for relieving debt or converting it into investment in social development in coordination with the broader development cooperation system. For example, conditional aid still represents a very high percentage of the total amount of ODA, and the undertaking to allocate 20% of bilateral ODA to basic social sectors is still far from being met. Furthermore, the **HIPC initiative** for debt-reduction, led by the IMF and the World Bank since 1996, **has not had the desired impact**, according to reports from these organisations themselves. Only **slight progress** has so far been seen and a number of difficulties have been reported in the countries in question. For example, the sharp fall in the price of certain products and reduced demand for raw materials has affected exports in poor countries and frustrated forecasts regarding their capacity to pay.

### c) Climate change

The United Nations Conference on climate change was brought to a close on 9 December in **Montreal** (Canada). The event, attended by thousands of delegates from 189 different countries, was hosted jointly by the United Nations and the Canadian Government, and it combined the 11<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties to the Framework Agreement on Climate Change (approved in 1992) and the First Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, which finally came into force in February 2005. This made it possible for certain countries that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, like the USA and Australia, to participate in the Montreal Conference as signatories to the Framework Agreement.

In spite of the **reluctance** expressed by countries like **Russia**, the **USA** and **Australia**, participants at the Summit succeeded in adopting more than 40 decisions, including the following:

- a) Establishment of a task force that will begin work in May 2006 to discuss the **new undertakings to reduce polluting emissions for the second period of the Kyoto Protocol (2013-2017)**.
- b) **Adoption of a five-year Plan of Action** for poor countries to tackle the **impacts of climate change**.
- c) Strengthening, simplifying and financing the so-called "**Clean Development Mechanism**" during 2006-2007 (with an allocation of more than 13 million dollars).
- d) Encouragement of **technology transfers to poor countries**.

#### Chart 8.8. Beyond Kyoto

Although the Summit succeeded in establishing the foundations for what has become known as the **post-Kyoto regime**, a number of environmental organisations have stressed the need to see the **fight to combat global warming** as a **dynamic process**, with the design of a "Kyoto 3" (going beyond 2017). In this connection, the Climate Action Network (which includes organisations like Greenpeace) called on governments **to ensure that global temperatures do not exceed pre-industrial levels by more than 2°C**. This would mean that industrialised countries would have to reduce their polluting emissions by 30% by 2020 and by 70-80% by 2050, which could mean an overall reduction of global polluting emissions by 50% by the middle of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

In spite of the fact that the **Summit was generally assessed by civilian organisations as positive**, serious **doubts** remain as to the **level of acceptance by the USA and Australia** of the eventual undertakings to be adopted following subsequent negotiations (these countries forced the inclusion of a clause under which the results of negotiations to begin in May 2006 would not be binding). There are also similar doubts regarding **China and India**. Both countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol but have not as yet been obliged to reduce their polluting emissions.

### d) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

This international instrument, the first sponsored by the WHO, came into force at the end of February after its contents had been ratified by 57 countries. It is estimated that **smoking currently kills almost 5 million people every year (the second highest cause of death)**, at an annual cost of around 200 billion dollars in health treatment and lost productivity. Furthermore, if current trends continue, smoking will cause the premature deaths of around 10 million people each year to 2020. This means that of the 1,3 billion people who currently smoke, 650 million may die prematurely before that date.


The Convention obliges ratifying countries to incorporate its contents in their domestic legislation within a maximum period of three years. Among the many **issues** that the Convention attempts to regulate are tobacco **advertising and promotion**, the **protection** of the non-smoking population, **help** for certain countries to replace the cultivation, manufacture and sale of tobacco with other business activities, and the increase of programmes to deal with the **diagnosis, counselling, prevention and treatment of dependency**, including access to the appropriate drugs. Increasing tobacco prices and the taxes applied is another of the measures suggested to control tobacco consumption. A World Bank study has shown that increasing the price of cigarettes by 10% reduces consumption by 4%. However, the impact of the measures contained in the Convention will not be felt all over the world as some **densely populated**

countries have not ratified it (USA, China and Brazil), while others (Russia and Indonesia) have not even signed it.

### e) The information society

Between 16 and 18 November, Tunis hosted the second phase of the World Summit on the Information Society, attended by more than 19,000 representatives from governments, businesses, international organisations and NGOs. The main targets of this event, which closed with the adoption of the Tunis Commitment and an Agenda for the Information Society, were **governance of the Internet and the so-called digital gap**, a concept that has become popularised in recent years and refers to the vast difference in access to so-called ICTs (Information and Communications Technologies) between industrialised countries and poor countries. Working on the general basis that access to information and knowledge is a necessary requirement for a country's development, a number of initiatives have been introduced in recent years to promote the implementation of ICTs in poor countries and use them to support pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals. Particularly notable events in this connection include the creation of the Global Digital Solidarity Fund, support for the reduction of connection tariffs for poor countries, the promotion of public policy in this area and the financing of technological infrastructure and content creation.

**Graph 8.4. Percentage of the population with Internet access by region**



Source: International Telecommunication Union

However, the item that received most attention at the Summit was governance of the Internet, which had already led to the establishment of a working group during the Geneva phase. Perhaps the most important development seen in Tunis in his regard was the **creation of an Internet Governance Forum**, a space for dialogue (though not a decision-making forum) in which governments, civilian groups and the private sector can participate equally, identifying emerging trends and facilitating dialogue between the competent bodies. The decision to create this Forum was a compromise between the position taken by the USA (which supervises the body<sup>20</sup> charged with managing Internet domains) and the **desire expressed by some southern countries to make governance of the Internet more multilateral**.

In spite of the fact that a number of civilian organisations participating in the Summit and its associated events acknowledged that considerable progress had been made, and that this had been one of the United Nations summits at which they had enjoyed the greatest participation, they also indicated that some of the **undertakings** adopted merely **confirmed the items approved at the first phase in Geneva**. They also felt that **insufficient progress** has been made in terms of **gender** (empowerment of women and gender cross-referencing in the implementation of programmes and policies), **human rights** (privacy, non-dis-


crimination and labour rights), **access to knowledge** (the intellectual property regulations and the importance of the public domain and “open content”) and the **freedom of expression and media diversity** (absence of popular and community media).

#### f) WTO Summit

A number of NGOs and even some governments expressed their profound **disappointment** that the discussions held by the 149 WTO member states in Hong Kong had ended in **minimal agreement** (when not breaking down completely) on the majority of issues discussed. Some critical commentators also pointed out that while substantial advances had been made in respect of the liberalisation of services in poor countries, the main demands of these countries still remained to be discussed. Some organisations even believed that the governments of India and Brazil had placed their own domestic interests above the combined requirements of the G20, the group of southern nations that they lead and to some extent represent.

The **main agreements** reached at the Summit were: a) the gradual **elimination** of **subsidies** for **agricultural exports by 2013**; b) an undertaking to **reduce** the highest **customs tariffs** for **industrial goods**, though the periods and measures involved have yet to be agreed; c) **access to markets** (without quotas or tariffs) for products from **LDCs**; d) an undertaking to continue negotiating the **elimination** of other forms of trade and price distortion (such as food aid); e) the **elimination** of **subsidies** for the **export** of **cotton** by 2006; f) an undertaking to **liberalise services** by poor countries; and g) additional resources to improve the production and trading capacity of poor countries.

However, some development organisations complained that the agreement put forward as the Summit's main achievement (i.e. the elimination of subsidies for agricultural exports) only represents a tiny part of the aid given to this sector. They also warned that the **progress achieved in relation to agriculture will unquestionably be eclipsed by the enormous impact** that the **agreement on industrial goods and services** will have on the economies of the industrialised nations.



## 9. Gender issues in peace-building

This section contains an analysis of the different initiatives being pursued by the United Nations and various international organisations and movements in relation to peace-building as seen from a **gender perspective**<sup>1</sup>. Viewing events from this perspective provides a picture of the different levels of impact that armed conflicts have on both women and men, the different ways and degrees in which women and men participate in peace-building and the real contribution offered by women in these processes. The section is divided into three main sub-sections: the first contains a review of the overall situation as regards gender inequalities, based on an analysis of the different indicators, the second contains an analysis of gender issues as seen in relation to the impact of armed conflicts, while the third looks at different initiatives in peace-building as seen from a gender perspective. A map is also attached showing the countries that display serious gender inequalities.

### 9.1. Gender inequalities

Indicator number 30 is the **Gender-related Development Index** (GDI), which reflects the differences between men and women in three basic aspects of human development: life expectancy, income per capita and literacy and numeracy. The importance of this indicator lies in the fact that it is not simply limited to a breakdown of the relevant information by gender but also involves assessing the information on the basis of the inequalities that are thus established between men and women, making it an indicator that is gender-sensitive<sup>2</sup>. Although the GDI does not deal with the many facets of gender equality, it does however indicate that the **situation for women is particularly serious in 32 countries**, of which 30 are in Africa. It should be stressed that these include six situations of armed conflict and nine of post-war rehabilitation. Not all countries in a situation of armed conflict show serious gender inequalities, though a significant number do, which demonstrates how the impact of these situations of armed violence represents an obstacle (if not a reverse) to the improvement of living conditions and development for women. The disappearance of a number of countries from this list in comparison with the previous year (in which 35 countries were listed) is not only due to improvements in the situation experienced by women in some of these countries but also results from an absence of up-to-date information for places like Haiti and the Central African Republic. Mention should also be made of the inclusion of countries like Afghanistan, whose absence until this year, due to a lack of systematic data, was remedied by the preparation by the UNDP of a report on human development in the country.

**Table 9.1. Countries with serious gender inequalities**

Afghanistan	Cameroon	Ethiopia	Madagascar	Niger	Sudan	Zambia
Angola	Chad	Gambia	Malawi	Nigeria	Swaziland	Zimbabwe
Benin	Congo, DR	Guinea-Bissau	Mali	Rwanda	Tanzania	
Burkina Faso	Côte d'Ivoire	Kenya	Mauritania	Senegal	Togo	
Burundi	Eritrea	Lesotho	Mozambique	Sierra Leone	Yemen	

1. The gender perspective, according to N. Vázquez, a Mexican feminist and researcher into the impact of war on women, is a *conceptual operational instrument that makes it possible to see what is really happening from a new perspective which transcends the biological explanation of what is different between the sexes, concentrating on the identification of cultural, historical and social factors, among other things, that differentiate men from women and generate conditions and positions of inequality between them, thus allowing us to intervene effectively in order to change these unequal positions*. The definition offered by the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women indicates that *gender refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with the fact of being a man or a woman, and the relationships between men and women, boys and girls, as well as the relationships among women and relationships among men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and learned during the socialisation process. They are specific to both context and time and can change. Gender determines what is expected, permitted and appreciated in both women and men in a given context [...]*.

2. While the statistics broken down by gender provide factual information on the situation faced by women, a gender-sensitive indicator offers direct evidence of the status of women in relation to a particular standard or reference group, in this case, men. Schmeidl, S. and Piza-Lopez, E., *Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action*, International Alert at <<http://www.international-alert.org/women/publications/EWGEN.PDF>>.

Armed conflicts have a clear impact on the aspects covered by the GDI, as demonstrated by the low levels of schooling for girls and young women in the areas affected by these conflicts, and the enormous difficulties encountered in gaining access to health services, as well as the lack of health services aimed specifically at women, such as those relating to reproductive health.

## 9.2. Gender and the impact of armed conflicts

This section contains an analysis of certain issues that highlight the way in which the impact of armed conflicts and violence affects men and women in different ways.

### a) Sexual violence as a weapon of war

As widely reported in recent years, sexual violence continues to be used increasingly as a weapon of war in the majority of today's armed conflicts, and is gradually becoming the most commonly used of all non-conventional weapons and strategies. Despite some formal advances in terms of follow-up and punishment, violence against women during armed conflicts, particularly sexual violence, remained one of the crimes that enjoyed the highest level of impunity<sup>3</sup>. Some figures illustrating the range of this type of violence in current situations of armed conflict have been provided by UNIFEM, which has said that half a million women were raped during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994<sup>4</sup>.

This issue has gradually taken on more importance in the public arena, and a number of humanitarian organisations have signalled the fight to combat this type of violence as one of their main priorities. One of these initiatives has been led by UNIFEM and UNFPA, which organised a conference towards the end of the year that was attended by experts from around the world in the prevention and treatment of sexual violence. In preparation for the conference, **a number of directives were launched, aimed at preventing and responding to sexual violence in emergency situations**, especially in places like refugee camps<sup>5</sup>. Some of the proposals contained in this document include measures such as ensuring that women distribute food aid in emergency situations to minimise the risk of abuse and sexual exploitation, working with communities of displaced people to ensure that daily tasks such as the collection of firewood or fuel or the use of latrines does not leave women vulnerable to attack, and providing medical services and psychological support for women who have been victims of sexual violence.

The preparation of these directives highlights **the importance that this issue is acquiring on the agenda of the different humanitarian organisations**. As part of the Consolidated Appeals process for 2006, UNFPA called on donors to increase their donations in order to tackle the needs of women in situations of armed conflict, when gender-based violence and vulnerability to sexual violence increases and reproductive health services are simultaneously vastly reduced, thus increasing the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS. UNHCR, marking the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, also underlined the risk of violence faced by women who are displaced or living as refugees, since enforced displacement breaks up the support networks that these women rely on in their own communities. The head of UNHCR, A. Guterres, reiterated his commitment to fight this violence against women and young female refugees, returnees and the internally displaced, signalling it as one of the main priorities of his mandate.

3. The Rome Statute, which led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court, regards rape as a war crime and a crime against humanity, and it classifies various acts of sexual violence as torture, inhuman treatment and even genocide. For more information see Barometer 9.

4. UNIFEM, *Not a minute more. Facts & Figures: Crimes Against Women in War and Armed Conflict*.

5. IASC Taskforce on Gender in Humanitarian Assistance, *Guidelines for Gender-based Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Settings Focusing on Prevention of and Response to Sexual Violence in Emergencies* <<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/iasc-gen-30sep.pdf>>.

## b) Femicide and violence against women

In recent years, the issue of femicide, particularly in a number of cities on the American continent, has been taking on greater public importance in a context in which violence against women has now become part of the public debate in the midst of great social alarm over the huge frequency of this kind of violence in all parts of society. It should be explained that this phenomenon, which refers to the murder of women purely because they are women, has not been sufficiently studied in itself, nor is it as yet provided for on the statute books, as a consensual approach that can be unanimously accepted by the various sectors working on or affected by this issue has yet to be agreed. However, we will here give some of the definitions that theorists and scholars of this issue have put forward.

It was unquestionably the case of **Ciudad Juarez** (Mexico) that set the alarm bells ringing about this type of crime against women, but femicide violence is also taking place in countries like **Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Peru**, among others. Furthermore, as the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences pointed out in the report she published after visiting Guatemala<sup>6</sup>, **the pattern followed by these murders displays certain similarities in all these countries**. The victims are mostly young, working women with limited resources but enough to gain a certain economic independence. The murder of women represents a *continuum* in the violence against women that is highly widespread and customary in these societies, where it also enjoys almost complete impunity, as the majority of these crimes are not even investigated, never mind punished. The fact that the Rapporteur has visited three of these countries in the last two years, Guatemala, El Salvador and Mexico, demonstrates the seriousness of this issue of violence against women.

This situation gives rise to a highly important issue: the way that **violence against women is seen as normal in a number of societies**, and the fact that this has led to a crescendo of violence that has culminated in 370 women being murdered between 1993 and 2003 in Ciudad Juarez. In Guatemala the figures were 978 women murdered between 2001 and 2003 and a further 489 by the end of 2004. The fact that the numbers in the latter country in one year are similar to the total for an entire decade in Mexico is probably not unrelated to the fact that Guatemala was caught up in an armed conflict which, once over, left as its legacy a culture of violence that is deeply rooted in society and that manifests itself in the murder of women. Upsurges in violence against women have been seen in many countries that are immersed in post-war rehabilitation processes, as demonstrated for example in the case of South Africa, where the end of Apartheid brought a huge increase in this type of violence. Given the figures quoted above, the case of Guatemala would seem to confirm this finding. Furthermore, the phenomenon of femicides should also be seen in the context of the new urban violence that is becoming widespread in a number of large cities and leading, in certain cases, to death rates that are higher than those recorded in some armed conflicts.

**Femicides should also be seen in the context of the new urban violence and leading, in certain cases, to death rates that are higher than those recorded in some armed conflicts.**

6. <<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/108/17/PDF/G0510817.pdf?OpenElement>>.


## Chart 9.1. What are femicides?

This term, coined in feminist theoretical writings<sup>7</sup>, is intended to **represent the murder of women when it is committed purely because they are women**. Although the concept of **femicide** is not recognised under any legal framework, the term has been widely accepted and used both by theoretical feminists and by women's and victims' organisations, and can now also be heard in some political circles. The first theories on femicide refer to it as *the murder of women because they are women, frequently with the approval if not the support of the state or religious institutions, which thus becomes a way of controlling women as a sexual class, making it central to the maintenance of the patriarchal status quo [...]. Femicide is wrapped in the mythology of the guilt of the woman. It is the behaviour of the woman that is examined [...]*.<sup>8</sup> Other definitions of the term *femicide* tackle issues such as the fact that, *with femicide, women are harmed in time and in space by people known and unknown, by violent people, individual and group rapists and murderers, both occasional and professional, leading to a cruel death for some victims. Femicide arises from a social and ideological atmosphere of machismo and misogyny, "normalised" violence against women and a lack of legal and political governance, leading to insecure conditions of coexistence for women that place their lives at risk and favour all kinds of crime [...]*.<sup>9</sup> Finally, the governments of Spain, Guatemala and Mexico, which took part in the International Inter-Parliamentary Dialogue on Femicide Violence, indicated that this kind of violence is *an extreme form of gender violence against women that violates the human rights of women, particularly the right to life, security and access to justice, restricting development and peace in society*.<sup>10</sup>

As many studies of this issue indicate<sup>11</sup>, **violence and the murder of women combine to repress attempts by women to subvert the patriarchal order of things** by achieving financial independence (women working in assembly plants in Mexico) or by taking part in political and social life (women activists in Guatemala).

Particular mention should also be made of the first WHO report on violence against women, entitled "WHO Multi-Country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women"<sup>12</sup>, in which an analysis of the impact of violence against women in 10 countries led to the conclusion that **the perception of the home as a safe place for women should be challenged**, as this is **the place** (the intimate space for relationships as a couple) **in which they are at the most risk of experiencing violence**.

Graph 9.1. Prevalence, by country, of physical and sexual violence inflicted by a partner during a woman's lifetime (percentatge)



Source: The authors from the WHO Multi-Country Study on Women's Health and Domestic Violence against Women, 2005.

7. In their work *Femicide. The politics of Women Killing*, Twayne Publishers, New York 1992, Diana Russell and Jill Radford offered a summarised definition of this term.

8. Ibid.

9. Legarde and de los Ríos, M., *¿Qué es feminicidio?* <<http://www.isis.cl/Feminicidio/Juarez/pag/queesfem.htm>>.

10. Conclusions of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Inter-Parliamentary Dialogue on femicide violence.

11. See the works cited above.

12. <[http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who\\_multicountry\\_study/summary\\_report/en/index.html](http://www.who.int/gender/violence/who_multicountry_study/summary_report/en/index.html)>.

The study points out that in the countries examined (Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia, Japan, Namibia, Peru, Samoa, Serbia and Montenegro, Thailand and Tanzania), violence against women is widespread. It is worth recalling here the words of the Executive director of UNIFEM, N. Heyzer, on the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, who said that one in every four women in the world would be raped, struck or suffer abuse of some kind during the course of their lives.

These figures, added to those relating to femicide, give an idea of the magnitude and seriousness of the phenomenon of violence against women, demonstrating the extent of the gender inequalities that still persist today.

### 9.3. Peace-building from a gender perspective

This section contains an analysis of some of the more important initiatives aimed at incorporating the gender perspective in various areas of peace-building.

#### a) Peace and gender on the international agenda during 2005

2005 was marked by a multiplicity of issues on the international agenda, particularly within the United Nations, relating to the subject of peace-building and the gender dimension. The first half of the year was marked by the Beijing + 10 process, designed to review and assess the advances made on the tenth anniversary of the 4<sup>th</sup> World Conference of Women<sup>13</sup>. Another of the most important events was the celebration in October of the fifth anniversary of the UN Security Council's approval of resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. In addition, the relationship between the gender perspective and peace-building was one of the issues discussed during the Millennium + 5 Summit in September. It can therefore be said that **the issue of peace-building from a gender perspective was present on the agenda of the international community on repeated occasions during the course of the year**. We might therefore ask whether the fact that it was present on the agenda has had any specific effect or resulted in changes in the decisions taken and policies implemented in this regard.

#### Chart 9.2. Beijing+10: a decade of advances or setbacks?

The Beijing + 10 process was aimed at assessing the implementation, 10 years after their approval, of the instruments that have guided international policies aimed at ending gender discrimination during the last decade: **the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action and the final document of the twenty-third special session of the General Assembly**<sup>14</sup>. The central conclusion reached as a result of this process was the confirmation of the **huge gap between the policies and decisions adopted and their actual application in practice**. Although there have been many formal advances, the effective implementation of the undertakings made has been very slow, partly due to their weakness or a complete absence of any form of accountability. It is also necessary to point out that **the proposals made by individual governments**, with the exception of those relating to the new challenges that have emerged over the last decade, **refer to undertakings that should have been fully met during the last ten years, and these do not indicate any qualitative advance as regards the pursuit of these undertakings**.

Another of the key issues of the Beijing + 10 process has been the request from women's movements and organisations for guarantees to ensure that the **undertakings made in Beijing in 1995 will be maintained in their entirety**, particularly those relating to sexual and reproductive rights. A unanimous declaration was finally achieved that reiterated the undertakings made in the Beijing Platform for Action in their entirety, without any exceptions. A sticking point had arisen as a result of demands from the USA for modifications that would place restrictions on the issue of sexual rights, particularly the right to abortion. Such modifications would have represented a considerable reverse and would in practice have meant that the issue of advances in gender equality had reached the highest point.

Finally, of the many issues tackled during this period of sessions, one that was particularly important involved **women in armed conflicts**. It should be said that some progress has been recorded, particularly as regards regulatory frameworks, through the adoption in 2000 of Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. Another notable advance has been the creation of a body

13. For more information on the specific contents of this process, see Barometer 7.

14. This period of sessions was entitled "Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century".

of case law on sexual violence during armed conflicts by the International Court for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court for Rwanda. In addition, thanks to the work done by women for peace organisations, the contribution of women in peace-building and conflict-prevention over the last ten years has achieved much wider international recognition. However, these advances have not been reflected in terms of improvements in the specific living conditions of women affected by armed conflicts, or as regards their protection from human rights violations such as sexual violence.

As far as the 2005 World Summit was concerned, a number of voices were heard to criticise the secondary role played by gender issues. Criticisms mainly revolved around two issues. Firstly, the fact that **gender mainstreaming<sup>15</sup> was left out when the report and agenda for the summit were prepared**. In other words, the issue of gender was dealt with specifically within individual areas but was not included as a general concept across the whole range of items to be debated. Furthermore, the measures proposed were circumstantial in nature and exclusively directed towards certain improvements in quality of life for women, rather than being ultimately aimed at transforming gender relations in an overall social, economic and cultural context.

### Chart 9.3. The Peacebuilding Commission

During the 2005 World Summit held in September, UN member states responded to a proposal from the UN Secretary General and agreed to the creation of a body known as the **Peacebuilding Commission**, which would commence operations on 31 December 2005 and would act as an inter-governmental advisory body charged with developing a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to peace-building and reconciliation in post-war contexts. After this agreement was reached, a number of issues were debated and the first proposals were made regarding **how the gender perspective and the experiences and knowledges of women could be incorporated in this body<sup>16</sup>**. By way of example, the Foreign Ministers of 14 countries and the EU's Commissioner for Foreign relations proposed the following to the UN Secretary General and the President of the General Assembly: the Commission should respect the **principles of representational equality** between men and women, calling on members states, the United Nations system and regional organisations to appoint women as representatives; it should ensure **precise knowledge of the roles, experiences and needs of women in post-war contexts**; and finally, the Peace-building Fund should take these issues into account when designing and implementing its activities. Other proposals that have arisen from different sectors of the United Nations are the creation of a full-time **Gender Advisor to facilitate the inclusion of this perspective** in the Commission's work.

The starting point for all these proposals was the indication that the Beijing Platform for Action and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women should serve as a framework. As regards the main challenges involved in peace-building processes, several issues have been mentioned, such as guaranteeing women's safety in their communities, offering them a political voice and access to and control over resources, and including them at all decision-making levels in peace processes in order to ensure that their views are taken into account<sup>17</sup>.

Elsewhere, in October the UN Secretary General presented an **action plan** for the implementation of Resolution 1325 throughout the United Nations system. His announcement coincided with the fifth anniversary of this Resolution and arose from a consultation process carried out by the Inter-institutional Task Force on Women, Peace and Security with various NGOs and individual states, which identified 12 areas of action.

15. Gender Mainstreaming, according to the United Nations, is the process of evaluating the implications for both men and women of a particular planned action, including legislation, policies and programmes, at all levels. It is a strategy designed to ensure that the concerns of both men and women form an integral part of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and social spheres, so that men and women can benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. This is one of the approaches aimed at achieving eventual gender equality.

16. <[http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/peacebuilding\\_commission.html](http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ianwge/taskforces/wps/peacebuilding_commission.html)>.

17. Puechguirbal, N., Third Committee Interactive Dialogue "Women in the peace building process". <<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/panel/peace/Puechguirbal%20text.pdf>>.

**Table 9.2. Action Plan for the implementation of Resolution 1325**

Areas of action	Some objectives
Conflict prevention and early warning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Achieve complete participation by women in all conflict-prevention work and the adoption of decisions.</li> <li>• Implement early warning mechanisms that take account of gender issues.</li> </ul>
Establishing and consolidating peace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Formulate strategies to ensure complete participation by women in peace processes (negotiation and application of peace agreements).</li> <li>• Adopt measures to ensure that Security Council missions take account of the gender dimension.</li> <li>• Support peace initiatives led by women.</li> </ul>
Peace-keeping operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Create instruments to include the gender perspective in peace-keeping operations and their mandates.</li> <li>• Include a gender perspective in operations on the ground, with provision of the necessary resources.</li> <li>• Train operational personnel in gender issues.</li> </ul>
Humanitarian response	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encourage participation by women refugees and IDPs and women's organisations in humanitarian assistance programmes.</li> <li>• Train humanitarian personnel in gender issues.</li> </ul>
Post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tackle the needs and problems encountered by women in relation to the lack of land, property rights and access to financial resources.</li> <li>• Promote participation by women in the creation of frameworks for reconstruction and governance, such as constitutional, judicial, legislative and security reforms.</li> </ul>
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inclusion of the gender perspective in DDR programmes so that they take account of the special needs of women and young girls.</li> </ul>
Prevention of gender violence in armed conflicts and response to victims	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Investigate this kind of violence and prepare reports.</li> <li>• Try those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.</li> <li>• Implement support programmes for victims.</li> </ul>
Prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strict application of codes of conduct and disciplinary procedures.</li> </ul>
Gender balance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intensify measures to identify suitable candidates for high office and positions with decision-making powers.</li> </ul>
Coordination and collaboration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen specialist gender-related groups in countries emerging from armed conflict</li> <li>• Appoint advisers for gender issues.</li> </ul>
Supervision and preparation of reports	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Systematic inclusion of the gender perspective in all reports presented to the Security Council.</li> </ul>
Financial resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased financial support for the application of Resolution 1325 with the allocation of resources from the ordinary budget and extra-budgetary contributions.</li> </ul>

Source: Secretary General's Report on Women, Peace and Security, S/2005/636

This action plan was accompanied by a distribution of duties among the different United Nations bodies, which have taken on a series of specific tasks to be performed as part of their own individual mandates, along with a timetable for their completion. This action plan is to be implemented between 2005 and 2007.

How have all these processes (Beijing+10, the Millennium Summit and the anniversary of Resolution 1325) been viewed? It should firstly be pointed out that a general assessment gives some uneven results. On the positive side, there have been numerous **advances** on a formal level, which have meant that the issue has gained a certain importance on the international agenda and become a subject for debate in international forums. The gender dimension in peace work is an issue that features in United Nations reports, while calls for the gender dimension to be included in all aspects of peace work have greatly increased in number. Furthermore, gender-related language is also now being heard in the various discourses of the United Nations. **There is, therefore, a certain consensus regarding the idea that at a formal and even at a legislative level, notable progress has been made, and this formal progress has helped to give the issue greater prominence.**

However, when it comes to assessing practical and specific **results**, the effect is not so positive, and the **actual successes achieved are few**. It should be pointed out that the fact that a call has been made this

year for the complete maintenance of the agreements reached in the Beijing Platform for Action demonstrates that **the undertakings made ten years ago have not only not been adhered to, they have in fact been called into question 10 years on** by some of the governments responsible for their implementation. Some of the greatest difficulties refer to the so-called glass ceiling, i.e. the obstacles that still remain for women to accede to certain positions of responsibility or participate in certain procedures such as peace processes<sup>18</sup>. Furthermore, there is still no guaranteed protection for women against violence, particularly sexual violence used as a weapon of war. Elsewhere, in spite of the growing formal recognition of the need for DDR processes to be designed and implemented with an in-built gender perspective and a sensitivity to the specific needs of women combatants, in order to ensure that these processes do not merely create further exclusion and discrimination, this has not been backed up by specifically defined measures. One area in which a certain amount of progress can be seen is in peace-keeping operations. Firstly, the concept of a Gender Adviser has gradually been introduced in a number of the missions currently in place, and secondly, an internal process has begun to end the abuses committed by the personnel employed in these missions<sup>19</sup>.

**Although it is true that the uneven impact of armed conflicts on men and women has received more attention, the same cannot be said for peace-building initiatives led by women.**

Finally, we should qualify our original statement that issues relating to the gender dimension in peace-building have become more prominent. Although it is true that the **uneven impact of armed conflicts on men and women has received more attention**, both in the

media and among prominent organisations, particularly the different UN agencies and a number of NGOs, **the same cannot be said for peace-building initiatives led by women**. These initiatives **remain unrecognised** in the majority of cases, meaning that they lack both support and resources, which in turn means that the proposals arising from these quarters do not reach the ears of the decision-makers.

## **b) The gender perspective in peace processes**

The vast majority of peace processes, particularly the phases in which the opposing factions are negotiating the end to a particular armed conflict, are notable for their exclusion of any contribution from women. In a very few of the peace negotiations that are currently underway or that have been seen in recent years, women have taken part either as members of the delegations entrusted with reaching agreement or in their own right in processes running parallel to the main negotiations. Some authors even talk about the masculinisation of peace processes, since the concept of a peace process generally refers to the time at which military personnel and the men holding positions of power decide to initiate a joint process to bring an end to violence, in contrast to the numerous attempts to transform a conflict, which are generally led by civilian groups and take place during the course of the conflict itself. In addition, such processes usually take a masculinised view of conflicts, which are seen solely as disputes over access to power or control over territory<sup>20</sup>.

**In a very few of the peace negotiations that are currently underway women have taken part either as members of the delegations entrusted with reaching agreement or in their own right in processes running parallel to the main negotiations.**

2005 was no exception in this regard, and participation by women remained anecdotal<sup>21</sup>. The exception is perhaps Darfur, where the opening of peace negotiations to bring an end to the armed conflict afflicting

18. The difficulties encountered by women in peace processes are analysed in more depth in the section headed *The gender perspective in peace processes* in this same chapter.

19. For more information on this issue and the specific measures adopted during 2005, along with observations made within the United Nations itself, see issues 7, 8 and 9 of Barometer.

20. Bell, C., "Women Address the Problems of Peace Agreements", in *Peace Work. Women, Armed Conflict and Negotiation*, 2004, ICES.

21. For specific examples of his point, see Barometer 9, which contains an analysis of the processes leading to the signing of peace agreements in Sudan and the Aceh region in Indonesia. Women were not involved in any of the negotiating processes that led to the signing of the various agreements involved.

this region of Sudan at the end of the year was accompanied by news of the participation of some women in informal negotiations on security issues.

What are the **main obstacles that would explain this exclusion and this masculinisation of peace processes**? Any response to this question must begin with the patriarchal framework in which these processes develop, since this remains the model on which the majority of societies are based. However, going beyond this general background picture, what specific aspects continue to impede participation by women?

Among the factors normally cited in this regard, particular mention should firstly be made of the fact that **access by women to positions in which they can take decisions remains highly restricted**. This was underlined by the UN Secretary General in his report on the implementation of the undertakings made in the Beijing Platform for Action, prepared for the Platform's review on the tenth anniversary of its approval. Given that the majority of people who participate in peace negotiations come from areas in which they have the capacity to exercise power and take decisions, one direct consequence is the exclusion of women.

It is important to add here that this exclusion doesn't only refer to the parties directly involved in the conflict but also to the third element in the triangle, the people and institutions that act as mediators and facilitators in these processes. It is also appropriate to talk about the masculinisation of these duties. This was confirmed in a recent study published by the *Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue*<sup>22</sup>, which examined the people acting as Track One mediators, or official diplomatic backing, and the characteristics required by these people, with the aim of discovering why such posts are so rarely occupied by women. The conclusion reached by the study was that rather than actual obstacles<sup>23</sup>, **what really prevented equal participation by men and women in the performance of these duties was a lack of political will** and weak arguments such as the view from some mediators that the involvement of women in such positions would disproportionately divert the agenda for negotiation towards so-called "women's issues". The study also pointed to elements such as the difficulty that women encounter in gaining access to parallel spaces in which informal relations are established (an extremely important part of peace processes), along with the fact that if a process is led by a women this will exacerbate the usual reluctance of armed parties to accept external intervention.

Finally, mention should be made of one more aspect, which is the reluctance among the heads of some armed groups (as well as some governments) to contemplate participation by women or accept that it is important or appropriate to include certain issues on the negotiating agenda. Issues relating to the emancipation of women have been seen as secondary among many armed groups and are always displaced by the pursuit of other objectives such as national liberation. These subjects are rarely perceived as aspects that could be dealt with alongside the main issues.

The challenge, therefore, lies in finding a way of convincing all parties of the importance of taking advantage of this key moment to develop transformational spaces that will lead to more equitable structures and relationships. The exclusion of such processes generally leads to subsequent exclusion from both the decision-making spaces and the institutions which result from the peace agreements reached, thus consolidating sexism and discrimination in society. The role that the international community could play here is unquestionably of huge importance and could persuade third parties to include this issue on the agenda and make all those involved see the necessity of working from this inclusive perspective.

22. Potter, A., *We the women. Why conflict mediation is not just a job for men*. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2005

23. The study points out that in spite of the difficulties faced by many women in acceding to the positions of responsibility that are typically occupied by men as mediators in a particular conflict, those who do succeed in reaching such positions do so because of their high level of training and technical skills. In addition, arguments such as the difficulty of reconciling family life with this sort of duty would also not be valid in this case, since the average age of these people places them at a time of life (between 55 and 75) when they no longer have to look after small children.

## Chart 9.4. Peace negotiations in Sri Lanka

The peace negotiations aimed at bringing an end to the armed conflict that has afflicted the north and east of the country since 1983 began in 2002, with facilitation from Norway, after the Government and the LTTE armed opposition group signed a cease-fire agreement in February of the same year. In December, during the third round of negotiations, it was agreed that a **sub-committee would be created that would allow women to participate**. Until that moment, the only woman who had been involved was A. Balasingham, wife of A. Balasingham, leader of the LTTE's negotiating team.

What led to the creation of this sub-committee, which was later dubbed the gender sub-committee by the women who served on it? A combination of factors explains how this decision was reached. Firstly, the existence of **UN Security Council Resolution 1325**, which calls for participation by women in equal conditions at all levels and in all phases of a peace process. The existence of this instrument, which makes states themselves responsible for facilitating this type of participation, combined with the existence of a **very active women's movement** which was pressing for this subject to be included on the negotiating agenda, led to an awareness of the issue within the governments of both Sri Lanka and **Norway, persuading them to create this space**. Norway also appointed a female facilitator to further strengthen this sub-committee, which included representatives from both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government.

Given its privileged position, **what role should the international community play** in order to ensure that peace processes don't just mirror the discrimination and exclusion seen elsewhere in society? Resolution 1325 sets out a clear framework in this regard, pointing to the responsibilities that must be assumed not only by governments but also by the UN Secretary General and, in general, all those people who are in some way involved in these negotiating processes.

## Chart 9.5. What does Resolution 1325 say about peace negotiations?

[...]

Recognising that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full **participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security**,

[...]

Encourages the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an **increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes**;

[...]

Calls on **all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements**, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia:

- a) The special needs** of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;
- b) Measures that support local women's peace initiatives** and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements;
- c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls**, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary.

Source: UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security

In addition, recognising the crucial role played by the international community, UNIFEM has prepared a series of recommendations to ensure effective participation by women in peace processes<sup>24</sup>. These recommendations are aimed at guiding the actions of the international community to incorporate the gender perspective in the peace processes in which it is involved in one way or another, right from the very beginning of the process. Firstly, UNIFEM sets out a series of key factors necessary both to guarantee the involvement of women and include the gender perspective: the creation of a women's social base with an agenda sensitive to gender issues and their inclusion in peace negotiations (particularly at the start of the process); the establishment of structures that will allow women to contribute and offer strategic support (throughout the negotiating process); including women's priorities in any peace agreement and ensuring that any agreement implemented is sensitive to gender (in order to guarantee that women will benefit from the post-war process).

24. UNIFEM, *Securing the peace. Guiding the International Community towards Women's effective participation throughout Peace Processes*. October 2005 <[http://www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/peaceprocess/Securing\\_the\\_Peace.pdf](http://www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/peaceprocess/Securing_the_Peace.pdf)>.

Thus, it is more likely that the opinions of women will be borne in mind if women have a common agenda that brings the different women's groups together and supersedes any social, political or geographical differences, while the international community can play a key role by facilitating the construction of a network among women who have been affected by a particular armed conflict. Another key contribution could involve offering support for these organisations when they request a participating role in negotiations or placing pressure on armed groups to include women in their delegations.

### Chart 9.6. The empowerment of women

One of the concepts that has become more widely accepted in recent years is that of the **empowerment of women** as a transforming tool to facilitate independence. However, what does this word mean? The United Nations understands empowerment to mean **power for, power with** and **power from** (as opposed to power over), as both a strategy and objective for development. It is believed that, given its transforming nature, empowerment will lead not only to an improvement in women's status through the satisfaction of their practical interests, but also to the **improvement of their status in gender relationships through the satisfaction of their strategic interests**.

Empowerment is, above all, a **process** that should originate with women themselves, and its ultimate aim is to ensure full participation in equal conditions in all decision making and in all the benefits that development brings to society. Empowerment also means the capacity to question the established powers and structures that lead to oppression and exclusion.


The challenge lies not only in increasing the number of women involved in peace processes but also in **gaining greater attention for gender issues from all those involved in all the different parts of a peace process, including the post-war rehabilitation phase**<sup>25</sup>.

But going beyond considerations of justice, what can the involvement of women contribute to peace negotiations? In all societies affected by armed conflict, women act as the driving force for a huge number of ordinary mediation and peace-building initiatives, particularly in some profoundly divided societies in which women have found a way of building bridges through dialogue and empathy in a way that overcomes the reasons that originally led to armed conflict and the creation of profound feelings of hatred and polarisation.

This heritage of experience that women have accumulated throughout history represents an enormously valuable contribution to the peace-building process which unfortunately remains unnoticed or relegated to a secondary plane in the majority of cases. If mediation by women were to assume greater importance as negotiating processes evolved and the warring parties sought rapprochement, then some of the day-to-day problems encountered by those who decide to embark on the road towards transforming armed conflicts (mistrust, a lack of empathy, a lack of respect for an enemy that prevents him from being treated as a legitimate participant, among other things) might perhaps be more easily remedied. Re-examining ways of incorporating this wisdom and moving away from today's flawed dynamics and unmovable obstacles represents a challenge that must be faced if we want to explore new paths and fresh tools that will bring an end to armed violence.

Feminising mediation processes in armed conflicts not only means greater participation from women but also involves the incorporation of a whole series of values that have fortunately, and in spite of everything, managed to survive patriarchal society and its fascination with violence. This not only means looking at the processes that lead to the signing of peace agreements from a new perspective and using new methodologies, it also means incorporating issues that are perhaps not included on the lofty political agenda but nevertheless form part of the daily lives of all the people affected by armed conflict.

25. Division for the Advancement of Women, *Peace agreements as a means for promoting gender equality and ensuring participation of women. Report of the Expert Group Meeting*. <<http://www.womenwarpeace.org/issues/peaceprocess/EGM2003Agreements.pdf>>.



Countries with serious gender inequalities

## Conclusions

At the end of 2005, there were 21 **armed conflicts** around the world, four less than in 2004, continuing the falling trend in the number of armed conflicts that has been recorded over recent years. In regional terms it is the continent of Asia where the most notable developments have been seen, as the majority of armed conflicts on the continent are either in a position of stalemate or reducing in intensity, particularly significant being the signing of the peace agreement in Aceh (Indonesia). Africa is the continent that has seen the greatest net fall in the number of armed conflicts over the last two years: Sudan (SPLA), Liberia and Nigeria (central and northern regions). Furthermore, among the remaining conflicts, Burundi and Côte d'Ivoire are immersed in processes that may lead to the resolution of the conflicts affecting their respective countries. Contemporary armed conflicts remain characterised by the fact that they are mostly internal, though the terrorism phenomenon should also be brought into the equation, given the distorting and contaminating effect it has on any understanding of today's armed conflicts. The terrorism issue has resulted in a new reading of international relations and led to both the legitimisation and simplification of the discourses set out by armed opposition groups using violence to achieve specific political ends.

A total of 56 **situations of tension and high-risk dispute** were recorded throughout the world during 2005, almost half of them in Africa. Indeed, Africa has continued to play host to a large proportion of the situations of tension in which scenes of particular violence have been reported, leading to fears of a deterioration in places such as the Central African Republic, though there are also some places that give reason for hope, such as Liberia. The holding of elections in a number of the contexts analysed has often been accompanied by a sense of destabilisation (with ballots frequently held amid accusations of fraud and manipulation) and even violence and repression, as was the case in Egypt and Kyrgyzstan. Of the total number of contexts of tension, 23 situations in 29 countries are particularly notable for their intensity. These have been deemed worthy of particular mention and analysis, due to their susceptibility to descend into armed conflict, bearing in mind the specific nature of all the regional dynamics involved in such potentially explosive situations. In this regard, particular mention should be made of the attention that the United Nations paid to conflict prevention in 2005, which has underlined the need to strengthen the role played by civilian groups and regional organisations in the area of prevention, as well as reinforcing the activities of the United Nations itself.

2005 will be seen as an historic year for **peace processes** as a result of the end of one of the most deadly armed conflicts in modern times, the conflict that has affected southern Sudan for more than twenty years. In January, the Sudanese Government and the SPLA signed a definitive peace agreement, after three years of negotiations in Kenya. The other notable event was the rapid and surprising end to the conflict in the Indonesian region of Aceh, thanks to the good offices of Finland, which led to the GAM's disarmament as the year ended. Given its symbolic effect in Europe, mention should also be made of the renunciation of the armed struggle by the IRA, and the organisation's subsequent disarmament, which brought an end to the conflict in Northern Ireland. As a result, 2005 ended with 35 sets of negotiations underway, though particular attention has been paid to those for which there is sufficient information to be able to track some kind of evolution throughout the year. Of the 26 negotiating processes examined, 18 relate to armed conflicts, 8 to unresolved conflicts and 2 to conflicts that have ended. It should also be particularly noted that negotiating processes are underway in two out of every three armed conflicts. Finally, as far as the peace temperature is concerned, the processes on the continent of Asia have shown considerably more positive advances than those underway in Africa, which have tended to deteriorate.

Over the course of the year, countries in a **post-war rehabilitation** and transitional phase have been characterised by high levels of violence and insecurity and by provisional governments with poor governance skills and a generally markedly partisan attitude. These factors have combined to impede the implementation of specific post-war rehabilitation activities in some places, particularly Cote d'Ivoire, Congo and DR Congo. It is important to note that the enormous humanitarian needs of ordinary people that are generally found in a transitional context have forced the diversion of funds to emergency work and humanitarian assistance, to the detriment of other areas more specifically aimed at rehabilitation, a factor which helps

perpetuate a country's dependence on outside contributions. As far as the countries currently immersed in a rehabilitation process are concerned, developments have been tempered by weaknesses in the rule of law and, therefore, the security sector, governments with markedly authoritarian tendencies that exercise strict control over dissident voices (such as those in Rwanda and Tajikistan) and, finally, the slowness of reconciliation and victim compensation processes and the amount of time taken by some countries to respond to the international criminal courts, as was the case with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Finally, it is important to underline the need to adopt a more strategic and coordinated approach to the international response to this type of context.

Two observations can be made in respect of **humanitarian crises**. Firstly, there was a slight net fall in the total number of crisis scenarios (from 44 in 2004 to 43 in 2005), with a slight increase in the number of these contexts found in Asia. Secondly, some of these areas of crisis (Angola, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Kosovo) were seen to improve, mainly where countries were immersed in a post-war rehabilitation process, while the worst deterioration was seen in countries currently involved in armed conflicts or situations of tension (Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Colombia, Indonesia and Iraq, among others), or countries that had fallen victim to some of the worst natural disasters of the year (Niger, Malawi and Pakistan). As far as **humanitarian action** is concerned, particular mention should be made of the increasingly serious security problems encountered by humanitarian personnel (especially in Darfur and Afghanistan), which represent a continual obstacle that compromises humanitarian work and raises innumerable problems. Elsewhere, the victims of the constant shortage of funds and the diversion of aid that resulted from the tsunami crisis have once again been the so-called forgotten crises, which are mainly to be found in Africa. This whole range of issues once again led to a large number of forums and meetings that identified the many lessons learned (though few are subsequently applied) and has also led to an interesting reform of the humanitarian system aimed at providing a quicker and more effective response to today's humanitarian crises.

Turning to the **disarmament** situation, the main international trends as regards the arms cycle present a bleak picture, in sharp contrast to the international initiatives relating to the issue of the proliferation of small arms. The trend in recent years indicates an increase in military spending to levels exceeding one billion dollars a year, a return to the amounts spent during the Cold War. This is to the detriment of more social policies, particularly in the areas of Research and Development. For their part, the export policies of the major powers also displayed an upward trend, and it should be remembered that four of the top five exporters are permanent members of the UN Security Council. To this we should add that export policies are not covered by any kind of legislation, which has also led to an illegal proliferation of small arms. Amid this negative outlook there are some rays of hope, such as the implementation of an International Arms Trade Treaty and the fact that the EU Code of Conduct has now been made legally binding. There have also been initiatives relating to disarmament and the implementation of DDR programmes, and these are being followed up and analysed with a view to achieving greater successes in other cases, both present and future.

Debate reopened at the end of 2005 regarding the protection of and guarantees for **human rights** in the context of the fight against terrorism, seen as one of the main challenges facing the international community. The lack of a unanimous response and the actions taken by certain western governments is posing a great threat to the global human rights system developed over more than 60 years ago by the United Nations, given the existence of practices such as torture and secret detentions. The actions of these countries are having a heavy impact on the international community, something which could lead to an even greater threat: the weakening of legislation. At a time when the reform of the United Nations (and the Human Rights Commission) is being debated and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is stressing the need to progress to an era in which human rights regulations are actually applied, all countries (though particularly those with the capacity to operate abroad, such as the USA and the EU) should more than ever be meeting the undertaking they made in 1948 under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

2005, which had been marked out by the United Nations as a turning point in advances towards the Millennium Development Goals and the design of a global agenda and common strategies in relation to **development** over the coming decades, turned out to be a year in which yet more expectations went unfulfilled. Three important summits held at the end of the year (the Information Society Summit, the Climate Summit

and the WTO Summit) illustrate this point clearly: minimum agreement reached late at night so that those taking part could save face, at the expense of decisions on more politically sensitive issues (polluting emissions, removal of subsidies, etc.). The large number of reports published and events organised during the course of the year reached conclusions that were worrying rather than encouraging: inequality continues to increase, not only in economic terms but also at the more basic levels of human development, and not only inside individual countries but also on a global scale. Nevertheless, certain positive facts can be pointed to: achievement of the Millennium Development Goals would be feasible if all the undertakings made up to this point were simply implemented. It is therefore, as on the majority of occasions, just a question of political will.

Finally, the prominent position occupied by the issue of the **gender dimension in peace-building** on the international agenda (Beijing +10 process and the 5<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the approval of UN Security Council Resolution 1325) has not been accompanied by any substantial progress in practical terms. A number of highly illustrative examples provide clear evidence of this lack of international commitment when it comes to putting the issue of the gender dimension into actual practice: the entirely marginal approach to this issue during the Millennium Summit, which brought a huge number of Heads of State and Government together; the questioning of the undertakings made ten years ago at the Beijing Summit (which also points to a failure to implement them); the growing impact of sexual violence as a weapon of war in today's armed conflicts; and the absence of women from almost all the peace negotiations currently taking place with backing from the international community. The fact that the gender dimension remains something that is talked about rather than put into political practice is highly illustrative of the fact that it is still regarded as a secondary issue and one that does not need firm action, an approach that has not been called into question by the world's leaders. In short, gender fundamentally remains an issue just for women.



## Appendix I. Country and indicator table and explanation of indicators

The following table has been prepared using 29 indicators which combine to offer information on the 191 United Nations member states and a further 18 states and territories in eight different categories: armed conflicts and high-risk disputes, peace processes, post-war rehabilitation, humanitarian crises, militarization and disarmament, human rights and International Humanitarian Law, development and gender. The table can thus be read in a number of different ways, observing the way an individual country behaves in respect of a combination of indicators or comparing the development status of different countries, for example. The attached bookmark lists the 29 indicators and can be used to cross-reference numbers and indicators and assist consultation of the table.

The table also contains a number of symbols. "Serious situations" (indicated with a white dot) are distinguished from "very serious situations" (distinguished with a black dot) for the majority of indicators. Additional symbols have been used for the indicators relating to human rights to identify situations classified as "very serious"<sup>1</sup>. Figures are also set alongside symbols in some cases, where it is thought that their inclusion may be of interest. There are four cases in which the indicators have a different meaning and are thus highlighted in a different way. The first (**PN**) refers to countries that were engaged in formal peace processes or negotiations at the end of the year. The second involves countries engaged in exploratory talks at the end of the year (**EX**). The idea in both cases was to highlight situations that require particular attention from the international community. Thirdly, countries classified in the group of Least Developed Countries are shown with the initials **LDC**, the idea being to emphasise their internationally recognised position of vulnerability and recall the undertaking to prioritise poverty-reduction strategies in these countries. Finally, the initials **HIPC** refer to countries classified as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. Given that the various sources consulted do not always give information for every country, a dash "-" indicates that this information is not available for the country in question, and this symbol is also used, in the case of conduct in the international arena, to highlight the states and territories that do not belong to the United Nations and therefore have no power to ratify international treaties.

1. For more information, please see the explanation of indicators.

# 1. Armed conflicts

## 1. Countries in armed conflict

SOURCE: Monitoring of the international situation by the School of Peace Culture using information provided by the United Nations and international and regional news agencies.

An **armed conflict** is considered to be any confrontation involving armed groups of regular or irregular forces of various kinds which, in an organised way and using arms and other destructive methods, claim more than 100 victims per year. This figure of 100 deaths should be seen in relation to other elements, such as the total population of the country and the geographical extent of the armed conflict, the level of destruction caused and the enforced displacements created. There may be more than one armed conflict in the same country.

- Armed conflict

# 2. Situations of tension and high-risk disputes

## 2. Situations of tension and high-risk disputes

SOURCE: Monitoring of the international situation by the School of Peace Culture using information provided by the United Nations and international and regional news agencies.

**Situations of tension and high-risk disputes** are understood to be contexts in which there are serious situations of social and political polarisation, with confrontations between political, ethnic or religious groups or between these groups and the state, which involve alterations in the operation of the state's own institutions (coups d'état, curfews and States of Exception or Emergency<sup>1</sup>), and in which there are significant levels of destruction, death or enforced displacement. It is possible that increased tensions in these contexts may, in the short or medium term, eventually erupt into armed conflict. It is possible that these tensions may not be felt directly within the borders of a particular country, but attention is paid to the extent to which they affect the interests or stability of the country in question or lead to specific attacks within the territory of another.

An analysis is also made of the contexts in which there are **tensions of a lesser intensity** than those described above and where armed conflict is therefore not expected to erupt in the short or medium term. Both of these categories (tensions and lesser tensions) include contexts in which peace agreements have at some point been signed between the warring factions, though with serious difficulties in respect of their implementation.

- Situations of tension and high-risk disputes.
- Situations of lesser tension.
- ▲ Contexts that include both a situation of lesser tension and other situations of tension and high-risk disputes.

# 3. Peace processes

## 3. Countries with formal peace or negotiating processes or talks in an exploratory phase

SOURCE: Monitoring of the international situation by the School of Peace Culture using information provided by the United Nations and international and regional news agencies.

1. For the purposes of this report, a state of emergency is understood to mean a situation in which constitutional order is disrupted with the restriction of certain basic freedoms. This term is used differently in different legislatures, such as, for example, state of exception, interior disturbance, state of national disaster, etc.

It is understood that a **peace process** is underway when the parties involved in an armed conflict have reached an agreement to pursue negotiations that will lead them to a peaceful way out of the conflict and regulate or resolve any basic disagreement that they may have. The process may be given a variety of names, but in all cases talks have been formalised, with or without the assistance of third parties. The fact that a negotiating process exists is viewed independently of whether it is evolving well or badly, an aspect analysed in the chapter dealing with peace processes. A peace or negotiation process is regarded as being in an **exploratory phase** when the parties are involving in a preliminary trial and consulting process, without having reached any final agreement on opening negotiations. This also includes peace processes that have been interrupted or have broken down, where attempts to relaunch them are ongoing.

- PN** Countries engaged in formal peace processes or negotiations at the end of the year
- EX** Countries engaged in exploratory negotiations at the end of the year

## 4. Post-war rehabilitation (international involvement)

### 4. Countries that receive international aid for post-war rehabilitation

SOURCE: Monitoring of the international situation by the School of Peace Culture using information provided by the United Nations, international organisations, research centres and the media.

**Post-war rehabilitation** means the coordinated actions of various primary, secondary and tertiary agents, with or without an international mandate or leadership, aimed at tackling: 1) the security of the ordinary people; 2) priorities of a humanitarian nature and the resettlement of refugees or displaced people; 3) physical reconstruction and the reconstruction of basic institutions; 4) the resolution of basic incompatibilities (i.e. social, economic, democratic and institutional normalisation); 5) reconciliation, a respect for human rights, the fight against impunity; 6) regional stability and reintegration in international forums and organisations; and 7) the construction of good governance and involvement of civilian society in the process through international involvement. The starting point for this analysis from an international involvement point of view is taken as one of three situations: the signing of a peace agreement or cessation of hostilities between all the parties engaged in the conflict, the victory of one or more of the parties over the rest, or a victory by one or more of the parties that is clearly brought about by international involvement. The cases analysed all involve post-war rehabilitation processes that are regarded as having begun in 1994 (the date of the Rwandan genocide) or later.

- Countries or territories that have reached a cessation of hostilities or have signed a peace agreement (either as the result of one party emerging victorious or through mediation by third parties) and in which post-war rehabilitation is progressing reasonably well.
- Countries or territories in which a peace agreement or cessation of hostilities exists but is progressing badly and thus impeding post-war rehabilitation work.
- Countries or territories that remain in a state of war but which are receiving considerable amounts of post-war international aid, which is often used as an incentive to facilitate the pursuit or fulfilment of an agreement that will allow hostilities to be brought to an end.

## 5. Humanitarian crises

### 5. Countries facing food emergencies

SOURCE: FAO, Foodcrops and shortages, at <<http://www.fao.org/giews/english/fs/index.htm>>.

FAO alerts refer to countries facing food shortages, whether due to drought, floods or other natural catastrophes, civil disturbances, population displacements, economic problems or sanctions. Countries are classified as facing food emergencies when they are facing (or have at some point in the year

faced) unfavourable prospects for the current harvest and/or a deficit in food supplies that has not been covered and that requires (or has required during the course of the year) exceptional external aid. A serious food emergency is one in which a country is affected or threatened by successive poor harvests and food shortages.

- Serious food emergency
- Food emergency

#### **6. Countries in which at least 1 in every 1,000 people is internally displaced**

SOURCES: *Internal Displacement Monitoring Center* at <<http://www.internal-displacement.org>> (December 2005), and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) at <[http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2005/pdf/sp\\_swp05.pdf](http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2005/pdf/sp_swp05.pdf)>

This indicator shows the number of displaced people as a percentage of the country's total population, while the figure indicates the absolute number of people displaced, as of December 2005. In cases in which the sources give two different figures, an average is shown.

- Situation regarded as very serious: at least 1 in every 100 people is internally displaced.
- Situation regarded as serious: 1 in every 1,000 people is internally displaced or, where this proportion is not reached, the internally displaced number at least 5,000.

#### **7. Countries of origin in which at least 1 in every 1,000 people is a refugee**

SOURCES: UNHCR, 2004 Global Refugee Trends. Overview of refugee populations, new arrivals, durable solutions, asylum-seekers and other persons of concern to UNHCR, June 2005, at <<http://www.unhcr.ch>>, and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) at <[http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2005/pdf/sp\\_swp05.pdf](http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2005/pdf/sp_swp05.pdf)>.

This indicator shows the number of refugees as a percentage of the country of origin's total population. The numbers show the absolute figure for refugees during 2004.

- Situation regarded as very serious: at least 1 in every 100 people is a refugee.
- Situation regarded as serious: at least 1 in every 1,000 people is a refugee or, where this proportion is not reached, refugees number at least 5,000.

#### **8. Countries included in the United Nations Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) for 2006**

SOURCE: CAP 2006 at <<http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/>>.

Since 1994, the United Nations has made an annual appeal to the donor community through OCHA, in an attempt to collect the funds required to deal with certain humanitarian emergency situations. The fact that a country or region is included in this appeal process implies the existence of a serious humanitarian crisis that has been acknowledged by the international community.

- Countries included in the United Nations CAP for 2006.

## **6. Disarmament**

#### **9. Countries whose military spending exceeds 4% of GDP**

SOURCES: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2005* and UNDP, *Human Development Report 2005*.

Military spending is understood to include the Ministry of Defence budget along with any costs of a military nature that are distributed among other Ministries. Given that there is frequently no standard calculation, information has been drawn from various sources in order to give a more reliable result. The economic situation in several contexts, particularly if they are subject to currency fluctuations,

represents another difficulty when calculating this figure and converting the amounts involved into dollars.

- Very serious situation: military spending exceeds 6% of GDP.
- Serious situation: military spending totals between 4% and 6% of GDP.

#### 10. Countries with imports of conventional heavy weapons exceeding 0.5% of their GDP

SOURCES: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2005* and World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2005*.

When calculating this indicator, import figures for 6 categories of conventional heavy weapons were taken into account, as set out by SIPRI: warplanes, armoured vehicles, artillery, radar and surveillance systems, missiles and warships. Other types of weaponry, i.e. conventional small arms and weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) have not been included as no statistics are available for these kinds of weapons. The numbers shown indicate conventional heavy weapons imports as a percentage of GDP. A value of 0.5% is regarded as indicating a high level of militarization.

- Very serious situation: imports of heavy weapons exceed 1% of GDP.
- Serious situation: imports of heavy weapons total between 0.5% and 1% of GDP.

#### 11. Countries in which the number of soldiers exceeds 1.5% of the population

SOURCES: IISS, *The Military Balance 2005-2006* and UNDP, *Human Development Report 2005*.

This definition only includes members of Government Armed Forces. Members of armed opposition groups and paramilitary forces are excluded due to the difficulties involved in calculating their numbers in many countries. The figure reflects the number of soldiers as a percentage of the country's total population.

- Very serious situation: number of soldiers exceeds 2% of the population.
- Serious situation: number of soldiers amounts to between 1.5% and 2% of the population.

#### 12. Countries in which arms embargoes have been imposed by the UN Security Council

SOURCE: UN Security Council Resolutions at <<http://www.un.org/documents/>>.

The imposition or recommendation of an embargo by the United Nations Security Council is understood to represent an acknowledgement that the situation in the country affected is exceptional. As a result, for the purposes of this study, no distinction is made between binding and voluntary embargoes. Voluntary United Nations embargoes take the form of non-binding "appeals" or "emergencies" on arms supplies. The date on which a United Nations voluntary embargo ends is difficult to establish because it will generally have no formal expiry date and its end will not be announced.

- Embargoed countries. *Armenia* (S/RES/853 of 29/07/93); *Azerbaijan* (S/RES/853 of 29/07/93); *Somalia* (S/RES/733 of 23/01/92); *Yemen* (S/RES/924 of 01/06/94).
- Sanctions imposed on armed opposition groups. In the case of *Afghanistan*, this sanction is imposed on the Taliban and remains in force in spite of the change in the country's circumstances (S/RES/1333 of 19/12/00); *Sierra Leone* (S/RES/1299 of 19/05/00, except for forces under the command of UNAMSIL and the Government of Sierra Leone, provided that weapons are used within its borders); *Rwanda* (S/RES/1011 of 16/08/95, which establishes restrictions on arms transfers, though it lifts the embargo on certain points of entry and maintains the arms embargo for *non-government forces* that has been in operation in this country as well as in *Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi* and *DR Congo* in case weapons are used in Rwanda).

### 13. Countries in which arms embargoes have been imposed by the EU and the OSCE

SOURCES: EU at <<http://www.ue.eu.int>>, and *Committee of Senior Officials*, Journal No. 2, Annex 1, Seventh Committee on Senior Officials meeting, Prague, 27-28/02/92

- By the **EU** (from more to less binding: Regulations = R, Common Positions = CP and Declarations = D): *Bosnia and Herzegovina* (CP 96/184/CFSP of 13/03/96, confirmed in CP 98/240/CFSP of 19/03/98; except for the transfer of small arms to the police from 19/07/99); *China* (Declaration of 27/06/89); *DR Congo* (Declaration 33/93 of 07/04/93); *Iraq* (Declaration 56/90 of 04/08/90); *Myanmar* (Declaration of 29/07/91 confirmed by CP 96/635/CFSP of 28/10/96); *Sudan* (CP 94/165/CFSP of 16/03/94); *Uzbekistan* (CP 2005/792/CFSP of 14/11/05), *Zimbabwe* (R no. 310/2002/ of 18/02/02).

By the **OSCE**: *Armenia* (28/02/92), *Azerbaijan* (28/02/92).

- Sanctions imposed on armed opposition groups. In the case of *Afghanistan* this refers to shipments to territories controlled by the Taliban (CP 2001/771/CFSP of 05/11/01); in the case of *Sierra Leone*, these are sanctions imposed on *armed opposition forces* operating in the country (CP 98/409/CFSP of 29/06/98).

## 7. Human rights and international humanitarian law

### 14. Countries that have not ratified the United Nation's main legal instruments on human rights

SOURCE: UNHCHR at <<http://www.unhchr.ch>> (on 31 December 2005).

This indicator is based on the total number of human rights instruments that a country has ratified from the 9 selected by the United Nations. These 9 instruments are:

- Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
- Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)
- Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)
- International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (1966)
- Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)
- Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)
- Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948)
- Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)
- International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (2003)

- Have ratified less than four instruments: 0 to 4
- Have ratified five instruments

### 15. Countries with serious and systematic human rights violations according to non-governmental sources

SOURCES: Amnesty International, *Report 2005, the state of the world's human rights*, at <<http://www.amnesty.org>>, Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2005*, at <<http://www.hrw.org>> and the authors' own monitoring of the current international situation from daily reports by various local human rights NGOs (the classification given to countries is the authors' own, as neither Amnesty International nor Human Rights Watch make this type of classification).

**Very serious human rights violations** are regarded as those abuses which affect the right to life and personal security and which occur in a systematic and widespread way as the result of the state's own actions or omissions, particularly in the case of extra-judicial executions, forced disappearances, deaths in custody, torture, arbitrary detention and widespread impunity. **Serious human rights violations** are all the abuses mentioned above when they occur frequently, in addition to abuses that

violate personal, political and civil rights, particularly trials without the necessary minimum procedural guarantees and the existence of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience, based on the methodology applied by the PIOOM (in Schmid, Alex P.; Jongman, Albert J. (eds.), *Monitoring Human Rights Violations*, Center for the Study of Social Conflicts, Faculty of Social Sciences, Leiden University, Leiden, 1992).

- Context regarded as involving very serious violations of human rights.
- Context regarded as involving serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

#### 16. Countries with serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms according to the EU

SOURCE: Council of the European Union, *EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2005*, Brussels, 10 October 2005, at <<http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/HRen05.pdf>>.

This indicator refers to countries whose position in human rights issues made them a **cause for concern** for the European Council for the period between 1 July 2004 and 30 June 2005. The European Union made declarations relating to the human rights situation in various parts of the world at the Third Commission of the 59<sup>th</sup> period of sessions of the UN Assembly General and the 61<sup>st</sup> period of sessions of the United Nations Human Rights Commission.

Please see the previous indicator for a definition of very serious and serious human rights violations according to the PIOOM.

- Context regarded as involving very serious violations of human rights.
- Context regarded as involving serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

#### 17. Countries with serious human rights violations according to the reports and resolutions of the UNCHR

SOURCES: UNHCHR, at <<http://www.unhchr.ch>> and Antena de la Comisión de Derechos Humanos (Antenna for the Human Rights Commission) in Spain, at <<http://www.escolapau.org/castellano/antena-comision>>.

This indicator relates to the extra-conventional mechanisms and special procedures established by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. The Commission has set out the mandates for Rapporteurs and Special Representatives, Independent Experts and Personal Representatives of the UN Secretary General to examine, research and publish the human rights situation in particular geographical areas. The work done by these experts is examined each year during the Commission's annual period of sessions (in this case, the 61<sup>st</sup> period of sessions held in Geneva in March and April 2005) and sometimes presented to the UN General Assembly.

The following is a list of countries for which one of these experts in human rights issues is currently exercising a mandate, along with the countries for which the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has presented a report or the UNCHR has passed a resolution, decision or presidential declaration. We have taken the decision to include presidential declarations on the human rights situation in some countries because, this being a political decision that is not subject to any vote, it sometimes represents the only way to achieve agreement condemning the situation in certain countries.

- **Critical reports by Rapporteurs and Special Representatives and condemnatory resolutions or rulings expressing concern by the UNCHR.**

**Africa: Burundi** (E/CN.4/2005/118, "Advisory services and technical cooperation in the field of human rights for Burundi" in E/CN.4/RES/2005/75); **Chad** (E/CN.4/2005/121, "Advisory services and technical cooperation in Chad" in E/CN.4/RES/2005/85); **DR Congo** (E/CN.4/2005/120, "Advisory services and technical cooperation in DR Congo" in

E/CN.4/RES/2005/85); **Liberia** (E/CN.4/2004/119, "Human rights situation in Liberia" in E/CN.4/RES/2005/117); **Somalia** (E/CN.4/2005/117, "Technical cooperation in the field of human rights in Somalia" in E/CN.4/RES/2005/83); **Sudan** (E/CN.4/2005/11, "Human rights situation in Sudan" in E/CN.4/RES/2005/82).

**America: Cuba** (E/CN.4/2005/33, "Human rights situation in Cuba" in E/CN.4/RES/2005/12).

**Asia and the Pacific: Cambodia** (E/CN.4/2005/116, "Advisory services and technical cooperation in Cambodia" in E/CN.4/RES/2005/77); **DPR Korea** (E/CN.4/2005/34, "Human rights situation in DPR Korea" in E/CN.4/RES/2005/11); **Myanmar** (E/CN.4/2005/36, "Human rights situation in Myanmar" in E/CN.4/RES/2005/10).

**Europe and Central Asia: Belarus** (E/CN.4/2005/35, "Human rights situation in Belarus" in E/CN.4/RES/2005/13).

**Middle East: Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967** (E/CN.4/2005/29, "Situation in the occupied Palestinian territories" in E/CN.4/RES/2005/1).

■ **Resolutions expressing concern on the human rights situations on a country by country basis, with prior report from the UNHCHR.**

**Africa: Sierra Leone** (E/CN.4/2005/113, "Assistance for Sierra Leone in the field of human rights" in E/CN.4/2005/RES/76).

**Asia and the Pacific: Nepal** (E/CN.4/2005/114, "Advisory services and technical cooperation in Nepal" in E/CN.4/2005/RES/78).

▲ **Presidential declarations by the UNCHR in respect of a particular country, following a prior report by a Rapporteur or Special Representative.**

**America: Colombia** (E/CN.4/2005/10, "The human rights situation in Colombia", at E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.1); **Haiti** (E/CN.4/2004/123, "The human rights situation in Haiti", at E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.1).

**Asia and the Pacific: Afghanistan** (E/CN.4/2005/122, "The human rights situation in Afghanistan", at E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.1); **Timor-Leste** (E/CN.4/2004/115, "The human rights situation in Timor-Leste", at E/CN.4/2005/L.10/Add.1).

18. **Countries that apply or retain the death penalty**

SOURCE: Amnesty International, *Facts and Figures 2005*, October 2005, at <<http://www.es.amnesty.org/temas/pmuerte/docs.shtml>>.

This indicator deals with the countries in which there have been executions and/or death sentences have been approved, along with the countries that retain the death penalty on the statute books, divided into **retentionists** (countries in which the death penalty is retained for common offences), **abolitions in practice** (countries which retain the death penalty for common offences but have not carried out any executions in the last ten years, and countries which have undertaken not to apply the death penalty) and **abolitionists for common offences** (countries which retain the death penalty for exceptional offences, i.e. under military law or in the context of an armed conflict). The figures show the number of executions confirmed by Amnesty International during 2004.

- Retentionist countries in which **executions have taken place and death sentences have been approved** (25 countries).
- Retentionist countries that are abolitionist in practice or for common offences in which **death sentences** have been approved. (32 retentionist countries; 6 abolitionist in practice: Algeria, Brunei Darussalam, Kenya, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka and Senegal, the last of which finally abolished the death penalty for all offences in 2004).
- Countries which retain **legislation for the application of the death penalty** but did not carry out any executions or hand down any death sentences in 2004. 17 retentionist countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Botswana, Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kazakhstan, Lesotho, Mongolia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Swaziland and Zambia. 18 abolitionist in practice: Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Congo, Gambia, Grenada, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nauru, Niger, Russia, Surinam, Togo, Tonga and Tunisia. 11 abolitionist for com-

mon offences: Albania, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Fiji, Cook Islands, Israel, Latvia, Peru.

#### **19. Countries of origin of people seeking political asylum**

SOURCE: UNHCR, *2004 UNHCR population statistics (provisional)*. *Asylum and refugee status determination* at <<http://www.unhcr.ch>> (on 6 June 2005).

This indicator gives provisional data on people granted asylum. The grant of asylum status, though sometimes subject to national or international restrictions, implies recognition by the host country that the security and freedom of the person seeking asylum is threatened in his or her country of origin. It therefore implies Government recognition of some human rights violations in this country of origin. The figures indicate numbers of people who were granted asylum status during 2004 where this number exceeded 100 from a particular country of origin.

- The country of origin of more than a thousand people granted political asylum status.
- The country of origin of between one hundred and a thousand people granted political asylum status.

#### **20. Countries that have not ratified Additional Protocol II of 1977, dealing with inter-state armed conflicts relating to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949**

SOURCES: ICRC at <[www.icrc.org](http://www.icrc.org)> (on 31 December 2005) and UNHCHR at <<http://www.unhchr.ch>>.

The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (the First Convention deals with the treatment of war wounded, the Second with the situation in the event of shipwreck, the Third with prisoners of war and the Fourth with the protection of civilians in times of occupation) and Protocol I of 1977 provide legislation and regulation for inter-state armed conflicts. This indicator looks at failure to ratify Protocol II, due to the fact that the majority of today's armed conflicts are taking place within a single country.

- Countries which have not ratified Protocol II.

#### **21. Countries that recruit child soldiers and have not ratified the optional Protocol for the Convention on the Rights of the Child in relation to the participation of children in armed conflicts**

SOURCES: Coalition to stop the use of child soldiers, *Child Soldiers Global Report 2004*, at <<http://www.child-soldiers.org>> (on 17/10/04), Secretary General's Report on Children and armed conflict A/60/335 of 07/09/05, and the optional Protocol for the Convention on the Rights of the Child in relation to the participation of children in armed conflicts, at <<http://www.unhchr.ch>> (as of 31 December 2005).

Child soldiers, both male and female, are defined in the most restrictive way, any person below the age of 18 who either voluntarily or forcibly joins Government Armed Forces and takes part directly in combat operations.

- Countries which have ratified the Protocol in which Government Armed Forces and armed opposition groups include child soldiers.
- Countries which have not ratified the Protocol in which Government Armed Forces and armed opposition groups include child soldiers.
- Countries in which armed opposition groups include child soldiers.

## 8. Development

### 22. Countries whose public spending on health and/or education is lower than their military spending

SOURCES: SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2005* (information on military spending refers to 2003 or, alternatively, the most recent year available); UNDP, *Human Development Report 2005* (information on health refers to 2002; information on education refers to the most recent year for which data is available, between 2000 and 2002).

The fact that public spending in health and/or education is lower than military spending indicates that the country's budgeting priorities place defence and militarization above satisfying the basic requirements of the ordinary population and financing public social services.

- Public spending on both health and education lower than military spending.
- Public spending on either health or education lower than military spending.

### 23. Countries with poor governance according to the World Bank

SOURCE: World Bank, *GRICS: Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot* at <<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2004/gov2001map.asp#map>> (data from 2004)

The World Bank's aggregate indicator sets out an average value for 6 governance components, these being accountability, political stability and absence of violence, effective Government, procedural guarantees, rule of law and control of corruption.

- Countries with very poor governance.
- Countries with poor governance.

### 24. Countries with a Human Development Index (HDI) lower than in 1990 and countries belonging to the group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

SOURCES: UNDP, *Human Development Report 2005* and the United Nations, at <<http://www.unctad.org/lDCs>>.

The UNDP prepares a compound index each year (HDI) which measures progress in 3 different areas of human development: potential for a long and healthy life (life expectancy), learning (adult literacy and gross schooling levels) and decent standard of living (per capita GDP). Given the natural empirical tendency of countries to show a gradual improvement in their quality of living indicators, a fall in HDI to levels below those recorded in 1990 indicates the difficulties experienced in some countries in guaranteeing the main elements of human development. In addition, ECOSOC updates the list of countries classified as LDCs every three years on the basis of three variables: low income (per capita GDP); low human resources (quality of life index based on life expectancy, calories per capita, schooling and literacy); and low levels of economic diversification (an index based on a number of macroeconomic indicators). There are currently 50 countries in the group of LDCs.

- Countries with a HDI lower than in 1990.
- LDC** Country belonging to the group of Least Developed Countries.

### 25. Countries with serious internal inequalities according to the Gini coefficient

SOURCE: World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2005* (data refers to the most recently available figures).

The Gini coefficient measures the level of inequality in income and consumption among an individual country's population. The value 0 represents perfect equality while 100 indicates complete inequality.

- Countries with a Gini coefficient exceeding 60.
- Countries with a Gini coefficient of below 40.

## 26. Countries receiving official development aid (ODA) equivalent to more than 10% of GDP

SOURCE: World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2005*

ODA as a percentage of GDP is one of the indicators that shows how economically dependent an individual country is, firstly because the state can delegate the services for which it is itself intrinsically responsible to parties offering international cooperation, and secondly because the increasing politicisation of ODA may place excessive conditions on the identification of a country's development priorities and the strategies to be pursued in order to advance them.

- ODA represents more than 20% of GDP.
- ODA represents more than 10% of GDP.

## 27. Countries with total external borrowings exceeding their GDP, countries that pay more to service their debt than they receive in official development aid and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)

SOURCES: World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2005 en*

<<http://www.worldbank.org/hipc>>; UNDP, *Human Development Report 2005* and the OECD's Development Aid Committee at <<http://www.oecd.org>>.

This indicator is intended to point to a number of elements that detail the level of a country's borrowings. Firstly, when a country's external debt is higher than its GDP, this indicates that the country will have problems in repaying this debt and financing some of the country's other development priorities. Secondly, the fact that a country pays more in total to service its debt (in terms of the amortisation of capital and interest payments) than it receives in ODA shows that in many cases there is a net transfer of resources from poor countries to the industrialised world. Finally, this indicator shows the countries included in the HIPC initiative, which was approved by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 1996 and is aimed at reducing debt (whether multilateral, bilateral or private) in these countries to a level that allows them to meet their repayments. It therefore represents a first step in reducing debt, thus allowing a debtor country to pay off its loans without endangering economic growth and without accumulating yet more back-payments in respect of its future debt levels.

- Countries with external borrowings higher than their GDP.
- Countries that pay more to service their debt than they receive in ODA.
- ▲ Countries with external borrowings higher than their GDP and which pay more to service their debt than they receive in ODA.

**HIPC** Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC).

## 28. Countries with high rates of deforestation and countries with high levels of polluting emissions

SOURCE: *World Development Indicators 2005*

This indicator signals those countries with high average levels of deforestation between 1990 and 2000 and countries with carbon dioxide emissions of more than 10 metric tonnes per person. Deforestation not only reflects a certain level of environmental degradation in a country but is also closely linked with other issues, such as poverty, demographic pressure on resources and vulnerability to natural disasters. In addition, high levels of polluting emissions per person indicate a lack of respect for the planet's environment and points to unsustainable economic growth models.

- Countries with an average annual deforestation rate of more than 3% between 1990 and 2000.

- Countries with an average annual deforestation rate of more than 1% between 1990 and 2000.
- Countries with carbon dioxide emissions of more than 15 metric tonnes per head.
- Countries with carbon dioxide emissions of more than 10 metric tonnes per head.

## 9. Gender and peace-building

### 29. Countries with serious gender inequalities according to the Gender-related Development Index (GDI)

SOURCE: UNDP, *Human Development Report 2005*

The GDI measures inequality between men and women in three basic areas of human development: a long and healthy life (life expectancy), learning (adult literacy and gross schooling levels) and decent standard of living (per capita GDP). The countries indicated are those that scored less than 0.500, this being the point from which the UNDP classifies its Human Development Index as "low".

- Countries with a GDI lower than 0.500.

Country	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29		
Afghanistan	●				●	○	●					○	○			●	▲	●	●	●			●	LDC							
Albania						○	○								○			○	●	●											
Algeria	●					●	○								●			■	○	○	○										
Andorra														●	-					●											
Angola		○		●	●	○	●	○						○	○	○			○	●	●	○	○	LDC			▲			●	
Anguilla (UK)														-	-																
Antigua and Barbuda														-	-		○														
Argentina														○	○		○	○							○		▲				
Armenia		○	NP			○	○		●	●	○	○	●						●	●	○										
Aruba (Netherlands)														-	-																
Australia																															
Austria																															
Azerbaijan		●	NP			●	●					●	●		○				○	○	○	○									
Bahamas														○				■													
Bahrain									○	○	○	○	○	○	○		○														
Bangladesh					○	○	○								●	●		●	○	○	○	○	LDC								
Barbados															-	○		■									■				
Belarus		○					○								●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○			■				
Belgium																															
Belize															-			■									■				
Benin								●							-		○	○						LDC			HIPC	○		●	
Bermudas (UK)														-	-																
Bhutan							●						●	●	○					●				LDC		○					
Bolivia				○	○									○	○		○								○	○	HIPC				
Bosnia and Herzegovina				○		●	●						●		○				●	●											
Botswana						●	●		○				●		-		○	○	●	●		●		○	○	●	■				



Country	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	
Democratic Republic of Congo	●					● 2,170,000	○ 462,203	●			○								● 7,340		■						● HIPC			●
Denmark															-															
Djibouti										● 2,06															LDC					○
Dominica														○	-		○													■
Dominican Republic															○															■
East Timor				○											○	○	▲							LDC			●			
Ecuador		●													○							●					■			○
Egypt		●					○ 5,376								●	●				○ 541		○					■			
El Salvador															○	○				○ 207						○				●
Equatorial Guinea		○					○ 549								○			■						LDC						
Eritrea		●		●		● 50,500	● 131,119	●	● 47	● 4,3				●	●					● 9,969		●		LDC						●
Estonia																														
Ethiopia		▲				○ 207,500	○ 63,105		○ 2,4	●					●	●				● 2,523		○		LDC			●			●
Fiji							○ 1,281								●															
Finland																														
France																														
Gabon															-			○												
Gambia								●							-			○						LDC		○	○			●
Georgia		●				● 240,000	○ 6,633								○					○ 956		○								
Germany																														
Ghana							○ 14,767	●												○ 109										○
Gibraltar (UK)																														
Greece									○ 0,8	○ 1,53																				
Grenada														●																
Guatemala		○		○		● 242,000		●							●	●		■		○ 405					○		■			○
Guernsey (UK)															-															

Country	Conflicts and peace-building			Humanitarian crises			Disarmament			Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law					Development				Gender issues and peace-building										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29
Guinea		▲			●	○	82,000		●						○		○	832					○						
Guinea-Bissau		●		●				●						○	○								○	LDC	○	○	●	●	●
Guyana				○										○	○		■	○	237				○			○	○		
Haiti		●		●			○	9,208						●	○	▲			●	2,471	●		○	LDC				●	
Holy See														●	-														
Honduras				○										○	○	○		○	103					○			■	■	
Hungary																											■	■	
Iceland																													
India	●	○	NP			○	600,000	○	●					●	●	●	●	●	1,004	●		○				■	■		
Indonesia		○	NP		○	○	471,000	○	●					●	●	●	●	●	1,115	●	●	●	○			■	■	○	
Iran, Islamic Rep. of							○	115,126						○	○	○	○	○	4,806	●	●	○	○		○		■		
Iraq	●		NP	■	●	●	1,200,000	●					●	○	○		■	●	1,655	●	●		●						
Ireland																													□
Israel	●	○	NP			●	225,000	●	●	○	0.6	2.68		●	●	●	○	○	157	●		●							
Italy																													
Jamaica														●	●		■	○	104									○	
Japan																	●												
Jersey (UK)														-	-														
Jordan								●	●	○	1.3	1.7			○	○	■	○	135			○			○				
Kazakhstan							○	6,121							○	○	○	○	200			○	○	○	○		■		
Kenya		○		●		●	382,000							●	●		■	○	384					○	○		■		●
Kiribati																													
Kuwait								●						-	○		●					○						■	
Kyrgyzstan		●												○	○	○	■	○	111			○	○			○			
Lao, People's Dem. Rep.				○			○	16,114						●	●	●	■					○				○			
Latvia							○	2,826									○										■		

Country	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	
Lebanon		▲				● 325,000	○ 19,886		○		○ 1,8					○	●		○ 324		●						▲			
Lesotho					○										-	○						●	○ LDC	●					●	
Liberia		▲		○	●	● 110,000	● 335,467	●				●	●		●	●	●			○ 990			●	LDC			● HIPC		○	
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya															○	○				○ 115		○						□		
Liechtenstein															-															
Lithuania															-															
Luxembourg															-															
Madagascar					○										-		○							LDC	○		HIPC		●	
Malawi					●			●							○									LDC	○	●	● HIPC		●	
Malaysia															●	●	■					○			○		■		○	
Maldives					●			●						○	○	●	○						LDC				■			
Mali					○			●							-		○							LDC	○	○	HIPC		●	
Malta																														
Man Islands (UK)															-															
Marshall Islands															-															
Mauritania					●		● 31,131	●							○		○							LDC		●	HIPC		○	●
Mauritius															-												■			
Mexico				○		○ 11,000									●											○		○		
Micronesia (Fed. States)															-															
Monaco															-															
Mongolia															-												○			
Montserrat (UK)															-															
Morocco									○						○													■		
Mozambique															○										LDC	●	HIPC		●	
Myanmar				○		● 540,000	○ 161,006	●							●	●	●	○						LDC			HIPC	○		
Namibia										● 1,2																				



Country	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29		
Rwanda		●		○		○	○	○	○			○		●		○		■	●	2,753					LDC		●		●	●	
Saint Kitts and Nevis														●	-			○													
Saint Lucia														●	-			○													
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines															-			○		○											
Salomon Islands														○	○									LDC		●					
Samoa														●	-								LDC		○						
San Marino														○	-																
Sao Tome and Principe								●						●	-								LDC			●					
Saudi Arabia								●						○	●	○		●				○									
Senegal						○	○	●							○	○	■		○	○			LDC		○		○				
Serbia and Montenegro		○		○		●	●	●							●	●		●	●	●	●										
Seychelles								●							-																
Sierra Leone		●		○			○	●						○	○		■		○	○			LDC		●	●	○		●		
Singapore									○		○			●	○	○		●				○									
Slovakia																															
Slovenia																															
Somalia	●	○	NP			●	●	●						●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		LDC								
South Africa															○									○	○						
Spain																															
Sri Lanka	●	●	NP			●	○	●							●	●		■	●	●	○								○		
Sudan	●	○	NP	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	■		LDC				●	○	●	
Surinam															-			○													
Swaziland															○			○						○		●				●	
Sweden																															
Switzerland																															
Syria Arab Rep		●				●	○	●	●		○				●	●	●	●	○	○		○									

Country	Conflicts and peace-building			Humanitarian crises			Disarmament			Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law					Development				Gender issues and peace-building										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29
Taiwan																													
Tajikistan				○			○ 56,780								○							○							
Thailand	●							●						●		●				●				○			■		
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia				○		○ 1,200	○ 5,106								○								○				■		
Togo		●					○ 10,819	●						●				○ 753					○	LDC				HIPC	●
Tonga														●															
Trinidad and Tobago															○		■							○				■	
Tunisia															○		○	○ 150									■		
Turkey						○ 678,000	○ 174,574		○					○	○	○		● 4,539				●		○			■		
Turkmenistan		○				○								●		○						●		○					
Turks and Caicos I. (UK)																													
Tuvalu														●										LDC					
Uganda	●	▲	EX		●	● 1,800,000	○ 31,963	●			○				●		■	○ 455				○	LDC	○	○	○	HIPC	○	
Ukraine		○					○ 89,579							○	○	○		○ 547					○				■		
United Arab Emirates										○ 1,9				○	○		■					●							
United Kingdom																													
United Republic of Tanzania		○			●			●			○			○	○		■						○	LDC			○		●
United States of America															○		● 59							○	○			■	
Uruguay																									○				
Uzbekistan		●				○ 3,400	○ 7,288						●		●			○ 320					●				■		
Vanuatu														●										LDC		○			
Venezuela		○												○	○			○ 878					○		○		■		
Vietnam							○ 349,780		○ 0,6					○	●	●		○ 570											
Virgin Islands (USA)																													
Yemen								●						●	●							○	LDC					○	●
Zambia														○	○								○	LDC	○	○	○	○	○

Country	Conflicts and peace-building			Humanitarian crises			Disarmament			Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law						Development			Gender issues and peace-building												
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29		
Zimbabwe		●			●	●	○	●				●						■	●				○					○		●	
TOTAL	19	23			28	26	16	41	8	6	4	6	12	28	49	32	12	23	28	35	4	14	13		6	14	9	7	32		
	○				17	23	50		13	4	9	5	2	15	59	22		46	46		3	29	30	19	48	20		25			
	■																2	38			3						58	5			
	▲																4										6				
	□																											4			
HIPC/NP																															
LDC/EX			3																					50							

## Appendix II. Oil-producing countries on alert due to conflict/tensions, human rights, human development, governance and/or militarization

This table demonstrates how the **exploitation of oil resources** can be found at the **heart of a number of today's armed conflicts and situations of tension**, and also how **the income obtained** from the exploitation of these resources **does not always result in improvements in living conditions** for the ordinary population. Thus, 22 of the 49 oil-producing countries are also the scene of armed conflicts and tensions and, in many of these cases, the poor distribution of the income generated by this resource is one of the main causes of the problem. The most notable cases are **Algeria, Iraq, Nigeria and Sudan**. In addition, violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms are reported in 38 of the 49 countries listed (77%, i.e. more than two thirds). Of these 38, serious human rights violations are being perpetrated in 22, according to organisations like Amnesty International and HRW. The World Bank reports that 16 of the 49 countries suffer from poor governance, 7 of them in Africa. In three cases, **Russia, Kazakhstan and Congo**, the HDI is lower than it was in 1990, in spite of the fact that they all have plentiful oil resources. As regards oil reserves, the two countries that showed the greatest increase in existing reserves from the previous year were **Kazakhstan and Sudan**.

Countries and ranking (position in 2004)	World reserves (%) and estimated exploitation period remaining (years)	Conflict and/or tensions 2005 Indicators 1 & 2 (1)	Human rights 2005 Indicator 15 (2)	Countries with a HDI lower than 1990 and LDCs Indicator 24 (3)	Poor governance 2004 Indicator 23 (4)	Militarization Indicator 9 (5)
1. Saudi Arabia (1)	22.1% (67,8)		●			●
2. Iran (2)	11.1% (88,7)		●		○	
3. Iraq (3)	9.7% (+100)	●	●		●	
4. Kuwait (5)	8.3% (+100)		○			●
5. UAE (4)	8.2% (+100)		○			
14. Qatar (14)	1.3% (42)					
22. Oman (22)	0.5% (19.4)					●
29. Syria (33)	0.3% (16.1)	▲	●		○	●
34. Yemen (44)	0.2% (18.2)		●	LDC	○	●
<b>Total Middle East</b>	<b>61.7% (81.6)</b>	<b>2/9</b>	<b>7/9</b>		<b>4/9</b>	<b>5/9</b>
6. Venezuela (6)	6.8% (71.5)	○	○		○	
11. USA (10)	2.5% (11.1)		○			
12. Canada (12)	1.4% (14.9)					
15. Mexico (13)	1.2% (10.6)	○	●			
17. Brazil (17)	0.9% (19.9)		●			
24. Ecuador (23)	0.4% (29.6)	▲	○			
35. Argentina (29)	0.2% (9.7)		○			
36. Peru (34)	0.1% (27.3)	▲	●			
39. Trinidad. and Tob. (30)	0,1% (17,5)		○			
44. Colombia (43)	0.1% (7.6)	●	●			●
<b>Total America</b>	<b>13.6% (***)</b>	<b>5/10</b>	<b>9/10</b>		<b>1/10</b>	<b>1/10</b>
7. Russian Federation (7)	6.1% (21.3)	●	●	●		●
8. Kazakhstan (18)	3.3% (83.6)			●	○	
18. Norway (16)	0.8% (8.3)					
20. Azerbaijan (20)	0.6% (60.2)	▲	○		○	
27. United Kingdom (26)	0.4% (6)					
38. Italy (36)	0.1% (19.3)					

Countries and ranking (position in 2004)	World reserves (%) and estimated exploitation period remaining (years)	Conflict and/or tensions 2005 Indicators 1 & 2 (1)	Human rights 2005 Indicator 15 (2)	Countries with a HDI lower than 1990 and LDCs Indicator 24 (3)	Poor governance 2004 Indicator 23 (4)	Militarization Indicator 9 (5)
43. Denmark (40)	0.1% (9.2)					
45. Romania (35)	0.05% (10.8)		○			
46. Uzbekistan (39)	0.05% (10.6)	▲	●		●	
47. Turkmenistan (48)	0.05% (7.4)	○	●		●	
<b>Total Europe and Central Asia</b>	<b>11,7% (21,6)</b>	<b>4/10</b>	<b>5/10</b>		<b>4/10</b>	<b>1/10</b>
9. Libya (8)	3.3% (66.5)		○		○	
10. Nigeria (9)	3.0% (38.4)	●○	●		○	
16. Algeria (15)	1.0% (16.7)	●	●			
19. Angola (19)	0.7% (24.3)	○	○	LDC	○	●
21. Sudan (42)	0.5% (57.3)	●○	●	LDC	●	
30. Egypt (28)	0.3% (13.8)	▲	●			
31. Gabon (31)	0.2% (26.6)					
32. Congo (37)	0.2% (20.3)	○	○	●	○	
37. Tunisia (46)	0.1% (25.2)		○			
40. Chad (49)	0.1% (14.6)	▲	○		●	
42. Guinea E. (50)	0.1% (10)	○	○	LDC	○	
49. S.Tome and Pincipe (51)	3000-8000**			LDC		
<b>Total Africa</b>	<b>9.4% (33.1)</b>	<b>8/12</b>	<b>10/12</b>		<b>7/12</b>	<b>1/12</b>
13. China (11)	1.4% (13.4)		●			
23. India (21)	0.5% (18.6)	●○	●			
25. Malaysia (27)	0.4% (12.9)		●			
26. Indonesia (25)	0.4% (11.5)	○	●			
28. Australia (24)	0.3% (20.4)					
33. Vietnam (32)	0.2% (19)		●			
41. Brunei (38)	0.1% (13.6)		○			
48. Thailand (41)	0.05% (6.3)	●	●			
<b>Total Asia and Pacific</b>	<b>3.5% (14.2)</b>	<b>3/8</b>	<b>7/8</b>	<b>0/8</b>	<b>0/8</b>	<b>0/8</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100% (40.5)</b>	<b>22/49</b>	<b>38/49</b>	<b>3/49, 5 LDC</b>	<b>16/49</b>	<b>7/49</b>

● (1) Countries in armed conflict, (2) Countries with **serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms** according to non-governmental sources, (3) Countries with a Human Development Index (HDI) lower than in 1990, (4) Countries with poor governance, (5) Countries with military spending exceeding 4% of GDP.

▲ (1) Situations of extreme tension and high-risk disputes.

○ (1) Situations of lesser tension, (2) Countries with **violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms** according to non-governmental sources.

○ (4) Countries with poor governance

NDA = No data available

\* Estimate 2003. \*\* Reserves estimated in millions of barrels.\*\*\*The estimated period for America is 11.8 years for North America and 40.9 years for Central and South America.

Source: Prepared by the authors from several indicators in this report and *BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2005*.

<[http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp\\_internet/globalbp/globalbp\\_uk\\_english/publications/energy\\_reviews\\_2005/STAGING/local\\_assets/downloads/pdf/oil\\_sec-tion\\_2005.pdf](http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/publications/energy_reviews_2005/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/oil_sec-tion_2005.pdf)>.

## Appendix III. Multilateral peace missions

At the end of 2005 there were **15 UN peace-keeping missions, 2 political missions directed and supported by the UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations and a further 10 UN political and peace-building missions supported by the UN Department of Political Affairs** in operation around the world, 13 of which were in Africa. The peace-keeping missions comprise around 70,000 troops (85,000 if all mission personnel are included), with more than 2,300 working in the political and peace-building missions. This means that in 2005, more specifically in the month of November, the highest number of peace-keeping troops in the organisation's history was reached, though this figure fell back again in December with the completion of the peace-keeping mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The cost of these missions for 2005-2006 comes to a total of around **5,000 million dollars**<sup>1</sup>. In spite of being higher than the 2004-2005 figure (4,000 million dollars), this amount represents only **0.5% of worldwide military spending** (which totalled around one billion dollars in 2005), and is much lower than the 120,000 million dollars that the different armed conflicts around the world cost each year. The United Nations is having to face numerous challenges as regards the political, logistical, financial, recruitment and security problems arising from the imminent creation or expansion of a number of missions, and these will reach an unprecedented scale in the organisation's history with the regional and international attempts to end the conflict in Somalia and the expansion of the UN peace-keeping mission in southern Sudan (UNMIS). However, the **shortages and problems** seen in recent years show no signs of abating, such as the significant proportion of mission troops who have insufficient training in peace-keeping and peace-building duties, and the assumption by military personnel of civilian duties that should be responsibility of humanitarian workers. At the same time, the multi-dimensional work that began with the end of the Cold War is gradually being consolidated, and it is now felt that the failures of the organisation (and more specifically the UN Security Council) in the case of Somalia (complete withdrawal at the beginning of 2005), the Srebrenica massacre (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995) and the Rwandan genocide (1994), which led to the reduction of UN involvement, are now a thing of the past, given that, as mentioned above, the creation and expansion of new missions in the coming year will represent a development that is unprecedented in the organisation's history.

Along with the United Nations, other more regional organisations have gradually become more involved in political and peace-building duties, such as the **OSCE** (with 18 missions in Europe and Central Asia), **NATO** (three missions), the **EU** (11 missions), the **CIS** (three missions), **CEMAC** (one mission), the **AU** (one mission, with another planned for 2006) and other multilateral organisations organised by groups of countries. Among these, particular mention should be made of the **EU**, which in 2005 put 10 political missions, training missions and operations to support existing missions in place. This meant the further strengthening of the multilateralism and collective security represented by the United Nations. Particularly notable was the introduction of the AMM, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (run jointly by the EU and ASEAN), the first time the EU has taken part in this type of operation in Asia.

1. The budget for 2005-2006 is 5,030 million dollars, which excludes the approximate cost of the three missions established in recent months (UNOCI in Côte D'Ivoire, MINUSTAH in Haiti and UNOB in Burundi).

UN peace Operations (15 PKO, 2 PO/PKO <sup>2</sup> , 10 PO and PBO)				
Country (beginning-end of armed conflict)	Existence and type of mission <sup>3</sup> (resolution, mandate)	Beginning-end of mission	Soldiers/Military observers/Police	Special Representative/head of mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed)
<b>ÁFRICA</b>				
Continent of Africa				Special Adviser for Africa, Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria) (1997)
Region of West Africa	UNOWA, SR's Office (PO) since 03/02			SR Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania) (2002)
Great Lakes region	SR's Office (PO) since 19/12/97			SR Ibrahima Fall (Senegal) (2002)
Burundi (1993-)	ONUB <sup>4</sup> (PKM) S/RES/1545	June 2004	5,336/189/87	SR C. McAskie (Canada) (2004)
Congo, DR (1998-)	MONUC (PKM) S/RES/1279	Nov. 1999	15,051/724/786	SR William Lacy Swing (USA) (2003)
Côte d'Ivoire (2002-)	UNOCI <sup>5</sup> (PKM) S/RES/1528	April 2004	6,701/195/674	SR Albert Tévoédjrè (Benin) (2004), replaced by SR Pierre Schori (Sweden) (2005)
Eritrea-Ethiopia (1998-2000)	UNMEE (PKM) S/RES/1312	July 2000	3,132/205/...	SR Legwaila Joseph Legwaila (Botswana) (2000) and SE Lloyd Axworthy (Canada) (2004)
Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999)	UNOGBIS (PBO) S/RES/1216	March 1999	.../2/1	SR Joao Bernardo Honwana (Mozambique) (2004)
Liberia (1989-)	UNMIL (PKM) S/RES/1509	Sept. 2003	8,387/107/312	SR Jacques Paul Klein (USA) (2003), replaced by SR Alan Doss (United Kingdom) (2005)
Morocco-Western Sahara * (1975-)	MINURSO (PKM) S/RES/690	Sept. 1991	28/195/6	SR Álvaro de Soto (Peru) (2004) replaced by SR Francesco Bastagli (Italy) (2005)
Central African Republic (1996-2000) (2002-2003)	BONUCA <sup>6</sup> (PBO) S/RES/1271	Feb. 2000	.../5/6	SR Lamine Sissé (Senegal) (2001)
Sierra Leone (1991-2001)	**UNAMSIL <sup>7</sup> (PKM) S/RES/1270 ended 31/12/05	Oct. 1999	11,278/269/130	SR Daudi Ngelautwa Mwakawago (Tanzania)
Sierra Leone (1991-2001)	UNIOSIL (PBO) S/RES/1620	Effective as of January 2006	.../.../...	Executive Representative Victor da Silva Angelo (Portugal) (2006)
Somalia (1988-)	UNPOS <sup>8</sup> (PO) S/RES/954	April 1995		SR Winston A. Tubman (Liberia) (2002) replaced by François Lonseny Fall (Guinea) (2005)
Sudan (1983-2004)	UNMIS <sup>9</sup> (PKM) S/RES/1590	March 2005	3,638/362/222	SR Jan Pronk (Netherlands) (2004)

2. The UNOTIL (Timor-Leste) and UNAMA (Afghanistan) political missions are directed and supported by the UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations.

3. Peace-keeping Operation (PKO), Political Office or Mission (PO) and Peace-building Operation (PBO).

4. The original AU mission (AMIB) was integrated into ONUB in June 2004.

5. A UN political mission (MINUCI, S/RES/1479) had been in place since May 2003, and this was joined by 1,300 ECOWAS troops (ECOMICI, ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire) in April 2004, with support from 4,000 French troops (Operation Licorne).

6. MINURCA (1998-2000) (PKO).

7. UNOMSIL (1998-1999) (PKO).

8. UNOSOM I (1992-1993) UNITAF (1992-1993, USA with a UN Security Council mandate) UNOSOM II (1993-1995) (PKM). Resolution S/RES/954 agreed the closure of UNOSOM II and established that the UN would continue observing events in Somalia through a Political Office based in Kenya.

9. The duties of the UNAMIS political mission (created in 2004) were passed on to UNMIS in Resolution S/RES/1590 in March 2005.

UN peace Operations (continuation)				
Country (beginning-end of armed conflict)	Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate)	Beginning-end of mission	Soldiers/Military observers/Police	Special Representative/head of mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed)
<b>AMERICA</b>				
Region of Latin America				SA Diego Cordovez (Ecuador) (1999)
<i>Colombia (1964-)</i>		Nov. 2002 – Jan. 2005		**SA James LeMoynes (USA) (2002)
Guyana-Venezuela				SR for the border dispute between the two countries, Oliver Jackman (Barbados) (1999)
Haiti (2004-)	MINUSTAH (PKM) S/RES/1542	June 2004	7,265/.../1,741	SR Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile) (2004)
<b>ASIA</b>				
Afghanistan <sup>10</sup> (2002-)	UNAMA (PO) S/RES/1401	March 2002	.../11/6	SR Jean Arnault (France) (2002) replaced by SR Tom Koenings (Germany), 27/12/05
<i>Bougainville-Papua New Guinea (1975-1997)</i>	**UNOMB <sup>11</sup> (PO)	Jan. 2004 – June 2005		Head of PO, Tor Stenbock (Norway) (2004)
Cambodia (1975-1979)		Nov. 2005		SR for the human rights situation, Yash Gay (Kenya), 01/11/05
India-Pakistan* (1946-)	UNMOGIP <sup>12</sup> (PKM) S/RES/91	January 1949	.../42/...	Military head of the observer mission, General Guido Palmieri (Italy), replaced by General Dragutin Repinc (Croatia), 12/12/05
Myanmar				SE Razzali Ismail (Malaysia) (2000)
Tajikistan (1992-1997)	UNTOP (PO)	June 2000	.../.../1	SR Vladimir Sotirov (Bulgaria) (2002)
Timor-Leste (1975-1999)	UNOTIL <sup>13</sup> (PO) S/RES/1599	May 2005	.../15/56	SR Sukehiro Hasegawa (Japan) (2004)
<b>EUROPA</b>				
Continent of Europe				No special adviser <sup>14</sup>
Cyprus*(1974-)	UNFICYP (PKM) S/RES/186	March 1964	840/.../68	SR Zbigniew Wlosowicz (Poland) (2000), replaced by Michael Moller (Denmark), 01/01/06
FYR Macedonia-Greece				Personal Envoy for talks between the two countries, Matthew Nimetz (USA) (1999)

10. This current phase of the armed conflict began with the attack by the USA and the United Kingdom in October 2001, though the country has been in armed conflict since 1979.

11. UNPOB (1998-2004) (PO).

12. UNIPOM (1965-1966) (PKM).

13. UNTAET (1999-2002) (PKM), UNMISSET (2002-2005) (PKM).

14. The UN Secretary General's former Special Adviser for European Affairs, Jean-Bernard Merimée (France), officially resigned his post in 2002, and is currently appearing before the courts as a result of his involvement in the UN "Oil for Food" corruption scandal in Iraq. However, until October 2005, Jean-Bernard Merimée still featured as a Special Adviser in the United Nations organisation chart, a fact that has given rise to an important controversy.

UN peace Operations (continuation)				
Country (beginning-end of armed conflict)	Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate)	Beginning-end of mission	Soldiers/Military observers/Police	Special Representative/head of mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed)
Georgia (Abkhazia)* (1992-1993)	UNOMIG (PKM) S/RES/849 S/RES/858	August 1993	.../122/11	SR Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland) (2002)
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo) (1998-1999)	UNMIK (PKM) S/RES/1244	June 1999	.../36/2,188	SR Soren Jessen-Petersen (Denmark) (2004) SE for the future state of Kosovo, Marti Ahtisaari (Finland) (2005)
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>				
Iraq (2003-)	UNAMI (PO) S/RES/1500	August 2003	.../4/...	SR Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan) (2004)
Iraq-Kuwait (1990 - 1991)				High Level Coordinator for Iraq's compliance with its obligations regarding the repatriation and return of Kuwaitis and other third-party nationals, Yuli Vorontsov (Russian Federation) (2000)
Israel-Palestine <sup>15</sup> (1948-)	UNSCO <sup>16</sup> (PO)	May 1948		SA for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative for the PLO and the PLNA, Álvaro de Soto (Peru), 06/05/05
Israel-Syria (Golan Heights) (1967, 1973)	UNDOF(PKM)	June 1974	1,047/.../...	Head of mission, General Bala Nanda Sharma (Nepal) (2004)
Israel-Lebanon (1967, 1982-2000)	UNIFIL (PKM) S/RES/425 S/RES/426	March 1978	1,994/.../...	SR Steffan de Mistura (Sweden) replaced by SR Geir O. Pedersen (Norway), 29/03/05
Middle East (1948-)	UNTSO(PKM) S/RES/50	June 1948	.../153/...	SE Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway) (1999)
<b>OSCE operations (18 missions)<sup>17</sup></b>				
<b>CENTRAL ASIA</b>				
Central Asia				OSCE President's Personal Envoy for Central Asia, Martti Ahtisaari (Finland)
Kazakhstan	OSCE Centre in Almaty (PC/DEC 243, 23/07/98)	January 1999		Ambassador Ivar Kristian Vikki (Norway)
Kyrgyzstan	OSCE Centre in Bishek, PC/DEC 245, 23/07/98	January 1999		Ambassador Markus Mueller (Switzerland)
Tajikistan	OSCE Centre in Dushanbe, Min. Council, 01/12/93	Feb. 1994	.../16/...	Ambassador Alain Couanon (France)
Turkmenistan	OSCE Centre in Ashgabad (PC/DEC 244, 23/07/98)	January 1999		Ambassador Ibrahim Djikic (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
Uzbekistan	OSCE Centre in Tashkent, PC/DEC 397, 14/12/00) <sup>18</sup>	1995		Ambassador Miroslav Jenca (Slovakia)

15. Although the armed conflict began in 1948, this report only examines the most recent phase of the conflict which began with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Intifada in September 2000.

16. UNEF I (1956-1967) (PKM) UNEF II (1973-1979) (PKM).

17. Troop deployment figures refer to 2004, and exact figures are not available for the countries not shown. See <<http://www.osce.org/about/13510.html>>.

18. Formally the Central Asia Liaison Office, PC/DEC 28 of 16/03/95.

<b>OSCE operations (18 missions) (continuation)</b>				
<b>Country (beginning-end of armed conflict)</b>	<b>Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate)</b>	<b>Beginning-end of mission</b>	<b>Soldiers/Military observers/Police</b>	<b>Special Representative/head of mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed)</b>
<b>CAUCASUS</b>				
Armenia	OSCE Office in Yerevan, PC/DEC 314, 22/07/99	Feb. 2000		Ambassador Vladimir Pryakhin (Russian Federation)
Azerbaijan	OSCE Mission in Baku, PC/DEC 318, 16/11/99	July 2000		Ambassador Maurizio Pavesi (Italy)
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) (1991-1994)	Personal Rep. of the President of the Minsk Conference	August 1995		Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk (Poland)
Georgia (1992-1993)	OSCE Mission in Georgia CSO 06/11/92	December 1992 .../144/...		Ambassador Roy Stephen Reeve (United Kingdom)
<b>EASTERN EUROPE</b>				
Belarus	OSCE Office in Minsk, PC/DEC 526, 30/12/02	January 2003		Ambassador Ake Peterson (Sweden)
Moldova, Rep. of	OSCE Mission in Moldova CSO 04/02/93	Feb. 1993		Ambassador William H. Hill (USA)
Ukraine	Coordination Project in Ukraine <sup>19</sup> , PC/DEC 295 01/06/99	June 1999		Ambassador James F. Schumaker (USA)
<b>SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE</b>				
Albania	OSCE presence in Albania, PC/DEC 160, 27/03/97	April 1997		Ambassador Pavel Vacek (Czech Rep.)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	OSCE Mission in B&H, MC/5/DEC 18/12/95	December 1995 .../142/...		Ambassador Douglas Davidson (USA)
Croatia (1991-1995)	OSCE Mission in Croatia PC/DEC 112, 18/04/96	July 1996		Ambassador Jorge Fuentes Monzonis-Villalonga (Spain)
Macedonia, FYR	OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission in Skopje CSO 18/09/92	September 1992		Ambassador Carlos Pais (Portugal)
Serbia and Montenegro	OmiSaM (OSCE Mission in Serbia and Montenegro), PC/DEC 401, 11/01/01	March 2001 .../.../30		Ambassador Douglas Wake (USA)
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo) (1998-1999)	OMiK (OSCE Mission in Kosovo) PC/DEC 305, 01/07/99	July 1999		Ambassador Werner Wnendt (Germany)
<b>NATO missions (3 missions)</b>				
Afghanistan (2002-)	ISAF S/RES/1386	December 2001 9,200/.../...		
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	**SFOR <sup>20</sup> S/RES/1088	December 1996 7,000/.../...		
Iraq (2003-)	NTIM-I, NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq, S/RES/1546	August 2004 65/.../...		
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo) (1998-1999)	KFOR S/RES/1244	June 1999 18,000/.../...		

19. Replaced the OSCE mission in Ukraine (1994-1999) devoted to managing the crisis in the Crimea.

20. SFOR was established in December 1996 to replace IFOR, which was created to implement the military elements in the Dayton Agreement of 1995. IN 2004, NATO decided to close the mission, and although it was replaced by EUFOR ALTHEA, a reduced military presence remains operational.

## EU operations (11 missions and 11 SR)

Country (beginning-end of armed conflict)	Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate)	Beginning-end of mission	Soldiers/Military observers/Police	Special Representative/head of mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed)
<b>EUROPE AND ASIA</b>				
Asia Central (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan)	Joint Action 2005/588/PESC	July 2005		SR Jan Kubis (Slovakia), 18/07/05
Balkans	Council Decision, 2005/912/EC of 12/12/05			Special Coordinator for the Stability Pact in South-eastern Europe, Erhard Busek (Austria), 12/12/05
Southern Caucasus	Joint Action 2005/496/PESC	July 2003		SR Heikki Talvitie (Finland) (2003)
Afghanistan <sup>21</sup> (2002-)	Joint Action 2001/875/PESC reformed 25/06/02	July 2002		SR Francesc Vendrell (Spain) (2002)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	Office of the High Representative and Special Representative of the EU in B&H	December 1995		SR Lord Ashdown (United Kingdom) (2002)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	EUPM, EU Police Mission in B&H Joint Action 2002/210/PESC	January 2003	.../.../479	
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	EUFOR ALTHEA <sup>22</sup> , EU Military Operation in B&H Joint Action 2004/523/PESC	December 2004	7,000/.../...	
Georgia	**EUJUST THEMIS, Justice Reform Mission in Georgia Joint Action 2004/523/PESC	July 2004-14/07/05		
Indonesia (Aceh) (1976-2005)	AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission) (EU + ASEAN) Joint Action 2005/643/PESC	September 2005	.../130+96/...	
Macedonia, FYR	EUPAT <sup>23</sup> , EU Police Advisory Team in FYR Macedonia, Joint Action 2005/826/PESC	December 2005		SR Erwan Fouéré (Ireland), 17/10/05
Macedonia, FYR	EUPOL Proxima <sup>24</sup> , EU Police Mission in FYR Macedonia Joint Action 2003/681/PESC	December 2003	.../.../184	SR Michael Sahlin (Sweden), replaced by SR Erwan Fouéré (Ireland), 17/10/05
Moldova	EU Special Representative's Office for Moldova Joint Action 2005/776/PESC	March 2005		SR Adrian Jacobovits de Szeged (Netherlands), 23/03/05
Moldova-Ukraine	EU Border Mission for Moldova and Ukraine	November 2005		
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo) (1998-1999)	EU's Council for Foreign Relations and General Affairs	November 2005		EU representative for the process to decide the future status of Kosovo, Stephan Lehne (Austria), 07/11/05

21. This current phase of the armed conflict began with the attack by the USA and the United Kingdom in October 2001, though the country has been in armed conflict since 1979.

22. The UN Security Council prepared Resolution S/RES/1551 of 09/07/04 to provide the mission with a mandate under the Council's guidance. This mission is a continuation of NATO's SFOR mission and holds the mandate to implement the Dayton Agreement of 1995.

23. EUPAT became the continuation of EUPOL Proxima from December 2005, and it must carry out its duties in coordination with the EU's Special Representative, Erwan Fouéré (Ireland)

24. The EU previously had a mission in FYR Macedonia, called CONCORDIA, which ceased operations on 15/12/03. CONCORDIA had itself been the continuation of Allied Harmony, the NATO mission in FYR Macedonia, which began in December 2002 and completed its duties on 31/03/03.

EU operations (11 missions and 11 SR) (continuation)				
Country (beginning-end of armed conflict)	Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate)	Beginning-end of mission	Soldiers/Military observers/Police	Special Representative/head of mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed)
<b>AFRICA</b>				
Great Lakes	Joint Action, OJ L 87, 04/04/96	March 1996		EU SE for the Great Lakes region, Aldo Ajello (Italy) (1996)
Congo, DR (1998-)	EUPOL Kinshasa, EU Police Mission in DR Congo Joint Action 2004/847/PESC	January 2005	.../.../30	
Congo, DR (1998-)	EUSEC DR Congo, Mission to Assist Security Sector Reform in DR Congo Joint Action 2005/355/PESC	June 2005	8/.../...	
Sudan	EU Special Representative's Office for Sudan Joint Action 2005/556/PESC			SR Pekka Haavisto (Finland), 18/07/05
Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)	AMIS EU Supporting Action for the AU Joint Action 2005/557/PESC	July 2005		SR Pekka Haavisto (Finland), 18/07/05
<b>MIDDLE EAST</b>				
Middle East (1948-)	EU Special Representative's Office for the Middle East Peace Process	November 1996		SR for the Middle East Peace Process, Marc Otte (Belgium) (2003)
Iraq (2003-)	EUJUST LEX, Integrated EU mission for the rule of law in Iraq Joint Action 2005/190/PESC	March 2005		
Israel-Palestine (1948-)	EU BAM Rafah, Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point Joint Action 2005/889/PESC	November 2005	.../.../70	
Israel-Palestine (1948-)	EUPOL COPPS <sup>25</sup> , an EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories is created within the EU Special Representative's Office for the Middle East, Decision 13696/05	Effective as of January 2006	.../.../33	
<b>Operations by Russia and the Community of Independent States (CIS)</b>				
Georgia (South Ossetia)	Joint Force for South Ossetia (Bilateral, 24/06/92)	July 1992	.../1,041/40	
Georgia (Abkhazia)	CIS Peace-Keeping Force in Georgia	June 1994	1,872/.../...	
Moldova, Rep. (TransDniester)	Peace-Keeping Force of the Joint Monitoring Commission (Bilateral, 21/07/92)	July 1992	1.272/10/...	
<b>CEMAC</b>				
Central African Republic (Oct. 2002 - March 2003)	CEMAC Multinational Force in CAR, Libreville Summit, 02/10/02	December 2002	380/.../...	

25. Mission resulting from the prior work done by the EU's Coordination Office to Support the Palestinian Police (EU COPPS), established in April 2005.

<b>AU</b>				
<b>Country (beginning-end of armed conflict)</b>	<b>Existence and type of mission (resolution, mandate)</b>	<b>Beginning-end of mission</b>	<b>Soldiers/Military observers/Police</b>	<b>Special Representative/head of mission (SR) Special Envoy (SE) Personal Envoy (PE) and Special Adviser (SA) (year appointed)</b>
Somalia (1988-)	AU Mission Planned for 2006			
Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)	AMIS (AU Mission in Sudan)		.../5.623/1.309 <sup>26</sup>	
<b>Other operations</b>				
Korea, DPR – Korea, Rep.	NSC (Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission) Armistice Agreement	July 1953	.../5/...	
Salomon Islands	RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission Salomon Islands (Biketawa Declaration)	July 2003	100/.../259	
Israel-Palestine (1948-)	TIPH 2 (Temporary International Presence in Hebron)	January 1997		
Egypt (Sinai)	Multinational Observer Force (Protocol to the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel of 26/03/1979)	April 1982	.../1.686/...	
Iraq (2003-)	Multinational Force in Iraq (USA-United Kingdom) S/RES/1511	Oct. 2003	183.000 <sup>27</sup>	
Côte d'Ivoire (2002-)	Operation Licorne (France)	February 2003	5.000	

\*Situations engaged in unresolved conflicts in 2004 (see the chapter on peace processes). The case of India-Pakistan is analysed from the point of view of a peace process.

\*\*In italics, missions that ended during 2005.

26. On 16 December 2005, <[www.irinnews.org](http://www.irinnews.org)>

27. Of this figure, 160,000 come from the USA, and the remaining 23,000 come from the other countries forming the Multinational Force in Iraq. See O'Hanlon, Michael E.; Kamp, Nina, *Iraq Index*, Brookings Institution, 5 January 2006, <[www.brookings.edu/iraqindex/](http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex/)>

## Appendix IV. Elections held during the course of the year in post-war rehabilitation contexts

Countries in a process of post-war rehabilitation	Date on which elections were held	Elections held since the beginning of the rehabilitation process	Results	International observation
<b>Afghanistan (2001)</b>	18 September 2005. Parliamentary and Provincial Council elections	Second. The first, Presidential elections, were held in 2004.	Parliament was divided into four groups: first, former members of armed groups linked with the northern alliance; second, independents, technocrats and tribal leaders with no party affiliation; third, the former communists; and finally, former members of the Taliban regime.	More than 500 complaints of fraud were recorded.
<b>Angola (2002)</b>	The last elections were the presidential and parliamentary elections of 1992.			
<b>Congo (2003)</b>	September 2005. Partial elections for the Senate	Second. The first Parliamentary and Senate elections were held in 2002.	The Congolese Workers Party led by President D. Sassou-Nguesso won 21 seats.	
<b>DR Congo (2003)</b>	General elections planned but postponed until March 2006. Constitutional referendum, 18 December 2005.			
<b>Côte d'Ivoire (2003)</b>	Postponed until October 2005			
<b>Eritrea (2000)</b>	Democratic elections have never been held.			
<b>Iraq (2003)</b>	1. January. General elections for a National Assembly which will be responsible for drawing up the Constitution. 2. October. Referendum to ratify the Constitution. 3. December. General elections for a permanent Government.	Not held until this year.	1. 14 parties obtained a sufficient number of votes to take seats in the assembly, the United Iraqi Alliance gaining the largest share of the vote at 48.19%. 2. The Constitution was approved by 73% of voters. 3. The Shiite coalition obtained 128 of the 275 seats, 19 fewer than needed for an absolute majority. The Kurdish parties obtained 53 and the Sunni coalition 44. (Provisional results)	1. Irregularities in the process, technical difficulties in casting votes and scant independent international supervision. 2. Boycotts and fraud in some provinces. 3. 2,000 complaints were registered, and the observers present could not reach agreement on whether or not they were free and transparent.
<b>Liberia (2003)</b>	Presidential and parliamentary elections. 11 October and 7 November 2005, first and second rounds respectively.	Second. The first took place in 1997.	The Unity Party (UP) won the second round with almost 60% of the vote.	Declared free and transparent by all the observers present, despite complaints of fraud voiced by runner-up G. Weah.
<b>Macedonia, FYR (2001)</b>	13 March 2005. Municipal elections	Parliamentary elections in 1998. Presidential elections in 2004.	The SDSM governmental coalition won in 25 districts	The largest Macedonian party, the VMRO-NP, the OSCE (ODIHR) and the USA stated that the elections did not meet international standards
<b>Sierra Leone (2001)</b>	The last elections were the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2002.			
<b>Sudan (South) (2004)</b>	The last elections were the presidential elections of 2000.			
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996)</b>	The last elections were the municipal elections of October 2004			
<b>Guatemala (1996)</b>	The last elections were the presidential elections of 1999 and 2003 and the parliamentary elections of 2003.			

Countries in a process of post-war rehabilitation	Date on which elections were held	Elections held since the beginning of the rehabilitation process	Results	International observation
<b>Guinea-Bissau (1999)</b>	19 June and 24 July 2005, first and second rounds respectively. Presidential elections.	The third presidential elections (previously held in 1999 and 2000). Parliamentary elections held in 2004.	J.B. "Nino" Vieira of the PAIGC with almost 53% of the vote in the second round.	International observers states that they took place in free, fair and transparent conditions.
<b>Rwanda (1994)</b>	The last elections were the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2003.			
<b>Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo) (1999)</b>	To date, two municipal elections have been held (2000 and 2002) and two sets of elections for the National Kosovo Assembly (2001 and 2004).			
<b>Tajikistan (1997)</b>	27 February and 13 March, first and second rounds respectively. Parliamentary elections.	Second parliamentary elections, the first being held in 2000. Presidential elections held in 1999.	The party in power, the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan with 74% of the vote.	Did not meet international standards according to the observers present.
<b>Timor-Leste (1999)</b>	The last elections were the presidential elections of April 2002, which were won by X. Gusmao with almost 83% of the vote.			

Elections were held in eight post-war contexts, preparations were underway for them to be held in one other, and in three such contexts (Cote d'Ivoire, DR Congo and Haiti) they had to be postponed. The holding of elections following an armed conflict conforms to a series of specific objectives. Firstly, there is the need on the part of the international community to gain legitimacy for the people with which it is dealing through the ballot box, a necessary step if it is to obtain funds from donors, among other things. In addition, the ballot box must replace the gun when it comes to allocating positions of power, though this does not always work. An example of this is the case of Angola and the parliamentary elections of 1992, when UNITA decided to resume the armed conflict in order to obtain the political advantage that it failed to gain via the ballot box.

The holding of elections is one of the first steps towards democratisation, given that the process of preparing and planning elections includes a series of elements that are inherent in a democratic society, such as the organisation of political parties, the completion of an electoral register, the establishment of an independent national electoral commission, the drawing up and approval of electoral law, the development of various media outlets to ensure fair and plural coverage of the process, support for political activities with security guarantees, the mobilisation of voters, etc. This in turn helps to encourage organisational structures within civilian society and support those established by the political parties themselves. Elections also offer armed groups the possibility of turning themselves into political parties, thus greatly reducing the possibility of a return to violence.

The holding of elections is one of the elements that marks a change from a transitional Government to an elected one, and it is therefore critical that the process should be as credible as possible in the eyes of the electorate and the political parties involved, so that both the process itself and the results gain as wide an acceptance as possible. A stable security situation is the best guarantee of greater participation by the electorate, and it is therefore vitally important to ensure correct implementation of processes aimed at disarming, demobilising and reintegrating former combatants.

## Appendix V. Donor response and CAP balance sheet for 2005

Response from donors during 2005				
Main Humanitarian Appeals <sup>1</sup>	Main bodies receiving aid <sup>2</sup>	Main sectors receiving aid <sup>3</sup>	Main donors <sup>4</sup>	TOTAL <sup>5</sup>
<b>Aid provided via the United Nations<sup>6</sup></b>				
1. Tsunami Flash Appeal (83%)	1. WFP	1. Food	1. USA (29.5%)	2,954 million dollars
2. Great Lakes (74%)	2. UNICEF	2. Education	2. Japan (10.8%)	
3. Angola Marburg Flash Appeal (72%)	3. UNHCR	3. Coordination	3. Private (8.2%)	
4. Benin Flash Appeal (64%)	4. UNDP	4. Housing	4. ECHO (EU) (5.9%)	
5. Eritrea (51%)	5. UNRWA	5. Economic recovery and infrastructure	5. United Kingdom (5.7%)	
<b>Overall Humanitarian Aid<sup>7</sup></b>				
	1. WFP	1. Multi-sector	1. Private (43.3%)	9,812 million dollars
	2. UNICEF	2. Food	2. USA (13.7%)	
	3. Bilateral	3. Health	3. Japon (6.42%)	
	4. Caritas/ Deutsche Caritas Verband	4. Economic recovery and infrastructure	4. ECHO (EU) (4.4%)	
	5. American Red Cross	5. Coordination	5. United Kingdom (3.6%)	

1. Made every year by the United Nations. The percentage shows the ones that have so far attracted the most financing from the international community, regardless of the amount requested.

2. United Nations agencies or NGOs that have so far attracted the majority of aid

3. Main sectors in which agencies or NGOs have decided to focus aid


4. Donors who have provided the largest amount of aid, regardless of their GDP

5. Total amount provided for humanitarian crises up to 30 June 2004

6. Multilateral humanitarian aid

7. Humanitarian aid provided outside the United Nations framework

Source: Reliefweb, <<http://www.reliefweb.int/fts>>.



## Appendix VI. Natural disasters during 2005

Appendix VI. Natural disasters that occurred during 2005	
Type of disaster	Country or countries affected (date)
<b>Avalanche</b>	• Tajikistan (February)
<b>Cyclone</b>	• Cook Islands / Tokelau Islands (March)
<b>Volcanic eruption</b>	• Comoros (April and November)
	• El Salvador (October)
	• Vanuatu (December)
<b>Hurricane</b>	• Caribbean (July and October)
	• Nicaragua (October)
<b>Fires</b>	• Indonesia (August)
<b>Floods</b>	• Afghanistan (June)
	• Bulgaria (July)
	• Central African Republic (August)
	• China (June and September)
	• Colombia (February)
	• Costa Rica (January and September)
	• El Salvador (October)
	• Horn of Africa (April)
	• Georgia (April)
	• Guatemala (October)
	• India (July)
	• Kyrgyzstan (June)
	• Macedonia (August)
	• Pakistan (February and July)
	• Romania (June y July)
	• Serbia and Montenegro (April)
	• Sierra Leone (August)
	• Tajikistan (July)
	• Venezuela (February)
<b>Extreme temperatures</b>	• Afghanistan (February)
<b>Earthquake</b>	• Southern Asia (October)
	• Chile (June)
	• China (November)
	• Indonesia (March)
	• Iran (February)
<b>Typhoon</b>	• Vietnam (September)
<b>Storms</b>	• Uruguay (August)
<b>Tropical storms</b>	• Honduras (November)

Source: United Nations.

## Appendix VII. Main new elements introduced in the Common Position on Exports of Military Technology and Equipment

The EU's Code of Conduct<sup>1</sup> was the first code to be established at an international level in relation to the arms trade, and is one of the most extensive of its kind. However, the criteria on which it is based are not sufficiently clear and detailed, and they fail to attribute responsibility to individual states as far as international legislation is concerned. After this latest review, five years on from its adoption, the Code will now be known as the Common Position on Exports of Military Technology and Equipment (CEMTEQ). Although this represents a positive advance in certain ways, NGOs still classify it as timid. This review also represents another step towards the adoption of an International Arms Trade Treaty, and it can be summarised in the following way:

- **Clarification and expansion of the Code's reach**

- *Replacement of the term "weapons" with "military equipment"*: This is more correct and more suited to the products included in the EU's List of Military Equipment (certain products, such as simulators and logistical and training equipment, while not actually weapons, should also be subject to control). This also includes intangible technology transfers (i.e. it regulates training and even the transfer of technological military know-how).
- *Regulation of production licences abroad*: in the case of European companies that operate in other countries.
- *Regulation of broking and transfers*: the Code of Conduct should apply to products that come from other countries but are traded within the EU, as well as to transactions in which companies or individuals from the EU are involved.

- **Strengthening human rights criteria**

- *Explicit establishment of respect for International Humanitarian Law in the country to which arms are to be sent.*

- **Requirement that member states publish national reports every year**

- *Requirement, under the terms of domestic legislation, that all EU countries publish an annual report detailing their arms exports.*

- **Compulsory regular review of the Code of Conduct**

- *The Code of Conduct should be reviewed and updated regularly.*

In short, the main advance introduced by this new Common Position is that it is binding and Countries have an obligation to adhere to it. However, it is to be regretted that the opportunity was not seized to take bolder and more specific steps forward, particularly as regards clarification of the actual concepts involved. The main recommendations put forward by NGOs and European research centres during the review period can be summarised as follows (the recommendations follow the current wording of the heading of each of the Code of Conduct Criteria):

**CRITERION 1. Respect for the international commitments of EU member states, in particular the sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the Community, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international obligations.**

- *Greater detail regarding the international obligations of individual states.*
- *Undertaking not to export small arms to non-state parties.*

**CRITERION 2. The respect of human rights in the country of final destination.**

- *Reference to the most important additional international instruments relating to human rights.*
- *Greater detail regarding the obligations of states under international law in respect of any transfers that might involve violations of human rights.*
- *Greater detail regarding the seriousness of the risks involved in respect of exports that could involve the abuse of human rights.*

**CRITERION 3. The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of tensions or armed conflicts.**

- *Inclusion of the fact that transferred weapons may be used in violent crimes.*
- *More detail on the assessment of the potential risk of transfers to countries that have just emerged from armed conflict.*

**CRITERION 4. Preservation of regional peace, security and stability.**

- *Inclusion of the possibility that a state may use force against its population or against another state.*
- *Greater detail regarding the assessment of the impact of a transfer in relation to legitimate defence requirements.*
- *Assessment of the impact of new technologies on regional stability.*

**CRITERION 5. The national security of the member states and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.**

- *(There are no recommendations in respect of this criterion)*

**CRITERION 6. The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for International Law.**

- *Specific undertaking not to transfer arms to states that violate international law, or weapons that do not distinguish between combatants and civilians or cause unnecessary suffering, or transfers that have not been accepted by the recipient state.*
- *Explicit undertaking not to transfer weapons that may be used to violate the United Nations Charter in aspects of international law, including a prohibition on the threat of the use of force, which may be used to violate international humanitarian law.*
- *More detail on the evaluation of a country's attitude to terrorism*
- *Undertaking to take account of a country's failure to participate in the United Nations Charter on Conventional Weapons Transfers.*

**CRITERION 7. The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.**

- *Assumption that authorisation will not be given when a transfer could be prejudicial to sustainable development.*
- *Introduction of a more specific examination of impact on the sustainable development of the recipient country.*
- *Reference to the need to assess the cumulative impact of arms transfers on sustainable development.*

**CRITERION 8. The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources.**

- *Explicit prohibition of arms transfers when they may be diverted and used in violation of any of the Code's criteria.*

In addition, although the Code covers a broad number of issues relating to the transfer of conventional weapons, it does not represent an exhaustive list and omits one essential issue, that of export licences.

- *Prohibit licences for weapons that have been assumed or seen to be involved in corrupt practices, which should be investigated before such licences are potentially issued.*

Finally, as far as the Code is concerned, the **strategic lines for the Code's interpretation** remain to be implemented by member states. The report therefore *recommends* that the results of the exchange of information on the application of the different criteria be published, so that the experience gained and lessons learned can be shared by all EU member states, a circumstance that will be of particular benefit to the EU's new members.

# Appendix VIII. The Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals

At the Millennium Summit held in New York in September 2000, 189 countries adopted the Millennium Declaration, which summarised the most important challenges and issues in a series of legal instruments. These included seven principles and the eight Millennium Development Goals, for which a target date of 2015 was set.

## **GOAL 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger**

**Target 1:** reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day

**Target 2:** reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

## **GOAL 2: Achieve universal primary education**

**Target 3:** ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling

## **GOAL 3: Promote gender equality and empower women**

**Target 4:** eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education

## **GOAL 4: Reduce child mortality**

**Target 5:** reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five

## **GOAL 5: Improve maternal health**

**Target 6:** reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio

## **GOAL 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases**

**Target 7:** halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

**Target 8:** halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

## **GOAL 7: Ensure environmental sustainability**

**Target 9:** integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources

**Target 10:** reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water

**Target 11:** achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers

## **GOAL 8: Develop a global partnership for development**

**Target 12:** develop further an open trading and financial system that is rule-based and non-discriminatory

**Target 13:** address the least developed countries' special needs

**Target 14:** address the special needs of landlocked and small island developing States

**Target 15:** deal comprehensively with developing countries' debt problems through national and international measures

**Target 16:** develop decent and productive work for youth

**Target 17:** provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries

**Target 18:** make available the benefits of new information and communications technologies

Source: United Nations, <<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals>>; World Bank, <<http://www.developmentgoals.org/>>.

## Appendix IX: Most notable events relating to the Millennium Development Goals during 2005

Goal <sup>1</sup>	Event / report	Aspects to be noted
<b>POVERTY and HUNGER (1 &amp; 2)</b>	UNICEF report on infant poverty in OECD countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Between 1990 and 2000, child poverty increased in 17 of the 24 OECD countries, in spite of the fact that social spending by the majority of the organisation's member governments also rose during the same period.</li> <li>• There is a clear correlation between social spending and child poverty, and intervention from Government can reduce levels of child poverty by up to 40%.</li> </ul>
	Report by the UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The report states that economic and social inequalities have increased over the last decade, in spite of unprecedented rises in growth levels and constant improvements in standards of living. 80% of world GDP is in the hands of 1 billion people living in industrialised countries.</li> <li>• The main reasons for the growing inequality are difficulties in accessing health and education services, the informal economy and low levels of qualification for employment. The report also underlines the fact that poverty is passed down from generation to generation.</li> </ul>
	Report by FAO, WFP and IFAD at the annual ECOSOC meeting	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The report calls on the international community to redouble its efforts in agriculture and rural development as the main strategy to reduce poverty and malnutrition at a local level, since the huge majority of people suffering from these problems live in rural areas and rely on agriculture as their principal means of subsistence.</li> <li>• It also points out the need to offer incentives to developing countries, within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, in order to reduce the high levels of deforestation and erosion.</li> </ul>
<b>EDUCATION (6)</b>	Addis Ababa Conference on education and development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Conference was told that education is the best way of reducing poverty in Africa as there is a direct correlation between illiteracy and poverty, hunger, a lack of food safety, poor health conditions and the impossibility of improving living standards. Emphasis was also placed on the provision of technological assistance for production initiatives in rural communities.</li> </ul>
<b>CHILD MORTALITY (5)</b>	UNICEF call for 763 million dollars	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aim: to attend to the needs of children living in 33 contexts of armed conflict or humanitarian crisis.</li> <li>• 45% of the 3.6 million people who died as a result of armed conflict during the 1990s were children. A further 20 million were forcibly displaced and several more million were wounded or suffered sexual violence, trauma of varying kinds, malnutrition or disease as a result of these conflicts.</li> </ul>
	Report by the United Nations Department of Financial and Social Affairs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Between the 1970s and the 1990s there was a substantial increase in the age at which people married in both industrialised and poor countries, and the average number of children fell from 5.4 to 3.9 per woman, the most significant reduction being seen in poor countries.</li> <li>• 72% of the world's governments directly support family planning programmes, while a further 17% support them indirectly through NGOs.</li> </ul>
	Annual report on world health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 10.6 million children and around 530,000 mothers die every year.</li> <li>• The situation faced by pregnant women and babies has deteriorated since 1990 in dozens of countries, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa.</li> <li>• Around 10% maternal deaths are attributed to unsafe abortions.</li> </ul>
	Warning from the UNDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Five million children could die in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 if current trends continue</li> <li>• This region, in which 45 million children do not attend school, currently accounts for one third of all extreme poverty in the world, though this percentage could rise to 50% by 2015.</li> </ul>
<b>MATERNAL HEALTH (6) (6)</b>	Launch of the Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This initiative brings together various international bodies (UNFPA, UNAIDS, UNICEF, the World Bank and the WHO) and health professionals. 500,000 women die every year for reasons connected with childbirth, while some 11 million children die from preventable diseases.</li> <li>• It is estimated that seven million deaths could be prevented each year through the application and extension of economically accessible treatments.</li> </ul>
<b>HIV/AIDS (7)</b>	International Conference on an AIDS Vaccine in Montreal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The United Nations Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa, S. Lewis, criticised the scant resources being assigned to medical research and called on professionals in the sector to demand greater support and financing from the relevant authorities.</li> <li>• By way of example, S. Lewis indicated that the funds that the G8 decided recently to assign to debt cancellation in Iraq and Africa are one of the reasons for the shortage of resources being experienced by the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which it is estimated will total 3,300 million dollars over the next two years.</li> </ul>

Goal	Event / report	Aspects to be noted
<b>HIV/AIDS (7)</b>	High-level meeting of the General Assembly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aim: review the objectives established in 2001 in relation to this subject and design international strategy for the coming years.</li> <li>• The UN Secretary General warned that the pandemic is expanding on all continents and that the fight against HIV/AIDS is the main challenge currently facing humankind. He therefore called on the international community substantially to increase their efforts in this area.</li> <li>• UNAIDS stressed that the main objectives in the fight to combat HIV/AIDS were universal access to treatment and prevention (both as the disease emerges and in the long term) and the provision of adequate resources.</li> <li>• The Executive Director of the Global Fund to combat HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria indicated that it was necessary to obtain additional funds in order to care for the thousands of orphans caused by the disease each year, among other things.</li> <li>• Mention was made of the progress being seen in countries such as Brazil, Cambodia, Thailand, the Bahamas, Cameroon, Kenya and Zambia</li> </ul>
<b>SERIOUS DISEASES (8)</b>	Conference hosted by the Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• During this Conference, which was held in London, donors promised 4,000 million dollars for the next two years to enable the Fund to continue its work. It was also announced that a similar conference would be held in June next year in order to raise the 7 billion estimated as required for 2006 and 2007.</li> <li>• The Fund, which was created three years ago on the initiative of the UN Secretary General, is active in 127 countries and to date has provided treatment for 220,000 people with HIV/AIDS, 600,000 with tuberculosis and 1.1 million with malaria.</li> </ul>
<b>ENVIRONMENT (9)</b>	Entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The protocol, which has come into force 7 years after it was established and has now been ratified by 140 countries, sets out that the emission of greenhouse gases must be 5.2% lower than 1990 emission levels by 2012.</li> <li>• The USA (25% of polluting emissions) has still not ratified the Protocol.</li> </ul>
	Report on transgenics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• According to the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications, the total area covered by so-called transgenic cultures around the world exceeds 81 million hectares, 20% higher than the preceding year.</li> <li>• Three countries account for 85% of that area: the USA (59%), Argentina (20%) and Canada (6%), though Brazil and China are also increasingly producing transgenics, concentrating mainly on 4 products.</li> </ul>
	World Bank and WWF Plan to combat deforestation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aim: reduce the overall deforestation rate by 10% by 2010.</li> <li>• The programme will encourage regional cooperation, the establishment of further protected areas of forest, the more effective management of these areas and better management of forests that fall outside the protected areas.</li> </ul>
	Report by UNDP, UNEP, the World Bank and the WRI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This report indicated that the proper management of natural resources on a local scale could, in many case, be one of the best strategies for fighting poverty, and it presented a number of successful scenarios where local communities have enjoyed great development thanks to their so-called "environmental income".</li> </ul>
	Report by the UN Secretary General on desertification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Secretary General called on the international community to redouble its commitment to the International Year of Deserts and Desertification, which is planned for 2006 and will involve a number of initiatives aimed at creating awareness of the importance, dangers and challenges of this growing phenomenon, in order to provide protection for biodiversity in deserts and safeguard the traditional knowledge of communities affected by desertification.</li> <li>• It is estimated that the so-called dry lands, which are home to some 2 billion people, constitute 41% of the planet's land mass, and that between 10% and 20% of these lands are degraded or barren.</li> </ul>
<b>WATER (10)</b>	Joint UNEP and World Conservation Union report on water	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The report indicates that deforestation, the unsustainable use of land and infrastructure construction in Asia over the last 40 years (particularly in India and China) have substantially increased the risk of drought and flooding on the continent.</li> <li>• At the present time, half of the mountainous regions in Asia are affected by development infrastructure, and this percentage could increase to 70% if current trends continue.</li> <li>• In China, where 300 million people depend on glacier water for their survival, it is estimated that the glaciers are disappearing at a rate of 7% per year, and that by 2050 more than 60% of them could have melted.</li> </ul>
	Call by the UN Secretary General	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Secretary General called on the international community to increase its promotion and financing for the "Water for Life" Decade (aimed at promoting the sustainable management of water resources), calling on individual states to create national strategies and other bodies (such as NGOs and international and regional organisations) to establish frameworks for transnational cooperation.</li> <li>• This is the second decade being dedicated by the United Nations to the issue of water, following the International Decade for Clean Drinking Water (1981-1990)</li> </ul>

Goal	Event / report	Aspects to be noted
<b>UNFIT HABITAT (11)</b>	Signing of the Green Cities Declaration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Declaration establishes specific strategies to ensure that the rapid urban development seen throughout the world in recent years is confined within sustainable development parameters.</li> <li>• This accelerated urban process (it is estimated that by 2030 60% of the world's population will live in urban areas) gives rise to many challenges, such as poverty, unemployment, crime, planning problems, drug-addiction and the temptation to support intensive, short-term development models that are unsustainable.</li> </ul>
<b>COMMERCIAL &amp; FINANCIAL SYSTEMS (12)</b>	World Bank report on intellectual property in poor countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The report underlines the defects in the agreement on commercial aspects of intellectual property rights, calling on poor countries to find alternative methods to protect their assets and know-how and denouncing the way that large transnationals take advantage of the benefits due to poorer communities.</li> <li>• Every year, poor countries lose 5 billion dollars to companies that have stolen their traditional know-how.</li> </ul>
	EU agreement on ODA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The countries that joined the EU before 2002 have undertaken to allocate 0.7% of their GDP to ODA by 2015, while the ten newest members will allocate 0.33%.</li> <li>• Half of all these resources will be assigned to Africa.</li> </ul>
	G77 South-South summit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The main aim of this event is to increase so-called south-south cooperation (mainly on a technical level) and coordinate common interests and negotiating strategies relating to trade in certain international courts.</li> <li>• The organisation was created in 1964 and currently has 132 member states, having become one of the main discussion and decision-making forums for poor and medium-income countries.</li> </ul>
<b>LDCs (13)</b>	UNDP report on the foreign debt of LDCs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A good percentage of the Least Developed Countries allocate up to 30% of their annual budgets to service their debts, thus mortgaging schooling and health programmes that are essential for their own development.</li> <li>• The 50 LDCs allocated around 5.1 billion dollars in 2002 to service their debt repayments.</li> </ul>
	Call on the international community to help LDCs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The United Nations High Representative for Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, A. K. Chowdhury, called on the international community to redouble its efforts in relation to such countries to ensure that they reached the Millennium Development Goals within the target period.</li> <li>• The main difficulties facing these countries include low levels of economic growth, very low levels of trade, environmental degradation, the weakening effects of HIV/AIDS and lack of direct foreign investment and the allocation of levels of Official Development Aid that fall well below the amounts promised or expected.</li> <li>• In recent years, the number of LDCs has doubled (from 25 to 50) and the population living in them could reach 740 million people by 2015.</li> </ul>
	UNDP report	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The report warned of the urgent need to strengthen the fight against HIV/AIDS in these countries, in which 11 million people are infected and, in some cases, life expectancy has fallen to 39 years. The impact of the pandemic is made all the worse by the enormous vulnerability of these countries.</li> <li>• The report underlines the importance of reducing levels of foreign debt (which is unsustainable in many countries) and guaranteeing active participation by ordinary people at a community level.</li> </ul>
<b>EMPLOYMENT (16)</b>	ILO report on world employment trends	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In spite of global economic growth, world employment only improved very slightly during 2004, and unemployment only fell from 6.3% to 6.1%.</li> <li>• The ILO once again signalled the importance of job creation policies as a method of achieving the Millennium Development Goals.</li> </ul>
	ILO world campaign to eliminate child labour in mines and quarries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The agreement signed by several of the most affected countries sets out a period of five to ten years for this practice to be abolished.</li> <li>• This kind of work affects a million children throughout the world, a third of the victims being in Latin America (particularly Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru and, to a lesser extent, Nicaragua and Brazil)</li> <li>• According to the ILO, 245 million children are currently working around the world, and 179 million of these are engaged in dangerous jobs or are forced to become prostitutes, fight in armed conflicts or become involved in drug-trafficking.</li> </ul>

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# School of Peace Culture (UAB)

The School of Peace Culture (*Escola de Cultura de Pau*) was formed in 1999, with the aim of organising various academic and research activities relating to peace culture, the prevention and transformation of conflicts, disarmament and the promotion of human rights.

The School is essentially financed by the Government of Catalonia, through the Catalan Development Cooperation Agency (ACCD), the Foreign Relations Secretariat and the Department for Universities, Research and the Information Society. It also receives support from other departments of the Catalan Government, as well as from local councils, foundations and other institutions. The School is directed by Vicenç Fisas, who also holds the UNESCO Peace and Human Rights Chair at *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*.

The main activities of the School of Peace Culture are as follows:

- **Diploma course in Peace Culture.** (230-hour post-graduate course with 70 places).
- **Elective subjects.** "Peace culture and conflict management" and "Educating for peace and in conflicts".
- **Initiatives for awareness and intervention in conflicts**, to facilitate dialogue between the parties involved.
- **Programme Colombia**, dedicated to raising awareness of the peace initiatives in this country.
- **Human Rights Programme**, which monitors the international situation relating to human rights issues, particularly those individual areas that currently define the world agenda, such as the effects of terrorism on the enjoyment of all rights, or corporate social responsibility.
- **Educating for Peace Programme.** The team that run this programme aim to encourage and develop the knowledge, values and skills needed in order to Educate for Peace.
- **Music, Arts and Peace Programme**, which concentrates on research into artistic initiatives that assist peace-building.
- **Disarmament and Human Safety Programme**, which focuses on various issues in the area of Disarmament, paying particular attention to micro-disarmament and the control of arms exports. The programme also tries to encourage individual states to concentrate less on military security and focus instead on more human aspects.
- **Alert Unit Programme on Conflicts, Peace and Human Rights.** This programme involves the day-to-day monitoring of the international situation relating to armed conflicts, situations of tension, humanitarian crises, development and gender. The information gathered is published in the annual *Alert!* and a series of fortnightly, monthly and quarterly publications.
- **Peace Processes Programme**, which monitors and analyses the different countries currently pursuing peace processes or formal negotiations, along with countries in which negotiations are at an exploratory stage.
- **Post-war Rehabilitation.** Programme, which monitors and analyses international aid in terms of peace-building in contexts of conflict and post-war environments.

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