Alert 2010!

Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding

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Summary

Alert 2010! Report on conflict, human rights and peacebuilding is a yearbook which analyzes the state of the world in connection with conflicts and peacebuilding based on six areas of analysis: armed conflicts, socio-political crises, peace processes, humanitarian crises, human rights and transitional justice, and the gender dimension in peace-building. Focusing on these areas, *Alert 2010!* attempts to offer an overview of the world's state of affairs and reveal possible trends and dynamics related to the characteristics and evolution of active armed conflicts, socio-political crises, peace processes and humanitarian crises in the world, and the state of human rights and the gender dimension within all of these circumstances. The analysis of the trends and dynamics is supplemented with a table of indicators that provides qualitative and quantitative information for each area of study. Most of these indicators, once cross-tabulated, can also help us understand how some factors influence others. The comparison of the data with figures from previous years means the report can act as a preventive alert regarding general trends or situations in specific countries. This can be useful, among other things, to devise foreign, development cooperation and arms transfer policies, as well as policies to prevent armed conflicts, consolidate peace processes, and post-war recovery. *Alert 2010!* also identifies several opportunities for peace. There are some scenarios with elements that lead us to believe that positive advances are possible in 2010 if the needed political actions are taken and international support is given.

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Prologue

Will the 21st century be more peaceful than the last?

The British historian, Eric Hobsbawm, described the 20th century as the "most murderous century of which we have record, both by the scale, frequency and length of the warfare which filled it, barely ceasing for a moment in the 1920s, but also by the unparalleled scale of the human catastrophes it produced, from the greatest famines in history to systematic genocide".[1] The 2009 Yearbook of the Escola de Cultura de Pau is an important tool for analyzing whether the 21st century will be different. This Yearbook will be published in the first decade of the new century and the new millennium. Do its messages give us optimism for the future?

The year 2009 ended with 29 armed conflicts in the world, of which 12 intensified during the year and 8 showed a reduction in hostilities, while the rest changed in neither direction. Both the number of conflicts and the numbers who died in these conflicts remain high, but not as high as the year 2000; 310,000 people died in armed conflicts that year.[2] This gives us some hope. There were also 8 successful peace negotiations. There are many organisations now focussed on peace, and monitoring peace processes. A form of sensibility to the questions of armed conflict and peacebuilding has emerged; it is a major concern of the international community, and the Yearbook notes there are now 15 UN peace missions around the world.

However, the Yearbook draws out other patterns and facets of last year's armed conflict, and these inject more caution in our analysis. It records the 75 situations of tension in the world, tensions which might become the armed conflicts of tomorrow. The Yearbook reminds us that 1 billion people suffer from hunger, that serious human rights violations have taken place in 48 countries, and of the high level of sexual violence against women in all of the armed conflicts in the world. The most intense armed conflicts (Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, DR Congo, Sri Lanka, North West Pakistan, Somalia, Southern Sudan and Northern Uganda) are very protracted and although one of the protracted conflicts, Sri Lanka, ended last year with a military defeat of the Tamil insurgents by the government, it is not clear whether the government will address the underlying issues of that insurgency and prevent a later generation taking up arms. The Israeli Palestinian conflict does not appear in the list of intense armed conflicts; however, it remains one of the most protracted armed conflicts which is deeply associated with a range of others in Asia and the Middle East. And if one looks at the 75 cases of tensions, it is striking how much violence can be unleashed

in countries which are not 'at war'. One of these is Madagascar, where 135 people died in two months of demonstrations after the radio and television station of the leading opposition figure were closed down. The world remains a very murderous place. If we are not to surpass the last century in levels of violence, there are urgent tasks.

The strength of the Yearbook is in the analytical questions it makes us ask. The Yearbook captures a moment in time. However, it encourages us to look over time and see patterns. One of these is that peace processes do not end levels of violence in society. Statistics of deaths in armed conflict do not necessarily capture all the deaths that indirectly happen in war situations as a result of disease, hunger and other effects of war. But nor do they capture the full picture of violent deaths as a result of the social and criminal violence which seems to have expanded in the wake of peace processes. The Global Burden of Armed Violence report of 2008 estimated that 740,000 people had died every year indirectly or directly from armed violence over the previous years, of these the majority (540,000) died in non conflict settings.[3] Intense civil wars leave legacies of violence which are not recorded in the statistics of armed conflict in any one year.

Violence reproduces itself through time and space. Through time, because those who have only known contexts of violence, such as the people of Colombia and Afghanistan who have lived over three decades of violent times, can easily reproduce violence over the next generation. Young men in particular, gain a sense of what it is to be a man in these contexts which makes violence a measure of masculinity and self esteem. The vast majority of violence in the world is perpetrated by young men on other young men.[4] This means also, that violence transmits itself through spaces of socialisation and is embedded in social relationships, from the intimate space of the home, to the neighbourhood, to the school, the prison and to the construction of the nation state itself.

The question we need to ask, therefore, is how do we interrupt the inter-generational cycles of violence? The Yearbook forces us to confront this complex question. The armed conflicts it records can be the sources of new forms of future violence. In El Salvador today, there is more violence every year than in the years of its civil war. Social and criminal violence erupts out of the despair for the future after war and in a context where il-

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1. Hobsbawm, E. (1994) *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century,* London: Michael Joseph p. 13
2. WHO (2002) *World Report on Violence and Health,* Geneva: WHO.
3. Geneva Declaration (2008) *Global Burden of Armed Violence,* Geneva: Geneva Declaration, p. 2.
4. Pearce, J. (2006) 'Bringing Violence "Back Home": Gender Socialisation and the Transmission of Violence Through Time and Space' *Global Civil Society 2006/7* London: Sage pgs 42-61.

legal trafficking offers quick sources of enrichment as long as you are willing to kill and hurt others. As new sources of conflict and violence arise in the next decades, from environmental depletion and resource scarcity, the question of ensuring that violence is not the means to resolve problems becomes increasingly urgent. It is here that the growing sensibility to armed violence, of which the Yearbook is a very good example, opens up space to discuss the question of violence in society as a whole. The struggle for peace is at least partly the struggle to build the conditions for people to live without vio-lence. The Yearbook is a very important contribution to our thinking, not only about how to end war but also how to end the cycles of violence which can generate new armed conflicts in the future. It is an essential publication for alerting us to the danger that the 21st century may easily become more murderous than the last.

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Introduction

For the ninth consecutive year, the Escola de Cultura de Pau has published its annual report, "Alert: Report on Conflicts, Human Rights and Peacebuilding", as a review of the events during 2009 which are covered in six chapters as follows: armed conflict, socio-political crises, peace processes, humanitarian crises, human rights and the gender dimension in peace-building, which at the same time are measured via ten indicators that allow us to make comparisons with the situation in previous years.

The number of armed conflicts has remained stable during 2009, but it should be highlighted that almost two thirds of them have largely focused on identity issues or demands for greater self-government, showing how important it is to arrive at "intermediate political architectures" that satisfy the demands of many peoples. The identity factor appears also in most of the socio-political crises of the last year –although being multi-causal– triggered by the opposition to a Government. The year 2009 has seen the end of negotiations in nine conflicts and how talks were opened in five other contexts, offering the possibility that 2010 will be a fruitful year for peace processes. The report refers to humanitarian crises in 30 countries, which to a greater or lesser degree also suffer from armed conflict or conditions of political instability. In general, there has been a slowing down during the year of the return of people displaced by violence in the majority of areas affected by humanitarian crises due to persistent insecurity. Furthermore there was a reduction in donations from the international community to finance humanitarian aid. Regarding the Human Rights Index 2009, which measures the degree of noncompliance and the lack of protection of human rights, discriminatory practices were found in 127 countries and in 83 there was a climate of complete impunity regarding violations of human rights, partly because the so-called war against terror undermines the human rights. Finally, the report highlights the increasing use of sexual violence as a weapon of war in the majority of the current armed conflicts.

For the third year running, the report includes an account of several opportunities for peace which in 2010 will manifest themselves as follows: the resolution of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey; compliance with Resolution 1325 of the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security; the beginning of peace negotiations in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria; the development of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; and the signing of the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of the internally displaced persons in Africa. As in previous years, the Alert report is not only a description of the events that have happened over the past year, but also an analysis of the challenges and opportunities for the coming year, which is the essence of the work of the Escola de Cultura de Pau.

Vicenç Fisas
Director of the Escola de Cultura de Pau

Table 1.0. **2009 Global conflict overview**

Continent	Armed conflict			Socio-political crisis			Total
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low	
Africa	DR Congo (East) *Somalia* Sudan (South) *Uganda (North)*	Algeria *Chad* Ethiopia (Ogaden) *Nigeria (Niger Delta)* *Sudan (Darfur)*	*Central African Republic*	Ethiopia Ethiopia (Oromia) Guinea Sudan Nigeria	Burundi *Chad – Sudan* Côte d'Ivoire Djibouti – Eritrea *Eritrea – Ethiopia* Guinea-Bissau Kenya Madagascar *Niger* *DR Congo* Somalia (Somaliland-Puntland) Zimbabwe	Angola (Cabinda) Congo *Mali* *Morocco – Western Sahara* Mauritania DR Congo – Rwanda – Uganda Rwanda Senegal (Casamance)	
SUBTOTAL	4	5	1	5	12	8	35
America	Colombia			Peru	Colombia - Venezuela Honduras	Bolivia Haiti Venezuela	
SUBTOTAL	1			1	2	3	7
Asia and Pacific	*Afghanistan* Pakistan (north-west) Sri Lanka* (north-east)	*Philippines (Mindanao-MILF)* *India (Assam)* India (ICC-M) India (Jammu and Kashmir) India (Manipur) Pakistan (Baluchistan) Thailand (South)	*Philippines (NPA)* Philippines (Mindanao – Abu Sayyaf) India (Nagaland)* *Myanmar*	China (Turkestan Eastern) *Pakistan* Sri Lanka	Korea, DPR – USA, several countries Korea, DPR – Rep. of Korea *Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF)* India (Nagaland) *India – Pakistan* Indonesia (Western Papua) Laos *Myanmar* Myanmar – Bangladesh Nepal *Nepal (Terai)* Thailand *Thailand – Cambodia* Tajikistan	China (Tibet) India (Tripura) Indonesia (Aceh) Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan	
SUBTOTAL	3	7	4	3	14	5	36
Europe		*Turkey (Southeast)*	Russia (Chechnya) Russia (Ingushetia)	Russia (Dagestan)	*Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)* Bosnia and Herzegovina *Georgia (Abkhazia)* Georgia (South Ossetia) Russia (North Ossetia) Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria) Russia (Karachay-Cherkessia)	*Cyprus* Georgia Moldova *Moldova, Rep. of (Transdniestria)* *Serbia-Kosovo*	
SUBTOTAL		1	2	1	7	5	16
Middle East	Iraq	*Israel – Palestine* Yemen		Iran	Iran (northwest) Iran (Sistan Baluchistan) Iran – USA, Israel *Israel – Lebanon – Syria* Lebanon *Palestine*	Saudi Arabia Egypt	
SUBTOTAL	1	2		1	6	2	12
TOTAL	9	13	9	8	44	23	106

* Conflicts concluded during 2009.
On italics armed conflicts and socio-political crisis with peace negotiations underway, at exploratory or formal level.

Countries engaged in armed conflicts (indicator no. 1)

Ending of armed conflict during 2009

1. Armed Conflicts

- In 2009 31 armed conflicts were reported, but a decrease in hostilities in Sri Lanka (northeast) and India (Nagaland) meant that at the end of the year 29 conflicts were active. The only addition to the list of conflicts with respect to 2008 is Sudan (southern).
- The large majority of armed conflicts took place in Asia (14) and Africa (10), while the rest occurred in Europe (three) the Middle East (three) and America (one).
- Approximately two thirds of the armed conflicts in 2009 were linked to identity issues and demands for greater self-government.
- The highest intensity armed conflicts took place in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, DR Congo (east), Pakistan (northeast), Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan (south) and Uganda (north).
- Violence increased in Yemen as part of the conflict between the Government and the followers of al-Houthi, in the north of the country, having a dramatic impact on the civilian population.
- Violence in Afghanistan became worse and in northeast Pakistan, with thousands of deaths, due to the expansion of the Taliban militia and an increase in terrorist attacks and clashes between insurgent groups and security forces.
- In Africa, the LRA area of operations moved from the north of Uganda to the border region between DR Congo, Sudan and the Central African Republic, while Somalia was witness to the worst escalation of violence in the last 20 years.

This chapter analyzes the armed conflicts that took place during 2009 (indicator 1). The chapter has two main sections, apart from the definition that follows and the map at the beginning which shows the active conflicts in 2009. The first section contains an analysis of the global trends in armed conflicts in 2009 and the second describes the evolution and most notable events of each armed conflict during the year.

1.1. Armed conflicts: definition

An **armed conflict** is any confrontation between regular or irregular armed groups with objectives that are perceived as incompatible and where the continuous and organized use of violence: a) causes a minimum of 100 battle-related deaths in a year and/or has a serious impact on the territory (e.g. destruction of infrastructures or natural resources) and the human security (e.g. injury or displacement of civilians, sexual violence, food insecurity, effect on mental health and the social fabric or interruption of basic services); b) pursues goals that can be differentiated from common crime and are normally linked to:
- demands for self-determination and self government, or identity issues;
- opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a State or the internal or international policies of the government, which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power;
- or to control the resources or the territory.

Figure 1.1. **Conflict dynamics**

Table 1.1. **Summary of armed conflicts 2009**

Conflict[1] -start date-	Type[2]	Main parties[3]	Intensity[4] Trend[5]
Africa			
Algeria -1992-	Internationalized internal	Government, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) / al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	2
	System		=
Chad -2006-	Internationalized internal	Government, new UFR coalition of armed groups (UFDD, UFDD-Fundamental, RFC, CNT, FSR, UFCD, UDC, FPRN), MDJT, FPIR, Janjaweed militias, Toro Boro militia, Sudan, France	2
	Government		↓
Ethiopia (Ogaden) -2007-	Internal	Government, ONLF, OLF, pro-government militias	2
	Self-government, Identity		=
Nigeria (Niger Delta) -2001-	Internal	Government, MEND, MOSOP, NDPVF and NDV, militias from the Ijaw, Itsekeri, Urhobo and Ogoni communities, private security groups	2
	Resources, Identity		↓
Central African Rep. -2006-	Internationalized internal	Government, APRD, UFRD, armed groups split from UFDR (FURCA, MJLC), FDPC, France, MICOPAX, EUFOR RCA/TCHAD and highway bandits (Zaraguinas)	1
	Government		=
DR Congo (East) -1998-	Internationalized internal	Government, Mai-Mai militias, FDLR, FDLR-RUD, CNDP, FRF, PARECO, APCLS, armed Ituri groups, Burundian FNL armed opposition group, Ugandan ADF-NALU and LRA armed opposition group, Rwanda, MONUC	3
	Identity, Government, Resources		=
Somalia -1988-	Internationalized internal	New Transitional Federal Government (TFG) – including the moderate faction of the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS), and supported by Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama'a, warlords, Ethiopia, US, AMISOM– radical faction of the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS) –including part of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Hizbul Islam, al-Shabab– and supported by Eritrea.	3
	Government		=
Sudan (South) -2009-	Internal	Ethnic communities militias, National Unity Government and the Government of South Sudan	3
	Territory, Resources, Self-government		↑
Sudan (Darfur) -2003-	Internationalized internal	Government, pro-government Janjaweed militias, JEM, several factions of the SLA and other armed groups	2
	Self-government, Resources, Identity		↓
Uganda (North) -1986-	Internationalized internal	Armed Forces of Uganda, Central African Republic, DR Congo and from South Sudan, pro-government militias from DR Congo and from South Sudan, LRA	3
	Self-government, Identity		↑
America			
Colombia -1964-	Internationalized internal	Government, FARC, ELN, paramilitary groups	3
	System		=
Asia			
Afghanistan -2001-	Internationalized internal	Government, international coalition (led by the US), ISAF (NATO), Taliban militia, warlords	3
	System		↑
Philippines (NPA) -1969-	Internal	Government, NPA	1
	System		=
Philippines (Mindanao-MILF) -1978-	Internal	Government, MILF	2
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf) -1991-	Internationalized internal	Government, Abu Sayyaf	1
	Self-government, Identity, System		↑
India (Assam) -1983-	Internationalized internal	Government, ULFA, DHD, Black Widow, NDFB	2
	Self-government, Identity		=

Conflict -start date-	Type	Main parties	Intensity / Trend

Asia			
India (Jammu and Kashmir) -1989-	Internationalized internal	Government, JKLF, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen	2
	Self-government, Identity		↓
India (Manipur) -1982-	Internal	Government, PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, KNF, KNA, KYNL	2
	Self-government, Identity		↓
India (Nagaland) -1955-	Internal	Government, NSCN-K, NSCN-IM	1
	Self-government, Identity		End
India (CPI-M) -1967-	Internal	Government, CPI-M (Naxalites)	2
	System		↑
Myanmar -1948-	Internal	Government, armed groups (KNU, SSA-S, KNPP, UWSA, CNF, ALP, DKBA, KNU/KNLA, KNPLAC, SSNPLO)	1
	Self-government, Identity		↑
Pakistan (Baluchistan) -2005-	Internal	Government, BLA, BRA and BLF	2
	Self-government, Resources		=
Pakistan (northwest) -2001-	Internationalized internal	Government, Taliban militias, tribal militias, US	3
	System		↑
Sri Lanka (northeast) -1983-	Internal	Government, LTTE	3
	Self-government, Identity		End
Thailand (South) -2004-	Internal	Government, secessionist armed opposition groups	2
	Self-government, Identity		=
Europe			
Russia (Chechnya) -1999-	Internal	Russian Federal Government, Government of Chechnya, armed opposition groups	1
	Self-government, Identity, System		↑
Russia (Ingushetia) -2008-	Internal	Russian Federal Government, Government of Ingushetia, armed opposition groups (Jamaat Ingush)	1
	System		↑
Turkey (Southeast) -1984-	Internationalized internal	Government, PKK, TAK	2
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Middle East			
Iraq -2003-	Internationalized internal	International coalition led by the USA/United Kingdom, internal and external armed opposition groups	3
	System, Government, Resources		=
Israel-Palestine -2000-	International	Israeli government, settlers' militias, PNA, Fatah (Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades), Hamas (Ezzedin al Qassam Brigades), Islamic Jihad, FPLP, FDLP, Popular Resistance Committees	2
	Self-government, Identity, Territory		↓
Yemen -2004-	Internationalized internal	Government, followers of the cleric al-Houthi (al-Shabab al-Mumen)	2
	System		↑

1: Low intensity; 2: Medium intensity; 3: High intensity;

↑: Escalation of violence; ↓: Decrease of violence; = : Unchanged; End: No longer considered an armed conflict

1. This column includes those States where armed conflict is taking place and indicates in parenthesis the region within the State where the conflict is confined or the name of the armed group involved in the conflict. This last option is used in those cases where there is more than one armed conflict in the same State or in the same territory within the State, with the purpose of differentiating them.
2. The report classifies and analyses armed conflicts using a dual typology which addresses, on the one hand, the causes or incompatibility of interests and, on the other hand, the convergence of the scenario of the conflict and the parties involved. With regard to the main causes the following can be distinguished: demands for self-determination and self-government (Self-government) or identity issues (Identity); opposition

1.2. Armed conflicts: global trends in 2009

In 2009, 31 armed conflicts were reported, although at the end of the year only 29 remained active. During the year the military victory of the Sri Lankan Army over the LTTE and a decline in hostilities in the Indian state of Nagaland meant that both contexts were no longer considered armed conflicts. Compared to 2008, the total number of armed conflicts remains unchanged (31 conflicts during the year, 30 active at the end of the year) and the only variation is the inclusion of Sudan (south), which experienced a serious increase in violence. The large majority of armed conflicts took place in Asia (14) and Africa (10), followed by Europe (3), the Middle East (3) and America (1). In all of the cases analyzed in this section, the State was one of the contending parties. Nevertheless, in numerous conflicts there were frequent clashes between non-state armed actors, while in other contexts, such as Sudan (south), inter-communal violence explained a considerable part of the high mortality rates. All of the conflicts, except the dispute between Israel and Palestine,[6] were internal (14) or

internationalized internal (16). The average duration of armed conflicts in 2009 was nearly 18 years, although this figure is questionable due to the difficulty of setting an exact start date for a conflict and due to the high number of current armed conflicts that have been through previous cycles of violence.

Although armed conflicts have multiple causes, it should be noted that **almost two out of three conflicts (19 of 31) refer mainly to identity issues or demands for greater self-government**. On the other hand, there are 14 cases where the main divergence is rooted in opposition to a specific Government or to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a State. Of these, there were five cases –Iraq, Chad, Central African Republic, DR Congo (east) and Somalia– where several armed groups were struggling to take power or undermine the central Government. In those cases where the main reason for the conflict is opposition to the State system, we can identify two categories. In the first, which includes Colombia, Philippines (NPA) and India (CPI-M), the insurgency advocates the establishment of a socialist style political and economic system. In the second category,

Graph 1.1. **Regional distribution of the number of armed conflicts**

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3. The main players that intervene in the conflicts are made up of a mixture of regular or irregular armed actors. The conflicts usually involve the Government, or its Armed Forces, against one or several armed opposition groups, but can also include other irregular groups such as clans, guerrillas, warlords, armed groups confronting each other or militias from ethnic or religious communities. Although they most frequently use conventional weapons, and more specifically small arms (which cause most of the deaths in the conflicts), in many cases other methods such as suicide attacks, bombings and sexual violence are used; even hunger is employed as a weapon of war.

4. The intensity of an armed conflict (high, medium or low) and its trend (escalation of violence, decrease of violence, unchanged) are evaluated mostly based on how deadly it is (number of fatalities) and other consequences on the population and the territory. In addition, there are other aspects to be considered, such as the systematization and frequency of the violence or the complexity of the military struggle (the complexity is normally related to the number of parties involved and how fragmented they are, the level of institutionalization and the capabilities of the State and the degree of internationalization of the conflict, as well as the flexibility of the objectives and the political willingness of the parties to reach an agreement). As a consequence, high intensity armed conflicts are usually those that cause over 1,000 annual battle-related deaths and also affect significant parts of the territory and population and include numerous actors (that establish relationships of alliances, confrontation or tactical coexistence among themselves). Medium and low intensity conflicts, with over 100 annual battle-related deaths, have the aforementioned characteristics but with a more limited presence and scope. An armed conflict is considered to be ended when a significant and sustained decrease in armed hostilities occurs because of a military victory, agreement between the actors in conflict, demobilization by one of the parties or because one of the parties abandons the armed struggle or limits it considerably as a strategy to achieve specific objectives. None of these options necessarily imply that the root causes of the armed conflict have been overcome or exclude the possibility of new outbreaks of violence. A temporary halt in hostilities, formal or tacit, does not necessarily entail the end of an armed conflict

5. In this column the evolution of events in the current year (2009) is compared with the previous year (2008). The escalation of violence symbol (↑) is shown if the general situation of the conflict during 2009 is worse than the previous year, the reduction of violence symbol (↓) if things have improved and the unchanged sign (=) if no significant change has taken place.

6. Although Palestine (whose Palestine National Authority is a political entity linked to a specific population and territory) is not an internationally recognized State, the conflict between Israel and Palestine is considered "international" and not "internal" since it is a territory which has been illegally occupied and it is not recognized as being part of Israel under International Law or by a United Nations resolution.

some of the contending parties have stated their intention to create an Islamic State or include essential elements of Islamic law in the institutions and laws of the State, such as the cases of Algeria, Afghanistan, Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf), Iraq, Pakistan (northeast), Russia (Chechnya), Russia (Ingushetia), Somalia and Yemen. It should be noted that some of the armed opposition groups that operate in those countries have been accused of having ties to the al-Qaeda network. Apart from the cases where the cause of the conflict is linked to identity and self-government or to the type of government or system, there are several countries where **control of resources and the territory** are essential to understanding the origin and the dynamics of the military conflict. This was especially clear in the cases of **Iraq, Nigeria (Niger Delta), Pakistan (Baluchistan), DR Congo (east), Sudan (Darfur) and Sudan (south), although in many other cases the control of, or access to, resources fuelled and aggravated the dispute**.

With regard to intensity, **in nine cases –Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, DR Congo (east), Pakistan (northwest), Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan (south) and Uganda (north)– very high levels of violence caused the death of nearly 1,000 people**, although in some of these cases, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan (northwest), Iraq, Sri Lanka, Somalia or Sudan (south), the number of deaths was much higher. Two countries joined the list of high intensity conflicts compared to the previous year: Uganda (mainly because of the spread of the LRA's armed activities to countries such as Sudan, Central African Republic or DR Congo) and southern Sudan (mostly due to increase in inter-communal violence). In contrast, conflict intensity decreased appreciably in some of the most virulent struggles of 2008, such as Chad, Israel-Palestine and Sudan (Darfur). Similar to last year, most of the armed conflicts were medium intensity (15 conflicts) and the remaining seven cases –India (Nagaland), Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf), Philippines (NPA), Myanmar, Central African Republic, Russia (Chechnya) and Russia (Ingushetia)- were low intensity. If we compare the situation to the previous year, **in 10 of the 29 active conflicts at the end of the year there was an increase in hostilities**, in eleven cases the situation did not change considerably and in eight cases a decrease in violence was reported: Chad, Nigeria (Niger Delta), Sudan (Darfur), Philippines (Mindanao-MILF), India (Jammu and Kashmir), India (Manipur), Turkey (southeast) and Israel-Palestine.

a) Regional trends

By region, it should be noted that **most of the conflicts in Africa are linked to the struggle to take or erode current power due to opposition to the internal or international polices of the Government**. However, the number of conflicts where demands of self-government of a territory or group are the key to the conflict is much lower than the worldwide average. In fact, although in the cases of DR Congo (east), Nigeria (Niger Delta) and Uganda (north), identity grievances have been used to justify the struggle or mobilize certain sectors of the population, the cases of Ethiopia (Ogaden) and Sudan (south) are the only ones where the issue of self-government plays an important role. The second main feature of the conflicts in Africa is the regional dimension, due to the important role that Governments from neighbouring countries play on many occasions and also because numerous armed groups have their bases in adjacent countries. In this regard, of note is the clear link between the conflicts that are taking place in the Central African Republic, Chad and Sudan (Darfur), the incursions by the Ethiopian Armed Forces in Somalia to support the Transitional Federal Government, the activity by armed groups from Rwanda in eastern DR Congo or the internationalization of the conflict in northern Uganda caused by the expansion of LRA activities to the southeast of the Central African Republic, northeast DR Congo and southeast Sudan. Except for the cases of Ethiopia (Ogaden), Sudan (south) and Nigeria (Niger Delta), all of the African conflicts were classified as internationalized internal. Another feature of armed conflicts in Africa is the high number of armed actors. Thus, in the cases of DR Congo (east), Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), and Nigeria (Niger Delta) the number of armed actors actively involved in the hostilities is greater than 10, and in another seven cases there are a minimum of four armed actors.

Currently, the average duration of armed conflicts in Africa (approximately nine years) is significantly below the world average (18 years) and the average for the rest of the continents. Thus, only three of the nine conflicts –Algeria, Somalia and Uganda (north)– have been going on for over 15 years, and seven of them began after 2000. However, the intensity of the conflicts in Africa is higher than in other regions, which is probably linked to the fact that **the continent is home to almost half of the highest intensity conflicts in the world: DR Congo (east), Somalia, Sudan (south) and Uganda (north).** With re-

Graph 1.2. **Intensity of the armed conflicts**

Graph 1.3. **Intensity of the conflicts by region**

gard to the evolution of the wars in Africa in 2009, we should note the increase in violence in southern Sudan (mainly due to communal fighting) and Somalia (where some analysts have denounced the greatest escalation in violence of the last two decades) or the expansion of the LRA armed group into the Central African Republic, Sudan and DR Congo. On a positive note, we should highlight the decrease of violence in conflicts such as those in Chad, Nigeria (Niger Delta) or Sudan (Darfur).

In **Asia, contrary to what happens in Africa, over 70% of the armed conflicts are linked to demands for self-government or identity issues** and the majority (64%) is highly internal. However, there are also situations with a clear international dimension, such as the cases of Afghanistan, India (Jammu and Kashmir) and Pakistan (northeast). The average duration of the conflicts in Asia surpasses 26 years and is clearly the highest in the world. In this sense, it should be noted that two of the oldest insurgencies on the planet (the Karen in Myanmar and the Naga in northeast India) can trace their origins back to the 1950s, while the two main communist insurgencies on the continent (the NPA in Philippines and the CPI-M in India) began their activities in the 1960s. In addition, there are five other conflicts –Philippines (Mindanao-MILF), India (Assam), India (Manipur), India (Jammu and Kashmir) or Sri Lanka (northeast)– that have been active for over two decades. Some of the factors that may explain the long duration of the armed conflicts in Asia is the limited presence of international actors in facilitation and mediation tasks (especially by the United Nations), the large number of conflicts linked to the foundation of the State or the difficulty in resolving disputes linked to identity and self-determination, which are frequent in Asia. As far as intensity is concerned, we should point out that three of the nine conflicts that have the highest mortality rates on the planet are taking place in Southern Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan (northeast) and Sri Lanka, in spite of the fact that this conflict ended in May.

In regard to the actors, there is a mixture of conflicts on the Asian continent with some armed groups having significant war capability and control of territory –the CPI-M in India, the NPA and the MILF in Philippines or the LTTE in Sri Lanka before their defeat in the first months of 2009– and other conflicts which are characterized by the fragmentation of the insurgent groups –Afghanistan, Pakistan (northeast), India (Assam), India (Nagaland), Myanmar or Thailand (south). Beyond the fact that practically all Governments use the term terrorist when referring to their respective armed opposition groups, of note are some cases such as Afghanistan, Pakistan (northeast), India (Jammu and Kashmir) or Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf) where the Governments have closely tied their counterinsurgency strategies to the so-called global war on terrorism which provides them with political legitimacy and in some cases with economic and military support. In the last cases listed the armed groups have made religious demands linked to Islam. **Another characteristic of the disputes in Asia is that there are some States, such as India, the Philippines or Pakistan, that are home to several armed conflicts, with different causes, war dynamics and locations**. On the topic of the evolution of the conflicts in 2009, of note is the escalation of violence in Afghanistan and in northeast Pakistan –both with a growing involvement by the US Government– and the increase in counterinsurgency offensives by the Myanmar Government in the east of the country and the Philippine Government in Mindanao against the Abu Sayyaf group. Furthermore, it should also be noted the decline in hostilities in the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir and Manipur. In another region in India, Nagaland, a significant decrease in the number of deaths led this report to consider this the end of the armed conflict. Also, the military victory by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces over the LTTE led to a drastic reduction in clashes and, thus, northeast Sri Lanka was no longer considered an armed conflict. However, in the final stages of the Army offensive, some of the most violent episodes of the war took place since its beginning in the 1980s.

Finally, there are some issues to consider with respect to the armed conflicts in the rest of the continents. In **America**, the conflict in Colombia continued to be one of the longest lasting and most lethal in the world, with a huge impact on the civilian population in terms of deaths and forced displacement. During 2009 violence increased in the southwestern regions of the country and the impact of the violence on the indigenous peoples was clear. In addition, the degree of internationalization of the conflict grew. In **Europe, the centre of disputes was again the area between the Black and Caspian seas**. In this region armed hostilities rose in the neighbouring Russian republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia due to the porous borders and a certain link between the insurgencies and the counterinsurgency policies. Nevertheless, in relative terms, the intensity of the conflict in both scenarios continued to be low. In Turkey, the different initiatives by the parties to resolve the conflict caused a decrease in the levels of violence, although armed clashes continued to be reported throughout the year and the Army continued to conduct bombing raids on the PKK in northern Iraq, where the group has its bases. Finally, in the **Middle East**, violence mounted in Iraq –mainly because of the proximity of the 2010 elections and the withdrawal of US troops from Iraqi cities– and especially in Yemen, where there is a risk of internationalization of the conflict due to the involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran and greater attention by the West to al-Qaeda's activities in the country. Furthermore, the intensity of the conflict between Israel and Palestine diminished, especially because of the end to the Israeli military offensive in Gaza in the month of January. In the cases of Israel-Palestine and Yemen, the intensity of the conflict was medium, while the conflict in Iraq continued to be one of the most virulent on the planet.

b) International missions

One of the questions in terms of global conflict during 2009 that deserves mention is related to international missions. In December 2009 around the world there were 15 UN peacekeeping operations, two political missions run and supported by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (BINUB and UNAMA) and another 10 UN political and peacekeeping operations supported by the UN Department of Political Affairs. From a regional perspective, of the 27 UN missions in the world, approximately half (13) were in the African con-

tinent, five in the Middle East, five in Asia, three in Europe and one in America. In addition, alongside the United Nations, many other regional organizations participate in military, political and peacebuilding tasks such as the OSCE (with 19 missions in the European and Central Asian sphere), the EU (15 missions in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East) and NATO (six missions in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East), the CIS (three missions in Europe), the AU (two missions in Africa), the OAS (two missions in America), the ECCAS (one mission in Africa) and seven multilateral operations under the auspices of countries or groups of countries. Changes that took place this year included not renewing the UN peacekeeping mission in Georgia, UNOMIG, as well as the two missions by the CIS in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The EU mission EUFOR TCHAD/RCA successfully transferred its functions to the MINURCAT in March. Additionally, a joint sea operation by NATO (Operation Ocean Shield), the EU NAVFOR and Combined Task Force 151

(led by the United States 5th Fleet), together with other ships, was launched to patrol Somali territorial waters and the Gulf of Aden in the northwest Indian Ocean to stop attacks on ships that fish or pass through the area.

The UN peacekeeping missions were made up of around 120,000 troops[7] and 3,781 more were on political and peacebuilding missions which are above the numbers for 2008. This clearly shows the continuous increase of missions and forces that has taken place in the last decade. Since June 1999, when the number reached its lowest point since the end of the Cold War (13,000 Blue Helmets), to the present day, growth has been constant and need are still dire in many contexts. To this number we should also add the NATO forces (more than 83,000 troops), from the EU (over 6,000 troops including police and soldiers in six contexts, although the end of EUFOR TCHAD/RCA reduces this number to less than half), from the CIS (more than 4,200 troops

Table 1.2. **Main international missions in 2009**

Name	Start-End	Name	Start-End
UN		**NATO**	
West Africa (UNOWA)	2001	Afghanistan (ISAF)	2001
Burundi (BINUB)	2007	Iraq (NTIM-I)	2004
DR Congo (MONUC)	1999	Kosovo (KFOR)	1999
Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI)	2004	Operation Active Endeavour (Mediterranean Sea)	2001
Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS)	2000	Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden (Operation Ocean Shield)	2009
Liberia (UNMIL)	2003	**EU**	
Western Sahara (MINURSO)	1991	DR Congo (EUSEC DR Congo)	2005
Central African Rep. (BONUCA)	2000	Central African Rep. and Chad (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA)	2007-2009
Central African Rep. / Chad (MINURCAT)	2007	Palestine Territories (EU BAM Rafah)	2005
Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)	2008	Palestine Territories (EUPOL COPPS)	2006
Somalia (UNPOS)	1995	Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan)	2002
Sudan (UNMIS)	2005	Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)	2003
Sudan (Darfur) (UNAMID)	2007	Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR ALTHEA)	2004
Haiti (MINUSTAH)	2004	**CIS**	
Afghanistan (UNAMA)	2002	Georgia (South Ossetia)	1992-2009
India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	1949	Georgia (Abkhazia)	1994-2009
Nepal (UNMIN)	2007	Moldova (Transdniestria)	1992
Timor-Leste (UNMIT)	2006	**ECCAS**	
Central Asia (UNRCCA)	2007	Central African Rep. (MICOPAX)	2008
Cyprus (UNFICYP)	1964	**AU**	
Georgia (Abkhazia) (UNOMIG)	1993-2009	Somalia (AMISOM)	2007
Kosovo (UNMIK)	1999	Comoros (MAES)	2007
Iraq (UNAMI)	2003	**Other missions**	
Golan Heights (UNDOF)	1974	DPR Korea and Rep. of Korea (NSC)	1953
Lebanon (UNIFIL)	1978/2006	Solomon Islands (RAMSI)	2003
Lebanon (USCOL)	2007	Hebron, Palestine (TPIH 2)	1997
Middle East (UNTSO)	1948	Egypt and Israel	1982
		Iraq (US and UK)	2003
		Côte d'Ivoire (Operation Licorne, France)	2003
		Timor-Leste (ISF, Australia)	2006

in three contexts, although the two missions in Georgia have concluded), ECCAS and the AU (almost 4,000 troops in three contexts), and another six operations from different countries (close to 6,000 police officers and soldiers). In general terms the total number of peacekeeping troops deployed across the world easily surpassed 210,000 soldiers and police officers. Moreover, if troops planned for in the design of the missions or their extensions were actually deployed (nearly 7,000 Blue Helmets in the UNAMID in Darfur, close to 2,000 in the MONUC, 5,000 in the AMISOM are still pending) the total would be 14,000 troops more. To this number it could also be added 7,000 soldiers proposed by the European countries and another 30,000 from the US for the ISAF in Afghanistan that will be deployed between the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010. This would raise the number to over **260,000 soldiers deployed across the world in international missions.** Finally, it must be added the joint sea operation in the Indian Ocean made up of the EU NAVFOR, NATO and the CTF 151 plus ships from other States such as Japan, China, India and Saudi Arabia, although the military figures for this operation are unknown.

The growing use of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to design the mandate of the United Nations missions has led to a greater participation in violent scenarios. These multidimensional missions are being established in situations that are more and more violent and with mandates that are more and more complex, as can be seen by the number of deaths among UN troops, which have tripled since the end of the Cold War, rising from 800 in 1991 to 2,659 in December 2009. At the same time, the number of military operations designed using Chapter VII as a framework have increased in recent years with the consent of the UN Security Council. An example of this is NATO/ISAF in Afghanistan, which is called a "coalition of goodwill". This is not a United Nations force *per se*, although it does have a mandate under the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and is conducting offensive operations independently, with US troops and to support the Afghan Government.

c) Arms embargoes

Furthermore, under the auspices of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council may adopt coercive measures to maintain or re-establish international peace and security. These include economic or other kinds of sanctions, without the use of military

force, or even international military intervention.[8] The use of mandatory sanctions is intended to apply pressure on a State or entity to comply with the objectives set by the Security Council without resorting to the use of force.[9] The sanctions can be economic or commercial in a broad sense, or more selective measures can be used such as arms embargoes, travel restrictions, financial or diplomatic restrictions, or both selective and general measures can be applied at the same time. The EU also imposes binding arms embargoes for its Member States. In some cases they respond to the need to implement arms embargoes that the United Nations imposes and in other cases they are initiatives of the EU itself.

In 2009, 28 arms embargoes were in force for a total of 17 States and non-state armed groups. Of these, 12 embargoes were imposed by the United Nations and 16 by the EU.[10] The UN Security Council passed resolution 1907 on December 23 which established a new arms embargo on Eritrea for violating the existing embargo on Somalia by providing political, financial and logistical aid, as well as training and arms to Somali Islamic armed groups opposed to the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The EU, in turn, imposed a new embargo on Guinea on October 27, due to the evolution of the situation in the country over the last year (10 days previously, ECOWAS had decided to impose a voluntary arms embargo for the Member States of the organization). The EU lifted the embargo on Uzbekistan on October 31 having considered that the human rights situation had improved in the country since the Andijan events, in spite of alerts from international organizations that there was a lack of any real advances. It is worth mentioning that 11 of the 16 embargoes established by the EU were to implement the UN Security Council embargoes.[11] The remaining five correspond to initiatives by the EU: China, Myanmar, Guinea, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe.

Of the 17 States and non-state armed groups indicated by both organizations, six refer to currently active armed conflicts (Myanmar, Sudan [Darfur] and armed groups in Iraq, Somalia, DR Congo and Afghanistan). Of the other 11, eight refer to scenarios of socio-political crises of varying intensity (China, Eritrea, Iran, Guinea, Lebanon, DPR Korea, Uzbekistan and Zimbabwe) and the remaining three have recently overcome armed conflicts and are in post-war peacebuilding stages (Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone) with different degrees of internal tension. Beyond the criticism which can be levelled at embargoes and their effectiveness, there are another 24

7. Of the 120,000 troops in UN peacekeeping missions, 98,114 are military and police personnel. 3% of this number (3,027 soldiers and police officers) are women. Data available on December 8, 2009.
8. For more information on the UN Security Council Sanctions Committees please see <http://www.un.org/sc/committees/>.
9. The sanction mechanisms, and specifically arms embargoes, have been used inconsistently since the founding of the United Nations. Between 1945 and 1989 they were only used in two contexts tied to the decolonization process: in the former Southern Rhodesia (currently Zimbabwe) between 1968 and 1979 (due to internal instability); and in South Africa between 1977 and 1994 (because of South African intervention in neighbouring countries, internal violence and instability, and the system of racial discrimination or Apartheid). Forsaking the use of these mechanisms during the Cold War, as with other United Nations instruments, was part of the politics of competition between the two Blocs, and the end to the Cold War resulted in a growing activism by the organization in this area, and others, and paved the way to the imposition of arms embargoes. Its use also strengthened the role of the United Nations as a cornerstone of international peace and security. In addition, arms embargoes came to be seen as a more effective sanction than economic sanctions since they focused on the State elite and the non-state armed groups, thus limiting their humanitarian impact.
10. There are two voluntary arms embargoes, one imposed by the OSCE on Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1992, and another imposed by ECOWAS on Guinea in 2009.
11. In the case of Sudan, the EU imposed it for the entire country in 1994 and the UN Security Council for the Darfur region in 2004; in the case of Iran they include different types of arms.

Table 1.3. Arms embargoes currently in force declared by the United Nations, the EU and the OSCE

Embargoes declared by the United Nations		Embargoes declared by the EU	
Country*	Effective date	Country	Effective date
Taliban militias and al-Qaeda**	2002	**Taliban militias and al-Qaeda***	2002
Côte d'Ivoire	2004	China	1989
Congo, DR (except the Government)	2003	Côte d'Ivoire	2004
Eritrea	2009	**Congo, DR (except the Government)**	2003
Iran	2006	Iran	2007
Iraq (except the Government)	2003	**Iraq (except the Government)**	2003
Lebanon (except the Government)	2006	Guinea	2009
Liberia (except the Government)	1992	Lebanon (except the Government)	2006
DPR Korea	2006	Liberia (except the Government)	2001
Sierra Leone (RUF)	1997	**Myanmar**	1991
Somalia (except the Government)	1992	DPR Korea	2006
Sudan (Darfur) (except the Government)	2004	Sierra Leone (RUF)	1998
Embargoes declared by the OSCE		**Somalia (except the Government)**	2002
Armenia - Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	1992	**Sudan**	1994
Embargoes declared by ECOWAS		Uzbekistan	2005-2009
Guinea	2009	Zimbabwe	2002

* In bold, country or group in armed conflict.
** Embargo that is not linked to a specific country or territory.
Source: SIPRI. Arms Embargoes Database. 2009.

armed conflicts where neither the UN Security Council nor the EU have proposed the establishment of an arms embargo as a form of sanction. Furthermore, there are another 60 situations of socio-political crisis of varying intensity that have not been subject to embargoes and, in many of these cases, the preventive nature of arms embargoes could mean a decrease in the hostilities.

d) Military expenditure and armed conflict

Finally, an analysis of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP of the countries in armed conflict can help us draw some conclusions. It should be noted that this study is hampered by a lack of official data, which is frequent for many of the activities in the military sphere. Due to the situation in some of these countries, data are nonexistent, lower than actual figures and/or has been manipulated, since part of the expenditures related to State security activities are included in other areas of the budget. However, in most of the cases the percentage of government military expenditure as a percentage of GDP does not surpass 3%, with the exception of Algeria, Colombia, Pakistan, Russia, Israel and Yemen, six of the 20 countries with available data (no data exist for Somalia, Sudan and Palestine).

Furthermore, according to SIPRI, it is estimated that worldwide military expenditure in 2007 reached 1339 billion USD which represents 25% of GDP in 2007.[12] Thus, the first conclusion is that only in nine of the 20 countries in armed conflict military expenditure in 2007 was equal or above the anticipated world average for the year (India, Sri Lanka and Iraq are included with the six countries mentioned previously). In the other 11 cases military expenditure was lower than the world average.

However, this initial conclusion must be qualified by other factors. A factor that is not usually considered, but would necessarily increase the war machine figures in each context, is the resources managed by the political-military movements and their military wings.[13] Only some approximate figures are available. The same may be said for international organizations or other countries that can be considered actors that are directly involved in the armed conflict due to their participation in the hostilities. In the case of armed groups, these figures can be a few thousand dollars a year, as in the case of some of the Mai Mai militias in DR Congo, or budgets of political-military movements whose organizational structure is much more complex. Examples of this last case include the FDLR in DR Congo, which

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12. The estimated figure for 2008 is 1464 billion USD, which represents 2.4% of GDP in 2008. This figure is a 4% increase in real terms compared to 2007 and a 45% rise since 1999. See SIPRI. *SIPRI Yearbook 2009. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
13. It must be noted that the total budget of armed groups is not dedicated to the war effort. They also include sections that are dedicated to maintaining their support networks and social policies, that is, resources that are not related to military aspects.

Table 1.4. **Military expenditure in countries that are the scene of armed conflict, 2007** [14]

Country	Military expenditure (percentage of GDP)	Country	Military expenditure (percentage of GDP)
Algeria	3,515 (3%)	India	23,535 (2.5%)
Chad	64.2 (0.96%)	Myanmar	--
Ethiopia	285 (1.7%)	Pakistan	4,468 (3.1%)
Nigeria	816 (0.6%)	Sri Lanka	795 (2.8%)
Central African Rep.	16.1 (1.1%)	Thailand	2,569 (1.3%)
DR Congo	169 (2%)	Russia	34,800 (3.5%)
Somalia	--	Turkey	11,155 (2.1%)
Sudan	--	Iraq	828 (2.5%)
Uganda	237 (2.2%)	Israel	12,513 (8.6%)
Colombia	5,579 (4%)	Palestine	--
Afghanistan	178 (2.2%)	Yemen	821 (5.1%)
Philippines	1,034 (0.9%)		

Source: SIPRI. *SIPRI Yearbook* 2009.

manages several millions of US dollars per year;[15] Hamas, with an approximate budget of between 30 and 90 million dollars per year; Hezbollah, with a budget of between 100 and 200 million dollars per year,[16] or the recently dismantled LTTE, with estimates of between 200 and 300 million dollars per year.[17]

There are also Governments and international organizations that use military force, normally to support the Governments of the countries affected by armed conflict, as part of a peace agreement or to verify compliance with the ceasefire agreement. This intervention may be unilateral with no legal basis, or under a United Nations mandate, which gives it a legal basis and international legitimacy. Nevertheless, in some cases the coverage afforded by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which allows the use of force,[18] converts the members of the international operations in parties of the armed conflict itself, although they have the legitimacy granted by the United Nations. An example of this are the two United Nations missions that are currently the most expensive and with the largest military component, the MONUC in the DR Congo, and the UNAMID[19] in the Sudanese region of Darfur. In the case of the MONUC, which has participated in combat operations on several occasions on its own or to support the Congolese Armed Forces, its annual budget, 1.35 billion dollars,[20] is 10 times the amount of resources the Congolese Government dedicates to the war effort, although the entire 1.35 billion

does not correspond to the military component of the mission. In the case of UNAMID, this figure reached 1.598 billion dollars for the same period, making the UNAMID the largest and most costly mission at present. Although the UNAMID had not entered combat with the different armed groups in Darfur or with the pro-government militias, its mandate to protect the civilian population may place the mission in a situation where they must use force to avoid human rights violations. In the case of NATO in Afghanistan, the ISAF's mandate is backed by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and its main function is to aid the Afghan Government to guarantee security in the country. Nevertheless, to implement that mandate it takes part in direct combat actions against different Taliban militias and other armed actors in the country and is therefore directly involved in the conflict. In this regard, the US budget for Afghanistan and in other countries (as part of Operation Enduring Freedom) has amounted to 159.8 billion dollars for the 2001-2008 period, with 34 billion corresponding to 2008. Finally, in the case of Iraq, the US budget was 603 billion dollars for the 2001-2008 period (153 billion for 2008, the highest figure since the operation was launched in 2003).[21]

1.3. Armed conflicts: annual evolution by region

Africa

a) Western Africa

Nigeria (Niger Delta)	
Start:	2001
Type:	Resources, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, MEND, MOSOP, NDPVF and NDV, militias from the Ijaw, Itsekeri, Urhobo and Ogoni communities, private security groups
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The conflict in the Niger Delta is the result of unsatisfied demands for control of the profits from oil resources located in that region. Several armed groups, MEND (Ijaw) is the most noteworthy, demand compensation for the impact the extraction industries have on their territory and a more equitable share of the profits obtained from the installations and a greater decentralization of the Nigerian State. Attacks on oil instal-

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14. In millions of US dollars. The percentage refers to the 2007 budget.
15. United Nations Security Council. *Final report of the Group of Experts on the DR Congo*. Letter dated 23 November 2009 addressed to the President of the Security Council from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the DR Congo. November 23, 2009, in <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep09.htm>.
16. Wallace, Bret. "Banks Are Not Mere Bystanders". The Terror Finance Blog, July 1, 2009, [consulted on 21.12.09], in <http://www.terrorfinance.org/Banks%20Are%20Not%20Mere%20Bystanders_Wallace.pdf>.
17. According to reports from Jane's Intelligence research centre cited in the Sri Lanka News, this figure is an estimation of the LTTE yearly budget. Jane's Intelligence stated that of that figure only nine million USD were needed for running their military activities. Sri Lanka News. "What if LTTE were Hamas & the GOSL were Israel with powerful friends?". January 10, 2009, in <http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2009/1/37519_space.html>.
18. Article 42 of the Charter states that the UN Security Council may take such action as necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
19. African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur.
20. For the approved period between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010.
21. SIPRI, 2009, op. cit.

lations and military posts, as well as kidnappings of workers, are the methods normally used by the insurgency. In addition, this situation has led to fighting for control of the land and resources by the different communities that live in the region.

During the year important advances took place which could have led to the resolution of the conflict in the Delta.[22] However, at the beginning of 2009 the outlook was not especially good since the MEND called off the ceasefire that had been declared in September 2008 and they threatened to launch a large scale offensive. Dozens of deaths and kidnappings occurred at the beginning of the year. The gas and oil supply was interrupted and there were attacks on oil platforms and Police stations. The situation got worse on May 15 with the offensive mounted by the governmental military unit **Joint Task Force (JTF)**. The JTF is responsible for security in the Delta. This offensive was the most serious in recent years, lasted three weeks and caused **hundreds of deaths and the displacement of thousands of people**. This provoked a response by the MEND with new kidnappings and attacks on the oil industry. After this operation, on June 25 the president declared **a ceasefire, an amnesty for members of the groups that abandoned armed combat in 60 days time and he freed one of the MEND leaders, Henry Okah.** As a result, **the MEND announced a temporary ceasefire** –for 60 days starting July 15– to facilitate the beginning of talks. This ceasefire was later extended for a month and then, in October, was made indefinite. Nevertheless, divisions in the MEND regarding the acceptance of the amnesty, and the existence of sectors that did not obey the orders from the leaders to demobilize, threatened to jeopardize the process. Moreover, mistrust by the MEND continued and on several occasions they threatened to renew fighting if advances were not achieved in the negotiation process, and due to some sporadic episodes with the JTF, and delays in the beginning of the rehabilitation program. At the end of the year 15,000 insurgents were included in the disarmament process, according to the Government.

b) Horn of Africa

Ethiopia (Ogaden)	
Start:	2007
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, ONLF, OLF, pro-government militias
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=

Summary:
Ethiopia has experienced secessionist movements or resistance to central power since the 1970s. The ONLF was founded in 1984 and operates in the Ethiopian region of Ogaden, in the southeast of the country, and demands a greater degree of autonomy for the Somali community that lives in the region. On several occasions the ONLF has conducted insurgent activities beyond the Ogaden region in collaboration with the OLF

22. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

which demands from the Government greater autonomy for the region of Oromia since 1973. The Somali Government has backed the ONLF against Ethiopia, who it went to war with for control of the region in 1977 and 1978. In this war Ethiopia defeated Somalia. The end to the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 2000 led to an increase in government operations to bring to an end the insurgency in Ogaden, and after the 2005 elections, fighting between the Armed Forces and the ONLF have been on the rise.

During the year there were **attacks and ambushes by the ONLF on the security forces and its garrisons, as well as military operations by the Army and the pro-government militias**, although this information could not be confirmed due to the restrictive information policy of the Government and limited access to the Ethiopian region of Ogaden. Even United Nations requests to access to the area were rejected. In mid-November, the ONLF announced the death of 626 Ethiopian soldiers and that it had captured seven towns, and military material and vehicles in different attacks conducted by the groups in the areas near the Somali border. The Government, which had previously announced in October that the ONLF was no longer a security threat, again denied the claims. According to the Government, the army offensive conducted in 2007 had dismantled the military capability of the ONLF. Simultaneously, the Malay multinational company Petronas, together with other foreign companies participating in the extraction of hydrocarbons in the region, was warned by the ONLF on several occasions of the consequences of collaborating with the Government since it is considered an accomplice of the serious situation of violence that troubles the area. Meanwhile, the Government continued in its attempt to convince this company and others that the ONLF no longer had the capability to attack oil exploration and production in the region. There was an upsurge of local denouncements of abuses and attacks by the Army and its militias against the civilian population, and Addis Ababa confirmed the execution of one of the ONLF leaders, Serad Dolal. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimated that 300,000 people continued to be displaced during 2009 as a consequence of the different inter-community conflicts and border disputes that affected the country.

The United Nations denounced that all of the parties in the conflict were committing acts of torture and deliberate attacks on civilians, which could be classified as war crimes

Somalia	
Start:	1988
Type:	Government Internationalized internal
Main parties:	New Transitional Federal Government (TFG) –which was joined by the moderate faction of the Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia (ARS), and supported by Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama'a, warlords, Ethiopia, US, AMISOM-, Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia radical faction (ARS) –which includes partly the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Hizbul Islam, al-Shabab- and is supported by Eritrea

Intensity:	3
Trend:	=

Summary:

The armed conflict and the lack of effective central authority in the country began in 1988 when a coalition of opposition groups rebelled against the dictatorial power of Siad Barre, and three years later they were able to depose him. This led to a new fight within the coalition to fill the vacuum of power which has caused the destruction of the country and the death of 300,000 people since 1991, in spite of the failed international intervention at the beginning of the 1990s. Various peace processes set up to create a central authority have run into numerous difficulties, including grievances between different clans and subclans which make up the Somali social structure, interference by Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the power of different warlords. The most recent peace initiative created in 2004 the TFG, which has been backed by Ethiopia in an attempt to regain control of the country which is partially in the hands of the UIC. The moderate faction of the UIC has joined the TFG and together they fight against the militias of the radical faction of the UIC which control part of the southern region of the country.

Despite the remodelling of the Transitional Federal Government in January which includes sectors linked to the ARS, among them Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed – the new president who replaces Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed–, fighting continued throughout the year in different areas in the centre and south between the **TFG –backed by the moderate militia Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama'a and by the AMISOM– against the insurgency made up of al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam.** In September **fighting between al-Shabab and allied factions of Hizbul Islam** took place for several reasons, among which was the control and management of the lucrative port of Kismayo, in the south, and the fact that some representative figures from Hizbul Islam joined the TFG. The presence of Ethiopian Armed Forces in Somalia was reported at different times during the year to give support to the TFG and pursue the insurgency. This was denied by Ethiopia. The US also carried out unilateral actions –bombardments– as part of the persecution of alleged members of al-Qaeda in the country that would have links to al-Shabab. At the beginning of Ramadan, the worst escalation of violence in the past 20 years broke out according to the local Elman Peace and Human Rights Organisation. Several sources have reported that **17,000 people have died since the beginning of 2007**. Al-Shabab threatened to extend the war to the Horn of Africa region. According to the TFG, thousands of foreigners entered the country to join al-Shabab with the goal of overthrowing it. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights denounced that all of the parties in the conflict were committing acts of torture and deliberate attacks on civilians, which could be classified as war crimes. The United Nations warned that the country was going

through its worst humanitarian crisis since 1991.[23] The TFG, unable to deal with the internal situation and piracy,[24] requested the strengthening of the AMISOM o its substitution by a more robust United Nations mission.

Sudan (Darfur)	
Start:	2003
Type:	Self-government, Resources, Identity Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, pro-government Janjaweed militias, JEM, several factions of the SLA and other armed groups
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The conflict in Darfur began in 2003 related to demands of greater decentralisation and development of the region by several insurgent groups, mainly the SLA and the JEM. The Government responded to this uprising by using its own Armed Forces and the Arab Janjaweed militias. The magnitude of the violence committed by all contending parties against the civilian population has led some to consider the possibility that genocide has taken place in the region. 300,000 people have died since the beginning of hostilities according to the United Nations. After a peace agreement (DPA) was signed between the government and one faction of the SLA in May 2006, levels of violence grew and brought about the fragmentation of the opposition groups and a serious regional impact due to the displacement of the population caused by the Sudanese implication in the Chadian conflict and the Chadian implication in the Sudanese conflict. An observation mission by the AU (AMIS), created in 2004, was included in 2007 in a joint UN and AU mission, the UNAMID. This mission has been attacked multiple times. In 2008 it did not reach even half of the planned 26,000 troops and therefore is unable to comply with its mission to protect the civilian population and humanitarian personnel.

The situation in Darfur was marked by the **arrest order, announced in March, by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against the Sudanese president accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity** in the region. The Government reacted by expelling the international humanitarian organizations from the country which gave rise to international condemnation and concern that the humanitarian situation would deteriorate. It also generated an important controversy between those in favour and those against the ICC decision. Afterwards, the order to expel the NGOs was partially revoked. During the year, the United Nations was able to see a gradual decline of fighting, although it underlined the volatility of the situation.[25] Even the general of the UNAMID Martin Agwai stated that the war had ended. His statement was strongly criticized. The Panel of Experts on

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23. See Chapter 5 (Humanitarian crises).
24. Given the persistence of piracy in the waters of the Gulf of Aden, with more than 140 attacks and fifty kidnappings of ships that were navigating within and outside the security zone patrolled by the international community, the special representative of UN secretary-general Somalia noted that the fight against piracy cannot be limited to the deployment of international naval forces, and added that the only sustainable solution is the establishment of an effective government and security institutions and provide alternative sources of income to the population. The lack of a central Government in the country, the general atmosphere of impunity and the very high economic benefits that kidnappings provide facilitate that several militias in the region of Puntland are increasingly getting involved in this activity, given the regional authorities' inability to control the situation, when they are not involved.
25. UN Security Council. *Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.* S/2009/352, 13 July 2009, in <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2009/352>.

the arms embargo stated in November that actions of war had continued.[26] They denounced the **systematic failure to comply with the embargo by all of the parties involved in the conflict, violations of human rights and abuses of the civilian population, especially against women, as well as the disproportionate use of force** by the Sudanese Army and paramilitary groups. Finally, the Panel evaluated the violation of the embargo in the context of four issues that continued to affect Darfur: competition for land and resources; the rape of women and impunity in Darfur; the war between the armed groups and the Governments of Sudan and Chad, with the Sudanese JEM and Chadian groups being the main actors; and finally, the cross-border attacks carried out by the Sudanese and Chadian Armies. Moreover, over two years after its creation, the UNAMID did not complete its deployment and suffered an increase in the number of attacks. 2.6 million people continued to be displaced and another 4.7 million relied on humanitarian aid.[27]

In southern Sudan there was an increase in inter-communal violence that easily surpassed 2,500 deaths since the beginning of 2009

Sudan (South)	
Start:	2009
Type:	Territory, Resources, Self-government Internal
Main parties:	Militias of ethnic groups, National Unity Government, the semi-autonomous Government of South Sudan, political parties of the south
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑

Summary:

After signing in 2005 the peace agreement between the SPLA armed group from the south and the Government of Sudan, which ended an armed conflict that set the north against the south for 20 years, inter-communal rivalry in the south reappeared at the scene of violence. The communities, which were fighting for control of resources and pastureland, initially limited their actions to stealing each others livestock. Since the end of 2008, however, there was a change in the pattern of violence with direct attacks on towns, deaths of members of the civilian population and kidnapping of children. The Government of South Sudan accused the NCP, the party of Sudan's president, of being behind the violence. Several analysts, however, suggested the possibility that different political groups from the south might also be interested in demonstrating the infeasibility of the political project of the SPLM, political wing of the former armed group, in light of the referendum planned for 2011 which will decide whether the south splits away from the north.

During the year there was a sharp rise in inter-communal fighting, mainly in the state of Jonglei, but also in Lakes, Unity and Central Equatoria. Most of the clashes were between militias of the Murle, Lou-Nuer, Dinka, Mundari y Shilluk communities and **the number of deaths since the beginning of 2009 has easily surpassed 2,500 victims**. More than 350,000 people have abandoned their

homes in southern Sudan due to the violence in the region. Several analysts pointed to a change in the pattern of inter-communal violence which had gone from clashes between farmers to direct attacks on villages and the kidnapping of children. The proximity of the general elections (February 2010) and the referendum (2011) –which will determine the possible secession of the south– could be behind the instability. In some cases the target seemed to be the SPLA security forces, which contradicted the government position which stated that the origin of the violence was competition for livestock.

The analyses also mentioned internal factors as the cause for the disputes and the existence of local rivalries –even within the SPLA itself– regarding the elections. The SPLA accused the Army and the NCP, president Omar al-Bashir's party, of providing arms and munitions to the militias of the southern states in an attempt to hinder the SPLA's efforts to disarm the civilian population. Khartoum, meanwhile, criticized the lack of action by the Government of the south. In this sense, the United Nations described the situation in the south of the country as a security vacuum, where the different communities depended on their own militias of armed young men to defend themselves from attacks and livestock theft.

c) Great Lakes and Central Africa

DR Congo (East)	
Start:	1998
Type:	Government, Identity, Resources Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, Mai-Mai militias, FDLR, FDLR-RUD, CNDP, FRF, PARECO, APCLS, armed Ituri groups, Burundian FNL armed opposition group, Ugandan ADF-NALU and LRA armed opposition group, Rwanda, MONUC
Intensity:	3
Trend:	=

Summary:

The current conflict originated with the coup d'état carried out by Laurent Desiré Kabila in 1996 against Mobutu Sese Seko, which eventually led him to relinquish power in 1997. In 1998, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, together with various armed groups, attempted to overthrow Kabila, who in turn received support from Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe, in a war that has left around four million dead. Control and exploitation of the country's natural resources have contributed to the perpetuation of the conflict and the presence of foreign Armed Forces. The signing of a ceasefire agreement in 1999 and various peace agreements in 2002 and 2003 led to the withdrawal of foreign troops and the creation of a transitional government and subsequently an elected government in 2006. This has not meant an end to violence in the east of the country, given Rwanda's involvement and the presence of factions that have not yet been demobilised, as well as the FDLR, which was responsible for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

26. UN Security Council. *Report by The Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning Sudan*. S/2009/562, 29 October 2009, in <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2009/562>.
27. See Chapter 4 (Humanitarian crises).

At the beginning of 2009, a series of events took place that shaped the rest of the year: tensions in the CNDP armed group resulted in an internal coup d'état. The military leader of the group, Bosco Ntaganda, replaced the leader Laurent Nkunda, and subsequently ended the hostilities against the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) and then integrated the armed group into them, with the consent of Rwanda. In an agreement on March 23, the CNDP certified its transformation into a political party in exchange for amnesty and the liberation of those under arrest. Nevertheless, the CNDP also maintained its structure and political control in North Kivu, in spite of the fact that it merged with the FARDC. Rwanda and DR Congo had been negotiating a rapprochement which resulted in the dismantling of this group. Additionally, in January and February the joint operation in Congolese territory between the Armed Forces from both countries against the Rwandese FDLR apparently resulted in a weakening of the armed group. However, at a later time the operation was considered a failure since **the FDLR regained the positions it had abandoned during the offensive, and a group of UN experts stated that the group's command structure was still intact** in spite of the operation, and maintained the same illegal funding mechanisms. Several analysts also stated that **the DDR process for the 25 or more Mai Mai militias and the reform of the security sector had been a failure due to corruption and poor management of the resources.** In March the FARDC operation, Kimia II, was launched with logistic support from the MONUC in an attempt to neutralize the FDLR. Systematic violations of human rights and sexual violence were perpetrated,[28] which raised contradictions in the MONUC. In November, Germany arrested the FDLR leader, Ignace Murwanashyaka, and his vice commander, Straton Musoni, who are accused of crimes of war and crimes against humanity.

Central African Republic	
Start:	2006
Type:	Government
	Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, APRD, UFRD, armed groups split from UFDR (FURCA, MJLC), FDPC, CPJP, France, FOMUC, MINURCAT and Zaraguinas (highway bandits)
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=

Summary:
In 2006, the situation in the country deteriorated considerably as a result of increased activities by a number of insurgent groups who dispute the legitimacy of the François Bozizé government, which took power following a coup d'état against President Ange Félix Patassé during 2002 and 2003. The Bozizé Government has been accused of mismanaging public funds and dividing the nation. The insurgency fights on two fronts: first, in the densely populated central and north-western parts of the country, the APRD, led by Jean-Jacques Demafouth, has challenged the Bozizé government and demanded a new sharing of power. Secondly, there has been an increase in

insurgency operations in the northeast of the country by groups belonging to the UFDR coalition. To this instability was added the emergence in the north-west of numerous bands of highway bandits, the Zaraguinas.

Instability persisted and the implementation of the peace agreements was slow. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the year the armed groups APRD and UFDR were included in the Government. In July, the leader of the FDPC armed group, Abdoulaye Miskine, signed a peace agreement that had been pending since 2008. **Several international organizations alerted to the gradual escalation of violence and insecurity due to actions by criminal groups, State security forces and armed groups which mainly affected the civilian population.** In October, Miskine torpedoed the peace process by stating that the Government had failed to implement the peace agreements of 2007 and 2009, and declared them invalid. Shortly after, his group, the FDPC, launched attacks against the Central African Army. The CPJP, the only armed group that had not joined the peace process to date, conducted various small military operations throughout the year and demanded that negotiations begin. At the end of the year, MINURCAT only had 2,750 of the planned 5,200 soldiers, 53% of the forces needed to guarantee the fulfilment of its mandate. The Government presented its DDR program in August. It is anticipated that between 6,000 and 10,000 insurgents will participate. Of note were some advances which took place in the political sphere. In October, the **Government enacted the election law, accepted by the opposition** that had threatened to withdraw from the process, and **days later the election commission was set up.** However, preparations for the presidential elections in March 2010 were delayed for numerous reasons. Former president Ange Félix Patassé returned from exile at the end of October to participate in the elections. Furthermore, the Ugandan LRA armed group stepped up its activities in the southeast of the country with kidnappings that forced the displacement of over 4,500 people.[29]

Chad	
Start:	2006
Type:	Government
	Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, new UFR coalition of armed groups (UFDD, UFDD-Fundamental, RFC, CNT, FSR, UFCD, UDC, FPRN), MDJT, FPIR, Janjaweed militias, Toro Boro militia, Sudan, France
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓

Summary:
The frustrated *coup d'état* of 2004 and the reform of the Constitution in 2005, boycotted by the opposition, sparked the insurgency that intensified its activity during 2006, with the aim of overthrowing the authoritarian government of Idriss Déby. This opposition is made up of several groups and soldiers hostile to the regime. In addition there is the antagonism that exists between Arab tribes and black populations in the border region between Sudan and Chad which is linked to

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28. See Chapter 6 (Gender).
29. See Uganda (north).

local grievances, competition for resources and the extension of the war to the neighbouring Sudanese region of Darfur as a result of cross-border operations by Sudanese armed groups and Sudanese pro-government Arab *Janjaweed* militias. These groups have attacked towns and Darfur refugee camps in eastern Chad, which has contributed to an escalation of tension between Sudan and Chad, which accuse each other of supporting the other's respective insurgencies.

Of note is the establishment between November 2008 and January 2009 of a new armed coalition, the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR), made up of eight armed groups including the main factions: the RFC of Timane Erdimi (chosen as leader of the coalition) and Mahamat Nouri's UFDD. Previous coalitions had failed because of divisions and rivalries regarding issues of leadership. This coalition launched in May an important offensive from Sudan and the Chadian Army responded by pursuing the rebel groups in Sudanese territory. The fighting caused 250 deaths (the majority from the rebel forces) and hundreds of wounded, according to the Chadian Government. Chad's incursion in Sudanese territory unleashed a new diplomatic crisis between both countries.[30] Nevertheless, in July a new coalition of three groups, the National Movement, **signed a peace agreement with the Chadian Government in Sirte (Libya) with the intermediation of Muammar Gaddafi.** It included a halt to hostilities, a general amnesty, and the possibility for the armed groups to participate in political activities and join the Armed Forces.[31] The UFR coalition of Timane Erdimi rejected this agreement and called for the establishment of an inclusive negotiating table. At the end of the year, MINURCAT only had 2,750 of the planned 5,200 soldiers, 53% of the forces needed to guarantee the fulfilment of its mandate. As an example, almost 200 attacks on humanitarian personnel took place in 2009. In the political sphere, the Government and the opposition made advances in the implementation of the agreement of August 2007 and agreed to create an election commission. However, the political environment continued to be affected by the lack of a solution to the conflict, as pointed out by the UN Secretary General.[32]

Uganda (North)	
Start:	1986
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Ugandan Armed Forces, Central African, Congolese and from South Sudan, pro-government militias from DR Congo and from South Sudan, LRA
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑

Summary:

Since 1986, northern Uganda has been suffering from a conflict in which the LRA armed opposition group, moved by the religious messianism of its leader, Joseph Kony, has been trying to overthrow the government of Yoweri Museveni, to establish a regime based on the Ten Commandments of the Bible and to bring the northern region of the country out of its mar-

ginalisation. The violence and insecurity caused by the LRA's attacks against the civilian population, the kidnapping of children to swell their ranks (around 25,000 since the beginning of the conflict) and the confrontations between the armed group and the Armed Forces (together with the pro-governmental militias) have caused the death of around 200,000 people and the forced displacement of nearly two million people at the height of the conflict. The LRA has expanded its activities in neighbouring countries where it set up bases, due to the inability in DR Congo and the Central African Republic to stop them, and with the complicity of Sudan. Between 2006 and 2008, a peace process had been ongoing and had managed to stop hostilities, although it failed and in December 2008, the Ugandan, Congolese and South Sudan (SPLA) Armies carried out an offensive against the LRA. This caused the group to split up and move to the north of DR Congo, the southeast of the Central African Republic and the south-west of Sudan where the offensive continued.

During the year a constant trickle of attacks by the LRA took place in the region made up of the provinces of Haut-Uélé and Bas Uélé (north and northeast of DR Congo), Haut Mbomou (southeast of the Central African Republic), and in towns of the neighbouring states in southern Sudan, Western Equatoria and Western Bahr al-Ghazal, near the Congolese and Central African border. The humanitarian agencies that work in the region denounced the death of 2,000 civilians since December 2008. Additionally, there were reports of plundering and the kidnapping of hundreds of people. This highlighted the fact that the LRA was made up of many small groups with certain freedom of action, according to different analysts. The military operations to dismantle the LRA had pushed the group (or some of its units, mainly the one led by Joseph Kony, who was allegedly in the Central African Republic) farther and farther to the north. This fragmented the group and its makeup became more international. Dozens of LRA members surrendered during the year reducing its numbers to several hundred combatants, the majority children, although the group did not lose its lethal capacity. Attacks by the LRA forced the displacement of 70,000 Sudanese, and some 5,000 Congolese sought refuge in the Sudanese state of Western Equatoria. Given the magnitude of the problem, the UN Security Council called for its peacekeeping missions in the Central African Republic (MINURCAT), DR Congo (MONUC) and southern Sudan (UNMIS) to coordinate its strategies to protect the civilian population from LRA attacks.

d) Maghreb and North Africa

Algeria	
Start:	1992
Type:	System Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) / al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Intensity:	2

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30. See Chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).
31. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).
32. UN Security Council. *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad.* S/2009/535, 14 October 2009, in <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2009/535>.

Trend: =

Summary:

This conflict began with the banning of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 1992 after it had won the municipal (1990) and legislative (1991) elections, defeating the party that had historically led the country to independence, the National Liberation Front. The victory of the FIS took place in the context of a growing Islamic movement in the 1970s in response to popular unrest which was further exacerbated in the 1980s by the economic crisis and the lack of opportunity for political participation. After the military chiefs of staff banned the FIS and dismissed the government, a period of armed struggle began between a number of groups (the EIS, the GIA and the GSPC, which split off from the GIA and became AQIM in 2007) and the army, backed by self-defence militias. The conflict left 150,000 dead during the 1990s, the majority of them civilians, amid accusations of army and Islamist groups' involvement in massacres. In spite of the reconciliation processes promoted by the government, the conflict is ongoing and has claimed thousands of lives since 2000.

Episodes of violence continued in the context of the conflict between the Government and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and **caused more than 300 deaths in incidents throughout the country and in border regions** during 2009. The former Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) celebrated its third year as a branch of al-Qaeda in the region and continued with attacks on the military, police and security guards, although it also caused civilian casualties. As part of its counterinsurgency campaign, the Government reported throughout the year the number of rebels captured and those who surrendered. In November AQIM leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, was sentenced to death in absentia along with fifty of his followers for an attack in 2007 that caused 11 deaths in Algiers. Together with the military campaign, the Algerian Government also launched a media offensive to question the Islamic cause of AQIM. In this context, some former GSPC leaders made a public statement calling for AQIM to abandon violence and accept the amnesty offered by the Government. In the political sphere, it should be noted that **insurgent activity redoubled at the time of the controversial April elections in which president Abdelaziz Bouteflika was re-elected to a third term** with over 90% of the vote. In parallel to the armed offensive, AQIM continued with its campaign of kidnappings. Often the victims were people from the West captured in neighbouring countries such as Mali or Niger. In November and December alone AQIM captured three Spaniards and two Italians in Mauritania and a French national in Mali. **In response to the expansion of the group's actions into the Sahel region, during 2009 regional cooperation initiatives were set in motion** to battle AQIM. This included forces from Algeria, Mali, Niger and Mauritania.

Box 1.1. **Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Origins, tactics and new areas of action**

Efforts by several countries in North Africa to coordinate their anti-terrorism strategies in 2009 could be attributed to a growing concern regarding the actions of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) beyond the borders of Algeria, the country were it arose in January 2007. Although this may seem recent, the truth is that this franchise of Osama bin Laden's network is the continuation of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which played an important role in the Islamic struggle against the Algerian Government at the end of the 1990s. Despite the name change, the group's actions have always been seen as part of a strictly domestic insurgency. Nevertheless, in recent years AQIM's operations have raised concern in the region and in European countries which have posed questions regarding their objectives, tactics and sphere of action.

In this context, one should analyze the origin of AQIM and its evolution after the Algerian GSPC. The latter had its roots in the internecine struggle set off in the country at the beginning of the 1990s when the Military regime decided to cancel the second round of elections when a victory by the Islamic movement seemed evident. The bloody internal war was witness to the emergence of several groups in protest against the Government. Among them was the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) who was accused of being responsible for multiple actions against the Algerian security forces and massacres and abuses of the civilian population. In 1998, the GSPC was born when the group split off from the GIA allegedly due to differences regarding the tactics used by the latter group that affected the civilian population. The members of the new GSPC considered these tactics counterproductive to achieve the goal of building an Islamic State. The GSPC, which had some veteran Algerian Mujahideen members from the war in Afghanistan against the soviets (1979 – 1989), rejected an offer of peace from the Government –which other organizations did accept– as well as the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, and became the most active Islamic armed organization in Algeria.

A key date for the GSPC was 2003, the year it chose a leadership in favour of maintaining the Jihad against the Algerian Government and open to joining the al-Qaeda cause. Factors such as the designation of the GSPC as a terrorist group by Washington after the attacks in 2001, religious motivations, the beginning of the war in Iraq –which boosted the recruitment of new members–, the decision to revitalize the movement and the possibility to extend its contacts with other militant groups, are some of the elements that would have favoured contacts with the network of Osama bin Laden, which was channelled through the al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Some investigations indicate that the ties were from much earlier on and that bin Laden himself had allocated funds for the creation of the GSPC at the end of the 1990s. Nevertheless, at least publically, it was not until September 11, 2006 when al-Qaeda admitted the tie to the GSPC. Four months later it was renamed AQIM.[33] Even though the group's main objective is linked to overthrowing the Algerian regime and the creation of an Islamic caliphate –some analysts feel that this is the genuine agenda and doubt that AQIM is a regional organization

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33. For more information, see Mekhennet, Souad. "Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Lifeline from al-Qaeda", *The New York Times*, July 1 2008, in <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01algeria.html#> and Hansen, Andrew. *Backgrounder: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb*. Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations, July 21 2009, in <http://www.cfr.org/publication/12717>.

that acts coherently–,[34] in public statements the group has broadened its objectives to include attacks on European and US interests, and asserts that it has expanded its activities and recruiting to neighbouring countries in the Maghreb and the Sahel. In videos and communiqués on the web, AQIM leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel –an explosives expert who goes by the name of Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud in recognition of al-Zarqawi– usually focuses on the situation in Algeria, but also expresses opinions on events in Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.[35]

The tactics used by the group have also gone through some changes. Although AQIM has mainly used actions which are typical of the traditional guerrillas, including ambushes and attacks with mortars and rockets, since 2007 the group has begun using suicide attacks. In April of that year, a terrorist attack against a governmental building caused the death of 30 people. Months later, a double suicide attack caused 41 deaths including 17 United Nations workers. The group also sets off explosives when Algerian military forces drive by, a technique that analysts liken to the one used by the Taliban in Afghanistan. AQIM has claimed responsibility for other attacks against the military and Israeli and French interests in Mauritania. It has called for the Jihad against the military Government that took power in the country after the coup d'état in 2008. Furthermore, one of AQIM's tactics is the kidnapping of Westerners. This usually occurs in the Sahel, in the border region between Algeria and countries such as Mali, Niger and Mauritania. Kidnapping Westerners has two purposes: apply pressure to free the prisoners of Islamic movements, and obtain resources through the payment of ransom. Information on other sources of funding for the group is varied and include donations by followers, trafficking in arms, drugs, vehicles and tobacco through the Sahara Desert, which is a region of porous borders and difficult for authorities to control. This kind of activities has led some analysts to argue that AQIM looks more like a band that seeks economic benefit than a radical Jihadist group. However, these statements are countered by other specialists that believe the ideological bent of AQIM is visible in some of the group's most recent actions, for example, the execution of a British hostage when London refused to free a Jordanian cleric, last May, or the demand for the withdrawal of Italian troops from Afghanistan and Iraq in exchange of the liberation of two other hostages at the end of 2009.

US Intelligence sources believe that AQIM currently has between 300 and 400 combatants in a mountainous area east of Algiers and another 200 have a support role in the rest of the country. There are also speculations that the base of operations is in southern Algeria and northern Mali, and that some of the most recent actions attempted to demonstrate their capability to act in the entire Islamic Maghreb. Some analysts, nevertheless, indicate that the group moved its bases and sphere of action in response to the strategy rolled out by the Algerian Government: on the one hand, a military offensive whose goal is to hound the group –with the belief that if they are busy surviving then they will not have time to prepare terrorist attacks– and, on the other, a campaign to question the legitimacy of AQIM's Islamic cause.[36] Algiers has made it easy for former GPSC leaders to publicly request that their former colleagues abandon the armed struggle and is fostering Sufism, a branch of Islam associated with contemplation and not combat.[37] In the current scenario, some analysts have also warned of the possibility that AQIM is trying to activate cells in Europe, especially after suspects of collaborating with the group have been arrested in several countries in the European Union. In this context, therefore, questions about the future of the group are also linked to the current and future initiatives of the EU and the US in the region and the effectiveness of the regional cooperation programs in Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger in their struggle against AQIM.

America

Colombia	
Start:	1964
Type:	System
	Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, FARC, ELN, new
	paramilitary groups
Intensity:	3
Trend:	=
Summary:	

In 1964, in the context of a pact for alternating power between the liberal and conservative parties (National Front), which excluded any political alternatives, two armed opposition movements emerged: the ELN (inspired by Che Guevara and with support from the working classes and academics) and the FARC (which had a peasants base and was influenced by Communist ideals). During the 1970s, several other groups emerged (M-19, EPL, etc.), which ended up negotiating with the government and supporting a new Constitution (1991)

which established the bases for a Social State of Law. The end of the 1980s saw the emergence of a number of paramilitary self-defence groups instigated by sectors of the Armed Forces, business people and politicians in defence of the status quo and the maintenance of illegal businesses who promoted a strategy of terror. Drug money is currently the main element that keeps the war alive.

The unilateral liberation of political and military hostages that the FARC have been carrying out little by little, came to a stop when the Colombian Chief of Staff demanded the rebels liberate all of the hostages in exchange for nothing. Before the end of the year, however, the Government withdrew the request and authorized Senator Piedad Córdoba, the ICRC and the Catholic Church to continue efforts to achieve the freedom of another group of hostages. **In the southwestern region of the country the armed conflict intensified and the number of civilian and combatant victims rose dramatically, especially among the indigenous people,** which

34. See Joffe, George. "A convenient untruth", *The Guardian*, April 12 2007, in <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/apr/12/aconvenientuntruth>.
35. See Europol. *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*. The Hague: Europol, 2009, in <http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TE-SAT/TESAT2009.pdf>.
36. See Tawill, Camille. "New Strategies in al-Qaeda's Battle for Algeria". *Terrorism Monitor*, Volume VII, 22, (July 27 2009), in <http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_007_63.pdf>.
37. See Chikhi, Lamine. "Algeria sponsors Sufism to Fight Extremism". *Reuters*, July 8 2009, in <http://in.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idINL721135820090708>.

has been the main object of violence by members of the guerrillas, the paramilitary forces and state agents. The UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions in Colombia estimates that in the last three years nearly 2,000 people have been killed by members of the Armed Forces and presented as "guerrillas who have died in combat". This practice, known as "false positives", led to the dismissal, capture and trial of over one thousand troops. The **"cross-borderization" of the conflict caused a serious diplomatic incident between the Government of Colombia and those of Ecuador and Venezuela.** The situation deteriorated after the agreement between Colombian leader Álvaro Uribe with the Washington Government that allows US soldiers to use seven military bases (three air force, two naval and two army) on Colombian soil in operations against the guerrillas and drug trafficking. Other countries in the region, such as Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia, expressed their concern in the UNASUR summit for the growing interference of the US in South America with the pretext of supplying technical, logistical and intelligence support to the Colombian Government in their fight against the rebels.

Asia and Pacific

a) Southern Asia

Afghanistan	
Start:	2001
Type:	System Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, International Coalition (led by United States), ISAF (NATO), Taliban militia, warlords
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑

Summary:

The country has lived in almost constant armed conflict since the invasion by Soviet troops in 1979, beginning a civil war between the Armed Forces (with Soviet support) and anti-Communist, Islamist guerrillas (Mujahideen). The withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 and the rise of the Mujahideen to power in 1992, in a context of chaos and internal fighting between the different anti-Communist factions, led to the emergence of the Taliban movement, which, at the end of the 1990s, controlled almost the entire Afghan territory. In November 2001, after the Al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, the US invaded the country and defeated the Taliban regime. After signing the Bonn agreements, an interim government was established led by Hamid Karzai and subsequently ratified at the polls. Since 2006, there has been an escalation of violence in the country caused by the revival of the Taliban militias.

The year was marked by an increase of violence, controversy regarding the elections and the US announcement at the end of last year of a massive deployment of troops. In the first eight months of the year 1,500 civilians died. Most of these deaths were attributed to the insurgency and a good number to international operations. The total death toll –combatants and civilians– at the end of the year reached several thousand. It was the most deadly year for the international troops, with 498 deaths, compared to 295 in 2008. **Combat became more intense in the south, especially in the province of Helmand**, where there was a wave of insurgent attacks, especially during mid-year, in response to the international operations. Insurgent violence became evident during the election campaign with at least thirty dead on voting day. Especially serious were several international air raids that caused numerous civilian deaths, such as the US strike in Farah (southeast), with 97 civilians dead according to the Afghan Government, or the one launched by NATO in September in Kunduz, with 70 dead. For their part, the insurgency carried out attacks in the capital, including a multiple attack in February against several government organisms, leaving twenty dead; an attack in October against a building where UN workers lived, with 11 dead, five of them UN workers; or an attack against the Indian embassy, with 17 dead. Additionally, the United Nations and international NGOs alerted to the deteriorating situation of women.[38] In this context of violence, at the end of the year, the US president announced a new strategy which included the deployment of 30,000 additional troops and a calendar for withdrawal which will begin in 2011. In this sense, the Taliban leader Mullah Omar rejected a negotiation with the Afghan Government as long as foreign troops were present.[39] In the political sphere, the re-election of Hamid Karzai in the first round was annulled after hundreds of thousands of fraudulent votes were cancelled which favoured him. His rival, **Abdullah Abdullah, withdrew from the second round and denounced the lack of guarantees. Karzai was declared the winner without having to go a second round** which had an impact on the legitimacy of the process.

India (Assam)	
Start:	1983
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, ULFA, DHD, Black Widow, NDFB
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=

Sintesis:

The ULFA armed opposition group emerged in 1979 with the aim of freeing the state of Assam from Indian colonisation and establishing a sovereign State. The demographic transformations the state underwent after the partition of the Indian subcontinent, with the arrival of two million people from Bangladesh, are at the centre of the ethnic Assamese population's demands for recognition of their cultural and civil rights and the establishment of an independent State. During the 1980s and 1990s several escalations of violence occurred as well as attempts at negotiation which failed. A peace process began in 2005 that resulted in a decrease in violence, but was interrupted in 2006, giving rise to a new escalation of the conflict. Additionally, during the 1980s armed groups of Bodo origin emerged, such as the NDFB, and demanded recognition of their identity as opposed to the majority Assamese population

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38. See Chapter 6 (Gender).
39. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

Overall, violence remained at a level comparable to previous years, with at least 380 deaths in the state of Assam between January and mid-December, although **the conflict with the Dimasa armed group "Black Widow" was escalated, which forced the group to surrender**. After months of insurgent violence and military operations against Black Widow in the North Cachar Hills district, a government ultimatum in September with the threat of a large scale offensive brought about the surrender of the group. Nearly 400 members were transferred to cantonment sites. In the first nine months of the year, at least one hundred people died due to violence in the district which caused the displacement of thousands of people and mainly affected the Dimasa and Zeme Naga populations. After their surrender, some media organizations reported that other irregular groups were committing acts of violence due to the insurgent power vacuum created. Moreover, with regard to the **ULFA** conflict, the group **continued to be active during the year** and the Police held them responsible for several attacks, including several explosions in January in Guwahati that caused fifty deaths and 60 wounded; various multiple explosions in April, also in Guwahati, with a dozen dead and 80 wounded; and two explosions in Nalbarri in November with nearly a dozen deaths and over 50 wounded. The group denied responsibility for the attacks **and in November agreed to the possibility of beginning peace talks with the Government** which coincided with civilian calls for dialogue.[40] In connection with the NDFB Bodo conflict, the Administration extended the ceasefire agreement and began peace talks with the group in Delhi, but maintained military operations against the faction led by Ranjan Daimary.[41]

Around 365 people died in 2009, which was slightly below the figure for previous years. In this sense, **the Government stated on several occasions that the conflict was in a sustained period of decrease in violence** and announced that it intended to withdraw thousands of troops from Jammu and Kashmir to redeploy them in areas where the CPI-M armed Maoist group operates. Nevertheless, in December the Government had only withdrawn 15.000 troops and had not announced the number of soldiers involved or a calendar for withdrawal. Meanwhile, the Government declared that only 110 of the 3,429 missing people in the region between 1990 and 2009 had disappeared after being arrested by the State security forces. However, **human rights organizations demanded a truth commission be set up since they considered that the number of missing persons could be as high as 8,000, the majority after being arrested by the State security forces.** Apart from the fighting that took place near the Line of Control, which caused the majority of the deaths, there were massive protests at different times of the year against the presence and the *modus operandi* of the security forces in Jammu and Kashmir. During the protests, led by pro-independence organizations such as Hurriyat Conference or United Jihad Council, hundreds of people were wounded and a similar number arrested. Political and social tension climbed significantly at certain times during the year, such as during the legislative elections in April and May (boycotted by some organizations) or the commemoration of India's independence in the month of August. In addition, in the second and third quarters massive protests were held for the rape and murder of two women, allegedly by the State security forces.

India (Jammu and Kashmir)	
Start:	1989
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, JKLF, Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Hizbul Mujahideen
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The armed conflict in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir has its origin in the dispute over the region of Kashmir which has set India and Pakistan against each other since their independence and partition. On three occasions (1947-1948; 1965; 1971) the two countries have clashed in armed conflict, both claiming sovereignty over the region, which is split between India, Pakistan and China. The armed conflict between India and Pakistan in 1947 gave rise to the current division and creation of a *de facto* border between the two countries. Since 1989, the armed conflict has moved to the interior of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, where a multitude of insurgent groups, in favour of full independence for the state or unconditional adhesion to Pakistan, confront the Indian security forces. Since the beginning of the peace process between India and Pakistan in 2004, violence has declined considerably, although the armed groups remain active.

India (Manipur)		
Start:	1982	
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal	
Main parties:	Government, PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, KNF, KNA, KYKL	
Intensity:	2	
Trend:	↓	

Summary:

The armed conflict that confronts the government with various armed groups operating in the state, as well as some who are fighting against each other, began with demands for independence by several of these groups, and with the tensions that exist between the different ethnic groups that coexist in the state. In the 1960s and 1970s various armed groups emerged, some inspired by Communism and others of ethnic origin. These groups have remained active throughout the subsequent decades. In addition, the regional context of a state which shares borders with Nagaland, Assam and Myanmar also marked the development of conflict in Manipur, and tensions between Manipuri ethnic groups and the Naga population are constant. The economic impoverishment of the state and its isolation from the rest of the country have decisively contributed to reinforcing a feeling of injustice among the Manipuri population.

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40. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).
41. Figure provided by the SATP think tank. The mortality data for the different conflicts in India and Pakistan are from the same source, in <http://www.satp.org/default.asp>.

Fighting continued between the security forces and the different armed groups, with some 380 deaths, one hundred less than the previous year. In the second half of the year armed violence decreased while social and political tension were on the rise. The insurgency was especially active in the Thoubal and Imphal districts. In Imphal, the murder of several civil servants in February, allegedly by the NSCN-IM (from the neighbouring state of Nagaland), brought on the imposition of a curfew which continued until the end of March. Moreover, in the Bishnupur district, the Police and Assam Rifles security force launched a special counterinsurgency operation in April which caused dozens of casualties in the armed groups of the area, mainly in the PREPAK. Beginning in July, violence in the state declined although social tension was on the rise with massive demonstrations which combined strikes and protests organized by the major Naga organizations and numerous civil society groups, as well as protests by the political opposition. They all **demanded the resignation of the state prime minister, Okram Singh, for the over 210 murders allegedly committed by the security forces and disguised as combat casualties**. The protests were sparked by the death, in July, of a young activist who was in favour of independence –according to some sectors he was killed in police custody–, and because of the denouncement of an increase in the number of murders that allegedly were being covered up. During the year there were also civilian protests against the intimidation and threats from armed groups. In addition, the agreement was again renewed for another year to suspend hostilities between the central Government, the Government of Manipur and two Kuki armed groups, the Kuki National Organisation and the United People's Front.

India (Nagaland)	
Start:	1955
Type:	Self-government, Identity
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, NSCN-K, NSCN-IM
Intensity:	1
Trend:	Fin

Summary:
El The conflict that affects the state of Nagaland began after the British decolonization process in India (1947) when a Naga movement emerged demanding recognition for the collective rights of the population, mostly Christian, as opposed to the majority which are Indian Hindu. The founding of the NCC Naga organization in 1946 marks the beginning of political demands for independence for the Naga people. These demands evolved over the following decades both in content (Nagaland independence or the creation of the Great Nagaland including territories from neighbouring states inhabited by Nagas) and in the methods of opposition, with the beginning of the armed struggle in 1955. In 1980 the NSCN armed opposition group was created as a result of disagreements with more moderate political groups, and eight years later split into two factions, Isaac Muivah and Khaplang. Since 1997 the NSCN-IM has maintained a ceasefire agreement and talks with the Indian Government, but in recent years the number of clashes between the two groups has multiplied.

Violence in the state declined significantly during the year, compared to the increase in fighting and number of victims during the 2007 and 2008 conflict, and was therefore no longer considered an armed conflict beginning in the first quarter.[42] Even so, some incidents during the first quarter were reported. On the one hand, there were clashes between the State security forces and the NSCN-IM, which warned the Government that it would not tolerate the presence of security forces in the area around the camps where its members are stationed. On the other hand, fighting took place between the NSCN-IM and rival NSCN-K in the area of Bhandari, in the Wokha district. Additionally, in February in the neighbouring state of Manipur, the murder of three Government employees by members of the **NSCN-IM** created tension between the parties in the conflict, although the armed group considered the attack the responsibility of individuals and requested that it not be used to hamper the peace process.[43] Moreover, **the group's leader, Isaac Chisi Swu, reasserted his commitment to a peaceful solution to the conflict**.

India (CPI-M)	
Start:	1967
Type:	System
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, CPI-M (Naxalites)
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑

Summary:
The armed conflict in which confronts the Indian government with the CPI-M Maoist armed group (known as the Naxalites, in honour of the town where the movement was created) affects numerous Indian states. The CPI-M surfaced in West Bengal at the end of the 1960s with demands related to the eradication of the land ownership system, as well as strong criticism of the system of parliamentary democracy, which was considered as a colonial legacy. Since then, armed activity has been constant and has been accompanied by the establishment of parallel systems of government in the areas under its control, which are mainly rural. Military operations against this group, considered by the Indian government as a terrorist organization, have been constant. In 2004, a negotiation process began which ended in failure.

Violence climbed, reaching 960 deaths during the year. The most significant increase was in the states of Chhattishgarh, West Bengal and Jharkhand where the most violent clashes were reported, as opposed to Orissa where there was a decline. During the year there were Naxalite attacks which caused a high number of deaths, the one in Chhattishgarh in June being the most notable with 39 police casualties and 15 wounded. This was the largest number of victims in one single day since the beginning of the conflict. Moreover, the insurgency used a large number of combatants in some of the attacks, such as the one against the Police in Maharashtra with 200 insurgents and 17 police dead; or another offensive against the Police in the state of Bihar with 200 insurgents that caused the death of 10 police officers. In addition, **the**

42. See Chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).
43. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

state West Bengal was, for the first time, the scene for high levels of violence. In this state there were over one hundred deaths during the year, compared to 20 in 2008, in fighting set off by the deployment of 1,800 soldiers in the area in June and after the death of 10 members of the government party, the CPI-M (this party has the same name as the armed group, but is opposed to it). In recent months, tension had mounted in the area of Lalgarh, which is mostly under Naxalite control since the end of 2008 when the Police were expelled and part of the State administration was dismantled. The violence in West Bengal caused the displacement of thousands of civilians. In the third quarter the authorities regained political and military control. Given the existing violence in the country, **seven states supported the initiative of the Interior Minister to coordinate the counterinsurgency campaign in the border regions.** Furthermore, in October a new strategy was announced, headed by the Police in the different states and which included the deployment of 70,000 members of the security forces, elite commandos and special forces, and the use of the Air Force. This plan was heavily criticized by the civil society. This operation was launched in December, known as Green Hunt, with the transfer of 3,000 police agents from Jammu and Kashmir to Chhattisgarh. The launch coincided with a leak that the insurgency was approaching the Indian capital.

The conflict in northwest Pakistan between the Taliban militia and the Army became worse, with over 2,800 deaths and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons

the decision to renew the armed struggle was just the continuation of a situation of violence that, in practice, had been maintained in the region. Following the pattern established since violence was renewed in 2005, the opposition groups' actions concentrated on infrastructures, rail networks and gas pipelines, as well as bombings against the security forces. In addition, kidnappings were carried out which resulted in the death of dozens of hostages. In parallel, **throughout the year nationalist Baluchi leaders were murdered, which was attributed to the security forces.** On several occasions these deaths sparked massive protests and strikes that, in turn, caused more fatalities and dozens of wounded. In September, the Government announced a general amnesty for Baluchi political prisoners and reported that the accusations of disappearances and torture of activists in the province were being investigated by the Pakistani Human Rights Commission. In December, according to official estimates, one thousand people were missing. At the end of the year, the Government presented a plan in the Parliament to increase the autonomy of Baluchistan, but the proposal was considered insufficient and rejected. On the regional level, Islamabad accused Afghanistan and India of providing support for the insurgency in Baluchistan, which is the poorest province in Pakistan in spite of its abundant natural resources. Both Governments rejected these accusations.

Pakistan (Baluchistan)	
Start:	2005
Type:	Self-government, Resources Internal
Main parties:	Government, BLA, BRA and BLF
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=

Summary:
Since the creation of the State of Pakistan in 1947, Baluchistan, the richest province in natural resources but with some of the highest poverty rates in the country, has experienced four periods of armed violence (1948, 1958, 1963-69 and 1973-77) in which the insurgents have spelled out their objective of achieving greater autonomy or even independence. In 2005, the armed insurgency reappeared on the scene, mainly attacking gas extraction infrastructures . The BLA armed opposition group became the main force opposing the presence of the central Government, which it accused of taking advantage of the wealth of the province without any of this benefiting the local population. As a consequence of the resurgence of the armed opposition, a military operation was launched in the province in 2005, causing the displacement of the civilian population and armed confrontations.

Conflict related violence in the region of Baluchistan was similar to levels in 2008. **The year began with the announcement by the BLA, BRA and BLF opposition armed groups that they were suspending the ceasefire that they had unilaterally declared at the end of 2008.** The argument used was the need to respond to the Armed Forces offensive which they accused of killing 50 people during the ceasefire. During this period the insurgency had continued their attacks and, therefore,

Pakistan (northwest)	
Start:	2001
Type:	System Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, Taliban militias, tribal militias, US
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑

Summary:
The armed conflict in the northwest region of the country began as part of the armed conflict in Afghanistan after the US bombings in 2001. The area is made up of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which had been inaccessible to the Pakistani Government until 2002, when the first military operations began in the area – and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan at the end of 2001, members of the Taliban militias with alleged connections to al-Qaeda, took refuge in this area, giving rise to large-scale military operations by the Pakistani Armed Forces (nearly 50,000 soldiers have been deployed) with US support. The local population, largely from the Pashtun ethnic group, have been accused of supporting the combatants from Afghanistan. Since the first operations in 2002, violence has been on the rise.

The atmosphere of violence in the northwest got worse, with at least 2,800 deaths during the year and had a greater effect on the NWFP during the first half of the year and on the FATA in the final months. In February in the NWFP, the central Government accepted an agreement between the provincial Government and the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariah Mohammadi organization,

which included the application of Islamic law in some areas of the province, disarmament of the militias and the end to military operations. This was followed by a ceasefire in Swat. Nevertheless, violence returned shortly after, with the **Taliban expansion in the former Malakand division** (Swat, Dir, Malakand and Buner districts, among others), and reached Buer and Dir, **only one hundred kilometers from Islamabad.** Counter-offensive operations by the Army in April forced the Taliban to retreat and put an end to the talks. According to UNHCR, since the beginning of operations in the NWFP, 2.3 million people have been displaced because of the violence.[44] More than one thousand people died in these actions and the Pakistani prime minister declared the area a disaster zone. The Government announced in July that it had regained control, although throughout the rest of the year the NWFP continued to be the scene of clashes and suicide attacks which caused hundreds of deaths. This included **an attack on a market in Peshawar with 96 fatalities, the deadliest in Pakistan in the last two years**, and which coincided with a visit by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Furthermore, the situation in the FATA deteriorated considerably after the peace agreement between the insurgency and the authorities failed in June. This led to more violence with large scale military offensives and a rise in insurgent attacks in areas such as Khyber in September, which caused tens of thousands of displaced people and over one hundred victims, and South Waziristan since October, with over 600 dead and hundreds of thousands of displaced people. In addition, **attacks by unmanned US drones caused dozens of deaths.** The death of Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the TTP, in an attack by the US was reported in August.

Sri Lanka (northeast)	
Start:	1983
Type:	Self-government, Identity
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, LTTE
Intensity:	3
Trend:	Fin

Summary:

In 1983, the Tamil pro-independence armed opposition group, the LTTE, began the armed conflict that has ravaged Sri Lanka for the past three decades. After the decolonisation of the island in 1948, the growing marginalisation of the Tamil population by the Government, which is mostly made up of the Sinhalese elite, led the group to fight for the establishment of an independent Tamil State. Since 1983, each of the three phases of the conflict has ended with a failed peace process. In 2002, peace negotiations began once again with Norwegian mediation, following the signing of a ceasefire agreement. The failure of the talks sparked a violent renewal of the armed conflict in 2006. In May 2009, the Armed Forces inflicted a military defeat on the LTTE and regained control over the entire country after killing the armed group's leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran.

In May, **President Mahinda Rajapakse declared that the armed conflict**, which had lasted 26 years and caused 86,000 deaths, **had ended**. Since then, the levels of violence have dropped drastically and this context is now no longer considered an armed conflict. [45] The Armed Forces' final offensive on the remaining LTTE strongholds began in January with the capture of Kilinochchi, where the group's headquarters had been located in recent years, and the Jaffna peninsula. Soon after, in February, the Army took the city of Mullaitivu and the Chalai naval base which significantly weakened the group's military capabilities and cornered them into a small area of the territory. According to Government sources, in the previous 34 months of the armed conflict nearly 22,000 insurgents and died and 6,200 soldiers. Conversely, the **United Nations stated that about 7,000 civilians had died and another 14,000 had been wounded between the months of January and May 2009**. In this sense, **the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, denounced that both sides could have committed war crimes** in the final stages of the armed conflict: the Government for bombing areas designated to protect civilians and for using cluster bombs, and the LTTE for using civilians as human shields and for blocking the evacuation of the civilian population in areas under its control. The land, air and sea battles in the final weeks of the Army's offensive forced the displacement of approximately 300,000 people with the majority being trapped in the combat areas. Finally, the Government officially declared an end to the armed conflict the day after the death of the LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was confirmed.

b) Southeast Asia and Oceania

Philippines (NPA)	
Start:	1969
Type:	System
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, NPA
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=

Summary:

The NPA, the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, began its armed struggle in 1969 and reached its peak in the 1980s, during the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. Although the group was seriously weakened at the beginning of the 1990s –because of internal purges, the democratisation of the Philippines during the second half of the 1980s and an offering of an amnesty–, it is currently estimated that the NPA operates in most of the country's provinces. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the NPA was included in the US and EU terrorist organization lists, which greatly undermined the trust between both parties and to a large extent caused the peace talks with Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's Government to be broken off. The political arm of the NPA, whose main aim is to take power and transform the political and socio-economic system, are the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front (NDF), which brings together various Communist-inspired organisations.

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44. See Chapter 4 (Humanitarian crises).
45. See Chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).

Box 1.2. **The reasons behind the military defeat of the LTTE**

On May 19, 2009, the president of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapakse, announced the military defeat of the Tamil armed opposition group LTTE after having killed its leader, Vellupillai Prabakharan. The defeat of one of the most powerful insurgencies in the world –approximately 15,000 combatants,[46] army, air force, navy and important financial resources– and for 26 years able to corner the Armed Forces, raised many questions regarding the key to an unforeseen victory. Although the ultimate reasons for the defeat are still not clear, a multi-causal approach seems necessary to attempt to explain how the Government was able to regain control of the entire island of Sri Lanka and dismantle the LTTE.

First, it is necessary to mention the split by Coronel Karuna and the impact it had on the group, which meant losing control of the east of the island and the desertion of an important number of LTTE combatants. Around 6,000 combatants left the ranks of the LTTE to join Karuna. The support provided by this faction to the Armed Forces in 2006 and 2007 was the beginning of the armed group's decline, which at that time was mainly grouped in the north of the island. Second, the LTTE defeat can also be included in the context of the global war against terrorism. In fact, the armed group was included in the terrorist organizations list of the EU and Canada in 2006.[47] The inclusion of the LTTE in the list not only hampered the negotiation process between the Sri Lankan Government and the armed organization because it forbade its leaders from travelling to UE countries, but also was a setback in logistic and financial terms since it made it more difficult to gain access to the economic resources provided by the diaspora.

Furthermore, contributions by the diaspora –vital for the armed group's maintenance–[48] had dwindled in recent years. Among the reasons analysts give for the growing distance between the diaspora and the armed group are certain practices (recruitment of child soldiers, utilization of the civilian population) and the fact that the group was self-proclaimed as the only legitimate representative of the Tamil people, which excluded other Tamil voices that were critical of the armed group's methods. Finally, the Government's determination to achieve a military victory no matter what the cost should be mentioned. This led them to give priority to military goals over other issues such as protecting the civilian population and respecting International Humanitarian Law. The end result was that the victory was accompanied by grave human rights violations, such as extrajudicial executions or bombings in areas set aside for the civilian population.

Despite continuing contacts between the Government and the NDF to renew the peace process,[49] fighting took place in many provinces throughout the year. Moreover, the Government insisted on its plan to defeat the NPA by 2010, as the President had repeated on several occasions. In this sense, **the Government substantially increased the number of military units dedicated to fight the NPA and reinforced the demobilization and reintegration program for combatants**. Manila reported that since the program began in 2001, over 12,000 insurgents, especially from the NPA, had accepted to participate in it and 3,700 members of the NPA had surrendered since 2004. Violence rose three times during the year. First, in the month of April, coinciding with the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the founding of the armed group and with the joint military exercises that the Philippine and US troops conduct each year. At different times of the year the NPA also carried out several attacks on US troops that were realizing counter-terrorism tasks in Mindanao. Second, violence rose again in September, shortly after an attempt to renew the peace process failed. Finally, in November and December, over 40 people died in different clashes which were especially intense in Mindanao. The Government accused the NPA of setting off more and more bombs by remote control and of increasing their attacks on the civilian population. In this sense, the Government reported that between May 2008 and

May 2009 the NPA had murdered over 120 people accused of providing information to the Government or not paying the revolutionary tax. The NPA denied this information and accused the Army of militarizing the civilian population with the creation of self-defence groups to fight against the NPA.

Philippines (Mindanao-MILF)	
Start:	1978
Type:	Self-government, Identity
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, MILF
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The armed conflict in Mindanao dates back to the end of the 1960s, when Nur Misuari founded the MNLF to fight for the self-determination of the Moro people –a number of Islamized ethnolinguistic groups that are politically organised into independent sultanates since the 15th century–. The MILF, for strategic, ideological and leadership reasons, broke away from the MNLF at the end of the 1970s and continued with the armed struggle while the MNLF signed a peace agreement in 1996 which included a certain degree of autonomy for the areas of Mindanao that are mostly Muslim (Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao). Despite the fact that both parties signed

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46. There is no agreement on the exact number of combatants. After the end of the conflict, the Government has stated that approximately 10,000 people remain under arrest accused of having links to the armed group. Moreover, the Government affirmed that number of insurgents killed in the 34 month period prior to the defeat of the armed group was 22,000 (BBC. "Colombo to rehabilitate rebels", BBC, 27 May 2009, in <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8069469.stm>.

47. The United Kingdom considered the LTTE a terrorist group since 2000 and the US named it Specially Designated Global Terrorist since November 2001.

48. It is estimated that before 2000 the Diaspora provided approximately 50 million dollars yearly. Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau and David Brannan. *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements.* Santa Monica: RAND, 2001.

49. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

a ceasefire in 2003 (monitored by an international mission) and that in recent years several rounds of negotiations have been held with the Government –with help from Malaysia and focusing on the ancestral territories of the Moro people– the MILF continues to be active in several regions of Mindanao and it is estimated to have around 11,000 members.

Although the intensity of the conflict declined compared to the last quarter of 2008, fighting continued throughout the year. The Government declared that one hundred members of the MILF had died during the fighting in January, in which the Army had conducted air strikes and had about 50 casualties in its own ranks. These clashes, especially those that took place in the provinces of Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao, caused the displacement of thousands of people. **Manila indicated that in the month of February over 120 people had died due to the precarious conditions in the displacement centres**. In subsequent months the Army stepped up its campaign to arrest those allegedly responsible for the outbreak of violence that took place in Mindanao in the final third of 2008, such as the commander Ameril Umbra Kato. The exact number of people that died during this offensive is unknown, although the Armed Forces announced that one hundred insurgents had died in the month of June alone, and a minimum of 200 combatants had surrendered. Conversely, **the MILF declared that over 500 soldiers had died between August 2008 and July 2009.** The Government accused the MILF of continuing to attack the civilian population and of participating in dozens of attacks with explosive devices. The MILF accused the Government of conducting air strikes and systematically destroying the populations' homes. According to official sources, in the first months of the year alone over 2,000 homes had been burned in the province of Maguindanao. Fighting decreased significantly during the second half of the year due to the signing of several agreements between the parties,[50] although isolated incidents continued to take place (such as the alleged participation of MILF members in the kidnapping of an Irish priest in October or the attack on a prison in Basilan in December), insurgent leaders were arrested and sporadic violations of the ceasefire agreement occurred.

Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf)	
Start:	1991
Type:	Self-government, Identity, System Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, Abu Sayyaf
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑

Summary:
The Abu Sayyaf group has been fighting since the 1990s to establish an independent Islamic state in the Sulu archipelago and the western regions of Mindanao (south). It initially recruited disaffected members from other armed groups, such as the MILF or the MNLF. However, it subsequently distanced itself ideologically from both organisations and became more systematically involved in kidnappings, extortion, decapitation

and bomb attacks, thus being included in the US and EU lists of terrorist organisations. The Government considers that its counterinsurgency strategy in recent years has significantly weakened the leadership and military capability of the group. It also warns, however, that Abu Sayyaf continues to be a threat to the State because of the significant resources that it obtains through kidnapping and through alleged alliances with organisations considered as terrorists, such as Al-Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah.

Fighting rose appreciably compared to last year and has caused the death of close to 200 people. The first part of the year was marked by an Armed Forces operation to free the hostages in Abu Sayyaf's hands, especially the three workers from the International Committee of the Red Cross (two of them foreigners) who had been kidnapped in January. Fighting was especially intense in July and caused the death of over 50 people and the displacement of some 10,000 people on Jolo Island. A few days after the last Red Cross worker was set free, the Armed Forces increased their military pressure against the group and deployed thousands of additional soldiers in the Sulu Archipelago. Thus, **in mid-August, 54 people, 23 of them soldiers, died on Basilan Island in one of the fiercest clashes in recent years.** A few weeks later, at the beginning of September, 34 members of Abu Sayyaf and eight soldiers died during the taking of one of the group's main camps on Jolo Island in which the Army used air strikes. The Armed Forces declared that both the military offensive during the last year and several internal purges had enormously weakened the armed capability of Abu Sayyaf, although they recognized that the group was trying to rebuild its links with organizations in the Middle East and, also, that each year it obtained large amounts of income from the kidnappings. In this sense, **Manila indicated that Abu Sayyaf had captured over 200 people since 2003**. Furthermore, the Government said the group was responsible for most of the 140 attacks with explosive devices during the year which killed over 50 people and wounded almost 300. Finally, the Government warned again of the presence of foreign organizations considered terrorists that operate in the south of the country and maintain close ties to Abu Sayyaf.

Myanmar	
Start:	1948
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, armed groups (KNU/ KNLA, SSA-S, KNPP, UWSA, CNF, ALP, DKBA, KNPLAC, SSNPLO)
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑

Summary:
Since 1948, dozens of armed insurgent groups of ethnic origin have confronted the government of Myanmar to demand recognition of their distinct ethnic and cultural characteristics and call for reforms in the territorial structure of the State or independence. Since the beginning of the military dictatorship in 1962, the Armed Forces have been combating armed groups in the ethnic states. These groups combine demands

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50. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

for self-determination for minorities and calls for democratisation, a goal they share with the political opposition. In 1988, the Government launched a ceasefire process with part of the insurgent groups which allowed them to continue with their economic activity (mainly, trafficking in drugs and precious stones). Nevertheless, military operations have been constant for decades and have been especially aimed at the civilian population to force the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people with the intention of eliminating the armed groups' bases.

The two main scenes of violence were the states of Karen and Shan, although attacks with explosive devices were also reported in Rangoon and Mon State. In Karen state, the Armed Forces and the Karen armed group DKBA (split off from the KNU) conducted the most important military offensive of the decade which forced 4,000 people to flee to Thailand. Some voices indicated that the motivation for the offensive was an attempt by the DKBA to militarily eradicate the KNU bases, control the region's natural resources and maintain greater commercial ties with neighbouring Thailand. In addition, **the DKBA began a forcible recruitment campaign among the civilian population in Karen state** to increase its forces from 6,000 to 9,000 and thus meet Government requirements for joining the border patrol, which is under the Armed Forces. The number of people that died during the fighting is unknown, although the KNU declared that some 250 soldiers could have died during the first half of the year. In turn, Thailand increased pressure on the KNU to restrict its armed activity in Thai territory. In Shan state, sporadic clashes took place between the Army and the armed groups SSA-S, KNPP and PNLO. **In July and August, over 30,000 people were forced to cross the border with China due to the fighting between the Armed Forces and the MNDAA, which was aided by the UWSA.** Since mid-2008, tension in this state has increased notably between the Government and several armed groups –like the KIA, the NDAA or the SSA-N– that signed ceasefire agreements with the Government but refuse to join the border patrol. In this sense, several sources warned about growing military tension between the Government and the UWSA (the most powerful armed group) and of the possible renewal of a high intensity conflict in Shan or Kachin states, where the KIO has also warned that it may renew armed activity if the Government obliges them to join the border patrol.

The Myanmar Armed Forces conducted one of the fiercest counterinsurgency offensives in recent years in Karen state

under the sovereign control of current day Malaysia and others (the southern provinces of Songkhla, Yala, Patani and Narathiwat) under Thai control. During the 20th century groups have existed that fought to resist political cultural and religious homogenization driven by Bangkok or to demand the independence of these provinces with a Malay-Muslim majority. The conflict reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s and tapered off thanks to the democratization of the country. Nevertheless, the arrival to power of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001 resulted in a drastic change of direction in the counterinsurgency policies and preceded the armed conflict which affects the region since 2004. The civilian population, both Buddhist and Muslim, is the main victim of the violence. Normally, no groups take responsibility for the actions.

The Government declared that violence was falling in the first months of 2009, but a study by the Thai research centre Deep South Watch presented in mid-September revealed that although levels of violence had gradually decreased since 2007 they had been on the rise again in 2009 and had reached 100 armed incidents per month (the highest number since 2007). The centre pointed out that from 2004 to August 2009 over 9,000 armed incidents had taken place, 3,600 people had died and over 6,000 had been wounded. Some media outlets, however, consider that the number of fatalities has surpassed 4,000 since 2004. As in previous years, the violence mainly affected the civilian population (Buddhist and Muslim) with a considerable impact on the educational domain, with dozens of attacks on schools and teachers. Intelligence sources estimate that the insurgency, led mainly by the BRN-C group, currently has between 4,000 and 9,000 active members which operate in small independent cells and have considerable autonomy to act. Although the Government declared that the key to resolving the armed conflict was to drive development projects, strengthen cooperation with Malaysia, increase local participation and carry out educational and cultural measures, **Bangkok increased its military presence in the south of the country (where almost half of the Army is already deployed) and extended the state of emergency in the three southern provinces.** In this sense, while Amnesty International accused the Armed Forces of systematically practicing torture, several organizations meanwhile criticized the Government for promoting the creation of civilian self-defence groups.

Europe

Russia (Chechnya)	
Start:	1999
Type:	Self-government, Identity, System
	Internal
Main parties:	Russian Federal Government,
	Government of Chechnya, armed
	opposition groups
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑

Summary:
After the so-called first Chechen war (1994-1996) which confronted the Russian Federation with the Republic of Chechnya,

Thailand (South)	
Start:	2004
Type:	Self-government, Identity
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, secessionist armed
	opposition groups
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=

Summary:
The conflict in southern Thailand dates back to the beginning of the 20th century, when the then Kingdom of Siam and the British colonial government in the Malay peninsula decided to divide up the Sultanate of Patani, leaving some territories

mainly over the issue of the latter's independence (which was unilaterally proclaimed during the break-up of the USSR), and which ended in a peace treaty that failed to resolve Chechnya's status, the conflict resumed in 1999 in what became known as the second Chechen war and was set off triggered by incursions into Dagestan by Chechen rebels and attacks on Russian cities. Prior to elections and using anti-terrorist rhetoric, the Russian military once again entered Chechnya to combat the moderate pro-independence regime that had emerged following the first war and that had itself been victim of internal disputes and growing criminality. Russia announced the end of the war in 2001, without having achieved any agreement or a definitive victory, and promoted a statute of autonomy and a pro-Russian Chechen administration. However, fighting continued accompanied by a growing Islamization of the Chechen rebel troops and the regionalization of the armed struggle.

There was a clear contrast between the official rhetoric of stability and a deteriorating security situation, especially for the civilian population. In mid-April, the Kremlin announced the **end to the anti-terrorism operation in Chechnya** in reference to the military campaign began in 1999 which gave rise to the second Chechen war. The decision implies the end to special measures and the withdrawal of temporary federal troops. In spite of the announcement, **violence rose during the year with an increase of actions by the irregular units, including suicide attacks.** Over one hundred people died in 2009 due to insurgent and counterinsurgent violence. According to the Chechen Interior Ministry, between the end of April and November, 118 combatants died. Of the incidents, we should highlight one operation by the Chechen security forces in mid-November, with an official count of 20 rebels killed. In parallel, the North Caucasus insurgency claimed responsibility for an attack on a luxury train 320 kilometers from Moscow in November, which caused 26 deaths and close to one hundred wounded, although several analysts had doubts about their participation. In addition, the counterinsurgency cooperation between Chechnya and Ingushetia increased. Meanwhile, **grave human rights violations continued**, including kidnappings and disappearances. Local and international organizations urged Russia to end the atmosphere of abuses against civilians. During the year several people with links to the fields of human rights, journalism and humanitarian work were killed, including the activist from the NGO Memorial Natalia Estemirova.[51] In addition, in March the former Vostok battalion commander and main rival of the Chechen president, Sulim Yamadayev, was killed in Dubai.

Russia (Ingushetia)	
Start:	2008
Type:	System
	Internal
Main parties:	Russian Federal Government, Government of Ingushetia, armed opposition groups (Jamaat Ingush)
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑

51. See Chapter 5 (Human Rights and Transitional Justice).

Summary:
The low-level violence experienced in Ingushetia since the beginning of the 21st century confronts the local and federal security forces with a network of armed Islamist cells known as the Jamaat Ingush and is part of the Caucasus Front (movement that brings together the different insurgent groups in the northern Caucasus). With origins that date back to the participation of Ingush fighters in the first Chechen War (1994-1996), since 2002 the Ingush insurgency has been restructured along territorial lines and has promoted a campaign of local violence. Without the nationalist drive of Chechnya, it pursues the establishment of an Islamic state in the Caucasus. The beginning of violence in Ingushetia occurred during the presidency in the Republic of Murat Zyazikov, whose term (2002-2008) is said to have been responsible for human rights violations, corruption, poverty, social and political tension and an atmosphere of misgovernment. The Ingush insurgents periodically attack military and civilian personnel belonging to the Russian and local state machinery. 2008 marked an increase in violence and tension.

The security situation in the Republic continued to deteriorate, in spite of a change in the Presidency at the end of 2008 and the announcement by the new leader, Yunus-bek Yevkurov, of his willingness to dialogue with the Islamic insurgency. During the year over one hundred people died, including insurgents, members of the security forces and civilians. The BBC estimated the number at 200 at the end of October and the NGO Médecins Sans Frontières had reported 140 during the first six months of the year. Additionally, suicide attacks and selective attacks by the insurgency against high level officials increased. In of the most notable incidents, **25 people died and 140 were wounded, including children, in a suicide attack with a truck bomb** against a police complex in the city of Nazran in August. This was the most deadly attack in the North Caucasus in recent years. The **Ingush president was also the victim of an attack, in which he was wounded**. In different attacks during the year high level officials died, such as the Minister of Construction and the deputy head of the Supreme Court. In response, Ingushetia and Chechnya increased their counterinsurgency cooperation. Meanwhile, the atmosphere of violence and abuses against the civilian population continued. The NGO Memorial warned that the war against terrorism in the North Caucasus had turned into a state of terror due to **extrajudicial executions, torture, disappearances and impunity**, also present in Ingushetia. The Ingush political opponent, Maksharip Aushev, was killed in the neighbouring republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. In October, **the president dismissed the entire Government** and criticized them for not having suitable strategies to resolve the Republic's socio-economic problems. Furthermore, he began contacts with local clans to create a council of *teips* (clans) to address Ingushetia's problems.

Turkey (Southeast)	
Start:	1984
Type:	Self-government, Identity
	Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Government, PKK, TAK
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓

Summary:

The PKK, founded in 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist political party led by Abdullah Öcalan, announced an armed offensive in 1984 against the Government and launched a military insurgency campaign to demand Kurdistan's independence. This prompted a strong response from the Government in defence of territorial integrity. The resulting war between the PKK and the Government particularly affected the Kurdish civilian population in south-eastern Turkey, trapped in the crossfire and victim of persecutions and forcible evacuation campaigns carried out by the Government. The conflict took a new turn in 1999, with the arrest of Öcalan and the subsequent announcement by the PKK that it was abandoning the armed struggle and transforming its goals. It would cease in its demands for independence to focus on fighting for the recognition of the Kurdish identity within Turkey. With Turkey's anti-terrorist discourse and the PKK claiming a policy of self-defence, the conflict remained alive as a socio-political crisis in subsequent years and escalated in 2007.

An opportunity for peace was created with trust building measures by the PKK and the Government, although in December violence was on the rise and the DTP Kurdish party was banned

An opportunity for peace during the year, as a result of the trust building measures by the Government and the PKK, was jeopardized at the end of the year with the banning of the pro-Kurdish party DTP and an upturn in violence. Until November fighting had declined considerably, although there were several clashes and cross-border operations by the Army against the PKK, with dozens of deaths. According to the group, 128 soldiers and 94 combatants died during 2009. The PKK, which had formally maintained a non-offensive position since the end of 2008 until the local elections in March 2009, announced **a new ceasefire in April. The PKK subsequently renewed it** and simultaneously made calls for dialogue and its leader, Abdullah Öcalan[52] requested the creation of a road map. **The Government, in an about-face regarding its earlier position, announced in July the preparation of reforms to resolve the Kurdish question** which it presented to the Parliament in November. The plan was rejected by the opposition and supported by the Army, who was determined to finish off the PKK. In this sense, the Parliament renewed for another year the Army's permission to attack the group in Iraq. This decision was considered by the PKK to be a declaration of war. Moreover, the armed group considered the Government's reform plan ambiguous. Even so, the PKK sent, at the initiative of Öcalan and as a peace gesture, a group of 34 people –eight combatants and 24 civilian refugees– from Iraq to Turkey in October. However, the mass reception they were offered in Diyarbakir was harshly criticized by the Turkish political class. Furthermore, the tension between the State and Kurdish social and political sectors was visible through-

out the year. There were massive arrests of activists and DTP members were accused of having links with the PKK after the March elections, in which the DTP won by a wide margin in the southeast. Protests were launched in response to the arrests and caused the death of at least one police officer and dozens of wounded. Tension increased significantly in December for two reasons: an attack by a PKK cell in the province of Tokat (centre) without orders from above which caused the death of seven soldiers and had a considerable political and social impact; and because of a judicial order to ban the DTP, accused of cooperating with the PKK. **The latter considered the position of the Government and the State an attempt to wipe out the group and its bases**; criticized the new conditions of Öcalan's arrest; and threatened with a process of no return in reference to a renewal of violence. Subsequent Kurdish demonstrations in numerous cities resulted in three civilians dead and several wounded. Massive arrests at the end of the year against Kurdish circles, including mayors from the DTP, resulted in 300 accused.

Middle East

Iraq	
Start:	2003
Type:	System, Government, Resources
	Internationalized internal
Main parties:	Transitional Government, international coalition led by the USA/United Kingdom, internal and external armed opposition groups
Intensity:	3
Trend:	=

Summary:

The invasion by the US-led coalition in March 2003, based on the alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction as a justification and with the purpose of overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime on the grounds of supposed links to the attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York, gave rise to the beginning of an armed conflict that has gradually involved an increasing number of actors: international troops, Iraqi Armed Forces, militias and insurgent groups and al-Qaeda, among others. The new power-sharing arrangement between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds within the constitutional framework introduced following Hussein's overthrow has aroused discontent in many sectors. Violence has been on the rise and armed opposition to the international presence in the country has given way to an internal power struggle with a strong sectarian bent since February 2006, mainly between Shiites and Sunnis.

The country continued to undergo high levels of violence which intensified in the second quarter with the withdrawal of US troops from Iraqi cities in June and with the approach of the elections planned for the beginning of 2010 (the second general election since Saddam Hussein was ousted). The continuous attacks, suicide

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52. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

attacks and episodes of sectarian violence ended the lives of thousands of people throughout the year. According to a study by the organization Iraq Body Count, a total of 4,500 civilians died in 2009, half the number of the previous year and the lowest number of civilian victims since the invasion of the country in 2003. Nevertheless, in 2009 the number of victims in large scale attacks increased. In October, the deadliest attack since 2007 killed 150 people in the centre of Baghdad, in theory one of the most heavily guarded places in the country, and which had been the scene of another attack two months earlier resulting in over one hundred dead. Towards the end of the year the situation of insecurity and the difficulties in passing the election law which should govern the general elections raised doubts about whether the US would be able to fulfil the **calendar of troop withdrawals announced in February by US president Barack Obama. He had anticipated the departure of combat troops in August 2010 with 50,000 troops remaining for limited missions until the end of 2011**. Finally, just before the deadline and under pressure from the US, the Iraqi Parliament passed the voting law and the elections were scheduled for March 7. A day later the country saw one of its bloodiest days, with a series of attacks in Baghdad that caused over one hundred deaths. Political tension and violence also marked the local elections in 14 of the 18 provinces in the country at the beginning of the year and in the elections in the Iraqi Kurdistan in July. Conflict in the province of Nineveh and its capital, Mosul, as well as an uncertain political situation in the Northern oil-rich city of Kirkuk, marked by ethnic divisions, made these areas the main spotlight of attention due to their potential instability.

Box 1.3. **Increased conflict in the "disputed territories" in Northern Iraq**

The "disputed territories" refer to a strip of land which extends from Syria to Iran along the southern edge of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region (Iraq). Once the stage for the Arabization policy of Saddam Hussein's regime, followed by the expulsion of the Kurdish population, the situation in these areas constitutes the principle axis of growing tension between the Kurdish government and the central powers in Baghdad. While the Kurdish authorities insist that the status of these zones be defined within the framework of the 2005 Constitution, a number of factors have made this impossible up till now, without any prospect of it taking place.[53]

According to the KRG, these areas include territories under the administration of Kirkuk, Nineveh (Mosul), Diyala and Wasit (Kut) and they are considered "disputed" because their internal frontiers, administrative bodies, resources and population were subjected to changes under the Arabization programs adopted decades ago by the central government. According to the KRG, these changes led to a decrease in the Kurdish population of each region, created new entities and transferred Kurdish and Turkoman land to Arab colonists. For this reason the KRG insists on looking at these policies again to define the status of these territories and, to this end, in 2003 the Kurdish authorities initiated a campaign to settle the question. On the other hand, central government is reticent about Kurdish claims and says the areas are only described as "disputed" because the Kurds claim them.

Matters have evolved on two levels. In the legislative sphere, various articles relating to the "disputed territories" have been approved. Among the most notable is Article 58 of the 2004 Transitional Administration Law, which was later absorbed into Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution approved in 2005, which lays out, with some ambiguity, three phases in order to arrive at a definitive status for these zones: "normalization", carrying out a census and holding a referendum. On the ground, various experts say that the area has progressively come under the control of the KRG, although it remains de jure under the central government. In practice, and among other measures, what this means is that there are peshmergas, Kurdish regional forces, present. As for the proposed phases, although the cut-off date for a referendum set out in the Constitution (31 December 2007) has passed, parts of the other phases have been carried out. According to the Kurdish government, the normalization phase is complete and logistically everything is ready to carry out the census. However, the lack of agreements between the sides has blocked advances towards the holding of a referendum.

Two principal factors, each given different weight, depending on the point of view, stand out among the causes of the dispute. On the one hand, the difficult area of the "disputed territories" is presented as a question of dignity and historical justice, rooting the problem in the policy adopted for decades by the Baghdad government. On the other hand, others see the existence of oil as the main factor in the dispute. According to the first point of view, there must be reparations for the damage suffered in the past, and to this end they see the application of Article 140 as the only and perfect solution. According the second analysis, oil is the fundamental factor in the dispute, linked to the perceived aspirations towards independence and the centrifugal forces around of Erbil. In parallel to an increase in political tension, an increase in direct violence in the "disputed territories" has been identified: violence has taken place in various ways, with continuous bomb attacks that have left dozens of deaths, and also killings and numerous incidents. The two main troubled areas are located in the areas of Mosul and Kirkuk. Near the latter, a large-scale attack in mid-June left a death toll of more than 70 and wounded nearly 200 people.

It should be borne in mind that the violence in the "disputed territories", which manifests itself in many ways and is in itself complex and multidimensional, sometimes becomes extremely diffused. According to some analysts, there is a perception that "everyone and no one" is behind the violence. Even so, various factors that contribute to violence in the "disputed territories"

53. Tomàs, Núria, Villellas, Ana. *The Autonomous Kurdistan Region: Risks and Challenges for Peace*. Quadern de Construcció de Pau nº. 8, Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace), July 2009. http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/qcp/kurdistan_risks_peace.pdf

can be identified, although the origin of the violence is the subject of diametrically opposed points of view. For some – among them Kurdish government sources – the al-Qaeda network is the main source of the violence or, at least, them along with Baathist insurgents backed by Syria. Those who attribute the violence to outside forces also highlight the presence of violent Saudi and Yemeni elements as a key factor. Others blame neighbouring countries, such as Turkey, for supporting opposition groups.

Others, however, highlight the violence's internal origin. In this respect, analysts interviewed lay some of the responsibility at the door of the KRG, For example, the massive presence of heavily armed peshmergas in such small areas (such as the city of Kirkuk) alongside other militias (Sunni Arabs and Turkomans) – although on a much smaller scale – has inflamed the situation. To this must be added the aggressive statements made by all sides. Some sources consulted also consider that maintaining a level of violence in the area is in Kurdish leaders' interest, adding that there is a developing power struggle between the PUK and the KDP. Central government has also made aggressive moves, such as the sending of tanks to Khanaqin in 2008. At the same time, the tight control maintained by the Iraqi National Police in Mosul significantly inflames the situation.

There is evidently a risk of escalating conflict. To avoid it, it would help if the recent rhetoric were toned down, consensus was found and confidence-building and peacebuilding policies were initiated urgently.

Israel – Palestine	
Start:	2000
Type:	Self-government, Identity, Territory Internacional[54]
Main parties:	Israeli government, colonist militias, PNA, Fatah (Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades), Hamas (Ezzedin al Qassam Brigades), Islamic Jihad, FPLP, FDLP, Popular Resistance Committees
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Summary:	

The conflict between Israel and the different Palestinian actors is renewed in 2000 with the outbreak of the second Intifada caused by the failure of the peace process initiated at the beginning of the 1990s (Oslo Process, 1993-1994). The Israeli-Palestinian conflict dates back to 1947 when UN Security Council Resolution 181 divided the territory of Palestine, then under British mandate, into two states. Shortly afterwards the State of Israel was proclaimed (1948). A Palestinian state has yet to materialise. In 1948, Israel annexed West Jerusalem, while Egypt and Jordan occupied Gaza and the West Bank respectively. In 1967, Israel invaded East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza after winning the Six-Day War against the Arab countries. Autonomy for the Palestinian territories was not formally recognised until the Oslo agreements, though its implementation would be prevented by military occupation and the territorial controls imposed by Israel.

The year began with high levels of violence due to the Israeli offensive on Gaza which lasted from December 27, 2008 to January 19, 2009. The so-called Operation "Cast Lead" concluded with 1,400 Palestinians dead –half of them civilians– and 13 Israeli victims –three of them civilians–. Although the air and land campaigns ended, during the whole year Israel maintained their blockade of Palestinian territory, which worsened the humanitarian crisis caused by the lack of access of the population to basic goods, services and materials to

rebuild what had been destroyed during the Israeli operation in December and January.[55] In September, an extensive report commissioned by the UN and led by the South African judge Richard Goldstone denounced the **commission of crimes of war during the Gaza conflict**. It accused Israel of using disproportionate force and indiscriminate attacks against civilians; and Hamas of launching missiles against Israeli territory. The text, which was passed by the UN Human Rights Commission and sparked a heated controversy, recommends sending the case to the International Criminal Court if the parties do not adequately investigate the allegations of abuses.[56] In the political sphere, the February elections in Israel brought to power the Likud in coalition with the extreme right parties. Expectations regarding the new US administration's plan to advance the peace process tailed off during the year in the face of **Washington's difficulty in getting a commitment from Benjamin Netanyahu's Government to halt the construction of settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem**, a condition that the Palestinians consider indispensable.[57] In December, the Israeli Government showed its willingness to suspend for ten months the construction of colonies in the West Bank, but it maintained its policy of demolishing Palestinian homes and announced the construction of another 700 homes in East Jerusalem. At the end of the year, the death of an Israeli and six Palestinians during incidents in the West Bank and Gaza provoked fears about a new increase of violence.

Yemen	
Start:	2004
Type:	System Internal
Main parties:	Government, followers of the cleric al-Houthi (al-Shabab al-Mumen)
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑

54. Although "Palestine" (whose Palestine National Authority is a political entity linked to a specific population and territory) is not an internationally recognized State, the conflict between Israel and Palestine is considered "international" and not "internal" since it is a territory which has been illegally occupied and it is not recognized as being part of Israel under International Law or by a United Nations resolution.
55. See Chapter 4 (Humanitarian crises).
56. See Chapter 5 (Human Rights and Transitional Justice).
57. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

Summary:

This conflict began in 2004, when followers of the cleric al-Houthi, who belonged to the Shiite minority, began an uprising in the north of Yemen with the aim of reinstating a theocratic regime similar to the one that disappeared in 1962. The rebels have always accused the government of corruption and of failing to pay attention to the northern mountainous regions of the country, while objecting to its alliance with the US in the fight against terrorism. The conflict has caused the death of thousands of people and the displacement of thousands more. Violence increased at the beginning of 2007 until a peace agreement was reached in June of that year. However, sporadic fighting and accusations of breaking the agreement continued.

Violence increased significantly in Yemen as part of the conflict between the Government and the followers of al-Houthi, in the north of the country, having a dramatic impact on the civilian population. In the first quarter, mutual accusations were repeated of non-compliance with the ceasefire agreed to in 2008. Beginning in August, fighting increased after the **Government launched a widespread offensive, called Operation Scorched Earth, against the Shiite insurgents**. The clashes forced the displacement of 75,000 people which makes a total of 175,000 since hostilities began in 2004. Humanitarian agencies and NGOs point to the grave situation of the civilian population which is often trapped in combat zones.[58] In September, it was reported the death of 87 people in a refugee camp, allegedly caused by the security forces. Restricted access to the area of conflict made humanitarian aid and independent verification of the number of victims difficult. According to estimates there could be as many as one hundred victims including civilians and combatants. In the last quarter the conflict threatened to escalate into a regional problem due to the growing involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran. At the same time, Yemen faced two other sources of conflict. The first was located in the south of the country, where recurring demonstration were taking place to denounce governmental discrimination towards the region and clashes between pro-independence groups and security forces which resulted in twenty deaths. The second source of conflict had to do with al-Qaeda since the Yemeni and Saudi branches announced their integration in January. During the year clashes between the Yemeni security forces and alleged members of al-Qaeda caused the death of at least fifty people and another six were sentenced to death for collaborating with the network. At the end of 2009, international attention was focused on Yemen because of a failed attack on an airplane in route to the US. The young Nigerian attacker had been trained in Yemeni territory. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the action and claimed it was a retaliation for the offensive by the Yemeni forces with support from the US that caused the death of at least 60 of its members.

Box 1.4. **Destabilization factors in Yemen**

On May 22, 2010 Yemen will celebrate its 20th anniversary as a State after unification in 1990 of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), in the north, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), in the south. The 20th anniversary of the sole Republic in the Arabian Peninsula will be celebrated in an extremely unstable context, amidst growing conflicts in the northern area of the country, with the forced displacement of thousands of people, and warnings from analysts regarding the possibility that Yemen may end up on the list of failed states. In its most recent ranking on this issue, Foreign Policy magazine placed it in a situation of high "danger" –number 18 on the list after North Korea– and warned of the possibility that it could become the next Afghanistan.[59] In December 2009, after the failed attempt by a young Nigerian trained in Yemen to commit a terrorist attack on an airplane flying to Detroit, all international attention was focused on the risks the country posed as a potential haven for al-Qaeda bases. US President Barack Obama himself had warned about this possibility a few months earlier. What factors contribute to the instability of this country? What are the key elements needed to understand the conflicts that affect Yemen? Without pretending to be exhaustive, we cite below the main sources of tension and some economic, political and demographic features and trends that affect the current situation.

First, it should be pointed out that episodes of violence in the country have revolved around three areas. The main centre of conflict –practically ignored by the international community in recent years, although much more visible in 2009–, is in the north of the country where the government forces and insurgents known as al-Houthists –followers of al-Houthi–, are fighting in the context of the hostilities that began in 2004. The Sanaa administration accuses the rebels of attempting to restore an imamate like the one that ruled in the area for one thousand years until the victory of the Republican revolution in 1962. That is, a clerical regime following the principles of Zaidism –a minority branch of Shiism in Yemen, but which holds the majority in the north of the country–. The al-Houthists, therefore, accuse the Government of corruption and marginalizing the north of the country. They have condemned Sanaa's alliance with the US in its campaign against terrorism. The conflict has taken place against a background of sectarian identities, regional underdevelopment and a perception of historical injustice. It has caused hundreds of deaths between the civilian population and combatants as well as a severe humanitarian crisis in the area due to the forced displacement of 175,000 people. Restricted access to the region has made it impossible to conduct an external evaluation of the conflict and of reports that cite the use of unconventional weapons and the recruitment of children and Ethiopians and Somalis for combat. At the end of 2009 international concern focused on the possibility that the conflict could intensify due to the intervention of neighbouring countries and even trigger a regional escalation. Saudi Arabia inter-

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58. See Chapter 4 (Humanitarian crises).
59. See Foreign Policy. *The Failed States Index 2009*. Washington DC: Foreign Policy, 2009, in <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings>.

vened directly against the al-Houthists in the border region beginning in November and, together with Yemen –in both countries the majority is Sunni–, have insinuated that Iran –with its Shiite majority– is backing the insurgents. Tehran denied the support and criticized the Saudi intervention. In this context, some analysts feel that if Iran was not yet giving support to the rebels they may begin considering this option due to the growing participation by Riyadh in the conflict.

In parallel, the central Yemeni Government is facing a growing secessionist movement in the south of the country, in the region which corresponds to the former PDRY which went through a period of Socialism in the 1970s and 1980s. Since the unification, the balance of power has leaned toward the north and, in fact, President Ali Abdullah Saleh (leader in the former YAR since 1978) has governed continuously since then. The fragile political balance set up when the new State was created only lasted a few years and resulted in the outbreak of a civil war in 1994 with the forces in the north eventually claiming the victory. Tension continues and during this last year there have been many demonstrations to denounce discrimination of the south, especially regarding the control of resources, and there have also been clashes with the security forces that have caused dozens of deaths. In this scenario, Human Rights Watch has warned of the climate caused by the repression of the separatist movement by the Government and of the violence that could break out in the region.[60]

The third source of conflict in the country—and the one which is garnering the most international attention– is linked to actions by al-Qaeda which announced the integration of its Yemeni and Saudi branches in January. Yemen, Osama bin Laden's father's homeland, is located in a highly strategic area –where the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa meet– with porous borders and areas of their territory that escape government control. These factors make the territory an ideal base for al-Qaeda activity; even more so given that the Yemeni security forces have focused their attention on the conflicts that affect the north and south of the country and that Yemen seems to be a more viable refuge because pursuit of its members has increased in neighbouring Saudi Arabia. What is now called al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is currently led by the former private secretary of bin Laden, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, has been operating in the country for years, especially against Western interests (17 marines died in 2000 in a terrorist attack against the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Cole and another 19 people died in an attack against the US embassy in Sanaa in 2008). According to some analysts, the group could strengthen its positions in Yemen by establishing relations with local tribes and exploiting the conflicts that affect the country, for example, by expressing support for the secessionist struggle in the south as it did in mid-2009.[61] Even before the failed terrorist attack in Detroit, the US had intensified its collaboration with Yemeni forces in its battle against al-Qaeda, considering that the group had shown signs that it was looking for higher profile targets in its attacks. It was also believed that this branch could attempt to get stronger considering the pressure the bin Laden network was under in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[62]

Along with these three sources of conflict, Yemen faces another series of challenges that also threaten its political future. These include social, economic and demographic problems that could heighten the climate of destabilization. In the economic sphere, we should note that it is the poorest country in the Arab world and has high rates of unemployment and inflation, as well as significant levels of corruption. In addition, most of the State's resources –around 75%– come from oil revenues and the reserves are rapidly being depleted. Some estimations state that these resources will not last more than five years while other more optimistic forecasts place the limit in 2017. These reserves are not the only ones that are in jeopardy in Yemen. Alarms have been raised regarding the dramatic decrease in the country's water supplies, placing it among the nations with the greatest water shortages in the world, according to the United Nations. The situation looks even more complex if we consider that these economic factors must be understood in the framework of a rising demographic trend: the Yemeni population is expected to double to 40 million people in the next twenty years. Currently, over two thirds of the population is below age 24, and the predictions are that in coming years a growing and impoverished population could increase its pressure on the Government that traditionally has had problems exercising central power. In Yemen tribal dynamics continue to play an important role and the population is heavily armed despite efforts by the Government to control the extensive use of light arms in most of the cities in the country.

Given the situation, specialized analysts have alerted to the need for both local actors and the international community to act quickly to avoid a worsening of violence in Yemen and they remind us that although the country has overcome several crises and situations of instability in the past, it has never had to face a combination of challenges so complex to resolve.[63]

60. See Human Rights Watch. *In the Name of Unity: The Yemeni Government's Brutal Response to Southern Movement Protests.* Washington DC, HRW, 15 December 2009, in <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/12/15/name-unity-0>
61. See Phillips, Sarah and Shanahan, Rodger. *Al Qaida, Tribes and Instability in Yemen.* Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, November 2009, in <http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/LOWY_AlQaida_Tribes_Instability_Yemen.pdf> and Bakier, Abdul Hamed. "Al-Qaeda in Yemen Supports Southern Secession". *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. VII, 16, (June 12, 2009), in <http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_007_32.pdf>.
62. In August, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula launched an unsuccessful terrorist attack against the Saudi prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who is responsible for Saudi anti-terrorist activities, with the same kind of explosive used by the young Nigerian in the failed attack on a flight between Amsterdam and Detroit.
63. For more information, see Bouceck, Christopher. *Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral*, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2009, in http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/yemen_downward_spiral.pdf. International Crisis Group. *Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb*. Middle East Report N°86, Brussels: ICG, May 27, 2009, in <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6113&l=1>.

Countries engaged in socio-political crises (indicator no. 2)

2. Socio-political crises

- During 2009, 76 socio-political crises scenarios in the world were reported with most of them taking place in Africa (26 cases) and Asia (22). The rest of the socio-political crises were located in Europe (13 cases), Middle East (nine) and America (six).
- On a global level most of the crises were medium or low intensity, but in 11 cases they were high intensity, including Ethiopia, the Ethiopian region of Oromia, Guinea, Sudan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Iran, the Chinese province of Eastern Turkestan, Peru and Dagestan.
- Opposition to specific governmental policies by political and social sectors was the main cause for socio-political crises in 2009 and in some cases provoked a strong response by the authorities, such as in the case of Iran.
- In the south of the Caucasus the Russification of Abkhazia and South Ossetia continued a year after the Russian-Georgian war ended.
- Stability in the region of Western Africa was threatened by the crisis in Guinea due to an attempt by the Military Junta to remain in power.

This chapter identifies the context of socio-political crises that took place during 2009 (indicator 2) and is divided in two parts: in the first part the situations and characteristics of socio-political crises are defined; and in the second we analyze the evolution and trends of the crises. At the beginning of the chapter a map is provided with all of the territories currently immersed in a situation of socio-political crisis.

2.1. Socio-political crises: definition

A socio-political crisis defines a situation where the pursuit of specific objectives or a failure to satisfy certain demands by different parties leads to high levels of political, social or military mobilization and/or the use of violence that does not reach the level of armed conflict and may include fighting, repression, coups d'état, bombings or attacks. If escalated, these situations could degenerate into an armed conflict under certain circumstances. Tensions are normally linked to: a) demands for self-determination and self government, or identity issues; b) opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a State, or the internal or international policies of a government, which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power; or c) control over the resources or the territory.

Table 2.1. **Summary of socio-political crises in 2009**

Socio-political crisis[1]	Type[2]	Main parties	Intensity[3] / Annual trend[4]
Africa			
Angola (Cabinda)	Internal	Government, FLEC armed group, Cabinda Forum for Dialogue (political alliance of social movements and armed groups)	1
	Self-government, Resources		=
Burundi	Internal	Government, armed opposition (PALIPEHUTU-FNL, commonly known as FNL) and political opposition (Hussein Radjabu's CNDD-FDD faction, UPRONA, FRODEBU)	2
	Identity, Government		↑
Chad – Sudan	International	Chad, Sudan, Chadian and Sudanese armed opposition groups	2
	Government		↑
Congo	Internal	Government, CNR opposition party and pastor Ntoumi's Ninja militias	1
	Self-government, Government		=
Côte d'Ivoire	Internationalized Internal	Government, Forces Nouvelles armed alliance, pro-government militias, ONUCI, Force Licorne.	2
	Government, Resources		=

Socio-political crisis	Type	Main parties	Intensity / Annual trend
Africa			
Djibouti – Eritrea	International	Djibouti, Eritrea	2
	Territory		=
Eritrea	Internationalized Internal	Government, political opposition and armed opposition (RSADO, ESF, DMLEK)	2
	Government		↑
Eritrea – Ethiopia	International	Eritrea, Ethiopia	2
	Territory		=
Ethiopia	Internal	Government (EPRDF coalition, led by the TPLF party), political and social opposition, FDD (Medrek) opposition coalition.	3
	Government		↑
Ethiopia (Oromia)	Internal	Government, OLF armed group	3
	Self-government, Identity		↑
Guinea	Internal	Military Junta, political opposition, State security forces, social movements	3
	Government		↑
Guinea-Bissau	Internal	Government, Armed Forces, opposition political parties, international drug trafficking networks	2
	Government		↑
Kenya	Internal	Government, ethnic-based militias, political and social opposition (political parties, civil society organizations), SLDF, Mungiki sect	2
	Identity, Government, Resources		↓
Madagascar	Internal	President Marc Ravalomanana, Mayor of Antananarivo Andry Rajoelina, State security forces	2
	Government		↑
Mali	Internal	Government, the Ibrahim Ag Bahanga faction of the ADC armed group	1
	Identity, Resources		↓
Morocco – Western Sahara	International[5]	Morocco, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), Polisario Front armed group	1
	Self-government, Identity, Territory		↑
Mauritania	Internal	Government, political and social opposition	1
	Government		=
Niger	Internal	Government, Coordination of Democratic Forces for the Republic (political opposition)	2
	Government		↑
Nigeria	Internal	Christian and Muslim, cattle raising and farming communities, community militias	3
	Identity, Resources		↑
DR Congo	Internal	Government, political and social opposition and former armed opposition groups	2
	Government, Resources		=
DR Congo – Rwanda - Uganda	International	DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda Governments, CNDP Congolese armed group, FDLR Rwandese armed group	1
	Identity, Government, Resources		↓
Rwanda	Internationalized Internal	Government, FDLR Rwandese armed group, political opposition, Rwandese diaspora in DR Congo and the West	1
	Government, Identity		↑
Senegal (Casamance)	Internal	Government, MFDC armed group and its different factions	1
	Self-government		↑
Somalia (Somaliland-Puntland)	Internal	Republic of Somaliland, Autonomous region of Puntland, SUDA armed group	2
	Territory		=
Sudan	Internal	NCP and SPLM political parties, SPLA armed group, pro-government militias, Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups and subclans in the south	3
	Self-government, Resources, Identity		↑

Socio-political crisis	Type	Main parties	Intensity / Annual trend
Africa			
Zimbabwe	Internal	ZANU-PF and MDC political parties, war veterans and youth militias related to ZANU-PF	2
	Government		↓
America			
Bolivia	Internal	Government, political and social opposition (political parties, authorities and organizations of the civil society from the eastern departments)	1
	Government, Self-government		↓
Colombia - Venezuela	International	Governments of Colombia and Venezuela	2
	Government		↑
Haiti	Internationalized Internal	MINUSTAH, Government, political and social opposition	1
	Government		↓
Honduras	Internal	De facto Government led by Roberto Micheletti, deposed Government led by Manual Zelaya	2
	Government		↑
Peru	Internal	Government, armed opposition (remaining factions of the Shining Path [Sendero Luminoso]), political and social (peasant and indigenous organizations)	3
	Government		↑
Venezuela	Internal	Government, political and social opposition	1
	Government		=
Asia			
China (Tibet)	Internationalized Internal	Chinese Government, Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government in exile, political and social opposition in Tibet and surrounding provinces	1
	Self-government, Identity, System		↓
China (East Turkestan)	Internal	Government, armed opposition (ETIM, ETLO), political and social opposition	3
	Self-government, Identity, System		↑
Korea, DPR –USA, Japan, Rep. of Korea[6]	International	DPR Korea, USA, Japan, Rep. of Korea, China, Russia	2
	Government		↑
Korea, DPR – Rep. of Korea	International	DPR Korea, Rep. of Korea	2
	System		↑
Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF)	Internal	Government, factions of the MNLF armed group	2
	Self-government, Identity		↑
India (Nagaland)	Internal	Government, NSCN-K, NSCN-IM, NNC armed groups	2
	Identity		↓
India – Pakistan	International	India, Pakistan	2
	Identity, Territory		↓
India (Tripura)	Internal	Government, armed opposition (NLFT, ATTF)	1
	Self-government		=
Indonesia (West Papua)	Internal	Government, OPM armed group, political and social opposition (secessionist, pro-autonomy, indigenous and human rights organizations), Papuan indigenous groups, Freeport mining company	2
	Self-government, Identity, Resources		↑
Indonesia (Aceh)	Internal	Indonesian Government, Regional Government of Aceh, political opposition	1
	Self-government, Identity, Resources		↑
Kyrgyzstan	Internal	Government, political and social opposition, regional Islamic insurgency	1
	Government		↑
Laos	Internationalized Internal	Government, political and armed organizations of Hmong origin	2
	System, Identity		=

Socio-political crisis	Type	Main parties	Intensity / Annual trend
Asia			
Myanmar	Internal	Government, political and social opposition (NLD opposition party)	2
	System		=
Myanmar – Bangladesh	International	Myanmar, Bangladesh	2
	Resources		↑
Nepal	Internal	Government, Armed Forces, political and social opposition (UCPN(M) Maoist party)	2
	System		↑
Nepal (Terai)	Internal	Government, Madhesi political (MPRF) and armed (JTMM, MMT, ATLF, among others) organizations	2
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Pakistan	Internal	Government, political and social opposition (PPP opposition party, judiciary), armed opposition (Taliban militias)	3
	Government, System		↑
Sri Lanka (northeast)	Internal	Government, LTTE, Tamil political and social opposition	3
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Thailand	Internal	Government, political and social opposition	2
	Government		↓
Thailand – Cambodia	International	Thailand, Cambodia	2
	Territory		=
Tajikistan	Internal	Government, political (Islamic Renaissance Party) and social (regional groups: Gharmis and Pamiris) opposition, former warlords, illegal Islamist groups (Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [IMU])	2
	Government, System		↑
Uzbekistan	Internal	Government, political and social opposition, Islamist armed groups	1
	System, Government		=
Europe			
Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	International	Azerbaijan Government, Government of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Armenia	2
	Self-government, Identity, Territory		=
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Internationalized Internal	Central Government, Government of the Republic of Srpska, Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the High Representative of the international community	2
	Government, Identity, Self-government		↑
Cyprus	Internal	Government of Cyprus, Government of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus	1
	Self-government, Identity, Territory		↓
Georgia	Internationalized Internal	Government, political opposition, Russia	1
	Government		=
Georgia (Abkhazia)	Internationalized Internal	Government of Georgia, Government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia, Russia	2
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Georgia (South Ossetia)	Internationalized Internal	Government of Georgia, Government of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia, Russia	2
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Moldova	Internal	Government, political and social opposition	1
	Government		↑
Moldova, Rep. of (Transdniestria)	Internationalized Internal	Government of Moldova, Government of the self-proclaimed Republic of Transdniestria, Russia	1
	Self-government, Identity		=
Russia (Dagestan)	Internal	Russian Government, Government of the Republic of Dagestan, armed opposition groups, social and political opposition	3
	System, Government, Identity		↑

Socio-political crisis	Type	Main parties	Intensity / Annual trend
Europe			
Russia (Kabardino-Balkaria)	Internal	Russian Government, Government of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, armed opposition groups	2
	System, Identity		=
Russia (Karachay-Cherkessia)	Internal	Russian Government, Government of the Karachay-Cherkess Republic, armed opposition groups	2
	System, Identity		=
Russia (North Ossetia)	Internal	Russian Government, Government of the Republic of North Ossetia, armed opposition groups	2
	System, Identity		=
Serbia – Kosovo	Internationalized Internal[7]	Government of Serbia, Government of Kosovo, political and social representatives of the Serbian community in Kosovo, UNMIK, KFOR, EULEX	1
	Self-government, Identity		↓
Middle East			
Saudi Arabia	Internationalized Internal	Government, al-Qaeda armed group	1
	System		=
Egypt	Internal	Government, political and social opposition (Muslim Brotherhood)	1
	Government		=
Iran	Internal	Government, political, religious and social opposition	3
	Government		↑
Iran (northwest)	Internationalized Internal	Government, PJAK armed group	2
	Self-government, Identity		=
Iran (Sistan Baluchistan)	Internal	Government, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasdaran), Jundallah (Soldiers of God /People's Resistance Movement)	2
	Identity, Government		↑
Iran – USA, Israel[8]	International	Iran, USA, Israel	2
	System		=
Israel – Lebanon – Syria	International	Israel, Syria, Hezbollah Lebanese group and its armed wing (Islamic Resistance)	2
	System, Resources, Territory		↑
Lebanon	Internationalized Internal	Government, political and social opposition, armed wing of Hezbollah (Islamic Resistance), militias	2
	Government		↓
Palestine	Internal	PNA, Fatah, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade armed group, Hamas and its armed wing Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades	2
	Government		=

1: low intensity; 2: medium intensity; 3: high intensity.

↑: escalation of crisis; ↓: decrease of crisis; = : unchanged.

The socio-political crises in bold are those mentioned in the chapter.

1. In this column we include those States where socio-political crisis is taking place and indicates in parenthesis the region within the State where the crisis is confined or the name of the armed group responsible for the conflict. This last option is used in those cases where there is more than one situation of crisis in the same State or in the same territory within the State, with the purpose of differentiating them.
2. This report classifies and analyses socio-political crises using a dual typology which addresses, on the one hand, the causes or incompatibility of interests and, on the other hand, the convergence of the conflict and the parties. With regard to the causes we distinguish between the following: demands for self-determination and self-government (Self-government) or identity issues (Identity); opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a State (System) or the domestic or international policies of the government (Government), which in both cases produces a struggle to take or erode power; to control over the resources (Resources) or the territory (Territory). In connection with the second typology, socio-political crises can be internal, internationalized internal or international. Consequently, internal crisis is that involving armed actors from the same State that operate exclusively within its territory. Second, an internationalized internal crisis is when some of the main actors are foreign, and/or when the tension extends into a neighbouring country. Third, international socio-political crisis is taken to be those where state or non-state actors from two or more countries are in conflict.
3. The intensity of the socio-political crises (high, medium or low) and its trend (escalation, decrease, unchanged) are evaluated mostly based on the level of violence and the extent of the political and social mobilization.
4. In this column the evolution of events in the current year (2009) is compared to the previous year (2008). The symbol ↑ indicates that the general situation during 2009 is more serious than during the previous year, ↓ means the situation is better and = is used if no significant change has taken place.
5. Although Western Sahara is not internationally recognized as a state, the socio-political crisis between Morocco and Western Sahara is considered "international" and not "internal" since it is a territory which has yet to be decolonized and its alleged ownership by Morocco is not recognized under International Law or by any United Nations resolution.

2.2. Socio-political crises: global trends in 2009

At the end of 2009 it was possible to identify 76 socio-political crisis scenarios in the world. In terms of geography, and following the trends from other years, most of them were located in Africa and Asia (26 and 22 crises respectively). In Europe 13 cases were counted, in the Middle East nine, and in America six. The total number of socio-political crises was relatively stable compared to previous years. **Most of the socio-political crises reported in 2009 intensified (45%) or remained at similar levels (33%) of violence, and political and social mobilization compared to the previous year**. The escalation in socio-political crises was especially evident in Africa where over half of them got worse (54%). Around half of the cases also got more complicated in Asia and America (50% in each region). On the contrary, a quarter of the socio-political crises worldwide showed a decline in violence.

Globally, the great majority of socio-political crises were of medium (42 cases) or low (23) intensity. A total of 11 socio-political crises (14%) were high intensity. As was the case in 2008, most of the serious situations were in Africa or Asia: in Ethiopia –for the country in general and specifically in the Oromia region–, Guinea, Nigeria, Sudan, Pakistan, Iran, Sri Lanka and the Chinese region of East Turkestan. This last case received widespread international attention in 2009 since it was a challenge to the Chinese Government and because the clashes in Xinjiang caused the death of over 200 people in the most serious incident in the area in recent decades. Sri Lanka, meanwhile, stopped being considered a case of armed conflict after the military defeat of the LTTE, but the situation of the internally displaced Tamil population was the main centre of tension in the country. Two other high intensity socio-political crises were reported in America and Europe: in Peru due to the activity of Shining Path and clashes between the Police and indigenous organizations; and in the Russian republic of

Dagestan, because of a rise in selective murders by the Islamist insurgency in an environment of generalized abuses and impunity.

With regard to the relation between the scene of the conflict and the involved actors the data confirm the trend from previous years: **most of the socio-political crises were internal in nature**. This means that 62% of the cases (47 of 76) involved actors from the same State and they acted within its territorial limits. In the rest of the cases, the crises presented some elements of internationalization (20%) or were identified as international socio-political crises (18%). In previous years this last type of crisis, which involves fighting between state and non-state actors from two or more countries, had mainly been located in Africa. Nevertheless, in 2009 Asia matched the African continent's number of international socio-political crises with a total of five cases. To those already on the list in 2008 –the crisis involving DPR Korea, the Republic of Korea, Japan and the U.S. with regard to Pyongyang's nuclear program; the one between India and Pakistan; and between Thailand and Cambodia– this year it has been included the crisis that sets North and South Korea against each other and the one that exists between Myanmar and Bangladesh. Also of note was the appearance of an international socio-political crisis in Latin America between the governments of Colombia and Venezuela. Regarding internal socio-political crises with elements of internationalization, an important number (six of the 15 cases identified) can be found in Europe.

As far as the causes or clashes of interests at the heart of the crises, **the main element of instability was linked to opposition to internal or international policies of specific governments.** Despite the multi-causality of these cases, almost half of the crises (37 of 76, or 49%) were related to political and social opposition movements organized against the authorities to take or undermine power. This explanation was especially relevant in the crises in Africa, and also in Latin America where the six

Graph 2.1. **Regional numerical distribution of socio-political crises**

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
6. This international socio-political crisis affects other countries not cited here, which are involved to different degrees.
7. The socio-political crisis between Kosovo and Serbia is considered "Internationalized Internal" since, despite its recognition as a State by several dozen countries, its international legal status is not yet clear or defined. Thus, this year it has been decided to maintain it in the socio-political crisis category used in previous editions of this report.
8. This international socio-political crisis affects other countries not cited here, which are involved to different degrees.

socio-political crises listed were linked to rejection of government policies, including the political and social crisis in Honduras, one of the worst in its history. In this Central American country the crisis was triggered in June by a coup and the expulsion of President Manuel Zelaya. At the end of 2009 there were no signs of a long-term solution.

In other regions some cases were the focus of widespread international attention because of the harshness of the repression against opposition movements, such as the one that affected members of political parties and social movements in Guinea in September which caused 150 deaths, or the repression of those protesting against Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after his controversial re-election as the president of Iran.

Two other important factors when identifying the causes of disagreements are related to identity issues, present in 42% of the crisis situations, and demands for self-government, in 30% of the socio-political crises. These elements were especially important in those cases recorded in Asia, Africa and Europe. Other reasons for socio-political crises in 2009 included opposition to the established system in a State, regarding political, economic, social or ideological issues (21%); as well as struggles to control resources (16%) or territories (12%). Together with other factors, the struggle to control resources was especially important in Africa in cases such as Angola (Cabinda), Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, DR Congo and Sudan.

Along with these causal factors, in 20 of the 76 reported cases in 2009 –equivalent to 26%– **the celebration of elections was a relevant aspect which revealed the conflicting positions of the different actors and/or triggered a rise in episodes of violence**. In this sense, it is possible to identify three situations. First, an increase in political polarization or disturbances related to election campaigns during the year, such as the cases of Haiti, Bolivia, Lebanon, Indonesia (West Papua and Aceh), Moldova or Russia (Dagestan). Second, those cases where the worsening of the crisis was linked to doubts about the legitimacy of the election process or its results, such as the cases of Niger –where the opposition boycotted the October elections after a controversial referendum–, Guinea and Iran. Finally, for another group of countries the crisis was linked to the proximity of elections, planned for 2010, and in some cases was visible in the struggle for the political power itself, in disputes over the election process and organization, and in greater harassment of opposition groups. In this context, several analysts warned of possible instability or increased violence related to upcoming elections in Zimbabwe, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Sudan, Burundi, DR Congo, Myanmar, Sri Lanka or Palestine.

When considering the type of actors involved in each socio-political crisis, the governments of the affected countries and territories participated as one of the parties in all of the cases. Another group of relevant actors are the armed groups that, in the majority of the cases, are part of the opposition. Armed groups were present in almost half of the crises, although their role in each one should be assessed individually, due to their different degrees of organization and ability to mobilize. The analysis of socio-political crises in 2009 confirms that a direct relation between the presence of armed groups and the intensity level of the crisis cannot be established. Although armed groups participated in seven of the 11 socio-political crises that were classified as high intensity in 2009, almost a third of the crises with the presence of armed groups were low intensity. Other armed actors present in crisis situations were pro-government, community-based and ethnic-based militias, as well as warlords. In some cases, the presence of mafia organizations or drug trafficking networks was detected.

2.3. Socio-political crises: annual evolution by region

Africa

a) Southern Africa

Madagascar	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government
	Internal
Main parties:	President Marc Ravalomanana, former Mayor of Antananarivo Andry Rajoelina, State security forces

Summary:
Since the end of the Communist regime in the 1990s the island has been going through processes of intermittent political instability. The unconstitutional seizure of power by the former Mayor of Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina, with support from the Army, sparked a new political crisis in March 2009. Difficulty in reaching a power-sharing agreement among the main political leaders has resulted in institutional paralysis, causing sporadic outbreaks of violence.

Protests, which caused over 135 deaths in two months of constant demonstrations, began in February after a broadcasting station and television channel of opposition leader, Andry Rajoelina (the then Mayor of Antananarivo), were closed down. This led to the resignation of the president, Marc Ravalomanana, who was replaced by his rival. **The president resigned after the presidential palace was taken by members of the Army**, which ended the neutrality of the security forces who, until then, had remained on the sidelines of the political confrontation and respected constitutional law. The AU began mediation between the main political leaders (former presidents Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy, besides Rajoelina and Ravalomanana) to bring to an end the crisis unleashed on the island, with a Government lacking legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. Joaquim Chissano, former president of Mozambique, achieved the first agreement for the creation of a transitional Government in August, known as the Maputo Agreement. Nevertheless, the inability of the four leaders to jointly decide who would fill the new positions, apart from Ravalomanana's reluctance regarding Rajoelina remaining in the presidency, continued to hold back the application of the Maputo Agreement and worsened the political and institutional crisis which caused serious repercussions on the population.

Zimbabwe	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	Government
	Internal
Main parties:	ZANU-PF and MDC political parties, war veterans and youth militias related to ZANU-PF

Summary:
Robert Mugabe's Government, in power since the country's independence in 1980 as leader of the ZANU-PF, continues its persecution of members of the opposition parties and members of the civil society. The Mugabe administration has been criticized for its high levels of corruption, wiping out the political opposition, mishandling of land reform and the economy, and for the systematic violation of human rights. The crisis sparked after the 2008 elections, with high levels of violence perpetrated by pro-government militias, and no progress in reaching an agreement to share power, increased the political and economic crisis of the country as well as its international isolation.

In February, **the ZANU-PF, President Robert Mugabe's party, and the main opposition group MDC, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, reached an agreement to share political power** after months of negotiation. Tsvangirai was named Prime Minister, while Mugabe maintained his position and controlled the ministries, as well as the State security forces. The one-sidedness of the agreement, which does not give the MDC much room to manoeuvre, was offset by pressure by the international community which conditioned the renewal of economic cooperation for the country to the implementation of true reforms by the new government of national unity. MDC members, a large number of civil society organizations and defenders of human rights continued to report the persecution of its followers by the security forces and the war veterans militias which are close to Mugabe. Many MDC members were arrested and the charges against them were not made public. This led Tsvangirai and his followers to boycott the government of unity sessions and demand advances in re-establishing the democratic system. Several human rights organizations and the Kimberley Process panel called for the Government to withdraw its troops from the area surrounding the diamond mines and accused the Armed Forces of systematically violating the rights of the population and the mine workers. Additionally, the IRIN news agency documented how the population of the central province of Mashonaland –former stronghold of the ZANU-PF and which had voted in favour of the MDC– was being intimidated by war veterans militias that are close to the president. Furthermore, one of the main agricultural unions in the country, the GAPWUZ, denounced that **over 60,000 agricultural workers had been displaced by the violence that broke out after illegal occupation of land** by Mugabe's followers. Several analysts warned that an increase in the levels of violence was probable with an eye to the elections planned for 2010.

b) West Africa

Côte d'Ivoire	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	Government, Resources
	Internalized Internal
Main parties:	Government, Forces Nouvelles, pro-government militias, ONUCI, Force Licorne.

Summary:
Since the outbreak of the armed conflict in 2002 the country has been split in two between the areas controlled by the armed opposition alliance Forces Nouvelles in the north and the south controlled by the Government. Despite the peace agreement in 2003, the *status quo* continued until the signing of the Ouagadougou political agreement in March 2007, which included the reactivation of the DDR program, identification of the population, celebration of elections and deployment of the administration in the entire country which would reopen the door to reunification. However, little progress in its implementation continued to seriously jeopardize peace.

The presidential elections planned for November 29 were again postponed due to the slowdown in the process to review the voting lists. Even so, the list of candidates was presented and for the first time it included the RDR opposition party leader, Alassane Dramane Ouattara, who had been excluded from previous elections due to doubts about his nationality. It is estimated that the right to vote was denied to 1.9 million people who were not able to prove that they were Ivorians to the mobile courts created to register the population.[9] This situation could again fuel instability during the coming year. There was no significant progress in the demobilization process of the armed groups and a decision regarding the demobilization of the pro-government militias in the west of the country was still pending. **A report by the UN Group of Experts** which tracks the arms embargo **warned that both the Forces Nouvelles and the Armed Forces continued to rearm and equip themselves.** It also stated that the north of the country is running under a warlord economy which ignores the agreements to return control of the borders and tax collecting to civilian authorities. The exploitation of the country's natural resources continued to fuel illegal arms purchases by both sides. Furthermore, violence against returnees continued, mainly in the west.

Guinea	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government
	Internal
Main parties:	Military Junta, political opposition, sectors of the State security forces (Presidential Guard), social movements

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9. Ivorian law only recognizes the nationality of those people whose ancestors were born in the country, *jus sanguinis*. The right to recognition of nationality was one of the most important factors in the armed conflict that plagued the country in 2002.

Summary:

The Army took advantage of the death of Lansana Conté in December 2008, after over two decades in power, to stage a new coup d'état and set up a Military Junta. Although the coup's leader, captain Moussa Dadis Camara, promised initially to return power to the civilian organizations, the long transition period and constant rumours regarding the presentation of his candidacy for the upcoming presidential elections increased the discontent of the population and political groups. The violent military crackdown on the demonstrators that gathered in Conakry in September 2009 to demand the resignation of Camara and a return to constitutional order, with over 157 deaths, aggravated political instability even more and increased fears of a new armed uprising based on ethnic rivalry.

Growing political instability reached a climax on September 28 with the violent military crackdown on a demonstration which was organized by opposition parties and a social movement platform to demand that no member of the Military Junta who ruled the country should be able to become a candidate in the presidential elections to return Guinea to democratic normality. **Several sources reported that the number of deaths was 157**, although the military authorities insisted that only 54 people had died after the security forces had captured the demonstrators by closing the doors of the National Stadium where thousands of people had gathered. Additionally, dozens of women were raped and some subsequently murdered by members of the military.[10] Several investigations revealed that an ethnic component may exist in the Army's fight to stay in power which highlights the confrontation between the Peul ethnic group, with a demographic majority in the country, and the ethnic groups called *forestiers*, with a majority in the Armed Forces but in the minority in the State. Burkinabe president Blaise Compaoré, as the mediator appointed by ECOWAS, attempted to forge an agreement between the Military Junta and the opposition with no satisfactory results. During the year numerous internal purges took place in the Army, including murders and jailings, as well as arrests of former Government officials and members of the opposition. In December, **the leader of the Junta, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, was the victim of an assassination attempt by the head of the presidential guard**, Lieutenant Aboubacar *Toumba* Diakite, one of the commanders most responsible for the massacre last September in Conakry. Camara was evacuated to Morocco for surgery and the Junta Defence Minister, Sekouba Konaté, took charge.

Guinea-Bissau	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, opposition political parties, Armed Forces, international drug trafficking networks

Summary:

The history of Guinea-Bissau since its independence from Portugal in 1974 is made up of a series of civil wars and coups d'état that have prevented the country from achieving political stability as well as aborting all attempts of democratic governance. The strong influence of the Armed Forces on the political reality of the country and the confrontation between parties that represent different ethnic groups are a major hurdle to peace. The breakdown of the stability pact signed in 2007 between the main political parties was, once again, a lost opportunity to end the spiral of violence that dominates politics. The growing impact of international drug trafficking networks in West Africa is an additional element in the crisis. The assassination of the president, Joao Bernardo Vieira, in March 2009, could signal the beginning of a new period of even greater instability.

The assassination in March of President Joao Bernardo Vieira by soldiers that accused him of being behind the

Box 2.1. **Guinea: the instability that threatens the future of the West African region**

The massacre by security forces of the civilian population on September 28 in Conakry, with 157 persons dead, was simply a brutal representation of the critical situation in Guinea since the military took power in December 2008.

The demonstration, organized by a coalition of opposition parties and civil society movements that called themselves Forces Vives, took place after the dialogue with the Military Junta was broken off. The talks were being held to create a National Transition Council which would be in charge of leading the effort to return to democracy. The talks were broken off because of the announcement by the leader of the Junta, Moussa Dadis Camara, that he would be a candidate in the upcoming presidential elections, therefore violating the first agreement reached with the opposition in March. Harassment of opposition members and human rights organizations, as well as the prohibition of the right to assembly, have only made the situation worse.

Camera's reaction to the events of September 28, when he assured that he had no control over the military forces that attacked the population and accused his aide, the head of the Presidential Guard Abubakar "Toumba" Diakite, of being responsible for the repression, demonstrated the existing fissures in the Military Junta. The National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD), as the Junta is called, is made up of 33 members. Each is key to controlling a military faction in the Army and, therefore, each has its own aspiration to power. Reports by local and international human rights organizations regarding the creation of pro-Junta support groups, with a clear ethnic component, should not only be a concern of the majority ethnic groups. It is likely that each one of the main CNDD leaders is putting together his own forces given the possible power struggle in the Junta. The assassination attempt on Camara by Diakite in December could be the beginning of a new war.

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10. See Chapter 6 (Gender).

The creation of militias has been especially important in the south, in the region known as Guinée Forestière, since the leader of the Junta is a member of the Guerza ethnic group, which is common in the area. This area of Guinea, which shares borders with Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire, was deeply involved in its neighbours' armed conflicts in the 1990s. There is a large number of arms and tension is constant between the different communities that live there and claim that they come from that territory as part of their constant confrontations. During the armed conflicts that took place in the 1990s in the Mano River region, Guinean military personnel received huge profits from arms trafficking and controlling the movement of goods and persons in the Forestière region. They forged military alliances that could prove to be extremely dangerous if they are reactivated. The creation of pro-Junta support groups has spread, however, to the national level after the CNDD designated military officers close to their cause as prefects in the 33 provinces that make up the country.

The designation of the vice president of the Junta and Defence Minister, Sekouba Konaté, as the replacement for Camara after the assassination attempt, could complicate the picture even more. According to information provided by the International Crisis Group, Konaté has strong ties with the former Liberian armed group LURD,[11] which could facilitate the participation of former Liberian militiamen in the conflict. In fact, the report issued by Human Rights Watch stated that numerous witnesses of the September 28 events affirmed that part of the militia that backed the repression were Liberian.[12] All of these data augur a bleak future for the region of West Africa since a potential armed conflict in Guinea could drag its fragile neighbours into a new scenario of violence.

death of the Chief of Staff, Tagmé Na Wai –who had died in an explosion a few hours earlier–, **threatened the precarious stability of the country**. ECOWAS, the AU and the United Nations redoubled their efforts to maintain constitutional order by backing new elections for June 28 to designate the new president, Malam Bacai Sanha, from the prime minister's party PAICG. Control by the Army of the country's political institutions and the fact that Guinea-Bissau is a narco-state, the link between the American cartels and Europe, were pointed to by the United Nations and different analysts as the key problems that must be resolved to stabilize the country. In June, the minister of Territorial Administration and candidate for the presidency, and a former Defence Minister were killed by the Army while resisting arrest for their alleged participation in a coup attempt. However, sources close to the victims refuted the official version and stated that they were political assassinations. Although a commission was created to investigate the March events, at the end of the year no light had been shed on the incident and no arrests had been made.

Niger	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, Coordination of Democratic Forces for the Republic (political opposition)

Summary:
President Mamadou Tandja's proposal to reform the constitution to extend the number of terms in office and perpetuate his own power sparked a mobilization by opposition groups against the plan. The Nigerien political opposition was the target of continuous harassment and arrests in an attempt to present them as corrupt traitors. The Parliament and the Constitutional Court were dissolved, and a referendum and legislative elections to designate a new Parliament were announced

which fuelled the country's political crisis and provoked condemnation by African and International organisms.

The president, Mamadou Tandja, was able to achieve 92% of the votes in favour of a controversial referendum to change the constitution. The reform would permit an extension of the number of presidential terms and allow Tandja to remain in power. The referendum was announced after the Constitutional Court and the Parliament voted against reforming the Constitution. The president dissolved both Chambers and called for legislative elections on October 20. The elections were boycotted by the opposition that joined together in the Coordination of Democratic Forces for the Republic. Numerous political public figures from the opposition, including 30 former members of parliament, were arrested repeatedly and accused of embezzlement and other crimes. The main opposition leader, Mahamadou Issoufou, was also arrested after calling for civil disobedience. **ECOWAS suspended the country from participating in its bodies and designated the former Nigerien president, Abdusalami Abubakar, as the mediator between the presidency and the opposition.** The EU suspended the development aid agreements it had with Niger, which deprived the country of 500 million euros of funds, after the celebration of the legislative elections and a new Parliament was designated. In addition, in October a new peace agreement was reached with the Tuareg armed groups with mediation by Libya.[13]

Nigeria	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Identity, Resources
	Internal
Main parties:	Christian and Muslim, cattle raising and farming communities, community militias

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11. International Crisis Group. *Guinea: Military Rule Must End*. Africa Briefing n ° 66, Dakar / Bruselas: ICG, October 16, 2009 in <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=4137&tid=6349&l=1>.
12. Human Rights Watch. *Guinea: September 28 Massacre Was Premeditated*. HRW, October 27, 2009 in <http://www.hrw.org/es/news/2009/10/27/guinea-september-28-massacre-was-premeditated>.
13. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

Summary:

Since 1999, when political power was returned to civilian hands after successive dictatorships and coups, the Government has been unable to establish a democratic system in the country. Huge economic and social differences continue to exist between the different states that make up Nigeria due to the lack of decentralization, and between the different social strata, which fosters instability and outbreaks of violence. In addition, strong inter-religious, inter-ethnic and political differences continue to fuel violence in the entire country. The lack of transparency and the corruption in politics are two additional burdens for the Nigerian democracy. Mafia practices and a resort to political assassination as an election strategy have prevented, at least in the last two presidential elections, the population's right to vote freely, which has increased discontent and fraudulent practices.

The most serious events in 2009 were the **simultaneous attacks by the Islamist sect Boko Haram** (with alleged links to al-Qaeda, according to statements by is leader) **against police posts and headquarters in the northern states of Bauchi, Kano, Borno and Yobe, in which over 700 people died during the month of August**, most of them members of the sect. The violence began in the city of Bauchi where members of the sect attacked a police station with explosives to protest the arrest of several of its leaders. In response to the attack, the police raided a settlement of the sect in the outskirts of the city. In this initial clash 39 people died. The group's leader, Mohamed Yusuf, died while under police custody and his successor threatened to launch a *Jihad* (holy war) with the goal of Islamizing the entire country. President Umaru Yar'Adua ordered an independent investigation to shed light on a possible extrajudicial execution by the Police. Over 3,500 people were displaced by the violence. After these events, the security forces performed several operations against different Muslim congregations, detained some of their members and dismantled their organization. Their members were forced to return to their places of origin and those that did not possess Nigerian nationality were deported. Moreover, fighting between seasonal migrating herdsmen and local cattle rancher communities were on the rise during the year due to the drought which forced the Fulani (cattle raising tribe) to roam for a longer period and further south with their herds. This community denounced that it was being criminalized by the local institutions in numerous states which had prohibited their presence in the main cities to avoid situations of violence. Clashes between Christian and Muslim communities also increased. Of note were the confrontations that occurred in the state of Bauchi where 11 people died and over one hundred were wounded.

Senegal (Casamance)	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑
Type:	Self-government
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, MFDC armed group and its different factions

Summary:

Casamance is a Senegalese region which is virtually separated from the rest of the country by Gambia where, since 1982, the Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) has demanded independence. The fighting between the Armed Forces and the MFDC reached a peak during the 1990s and finalized in 2004 with the signing of a peace agreement by its maximum leader Diamacoune Senghor. Since then low level clashes have continued between the different factions that do not recognize the agreement reached with the Government and fight to increase their control over the territory.

Instability grew in Casamance during the second half of the year when **the Army bombed positions of the MFDC armed group in the outskirts of Ziguinchor** (the capital of the region) after the group attacked a military barracks and killed a soldier. The number of attacks and insecurity on the roads had increased since May, especially in the region of Bignona. This activity was attributed to an MDFC faction led by Bertrand Sambou, known as Essaoulé and who operates in the border region with Guinea-Bissau, where an MFDC attack caused the death of six soldiers in October. Academics, politicians and members of the civil society demanded that the Government and the rebels begin talks to negotiate a lasting peace, since the agreements signed in 2004 had not managed to end the armed conflict and had left the region in a situation that was neither war nor peace. Several analysts warned that the death in March of the Guinean president, Joao Bernardo "Nino" Vieira, could have an impact on the security situation in Casamance. Under his orders the Guinea-Bissau Army had fought against factions of the MFDC on the border and had been able to neutralize the group which led to greater stability. In 1998, when Vieira dismissed the head of the Armed Forces and accused him of arms trafficking with the MFDC, there was a mutiny in the Army and troops from Guinea and Senegal went to Vieira's aid to avoid his overthrow. This did not avoid his eventual expulsion from power in 1999 in a coup.

c) Horn of Africa

Djibouti – Eritrea	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	Territory
	International
Main parties:	Djibouti, Eritrea

Summary:

The border between the two countries is a source of disagreement and tension. This border was poorly established in 1901 in a treaty between France (the colonial power in Djibouti) and Italy (the colonial power in Eritrea). This unresolved demarcation was the cause of clashes between the two countries in 1996 and 1999. This dispute became worse on a regional level due to tension between Eritrea and Ethiopia, since the U.S. is a firm Ethiopian ally; due to the war in Somalia, where Eritrea backs the opposition coalition while Ethiopia and the U.S. back the Federal Transitional Government; and due to the war in the Ethiopian region of Ogaden where Eritrea supports the insurgency. Djibouti, which has maintained a neutral position in the Somali conflict, has been the scene of the most recent peace talks between some of the actors in the Somali confrontation. Its location is strategic to control sea traffic in the Red Sea (France and the U.S. have military bases there), and after the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Djibouti has become the only access route to the sea for Ethiopia.

In April the Security Council made some timid advances in **the conflict between the two countries**. The organism accused Eritrea of ignoring the resolution passed in January in which it was required to withdraw its troops from the border territory under dispute with Djibouti, Ras Doumeira, in five weeks. The Council expressed its desire to meet with representatives from the Eritrean administration to express their concern regarding the failure to comply with the resolution. At the same time, members of the Council praised the mediation efforts undertaken to date by organizations such as the AU, the Arab League or the OIC. At the end of May the Council stepped up pressure and accused Eritrea of supplying arms to the Somali insurgency in an attempt to destabilize the country. This was denied by Eritrea while several countries and regional organizations demanded that sanctions be applied. The Council announced that it would conduct an investigation to shed light on the situation. At the end of September, Djibouti called again for the Council to take steps to resolve the dispute between both countries. They warned that if the problem was not adequately resolved, the situation could set a dangerous precedent for other crises currently underway. In its turn to respond, the Eritrean representative stated before the UN General Assembly that his country had no territorial ambitions and had not occupied any territory that was part of Djibouti and added that Djibouti had only presented a partial picture of the situation. Later, in October, **Djibouti launched a diplomatic campaign against Eritrea accusing it of interfering in the security of the country by providing arms and training to anti-government movements** with the goal of conducting acts of sabotage inside its territory, but provided no more details. In December the UN Security Council passed a resolution which condemned Eritrea and demanded it reopen the dialogue with Djibouti and imposed an arms embargo on Eritrea for its collaboration with Somali armed groups.

Eritrea – Ethiopia	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	Territory
	International
Main parties:	Eritrea, Ethiopia

Summary:

In 1993, Eritrea achieved independence from Ethiopia, although the border between the two countries was not clearly established, which confronted them between 1998 and 2000 and caused 100,000 deaths. In June 2000 they signed an agreement to end hostilities, the UN Security Council set up the UNMEE mission to supervise it, and in December they signed the Algiers Peace Agreement. It establishes that both will submit to the decision reached by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) which is charged with delimiting the border based on the relevant colonial treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and international law. In April 2002 the EEBC announced its decision and assigned the border town under dispute, Badme, (epicentre of the war and currently under Ethiopian administration) to Eritrea, which was rejected by Ethiopia.

During the year there were no variations in the relationship between the two countries that would indicate a change regarding the border dispute that confronts them and no significant events in the border region since the UNMEE mission withdrew in July 2008. Ethiopia repeated in January its willingness to begin talks with Eritrea without pre-conditions, and in February the Libyan leader and rotating AU president, Muammar Gaddafi, offered to mediate in the dispute. This was rejected by Eritrea which considered the proposal arbitrary. Asmara, in addition, repeated that the main condition was Ethiopian withdrawal from the disputed territory. **In August the Permanent Court of Arbitration rendered the war compensations between Eritrea and Ethiopia and concluded that Eritrea must pay Ethiopia 11 million dollars.** At the same time, both countries accused each other of being involved in the conflict in Somalia, where Ethiopia backs the Transitional Federal Government and Eritrea the Islamist insurgency. Ethiopia also accused Eritrea of giving support to the insurgency of Ogaden, in Ethiopia. Ethiopia, together with others in the region such as Djibouti and Kenya, **accused Eritrea of supplying arms and training to the Somali insurgency in violation of the arms embargo imposed by the United Nations since 1992.** During the year international consensus grew regarding this issue and different countries and organizations seconded the position that the AU adopted in May –in June, the US, in September the IGAD and in October the United Kingdom– to demand that the UN Security Council impose sanctions against Eritrea after reports were published that they were supplying arms to the Somali insurgency. This growing demand culminated in December with the establishment of an arms embargo by the UN Security Council on Eritrea.

Ethiopia		
Intensity:	3	
Trend:	↑	
Type:	Government, Identity, Self-government	
	Internal	
Main parties:	Government (EPRDF coalition, led by the TPLF party), political and social opposition, FDD (Medrek) opposition coalition.	

Summary:

The Ethiopian administration that has governed since 1991 is facing a series of opposition movements that demand advances in the democracy and governability of the country, as well as a greater degree of self-government. The government coalition EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) is controlled by the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) party, of the Tigrayan minority, that rules the country with growing authoritarianism with the consent of the Amhara elite. There is discontent in the country with the ethnic federal regime implemented by the EPRDF which has not resolved the national issue and has led to the consolidation of a strong political and social opposition. Along with the demands for the democratization of the institutions, there are political-military sectors that believe that ethnic federalism does not meet their nationalist demands and other sectors, from the ruling classes and present throughout the country, that consider ethnic federalism to be a deterrent to the consolidation of the Nation-State. In the 2005 elections this diverse opposition proved to be a challenge for the EPRDF, who was reluctant to accept genuine multi-party competition, and post-election protests were violently repressed.

During the year there was **growing tension due to the future legislative and presidential elections to be held in May 2010**. **The Government increased it abuses, pressure and intimidation on the opposition by arresting hundreds of activists and candidates**. The situation became more intense during the local elections in April, which the EPRDF won with an overwhelming victory. The opposition even accused the Government of extrajudicial executions, for political reasons, and the utilization of food aid as a political weapon to win the elections. The political opposition denounced that its supporters were not receiving aid as a way of pressuring them to join the governing EPRDF. Some laws were also tightened up, such as the anti-terrorism law and the law regulating NGOs, in an attempt to restrict fundamental rights, repress the political opposition and independent criticism. The donating entities expressed concern regarding these restrictions.[14] In addition, the International Crisis Group warned that the elections could increase internal tensions and spark violence of regional dimensions.[15] In November, after two months of intense debate, in which 65 parties, EPRDF and the three main opposition parties AEUO, EDP and CUD –which are currently part of the opposition coalition FDD- reached an agreement regarding the electoral code of conduct and strategies for its implementation. Furthermore, at different times during the year outbreaks of inter-community violence took place over the ownership and use of land and sources of water in different parts of the country. The most important outbreak took place in February between the Borena and Gheri (south) communities and caused the death of 300 people and up to 100,000 displaced persons.

In the Ethiopian region of Oromia, opposition organizations denounced the death of between 100 and 200 persons in inter-community clashes encouraged by the Government

the OLF split away in 1992 from the transitional Government led by Meles Zenawi's TPLF party, that controls the coalition in power, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and has initiated an armed struggle against the central Government and against other Oromo pro-government political movements, and demands independence for the Oromo community. On several occasions it has collaborated with the ONLF from Ogaden in actions against the central Government.

For years there have been sporadic clashes between the OLF and the Ethiopian Army in which dozens of combatants have died, as well as arrests of members from the Oromo community accused of being OLF members. In August, during one of those raids the security forces arrested dozens of prominent intellectuals from the Oromo ethnic group in the capital and in different towns in the state of Oromia, according to the Human Rights League of the Horn of Africa. At the same time, OFDM and OPC Oromo parties denounced that the Government had denied them the right to form a coalition, the Oromo Federalist Congress. OLF issued a communiqué in which it accused the Government of politicizing the serious drought that was affecting the region. **Oromo opposition organizations denounced the death of between 100 and 200 people and dozens of people with varying degrees of injury due to inter-community violence incited by the Government.** These organizations accused the Government of fuelling the conflicts between the Oromos and other communities in the country, of fostering division in the Oromo community by using religion and a sense of clan and community, and also of encouraging political repression. In June nearly 3,000 Oromo students conducted protests in the University of Awassa to denounce the growing repression that the Government exercises on its community.

Ethiopia (Oromia)	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Self-government, Identity
	Internal
Main parties:	Central Government, Regional Government, political (OFDM, OPC parties) and social opposition, armed opposition OLF, IFLO

Summary:
Ethiopia has experienced secessionist movements or rejection of central power since the 1970s. The Oromo OLF emerged between 1973 and 1974 and operates in the Ethiopian region of Oromia, in the centre and south of the country, against the Mengistu dictatorship and with the goal of establishing an independent State for the Oromo community. Despite differences, the political and armed nationalist movements of the Oromo participated together with other insurgent groups in the country to overthrow the Mengistu regime in 1991. However,

Chad – Sudan	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government
	International
Main parties:	Chad, Sudan, Chadian and Sudanese armed opposition groups

Summary:
The beginning of the war in Darfur in 2003 marked the gradual deterioration of relations between both Governments, whose presidents were former allies in the overthrow of Chadian president Hissène Habré by Idriss Déby in 1990. Although Chad acted as the mediator between the Sudanese Government and the Darfur insurgency in 2004, the rise in violence, the influx of Sudanese refugees to eastern Chad and incursions by the Sudanese Janjaweed pro-government militias in this area

14. The NGO legislation, which is in force since March, penalizes the human rights activities undertaken by those Ethiopian organizations that receive over 10% of their funding from abroad and limits the human rights activities of foreign NGOs, including campaigns for gender equality, children's rights, the rights of the disabled and conflict resolution. Amnesty International "Ethiopian parliament adopts repressive new NGO law". AI, January 8, 2009, in <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/ethiopian-parliament-adopts-repressive-new-ngo-law-20090108>.
15. International Crisis Group. Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents. Crisis Group Africa Report n° 153, Bruselas: ICG, September 4, 2009, in <http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/horn_of_africa/153_ethiopia___ethnic_federalism_and_its_discontents.pdf>.

caused numerous criticisms of the Chadian Administration for its policy of neutrality. It is worth recalling that some of the armed groups from Darfur are from the same community that governs Chad, the Zaghawa. In 2004 several insurgencies against the Idriss Déby Government were set up, and since then both Governments have backed the armed opposition of the other country.

The year was marked by the persistent climate of mistrust and confrontation between both countries and by the diplomatic initiatives to reduce the tension and in December several meetings were held and a decision was made to implement the previous agreements. Nonetheless, **during the year several incursions took place by the Armies of Chad and Sudan in the border region** in pursuit of armed groups. Despite a new agreement in Doha reached on May 3 by both countries, the fourth after those signed in Tripoli, Riyadh and Dakar, **the Chadian rebel offensive[16] and subsequent invasion by the Chadian Army in Sudanese territory deteriorated the situation once again.** In July, the Chadian Army launched an air offensive in West Darfur, after it was announced that Qatar had been planning a meeting between the Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, and his Chadian counterpart, Idriss Déby. In November, Sudan launched an air strike against a Chadian detachment that had previously crossed the Sudanese border. A Chadian soldier was killed and military escalation was feared. The governing party in Sudan, the NCP, criticized Chad for not taking seriously the normalization of mutual diplomatic relations seeing as N'Djamena had linked the improvement of bilateral relations to the expulsion of Chadian rebels from Sudan. At the same time the lack of advances by Khartoum fuelled the intransigence of Darfur armed groups in the Doha (Qatar) peace talks since they are backed by N'Djamena. Visits by delegations from both countries and regional and international good offices were able to achieve advances in the dispute, although implementation of the agreement is pending, as in previous occasions.

Sudan	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Self-government, Identity, Resources
	Internal
Main parties:	NCP and SPLM political parties, SPLA armed group, pro-government militias, Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups and subclans in the south

Summary:
In 2005 the armed group SPLA and the Sudan Government signed a final peace agreement (CPA) which ended 20 years of armed conflict that confronted the north and the south of the country. The lack of definition of several points in the agreement is making advances in the peace process difficult. On the other hand, the end to the conflict on the national level has led to a resurgence of mistrust and disagreement between the different ethnic groups and clans that live together and compete for the scarce resources in the south of the country.

The contrast between groups such as the Khartoum elite and the states of the Upper Nile that control Sudanese economic wealth on the one hand, and the other states that make up the rest of the country on the other, is at the centre of the conflict that threatens peace in Sudan.

A lack of understanding between the signatories of the 2005 Global Peace Agreement, the NCP and the SPLM, continues to hinder its implementation. The main disagreement occurred in the negotiations surrounding election legislation reform and validation of the results in the referendum for self-determination of the south that will be held, according to the peace agreement, in 2011. SPLM did not accept the validity of the national census realized in 2008 and opposed its use to determine the sharing of oil profits and for the voting census. Voter registration began on November 1. 28 Sudanese opposition parties, led by SPLM, signed the Juba Declaration on Dialogue and National Consensus, in which they were committed to boycotting the coming presidential elections if the Government was unable to pass the legal reforms essential for the implementation of the peace agreement. In a climate of growing tension, **the president of the semi-autonomous Government of the south, Salva Kiir, was in favour of southern secession since remaining in a united Sudan would convert all of the southerners into second class citizens**. In addition, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague established the new border in the oil region of Abyei which left the main oil well in the north and the most fertile land and the Capital in the south. This decision was contested by the Misseriya Arab cattle-raising tribes that demanded compensation from the State since they believed the decision would seriously affect their grazing activities. Many analysts called attention to the growing tension and the large amount of arms, militias and armed groups in Southern Kordofan (north) which could become a new Darfur if measures were not taken to change the dynamics of the situation. During the year 244 people died in this province in a series of clashes which included the participation of Arab, Misseriya and Reizegat tribes.

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Burundi	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Identity, Government
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, social and political opposition (Hussein Radjabu's CNDD-FDD faction, UPRONA, FRODEBU, FNL)

Summary:
The political and institutional transition process which began with the signing of the Arusha peace agreement in 2000 officially ended in 2005. The passing of a new Constitution which formalizes the sharing of political and military power between the two main communities, the Hutus and the Tutsis, and the

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16. See Chapter 1 (Armed conflicts).

elections which have led to the formation of a new Government, are an attempt to set the future foundation to overcome the conflict which began in 1993. This is the main opportunity to end the ethno-political violence that has affected the country since its independence in 1962. However, mistrust persists between the political parties and power struggles continue within the governmental CNDD-FDD, and between the Government and the political opposition. In addition, the country's last armed group, the FNL, has joined the political fray with its renunciation of violence.

The elections will take place in July 2010. Despite several advances in the preparation process, such as the new Election law, agreed by consensus, or the participation of the opposition in the election commission, **the climate of tension was on the rise**. Several analysts warned that the elections could trigger an escalation of violence due to the combination of a significant presence of small arms and the well organized sections of youth activists from the political parties. Although 70,000 arms have been collected since August 2007, it is estimated that there are still 100,000 in the hands of civilians. In addition, the State security forces are made up of the armed groups that reached peace agreements with the Government and some analysts do not rule out the possibility that a process of regression may occur. In April the last guerrilla group, the FNL, became a political party and the DDR program was implemented for its combatants, although this caused tension and resentment due to the application of different compensations. Furthermore, former high level officials from the FNL, including the former Foreign Secretary Jacques Kenese and the former spokesperson Pasteur Habimana, criticized **the authoritarian drift of the FNL** and they were expelled in August accused of treason. Growing intimidation and threats against activists in the opposition became evident with the prohibition of the FORSC, an umbrella organization of 146 civil society associations. Human Rights Watch denounced that **both the FNL and the Government had used political violence and intimidation against the opposition and that arbitrary arrests and several politically motivated extrajudicial executions had taken place.**

Kenya	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	Identity, Government, Resources
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, ethnic-based militias, political and social opposition (political parties, civil society organizations), SLDF, Mungiki sect

Summary:
Kenyan politics and the economy have been dominated since its independence in 1963 by the KANU party, which is controlled by the most numerous community in the country, the Kikuyus, to the detriment of the remaining ethnic groups. In 2002 the successor to the kleptocrat and authoritarian Daniel

Arap Moi (in power for the previous 24 years) was defeated by Mwai Kibaki who promised to end corruption and redistribute wealth in a poor, agricultural country that bases its growth on tourism. Nevertheless, Kibiaki's unkept promises fostered a climate of frustration and Raila Odinga became a threat to his hold on power without needing to base his campaign on tribal affiliation, but on change and the building of a more just society. Election fraud in December 2007 triggered an outbreak of violence that caused the death of 1,300 people and 300,000 displaced. After this situation an agreement was reached by both sectors to create a fragile national unity Government. At the same time, several areas of the country were the scene of inter-community disputes for land ownership, also politically instigated at the time of elections, and illegal activities by the Mungiki sect were a challenge to the stability of the country.

The year was marked by **the political crisis that affected the governmental coalition**, the result of the agreement after the 2007 post-election violence, and the **severe drought that gripped the country which caused a serious humanitarian crisis.**[17] President Mwai Kibaki has rejected criticism for his inaction, the failure to curb corruption, the continuing disputes between government partners, the slow progress in the implementation of political reforms, and the inability to cope with economic decline. However, a government panel presented the draft constitution that reduces presidential powers, increases those of the prime minister, creates the Senate and the Supreme Court and increases decentralization. The Government began the first national census in the last decade. The process sparked a controversial debate on ethnicity, since it asks people to identify their ethnic group in the census and this information could be used politically. This same information contributed to the outbreak of post-election violence in 2008 and on other occasions. **The U.S. threatened to ban flights for 15 top country officials and personalities as a form of pressure to promote reforms that are at a standstill.** After failing in an attempt to create a special court before September 30 to judge post-election violence, the government announced its willingness to cooperate with the ICC. Furthermore, at different times of the year the drought led to outbreaks of inter-community violence related to land and water ownership that caused dozens of victims across the country. There were also outbreaks of violence involving members of the Mungiki sect. Its leader, Maina Njenga, was released for lack of evidence in a charge of murder that he had been accused of.

DR Congo	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	Government, Resources
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition and former armed opposition groups

17. See Chapter 4 (Humanitarian crises).

Summary:

Between 1998 and 2003 the so called "first African world war" took place in the DR Congo.[18] The signing of several peace agreements between 2002 and 2003 had implied the withdrawal of foreign troops and the creation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) which was made up of the former government, the political opposition, the RCD-Goma, RCD-K-ML, RCD-N, and MLC armed groups, and Mai Mai militias. Since June 2003 the TNG was led by President Joseph Kabila and four vice presidents, two of which belonged to the former insurgency: Azarias Ruberwa from the RCD-Goma and Jean-Pierre Bemba from the MLC. The TNG drafted the constitution, which was endorsed in December 2005. Between July and October 2006 legislative and presidential elections were held, in which Kabila was elected president, and Jean-Pierre Bemba came in second, amid a climate of heightened tension and accusations of fraud. The formation of the new government in 2007 did not stop instability and strife in the political arena.

The climate of political instability persisted in parallel with an escalation of violence in the eastern part of the country.[19] **In March the president of the National Assembly, Vital Kamerhe, resigned following the institutional crisis caused by the presence of Rwandan troops in Congolese territory**, as part of the joint operation that both countries had conducted between January and February. **Several organizations reported the use of violence, impunity and intimidation by the government to silence the opposition and human rights activists. The electoral process continued to be stalled during the year, prompting fears that it was not technically or logistically possible to hold municipal elections in June 2010**. One of the main issues was the fact that the census would only be ready in the capital, as well as the lack of funds for the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Moreover, despite the climate of insecurity, political parties proposed that people return to their places of origin to participate in the elections, which went against the position of the United Nations and the IEC. Given these delays there was concern that President Joseph Kabila's government was interested in holding both the municipal and general elections, scheduled for 2011, on the same day to achieve election gains. Currently the political opposition does not have a strong leader able to capitalize on the climate of discontent, according to several analysts. In mid-October the 2010 budget was approved despite criticism from the opposition and even from some members of the PPRD government. A vote of confidence against Prime Minister Adolphe Muzito failed and the tension between him and Kabila increased. In early November inter-community clashes broke out in northeastern DR Congo between Munzala and Enyele communities over fishing rights and land ownership, which caused the death of over 100 people and displaced another 184,000 in mid-December. More than 84,000 took refuge in neighbouring Congo. The government counter-offensive aggravated the situation.

DR Congo – Rwanda – Uganda	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Identity, Government, Resources International
Main parties:	DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda Governments, CNDP Congolese armed group, FDLR Rwandese armed group

Summary:

The "first African world war", so called due to the participation of up to eight countries in the region, took place in DR Congo between 1998 and 2003.[20] The signing of several peace agreements between 2002 and 2003 implied the withdrawal of hostile foreign troops (mainly Rwanda and Uganda). They justified their presence because of the insurgent groups in Congolese territory which they were attempting to eliminate since the Congolese Armed Forces were unwilling to finish them off. Meanwhile they controlled the eastern region and plundered the natural resources. DR Congo has relied on these groups that are hostile to Rwanda and Uganda, mainly the FDLR which caused the 1994 Rwanda genocide, to favour their own interests. Relations between the three countries remain difficult due to the existence of these groups and the failed implementation of the agreements to demobilize or put an end to them.

During the year significant changes took place in the relations between DR Congo, Rwanda and Uganda. DR Congo and Rwanda had accused each other repeatedly of supporting each other's respective insurgencies. However, in January **DR Congo agreed to the entry of the Rwandan Army in their territory to pursue the Rwandan Hutu armed group FDLR, some of whose members are responsible for the genocide of 1994.** In return, **Rwanda was forced to capture Laurent Nkunda**, leader of the CNDP armed group who had been ousted from the leadership of the group and fled to Rwanda. One of the disputes between the two countries, the extradition of Nkunda, was still on hold. In parallel, the presidents of Rwanda and DR Congo met in Goma in August to restore diplomatic ties. This was the first official meeting between its leaders in over a decade. The leaders agreed to joint planning of economic activities and the reactivation of the DR Congo-Rwanda Joint Permanent Commission, which had been non-operational for the past 21 years. At the same time, the resumption of diplomatic relations between DR Congo and Uganda through the appointment of new ambassadors reopened lines of communication that had been severed 12 years previously due to the war. The military operation against the Ugandan LRA facilitated the formalization of these links. As part of the Kimia II Operation, FDLR members entered Burundi from DR Congo, according to Rwandan and Burundian government sources. The same sources warned that ex-combatants of the Burundian FNL, now a political party, would be joining the FDLR.[21]

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18. See the summary of DR Congo (east) in Chapter 1 (Armed conflicts) and the summary of DR Congo–Rwanda-Uganda in this Chapter.
19. See Chapter 1 (Armed conflicts).
20. See the summary of DR Congo (east) in Chapter 1 (Armed conflicts).
21. See Chapter 1 (Armed conflicts).

e) Northern Africa and Maghreb

Morocco – Western Sahara	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑
Type:	International
	Self-government, Identity, Territory
Main parties:	Morocco, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), Polisario Front armed group

Summary:
The roots of conflict can be found in the end of Spanish colonial rule in Western Sahara in the mid-seventies. Splitting the territory between Morocco and Mauritania, without taking into account the right to self-determination of the Sahrawis or commitments made regarding a referendum on independence in the area, led to the annexation of much of the territory by Rabat and the displacement of thousands of Sahrawis, who took refuge in Algeria. In 1976, the Polisario Front nationalist movement declared a government in exile -the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)- and launched an armed campaign against Morocco. Both parties accepted a peace plan in 1988 and since 1991 the UN mission in the Sahara, MINURSO, monitors the ceasefire and is responsible for organizing a self-determination referendum in the territory. In 2007, Morocco submitted a plan to the UN for greater Western Sahara autonomy, but the Polisario Front called for a referendum that includes the option of independence.

In late 2009 the conflict between Morocco and Western Sahara garnered unusual international attention following Rabat's decision to deport the Sahrawi activist Aminatou Haidar. The woman was sent against her will to Spain, where she began a hunger strike to pressure the Spanish and Moroccan governments. Her situation led to diplomatic tensions and high-level contacts by the governments in Europe and the U.S., who attempted to get a commitment from Morocco to allow the activist's return. **After 32 days, Haidar was allowed to return to Western Sahara. The measure was justified by Rabat as a humanitarian gesture, and celebrated by Haidar as a victory for the Sahrawi cause.** Before the flap over this case, news reports warned of tougher actions by Moroccan authorities against Sahrawi activists, especially after King Mohammed VI's speech on the anniversary of the Green March, in which he called on security forces to act decisively against those he described as enemies of Morocco's territorial integrity. Shortly before, reports had been issued that several people had been arrested and a Moroccan military court would try seven pro-independence Sahrawis. In this context, in late November, the UN secretary general, Ban Ki-moon expressed concern over the growing tension between the parties in the negotiations on the future of Western Sahara. During the rest of the year little progress was made and attention was focused on the possibility of Rabat and the Polisario Front resuming their talks following the appointment in January of Christopher Ross as Ban Ki-moon's envoy for Western Sahara. After a visit to the area, Ross got the parties to hold an informal meeting, held in August in

Austria, but no important commitments were made public.[22] Earlier, Mohammed VI announced a plan to begin a process of regionalization in the country beginning in the southern provinces (Western Sahara). Meanwhile, in September, UNHCR cut in half estimates of the number of refugees in camps in Tindouf (Algeria) compared to the figure of 165,000 provided by the Polisario Front.

America

a) North America, Central America and the Caribbean

Haiti	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Government
	Internationalized Internal
Main parties:	MINUSTAH, Government, political and social opposition

Summary:
After former president Jean Bertrand Aristide left the country in February 2004, which avoided an armed confrontation with the rebel group that had taken control of most of the country, a Multinational Interim Force and a UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSTAH) were consecutively deployed to assist the interim government to restore order and security. Although René Préval's election as the new president in early 2006 brought with it greater political, social and economic stability, there are still several problems, including allegations of human rights violations against the MINUSTAH, high crime rates, the control armed gangs have in certain urban areas, difficulties in the process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, the high levels of corruption, poverty and social exclusion, or lack of trust and cooperation between the major political parties.

During the first part of the year there were several violent incidents linked to elections to the Senate, while in the second half of the year continuing protests by thousands of students took on greater significance. In February, to mark the fifth anniversary of the departure from the country of former President Jean Bertrand Aristide, thousands of people marched to demand his return. The mobilizations increased significantly after the Provisional Electoral Council ruled out the candidacies of those close to Aristide for elections to the Senate. **In the two rounds of the elections, in the months of April and June, there were irregularities and violent incidents, such as attacks on polling stations, clashes between supporters of various political parties and electoral intimidation.** The most serious incidents occurred in the Central Plateau region, where election results were annulled. Moreover, since August and over a period of several months, **thousands of students held frequent demonstrations in favour of increasing the minimum wage and the implementation of significant changes in the educational system.** The demonstrators also protested against the presence in the country of MINUSTAH, which at different times of the year was involved in clashes with groups of

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22. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

demonstrators. In early November, the Senate dismissed the prime minister, Michèle Pierre-Louis, on the grounds that he was not stimulating the economy or reducing poverty rates. In response to the concerns in the international community that this political vacuum could destabilize the country again, the Parliament rather quickly elected Jean-Max Bellerive as Prime Minister, the sixth person to hold the position since 2004. In December, hundreds of supporters of Jean Bertrand Aristide demonstrated again to demand that Fanmi Lavalas, the party led by the former president, be allowed to participate in the legislative elections scheduled for February 2010.

Honduras	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government
	Internal
Main parties:	De facto Government led by Roberto Micheletti, deposed Government led by Manual Zelaya

Summary:

In 2009 the political and social tension in Honduras rose markedly after president Manuel Zelaya announced his intention to hold a referendum to amend the Constitution and run for a new term. The proposal was rejected by several political parties and considered illegal by Congress, the Army and various judicial and electoral institutions. Furthermore, social polarization grew stronger between those who supported the agenda of social and political transformation of Zelaya, elected in 2005, and he was accused of having drifted away from the majority view in his own party and of getting too close to the Governments that make up the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), particularly Venezuela. Tension in the country reached a high point in late June after Zelaya ordered the dismissal of the head of the Joint Chiefs for refusing to distribute the ballots for the referendum, and after the Army took to the streets of Tegucigalpa.

Honduras experienced one of the most serious political and social crises in recent history when, at the end of June, the Armed Forces perpetrated a coup against President Manuel Zelaya, and forcibly relocated him to Costa Rica. According to the de facto Government that took power after Zelaya, Congress had dismissed the president and the Supreme Court had ordered his detention to avoid the referendum on constitutional reform, which would have allowed Zelaya's re-election. In the following months, hundreds of people were injured and arrested during the demonstrations that Zelaya's supporters continuously organized. Supporters of the de facto Government, led by the former president of Congress Roberto Micheletti, also held regular demonstrations. Internationally, most governments and international bodies did not recognize the de facto Government and political and economic sanctions were imposed to force Zelaya's return to power. In parallel, the president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, tried to facilitate a rapprochement between the parties and develop a plan to resolve the political crisis. **Zelaya returned secretly and**

Honduras experienced one of its most serious political and social crisis in its history as a result of the coup perpetrated by the Armed Forces in June

by surprise to Honduras in late September and took refuge in the Brazilian Embassy to avoid arrest. The de facto Government declared a state of siege, ordered the military to surround the Brazilian Embassy and increased the repression against Zelaya's supporters. After pressure and diplomatic efforts by the international community, in late October the two sides signed an agreement which, among other things, provided for the formation of a national unity Government, the possibility that Congress would decide if Zelaya returned or not to office, and recognition of the elections scheduled for November 29. However, a few days later the agreement broke down due to mutual accusations by both parties. After the victory of Porfirio Lobo in the November 29 elections, not recognized by Zelaya and without international observers, **Congress overwhelmingly rejected Zelaya's return to the presidency**. In the final weeks of the year, both the president-elect and several Latin American countries tried to finalize a plan to overcome the impasse and facilitate Zelaya's departure.

b) South America

Bolivia	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Self-government, Government
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition (political parties, authorities and organizations of the civil society from the eastern departments)

Summary:

In late 2003, the then President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada fled into exile to the U.S. after the crackdown on several anti-government protests provoked more than 100 deaths in the months of February and October. After a period of uncertainty during which the two presidents took power on an interim basis, Evo Morales won the elections in December 2005, becoming the country's first indigenous president. However, the actions of his Government, especially agrarian reform or the nationalization of hydrocarbons, was hampered by fierce opposition to his political plans by various political parties and the eastern regions of the country which, led by the Department of Santa Cruz, demanded greater autonomy. Political tension and polarization also increased with the adoption of the new Constitution, which was directly rejected by the opposition and the departments of the so-called "half moon", as well as referendums on autonomy held in the eastern departments, deemed illegal by the Central Government.

Although the socio-political violence and tension dropped substantially compared to last year, high levels of social polarization continued to be reported and the authorities of the country's eastern departments continued to lead the opposition to Evo Morales' Government policies. **In January, the new Constitution was approved in a referendum by 61% of the population, but was defeated in the eastern departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and Pando.** The international community certified the transparency of the referendum de-

spite allegations of fraud by the opposition. In the following months the Government and opposition parties met on several occasions to discuss the autonomous framework of the country and the implementation of the Constitution, but several sources of conflict prevented a rapprochement between the parties and led to protests, at different times of the year, both in favour of and against the Government. First, the profound disagreement between the Government and opposition regarding the new election law (which according to the opposition benefits Evo Morales) and the law of indigenous autonomy (which according to the opposition divides the country along ethnic and cultural lines). Second, the allegations by various political groups and human rights organizations regarding continuous attacks on the opposition. For its part, the Government repeatedly accused the opposition of funding mercenary groups to destabilize the country, especially after mid-April when an operation was dismantled that, according to the Government, intended to make an attempt on the life of Evo Morales and others political leaders. **The third source of tension was linked to the intense election campaign in December, in which Evo Morales with 64% of the vote** beat his rival, Manfred Reyes Villa, the former governor of Cochabamba.

Colombia – Venezuela	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government
	International
Main parties:	Governments of Colombia and
	Venezuela

Summary:

The move towards the Venezuelan border by the FARC Colombian armed group because of military pressure from the Colombian Army, and the possibility that it may have infiltrated in Venezuelan territory and maintain bases there, sparked a diplomatic crisis between both countries. Furthermore, the growing military cooperation between Colombia and the U.S., based on the Plan Colombia to eradicate crops and provide support for counterinsurgency operations, has increased discontent among neighbouring countries who view with mistrust the installation of U.S. military bases near their borders. Moreover, the strategic differences between the Colombian and Venezuelan Governments regarding the role the U.S. should play in South America have fuelled animosity and confrontation between the two countries. Venezuela aims to use the UNASUR integration process as a way of counteracting the U.S.'s historic influence in the region. Meanwhile, Colombia remains one of the main allies of American power in the area, whose cooperation is key for the Colombian Government's policy to eradicate coca production and fight against the insurgency.

The military strategy pursued by the Colombian Army to push the armed groups toward the border areas heightened tensions between Colombia and neighbouring countries, mainly Venezuela and Ecuador to a lesser extent, due to the presence of FARC members in their territory and the repeated incursions by Colombian military forces in both countries without the approval of the respective Governments. Much of this tense atmosphere was related to the military cooperation agreement signed in October

by the U.S. and Colombia to set up, on Colombian soil, seven U.S. military bases and allow the use of ports, telecommunications and national defence infrastructures. This military alliance was seen by the Venezuelan Government as a direct threat, while UNASUR demanded assurances that these bases would not be used to launch attacks against any country in the region. Similarly, the announcement in September by the Venezuelan Government that they had purchased Russian arms worth 2,200 million dollars was seen by the U.S. as a serious challenge to stability in the region. The precarious diplomatic relationship has been fuelled by the growing militarization of their common border and the continuous references to a possible armed confrontation by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, as well as by repeated allegations by Álvaro Uribe's Colombian Government regarding the complicity of the Venezuelan president due to the presence of the FARC in its territory. The bombing of two border bridges by the Venezuelan Army on November 19 in Venezuela or the arrest of three Colombian intelligence agents accused of not having permission to cross the border and investigate the murder of 10 Colombians on Venezuelan soil, were two incidents that highlighted the growing level of hostility between the two countries. **Diplomatic relations between both countries have been suspended and attempts at mediation have been unsuccessful** as well as the good offices requested by Colombia to Brazil, Spain and the Dominican Republic. Both Colombia and Venezuela filed complaints with various multilateral bodies, such as UNASUR, the OAS and the UN Security Council.

Peru	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, armed opposition (remaining factions of the Shining Path [Sendero Luminoso]), and political and social (peasant and indigenous organizations)

Summary:

In 1980, precisely the year that the country returned to democracy, an armed conflict between the Government and the armed Maoist Shining Path began, lasted for two decades and killed over 60,000 people. Under the counterinsurgency policy in the nineties the state became more authoritarian in the hands of Alberto Fujimori, who in 2000 went into exile in Japan after being deposed by Congress and charged with numerous cases of corruption and human rights violations. Since 2008 actions by the remaining Shining Path factions have increased significantly in the regions of Alto Huallaga and particularly in the valley between the Apurimac and Ene Rivers (VRAE). The Government, which links Shining Path to drug trafficking, has increased dramatically its military operations in both regions and has refused any dialogue. Moreover, several groups, especially indigenous peoples, have held regular demonstrations to protest the economic policies of the Governments of Alejandro Toledo and Alan García.

In addition to the protests that at different times of the year several groups carried out (such as steel, metallur-

gy, mining, teaching, transport), the two main areas of tension were armed actions by Shining Path and clashes between Police and indigenous organizations in the Amazon region of Bagua. After more than two months of protests against legislation on the use and exploitation of natural resources in the Amazon by indigenous organizations, **serious conflicts in early June between the Police and hundreds of indigenous protesters killed at least 34 people and 22 were police officers.** However, social organizations considered that the number of indigenous deaths was much higher. After several weeks of international diplomatic pressure and demonstrations in several Peruvian cities, Alan García's Government repealed the decrees that sparked the protests. Furthermore, these events forced the resignation of Prime Minister Yehude Simon, prompting the reorganization of the administration and the appointment of Javier Velasquez as prime minister. Moreover, **during 2009 clashes increased between the Armed Forces and Shining Path in the regions of Alto Huallaga and in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley (VRAE).** Since the military offensive began in October 2008 it is estimated that about fifty soldiers (and an undetermined number of members of Shining Path) have died. On several occasions during the year, Shining Path leaders called for a political negotiation with the state on issues such as an amnesty for Shining Path combatants or closure of the military base in Callao. In November the founder of Shining Path, Abimael Guzmán, announced Shining Path's intention to become a political party and go to the polls in 2011.

Asia

a) Central Asia

Tajikistan	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government, System
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, political (Islamic Renaissance Party) and social (regional groups: Gharmis and Pamiris) opposition, former warlords, illegal Islamist groups (Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [IMU])

Summary:
The socio-political crises affecting Tajikistan is linked largely to the armed conflict of 1992-1997, which pitted against each other two blocks marked by strong regional divisions: the opposition alliance of Islamist forces and anti-Communist liberal sectors (centre and east of the country) against the Government forces, heirs of the Soviet regime (north and south). The peace agreement of 1997 resulted in a power-sharing commitment with the incorporation of the Government opposition. In its post-war rehabilitation phase, the problems facing the country include regional socio-political crises (with growing public discontent in the Leninabadi population in the north of the country towards its former allies in the South, the Kulyabis, the dominant population group in power after the end of the war), the presence of some non-demobilized warlords in parts of the country, the increasing authoritarian rule,

corruption, high levels of poverty and unemployment, tensions with neighbouring Uzbekistan, the instability associated with its border with Afghanistan and the potential threat of armed Islamist groups.

Tension increased with new security incidents linked to irregular groups. **Security forces said they killed at least a dozen suspected insurgents, including several from the IMU**, in various operations on the outskirts of the capital, Dushanbe, and near the border with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In addition, several dozen people were arrested or imprisoned during the year on charges of terrorism or membership in proscribed groups, including Hizb ut-Tahrir and Jamoai Tablighi. Two bombs exploded in July near the airport of Dushanbe, while in the capital another explosion was reported which coincided with a meeting of the presidents of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Russia to address security issues. In this regard, there were increased warnings regarding a **rise in the incidents in areas near the Afghan border, as well as a greater threat from Islamist groups in the Ferghana Valley**. Moreover, since mid-year there was increased military presence in areas of Tavildara and the Rasht Valley which, according to the Government was part of the anti-narcotics operations Poppy 2009. Nevertheless, some experts indicated that the campaign was actually designed to combat the opposition, such as former war commanders, including Mullo Abdullo, one of the UTO armed opposition leaders that did not recognize the 1997 peace agreement. Various media agencies said in June that Abdullo might have returned from Afghanistan to Tajikistan to recapture the area he controlled during the war, claims which the Government denied. The Government also reported the death of former minister and former leader of the UTO forces, Mirzo Ziyoev, at the hands of an armed group, although opposition sectors attributed his death to the state. Moreover, judicial proceedings were initiated against 49 allies of Ziyoev, including eight suspected members of the IMU, for an alleged plan of an armed operation to release imprisoned followers. Moreover, tension continued between Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan over the supply of electric power and natural resources.

Uzbekistan	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=
Type:	System, Government
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition, Islamist armed groups

Summary:
The regime of Islam Karimov, in power since 1989 (first as leader of the Uzbek Communist Party and since 1991 as president of the independent country), has been characterized by its systematic repression of the political, social and religious opposition, using a personalistic political system, tight control of public spaces and the violation of rights and freedoms. Since the late nineties, the country has suffered violent attacks by underground Islamist groups, notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Tension escalated in the country beginning in May 2005 following the regime's violent repression of demonstrations in Andijan, which result-

ed in the death of several hundred civilians and more than a thousand refugees fleeing to neighbouring countries.

Incidents continued to be reported regarding irregular Islamist groups. Regional instability and the climate of human rights abuses persisted. Several persons died in different incidents during the year. Two attacks in Andijan and in Khanabad (Ferghana Valley), which authorities blamed on a group of insurgents who had crossed from Kyrgyzstan, led Uzbekistan to temporarily close its border with its neighbouring country and a greater deployment of forces and controls. Kyrgyzstan rejected the Uzbek accusations and both countries accused each other of provisionally detaining several border guards. In parallel, the Uzbek Government criticized Russia's plans to build a second military base in Kyrgyzstan near the Uzbek border. Moreover, at least three people died in the capital, Tashkent, in an attack which the Government attributed to the IMU, although some analysts questioned the authorship. In relation to regional instability, the Commonwealth of Independent States warned that further deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan could severely affect Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan's military announced that it had killed the leader of the IMU, Tohir Yuldash, in August in South Waziristan (Pakistan). Moreover, the Police detained 30 Muslim women in mid-November on unknown charges, in addition to the thirty arrested in late 2008 for allegedly being regional leaders of Hizb ut-Tahrir and accused them of religious extremism. Meanwhile, the Russian NGO Memorial reported that over 1,450 people have been politically persecuted in Uzbekistan between 2004 and 2008, including some thirty human rights activists. Also, the NGO Human Rights Watch denounced the **deteriorating human rights situation** as well as an increase in intimidation in the run up to parliamentary elections in December.[23] Despite this, in October the EU lifted the arms embargo against the Government claiming that there had been progress in the area of human rights.

b) Southern Asia

India (Nagaland)	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	Self-government, Identity
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, NSCN-K, NSCN-IM, NNC
Summary:	

The conflict that affects the state of Nagaland began after the British decolonization process in India (1947) when a Naga movement emerged demanding recognition for the collective rights of the population, mostly Christian, as opposed to the majority which are Indian Hindu. The founding of the NCC Naga organization in 1946 marked the beginning of political demands for independence for the Naga people. These demands evolved over the following decades both in content (Nagaland independence or the creation of the Great Nagaland including territories from neighbouring states inhabited by Nagas) and in the methods of opposition, with the beginning of the armed struggle in 1955. In 1980 the NSCN armed opposition group is created as a result of disagreements with more moderate political groups, and eight years later split into two factions, Isaac Muivah and Khaplang. Since 1997 the NSCN-IM has maintained a ceasefire agreement and talks with the Indian Government, and they reached a ceasefire agreement in 2000, but in recent years the number of clashes between the two groups has multiplied.

During the year **violence dropped significantly** in the state compared to previous years, reversing a trend that had begun in 2005. This led to a change in its status to socio-political crises and not an armed conflict, as was the case in 2008. **Clashes between different armed Naga factions ceased almost entirely**, although extortion, intimidation and kidnapping continued to be reported. During the second quarter, **the main Naga insurgent organizations signed an agreement known as the "Covenant of Reconciliation"**.[24] This agreement was extended in September with the signing of the "Declaration of Commitment" by three insurgent organizations, NSCN-IM, NSCN-K and NNC, whereby they agreed to work together. The reduction in violence has resulted in a considerable decrease in the number of deaths. If in 2008 nearly 150 people died due to armed insurgency related violence, in 2009 the figure did not exceed twenty.[25] Moreover, the mechanism for monitoring the ceasefire agreements agreed to some requests by the armed opposition group NSCN-K, such as the creation of new cantonment sites. At various times of the year the Government highlighted the reduction in violence and the progress made towards peace and reconciliation in the state,[26] but also expressed concern about the support the Naga insurgency was providing to armed groups in other Indian states.

India – Pakistan	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	Identity, Territory
	International
Main parties:	India, Pakistan
Summary:	

The tension between the States of India and Pakistan began with the independence and partition of both and the dispute over Kashmir. On three occasions (1947-1948; 1965; 1971) the two countries have clashed in armed conflict, both claiming sovereignty over the region, which is split between India, Pakistan and China. The armed conflict in 1947 led to the current division and de facto border between the two countries. Since 1989, the armed conflict moved to the interior of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1999, a year after

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23. See Chapter 5 (Human Rights and Transitional Justice).
24. See Escola de Cultura de Pau, Barómetro number 20, September 2009 in <http://escolapau.uab.es/img/programas/alerta/barometro/barometro20.pdf >.
25. Figure provided by the SATP think tank. The mortality data for the different socio-political crises in India and Pakistan are from the same source, in <http://www.satp.org/default.asp>.
26. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

both countries carried out nuclear tests, the tension almost resulted in a new armed conflict which was paralyzed by U.S. mediation. In 2004 a peace process began, but with no substantial progress in resolving the Kashmir dispute, although there was significant rapprochement especially in economic relations. However, Indian allegations that Pakistan was supporting the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir have persisted, and sporadic episodes of violence on the de facto border that divides the two States.

The relationship between India and Pakistan was strained during the year, although there was **some rapprochement between the two Governments in the second half of 2009**. The **peace process was suspended for all of 2009**, and the Indian Government conditioned its return to the negotiating table to the investigation and action taken by the Pakistani Government against the perpetrators of the bombings in Mumbai in November 2008, while Pakistan reiterated that it had no responsibility in the matter. Despite the formal interruption of the peace process, representatives of both Governments met on several occasions during the year although no agreement was reached to restart formal negotiations.[27] Moreover, the Indian administration denied it was supporting the insurgency in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan and the tribal areas. Pakistan asked the U.S. to pressure India to restart dialogue and thus be able to concentrate its efforts in combating the Taliban insurgency. Moreover, there were some episodes of tension on the Line of Control, the de facto border between the two countries. One Indian soldier died from gunfire from Pakistani territory, and it was not possible to identify whether it was the responsibility of the security forces or the insurgency. In addition, India accused Pakistan's Armed Forces of firing two missiles that landed in its territory with the intention of intimidating a contingent of border security forces composed entirely of women.

Nepal	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	System
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, Armed Forces, political and social opposition

Summary:

In 1996, an armed conflict, that lasted a decade, began between the Nepalese Government and the armed wing of the Maoist CPN-M, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which sought to overthrow the monarchy and establish a Maoist republic, in a country affected by poverty, feudalism, inequality and the absence of democracy. After ten years of armed conflict and a self-coup by which the king assumed all state powers in 2005, at the end of April 2006 King Gyanendra ordered the reopening of parliament after several weeks of intense social protests which claimed the lives of about twenty people. The protests that led to the overthrow of the king were organized by a coalition of seven main democratic opposition parties and the Maoists. After the fall of the monarchy they unilaterally declared a ceasefire backed by the Interim Gov-

ernment. In November 2006 a peace agreement was signed which ended the armed conflict and subsequently a republic was declared. In 2008 a constituent assembly was established that will draft the new constitution of Nepal.

Tension increased in the country following the **political crisis triggered by the resignation of Prime Minister** Pushpa Kamal Dahal, after **President Ram Baran Yadav refused to support his decision to dismiss the chief of the Armed Forces** and expel the CPN-UML party from the Government. Following the resignation of Dahal, a new Government led by CPN-UML party was formed, with Madhav Kumar Nepal as Prime Minister. The new multi-party Government did not include the Maoist party UCPN(M), but several Madhesi parties did participate. In response, **tens of thousands of supporters of the UCPN(M) demonstrated on numerous occasions in the streets against the president and the new Government and the party warned several times that violence could be renewed.** In addition, violent clashes took place on several occasions between members of youth organizations from both the CPN(UML) and the UCPN(M) parties. International diplomats repeatedly expressed concern about the lack of commitment by the parties in implementing the 2006 peace accords. Moreover, the suggestion by the UN Secretary General to form a national unity Government to end the crisis was interpreted by the Administration as an attempt to interfere in Nepal's internal affairs. Of note was the resumption of work by the committee responsible for overseeing the integration and rehabilitation of former Maoist combatants. In addition, it resumed the demobilization process for 4,000 combatants, including child soldiers. The year ended with a new upsurge in political tension after the unilateral proclamation of 12 autonomous states by the Maoists, without any federal model having been established by Parliament, and the death of several people during their eviction from land occupied in an action led by Maoist supporters.

Nepal (Terai)	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	Self-government, Identity
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, Madhesi political (MPRF) and armed (JTMM-J, JTMM, MMT, ATLF, among others) organizations

Summary:

The socio-political crises in the Terai region (in the south of the country along the border with India) has its origin in the historically marginalized Madhesi population and the dissatisfaction caused by the peace process begun in 2006 which ending the armed conflict that ravaged the country since 1996. The population of the Terai -around half the population of the country- has been the victim of historical, political, social and economic exclusion. The signing of a peace agreement and the approval of an interim constitution that ignored the feelings of outrage and demands for greater recognition led the Madhesi organizations to initiate protests in the early

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27. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

months of 2007, which led to violent clashes with the police and the Maoists.

During the year there was a **decrease in violence and tension**. While the year began with several bombings in the southern region of Nepal, acts of violence decreased in number and intensity in parallel with the **negotiation process that the Government carried out with various armed groups**.[28] During the last quarter no attacks by armed Madhesi organizations were reported. The total number of deaths due to violence in Terai, linked to Madhesi demands, may have been less than twenty, a figure considerably lower than previous years. According to official sources, of the 110 active military organizations, only 12 are of an exclusively political nature, compared to 70 which are completely criminal. The Government of Nepal announced that there would be changes in the security strategy for the area, leading to armed opposition groups -Madhesi Mukti Tigers, Madhesi Virus Killers, Janakranti Samyukta Party Nepal Terai and Rajan Mukti faction of Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha- to proclaim the formation of a coalition in response to the lack of governmental willingness to implement the peace agreements reached with the Madhesi insurgency. For its part, the Government also said that peace negotiations would be undertaken only with organizations with political objectives, ruling out any talks with criminals.

Pakistan	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government, System Internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition (PPP opposition party, judiciary), armed opposition (Taliban militias)

Summary:
In 1999 a coup by General Pervez Musharraf brings to an end the Government of then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and he accuses the current and previous Governments of mismanagement and corruption. The coup warranted international isolation for the new military regime which ended with the 9-11 attacks in 2001 Musharraf became the main U.S. ally in the region in the persecution of al-Qaeda. The perpetuation of Musharraf in power, the fact that he simultaneously held the positions of Head of State and Head of the Armed Forces, attempts to end the independence of the judiciary or the growing strength of Taliban militants in tribal areas bordering Afghanistan are some of the elements which explain the fragile political situation. In 2008, Musharraf resigned as president after his defeat in the legislative elections and was replaced in office by Asif Ali Zardari.

The intensity of the internal political crisis declined, especially after the Chief Justice, Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, and the chief minister of Punjab province,

Shahbaz Sharif, brother of political leader Nawaz Sharif who was dismissed from his office by the Supreme Court, were reinstated in their positions. The year ended with the Supreme Court decision outlawing a decree passed by the previous president, Pervez Musharraf, which granted amnesty to 8,000 civil servants and senior officials accused of corruption. Following this decision the Defence and Interior ministers, along with 250 others, were summoned by the courts. The current president, also with various cases of corruption pending, enjoys presidential immunity. On the other hand, **there was a surge in violence across the country**. **The main cities**, particularly Islamabad, Lahore (capital of Punjab province) and Rawalpindi (location of the headquarters of the Armed Forces), **were the scene of multiple attacks that caused over 300 deaths across the country**.[29] This violence was blamed on the Taliban insurgency, which security forces are fighting in the northwest of the country.[30] Of note was the attack that took place against the Sri Lankan national cricket team and several more large-scale attacks in Lahore. The taking of several hostages inside the Rawalpindi headquarters by the Taliban insurgency for several days revealed the precarious security measures of the Armed Forces and the insurgency's ability to put the Government and the security forces against the wall. Moreover, President Asif Ali Zardari gave the prime minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, control over the nuclear arsenal to defuse criticism for the accumulation of power that had resulted from the reforms of his predecessor, general Pervez Musharraf.

Sri Lanka (northeast)	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↓
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, LTTE, Tamil political and social opposition

Summary:
In 1983, the Tamil pro-independence armed opposition group, the LTTE, began the armed conflict that has ravaged Sri Lanka for the past three decades. After the decolonisation of the island in 1948, the growing marginalisation of the Tamil population by the Government, which is mostly made up of the Sinhalese elite, led the group to fight for the establishment of an independent Tamil State. Since 1983, each of the three phases of the conflict has ended with a failed peace process. In 2002, peace negotiations began once again with Norwegian mediation, following the signing of a ceasefire agreement. The failure of the talks sparked a violent renewal of the armed conflict in 2006. In May 2009, the Armed Forces inflicted a military defeat on the LTTE and regained control over the entire country after killing the armed group's leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran.

The **situation of the internally displaced Tamil population**, detained in camps set up by the Government, was the main source of tension in the country after the end

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28. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).
29. This does not include those killed in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and North-West Frontier Province. The events in these areas are discussed in the section Pakistan (northwest) in Chapter 1 (Armed Conflicts).
30. See Chapter 1 (Armed conflicts).

of armed conflict in May.[31] Between 250,000 and 300,000 people were forced to remain in Government facilities in poor conditions, while the Government conducted a screening process in search of members of the armed opposition group that officials said were camouflaged among the civilian population. Many governments, the United Nations and organizations that defend human rights expressed concern for the situation of this population and pointed out that the existence of these camps hindered any possible reconciliation process in the country. Finally, international pressure in the month of November led the Government to allow just over half of the displaced persons to leave these facilities.[32] Moreover, the **head of the Armed Forces and architect of the military defeat of the LTTE**, General Sarth Fonseka, announced his resignation amid numerous rumours of his **possible candidacy for the presidential elections** to be held in January 2010, two years before the end of President Mahinda Rajapakse's current term in office. As for the LTTE armed opposition group, after the death of its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, Selvarasa Pathmanathan was proclaimed his successor. He was in turn succeeded by Visvanathan Rudrakumaran after his arrest in Thailand. The Tamil diaspora in exile announced the formation of a Provisional Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam and will hold referendums in different countries which propose the creation of an independent Tamil state. The year ended with the appearance of a Tamil Marxist armed opposition group, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which announced it would carry out attacks against the Government and the Armed Forces to ensure the establishment of an independent Tamil state.

The situation of the internally displaced Tamil population was the main source of tension in the country after the end of armed conflict in May

c) Eastern Asia

China (Tibet)	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Self-government, System, Identity Internationalized Internal
Main parties:	Chinese Government, Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government in exile, political and social opposition in Tibet and surrounding provinces

Summary:

In 1950, a year after it won the Chinese civil war, the Communist Government of Mao Tse-tung invaded Tibet and during the decade that followed increased its military, cultural and demographic pressure on the region and quelled several attempts at rebellion which killed thousands of people. Given the brutality of the occupation, in 1959 the Dalai Lama and tens of thousands of people fled Tibet and went into exile in several countries, especially in Nepal and northern India where the Government has its headquarters in exile. In recent decades, both the Dalai Lama as well as numerous human rights organizations have denounced the repression, demographic colonization and attempts at acculturation undergone

by the Tibetan people, part of whose territory has the status of autonomous region. The dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Beijing has been interrupted several times by the Chinese Government's accusations regarding alleged secessionist goals by the Dalai Lama. The outbreak of violence that took place in 2008, the fiercest in recent decades, interrupted the dialogue again and significantly undermined the parties' mutual trust.

Rates of violence declined substantially compared to 2008, though human rights organizations and **groups of Tibetans in exile denounced on several occasions that the Government continues its repressive and discriminatory policies towards the Tibetan community**. In the first quarter, hundreds of people were arrested in connection with the Tibetan New Year celebration and the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the failed uprising against Chinese occupation. In late March, a hundred people were arrested for an alleged attack on a police checkpoint in the province of Qinghai. However, the biggest protests in the Tibetan community took place in Nepal where much of the Tibetan diaspora lives. In mid-July, fifteen people were arrested in Kathmandu during a demonstration outside the United Nations headquarters to demand a more active role of the organization in the Tibetan conflict. The protest organizers announced their intention to demonstrate on the 14th of each month to commemorate the most virulent outbreak of violence in recent decades in Tibet, which began on March 14, 2008. Also in Nepal (and China) dozens of people were arrested after a court convicted and sentenced to death four persons for the aforementioned outbreak of violence. **In October, the tension in Tibet and Nepal rose again in relation to the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China** and the Nepalese police detained about 80 people. In December, between 60 and 150 people were arrested in Sichuan province when they were demonstrating to demand the release of a prominent Tibetan activist. In the political sphere, the Chinese Government repeatedly reaffirmed its refusal to grant greater autonomy to Tibet and continued to accuse the Dalai Lama of encouraging the secessionist movement. In addition, Beijing criticized the Governments and agencies that received the Dalai Lama, and accused of interference those who denounced the human rights situation in Tibet or those who urged a renewal of dialogue to resolve the conflict.

China (East Turkestan)	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Self-government, System, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Chinese Government, armed opposition (ETIM, ETLO), political and social opposition

Summary:

Xinjiang, also known as East Turkestan or Uyghuristan, is the westernmost region of China. It holds significant hydrocarbon

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31. See Chapter 1 (Armed conflicts).
32. See Chapter 4 (Humanitarian Crises).

deposits and has historically been inhabited by the Uyghur population which is mainly Muslim and has major cultural ties with Central Asian countries. After decades of acculturation policies, exploitation of natural resources and strong demographic colonization, which has substantially altered the structure of the population and caused community tensions since the fifties, several secessionist groups began armed action against the Chinese Government, especially in the nineties. Beijing considers groups such as ETIM or ETLO to be terrorist organizations, and has sought to link its counterinsurgency strategy to the so-called global war on terrorism. In 2008, during the celebration of the Olympic Games in Beijing, there was an increase in armed attacks by insurgent groups, while 2009 was witness to the most intense community clashes of recent decades.

Although the activity of armed opposition groups was much lower than last year, in 2009 Xinjiang was the scene of the most serious episode of violence in recent decades. In early July, **about 200 people were killed and more than 1,700 wounded in the city of Urumqi in clashes between Han and Uyghur communities and through the actions of state security forces** to contain the spiralling violence. The incidents, which led to the arrest of some 1,600 people, the deployment of thousands of additional police officers and the imposition of a curfew, began following protests by the Uyghur community for the death of two workers at a factory in the Chinese province of Guandong. Beijing accused the organization in exile, the World Uyghur Congress, and its leader, Rebiya Kadeer, of instigating the violence in Xinjiang. At the international level, several governments, international agencies and human rights organizations criticized the disproportionate use of force by state security forces and the treatment public authorities accord to the Uyghur community. In addition, Human Rights Watch reported in October that 50 Uyghur people had disappeared after being arrested during the clashes in July. In the last quarter of the year up to 22 people were sentenced to death for their involvement in the confrontations. Although tension decreased substantially during the months of July and August, **in mid-September another outbreak of violence was reported in the city of Urumqi in which five people were killed and 14 wounded**. This time, violence broke out after thousands of people, mostly ethnic Han, protested in the streets of Urumqi against a series of attacks with syringes. According to Beijing, the people who carried out those attacks were part of organized groups. The protests led to the ouster of the Communist Party leader in Urumqi and the chief of police in Xinjiang province.

Although in the seventies a dialogue on reunification began, both countries have threatened on several occasions to take military action. Thus, in recent decades there have been numerous armed incidents, both on the common border between the two countries (one of the most militarized areas in the world) and the sea border in the Yellow Sea and the West Sea. Although in 2000 the leaders of both countries held a historic meeting where they agreed to the establishment of confidence-building measures, tension again rose significantly when South Korean President Lee Myung-bak took office in 2007.

In 2009 the relationship between the two countries experienced some of the moments of greatest political and military tension in recent years. On the occasion of the joint exercises conducted each year by troops from South Korea and the U.S., and that involve the deployment of some 28,000 U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula, during the early months of the year the North Korean Government greatly increased its war rhetoric, closed the border, cut military communication with its neighbour and stated that it was breaking off all previous agreements with the South Korean Government. Political tension continued throughout most of the year, as evidenced by the detention of a South Korean fishing boat in July or the retention of a South Korean worker for more than four months (his release came after a visit by the president of Hyundai to Pyongyang). However, on the occasion of the funeral of former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung, a North Korean delegation visited Seoul and reached an agreement with the South Korean Government on some confidence-building measures, such as the reunion of families separated by war. **Military tension between the two countries rose again significantly late in the year after a naval clash in the Yellow Sea (or West Sea) in which a North Korean crew member was killed and three were wounded**. Seoul said that the incident, the first of its kind in seven years, had occurred because the North Korean ship that had ventured into South Korean waters illegally failed to respond to warning signals. However, Pyongyang demanded an apology from the South Korea administration for the incident, stated it would take all necessary actions to defend its sea border and activated its missile radar system, prompting some South Korean vessels to change their usual routes. In the month of December, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak expressed his willingness to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il to address the issue of dismantling North Korea's nuclear program and the liberation of war prisoners and other persons arrested by Pyongyang in recent decades. However, North Korea denies that it has prisoners of war and claims that those arrested had left their country voluntarily.

Korea, DPR – Rep. of Korea	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	System
	Internal
Main parties:	DPR Korea, Rep. of Korea

Summary:

After the end of World War II and the occupation of the Korean peninsula by Soviet (north) and U.S. (South) troops, it was divided into two countries. The Korean War (1950-53) ended with an armistice -technically the two countries remain at war- and the establishment of a de facto border at the 38th parallel.

Korea, DPR – USA, Japan, Rep. of Korea	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government
	International
Main parties:	DPR Korea, USA, Japan,
	Rep. of Korea, China, Russia

Summary:

International concern over the North Korean nuclear program goes back to the early nineties, when the North Korean Government restricted the presence of observers from the International Atomic Energy Agency and carried out several missile

tests. However, international tension increased significantly after 2002 when the U.S. administration of George W. Bush included the North Korean regime in the "axis of evil". A few months after Pyongyang restarted a major nuclear reactor and also withdrew from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, in 2003 multilateral talks began on the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula with the participation of the Governments of North Korea, South Korea, U.S., Japan, China and Russia. In April 2009, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the talks after the United Nations imposed new sanctions on the country for the launch of a long-range missile.

The tension between North Korea and several countries (notably USA, Japan and South Korea and to a lesser extent, China and Russia) over the nuclear program that Pyongyang is developing experienced a significant escalation over previous years. **In April, Pyongyang launched a long-range missile (a communications satellite according to the North Korean Government) and, a few weeks later several short-range missiles and conducted an underground nuclear test.** These actions led to angry protests by many countries and the imposition of new sanctions by the UN Security Council, such as the prohibition of exporting and importing arms. The North Korean regime declared that it would continue with its nuclear program and would consider the interception of any of its ships a declaration of war. Moreover, Pyongyang expelled several international observers and interrupted its relations with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which had certified that North Korea had achieved considerable nuclear capability. **In July, the international community condemned both the launch of new short-range missiles from its east coast** as well as the use of a growing war rhetoric in the face of the possible imposition of new sanctions. Similarly, in October it was announced that North Korea had launched another five short-range missiles from its east coast. Moreover, the international community was concerned by Pyongyang's announcement that it continued to process fuel rods to extract plutonium, an essential process for the manufacture of atomic bombs. Several analysts considered these actions by the North Korean Government as a way of exerting pressure before the forthcoming bilateral talks announced by U.S. President Barack Obama. In December, the U.S. special envoy met in Pyongyang with North Korean authorities. Both sides agreed to continue the dialogue to restart the six-party talks and to implement a 2005 joint statement urging North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program in exchange for political and economic incentives.

d) Southeast Asia and Oceania

Philippines (Mindanao-MNLF)	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internal
Main parties:	Government, factions of the MNLF armed group

Summary:

Although active throughout the twentieth century, the independence movement in Mindanao became politically organized during the sixties and began the armed struggle in the early seventies, at the hands of the MNLF. Many of the 120,000 people estimated to have died in Mindanao in the conflict were killed in the seventies during the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos. A faction of the MNLF, the MILF split away from the group soon after it signed a peace agreement in 1976 with the Government which provided for Mindanao's autonomy (not independence). Despite the agreement, the armed conflict continued until 1996 when another peace agreement, similar to the one from 1976, was signed. In recent years, some MNLF factions that have not disarmed have staged some episodes of violence to demand the full implementation of the peace agreement and the release of the founder of the MNLF, Nur Misuari, who was arrested in 2001 after being accused of rebellion. Although tension has decreased since 2007 because of the agreement between the parties to review and implement the 1996 peace agreement and the authorization for Misuari to participate in political activities, sporadic clashes still occur in parts of Mindanao.

While active negotiations continued between the MNLF and the Government to fully implement the 1996 peace agreement,[33] **at various times during the year there were clashes between the MNLF and the Armed Forces**. In August, ten members of the MNLF were killed and several were caught in Balabac Island in Palawan province. According to authorities, the MNLF, led by Abdullah Abdujarak, was extorting the local population, which had caused some 800 families to flee. However, the group's founder, Nur Misuari accused the Army of having committed a massacre against their group. Later in the month of October, four people were killed and nine wounded during an attack on a military post by a faction of the MNLF led by Habier Malik. At the same time, a group calling itself the Bangsamoro National Liberation Army claimed responsibility, together with the MNLF, for a bombing that killed two U.S. Marines near Indanan town. The group charged that the Philippine and U.S. troops were conducting a military offensive against the MNLF and threatened further attacks if they continued the actions. In addition, the Government continued to accuse some of the MNLF factions of cooperating with the armed opposition group Abu Sayyaf, particularly in Sulu. Moreover, **the Police stated that the year was also witness to several clashes between members of the MNLF and MILF, although other sources claim it was fighting among clans, families or communities known as "rido"**. In one of the most significant episodes of this kind of violence which took place in the month of May, more than 20 people were killed and 10,000 others were forced to flee in the provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat. In December, the MNLF leader and mayor of Cotobato, Muslimin Sema, denied having a private army of about 1,000 troops, as military intelligence sources had revealed.

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33. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

Box 2.2. **The Maguindanao massacre**

On 23 November 2009, 57 people were killed near the town of Ampatuan (Maguindanao Province, Philippines) on their way to the presentation of the candidacy of Esmael Mangudadatu. Of those killed 34 were journalists, and some media sources pointed out that this is the worst slaughter of journalists registered to date. Several of the women who were in the convoy (among them the wife and two sisters of Esmael Mangudadatu) were raped before being killed, and most of them were beheaded. According to several sources, the slaughter had been perpetrated by a hundred armed men in the service of Andal Ampatuan (leader of one of the most powerful clans in Mindanao) and commanded by his son whose name is also Andal Ampatuan.

The Government declared a state of emergency in the city of Cotobato and the provinces of Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao (where martial law was also subsequently declared), in addition to deploying hundreds of troops to restore security in the area. About 60 people, including Andal Ampatuan (Jr.), were arrested, while several hundred militiamen in the service of Ampatuan were disarmed. However, the Government believes that thousands of people are currently fleeing the Armed Forces in various parts of Mindanao. On the other hand, the party of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (Lakas Kampi CMD) expelled Andal Ampatuan (Maguindanao governor until then) from the party and his sons Zaldy (governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao) and Andal (Mayor of Ampatuan). Andal Ampatuan (Jr.) pled not guilty to all charges (claiming to be somewhere else at the time of the events) and in turn blamed commander Umbra Kato, one of the most wanted MILF commanders. The MILF vehemently denied any involvement in the events and ordered its members to remain stationed at their camps to avoid interfering in the search and seizure work of the Armed Forces.

Despite belonging to the same party, previous episodes of violence had been reported related to the rivalry between the Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans. Tension had increased in 2009 because of Esmael Mangudadatu's intention to run for the post of governor of Maguindanao in the 2010 elections. After having served on two consecutive occasions as governor of the province, and given the impossibility of running for a third term, Andal Ampatuan wanted his son to hold the office. According to some sources, the president herself and several senior Government officials have mediated between the two clans (who hold more than twenty public offices in the province, especially the Ampatuans) to avoid an escalation of violence. According to these sources, after several meetings, Esmael Mangudadatu had committed not to run for governor. In addition to the rivalry between Mangudadatu and Ampatuan, several analysts have pointed to some issues that help understand the nature of violent acts such as this massacre, including the notable increase of violence in pre-electoral periods throughout the country, especially in Mindanao; the widespread availability of weapons in the region; the long duration of the armed conflict between the Government and various Moro armed groups; the existence of militias and private armies in the service of local politicians; and the absent or dysfunctional justice system in various parts the territory, which encourages impunity, or recurrence of the "rido" phenomenon (family and clan clashes linked to power struggles and acts of honour and revenge).

Indonesia (West Papua)	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Self-government, Identity, Resources Internal
Main parties:	Government, OPM armed group, political and social opposition (secessionist, pro-autonomy, indigenous and human rights organizations), Papuan indigenous groups, Freeport mining

Summary:

Although Indonesia achieved independence from Holland in 1949, West Papua (formerly Irian Jaya) was administered for several years by the United Nations and was not formally part of Indonesia until 1969, after a referendum that many considered fraudulent. Since then, a deeply rooted secessionist movement exists in the region and an armed opposition group (OPM) that carries out a low-intensity armed struggle. In addition to the constant demands of self-determination there are other trouble spots in the region, such as conflicts between various indigenous communities, tension between the local population (Papuan and mostly animist or Christian) and so-called transmigrants (mostly Muslim Javanese), protests against the transnational extractive corporation Freeport, the largest in the world, or allegations against the Armed Forces for human rights violations and unjust enrichment.

The first months of the year saw a notable increase in violence, socio-political tension and demonstrations for independence, which the Government attributed to the proximity of elections in April. Earlier this year the Government stepped up security measures in the Puncak Jaya region after detecting an increase in OPM activity. Months later, the organization West Papua National Coalition for Liberation reported that more than 30 people, mostly soldiers, could have been killed in the fighting in that region. **Some of the most serious violence occurred in early April, when fighting between the Armed Forces and the OPM killed 11 people and displaced several thousand people near the border with Papua New Guinea.** In addition, several houses and the University of Cendrawasih were burned. In the previous weeks, four civilians were killed in various acts of violence. During the elections there were no significant incidents, although there were several initiatives to boycott the elections in regions such as Nubile, Wamena or Nubira. At mid-year there was a significant **increase in violence in the region where the U.S. multinational mining company Freeport operates.** In July, three people died and ten others were wounded near the headquarters of the company, the world's largest in its field. Although initially blamed on the OPM armed group, some sources said that such actions may be linked to organized crime or even rivalry between the Police and the Armed Forces to secure Freeport's protection services contract. At the end of the year, several people were arrested during the

commemoration of West Papua's independence. Moreover, in early December, 250 people attacked the office of the governor of West Papua in Manokwari to demand the appointment of an indigenous leader as president of the West Papuan Parliament.

Indonesia (Aceh)	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑
Type:	Self-government, Identity, Resources Internal
Main parties:	Indonesian Government, Regional Government of Aceh, political opposition

Summary:
After nearly 30 years of armed conflict between the Armed Forces and the GAM armed separatist group, both sides signed a peace agreement in August 2005, just months after the tsunami had completely devastated the province and brought about the arrival of hundreds of NGOs. The peace agreement which provided for broad autonomy for Aceh, the demilitarization of the region, the disarmament of the GAM and the deployment of an international mission to oversee its implementation, led to a significant reduction in the levels of violence and made regional elections possible for the first time in the history of the region, a former GAM leader being the winner. Despite the progress made in the peace process and reconstruction, in the years following the signing of the peace agreement there have been several conflicts related to the reintegration of combatants, to demands for the creations of new provinces or to allegations of corruption and incompetence against public authorities.

In the first months of the year Aceh experienced the most important spiral of violence since the signing of peace the agreement in August 2005. From December 2008 to February 2009, 16 people were killed, 50 injured and many buildings and vehicles were set afire. Several research centres attributed these acts of violence to the proximity of the Indonesian parliamentary elections on April 9 -local political parties were able to participate for the first time in the history of Aceh- and to fears of a landslide victory by former GAM combatants which could again open the door to independence for Aceh. Partai Aceh, the political party founded from the GAM, was the one most affected by pre-election violence (four of its members were killed), although during the first quarter up to 13 attacks against the headquarters of various political groups were reported. Finally, **the elections took place without major incidents and under the watchful eye of numerous local and international organizations**. Partai Aceh received 48.9% of the vote, and far behind was the Democratic Party of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (10.9% of the vote) and the Golkar Party, led by Vice President Jusuf Kalla (5.3%). During the second half of the year the levels of political and social tension declined significantly. However, during the month of November a series of consecutive attacks against foreign workers took place, although no group claimed responsibility.

Laos	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	System, Identity Internationalized Internal
Main parties:	Government, political and armed organizations of Hmong origin

Summary:
Several Hmong organizations in exile and human rights groups reported that, since it took power in 1975, the Government has systematically repressed the Hmong community for its support of U.S. troops during the War in Indochina in the sixties and seventies. Although currently some 275,000 Hmong people are living in the U.S. and several thousands have lived in recent years in a refugee camp in Thailand, it is estimated that there are still thousands of people living in jungle areas in the north of the country. The harsh humanitarian conditions and the military repression of the Laos and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam Governments cause the death of dozens of people each year. Moreover, several human rights organizations and the thousands of Hmong refugees in northeastern Thailand are opposed to their repatriation to Laos on the grounds that their safety is not guaranteed there.

Allegations by human rights organizations continued regarding the Thai Government's intention to repatriate to Laos some 5,000 Hmong people who have lived for years in refugee camps in the Thai provinces of Petchabun and Nongkhaito. Although these organizations believe that Laos does not currently meet the conditions for a safe return, Bangkok has already repatriated more than 2,000 Hmong people in recent years and has reiterated to Laos its commitment to continue with the repatriations. Organizations such as MSF reported that Bangkok is coercing the refugees and is blocking the arrival of food to the camps to force their repatriation. The second source of tension was the repression by the Laotian authorities against ethnic Hmong living in Laos which has been denounced by the Hmong organizations in exile. **According to the Center for Public Policy Analysis, dozens of Hmong people were killed at different times of the year by the Laotian Army with occasional help from the Vietnamese Armed Forces.** This organization reported that the Laotian Army could be committing acts of ethnic cleansing in certain regions of the country (such as Phou Da Phao, Phou Bia, Sannoi, Luang Prabang or Borikhamshai) and warned in early April that the lives of about 6,700 people were in danger. Similarly, other organizations such as the Congress of World Hmong People or Hmong ChaoFa Federation State denounced the continued violation of the rights of the Hmong people and warned that the Laotian state could be committing war crimes. Moreover, these organizations reported that on the occasion of the celebration of the Southeast Asian Games in Laos and the visit to the region by U.S. President Barack Obama, more than 1,170 political and religious dissidents had been arrested.

Myanmar	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	System
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition (NLD opposition party)

Summary:

A coup in 1962 was the beginning of the Government of the Military Junta that has since remained in power. The military Government abolished the federal system and imposed a harsh dictatorship, known as the "Burmese Way to Socialism." In 1988, the economic crisis led thousands of people to express their dissatisfaction in the street. These demonstrations were harshly repressed by the military regime killing 3,000 people. Nevertheless, the Government called an election whose outcome was never recognized after the democratic opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi won the election, was subsequently arrested and has been under arrest intermittently since then. In 2004, the Government begins a process of reforming the Constitution in an attempt to provide an image of openness for the regime which was discredited by the political opposition to the dictatorship.

The situation in the country was marked by several major events that occurred throughout the year. First, the **opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi**, charged with violating the conditions of her house arrest after a U.S. citizen barged into her home, **was tried and sentenced to 18 months of house arrest despite protests by the international community**.[34] Second, the **U.S. Government announced a change in its policy towards Myanmar** and appointed Kurt Campbell as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs to act as interlocutor with Myanmar. Campbell met with Prime Minister General Thein Sein, and other government representatives and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and other members of the political and ethnic opposition during a visit to the country. While the U.S. Administration said its intention was not to immediately end the sanctions on the country, it said it would be willing to improve relations if there were steps towards democracy. The U.S. announced that its aims were to support human rights, achieve the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all other political prisoners and the promotion of democratic reforms. Moreover, **the opposition leader initiated a dialogue with foreign diplomats to address the issue of economic sanctions on Myanmar**. She also met with several leaders of her party after being authorized to do so and called for the reorganization of the party. Finally, in regard to the 2010 elections, the Government continued to pressure several armed groups to become border security forces and several political parties close to the military regime were formed. In addition, harassment and persecution of political opposition activists and defenders of human rights continued.

Thailand	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	Government
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition

Summary:

Although since coming to power in 2001, many sectors denounced Thaksin Shinawatra's authoritarian style, his campaign against drug trafficking (which killed over 2,000 people) or his militaristic approach to the conflict in the south, the socio-political crisis that Thailand has suffered in recent years escalated in 2006. That year, after a case of corruption was made public, there were massive demonstrations demanding the resignation of Thaksin Shinawatra until, in the month of September, a military Junta staged a coup that forced him into exile. While in August 2007 a new constitution was approved by referendum, the new Government failed to reduce social and political polarization in the country. Thus, a party loyal to Thaksin Shinawatra won the elections in December 2007. However, during 2008 there were numerous acts of violence and mass demonstrations against the Government, prompting the resignation of two prime ministers and the coming to power in December 2008 of Abhisit Vejjajiva, member of the opposition to Thaksin Shinawatra.

On several occasions the Government imposed a state of emergency and invoked the Internal Security Act to address the massive mobilizations that continued throughout the year, especially by followers of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The United Front of Democracy and Against Dictatorship (FUDD), a supporter of Thaksin Shinawatra, demanded the dissolution of parliament and early elections, considering that the current Government of Abhisit Vejjajiva lacked legitimacy. The protests led by the FUDD prevented the holding of an ASEAN summit in Bangkok in February, and in April caused the emergency evacuation of participants in other ASEAN summit in the city of Pattaya after the protesters invaded the compound where the meeting was being held. Also in April, two people died and 120 were injured in the course of anti-government protests. Amid growing tension, heightened by statements by Thaksin Shinawatra from abroad which questioned the legitimacy of Government, the Administration was willing to address some of the demands of the FUDD. However, the **People's Alliance for Democracy, an opposition movement to Thaksin Shinawatra and his related parties, threatened to resume protests if parliament amended the constitution or gave amnesty to politicians close to Thaksin**, which had been barred from politics after being found guilty of electoral fraud. Tension in the country increased substantially after the Cambodian Government appointed Thaksin Shinawatra as economic adviser and allowed him to reside in Cambodia and move freely throughout the territory. This decision by the Cambodian Government raised diplomatic tension between the two countries and led to protests by thousands of people in Thailand. In December, several thou-

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34. See Chapter 5 (Human Rights and Transitional Justice)

sand people protested once more against the Government in a demonstration in which Thaksin Shinawatra, from abroad, criticized the country's instability.

Thailand – Cambodia	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	Territory
	International
Main parties:	Thailand, Cambodia

Summary:

The origin of the dispute between the two countries is the sovereignty over a piece of land of approximately 4.6 km^2 which surrounds the Buddhist temple of Preah Vihear, built in the eleventh century, which is situated on the border between Thailand and Cambodia. After centuries of dispute, in 1962 the International Court of Justice ruled that the temple belonged to Cambodia, but did not rule over the territory around the temple. However, the fact that the best access to the temple is from the Thai side, as well as Thailand's disagreement about the historical maps used for the decision by the International Court of Justice, have fuelled the claims by Thailand in recent decades. The disputed border region has a large number of troops and landmines.

Military tension between the two countries reached its peak in early April, when **three soldiers were killed and 10 wounded after an exchange of fire between the armies at the border**. The clashes also caused the displacement of hundreds of people. The Cambodian Government accused the Thai Army of having crossed the border and demanded compensation for the damage caused. Although after the fighting was over both Governments appealed for calm and said they were working to resolve the conflict, the Cambodian Armed Forces repeatedly warned that it would repel any aggression from Thailand. The second greatest moment of tension during the year occurred in September when the People's Alliance for Democracy –the movement that had led protests against the former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra- mobilized thousands of people on the border between both countries to demand a firmer stance by Bangkok in the territorial dispute that pits the two states against each other. Dozens of people were injured in clashes between protesters and Thai security forces. For its part, the Cambodian Administration increased the deployment of troops at the border, gave orders to shoot anyone trying to cross and announced its intention to raise the issue before international forums such as ASEAN or the UN Security Council. **Bilateral relations deteriorated again later in the year after Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen decided to appoint Thaksin Shinawatra,** who visited Cambodia a few days later, **as economic adviser to his Government**. Immediately, Bangkok recalled its ambassador (in response Phnom Penh did the same), cancelled development aid, threatened to review the agreements reached by both Governments in recent years and to close several border crossings.

Europe

a) Western, Central and Eastern Europe

Moldova	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, political opposition

Summary:

Moldova, one of Europe's poorest countries, emerged as an independent state in 1991, as part of the decomposition of the USSR. Most of its territory between the rivers Dniester and Prut, historically known as Bessarabia, was annexed by the USSR in the forties, with Romania controlling the western half of the historical Moldova. In turn, the Soviet regime joined the Transnistria region, with a Slavic majority and until then an autonomous region within Ukraine, to Besarabia. Since independence, Moldova has gone through periods of instability, partly linked to its historical development. Thus, the nineties were marked by tension between the sectors in favour of re-establishing ties with Romania and those that advocated Moldovan independence, as well as by the armed conflict (1992) between the Moldovan State and the forces from Transnistria, which declared itself independent. Gradually, the pro-Romanian opinion in Moldova gave way to the consolidation of a mostly sovereigntist position. The Communist Party won the presidency in 2001. Its initial reconciliation with Russia led to numerous protests which later gave way to a more distant relationship. The communist Government and the liberal leaning opposition have maintained political struggles in recent years.

The controversial parliamentary elections in April led to serious unrest, with some fatalities, and in July the repetition of the elections led to the communist defeat. Following the announcement of the ruling Communist Party victory in April, at least 15,000 people marched in the capital claiming there had been election fraud. These protests resulted in violent riots, with the **occupation of Parliament and the headquarters of the Presidency**. Three protesters were killed, including two in police custody, several hundred police officers and members of the opposition were wounded and many other activists were arrested. The next day the Police regained control of both buildings. Subsequently, a European Parliament delegation stated that during the riots serious acts of violence were committed by the Police. The president, Vladimir Voronin, who described the events as an attempted coup, said that Romania was involved in the start of the protests and expelled its ambassador. However, he announced an amnesty for those arrested in the protests and committed to starting a dialogue with the opposition. The United Nations urged all sectors to avoid further violence. The Central Election Commission initially endorsed the Communist victory, with 60 of the 101 seats, while the OSCE, after a positive initial report, denounced the falsification of election lists. The opposition boycotted the Parliament during the appointment of new officials until **Voronin finally dissolved Parliament and called new elections for July**. After this election, that received a positive mark from the OSCE and local political forces, four liberal leaning

opposition parties, which all together held a majority of seats, agreed to form a coalition Government, and the Communist Party was ousted for the first time. The new Government was approved by Parliament in September. However, tension continued with the resignation of Voronin and a delay in the election of his replacement due to legal issues, and obstruction by the communist opposition of the incumbent party's candidate.

b) Southeast Europe

Bosnia and Herzegovina	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Self-government, Identity, Government Internationalized Internal
Main parties:	Central Government, Government of the Republic of Srpska, Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the High Representative of the international community

Summary:
During the decomposition of the Federation of Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, inhabited by Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats, was affected by a war between 1992 and 1995. The Serbian political elite in the country, with support from Serbia, as well as Bosniak and Croat politicians mobilized their populations and forces around the issue of ethnicity and plans for self determination which were mutually incompatible. The Dayton peace accords ushered in a fragile State, divided into two ethnopolitical entities: Republika Srpska (Serb majority and with 49% of the territory and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (with Bosnian and Croatian population and 51% of the territory), both with broad powers, including military power. Political tensions among the nationalist elites from the three communities, and between them and the international presence that oversees implementation of the agreements, plus the legacy of the conflict's impact on the population and the country, are still active areas of tension.

International warnings increased regarding the climate of political crisis in the country and the deterioration of the situation. In January a possible local agreement became public as part of the Prud negotiating process for a new administrative and territorial organization. This process would involve three levels of government, with the second level being divided into four territorial units. This was interpreted as a possible step from the current two entities to three (Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian). However, in the following months divisions between the representatives of the three communities increased, impeding progress. The high representative, Valetin Inzko, overturned a decision by the Bosnian Serb, Republika Srpska Parliament urging it to reclaim powers transferred to the central administration, a decision strongly criticized by the Serb entity. This threatened to boycott all central institutions if the High Representative continued using its executive powers, after a new showdown

over the state electricity company. To find a solution to the crisis, **the EU and U.S. in October promoted several high-level meetings with local leaders, which ended without local support for the international proposals for constitutional reform**. In late November, the international team of experts submitted a new proposal for reform. In turn, the Peace Implementation Council expressed great concern at the lack of progress in the country and they therefore agreed to extend the mandate of the High Representative (OHR), while the UN Security Council renewed the EUFOR mandate. At year end, the confrontation worsened between the Bosnian Serb authorities and the OHR after the organism again used its special powers to extend the mandate of judges and prosecutors on war crimes, which gave rise to the threat of a referendum by the Republika Srpska. During the year the political and social crisis in the city of Mostar continued. It began after the October 2008 elections, with the Croat and Muslim parties unable to reach an agreement to elect a new mayor or approve the budgets, which led to strikes and protests during 2009. In December, the OHR approved measures against the crisis.

Serbia – Kosovo	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	↓
Type:	Self-government, Identity Internationalized Internal[35]
Main parties:	Government of Serbia, Government of Kosovo, political and social representatives of the Serbian community in Kosovo, UNMIK, KFOR, EULEX

Summary:
The tension between Serbia and Kosovo is associated with the process of determining the political status of the region after the armed conflict of 1998-1999, which confronted the Albanian armed group KLA on the one hand and NATO on the other with the Serbian Government, after years of repression by Milosevic's regime against the Albanian population in the former province of Serbia within the Yugoslav federation. The NATO offensive, unauthorized by the UN, gave way to an international protectorate. In practice, Kosovo was divided along ethnic lines, with an increase in hostilities against the Serb community, whose isolation was in turn reinforced from Serbia. The final status of the territory and the rights of minorities have been a constant area of tension, in addition to Kosovo's internal problems (for example, unemployment, corruption, criminality). The process of determining the final status, started in 2006, failed to reach an agreement between the parties or support from the UN Security Council for the proposal by the UN special envoy. In 2008, Kosovo's parliament proclaimed independence for the territory.

The situation in Kosovo was relatively calm, albeit with limited incidents throughout the year in the areas with a Serb-majority. The first anniversary of the declaration of independence of Kosovo was uneventful and by year end 63 States had recognized its sovereignty, including

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35. The socio-political crisis between Kosovo and Serbia is considered "Internationalized Internal" since, despite its recognition as a State by several dozen countries, its international legal status is not yet clear or defined. Thus, in 2009 it was decided to maintain it in the socio-political crisis category used in previous editions of this report.

22 from the EU. The EU mission, EULEX, completed its deployment, while the UNMIK maintained a small presence, and NATO announced a reduction in its troops from 13,800 to 10,000 for early 2010, subject to the requirements of security, a decision which Serbia criticized. However, tension between Kosovo and Serbia remained high, with no advances in the process driven by the UN to address technical issues that affect both of them. In turn, **Serbia considered a threat to its security the creation of the Kosovo Security Force** (KSF), which became operational in January as a lightly armed force with initial functions of crisis response, civil protection and demining. The local elections in Kosovo in November passed quietly, although the Serbian Government had warned that it would only recognize the local governing bodies that emerged from the Serbian elections of 2008. However, the EULEX mission and the Serbian police signed a police cooperation protocol in September. Despite the initial rejection, the Kosovo Government finally supported it, while Albanians groups protested in Pristina against the pact, with some thirty EULEX vehicles damaged and twenty arrests. Similarly, **limited protests by part of the Serbian population took place in northern Kosovo against electricity cuts** that the Kosovar state company was applying because of unpaid bills, with dozens injured, as well as protests in Mitrovica against the reconstruction of Albanian homes, with several people injured and some property damage. Meanwhile, mid-year 325 Kosovo Serb police officers returned to their posts which they had left in 2008 in protest for the declaration of independence.

c) Caucasus

Armenia – Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh)	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	Self-government, Identity, Territory International
Main parties:	Azerbaijan Government, Government of Armenia, Government of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic

Summary:
The tension between both countries in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh region is linked to the lack of solutions to issues from the past armed conflict between December 1991 and 1994. Nagorno-Karabakh is an Armenian-majority enclave in an Azeri environment. It is formally part of Azerbaijan but has de facto independence. This began as an internal conflict between self-defence militias in the region and the Azerbaijan security forces over the sovereignty and control of Nagorno-Karabagh and progressively degenerated into an interstate war between Azerbaijan and neighbouring Armenia. The armed conflict, which left 20,000 dead and 200,000 displaced and forced ethnic homogenization of the population on both sides of the ceasefire line, led to a situation of unresolved conflict. The issue of Nagorno-Karabakh's status, the return of the population and recurrent violations of the ceasefire were the main areas of tension.

Tension continued along the Line of Separation, with further violations of the ceasefire, in parallel to intensified diplomatic contacts and certain optimism about the prospects of rapprochement. During the year **several Armenian soldiers were killed and as many Azeris in several shootings near the ceasefire line** and due to the explosion of mines. The death toll because of violations of the self-regulated ceasefire amounts to 3,000 since the signing of the agreement in 1994, according to the International Crisis Group. Moreover, the outgoing president of Nagorno-Karabakh, Bako Sahakyan, said earlier this year that its forces had increased their effectiveness and had reinforced the borders, arguing that the Azeri increase in military spending forced the region to strengthen its offensive capability. Azerbaijan expressed concern about an alleged Russian arms delivery to Armenia that had occurred in 2008, but Russia and Armenia have denied the allegations. Moreover, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, led by Russia, spoke in support of Armenia in the event of a future Azeri attack on Nagorno-Karabakh. At the diplomatic level, talks were intensified with six meetings between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. According to the co-chairs of the Minsk Group of OSCE, the parties were closer to an agreement on basic principles.[36] However, at the end of the year an exchange of accusations between senior officials again held up negotiations, with **Azerbaijan threatening to opt for a military solution if talks failed and the Armenian response which threatened to recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh**. In parallel, the process to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey raised questions about its impact on the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh.[37]

Georgia	
Intensity:	1
Trend:	=
Type:	Government Internationalized Internal
Main parties:	Government of Georgia, political opposition, Russia

Summary:
Since its independence from the USSR in 1991, Georgia has gone through various stages of violence and instability: internal civil war (1991-1992); wars for control of the regions of Abkhazia (1992-1994) and South Ossetia (1991 – 1992); peaceful overthrow of President Shevardnadze in the so-called Rose Revolution (2003), which led Mikhail Saakashvili to the presidency (2004) in response to accusations against Shevardnadze for political corruption and electoral fraud; and the brief Russian-Georgian war in 2008 over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In a context of fragile institutions and a historical legacy of chronic instability, from the end of the first term to the beginning of the second (2007-2008) the Georgian Government has been witness to increasing domestic protests by the opposition (allegations of authoritarianism, corruption, lack of response to socio-economic problems, etc.), as well as disputes with Russia. The antagonism with Russia is marked by factors such as the rapprochement of Georgia to the U.S. and NATO, Russia's resurgence as a global power and the struggle for power in the Eurasian energy sector.

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36. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).
37. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

The conflict between the political opposition and the Government, and the Russian role in Georgia's instability, contributed to political tensions remaining high in Georgia beginning in the second quarter. Since early April, **13 opposition parties demanded the resignation of President Mikhail Saakashvili, and organized demonstrations and protests** that raged for months in the capital, Tbilisi, and other cities, with a peak participation of 60,000 people in early April and late May. The NGO Human Rights Watch warned of growing intimidation suffered by opposition supporters, while clashes between police and protesters in May resulted in several dozen injured and as many arrested. The atmosphere of confrontation in the streets declined in successive months with a decrease in the number of protests and lower participation. The political opposition -which alleged fraud in past elections, deficiencies in the electoral law and a disproportionate use of force against opponents- agreed to begin talks with the Government, but rejected the president's proposals and tensions remained high during the rest of the year. Moreover, in May **the Georgian Army ended a military mutiny which had lasted for several hours at a military base near the capital.** 500 soldiers participated and one was killed and several were wounded. **Georgia accused Russia of supporting the rebellion in order to overthrow Saakashvili**, while Russia denied any involvement. In turn, the Kremlin dismissed the current Georgian regime as a "red line" which prevents the normalization of Georgian-Russian relations. Relations again deteriorated in the context of the first anniversary of the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008. The Kremlin accused Georgia of rearming with U.S. support, while Georgia criticized the Russian military exercises in the Caucasus, the largest since the war of 2008. However, later in the year both countries agreed to reopen in 2010 the Kazbegi-Zemo border crossing point, closed by Russia since 2006.

Georgia (Abkhazia)	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	Self-government, Identity
	Internationalized Internal
Main parties:	Government of Georgia,
	Government of the self-proclaimed
	Republic of Abkhazia, Russia

Summary:
The precarious security situation in the region is due to the lack of solutions to the fundamental issues that caused the armed conflict (1992-1994). Abkhaz local leaders, backed by Russia, upheld the independence of the region whereas the Georgian Government defended the country's territorial integrity in the midst of the decomposition of the USSR. After the end of this war, which displaced some 200,000 Georgians, Abkhazia has functioned as a *de facto* state. Despite the existence of a ceasefire agreement, a negotiating process and international presence (UN observers and Russian peacekeeping forces), hostility remained high, fuelled by geo-strategic and balance of powers tensions in the Caucasus between Georgia and Russia. These rose until they became an international war in August 2008, launched in South Ossetia, after which the Abkhaz forces con-

solidated their control over Abkhazia and Russia formally recognized its independence. Frequent security incidents, the uncertain status of the territory, the role of Russia and the cumulative impact of both wars are ongoing sources of tension.

One year after the Russo-Georgian war, tensions around Abkhazia remained high, marked by the **dismantling of the former security regime, a process of Russification and an unstable situation of calm in the area of security**, with minor incidents throughout the year. One of the most significant events was the **Russian veto in June to the renewal of the UN mission in Georgia, the UNOMIG, which was dismantled. Furthermore, Abkhazia continued to deny access to the EU mission, the EUMM.** This all occurred while Abkhazia and Russia were reaching a military agreement, which includes the creation of a military base in Gudauta and ratifies the continued presence of 17,000 Russian soldiers in Abkhazia, and another agreement for the protection of borders that allows Russian troops to patrol the boundary line. Furthermore, Abkhazia announced the future creation of its own army with between 10,000 and 15,000 troops. In its report at the beginning of the year, the UN secretary-general had warned that Abkhaz heavy weapons and military personnel were being moved to the perimeter of the conflict zone. Meanwhile, Georgia and EUMM signed a memorandum which restricted the movement of Georgian troops that was generally upheld during the year. In humanitarian terms, the Abkhaz authorities have stated that the displaced Georgian population can return only if they renounce their Georgian citizenship. The civilian population on both sides of the border, especially in Gali and Zugdidi, were affected by restrictions placed on crossing the ceasefire line. The UNOMIG reported earlier this year an increase in cases of alleged harassment and intimidation against the Georgian population in Gali (Abkhazia) since October 2008 and an increase in ceasefire violations and crime. **The incidents continued during the year, with several dead and wounded**, and the detention of several ships en route to Abkhazia by Georgia, despite the use of the joint mechanism of prevention and incident response.[38] At the end of the year, the Government announced the preparation of a new strategy with the aim of promoting relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia through a "status-neutral" mechanism.

Georgia (South Ossetia)	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	Self-government, Identity
	Internationalized Internal
Main parties:	Government of Georgia, Government of
	the self-proclaimed Republic of South
	Ossetia, Russia

Summary:
The tension in the region is due to the fact that fundamental issues, over which the Ossetian and Georgian forces fought a war from 1991 to 1992, have not been resolved. Since then, the parties have maintained their respective positions in defence of their independence from or unification with Russia and the territorial integrity of Georgia, without being able to

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38. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

resolve through negotiation the impasse in the region which is *de facto* independent. In turn, the internal conflict has been fuelled by tensions between Georgia and Russia -linked to geostrategic and balance of power issues in the South Caucasus region- which in 2008 escalated into a brief war launched in South Ossetia and extended later to Abkhazia Georgian-controlled areas. After the last war and forced displacement of the majority of the Georgian population that lived in South Ossetia, the Ossetian position was reinforced. Russia recognized its independence and continued its military presence in the region. The matter of displaced persons from both, the nineties and the second war, besides the status of the territory and occasional violations of the ceasefire continue to be sources of tension.

The situation was relatively calm, with some security incidents, while the region continued its political, military and socio-economic rapprochement to Russia. **The Kremlin reiterated that the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia was not negotiable** and signed military agreements that ratify their presence there, with 17,000 troops and plans to build a military base in the capital, Tskhinvali, and a military airport in an area which until the 2008 war was controlled by Georgia. Moreover, given the lack of agreement within the OSCE, **in early 2009 the mission of this organization in Georgia was pulled out. In June, 20 additional observers** deployed by the OSCE after the war of 2008 in areas adjacent to South Ossetia also withdrew. Access to the interior of Ossetia continued to be denied to the UEMM mission. The report on the war of 2008 by an independent mission commissioned by the EU concluded that all sides violated international law during the war and noted that there were strong indications that ethnic cleansing was practiced against the Georgian population in South Ossetia. The region held parliamentary elections in May, not internationally recognized, which led to strong criticism from Georgia. In addition, throughout the year there were **some security incidents which caused** at least one fatality and several injuries, and **frequent arrests of civilians for crossing the border**. The conflicting parties stayed in touch through the joint mechanism to prevent and respond to incidents, although several meetings were cancelled because of disagreements and preconditions.[39]

Box 2.3. **A year after the war: trends in the conflict in the South Caucasus**

A year after the Russo-Georgian war which once again put the Southern Caucasus on the map of international conflict, the situation in the region is cause for concern and includes two trends. First, the marked decline in peacebuilding in regard to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where the impact of the war and subsequent events have permanently eliminated the possibility of short and medium term peace, and perhaps even in the long term. Second, the growing ambivalence over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which swings between a worrying fragility on the ceasefire line and some significant progress in the peace process. Each of these trends requires different approaches, with greater emphasis on confidence-building measures in the first case and a boost to formal peace negotiations in the second.

The policy of *fait accompli* (international war, population displacement and impediments to return, formal recognition by Russia of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, militarization of both regions, etc.) has returned the conflicts affecting Georgia to a new "point zero". Currently it is in the initial phases of a new, more complicated cycle. Several reasons for this deterioration can be mentioned, including: a) the cumulative impact of two wars on human security, b) the dismantling of the negotiation platform built in the first half of the nineties, c) the collapse of the previous security systems and a decline in international presence, d) the ambiguity of the ceasefire agreement of 2008; e) the greater importance of the multilevel nature of the conflicts (intrastate, international, regional dimension), with the difficulties that this entails in negotiating terms; f) the distancing of the conflicting parties and the strengthening the military and political positions of the pro-independence regimes, g) the persistence of security incidents and violence in a fragile and militarized context.[40]

During 2009, and especially after the publication of the report on the war of 2008 commissioned by the EU to the International Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, the gap that separates the two sides has become clear. Without some self-criticism after the war and considering the elements described above, the horizon ahead is a limbo of legal (undefined status), humanitarian (prolonged displacement and blockage of humanitarian access) and security (volatile situation regarding the administrative borders) issues. Generationally, the former co-existence of the diverse communities is beginning to seem far removed in the past, which adds additional risks in terms of flexibility and willingness to rethink their positions.

Moreover, compared to the deterioration on the issue Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the trend regarding Nagorno-Karabakh is ambivalent. The 2008 war in neighbouring Georgia raised the alarm about other unresolved conflicts in the former Soviet sphere. In the context where there is no peace and no war in Nagorno-Karabakh, violations of the self-regulated ceasefire have taken over 3,000 lives since 1994, and increase warning calls in this regard. Armenia's internal instability and the Azerbaijan economic boom have not helped the rapprochement in a conflict marked by strong horizontal divisions (between Armenia and Azerbaijan) and vertical divisions (between the negotiating elites of each country and their constituencies). However, optimism has increased in mediation circles due to the progress made in the formal negotiations. In this sense, there seems to be a sufficient degree of rapprochement between the parties to soon achieve a preliminary agreement on basic principles that should guide the process to a peace accord at a later date.[41] Therefore, the number of high-level meetings has been stepped up, and in speeches by the elites to the public the aggressive rhetoric has been toned down.

39. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).
40. Villellas, Ana. "Peace processes in the Southern Caucasus: hurdles and challenges to peace". Presented at the roundtable South Caucasus Conflicts, History and Future, organized by the Institut de Drets Humans de Catalunya. Barcelona, 21 October 2009.
41. International Crisis Group. *Nagorno-Karabakh: Getting to a Breakthrough*, Europe Briefing n.º 55, Baku/Yerevan/Tbilisi/Bruselas: ICG, 7 October 2009, in <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6338&l=1>

Russia (Dagestan)	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	System, Government, Identity
	Internal
Main parties:	Russian Government, Government of the Republic of Dagestan, armed opposition groups, political and social opposition

Summary:

Dagestan, the most extensive, populous and most ethnically diverse republic in the North Caucasus, has had to face a situation of increased conflict since the late nineties. Among the sources of tension is the violence between the Islamist-based armed insurgency, which advocates the creation of an Islamic state, and the local and federal authorities, and that has resulted in periodic attacks and counterinsurgency operations. The armed opposition is led by a network of armed Islamist units known as Sharia Jamaat. Human rights violations and abuses of power have increased, often as part of the "fight against terrorism" which increases social unrest in a republic with high unemployment and poverty, despite the wealth of its natural resources. Moreover, ethnic tensions, political power rivalries and criminal violence are other areas of conflict.

Violence rose in the republic, with an **increase in the number of assassinations targeted against senior officials, as well as the climate of widespread abuses and impunity**, in a context marked by crime and political corruption. In December, the acting Interior Minister, Aleksandr Trofimov, estimated that the insurgents had suffered 135 casualties in 2009 (compared to 77 of 2008) and 76 deaths in the police force, in addition to the deaths of 15 civilians, and noted that 193 attacks on police had been reported, double the previous year. The leader of the Sharia Jamaat insurgency, Emir Musa, died in February during a counterinsurgency operation in Leninkent and was replaced by Al-Bara. Also in June the **Interior Minister Adilgerei Magomedtagirov was assassinated,** which was the first death to occur at the ministerial level allegedly carried out by insurgents. Other targeted attacks included the killing of several pro-government Muslim clerics, a prosecutor in the capital, two senior military officers and two other district leaders, among others. Moreover, **during the year there were several suicide bombings** and a bomb exploded on a train but caused no casualties. The chief prosecutor of the republic said that there is an undeclared war against the security personnel of Dagestan. In turn there was a prevailing climate of human rights violations.[42] In an open letter, the Russian NGO Memorial reported that in the republic torture was being used, abductions and extrajudicial killings were being carried out and illegal prisons existed. According to Memorial, civilians are caught between the insurgency and power structures. The complaint was dismissed by the president of Dagestan. In August, a hundred people demonstrated against the abductions and demanded investigations. Moreover, tension also rose in relation to

In Dagestan targeted attacks by the insurgency increased, including the assassination of the Interior Minister and human rights violations

the local elections in Russia, with allegations by the opposition of malpractice and the closure of at least one third of the polling stations in the third largest Dagestani city, Derbent, for security reasons. Nevertheless, the elections were declared valid.

Middle East

a) Persian Gulf

Iran	
Intensity:	3
Trend:	↑
Type:	Government
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, political, religious and social opposition

Summary:

Since coming to power in 2005, the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been the object of internal protest by many sectors. Both the way foreign policy is being handled (with a defiant defence of the right to have nuclear capability) as well as the results of its internal policies (failure to improve the country's economic situation, amidst accusations of political favouritism) have created a growing opposition within the country. Decades of confrontation between conservatives and reformists has set Ahmadinejad in recent years against various political figures that left power in 2005. Also, religious authorities and the Armed Forces, mainly the Revolutionary Guard, have played an important role in the evolution of Iran, a country with vast energy resources and a key geostrategic position.

The conflict escalated in Iran during 2009. After a campaign marked by bitter political clashes between President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his opponents, the president was declared the winner of the June 12 elections. The results were denounced as fraudulent by **the opposition, which staged the largest protests in Iran since the Islamic revolution of 1979.** The post-election period was marked by intensifying social and political confrontation and by the repression of the opposition by the security forces, which resulted in the deaths of at least 30 people, although the opposition said the figure was over 60. In this context and after a partial recount of the votes, Ahmadinejad was confirmed in office and was sworn in for a new term in August with the backing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, supreme leader of the Islamic Republic. In parallel, prominent reformist leaders, including former presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, supported the demands of the opposition. **More than a thousand people were arrested in the protests, and in the second half of the year the opposition continued to denounce the torture, abuse and sexual assault of those arrested**. In this context, the Government launched an ideological campaign to promote the ideals of the Islamic revolution, in addition to its strat-

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42. See Chapter 5 (Human rights and transitional justice).

egy of controlling the media and Internet. Also in August a macro-trial was launched against more than one hundred alleged instigators of the protests and at the end of the year five members of the opposition had been sentenced to death and 80 had received sentences of between six months and 15 years in prison, in a context where the opposition appeared to be weakening. However, in late December, the death of Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montanzeri, renowned for his criticism of the regime, sparked new and massive demonstrations against the Ahmadinejad Government and ushered in a new wave of violence that culminated in the death of another eight people and dozens of wounded.

Iran (Sistan Baluchistan)	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	Identity, Government
	Internal
Main parties:	Government, Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran), Jundallah (Soldiers of God / People's Resistance Movement)

Summary:
Since 2005 the group Jundallah (Soldiers of God) has carried out an insurgent campaign in the southeastern province of Sistan Baluchistan, a region with a Sunni majority in contrast to the rest of the country, which is predominantly from the Shiite branch of Islam. The organization, which also calls itself the People's Resistance Movement, was founded in 2002 and claims they are the victims of sectarian persecution by Tehran. They claim that their goal is to protect the rights, culture and religion of the Baluchis, but deny having a separatist agenda and links abroad. The Iranian Government, meanwhile, accuses Jundallah of connections to the U.S., UK, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the al-Qaeda network. Sistan Baluchistan is a province bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan –the Baluchi population lives on both sides of the border– and is an area with high rates of poverty, marked by smuggling and drug trafficking routes. Faced with the possibility of this region becoming unstable, Tehran has strengthened its control mechanisms and condemned Jundallah militants to death. The insurgent group's actions include kidnappings, attacks and suicide bombings and several have targeted officers of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran).

Actions by the Jundallah insurgency group in Iran's southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchistan stepped up during the year, with operations that received widespread media coverage. Attacks by the Sunni group increased in the period before the national elections in June, the most notable being the offensive against a Shiite mosque in May that killed 25 people. Given the increased activity of the Soldiers of God, the Iranian Government decided to entrust the task of strengthening security in the province to the Revolutionary Guard. **The action with the greatest international impact took place in October, when the Sunni group staged an attack on the Revolutionary Guards that killed 42 people, including six senior officers.** The incident, classified as the deadliest that had take place in the region, was con-

After the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the opposition staged the biggest protests in Iran since the Islamic revolution of 1979

sidered a qualitative leap in actions by Jundallah due to the number of victims and the importance of the target. Tehran announced a tough response and accused the United States, Britain and Pakistan of backing the Baluchi insurgency. Throughout the year the authorities in Tehran sentenced to death more than a dozen people accused of belonging to the group and for their involvement in attacks in Sistan Baluchistan, 13 of whom were executed in July.

Iran – USA, Israel	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	System
	International
Main parties:	Iran, USA, Israel

Summary:
International pressure on the Iranian regime is part of the policy launched after 11 September 2001 by the U.S. Administration of George W. Bush, who in January 2002 declared Iran as an enemy state for its alleged links to terrorism. Since the 1979 Islamic revolution that toppled the regime of U.S. ally Shah Reza Pahlavi and proclaimed the Ayatollah Khomeini the country's supreme leader, the U.S. had accused Iran of supporting armed groups such as Hezbollah. In the midst of this opposition, the victory of ultra-conservative Ahmadinejad in the presidential elections of August 2005 reinforces a nationalist rhetoric that affirms the right to develop a nuclear program for peaceful purposes, while the international community stirs fears of an imminent capacity to build a nuclear bomb by a regime considered hostile to Western interests in the region.

The Iranian nuclear program continued to cause tension at the international level. **The year began with expectations of a possible change in the relationship between the U.S. and Iran** after Washington expressed their willingness to begin direct talks on the Islamic Republic's nuclear plan and because the new president, Barack Obama, addressed a televised address to the Iranian people and authorities. Tehran said it hoped for a positive change in the form of actions and not just words by the U.S., who renewed sanctions against Iran in March. The five members of the UN Security Council and Germany (G5 +1) proposed new talks in April, although the first formal meeting was not held until October, after the U.S. warned Iran that the offer of dialogue was not indefinite. Days before the meeting, **Tehran revealed the construction of a second nuclear plant to enrich uranium in the city of Qom,** which it had not reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and tested missiles capable of reaching Israel and parts of Europe. Despite the tense atmosphere, the G5 +1 and Iranian negotiators reached an initial agreement in Vienna in late October for Iran to send its low-enriched uranium to France and Russia, where it would be converted into fuel for civilian research. However, senior Iranian leaders said they would not accept sending uranium abroad. In late December the powers that negotiated with Iran were still waiting for a formal response to the proposal and considered the possibility of applying pressure with

new sanctions, while the IAEA decided to condemn the Islamic Republic for the first time since 2006 for its lack of cooperation in the investigation of its nuclear activities. Moreover, throughout the year reports in the media pointed to possible Israeli covert actions to halt Iran's nuclear program, which it considers a threat. However, Israel denied any unilateral plans for action.

In November, five months after the elections, a new Lebanese Government was finally established under Prime Minister Saad Hariri

flict and which have killed or wounded some 300 civilians since the end of the war. **In the second half of the year there was a verbal escalation**: Israel said it would consider Beirut responsible for the attacks launched from its territory and warned Lebanon of including Hezbollah in the Government, while the Islamist group said it would strike Tel Aviv if Israel attacked. In November, a new UN report on the implementation of resolution 1701, which establishes a cease-fire between the parties, warned that since June hostile incidents and violations of the resolution had been recorded, reflecting the fragility of the truce and the risk of worsening tension.[44] In the case of Syria and Lebanon, the continuing good relations were confirmed by the official naming of ambassadors, the meeting in November between the presidents of both countries and the visit to Damascus by Lebanese prime minister, Saad Hariri, in December.

b) Mashriq

Israel – Lebanon – Syria	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↑
Type:	System, Resources, Territory
	International
Main parties:	Israel, Syria, Hezbollah Lebanese group and its armed branch (Islamic Resistance)

Summary:
The backdrop of the tension is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its consequences in the region. On the one hand, the presence of thousands of Palestinian refugees who settled in Lebanon since 1948, with the leadership of the PLO in 1979, led to continual attacks by Israel in southern Lebanon until they occupied it in 1982. The founding of the armed Shiite group Hezbollah in the early eighties in Lebanon, with an agenda of resistance against Israel and the liberation of Palestine, led to periodic clashes which culminated in the massive Israeli offensive in July 2006. Moreover, the 1967 war meant the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights, which together with Syrian support for Hezbollah explains the tension between Israel and Syria.

The downward trend in the tension between Syria, Israel and Lebanon in 2008 suffered a setback in 2009. A decisive factor in this shift was the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip between December 2008 and January 2009, which resulted in the **suspension of peace talks between Syria and Israel** which had begun months earlier and also distanced the Israeli Government from Turkey, who had acted as mediator.[43] The new Israeli administration, in power since April, was willing to resume negotiations, but refused to withdraw from the Golan Heights, a condition that was not negotiable for Damascus. With respect to the relationship between Israel and Lebanon, rockets launch from southern Lebanon into northern Israel during the Israeli offensive in Gaza raised fears of renewed hostilities. The tense atmosphere was maintained by repeated Israeli accusations that Hezbollah had increased its firepower in southern Lebanon, especially after the explosion of an arms depot in July. During the year, several rocket and artillery strikes on both sides of the border caused injuries but no fatalities. In May, Israel provided a report to the UN with the location of cluster bombs dropped on Lebanon in 2006, one quarter of which failed to explode during the con-

Lebanon	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	↓
Type:	Government
	Internationalized Internal
Main parties:	Government, political and social opposition, armed branch of Hezbollah (Islamic Resistance), militias

Summary:
The assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 sparked the so-called "Cedar Revolution" that, with mass demonstrations, forced the withdrawal of Syrian Armed Forces –present in the country for three decades– required by Security Council Resolution 1559, promoted by the U.S. and France in September 2004. The immediate polarization between, on one hand, opponents of Syrian influence (led by Hariri's son, who blamed the Syrian regime for the assassination) and, on the other hand, sectors closer to Syria such as Hezbollah, caused a political, social and institutional crisis marked by confessional divisions.

The political crisis in Lebanon declined compared to the high levels of violence recorded in 2008 due to fighting between Government forces and the opposition led by Hezbollah. However, political polarization increased as the June election drew near. The election was won by the coalition led by Saad Hariri (March 14 Alliance). Hezbollah and its allies (March 8 Alliance) accepted the results and a long process of negotiation began to form the new national unity Government. After three months of deadlock due to disagreements about who would head the ministries, Hariri gave up trying to form a Government, but the Lebanese president, Michel Suleiman, entrusted him with the task a second time. **Amid repeated international calls for an end to the uncertain political situation, in November the new Government was finally formed**, with 15 representatives from Hariri's

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43. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).
44. See the 11th report of the secretary-general on the application of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), S/2009/566, 2 November 2009, in <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2009/566&referer=http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/reports.shtml&Lang=>.

coalition, 10 from the opposition -including two members from Hezbollah- and five nominated by the President. One of the first statements of the unity Government recognized Hezbollah's right to maintain their arsenals, despite the reluctance of some members of the March 14 Alliance. In 2009, four years after the death of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon at The Hague was launched to investigate his murder.[45] Due to lack of evidence, the court ordered the release of four generals who had been under arrest since 2005 for this case. At the same time, a report by the International Crisis Group warned of the potential for violence in the situation of Palestine refugees in Lebanon, pointing out that they are well armed, socially marginalized and economically deprived, facts which could have unfavourable repercussions both within Lebanon and in the framework of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.[46] In March, Kamal Medhat, the number two of the PLO in Lebanon, was killed in an explosion.

Palestine	
Intensity:	2
Trend:	=
Type:	Government
	Internal
Main parties:	PNA, Fatah, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade armed group, Hamas and its armed wing Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades

Summary:

The opposition between the various Palestinian sectors in recent decades has been led mainly by secular nationalist groups on the one hand (Fatah and its armed wing al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, PFLP, DFLP) and religious groups on the other hand (Hamas and its armed wing Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades, Islamic Jihad). The confrontation is part of a power struggle to control the Palestinian territories and has led, in turn, to different approaches toward relations with Israel. After years of Fatah domination in Palestinian politics (movement led by Yasser Arafat and later by Mahmoud Abbas), accusations of corruption and not defending Palestinian interests in the peace process sparked the victory of Hamas in the January 2006 elections. This event triggered a dialectical and armed struggle between both groups for control of the political institutions and, above all, the security forces.

The year began with hope due to the renewal of talks in February between Hamas and Fatah. **Under Egyptian mediation several rounds of negotiations were held** that focused on the release of prisoners from both sides and in forming a unity Government, which did not materialize. After resigning in March the Palestinian West Bank Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, once again put together a Government in May that was not recognized by Hamas. Although it was later revoked, the initial decision by the Government of Mahmoud Abbas to support the postponement of the UN debate on the Goldstone report (regarding crimes committed during the Israeli offensive in Gaza) provoked sharp internal criticism of the Palestinian president in October. That same month Fatah signed a deal brokered by Cairo which included holding elections in June 2010, the release of detainees and a reform of the security forces. Given Hamas's reluctance to sign the text, Abbas called for elections on 24 January, but the Islamist group announced it would not allow elections in Gaza before reaching a reconciliation agreement.[47] **Abbas, confirmed as Fatah leader in August during the first congress the group had held in 20 years, announced he would not run for re-election as president of the Palestinian Authority**, in an attempt to pressure Israel to renew the stalled peace process. In late December, and given the impossibility of reaching an agreement, the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank extended the mandate of Abbas and the Parliament. In parallel some episodes of tension and violence were reported. According to a report by Human Rights Watch, the Hamas security forces killed 32 Palestinians from rival sectors and suspected collaborators with Israel, and mutilated about 50 during the Israeli offensive in Gaza that ended in January. In June three policemen, two Hamas members and a civilian, were killed in an incident in Qalqilya (West Bank). In addition, 24 people were killed in August in an incident in Gaza between Hamas forces and the Jund Ansar Allah militant group, allegedly linked to al-Qaeda. Hamas launched an offensive against this movement after Jund Ansar Allah declared Gaza an Islamic emirate and criticized Hamas for not imposing a strict form of *sharia* in the territory. The incident draws attention to the presence of Salafist groups linked to al-Qaeda in Gaza which Hamas wants to neutralize.

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45. See Chapter 5 (Human Rights and Transitional Justice).
46. International Crisis Group. Nurturing Instability: Lebanon's Palestinian Refugee Camps, Middle East Report n° 84, Beirut/Brussels: ICG, 19 February 2009, in < http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6123&l=1>.
47. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).

Countries engaged in peace processes or formal negotiations (indicator no.3)

3. Peace Processes

- The peace agreement in Somalia between the Transitional Federal Government and the moderate faction of the opposition group ARS, which already forms part of the new Government, stands out on a year in which negotiations came to an end in nine conflicts.
- Negotiations in Sri Lanka collapsed after the Armed Forces victory over the Tamil armed group LTTE.
- The Turkish Government and the Kurds of the PKK came together as a result of new proposals that may open the way to direct dialogue, although a decision by the Constitutional Tribunal at the end of the year may cut short the process.
- The president of Burundi declared the war was over. At the same time, the FNL became formally a political party. By the end of the year, around 21,000 members of that group had disarmed, demobilized and re-integrated into civil society.
- The main reason given for the failure of negotiations were, as in previous years, the lack of confidence or mistrust towards some mediators, splits and dissidences within armed groups, basic differences over the agenda, and mistrust between the negotiating parties.
- The "peace temperature index", which measures the state of negotiations, registered 1.2 points on a maximum of 3, compared to 1.1 last year.

This section analyzes those armed or unresolved conflicts that have entered into a formal phase of negotiation, that are involved in a clear peace process, are exploring the beginning of negotiations or where negotiations have broken down or stopped for some reason.

During the year, negotiations came to an end in nine conflicts, of which the peace agreement in Somalia between the **Transitional Federal Government and the moderate faction of the opposition group ARS,** which already forms part of the new Government, stands out. Compared to 2008, a greater number of processes were consolidated and interruptions dropped down, but there was an increase in cases of conflict in which the negotiation process broke down or could not begin (32.3% of cases), of which the failure of the negotiations in Sri Lanka after the Armed Forces military victory over the Tamil armed group LTTE, stands out.

Table 3.1. **State of negotiations at end of 2009**

Good (5)	With difficulties(19)	Bad (7)	Exploratory (5)	Resolved (9)
Cyprus	*Armenia-Azerbaijan*	*Ethiopia-Eritrea*	Afghanistan (Taliban)	*Central African Rep.*
China-Taiwan	*Chad-Sudan*	*Georgia (Abkhazia and*	India (ULFA)	*(FDPC)*
India (ULFA pro-talks)	*India (NDFB)*	*South Ossetia)*	*Israel-Syria*	*Chad (National*
Philippines (MILF)	*India (NSCN-IM)*	Israel-Palestine	Myanmar (KNU)	*Movement)*
Uganda (ADF)	*India (NSCN-K)*	Pakistan (Baluchistan)	Turkey (PKK)	*DR Congo (CNDP)*
	India-Pakistan	*Palestine*		*India (DHD-J)*
	Kosovo	*Morocco-Western Sahara*		*Mali (ATNM)*
	Mali (Tuaregs)	Uganda (LRA)		*Myanmar (KNI-KNA Peace*
	Moldova (Transdniestria)			*Council)*
	Myanmar (NLD)			*Niger (FFR)*
	Myanmar (several)			*Somalia (ARS)*
	Nigeria (MEND)			*Thailand-Cambodia*
	Nepal (Terai)			
	Niger (Tuaregs)			
	Philippines (MNLF)			
	Philippines (NPA)			
	R. Central America			
	Sudan (SLA factions)			
	Sudan (JEM)			

(Unresolved conflicts which are not at armed phase or which at the end of the year cannot be classified as "armed conflicts" are indicated in italics).

The first part of this chapter lays out definitions and typologies of peace processes, the second analyzes the development of negotiations during the year, and the third discusses the "peace temperature" in 2009. In general terms, 35% of the negotiations during 2009 were good or ended in a satisfactory manner. A somewhat higher percentage of negotiations have encountered serious difficulties, and 18% went very badly. One of the most significant developments of the year has been a coming together of the Turkish Government and the Kurds of the PKK, thanks to proposals from both parties that might open the way to direct dialogue during 2010. Of the negotiations on Table 3.1, 16 correspond to armed conflicts and 28 to non-armed conflicts.

3.1. Peace processes: definitions and typologies

Negotiation is understood as the process by which two or more opposing parties (whether they are countries or internal parties within a country) agree to discuss their differences within an agreed framework in order to find a satisfactory solution to their demands. This negotiation may be direct or facilitated through third parties. Normally formal negotiations have a prior or exploratory phase, which allows them to define the framework (format, place, conditions, guarantees, etc.) of the future talks. A peace process is understood as the consolidation of negotiation scheme once the issues on the agenda, the procedures to be followed, the calendar and the facilitation have been defined. Negotiations are therefore, one of the stages of the peace process.

A **"ceasefire"** is understood as a military decision to stop fighting and the use of arms during a specified period, while a "**cessation of hostilities**" includes, as well as a ceasefire, the commitment not to kidnap, harass civilians, threaten with the use of violence etc.

In terms of their ultimate objectives and the dynamic of the different negotiation phases, the majority of peace processes can be defined within one of these five **categories or models**, although sometimes a process may combine two categories:

a) Demobilization and reinsertion.
b) Political, economic or military power-sharing.
c) Exchange (peace for democracy, peace for territories, peace for the end of occupation, peace for the recognition of rights, etc.)
d) Confidence-building measures.
e) Formulas for self-government or "intermediate political architectures".

The model of process selected usually corresponds to the type of demands presented and the capacity of the protagonist to pressure (level of military, political and social symmetry), although sometimes the facilitators or those accompanying the negotiators can have an influence, as can the weariness of the negotiators, the support they receive, as well as other less rational factors linked to pathologies of the leaders, collective imaginary or historical inertia. On some occasions, and especially

if the process is long, it may happen that the starting point is one of the listed categories (the "a" for example) but later the demands would increase, pushing the process into a more complex category. It is also important to bear in mind that not all the processes or initial phases of exploration, dialogue and negotiation are carried out with sincerity, that is to say, they frequently form part of the same strategy of war, whether in order to gain time, internationalize and publicize the conflict, rearm or for other reasons.

3.2. Evolution of peace processes

Africa

a) West Africa

In **Mali**, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, the leader of the Tuareg armed group ATNM, asked to reopen negotiations with the Government after the Army attacked its headquarters in January, forcing him to flee to Libya. Faced with the Mali Government's determination to give a military solution to the Tuareg rebellion, Ag Bahanga asked Algeria to mediate, as it was the country that had been the main mediator in the conflict. In July representatives of the ATNM and ADC met with the Government to resume the dialogue under the mediation of Algeria. However, it was the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi who announced that Mali and Niger had reached a peace agreement with their respective insurgencies in October, highlighting the presence of Ag Bahanga at the ceremony held for the official announcement. The Mali authorities launched a campaign to encourage the Tuareg combatants to hand in their weapons two weeks after the signing of the new peace agreement. The governor of the Kidal region, a stronghold of the armed Tuareg groups, emphasized the need for the population to understand that carrying arms would not guarantee their security, but rather the contrary. Furthermore the director of the Northern Mali Development Agency, Mohamed Ag Mahmud said that fighting against the spread of arms was also key to fighting drug trafficking in the region. For their part, representatives from northern Mali, especially Arabs, Peuls, Tuaregs and Songhai, met for the first time in 10 years in Kidal to seal a peace and reconciliation accord. One of the decisions reached at the meeting was the creation of a permanent structure for dialogue between the communities, which have been in confrontation on various occasions during 2009. In August the Peul pro-government militia Ganda Koy announced its transformation into a development association, a step that would allow them to benefit from social integration projects and credits offered within the framework of a peace accord signed by the armed Tuareg groups in 2006. With this in mind, in July the Government gave 1.3 million CFA francs to the Northern Development Agency to initiate a program of socio-economic reinsertion within the framework of the effective implementation of the aforementioned accord.

In **Niger** in March the MNJ, a Tuareg armed group, asked for peace talks to be reopened with the Government under the mediation of the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, having first, in a gesture of goodwill, released five

soldiers whom they had held prisoner since June 2007. In May Agaly Alambo, the group's leader, set out the MNJ preconditions for the resumption of talks, among them an end to the state of emergency in the north, the integration of his fighters into the Armed Forces and the investment on the development of the northern region of a greater percentage of the profits of uranium mining in the north. He also demanded the release of all his combatants held since 2007, an end to the hostilities and an agreement on a timetable for negotiations. The Niger Patriotic Front, which broke away from the MNJ in March, also joined the process under Libyan mediation and presented its demands to the Niger Government. A second faction established in May, the Front des Forces de Reddresement (FFR) led by Rhisa Ag Boula, abandoned the talks which they described as a government farce. On October 7 Gaddafi announced that the Mali and Niger governments had reached a peace agreement with the Tuareg armed groups, under which 1,100 combatants would lay down their weapons. However, the armed group MNJ published a communiqué on its web page discrediting its leader Agaly Alambo and saying it would not comply with the peace accord. Later the government decreed an amnesty for all Tuareg combatants who were committed to the process of disarmament and Libya initiated the repatriation of members of Tuareg groups who agreed to the peace agreement, a sign of the pacification of the north of the country. In November the Niger Government announced the end of the state of emergency in the north, thus meeting one of the MNJ's key demands, although the military deployment was maintained due to the increasing presence of elements of the Algerian armed group AQIM in the area. At the end of December the FFR laid down its weapons after talks mediated by Libya.

In the Niger Delta region (**Nigeria**) in January the armed opposition group MEND ended its truce, declared four months earlier, after the Army attacked one of its factions, the Niger Delta Vigilante, led by Ateke Tom. At the beginning of June president **Umaru Yar'Adua offered an amnesty program for armed militants in the Niger Delta region.** MEND said it would only consider a well-defined amnesty that had been negotiated by both parties. In mid-July MEND announced a 60-day ceasefire in order to facilitate peace talks with the Government, as a result of the amnesty decreed and the release by the Government of one of their leaders, Henry Okah. In mid-September, MEND agreed to extend the ceasefire –begun on July 15 and due to expire in September– for a month, although it said this didn't mean it accepted the Government's offer of amnesty. The group said that the process initiated by the Nigerian authorities didn't include dialogue on the main roots of the conflict and they would not abandon the armed struggle. Timi Alaibe, the presidential assessor of the amnesty and the Government's chief negotiator, who had recently met the MEND leaders Ateke Tom and Government Tompolo, said that around 6,000 militants had asked to be given the amnesty offered by the Government, of which 3,000 had been registered. Among MEND's demands were the withdrawal of the Armed Forces from the region and a three-month extension of the amnesty beyond the original date of October 4. During the second half of October MEND declared an indefinite ceasefire, starting October 25, in order to encourage open peace talks with the

presidency. By the second half of November, hundreds of MEND militants who had handed over their weapons demonstrated in Port Harcourt (capital of Rivers state) demanding their first month's demobilization allowance, set by the Government at $433 a month. Nevertheless, **the MEND spokesman described a meeting with president Umaru Yar'Adua as fruitful, indicating the start of a serious and positive dialogue on peace**. The presidency made similar encouraging statements about the meeting, which was also attended by Wole Soyinka, the Nobel literature laureate, who was named by MEND as a member of their mediation team.

b) Horn of Africa

In relation to the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in mid-January the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry announced that he was willing to open a dialogue with Eritrea to resolve the border dispute. Shortly afterwards, the Libyan president, **Muammar al-Gaddafi** –who held also the presidency of the African Union– **announced in Asmara**, the Eritrean capital, **that he would launch an initiative to resolve the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia**, but the Eritrean president rejected any effort or attempt to mediate. In mid-August, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (set up at the end of the armed conflict between both countries and with its headquarters in The Hague) ordered both countries to pay mutual compensation for the damage caused during the war between 1998 and 2000. The frontier between the two countries continued to be in dispute with the respective armies lined up on both sides. In mid-October, the Ethiopian prime minister, Meles Zenawi, accused Eritrea of sowing chaos in the region and once again called for sanctions against the Asmara Government for its alleged support of Somali rebels. **He also emphasized that the current position of the Eritrean Government made an agreement about the border highly improbable**.

In early January, the Ethiopian Government announced in **Somalia** the beginning of the withdrawal of the 8,000 troops it had deployed in the country, raising fears of a power vacuum and an escalation of violence. At the same time, under the auspices of the United Nations, peace talks were held between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the moderate faction of the ARS in Djibouti. The UN was trying to establish a government in which all parties participated. At the end of January, the Transitional Federal Parliament –based in Djibouti– chose the moderate Islamist **Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed,** leader of the ARS, as the president of the TFG, after Nur Hassan Hussein "Nur Adde" (until then prime minister) withdrew his candidacy and was replaced by Omar Abdirashid Shamarke who, in one of his first statements, announced that he was ready to open a dialogue with the radical insurgency. The leader of the radical group al-Shabab, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow, taking control of Baidoa (the former seat of the Parliament) after the Ethiopian troops withdrew, stated his opposition to the new president and prime minister, accusing them of having sold out to the West and the Ethiopian enemy, for which he encouraged the nation to increase its attacks on AMISOM, which was trying to fill the power vacuum left after the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. At the beginning of May the joint offensive carried out in Mogad-

ishu by the armed Islamic groups al-Shabab and Hizbul-Islam left hundreds of people dead and led to the displacement of some 70,000 civilians. To many analists, this offensive posed enormous difficulties for resuming the peace talks and establishing an inclusive Government that would include the forces of al-Shabab, led by Sheikh Dahir Aweys who, along with the current TFG president, had led the so-called Islamic Tribunals in 2006. In the third quarter of the year members of the TFG asked for the AU mission to be substituted by a more robust UN mission. Equally important was the creation of the Joint Security Committee to support Somali institutions made up of the TFG, AMISOM and the United Nations Political Office in Somalia (UNPOS). At the beginning of November, the armed Islamist group Al-Shabab rejected the dialogue proposed by TFG prime minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Shamarke, arguing that they would not enter into dialogue with those who did not want to implement Sharia or Islamic law. Several days later there were serious clashes between the al-Shabab militia and sectors of its former ally Hizbul-Islam, in the Lower Jubba region in the south of the country. Both groups, former allies, have confronted each other since October for various reasons, the most important of which is control of the port of Kismayo in the south.

Peace talks have been held between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the moderate faction of the ARS under the aegis of the United Nations

Regarding the situation in Darfur (Sudan), in **mid-February the armed opposition group JEM reached a good-will accord with the Government after a week of talks in Doha mediated by Qatar**, although that did not put an end to the fighting. Under the agreement, there would be an exchange of prisoners, with the release of those who were held last year in Khartoum in relation to an attack carried out by the JEM on the outskirts of the city. Both parties are also committed to ending violence against refugee camps in the Darfur region. However, the parties could not agree on a ceasefire neither on a cessation of hostilities. At the beginning of April the JEM tied its return to negotiations in Doha with the return of the NGOs expelled from Darfur and rejected Egypt and Libya's regional initiatives in a new attempt to mediate in the conflict. On the one hand, the faction of the SLA led by Minni Minnawi, which signed the 2006 peace accords, announced its intention to form a political party to stand in the elections scheduled for February 2010. Shortly afterwards, the Qatar media reported that delegations **from five armed groups from Darfur had arrived in the country to discuss their participation in the peace process begun in March with the JEM**. Groups which in March signed in Libya an agreement to take part in these talks were the SLA-Unity, the faction of the SLA led by Khamis Abdullah Abakr, the URF, the Idriss Azrag faction of the JEM and the SLA-Juba. **Small factions were merged into larger armed groups in what was described as a union brought about through exhaustion**.

During the third quarter of the year, efforts were concentrated on dialogue with the JEM, the main armed group in the region, during a period that saw a general reduction in hostilities in the area. The JEM, however, threatened to withdraw from the peace talks with the Govern-

ment if other armed opposition groups entered into separate negotiations, as had been suggested by the Sudanese, Libyan and Qatar governments, the main mediator, Djibril Bassolé, and the US special envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration. The JEM proposed that armed groups that wanted to join the peace negotiations should do so within either the JEM panel or the Government. **In this context, the Egyptian Government hosted the "Cairo Consultative Forum", a meeting in which seven armed groups tackled two options for taking part in peace negotiations with Khartoum: unify their structures or otherwise adopt a common negotiating position.** The JEM also opposed the inclusion of tribal leaders in the negotiations, given the complexity of managing the more than 80 different ethnic groups that live in the region. On the other hand, in an attempt to salvage the stalled negotiations in Doha (Qatar), Libya, which presides over the AU, held a series of meetings with armed groups in the region. For his part, the leader of the JEM, Khalil Ibrahim, met Djibril Bassolé, the joint AU and UN mediator, in N'djamena (Chad). During the meeting Ibrahim reaffirmed his commitment to the Doha peace process and agreed to organize a consultative meeting in the capital on a global strategy in relation to the peace process. The SLA faction Abdel Wahed Al-Nur, which according to various sources enjoys considerable support in the Darfur refugee camps, refused to take part in peace talks in Doha, insisting that security should be improved before dialogue began.

c) Great Lakes and Central Africa

In **Burundi**, at the beginning of April, the FNL leader, Agathon Rwasa, announced his intention to abandon the armed struggle. He made the announcement at a ceremony involving the symbolic disarmament and demobilization of thousands of FNL ex-combatants, attended by the South African mediation team, the AU and the UN. The **Burundi president**, **Pierre Nkurunziza, was pleased with Rwasa's announcement and declared the war was over. At the same time the FNL formally became a political party.** One of the main concerns about the process was the small number of weapons (only 722) handed in to the authorities. In early June, 24 leaders of the armed group were named to occupy positions in the State administration. The Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi set up a new structure to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement signed in 2006, ratified in December 2008 and whose implementation has been effective since April 2009. During the third quarter of the year, significant internal divisions emerged within the FNL. In August the FNL decided to expel its spokesperson, Pasteur Habimana, who played a crucial role in the peace negotiations, and also other leaders of the new political group. Habimana was accused by Rwasa of favouring the ruling party and of embezzling FNL funds. In mid-September, former senior members and representatives of the FNL denounced the authoritarian drift and the illegitimacy of the head of the former party, Agathon Rwasa, who was already excluding party members who took a critical line and who had not called a new general congress despite

the fact that the last congress was held in 2004 and that it was agreed it should be held every three years. At the end of the year, around 21,000 members of the FNL had been disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into civil society, a number that included more than 1,000 female combatants and 500 child soldiers. Some 4,000 FNL combatants have been integrated into the country's security forces.

In **Chad**, in mid-January, **various armed opposition groups came together against president Idriss Déby and created the Union des Forces de la Résistance (UFR)**. A new armed group was also formed in Cameroon with the aim of deposing president Déby; this group, named the Forces Progressistes pour l'Independence et la Renaissance (FPIR), was created by the Forum for Exiled Chadians in Central Africa, known by its French acronym FECAT. The spread of new armed groups led to a noticeable deterioration in the security situation and in respect for human rights, and fed the growing tensions on the frontier between Chad and Sudan, with armed rebel groups and militias supported by Sudan launching significant offensives in the last three dry seasons, including attacks in 2006 and 2008 on the Chad capital N'Djamena. The Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi called on Chad and Sudan to resolve their differences within the framework of the inaugural session of the summit of the Community of Sahel-Sahara States (CEN-SAD) held in Sabratha (close to Tripoli, Libya) which brought together the heads of state and political representatives of the 28 member countries. **At the end of July the Government of Chad and a coalition of three armed groups signed a peace accord in Syrte (Libya) after mediation by the Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi who is also president of the AU**. The agreement established an immediate cessation of hostilities, the exchange and liberation of prisoners within the framework of a general amnesty, giving the armed groups the possibility to develop its political activity and with its members integrated into the Armed Forces within three months. The coalition of groups established in June, called the National Movement, is made up of three armed groups, the UFDD–Renovado (led by Issa Moussa Tamboulet), the MNR (led by Mahamat Ahmat Hamid) and the FSR, led by Ahmat Hasaballah Soubiane, who is also leader of the coalition. A coalition of groups led by Timane Erdimi, named UFR which includes eight armed groups, rejected the accord on the grounds that it was exclusive and called for a new, inclusive negotiating round.

In the **Central African Republic** the first meeting of the implementation monitoring committee (set up after the fourth meeting of the committee for the supervision of the global accord reached in Libreville, the Gabon capital, in June 2008) was held on February. The implementation monitoring committee (*comité de pilotage*), presided over by the UN, is made up of 15 members, of which the delegate from the armed group APRD, representing the country's insurgents, and the delegate from the Government were named respectively first and second vice-presidents. At the end of February, however, the armed opposition group FDPC, led by Abdoulaye Miskine, launched an attack on Batongofo, 500 km north of Bangui. The leader of the FDCP confirmed that 400 ex-combatants, who

hadn't been under the DDR program, had taken up arms again. For their part, on February 16 the leaders of FDCP and the MLCJ leader, Abakar Sabone, signed a joint communiqué threatening to restart the war. The two movements were equally critical of the appointment of Jean Jacques Demafouth (leader of the armed group APRD) as vice-president of the DDR monitoring committee, a nomination that was established in the Libreville accords without their approval.

In spite of these *contretemps*, in March the UN considered the December 2008 peace talks as a window of opportunity for the consolidation of peace in the country. For this reason various committees were set up in the areas of governance and policy; security and armed groups; and socio-economic issues. At the same time several agreements were reached, among them the establishment of an Government of national unity or the holding of elections in 2009 or 2010. In early April, the leader of the APRD, Jean-Jacques Demafouth, offered himself as a mediator between the Government and the existing armed groups. The APRD signed a peace agreement with the Executive at the end of 2008. In early June, the leader of the armed group MLCJ, and former co-founder of the UFDR, Abakar Sabone, returned to Bangui. Sabone, who had been in exile for four years, joined the peace process in December 2008. Sabone announced that he had reached an agreement with the Government and confirmed that he was ready to disarm his combatants. In mid-June, however, there were confrontations between the Army and the armed group CPJP. At the beginning of July the armed group **FDPC, led by Abdoulaye Miskine, signed a peace agreement with the Government within the framework of an EU summit held in Sirte (Libya)**. The rebel leader, exiled in Libya, had still not signed the global peace agreement established in June 2008 under the auspices of Gabon. The Government announced the beginning of a program of disarmament for the APRD that would be in place over a period of three years and which would affect 6,000 combatants in 14 of the country's districts.

Regarding the situation in the east of the **DR Congo**, significant divisions emerged at the core of the Congolese Tutsi rebellion CNDP with the announcement by the military leader (Chief of Staff) of the rebellion, Bosco Ntaganda, of the expulsion from the leadership of General Laurent Nkunda, on grounds of bad governance. A few days later, Laurent Nkunda was arrested during a joint military operation between Rwandan and Congolese forces. Furthermore, the faction of the armed Tutsi opposition group CNDP led by general Bosco Ntaganda, alias "Terminator", and 10 other rebel leaders who only days earlier had confirmed that they had deposed General Laurent Nkunda, on January 16 announced an end to hostilities against the Congolese Armed Forces. **After the Government and the armed Congolese opposition group CNDP signed a peace agreement on March 23,** which proposed among other things, that the CNDP become a political party, in early April the mediator in the conflict and ex-Nigerian president, Olesegun Obasanjo, and the ex-Tanzanian president and special envoy of the AU, Benjamin Mpaka, urged the country's leaders to guarantee the full implementation of the regional peace accords.

The presidents of Rwanda and DR Congo met to restore diplomatic relations

During the third quarter there was no advance in dealing with the armed opposition group FDLR, whose activities and those of the Congolese Armed Forces led to the displacement of 400,000 people in the first three months of the year. On a positive note, the presidents of Rwanda and the DR Congo met in Goma to restore their diplomatic ties, a meeting described by Joseph Kabila as a great step forward. It was the first official meeting between the leaders of Rwanda and the DR Congo of the decade. The leaders agreed on the joint planning of their economic activities and the re-activation of the Permanent Joint Commission on RDC-Rwanda that had lain dormant for the past 21 years. For Paul Kagame this meeting symbolized friendship, stability and good relations between DR Congo and Rwanda. However one of the points of disagreement between both leaders was Rwanda's refusal to extradite the leader of the CNDP Tutsi militia, Laurent Nkunda, because it was assumed that he would face the death penalty in DR Congo.

In **Uganda** attempts to open up a process with the armed opposition group LRA were broken off in the first quarter, after the group launched a major offensive, carrying out massacres of the civilian population, looting and destroying houses. As a sign of the **progressive disintegration of the group**, at the end of January it was confirmed that **the vice-commander of the group, Okot Odhiambo, surrendered** after he after he contacted the IOM to announce his desertion. In mid-June, the Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, confirmed that the LRA leader, Joseph Kony, was once again sending out messages indicating his willingness to reach a peace agreement and asking for a ceasefire. At the end of July, various religious, political and community leaders in the north of Uganda, among them the Archbishop of the diocese of Gulu, John Baptist Odama, called into question the recommendations made by the former special envoy of the UN secretary-general for the conflict in the north of Uganda, Joaquim Chissano, who put forward the necessity of using military methods at the same time as peace initiatives in order to force the LRA to accept peace negotiations. In mid August, David Matsanga, the LRA's representative during the peace negotiations with the Ugandan Government in Juba, announced that he was resigning from his post in order to present his candidacy at the presidential elections in 2011. Matsanga's credibility had been called into question after he said on repeated occasions that the leader of the armed group, Joseph Kony, was ready to sign the agreements. A few days later Justine Labeja, the new spokesperson for the LRA's peace negotiations, asked that various points of the draft agreement which was expected to be signed in Kampala at the end of April 2008 be revised in regard to the provisions over the future of their leader, Joseph Kony, regarding the request for his arrest by the International Criminal Court, as well as the safety and well-being of members of the LRA who have laid down their arms. Labeja said that these modifications would make it easier to persuade Kony to sign.

d) Maghreb

Regarding negotiations between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front in relation to the **Western Sahara** dispute**,** in early January, **Ban Ki-moon the UN secretary-general, appointed the diplomat Christopher Ross as his Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara**. The former US Ambassador In Syria and Algeria, who visited the area for the first time in February and said he backed a solution to the conflict that took into account the right to self-determination of the Saharawi people. Given that the UN secretary-general's personal envoy for the Sahara felt that conditions were not met to restart negotiations, he approved the holding of "informal discussions" between the two parties. The negotiations have been stalled since March 2008. At the end of July the **King of Morocco, Mohammed IV, announced that he was giving green light to a regional process for the Western Sahara.** The King announced the establishment of a consultative commission that would present a plan to implement advanced regionalization in the country, which hitherto has been characterized by a centralized territorial organization. Following this announcement, the process will begin for the so-called southern provinces (Western Sahara) which should become a model for the rest of Morocco. In mid August, and **after two days of informal meetings** in a hotel in Dürnstein (Austria), **Morocco and the Polisario Front agreed to resume talks on the Western Sahara, thus re-establishing contacts that have been paralyzed for the past 18 months**. The promoter behind this meeting was Christopher Ross, who emphasized that these preliminary talks had taken place in an atmosphere of serious commitment, trust and mutual respect. The dates and location for holding peace talks, which constitute the fifth round since those held in Manhaset (New York), have yet to be set. In mid-September, however, this rapprochement suffered a setback when the UN High Commissioner for the Refugees, Antonio Guterres, reduced by half the estimated number of Saharawi refugees in camps in Tindouf, in the southeast of Algeria, compared to the figure put forward by the POLISARIO Front. The movement, which stands for the independence of the Western Sahara, had said that there were 165,000 refugees in Algerian territory. In October the Egyptian Hany Abdel-Aziz was named Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Western Sahara and head of MINURSO.

Latin America

Regarding Colombia, at the beginning of the year the High Commissioner for Peace, Luis Carlos Restrepo, presented his irrevocable resignation and was substituted by Frank Pearl who until that moment had been assuming the functions of a High Council for Reintegration. In mid-February, the US ambassador in Bogotá, William Brownfield, caused surprise when he said that his Government was willing to listen to proposals that would contribute to finding a solution to the Colombian conflict and to studying the legal position of FARC prisoners held in US jails. At the end of February Democrat Party sources in the U.S. Congress revealed that the financing of the Plan Colombia in 2009 would amount to $545 million, but that its internal distribution would change, giving greater priority to supporting social programs for the reinsertion of ex-combatants. Furthermore the new text of Plan Colombia increase the conditionality of aid asking the State Department to regularly inform Congress about the state of human rights in Colombia and the demobilization of paramilitary networks,

with assurances that the Government was cutting its links with them. In early September, president Álvaro Uribe received the support of a majority in Parliament for his project for a referendum on his possible re-election for third term. The Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez, proposed during the UNASUR Summit in Bariloche, the creation of a regional group to develop a peace initiative for Colombia. This proposal was seconded by the Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa. It should also be pointed out that in the most recent report by the Prosecutor's Unit For Justice and Peace says that the paramilitaries had admitted killing 21,000 people over the past 22 years.

Regarding **FARC**, in early February Alfonso Cano, the senior leader of the guerrilla organization, said his movement was willing to open a dialogue with the current Government, on the grounds that it gave the necessary guarantees for its spokesman, and reiterated the Bolivar platform for a new Government, contained in 11 points or demands. At the beginning of April, president Álvaro Uribe proposed that they cease armed action for a period of three or four months as a prior condition to peace talks. The Government had previously announced its new strategy for annihilating the guerrillas, which was described as a qualitative improvement in the fight against armed groups. The president had previously discounted any possibility of dialogue or negotiation for the humanitarian exchange of prisoners. The Secretariat of FARC, in a letter sent to *Colombianos y Colombianas por la Paz* (CCP) rejected president Uribe's request, insisting that any step towards peace must be bilateral. FARC later asked UNASUR and ALBA to include in their working agendas a political solution to the Colombian conflict as a matter of continuing concern for Latin American countries.

In the case of the stalled talks with the **ELN** group, in early May the Central Command of said group, in a written reply to Colombians for Peace (CCP), said that there were no issues that were subject to veto within the overall framework of a process of dialogue and negotiation and added that they were willing to talk about the matter of kidnappings, forced disappearances and political prisoners. In their letter they insisted that all sectors of society would have to take an active role when it came to drawing up the agenda for a political solution. Finally, they warned that they would not accept any type of precondition, a direct allusion to the intervention by the former High Commissioner for Peace, Luis Carlos Restrepo, who demanded a meeting of the combatants and militants of the ELN in order to bring about an end to fighting and hostilities. In early September, the ELN Central Command, in a letter to the Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa, who took over the presidency of UNASUR, requested that this regional integration body take control of the process of finding a political solution to the internal conflict in Colombia.

Asia and Pacific

a) South Asia

In **Afghanistan**, in mid-January the head of the Saudi Arabian intelligence services, Muqrin bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, met with representatives of the Afghan Government in what may be an attempt to mediate between the Taliban insurgency and the Afghan authorities. The Saudi representative met with the Afghan president Hamid Karzai and members of his cabinet, as well as with leaders of the political opposition. President Karzai insisted, however, that negotiations with the Taliban could only be established through government channels, after various reports appeared which suggested that Danish soldiers were having talks with local leaders at which Taliban representatives were also present. A few weeks later the US presidential envoy, Richard Holbrooke, said that winning the war in Afghanistan would be much harder than winning the war in Iraq and announced a change in US policy. Nevertheless, the US envoy indicated that he ruled out talks with the hard-core of the Taliban insurgency, and also said he was opposed to the agreements reached recently with the Pakistani Taliban insurgency. For his part, the US president Barak Obama said that reconciliation with the Taliban could form part of an important initiative in the armed conflict in which a US military victory was unlikely. At the end of August, General Stanley McChrystal, commander of the US and international forces deployed in the country, highlighted the need for a new military strategy in the country, pointing to the failure of the current strategy. McChrystal described the situation in Afghanistan as serious and said that the priority must be the protection of the civilian population and not the struggle against the Taliban insurgency. In mid-October, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, confirmed that the Government was studying the possibility of negotiating with the Taliban, as part of a new strategy. Shortly afterwards, Hamid Karzai was named winner of the presidential elections by the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) after his rival Abdullah Abdullah withdrew from the second round. Abdullah alleged that the CEI, which he accused of fraud in the first round, remains intact, thus annulling guarantees that the second round would be free from fraud.

In the second fortnight of November, the US special representative for Afghanistan, Richard Holbrooke, confirmed that **Saudi Arabia had initiated a process of dialogue with the Taliban and said that the US would support any Saudi initiative**. According to the Saudi press, the US ambassador for Afghanistan, General Karl Eikenberry, had held talks with the former Taliban foreign minister, Mulla Mutawakil, in Kabul. Eikenberry had offered to recognize the Taliban government in various provinces –Helmand, Kandahar, Arakzan, Kunar and Nuristan– in exchange for the Taliban ending its attacks on the US Armed Forces in the country. Mutawakil was to take this proposal to Mullah Omar. Pakistan and the United Kingdom were also involved in talks with the Taliban although at the moment they had been carried out through Taliban intermediate rank militants and not the leadership.

Regarding the various armed conflicts confronting India, at the end of the year the interior minister **P. Chidambaram confirmed that he was willing to begin negotiations with the Maoist insurgency,** insisting that they weren't terrorists and that among their demands there were important issues concerning the lack of development of the country. Chidambaram said they would not be asked

to hand in their weapons, only that they should abandon violence. He also said that the governments in the states whit a Naxalite presence would be present in the talks. The Naxalite insurgency is present in more than 20 states. In the states of **Assam**, at the beginning of January, Alpha and Charlie Battalion 28º of the ULFA, which had announced a unilateral ceasefire in June, set up a new organization called **ULFA Pro-talks** led by Mrinal Hazarika. Furthermore they announced that they were renouncing their demand for sovereignty and independence and would work to achieve greater autonomy for Assam.

However, this faction indicated that the insistence by the Government that they should lay down their arms as a necessary condition to continue peace talks was unacceptable and threatened to resume armed activity if talks did not begin. In spite of that, the Government initially announced that it would step up its operations against the armed group, ruling out any rapprochement for the time being. A few days later, the Government announced tougher conditions for the armed groups committed to the ceasefire, which should designate areas for the cantonment of their militants. As for talks with the pro-talks faction **NDFB,** in early January the Government announced a **six-month extension to the ceasefire agreement**. However, that Government said that the agreement would be suspended immediately if there were any violations of the cease-fire. In May the NDFB asked the Supreme Court in Guwahati to lift the ban on the organization, given that it had accepted the Indian Constitution. The secretary-general of the group, Gobinda Basumary, presented the request to the high tribunal and pointed out that the group had been maintaining a ceasefire since May 2005 and that its members lived in designated cantonment camps. On the other hand, the ceasefire agreement with the armed opposition group DHD(N) was also extended for another year after talks between representatives of central and regional Government and the insurgent group. The DHD(N) said it was pleased with the outcome of the meeting.

In mid-September **the armed opposition group DHD-J, also known as Black Widow, began a process of surrender and handing in its weapons** after the Government gave them an ultimatum to surrender by September 15 under threat of a large-scale military operation. The 350 members of the armed group would be moved to cantonment centres. Talks began in August, after which the Government rejected the armed group's ceasefire proposal and insisted that they hand in their arms. In the second fortnight of November, **the Government set out a limit of one year to reach agreements with armed groups with whom it had agreed ceasefires**: DHD(J), UPDS and NDFB (pro-talks faction). The Government's designated negotiator, P.C. Haldar, carried out negotiations with the three groups. The Government indicated that it did not want to repeat the same mistakes as in previous situations where the negotiations dragged on for several years. The three organizations presented documents setting out their demands.

In the state of **Nagaland**, in mid-January the leader of the NSCN-IM, Isaac Chisi Swu, stated that he was committed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. In early June, the **armed opposition group NSCN-K confirmed**

that it was ready to begin formal peace negotiations with the Indian Government, eight years after reaching a ceasefire agreement with Delhi. The NSCN-K said it would set no preconditions for talks and said that questions such as sovereignty could be discussed at the negotiating table, but not in such a way that they would become an obstacle for the negotiations as a whole. In mid-June the **Forum for Naga Reconciliation announced the signing of an accord between the various parts of the Naga insurgency.** The document was signed by the leaders of the main armed Naga opposition groups: NSCN-IM, the Federal Government of Nagaland (created in 1956 by the first Naga insurgent organization, NSCN-K) and the GPRN/NSCN (established by the NSCN-K). The central Government asked the NSCN-IM group to analyse the Indian Constitution in detail and suggest possible amendments that could contribute towards resolving the Naga conflict. **The NSCN-IM stated it does not accept that the Indian Constitution could be the basis for a solution to the Naga dispute, as the Government had suggested indicating that an agreement was reached on autonomy within the framework of a Magna Carta.** The armed group denied government claims that there had been any bilateral discussion about an autonomy formula. In mid-September, the NSCN-IM indicated that the peace deal offered by the Indian Government to the different Naga insurgent organizations was in contradiction to the bilateral agreements already reached, in which the NSCN-IM was the only insurgent organization with a mandate to negotiate with the Government. This measure contradicted the accord reached by the Indian Government and the group in Paris in 1995, and in their opinion was designed purely to create division among the Nagas. In 1995 it was agreed that bilateral peace negotiations would be at the ministerial level, held outside of Indian territory and without preconditions by any party.

In the context of the conflict between **India and Pakistan over Kashmir**, in mid-February the Pakistani police arrested the leader of the armed opposition group Hizbul Mujahideen, Muzaffar Ahmad Dar, commander in chief of the armed group's operations. In mid-June, the separatist organization JKLF held a meeting between Indian and Pakistani leaders and emphasized that the situation could only be resolved through dialogue. In mid-July, India repeated on numerous occasions that the resumption of talks was conditional on the advances that Pakistan made in detaining and prosecuting those responsible for the attacks in Mumbai. On the other hand, both countries agreed to resume their bilateral trade, also suspended after the attacks. In early August, however, Pakistani government sources said that India's launching of the nuclear submarine "Arihant" amounted to a threat to regional peace and stability, as well as to the advances in the peace process between the two countries, two weeks after both had agreed to resume peace talks. At the beginning of October, **India rejected the Organization of the Islamic Conference's (OIC) appointment of a special envoy for Kashmir**, saying that they could not interfere in India's internal affairs. Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, the leader of the coalition of moderate separatist parties APHC, said that a peace delegation would be dispatched to Delhi and Islamabad in order to reduce tensions between both countries and to restart dialogue. In early November, the central Govern-

ment announced that it was preparing a set of political measures for the autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir that could be put in place over the next two years. These measures were the result of the working groups set up in 2006 and deal with the relations between the state and central Government, confidence-building measures, strengthening of relations across the Line of Control (the *de facto* frontier between India and Pakistan), economic development and the governance of the state. During the second fortnight of November the leaders of the APHC, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Abdul Gani Bhat and Bilal Lone, met at close door for the second time with the Minister of the Interior, Palaniappan Chidambaram. Chidambaram did not make any statement regarding this meeting but previously had said that a process of "silent diplomacy" had been initiated. Nevertheless, other sectors of the APHC, especially the one led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani, opposed negotiations with Delhi, insisting that these talks should be tripartite and involve Pakistan's participation.

In **Nepal, the Government reached a five-point agreement with the armed opposition group Liberation Tigers of Terai Eelam** after negotiations held in Birgunj. This accord established that the safety of the group's members would be guaranteed by the Government as long as talks continued, while the armed group committed itself to not carrying out any armed activity during the period of dialogue. In March there were confrontations between police and demonstrators in the Chitwan area during a protest organized by the Tharu community. Nevertheless, having reached an agreement with the Government, the general strike was called off. Under the agreement, the Tharu population would not be classified in the same category as the Madhesi, which would deprive them of specific quotas in government positions. This was the group's main demand. Furthermore, they accuse the Maoist government of having broken a promise to guarantee greater autonomy. In early May the Tharu organization TJSC called off a two-week strike after having opened a dialogue with the Minister for Peace and Reconciliation. The main demands of the Tharu organizations relate to their recognition as an ethnic group and better representation at an institutional level. In early July, the recently appointed Minister for Peace and Reconstruction, Rakam Chemjong, denied that he was going to have peace talks with all the Mahhesi organizations, saying that the majority were not political groups and were involved in criminal activities. Chemjong insisted that those organizations that had carried out extortion, kidnapping and murder were not political groups. At the end of the same month, and coinciding with the government's decision to launch a new security strategy in the country, **four armed groups that were operating in the Terai region announced a coalition of forces.** The leaders of Madhesi Mukti Tigers, Madhesi Virus Killers, Terai Samyukta Janakranti Party Nepal and Rajan Mukti faction of the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha held a joint press conference at which they announced their willingness to coordinate their stances and strategies. The government had already held a preliminary round of talks with these groups. The groups accused the Government of not implementing the accords reached, of not acting in a serious manner in relation to peace talks and demanded a second round of talks with the Terai groups.

Regarding the various conflicts and talks taking place in different parts of Pakistan, it should be noted that at the beginning of January in the **Baluchistan** region, the armed opposition groups BLA, BRA and BLF announced an end to the ceasefire unilaterally decreed four months earlier. A spokesman for the BLA said that the ceasefire had been declared in order to obtain a response from the Government, but the continuing military operations meant that they had to resume the armed actions. In mid-March, furthermore, the US Government was considering expanding its military operations in Pakistan and attacking Taliban bases in Baluchistan, the base of the top Taliban leaders. In mid-September, the president, Asif Ali Zardari, and the prime minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, accepted the recommendations made by the PPP party's Committee on Baluchistan. Therefore the Government announced the withdrawal of charges against the Baluchi political leaders and the approval of a general amnesty for political prisoners. President Zardari indicated that it was necessary to create an atmosphere that would allow the displaced and exiled population to return and would put in place measures to deal with the suffering experienced by the population over decades. In the second fortnight of November, the Government presented the Senate and the National Assembly a plan for Baluchistan which put forward constitutional reforms that would increase the province's autonomy. Furthermore, the plan included a long list of measures designed to promote political dialogue with all parties in the province. The Baluchi parliamentarians and Pashtuns of all political parties, including the ruling party, rejected the proposal saying that it was clearly inadequate and underscoring that it made no sense without a significant extension of the province's autonomy.

In the case of **Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province**, in mid-February the Government signed an accord with the Taliban group Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, led by Maulana Fazlullah, and a member of the Taliban coalition Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in which the Government agreed to the imposition of Sharia law in the Malakand region, which includes the Swat Valley. The US Government showed its concerned about the agreement reached in Swat, saying that it amounted to a rendition in the face of Taliban insurgency. For their part, the Taliban reiterated that they would not hand in their arms in Swat as part of the agreement because to do so would go against Islam. The Taliban announced they would extend their struggle to other parts of the country until they achieved their objectives. In early May, however, Pakistan security forces intensified the military operation against the Taliban insurgency in the area especially in the districts of Swat, Malakand and Dir. The intensification of the military operation began shortly after the prime minister speaking to the Armed Forces on May 7 said that the Government's goodwill that had led to them signing a peace agreement with the Taliban insurgency and accepting the imposition of Sharia in specific areas had been misinterpreted. In mid-June there were serious clashes between the security forces and Taliban insurgents. The Armed Forces began an offensive in South Waziristan against areas controlled by the Taliban insurgency loyal to commander Baitullah Mehsud. **Thus all the partial accords reached were broken**. In early July, the Minister of Information confirmed that military op-

erations in Swat and Bunner had been completed, and that the security situation in both areas allowed for the return of the displaced population to their places of origin. In mid-August, the main spokesman for the armed group TTP, Maul Umar, captured by the security forces, confirmed the death of Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the TTP, as a result of a US missile attack at the beginning of the month. In the second half of November, Maulana Fazlullah, the Taliban leader, whom the Armed Forces claimed to have killed in July, reappeared after several months and fled to Afghanistan. Fazlullah said that its group would soon be launching new large-scale attacks against the security forces in Swat.

In **Sri Lanka**, the Armed Forces said in February that there was no possibility of a negotiated surrender with the LTTE and said that their rendition would have to be unconditional. In early April the Government confirmed that it had captured all of the territory under the LTTE's control, and said the conflict was nearly over. The Sri Lankan Government asked Norway to abandon its role of facilitator, after its embassy in that country suffered an attack attributed by the Singhalese Executive to the LTTE. At the same time, the Government rejected straight the LTTE's declaration of a ceasefire on April 26, saying the group must surrender or accept its destruction. At the end of May, **president Mahinda Rajapakse declared the end of the armed conflict after 26 years of confrontation a day after it was announced that the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was dead.** The armed group recognized the death of their leader for the first time, and said it was willing to initiate a democratic process to defend the rights of the Tamil population. Nevertheless, president Mahinda Rajapakse said this possibility was not being considered. In mid-June, the LTTE announced the establishment of a provisional government of transition in order to achieve self-determination for the Tamil people, and that a committee led by the exiled Tamil lawyer Rudrakumar Viswanathan would lead the process. In mid-September, however, exiled political LTTE activists announced that they were forming a government in exile, after the leader of the group, Selvarasa Pathmanathan, was arrested. The new Government will be based in the various countries where the Tamil diaspora lives in exile. The LTTE announced that it would be holding elections next April.

The Sri Lankan president announced the end of the armed conflict after the defeat of the Tamil armed group LTTE

b) East Asia

In early March, the **Chinese prime minister expressed his government's willingness to start talks with Taiwan over political and military issues with the aim of reaching a peace agreement between the two parties.** For its part, the Taiwan Government expressed its desire to deal with economic relations first before dealing with political issues. In the second half of April, China and Taiwan, in a new step towards improving their relations, reached an agreement that would allow investment across the Taiwan Strait. This is the third agreement between the opposing parties since the new Taiwan Government came to power. The communiqué also stated that both parties have a unique and historic opportunity to promote China's economic investment in Taiwan. The

Taiwan economy entered into recession last year. In the second half of October, it was announced that China and Taiwan would have permanent representatives in each other's territory, a measure that marked another step in the process of relaxing relations initiated after the Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou came to power last year. According to government sources in Taipei quoted in the press, the decision to establish permanent representatives arose out of the significant increase in tourists in both directions.

Regarding the conflict in **Tibet**, at the end of February, and coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the region's occupation, the **Chinese Government published a report in which it said it would not grant independence nor high levels of autonomy to Tibet**, and accused the Dalai Lama of feeding regional instability. At the end of May, a representative of the Dalai Lama, Kelsang Gyaltsen, said that the Tibetan Government in exile was ready to restart talks with the Chinese Government, which ended in October 2008. Kelsang Gyaltsen reiterated that their principal demand, autonomy and not secession, was fully consistent with the Chinese Constitution. Furthermore he said that meeting between groups of Tibetans and Chinese people were being organized to improve communications and understanding between both parties. Between 2002 and 2008 nine rounds of negotiations between Chinese officials and representatives of the Dalai Lama had been held.

c) Southeast Asia

En **Philippines**, a mediados de enero el ex director de la In the **Philippines**, in mid-January the former police chief and until then deputy general director of the National Security Council, Avelino Razon, was appointed as the new presidential peace advisor replacing Hermogenes Esperon, who was named chief of Presidential Management Staff. At the end of the year, Razon was replaced by A.T. Abaya. Regarding negotiations with **MILF**, early in the year, Rafael Seguis, the head of the Government's negotiating panel with this group, announced that his team would soon be visiting Kuala Lumpur to discuss with the Malaysian Government, which has facilitated talks in recent years, the resumption of the negotiating process. MILF welcomed the government negotiating panel's visit to Malaysia, but at the same time reiterated its refusal to resume talks until the Government ended its military offensive against the group in various parts of Mindanao. In February, Razon said that the government would work on the development of several confidence-building measures, and said it was willing to revise the nature and structure of the process of facilitation in order to improve it. The Government carried out consultations with various international experts, including a British delegation which took part in the peace negotiations in Northern Ireland. A team from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue also met with MILF leaders with the aim of unblocking the process.

In June, the Government announced its intention to sign a peace agreement with MILF before the end of the presidential mandate of president Gloria Macapagal Ar-

royo in 2010, and offered to resume peace talks if an agreement on the cessation of hostilities could first be reached, supervised by the International Monitoring Team. Furthermore, the Government asked for the participation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in the resolution of the conflict because they believed it would be difficult to arrive at a definitive agreement through bilateral negotiations. In June, after the invitation of the British Government, a MILF delegation visited Northern Ireland to learn about the experience of the peace process there. Shortly afterwards, president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ordered the suspension of the military offensive against MILF in Mindanao, in a new attempt to reopen peace negotiations. The group reciprocated and stopped attacks against military positions in the south. In mid-September, the **Government and MILF signed in Kuala Lumpur a framework agreement over the establishment of an international group to support the negotiating process.** At the end of October, the Philippines Government and MILF signed an agreement over the protection of civilians, reached under the auspices of the Malaysian Government and drawn up in Kuala Lumpur. The deal commits both parties to taking the necessary measures to avoid the death of civilians or the impact on them or their infrastructure or their personal goods, as well as facilitating the provision of humanitarian aid and assistance. The Government and MILF also agreed to extend the mandate of the International Monitoring Team, which from now will be responsible for the supervision, verification and notification of both parties' compliance regarding the protection of civilians. In the second half of November, they met in Malaysia, under the facilitation of Datuk Othman Bin Abdul Razak, the Government's and MILF's negotiating panels, as well as representatives of the governments and the NGOs that comprise the International Contact Group (Humanitarian Dialogue Centre, Conciliation Resources, Mohammedia and the Asia Foundation), reaffirming the willingness of both parties to sign a peace agreement.

In regard to talks with the **MNLF** group, in early February the Government approved an Executive Order to amend the Organic Law that created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In March, the **MNLF announced that it had begun talks with the MILF to find common ground and look for a common solution for the conflict in Mindanao**. Nevertheless, in early May, some 10,000 people were forced to abandon their homes because of fighting between the MILF and MNLF in the provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat. Some sources said that the confrontations were caused by the phenomenon known as "rido" and because of the rivalry between the groups' leaders. The secretary-general of the OIC urged the Philippine government to fully implement the peace agreement signed with the MNLF in 1996. In recent months the OIC had helped to bring about several working meetings between representatives of the Government and the MNLF to develop the content of said accord. In August, the founder of the MNLF, Nur Misuari, accused the Armed Forces of having carried out a massacre. Manila insisted that this incident would not affect the negotiating process with the MNLF over revising and fully implementing the 1996 peace accord. Re-

garding the rapprochement between the armed group **NPA** and its political arm the NDF, at the end of February the presidential adviser on the peace process, Avelino Razon, announced that within one or two months it would be possible to renew informal contacts with the NDF with the objective of returning to formal peace talks, interrupted in 2004. According to Razon, the Government would consider the bulk of the 13 conditions laid down by the NDF in order to renew peace talks, even if they had not declared a ceasefire. For its part, the **NDF said it was willing to restart peace talks at the point at which they had stalled in 2004** if the Government accepted some of its demands. The Government and the NDF (political arm of the NPA) announced its intention of reopening official peace negotiations in August in Oslo (Norway). This announcement was made after informal meetings between both parties facilitated by Norway, in which the NDF committed itself to not insisting that it would be removed from the EU and US list of terrorist organizations as a precondition for dialogue. During the announcement, the Government said its negotiating panel was in constant contact with Jose María Sison, leader and founder of the communist movement, and Luis Jalandoni, chief negotiator for the NDF. In mid-July, Luis Jalandoni arrived in Manila to prepare for the restart of peace talks with the Government. The revived dialogue was agreed after the Government offered guarantees of safety and immunity to the NDF negotiating team, backtracked on the the insistence of them signing a long-term agreement on the cessation of hostilities and committed themselves to asking that the Justice Department free the three NDF negotiators.

The Philippines government and the MILF agreed the establishment of an international group to assist in the negotiating process

At the end of July, the NDF agreed to include the disarming of the NPA in the agenda of the peace talks that were to resume in Norway. However, the talks were temporarily postponed over a disagreement concerning the freeing of 14 NPA members. On the other hand, the government criticized the NPA for imposing preconditions on resuming the dialogue, as well as for attacks apparently carried out by the NPA in various parts of the country. In mid-September, however, the NDF ordered the armed opposition group NPA to increase its attacks on US troops deployed in Mindanao. This announcement came a few days after the announcement by the Philippine government and the US that they intended to increase cooperation in counterinsurgency operations, especially against the armed opposition group Abu Sayyaf. The government announced its willingness to continue with exploratory peace talks with the NDF, but at the same time said it would abandon efforts to arrive at a peace agreement with the NPA if the NDF continued sabotaging the peace process. These statements were made after contact between both parties was broken off over the demand by the NDF that 10 of its imprisoned leaders be freed. The Government only released two of them, accusing the NDF of trying to obtain at the negotiating table what they couldn't get in the courts. Furthermore, Manila accused the NDF of not wanting to deal with questions of disarmament or cessation of hostilities and that it was the prisoner of the opinions and strategies of Benito and Wilma Tiamzon who, according to the government, were the real leaders of the commu-

nist movement, which, if true, would point to a significant split within the group.

Regarding the conflict in the Indonesian region of **Western Papua**, in the second half of April the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, said that the Indonesian Government must give the province of Papua more autonomy and planned to raise the subject with her Indonesian opposite numbers. For its part, the Indonesian Government ordered the expulsion of ICRC from the Papua region after this organization visited some members of secessionist groups. In mid October, the West Papua National Liberation Coalition (**WPNLC), an umbrella group of some 30 organizations, said that it wanted to have direct negotiations with the government to try to find a solution to the conflict.** According to the WPNLC, these talks would need a third party in the role of facilitator, which could be a Government or an international NGO and could use as its model the negotiations with the armed opposition group GAM that was operating in Aceh province. The leaders of this organization said they had not received a reply to the letters they had sent to president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2007 and 2008 requesting dialogue. Recently, a group of Papuans, led by the spokesman for the West Papua Legislative Council, asked the acting vice-president, Yusuf Kalla, to mediate in eventual talks.

In the case of the different armed groups operating in Myanmar, the faction KNU/KNLA Peace Council, a KNU splinter group, reached an agreement with the Military Junta under which members of this armed group could work as frontier guards in the Three Pagodas pass, on the frontier with Thailand. The armed opposition group KNU agreed to have a meeting with government representatives to discuss the possibility of arriving at a cease-fire agreement, after representatives of the armed organization met with the Thai foreign minister. The Government of Myanmar is especially interested in reaching an agreement so that the KNU will stand in the elections called for 2010, which would increase the legitimacy of these elections, until now rejected by the opposition. **The Military Junta is negotiating with those armed opposition groups with which it has maintained a ceasefire proposal through which they would join the frontier security forces but would lose their organizational autonomy**. The insurgents would come under the mandate of the Armed Forces. Among those with whom this proposal is being discussed were UWSA, KIA, MNDAA and NDAA. The proposal would be implemented after the elections anticipated in 2010. In early June, the armed opposition group KNU called on international bodies to put pressure on the Myanmar Government to hold three-way talks over the ethnic and political conflicts in the country. On the other hand, a minority faction of the armed opposition group Karenni KN-PLF said it would become a frontier force with the agreement of the Burmese military regime. The KNPLF, which itself split off from the KNPP in 1978, has maintained a ceasefire since 1994 and since then has operated as a militia for the Armed Forces. Nevertheless, the majority of the armed group did not accept this agreement. In November, the government rejected the establishment of a Wa autonomous state, demanded by the armed group UWSA. The 2008 Constitution recognizes the existence of an "autonomous administrative Wa di-

vision", limiting it to ethnic autonomy. The armed group UWSA agreed to become a frontier security force, but not under the orders of the Armed Forces.

The Kachin NDA-K group did accept this demand and became one of the first to become a frontier force. As for relations between the Military Junta and the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, in early February, the UN secretary-general's envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, completed his visit to the country without having met the head of the Military Junta, general Than Swe, but he did meet Aung San Suu Kyi, and also the prime minister, general Thein Sein. Meanwhile, the new US administration of president Barack Obama may not be opposed to holding direct talks with the Military Juta, according to State Department sources. The deputy secretary of state pointed to the possibility of creating a format analogous to that used in talks with North Korea, using a six-way dialogue in which ASEAN, Japan, China and India would also take part. In early July the Military Junta prevented the UN secretary-general from meeting with the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi during a visit to the country. However, US Representatives from the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton's delegation met representatives of the Military Junta in Phuket (Thailand), during the holding of the Asian forum. The US asked Myanmar to free some 2,100 political prisoners, including the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and offered Myanmar financial investment in the country in exchange for the release of the opposition leader. In early October, Aung San Suu Kyi met various Western diplomats –from Australia, Great Britain and the United States– to discuss the question of economic sanctions on the country. Aung San Suu Kyi asked the diplomats to clarify the objective of these sanctions, as well as their consequences. After meeting the leader, the representatives met with various members of Aung San Suu Kyi's party, the NLD. These meetings took place after Aung San Suu Kyi had asked the leader of the Military Junta, general Than Shwe, to meet with the diplomats to discuss a possible end to sanctions. For their part, **US Representatives emphasized the willingness to improve relations with the Military Junta if it took concrete steps towards democracy**. In the second half of November, the US Government said it was hoping to see the beginning of a process of dialogue between the Military Junta and the leader of the opposition Aung San Suu Kyi, after which the party that she leads, the NLD, published a letter that Aung San Suu Kyi had sent to the leader of the Junta, general Than Shwe, expressing a willingness to collaborate with the Government to put an end to sanctions. In December, Aung San Suu Kyi was allowed to meet with members of her party.

Regarding the ongoing conflict in the south of **Thailand**, the new Government announced its intention to create a new administrative structure to face up to the principal problems in the south of the country. This body would count on the participation of various sectors of civil society and of different political colorations. The deputy prime minister, Suthep Thaugsuban, will coordinate the setting up of the organization which was viewed as a priority on the new Executive's agenda. At the end of May, the deputy prime minister, Suthep Thaugsuban, said that there were between 4,000 and 5,000 active insurgents in the south of Thailand and that a solution

to the conflict would not be found solely through military or political means, but by increasing development and improving the quality of life of the southern provinces. Meanwhile, the head of the Armed Forces ruled out starting talks with the armed groups and at the same time reaffirmed **the focus of the Government for managing the conflict, which consisted in promoting the development of the region in economic, social, cultural and educational terms.** After serious confrontations in recent months, a visit by UN representatives and representatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to see at first hand the situation in the south of the country provoked the Government into rejecting any intervention by either organization in the resolution of the conflict, as local media have suggested.

In a different field, in early February, and after a visit by the Thai foreign minister to Cambodia, both countries agreed to resolve by peaceful means their territorial dispute, which last year provoked various confrontations between the Armed Forces of both countries. Both bodies agreed that the Joint Frontier Committee of Cambodia and Thailand would meet in Thailand between the second and fourth of February and that the Cambodian prime minister, Hun Sen, would visit the neighbouring country with a view to the ASEAN summit which will be held shortly afterwards in Thailand. Among the points on the agenda were the exchange of prisoners and the deployment of troops along their common frontier.

Europe

a) Southeast Europe

In **Cyprus**, after a meeting on January 5, the UN secretary-general's special representative in Cyprus, Tayé-Brook Zerihoun, said that leaders of the two communities had arrived at an **agreement on harmonization and cooperation between the Federal Government and the constituent states**, and that they were close to an agreement on the rules of conduct. In the second half of April, the election of a new conservative and nationalist Government in elections held on April 19 in the Turkish-Cypriot third of the island, raised fears in the Greek-Cypriot political world of a hardening of negotiating positions. The victorious party, the Party of National Unity (UBP), which won 26 of the 50 parliamentary seats, announced that it was not opposed to the idea of a federal solution, but that it had another way of defining federalism. The UBP sought the recognition of the existence of two states and said it would support a solution based on the idea of the existence of two peoples, two states and two democracies. In mid-August, the Greek-Cypriot president, Demetris Christofias, and the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, completed the first phase of direct negotiations for the resolution of the conflict on the island. This first phase included 40 meetings, described as positive by both parties as well as by the United Nations, which facilitated the process. The second phase of direct talks began in September, including discussions under the six headings: government and power sharing, questions related to the EU, security guarantees, territory, property and economic affairs and the drawing up of issues agreed upon and those still in dispute. In mid-October, the Greek-Cypriot

and Turkish-Cypriot Governments cancelled their respective annual military exercises with the aim of creating a climate of trust and avoiding tensions during the negotiating process. In the second half of November, Greece and the Greek-Cypriot Government rejected Turkey's proposal to organize multilateral negotiations which would include both Cypriot communities, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, asserting that the current negotiation under UN mediation was the only legitimate forum in which to arrive at an agreement.

With regard to **Kosovo**, in mid January the **Kosovo Security Forces (KSF in its English initials) came into operation**, a body that was taking over from the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC in its English initials). The setting up of the KSF was laid out in the Ahtisaari plan. According to NATO, which will train and supervise it, the KSF is not so much an army as a lightly armed force. In the second half of April, the Kosovo president, Fatmir Sedjiu, confirmed that he had asked the UN to end its mission in the country, as he considered that its presence was not any longer necessary a year after the declaration of independence. In mid-June, NATO defence ministers agreed to reduce the number of peacekeeping troops in Kosovo from 14,000 to 10,000 over the next few months. The meeting also considered the possibility of reducing the total number to 2500 over a longer term if the security situation in Kosovo remained stable and was improving.

In mid-September the **EU EULEX mission and the Serbian Police (MUP) agreed a protocol of cooperation.** In spite of initially rejecting it, the Kosovo Government eventually accepted the signing of this agreement, saying that it did not imply any threat to the sovereignty or the territorial integrity of Kosovo. In spite of this, various Kosovo sectors maintain their opposition to the agreement, which will include the exchange of information about organized crime and better control of the frontier between Kosovo and Serbia.

In the case of the dispute between **Moldova** and the **Transdniestria** region, in mid-February the separatist leader Igor Smirnov said that the 5+2 process was only an assessment framework and insisted on the necessity of a 2+1 format for dialogue with Moldova under Russian mediation. Nevertheless, Smirnov said that if they could not reach agreement on political questions, mutual interest meant that they would have to develop economic cooperation. In mid-March, **the Moldova and Transdniestria region Governments agreed that the CIS peace mission should become a new mission under the auspices of the OSCE, once an agreement had been reached about the Transdniestria conflict**. This was communicated in a joint declaration, which was also backed and signed by Russia, in the framework of a trilateral meeting in the Kremlin. In the document, the participants confirmed the relevance of the 5+2 format, agreed to create the conditions to restart as soon as possible work within this format, and confirmed that they would continue maintaining direct contact and would instruct the working groups to establish measures of trust. For its part, the EU, delivered its proposals for measures to create trust within the political, social, health, education and environmental protection fields, to the Transdniestria Government. The EU initiative was designed to

generate trust between both banks of the Dniester River. The Transdniestria foreign minister, Vladimir Yastrebchak, said it was a positive initiative and would be looked into. The object of these measures was to restart the process of dialogue with Moldova under the 5+2 format, broken off in 2006. Yastrebchak, however, suggested that there was only a slight possibility of reviving the process of dialogue. In mid-July, the president of Moldova, Vladimir Voronin, said he was in favour of restarting talks to arrive at an agreement with the Trandsniestria region and insisted that it was one of the key priorities of his Government. In mid-September, Vladimir Yastrebchak said that the internal political situation in Moldova could delay the process of resolving the conflict. The comments were made shortly after the announcement of the resignation of the Moldova president Vladimir Voronin, after eight years in power. His departure took place in the context of political uncertainty after post-electoral riots and the change of direction by the government through an alliance of opposition forces which had been victorious in recent legislative elections. One of the new Government's first measures was the dismantling of the Ministry of Reintegration. In mid-October the head of foreign affairs of the Transdniestria regime, Vladimir Yastrebchak, confirmed that the region was open to dialogue but that this could not take place in a spontaneous manner, but through a well-prepared mechanism and with guarantees from the international community. The Transdniestria leader, Igor Smirnov, was also against reviving the so-called Kozak memorandum, prepared by Russia in 2003, signed by Transdniestria and rejected by Moldova. According to Smirnov, this document –which proposed a federal solution– was now out of date and didn not correspond to the current situation. On the other hand, the new Moldova prime minister, Vlad Filat, said it was necessary to develop the relationship between both societies, promoting links between young people, teachers, doctors and sports people among others, and said that they would devise joint projects to improve living standards. In early November, delegations from both sides as well as mediators and international observers under the format 5+2, held a consultative meeting in Vienna. At the meeting, which did not constitute the resumption of substantive negotiations under the 5+2 model, the various parties were in agreement on the necessity to intensify dialogue and to study possibilities to eliminate obstacles and to revive the 5+2 negotiating process.

In the conflict between **Turkey** and **Kurdistan**, in mid-February the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan urged the Turkish authorities to open a dialogue with the Kurds, on the 10th anniversary of his detention. According to media reports, the Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani might begin talks with the PKK to negotiate a plan that would allow the PKK to lay down its arms in exchange for an amnesty for some of its members for a fixed period of time. According to the newspaper *Vatan*, the US was also working on a plan to take up the Kurdish question, which might include disarming the PKK. On April 13, the PKK announced, via the Executive Council of the KCK, a ceasefire until June 1, with the aim of helping to arrive at a negotiated settlement of the Kurdish conflict. The leader of the pro-Kurd party DTP, Ahmet Türk, met US president Barack Obama on his visit to Turkey. Outside the meeting, Türk said that

his party wanted to sit down with the Army to find a solution to the violence in the country and that there was clearly an opportunity for peace and democracy. In early May, the PKK leader Murat Karayilan also said there was an opportunity for peace and called on the Government to find a solution through dialogue that would put an end to the armed conflict. He emphasized his group's willingness to open direct dialogue with the Government or, if this wasn't possible, of a dialogue via the pro-Kurdish DTP party or through a "group of wise men". In early June, the PKK extended its ceasefire until July 15 and called for a solution through dialogue to bring about an end to the conflict. In mid-July, the PKK decided to extend for the third time a unilateral ceasefire which it described as an action designed to encourage the peaceful resolution of the conflict with the Turkish Government. In early August, in an unprecedented political meeting, the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, met for more than an hour with Ahmed Ahmed Türk, leader of the Democratic Society Party (DTP), a Kurdish nationalist grouping, with the aim of advancing towards a solution to the Kurdish conflict. This gesture was interpreted by the press as a gamble by Erdogan to open a dialogue with Turkey's Kurds. The overall leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, said before the announcement of the expected route map (expected on August 15 but ultimately delayed) that a new phase had begun, new and different and as important as the foundation of the Turkish Republic, and which amounted to completing what had begun in the 1920s. His model proposed the coexistence of the State and a democratic Kurdish nation, such that the Kurds would recognize and accept the existence of the State, while the State for its part would accept the rights of the Kurds to form a democratic nation.

Meanwhile, the Government continued developing its package of reforms to advance the resolution of the Kurdish question. The Executive referred to this initiative as the "democratization package" that would not only apply to the Kurdish population. According to sources in the Turkish newspaper *Today's Zaman*, the government's *red lines* were any change in the unitary system of Turkish government or an amnesty that would include Abdullah Öcalan, measures that it would not accept. What was involved was a package of reforms and gradual measures in the short, medium and long term. Among the long-term measures were constitutional amendments and the new definition of citizenship in the Constitution. In mid-October, Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, said from prison that the resolution of the Kurdish conflict remained blocked because the protagonists, including the PKK, didn't fully understand the essence of the problem. According to Öcalan, changing an article of the Constitution was not enough of itself to resolve the conflict. Meanwhile, the leader of the opposition party CHP, Deniz Baykal, agreed to meet with the prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to discuss, among other questions, the government initiative for the resolution of the Kurdish question. Neither leader had met since July, when the Government announced that it was preparing reforms. In the second half of November, the **Government presented Parliament with the first concrete measures in its democratic initiative for the resolution of the Kurdish question, as a continuation of the parliamentary debate that began at the beginning of No-**

vember. It involved various short-term advances in the cultural, political and social fields. Among the decisions announced by the interior minister, Besir Atalay, was the possibility of towns and areas that had been obliged to adopt Turkish names of reverting to the original names. This measure would become a reality through referendums previously agreed by the minister of the interior. According to Government estimates, some 100 places could change their names in 2010. On the other hand an independent commission would be set up to investigate violations of human rights, especially in the southeast of the country. At the same time, Turkey was expected to ratify the United Nations Convention against Torture. Also, although Turkish would continue to be Turkey's official language, obstacles to the use of Kurdish would be removed. Among them, restrictions on the amount of time given to Kurdish broadcasts would be removed and private radio and television stations would be allowed to broadcast in Kurdish, and help would be given to learn native languages, although they would not be taught in public schools. Political parties could use different languages in their campaigns. The Koran would also be translated into Kurdish. At the same time people who fled Turkey after the military coup in 1980 and who were deprived of Turkish citizenship, could have it reinstated, including people of Kurdish origin, unless they had been involved in terrorism or armed actions. There was no talk as yet about a general amnesty for members of armed groups, only about reducing prison sentences. The initiative was presented in a parliamentary session that many analysts consider historic, but which was harshly criticized by the Turkish nationalist opposition, which alleged that the AKP was co-operating with the PKK. The pro-Kurdish DTP urged the government to clarify as soon as possible what its intentions were and how it intended to implement the new measures. According to the DTP leader, Ahmet Türk, if the issues were really confronted, the guns could fall silent within three months. The Government also changed the regime of solitary confinement of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who for 10 years has been the only inmate in the prison on the Isle of Imrali. Nevertheless, Öcalan himself heavily criticized the new conditions. In mid-December, however, the Constitutional Tribunal banned the pro-Kurdish DTP party for its alleged links with the PKK, throwing into doubt the viability of the Government's plans to carry out reforms. The PKK interpreted the ban as a declaration of war.

b) Caucasus

Regarding the dispute between **Armenia and Azerbaijan** over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, in mid-January, and in the midst of various ceasefire violations, the Azeri president Ilham Aliyev said that the Moscow Declaration of November 2008 showed that the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute could only be resolved over a series of stages. According to Aliyev, the fixed position of Azerbaijan required first of all the withdrawal of Armenian forces and the resolution of security problems in the context of international guarantees. Once these problems were solved, it would be possible to deal with the future status of the territory, the Azeri president said. In the second half of April, the Azeri president Ilham Aliyev said that decision over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh might

be put off indefinitely because there could not be a unilateral decision. Aliyev reiterated, as on past occasions, that Azerbaijan was not participating and would not participate in a process that foresaw the legal separation of the enclave. On the other hand, he said that Azerbaijan understood that it was important for Armenia to maintain a land link with Nagorno-Karabakh and saw no problem in this regard. In mid-September, the Azeri Foreign Ministry said it would consider opening the frontier with Armenia in exchange for the handing over of five districts in Nagorno-Karabakh that had been under the control of Armenian forces since the end of the armed conflict. According to the ministry's spokesman, this possibility had been raised before and amounted to a preliminary phase in resolving the conflict, a phase that would also include the repatriation of internally displaced people.

In the conflict between **Georgia** and its separatist regions, in mid-February parties to the conflict agreed in Geneva, under the mediation of the UN, OSCE and EU, proposals for the establishment of **joint mechanisms to prevent and respond to incidents**. In the joint communiqué the mediators said that the measures included holding weekly meetings -or more frequently if it was considered necessary- between the bodies responsible for security and public order in the affected areas as well as with international organizations. A 24-hour hot line was also established and joint visits would be made to the areas that were causing the most concern. Regarding South Ossetia, which last year Russia recognized as an independent State, in late January the Georgian defence minister and the EU observer mission (EUMM) signed a memorandum which placed restrictions on the movement of Georgian forces in territory adjacent to South Ossetia. In mid-March, the South Ossetia Government announced that it would be shortly signing a military agreement with Russia which would allow Russia to establish military bases on its territory for a period of up to 99 years. On the other hand, the South Ossetia leader Eduard Kokoity said that the EU and the OSCE were responsible for the events of August 2008 and said he was not in favour of the EU observer mission EUMM, which he considered inadequate for the job. At the end of May, talks in Geneva over the security and the South Caucasus between Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Russia and Georgia, which involved the mediation of the UN, EU and OSCE, as well as US participation, were suspended. **Previously the Russian and South Ossetia delegations refused to take part in the fist round of the aforementioned negotiations on the grounds that they made no sense without an Abkhaz presence.** The Abkhazia delegation warned that it would not join the dialogue if the United Nations and the EU were biased in favour of Georgia. The Abkhaz leader Sergey Bagapsh said he was considering whether Abkhazia needed to continue participating or not in the Geneva talks, which brought together Georgia, Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to Bagapsh, Abkhazia was taking part in this format only in respect to the plan signed by the Russian and French presidents. In mid-June, Russia vetoed the renewal of the UN (UNOMIG) mission in Abkhazia, which opened the way for the mission to be dismantled. It is also important to note that in early June, the official Unity Party, linked to the leader Eduard Kokoity, won the parliamentary elections in the separa-

tist South Ossetia region, not internationally recognized, with 46% of the vote and 17 of the 34 seats, followed by the Popular Party and the Communist Party with 22.6% and 22.2% respectively (nine and eight seats). According to the electoral commission, there was 80% participation. Towards the end of the year it was expected that the next rounds of talks would take on the basic questions for a framework accord on the use of force. Nevertheless, the South Ossetia authorities decided not to participate in the meeting on November 19 on the framework for a mechanism for the prevention and management of incidents and warned that it would not take part in this forum until it received information about the whereabouts of Ossetian citizens arrested earlier by Georgia. They also complained that the framework of the talks only resolved questions put forward by Georgia. At the end of the year, the Georgian Government prepared a draft of a new political strategy in relation to the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. The strategy sought to involve and commit itself to both regions in regard to the economy, education, health and culture as well as promoting diplomacy and contacts between the people.

Middle East

In early February, provincial elections were held in **Iraq** with 51% participation, according to Electoral Commission figures. The Government said there was increased participation in Sunni areas, a community which had boycotted previous elections. In mid-March, the Government of Nouri al-Maliki called for reconciliation between the different groups in the country, asking that those who worked for the Government of the former president Saddam Hussein be pardoned, after he attended a conference on reconciliation with a Shia tribe. Maliki said that an important part of the reconciliation plan was the creation of tribal councils that had a relevant role to play in local government. This initiative was opposed by various Iraqi politicians, who said that Maliki's real intention was to get good results at the next parliamentary elections. On the other hand, Kurdish representatives, Turkomans and Arabs who are disputing power in the northern city of Kirkuk, reached an agreement under which the governor of the district would be a Kurd, the deputy governor an Arab and the president of the local council a Turkoman. In early August, Iraqi and Iraqi Kurdistan leaders took the first important step towards resolving the conflict in the oil-rich territories. After a year of faltering dialogue, the Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan to meet with the recently elected president of the region Masoud Barzani. It was al-Maliki's first visit to the zone since he assumed office in 2006. Within the context of this meeting, leaders resolved to keep on talking and to establish a joint committee to study outstanding disputes.

As for the situation between **Israel and Palestine,** the beginning of the year was dominated by the **Israeli offensive against the Gaza Strip, which began on December 27 and caused the death of 1,400 people, as well as injuring thousands**, in the most violent operation since the 1967 war. Before the operation began, the Israeli foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, said that Israel must overthrow Hamas. The attack occurred at the end of a

six-month truce between Hamas and Israel which ended on December 19. After various attempts, on January 8 **the UN Security Council approved resolution 1860 presented by the United Kingdom, by 14 votes with the abstention of the US. The resolution called for an immediate, sustainable and fully respected ceasefire** that would bring about the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, to the authorization of supplies of food, fuel and medical treatment to the territory, and the increase in international efforts to prevent contraband arms and munitions finding their way into the Strip. In mid-February, after the Israeli offensive against Gaza and the separate truce declarations made by Hamas and Israel, talks over a long-term truce continued under the auspices of Egypt. During the talks both parties found common ground on issues such as a 300-metre control zone on the length of the border between Gaza and Israel. However, the first disagreement came when Israel insisted that Hamas free one of its soldiers captured in 2006 as a prerequisite for any agreement. At the beginning of March, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, visited the Middle East for the first time since taking office and said that a two-state solution was inevitable. On April 11, 10 days after taking over as prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu had his first meeting with the Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, to whom he announced his intention to resume peace talks. In early May, Abbas had talks with the Egyptian president Hosni Moubarak, and with the president of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, to coordinate and take forward the cause of peace with Israel. According to Abbas, the idea is to develop a global Arab plan to resolve the problems of the Middle East, specifying that this did not involve only the Palestinian question but also the Israeli occupation in general. According to the newspaper Al-Quds al-Arabi, the Arab States were revising elements of the 2002 plan under which Israel would accept the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state. The changes also involve modifications to the right of return of Palestinians within Israel, a controversial question in Israel. The same newspaper said that the changes had been asked for by the US president Barack Obama. In mid-June, the Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu gave a talk at the University of Bar-Ilan, close to Tel Aviv, in which he reiterated his willingness to see the creation of a Palestinian state as long as it was demilitarized and that the Palestinians recognized Israel as a Jewish state. According to Netanyahu, a future Palestinian state would not have control of its air space nor would it be able to trade in arms. Early September 1 saw the first meeting between a Palestinian minister and an Israeli counterpart in six months. In November, in a sign of frustration over the blocked Middle East peace process, Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, said that he would not stand at the next general election. He was frustrated at US policy in regard to the construction of Israeli settlements in occupied territories as, although Obama had backed the necessity for a complete halt to the building of new colonies, Washington later took a more flexible line on the issue. In the second half of November, shortly after announcing the building of new settlements, the Netanyahu Government said it was willing to agree the partial suspension of the colonization of the West Bank for a 10-month period but it would only apply to new permits –not affecting the building of settlements already under

way– and excluding East Jerusalem. The construction of settlements in occupied Palestinian territory began in 1967 and there are now approximately 500,000 colonists.

As for closer relations between **Israel and Syria**, after the Israeli offensive against Gaza the Syrian Government announced the end of indirect talks with Israel that had been mediated by Turkey. In mid-March, the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad said it was possible to reach a peace agreement with Israel but that it was only possible to normalize relations if Israel ended its conflict with the Palestinians. Meanwhile, two US envoys had meetings with senior officials of the Syrian Government, the first high-level contacts between the US and Syria since 2005. At the end of May, the Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu said, after a meeting with US president Barack Obama, that he was in favour of resuming peace negotiations with Syria. However, he said he would not make any concession that would jeopardize the security of his country and added that he was against withdrawing from the Golan Heights, a condition that Syria sees as essential to any type of agreement. The president of Turkey, the mediating country until talks were suspended in December 2008 because of Israel's decision to attack Gaza, once again offered its services to both countries to resume the dialogue. In the second half of November, **the Israeli Government said it was prepared to resume talks with Syria over a withdrawal from the Golan Heights**. According to press stories, the French president Nicolas Sarkozy delivered this message from the Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu to the Syrian president Basher al-Assad. Shortly afterwards, Netanyahu publicly reiterated his willingness to negotiate **directly or through an impartial mediator, possibly France**, given that Sarkozy was close to both leaders. Up to now this role had been taken by Turkey, but the Israeli and Ankara governments had distanced themselves from each other after Turkey's rejection of the Gaza offensive.

Regarding **Lebanon**, the key point is that in mid-March the UK Government said that it had re-established contacts with the political wing of the Lebanese Hezbollah movement, in what it described as a positive political move for the country. This step occurred 10 months after Hezbollah signed a unity accord and joined the Lebanese Government. Parliamentary elections were held in early June which resulted in victory for the coalition led by Saad Hariri, who obtained 71 of the 128 seats, one fewer than in the elections four years ago. In the middle of that month, the British ambassador to Lebanon met for the first time since 2005 with political representatives of Hezbollah after the British Government approved the move. During the meeting they discussed the formation of a new Lebanese Government. On the other hand, Javier Solana, the European Union's representative on foreign affairs, had met a few days earlier with one of Hezbollah's 11 parliamentary representatives in Beirut. In early November, five months after the elections, a Government of national unity was finally established in Lebanon, led by the prime minister Saad Hariri. The country's president Michel Suleiman, announced that his cabinet would be made up of 30 members, of which 15 were members of the Hariri coalition, the election winners who are also backed by the West. The other 10

ministers would be drawn from the opposition, including two from Hezbollah.

Regarding the internal conflicts between groups in **Palestine**, in early February Hamas called for new representation for the Palestinian people, confirming that they did not accept president Mahmoud Abbas. In the context of the situation in Gaza, in February both groups **held talks mediated by Egypt in order to find common ground,** the first direct meeting between the two in 10 months. A few days later, both political groups agreed to the creation of five committees with a view to the establishment of a government of national unity that will prepare to hold presidential and legislative elections and coordinate reconstruction of Gaza. In mid-March, various rival Palestinian groups met in Cairo and agreed to hold presidential and legislative elections before the end of January 2010, although they remained in disagreement over the formation of a government of national unity. At the end of May, the last round of talks between Fatah and Hamas ended in Cairo (Egypt) without making any progress. In June, Egyptian mediators organized separate meetings between representatives of Hamas and Fatah in order to find common ground. In the middle of that month, the former US president Jimmy Carter visited the Gaza Strip and met Hamas leaders. There was **a milestone in the internal talks between Palestinian groups when in August, in Bethlehem, the first al-Fatah Congress in 20 years was held,** attended by 2,300 delegates who discussed the future of the Palestinian political organization. Fatah opted to rejuvenate its leadership after various days of debate over the future of the Palestinian group. President Mahmoud Abbas was confirmed in this post, although the press pointed to the triumph of Marwan Barghouti, elected as a new member of the Central Committee of the group founded by Yasser Arafat. According to press reports, the Israeli Government is divided over whether to free Barghouti, a popular figure among Palestinians, who is in an Israeli jail serving five life sentences. At the end of August, the Palestinian prime minister, Salam Fayyad, presented an action program which envisages the *de facto* creation of a Palestinian state at the beginning of 2011, independently of negotiations with Israel. Fayyad reiterated that the Palestinian Government had a commitment to put an end to the divisions with the Islamist Hamas movement which controls the Gaza Strip. In September, Ismail Haniya, the Hamas leader in Gaza, announced that the Islamist group was hoping to meet with Fatah in mid-October to ratify a mediation and reconciliation agreement promoted by Egypt. Preliminary information suggests that the pact would include a commitment over prisoners belonging to both factions in Gaza and the West Bank and over the 2010 elections. By the end of October, the Egyptian-mediated attempts to bring about reconciliation between the two principal Palestinian groups, Hamas and Fatah, were stalled, while tension increased after the announcement of elections. Hamas said the elections would not take place in Gaza, which has been under their control since 2007, and insisted that there could be no elections until a national reconciliation agreement had been reached.

Regarding the conflict in **Yemen**, at the end of January the Saada Mediation Committee won agreement from the Yemeni authorities that 100 al-Houthi militants in-

jured during recent confrontations in the province could be treated in hospitals outside of Saada. It was in this context that the leader Abdul Malek al-Houthi put out a press release asserting that the move had come about through the freeing of 30 Armed Forces and security corps prisoners who were handed over to the Mediation Committee as a gesture of the group's good intentions and as a step towards peace. In September, and after a government offensive against the rebels, the Yemen Government rejected outside mediation to resolve the conflict affecting the north of the country where escalating violence was causing a severe humanitarian crisis. In statements to the TV channel Al Jazeera, the Yemeni Foreign Minister, Abu Bakr al Qirbi, said that international intervention would only make the present situation more difficult. The minister preferred an internal dialogue and insisted that the Government was ready to talk to anyone who was prepared to abide by the law and the Yemeni Constitution. In early November, confrontations in the frontier zone between Yemen and Saudi Arabia intensified after the intervention by Saudi forces against Shia rebels who are fighting against Yemeni government forces. The Saudi Air Force bombed al-Houthi positions. The Shia insurgents complain about discrimination, demanding more autonomy and a greater role for the Shia version of Islam and accused Saudi Arabia of supporting the Sanaa Government. For its part, the Yemeni Government said the insurgents wanted to reinstate the Shia imamate in the area and that they were being supported by Iran. Some 175,000 people have been forced to abandon their homes since the beginning of the confrontations in 2004. Some analysts believe that if Saudi Arabia continues attacking the rebels in Yemen,

Iran might decide –if it hasn't already done so– to back the insurgents.

3.3. The peace temperature in 2009

For some years, the Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace, ECP) has drawn up a monthly index of the state of ongoing peace negotiations in the world, with the aim of analyzing the dynamic that these processes produce. In 2009 the index analyzed a selection of 33 sets of negotiations.[1]

The index is configured based on the average resulting from giving three points to processes that have functioned well during the month, one point for those that remain stalled or where there have been no new developments, and no points where there have been problems, such that the maximum possible score in one month is 3, and the average 1.5 points. As can be seen in the following graphic, the year ended with a monthly average of 1.2 points, compared to an average of 1.0 in 2008, 1.1 and 2007, 1.2 and 2006, 1.3 in 2005 and 1.4 and 2004, putting a brake on the fall during the recent years although without in any one month reaching an average equal to or above 1.5 points. The index offers a glimpse of the existing obstacles in order to keep the majority of the processes evolving in a positive and sustained manner, as seen in the enormous problems that have attended the processes or exploratory talks in Afghanistan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, the Philippines (NPA) South Ossetia, Israel-Palestine, Pakistan, Western Sahara, southern Thailand, Uganda or Yemen, among other areas.

Graph 3.1. **The peace temperature in 2008 and 2009**

1. Afghanistan, Armenia-Azerbaijan, Burundi (FNL), Chechnya, China (Tibet), Cyprus, Ethiopia–Eritrea, the Philippines (MILF; NPA), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), India (NDFB), India-Pakistan, Israel-Palestine, Israel-Syria, Kosovo, Moldova (Transdniestria), Myanmar (KNU, NLD), Nepal (Terai), Niger (MNJ), Nigeria (MEND), Pakistan (North-West Frontier), Central African Republic (APDR, FDPC), Western Sahara, Somalia, Sudan (Darfur), Thailand (south), Turkey (PKK), Uganda (LRA), and Yemen.

Box 3.1. **The mirrors of peace**

Despite the fact that every conflict and peace or negotiation processes differ from one another, there are often some common issues, such as methodology, objectives, etc. that may attract special attention. The following table reflects some processes where the actors involved –both governmental and armed groups– have studied, observed or travelled to other regions to learn more closely about the way other peace process was developed, and find a mirror for inspiration as to how best to address their own challenges and obstacles.

Countries facing humanitarian crises

Countries facing forced displacement of population (indicators no. 5 and 6)

Countries facing food insecurity (indicator no. 4)

Countries included in 2010 CAP or with flash appeals launched in 2009 (indicators no. 7)

4. Humanitarian emergencies and humanitarian action

- 1 billion people, a sixth of the world's population, suffered from hunger during 2009.
- Political crises exacerbated humanitarian emergencies in Guinea, Madagascar and DPR Korea.
- John Holmes, the UN undersecretary general for Humanitarian Affairs, described as catastrophic the displacement of populations occurring on the frontiers of DR Congo, Sudan and Uganda after the joint military operation against the armed group LRA.
- The Governments of Sri Lanka and The Philippines restricted and controlled the delivery of humanitarian aid to displaced people, arguing that they wanted to avoid it being diverted to armed groups.
- Somalia suffered its worst humanitarian crisis in the past 18 years, with a vertiginous rise in the number of people trying to flee the violence by crossing the Gulf of Aden towards Yemen.
- The lack of security guarantees led humanitarian organizations to temporarily suspend their work in most of the countries affected by armed violence.

This chapter analyzes the situation in regard to humanitarian crises and humanitarian action, paying special attention to contexts of violence. The first part deals with the definition of humanitarian crises and analyzes the indicators that have helped to determine which countries faced a situation of crisis during 2009. The second part looks at the evolution of each of these contexts according to regional criteria. The third part reviews the most important aspects of humanitarian action practices over the year. The chapter includes a map showing the countries affected by humanitarian crises.

4.1. Humanitarian crisis: definition and indicators

A humanitarian crisis is understood to be a situation in which there is an exceptional and generalized threat to human life, health or subsistence. These crises usually appear within the context of an existing situation of a lack of protection where a series of pre-existent factors (poverty, inequality, lack of access to basic services) exacerbated by a natural disaster or armed conflict, multiply the destructive effects.

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a proliferation of the type of humanitarian crisis that has become known as a complex emergency. These phenomena, also known as **complex political emergencies**, are man-made crises where a situation of violence causes human fatalities, forced displacement, epidemics and famine. These are combined with a weakening or total collapse of economic and political structures and, sometimes, with the presence of a natural disaster. Complex emergencies differ from crises in that they are more prolonged, are at root political and have a significant destructive and de-structuralizing impact on all spheres of life. As a result, the response to these crises usually involves a large number of players, as well as those exclusively involved in humanitarian work, including peacekeeping missions and political and diplomatic figures.

Figure 4.1. **The onset of a humanitarian crisis**

Four indicators have been used to determine the number of countries that faced a humanitarian crisis in 2009. These indicators measure the seriousness of food crisis, the impact of the displacement of people related to violent situations and the most critical emergency situations for which the United Nations asked for funds. First of all, the periodic reports published by FAO on crops prospects and food situation states that there were 36 countries in which there was a food emergency during 2009 (indicator Nº4).[1] Of this group, 28 were in Africa, 10 in Asia, three in America and three in the Middle East. It is a lower number than in the previous year (43), although one thing that stands out is the rise in the number of countries in the Middle East affected by food insecurity, up from one to three, principally as a result of droughts and armed conflict. According to FAO and UNICEF Asia was the region where food insecurity increased the most in the past year, in particular in Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal.

Asia was the region where food insecurity increased the most in the past year

In spite of the fact that during 2009 food prices on global markets dropped in relation to 2008 –when staple food such as wheat and maize reached historic highs –this didn't have any immediate impact on local markets. As a result people in a large number of countries, generally the poorest and the most dependent on exports, had difficulty accessing to food. The FAO annual report on food insecurity published in May warned that the number of people suffering from hunger in the world was more than 1 billion in 2009, a sixth of the world's population, and almost 100 million people more than in the previous year. FAO said that the reason for this increase was not lack of production, given that harvests were good and improved in relation to those in 2008, but persistently high prices in local markets and the fall in income for a large number of families caused by job losses as a result of the world economic crisis. **FAO described it as a "silent crisis", which implied serious dangers for peace and security.**

The second factor for determining the existence of a humanitarian crisis is the pattern of **forced internal displacement** (indicator Nº5), the one that takes place as a result of violence within a country's borders. The report published by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC),[2] which analyzes this internal displacement during 2008, suggests that the number of internally displaced people remained stable, with a total of 26 million displaced people in 52 countries, being Africa the region most affected. In this context, the approval by the member states to the African Union (AU) of a convention for the protection of internally displaced people on the continent marks a significant step forward in the struggle to deal with this phenomenon and a commitment on the part of governments to prevent these situations arising,[3] making the Guiding Principles on Internal

Map 4.1. **Number of internally displaced persons in 2009[4]**

1. See Annex I (Table of countries, indicators and description of indicators).
2. The IDMC report published in June 2009 refers to data from 2008. However, the data is considered representative of displacement trends in 2009, as it is complemented with updates made by the centre (figures and context analyses) and the monitoring made by the Escola de Cultura de Pau of the international situation during the year.
3. See "Opportunities for Peace" section of this report for more information on the African Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced People.
4. Based on IDMC data and updated December 2009 <http://www.internal-displacement.org/>.

Displacement legally biding.[5] Southern and Southeast Asia were the regions with the highest increase in the number of internally displaced people, especially in the Philippines, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The IDMC annual report claims that in 21 of the 52 affected countries the absence of a political or peace agreement was one of the main obstacles to find a durable solution for the situation of displacement, highlighting how closely this phenomenon is related to peacebuilding.

In 49 places the situation was described as serious, where one in every thousand people is internally displaced, of which 20 were in Africa, 11 in Asia, followed by Europe with eight countries, the Middle East with six and America with four. **The most serious cases, in which displacement affected one in every hundred people, were to be found in 25 countries, of which 10 were African, six European, five Middle Eastern, three Asian and one American.**

The third indicator, which relates to the **number of refugees assisted by UNHCR**, points to a slight decline in the number of refugees, from 11.3 to 10.5 million, 7%

In 21 countries the absence of a political or peace agreement was one of the main obstacles to find a durable solution for the situation of displacement

less than in 2007. However, the number of Palestinian refugees assisted by UNWRA rose in 2008, from 4.6 to 4.7 million. **Altogether, in 2008 15.2 million people lived outside of their country as a consequence of violence.**[6] One in every thousand people sought refuge beyond their national frontiers in order to save their lives in 67 countries.

In 13 countries, one in every hundred people was a refugee, notably in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine which between them account for two thirds of the refugees in the world. Asia remains the continent with the largest number of refugees assisted by UNHCR, more than 3.5 million people. Somalia (561,154), Sudan (419,248), Colombia (373,532) and DR Congo (367,995) were also among the most affected countries.

Finally, the fourth indicator used is the **Consolidated Appeal Process** (CAP) (indicator Nº.7),[7] the means by which the United Nations appeals for funds for the humanitarian crises that it considers the most serious and in need of international aid.[8] **For 2010, OCHA appealed** in November for **7.13 billion dollar** –9% less than in 2009, when it reached a record figure– **to help 48 mil-**

Graph 4.1. **United Nations Humanitarian Appeal for 2010 (millions of dollars)**

Source: OCHA. *Humanitarian Appeal 2010. Consolidated Appeal Process*, November 2009.
(*) Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

5. "The Guiding Principles are based on International Humanitarian Law and the international law on human rights and, by analogy, the rights of refugees. It aims to establish an international norm to guide governments, regional organizations and other relevant parties in the provision of aid and protection to internally displaced people. The Principles referred to rights and related guarantees to the protection of internally displaced people in all phases of the displacement. They protect them against arbitrary displacement, establishing the bases for their aid and protection during displacement and establishing guarantees for their return, resettlement and reintegration in secure conditions. Although not a legally binding instrument, the Principles reflect and are consistent with international law." Global Database Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (General Assembly Res. 60/L.1, 132, U.N. Doc. A/60/L.1)
6. The UNHCR report published in June 2009 is based on the agency's global data from January to December 2008. However, the data is considered to be representative of the refugee situation in 2008, as it is complemented with the monitoring of the international situation during the year carried out by the Escola de Cultura de Pau, showing the persistence of the same situation.
7. The United Nations annual appeal to donors. This is a programmatic cycle meant for humanitarian organisations to plan, coordinate, finance, implement and monitor the response to disasters and emergencies in consultation with Governments.
8. In the second section of the chapter there is an analysis of the financial trends of donor countries within the framework of the CAP and with respect to global humanitarian aid.

lion people in 25 countries. Altogether, the United Nations is giving its support to 12 situations of humanitarian emergency –Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Kenya, DR Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Palestine, Uganda, Yemen, Zimbabwe and West Africa– considered as the most serious by the international body. The report accompanying the United Nations CAP listed Ethiopia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka as among other countries that will receive special attention. In regard to the previous year, the appeal included Yemen as an especially worrisome situation, while specific appeals for Iraq and Côte d'Ivoire disappeared.

The crisis appealing for the largest number of funds was once again Sudan, with 1,878 billion dollar, followed by Afghanistan with 871 million. OCHA pointed out that the financial support requested to the donor countries didn't amount to even 1% of the funds destined by the world powers in 2009 to save private financial institutions and to create economic stimulus to avoid the crisis.

Making an assessment of the data obtained from the four indicators, and taking into account the information analysed during the year by the Escola de Cultura de Pau, it is considered that **30 countries were undergoing a humanitarian crisis during 2009**, six fewer than in the previous report.[9] Some post-conflict situations which had been analyzed in West Africa (Liberia and Sierra Leone) ceased to be understood as emergencies, although there are continuing concerns about the living conditions of the population. This is also the case in East Timor in Asia and Haiti in America, although the fragility of these contexts cannot discard the onset of an emergency within a short time. Guatemala has appeared as a new emergency, a sign of the impact the economic crisis mainly have on the food security levels of the population of Central America.

OCHA pointed out that the financial support requested to the donor countries didn't amount to even 1% of the funds destined by the world powers in 2009 to save private financial institutions

East with three and America with two. This report does not deal with situations of long-term displacement of populations that exist in various European and Central Asian countries given that, although the situation of the population is far from being normalized, the conditions of vulnerability and emergency are not such that they would be considered humanitarian crises.

4.2. Evolution of humanitarian crises

During 2009 the majority of these situations deteriorated considerably, forcing the humanitarian community to significantly revise their budgets, and to demand more funding after the second quarter. There were especially worrying situations in the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Yemen, with a sharp rise in the number of people in need of assistance compared to the previous year. The situation relatively improved in places such as Chad, although there was still a degree of humanitarian emergency. The fact that Côte d'Ivoire was excluded from the consolidated appeals process indicated the improvement of the humanitarian situation in the country in recent years, although it remains fragile.

Africa

If in 2008 the rise in the price of the main staple foods was responsible for the aggravation of many humanitarian emergencies on the continent, in 2009 the sharpening levels of violence and natural disasters were the main causes of crisis. The serious impact of the food crisis from the previous year had reduced the capacity of many people to cope, as a result of which OCHA and FAO insisted on the necessity to invest in prevention and early recovery programs, which brought together humanitarian and development aid to strengthen the response capacity of the population. The most serious situations took place in Somalia, DR Congo, Sudan and Ethiopia.

a) Southern Africa

Countries	Crisis factors
Madagascar	Political crisis, natural disasters, international isolation
Zimbabwe	Political and economic crisis, HIV/AIDS, international isolation

The region's main humanitarian emergencies developed in two context of socio-political crisis, **Madagascar and Zimbabwe**, where the effect of poor harvests, drought and epidemics were aggravated by the instability of the Governments of both countries, which had the effect of reducing the international community's donations. Lack of trust in local governments led international bodies

Box 4.1. **Countries facing humanitarian crises in 2009**

Afghanistan	Guatemala	Nigeria
Burundi	Guinea	Pakistan
Central African Republic	Iraq	Palestine
Chad	Kenya	Philippines
Colombia	Madagascar	Somalia
Côte d'Ivoire	Mali	Sri Lanka
DPR Korea	Mauritania	Sudan
DR Congo	Myanmar	Uganda
Eritrea	Nepal	Yemen
Ethiopia	Niger	Zimbabwe

During the year, Africa continued to be the continent most affected by humanitarian crises, with 16 of the 30 existing (51%), followed by Asia with six, the Middle

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9. Humanitarian crises analysed in this chapter have obtained a high value in at least three of the four indicators used. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions – Angola, Bangladesh, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Syria – where it is recognized that the situation is extremely fragile even if it is not a humanitarian emergency. The chapter also provides information about Colombia, DPR Korea, Madagascar and Nepal, each of which deserves special attention even if they don't comply with the discrimination criteria.

such as the EU to stop bilateral aid and to channel funds for humanitarian aid via the NGOs of both countries. However, the need for a global response to the humanitarian crises highlighted the importance of a coordinated response by humanitarian organizations and the Government.

In April OCHA launched an emergency appeal to help 3.4 million people in **Madagascar**. The office remarked that the political crisis in the country had reduced the capacity of the State to meet people's needs. The prevailing drought in the south and typhoons in the north of the island aggravated food insecurity. Equally, OCHA increased the humanitarian appeal budget made in December 2008 for **Zimbabwe**, from $550 million to $719 million while FAO estimated that 2.8 million people would face food insecurity in the country in 2009. In July, the country declared cholera epidemic over after it had killed at least 4,300 people and infected more than 100,000 since August 2008.

Particularly worrying was also the situation generated by torrential rains that affected Namibia and Angola, as was the humanitarian emergency that took place on the border between Angola and DR Congo, in which 30,000 Angolans were forced to go back to their country, where according to UNHCR they faced conditions of extreme vulnerability.

b) West Africa

Countries	Crisis factors
Côte d'Ivoire	Economic and political crisis, return of displaced people
Guinea	Political crisis, international isolation
Nigeria	Armed conflict, forced displacement
Sahel (Mauritania, Mali & Niger)	Tension, economic and political crisis, natural disasters

Although West Africa was not the scenario of the continent's worst humanitarian crises, the inclusion of the area within the Consolidated Appeals Process in 2010 revealed the fragile living conditions of a large part of the population. The combined effects of food insecurity, recurrent disasters, epidemics and socio-political instability (Guinea, Mauritania, Niger), added to the increased activity of drug trafficking networks and the illegal arms trade in the region (Guinea-Bissau), has left 139 million people in conditions of extreme poverty. The extreme poverty reduces the capacity of people to cope with possible humanitarian emergencies. Heavy rains in September forced OCHA to make an emergency appeal for Burkina Faso, a country especially badly affected with 100,000 displaced people and dozens of victims.

The return to their villages of internally displaced people in **Côte d'Ivoire** revealed the limited support these communities were receiving, especially in the west of the country where traditional chiefs said they were worried about the scarcity of food, water and medical assistance. The same situation was reproduced in the north of **Niger**, where the return of people displaced by the Tuareg conflict led to demands for assistance of the population. On the other hand, the level of violence in Guinea and Nigeria increased the degree of vulnerability in both countries. In **Guinea** donor countries cancelled all official aid reacting to the *coup d'état*; while in **Nigeria** military operations in the Niger Delta region and violence in the north –violent actions by Islamist sects and inter-communitarian clashes, led to increased levels of internal displacement with an insufficient response at government level. The erratic rainfalls throughout the year in the west of the **Sahel** region may make levels of chronic malnutrition, already extremely high, even worse, as well as reducing the amount of pasture land, which could generate conflicts between communities faced with prevailing shortages of resources.

c) Horn of Africa

Countries	Crisis factors
Eritrea	Tension, natural disasters, forced displacement
Ethiopia	Armed conflict, natural disasters, forced displacement
Somalia	Armed conflict, natural disasters, forced displacement
Sudan	Armed conflict, natural disasters, forced displacement

Violence, insecurity and droughts made the Horn of Africa the most critical zone on the continent. FAO and WFP warned that 23 million people in the region needed urgent food aid. WFP asked for $1 billion to fund its operations in the Horn during the first six months of 2010. More than half of the affected people, some 13.7 million, were in **Ethiopia**. An Oxfam International report said that 6.2 million people in the country were in need of urgent aid, underlining the fact that 25 years after the Band Aid campaign (set up to attract funds to alleviate the starvation that caused the death of 1 million people in the 1980s) there had been little advance in strategies to strengthen the levels of food security over the long term.[10] However, the Ethiopian Government reported much lower figures, suggesting that only 4.9 million people needed aid. At the same time, numerous NGOs criticized excessive government control over them which limited their capacity to assist the population. In **Eritrea**, in spite of the fact that president Isaias Afewerki took a positive view regarding food supply in 2010, WFP and other humanitarian organizations emphasised the worrying situation in the country, where malnutrition affected two out of every three people, according to FAO, and where strict government controls over the movements of NGOs would make humanitarian operations more difficult in the event of an emergency.

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10. Nick Martlew. *Band Aids and beyond: tackling disasters in Ethiopia 25 years after de famine*. Oxfam Briefing Paper, 22 October, 2009, <http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp133-band-aids-beyond.pdf>.

Attacks on humanitarian workers in Somalia and Sudan hampered access to people cut off by the violence and living in extremely difficult conditions. In the case of Somalia, the armed group al-Shabab stopped the humanitarian work of all the NGOs in territory under its control with threats of violence, while accusing these organizations of spreading non-Islamic values. The UN said that the country was facing its worst humanitarian crisis of the past 18 years and that the funds offered by the donor community were insufficient for the almost 4,000,000 people dependent on humanitarian aid. One statistic that illustrates the seriousness of the crisis is the number of Somalis who tried to cross the Gulf of Aden to seek refuge in Yemen during the rainy season – the most dangerous time to make the crossing – which doubled the figure of the previous year.

In **Sudan**, the International Criminal Court's arrest warrant against the Sudanese president led to the expulsion of 16 NGOs (13 of them international) operating in the Darfur region. At the time it was estimated that this left 4.7 million people in the province without assistance. The announcement by the government that it intends to close refugee camps in 2010 could trigger a new crisis of internally displaced people. Furthermore, the growing violence in the south of the country led to the displacement of 350,000 people in the area where 1.2 million people live in a situation of severe food shortages made worse by the persistent drought. In spite of the attempts by the United Nations and various mediating groups to arrive at agreements with the armed groups and the Government in order to help the efforts of humanitarian workers in both countries, the number of kidnappings and attacks on humanitarian convoys continue to grow, forcing the suspension of aid on repeated occasions.

The international arrest warrant issued against the Sudanese president led to the expulsion from Darfur of 13 international NGOs

d) Great Lakes and Central Africa

Countries	Crisis factors
Burundi	Post-conflict situation, return of displaced people
Chad	Armed conflict, regional instability, forced displacement
Kenya	Tension, natural disasters, forced displacement
Central African Rep.	Armed conflict, forced displacement
DR Congo	Armed conflict, forced displacement, epidemics
Uganda	Armed conflict, natural disasters, forced displacement

The humanitarian situation in the region was seriously affected by the dynamics of cross-border violence on the part of armed groups such as the Ugandan LRA,[11] military operations and attacks by insurgent groups on the frontier between Chad and Sudan, and joint opera-

tions against the Rwandan FDLR in DR Congo, which led to the displacement of the local population. Meanwhile in **Uganda** the humanitarian emergency focused on the situation of the returnees, as 1.4 million people who have decided to go back home since 2006 were facing a total lack of basic services and security in a region still plagued by arms. OCHA issued a reminder in its 2010 appeal of the necessity to coordinate the cessation of an emergency operation with the establishment of development projects so as to avoid a situation in which the people found themselves without assistance.

The United Nations said the increasing number of attacks against humanitarian personnel in **Chad** was one of the main obstacles to the aid operations. In 2009 the number of reported attacks rose to 192, compared to 100 in 2008, the majority of which were attributed to the prevailing criminality in the area and not to the armed conflict. The security situation meant that aid operations were suspended on numerous occasions. However Michele Falavigna, the resident humanitarian coordinator, said there were positive signs of recovery that would allow some of the funds requested by OCHA through the CAP to fund early recovery and development projects. Among these positive signs, Falavigna pointed to the return of a significant part of the country's 168,000 internally displaced people. Insecurity was also a constant factor in the **Central African Republic**, worsened by the attacks of the Ugandan armed group LRA in the southeast. UNHCR estimated that 100 Central Africans were crossing the border into Chad every day to flee the violence, with the result that there were 70,000 refugees in the neighbouring country. Catherine Bragg, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, warned that as a result of the violence at least a quarter of the population was in need of humanitarian aid.

OCHA kept on describing the humanitarian situation in **DR Congo** as among the worst in the world. Joint military operations against the FDLR in the east and against the LRA in the northeast caused the internal displacement of more than 140,000 people. John Holmes, the undersecretary general for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, described the joint military operation against the LRA as catastrophic due to the complete absence of protection for civilians. Since September 2008, a total of 540,000 people have been forced to move in the east of the country, according to the United Nations. There has also been a serious increase in attacks against humanitarian personnel in the region, with more than 100 in North Kivu alone, the highest number yet recorded in one year in the area, according to the United Nations. There was continued cause for concern about the humanitarian situation of people in the rest of DR Congo in areas not affected by the violence, with extremely high mortality rates, sickness and malnutrition, according to OCHA.

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11. See Chapter 1 (Armed conflicts).

Box 4.2. **IDP camps: war strategy and humanitarian dilemmas**

Sovereignty establishes the principle that the State is responsible for protecting people within its territory who are affected by violence or armed conflict. However, in reality, in too many cases the State is the main cause of its citizens' suffering. Applying this reality to an analysis of the internal displacement of populations shows that, on many occasions, governments have developed strategies in order to expel a population from a particular territory. The logic behind this strategy is that of the metaphor used by Mao Tse Tung, to "deprive the fish of water", according to which, moving people from a particular area deprives armed opposition groups, directly or indirectly, of popular support. To this it must be added that, in some cases the affected territory possesses important economic or geostrategic resources.

The ethical debate associated with this reality comes to the fore when humanitarian organizations have to carry out the duty of helping people displaced as a result of this deliberate strategy. In some cases, the displaced people are held in camps created by their own Government, and which are under close surveillance in order to prevent them from returning. In other cases, attempts are also made by the Armed Forces to find out members of insurgent groups or their collaborators, rendering all the occupants victims of siege and threats. Providing aid in these camps of forcibly displaced people indirectly supports the government's strategy of "territorial cleansing". However, the alternative of not aiding and openly condemning the situation might only make things worse for the internally displaced people.

An experience such as this arose in Uganda during the 1990s, when WFP was assisting displaced people in settlement camps, while the government was insisting that these people had been displaced by attacks carried out by the armed group LRA.[12] In Turkey, also in the 1990s, the Government launched a resettlement program, creating "centralized villages" to prevent the Kurds returning to the southeast, and where the people's movements were monitored.[13] Something similar happened in Sri Lanka in 2009, when the government created reception centres for people displaced during the last military operation against the LTTE, without allowing those who had fled to return to their homes. In all these cases, the State bodies insist that people have been displaced by armed groups.

Access to people displaced and held in camps as a result of government action is in many cases restricted, particularly during the early phases of the "cleansing" strategy. However, the inability or the unwillingness of the State to help these people, combined in many cases with international pressure, means that the task falls to humanitarian organizations. The principles of humanitarian action – impartiality, neutrality and independence – mean that, in order to go about their work, it is difficult for humanitarian workers to bring pressure to bear to end what is a serious violation of the International Humanitarian Law, if they want to provide aid.

The principle of the Responsibility to Protect,[14] at the same time as recognizing the principle of State sovereignty, establishes that the international community is responsible for dealing with situations of vulnerability and violation of rights when the institutions of a particular sovereign state are not capable or not willing to help their citizens. At the same time, civil society organizations are key to condemning and making known the strategic use of forced displacement, creating a greater social awareness that may lead to the international community taking up the issue.

Finally, the persistent drought not only aggravated food shortages in **Kenya** – which has suffered its worst water shortage in a decade – but has led to an increase in displaced people as a result of inter-communal clashes over resources in the north of the country. This also contributed to the increase in the forced expulsion of Somali refugees because of a shortage of resources in the same area and led to an extreme deterioration in the humanitarian conditions of those who remained in refugee camps along the frontier. An especially worrying development was the report made by Human Rights Watch about the recruitment of young Somalis in Dadaab refugee camps on the part of the Kenyan Government in order to create militias to fight the expansion of the armed al-Shabab group within its frontiers.[15] The Kenyan president decreed a national disaster situation over the food crisis that affected 3.5 million people and asked the international community for $400 million in aid. Food shortages continued to be a matter of concern in **Burundi**, where several provinces were badly affected by natural disasters, conflicts over territorial control, the return of Burundian refugees (31,562 this year), epidemics and a shortage of supplies to local markets, according to the UN secretary-general's report on the country.[16]

12. Batha, Emma. "Have aid agencies prolonged Uganda's war?". Reuters, 21 February 2009.
13. Linzey, Sharon and Mark Muller. *The Internally Displaced Kurds of Turkey: ongoing issues of responsibility, redress and resettlement*. KHRP, September 2007.
14. Principle approved by the UN General Assembly in 2005, according to which the international community is responsible for protecting civilians of a third State when the sovereign authorities fail to do so. For more information see *ICISS The responsibility to protect* <http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf>.
15. Human Rights Watch. "Kenya recruits Somali refugees to fight Islamists back home in Somalia". HRW, 10 November 2009. <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/11/16/kenya-recruits-somali-refugees-fight-islamists-back-home-somalia>.
16. United Nations. *Sixth report of the Secretary-general on the Integrated Office in Burundi*, section IV epigraph K "Humanitarian situation". 30 November 2009 <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2009/611>.

America

Countries	Crisis factors
Colombia	Armed conflict, forced displacement
Guatemala	Economic crisis, food shortages

The economic crisis has left its mark on the American continent, where there has been a significant reduction in remittances, affecting the buying power of numerous households principally in Central America. Disasters have also created states of emergency in countries such as **El Salvador**, where Hurricane Ida left 100 people dead and 10,000 people without food, forcing the Government to declare a state of emergency and launch an emergency appeal for $13 million to help the affected families. On the other hand, in **Guatemala**, the Government declared a state of emergency after persistent droughts aggravated the food insecurity levels. Between January and September 462 people died of hunger and 54,000 families were short of food in east of the country, an area known as the "dry corridor". UNICEF warned that rates of malnutrition among the under-five children had reached 50%, and could rise to 80% in rural areas.

Food insecurity forced the Government to declare a state of emergency in Guatemala

In **Colombia** the displacement crisis went on for another year, and according to the latest CODHES figures, the numbers had increased by 24.4% compared to the last estimates, meaning that 4.5 million people were affected. Furthermore, figures provided by Refugees International said that one in 10 Colombians had been displaced through violence. The most affected areas continued to be those with Afro-Colombian communities as well as indigenous groups (Chocó, Nariño and Valle del Cauca) with an especially high rate of displacement in the indigenous Awa territories (38 members of this group died in 2009). In November OCHA announced the creation of an Emergency Response Fund for Colombia, with the aim of providing a more flexible response to crisis situations in the country, with the fund managed entirely from within Colombia. At the other extreme, the Colombian Senate rejected the Victims' Rights Act, designed to provide better assistance to people affected by the armed conflict, arguing that the high cost of reparations and restitutions could not be assumed by the State. On the other hand, the aid offered to victims by the government body Acción Social was judged by the Constitutional Court to be insufficient.

Asia and the Pacific

Countries	Crisis factors
Afghanistan	Armed conflict, natural disasters, forced displacement
Philippines	Armed conflict, natural disasters, forced displacement

Myanmar	Armed conflict, forced displacement, epidemics
Nepal	Post-war situation, natural disasters, return of displaced people
Pakistan	Armed conflict, forced displacement
DPR Korea	Economic crisis, natural disasters, international isolation
Sri Lanka	Armed conflict, natural disasters, forced displacement

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, population displacement caused by military operations against Taliban groups and Taliban attacks were the main cause for concern for the humanitarian community, together with the constantly rising number of attacks against members of NGOs and aid organizations. In January 2009 OCHA reopened its offices in **Afghanistan** because of the urgent need to coordinate the work of humanitarian and development agencies in the area. Problems generated on the one hand by the shrinking humanitarian space, and the confusion between humanitarian and military work, was a constant throughout the year, during which there were continued attacks against people carrying out aid work. There was little implementation of the Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian and Military Actors in Afghanistan,[17] agreed in 2008 by agencies, NGOs and NATO. Lack of security led to the evacuation of some UN personnel. There were floods in the north and west of the country and an earthquake in the Nangahar province during the second quarter of the year.

In **Pakistan**, three members of UNHCR died in attacks by the Taliban that accused all of the humanitarian organizations of being anti-Islamic and demanded their withdrawal. In September it was estimated that 1.6 of the 2.3 million people displaced by military operations against the Taliban in the North-West Frontier Province had returned. However, violence resumed in this province and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and it was estimated that across the country, about 900,000 people were displaced, of which practically half were from South Waziristan (FATA). The majority of people affected by displacement were hosted by relatives, as the Pakistan authorities didn't find it safe to set up refugee camps, making the delivery of aid still more difficult. For safety reasons the Government also restricted humanitarian organizations' access to the areas affected by the conflict, leaving the assistance of the most affected in the hands of the Pakistan authorities who were accused of diverting humanitarian aid.

More than 280,000 people were displaced in the north of **Sri Lanka** as a result of fighting between the Army and the armed group LTTE, whose defeat marked the end of the armed conflict. The internally displaced peo-

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17. *Guidelines for the interaction and coordination of humanitarian actors and military actors in Afghanistan.* Approved on May 20, 2008 by UNAMA, ISAF-OTAN and close to 100 NGOs who coordinate humanitarian assistance in the country through the United Nations.

ple, principally ethnic Tamils, were caught in the cross-fire and later forced into settlement camps by the government. For several months the humanitarian organizations condemned the precarious situation of the people in these 44 camps, whose population was doubled its capacity in many cases. On grounds of national security, the Government restricted humanitarian personnel's access to the camps, saying that there were probably members of the LTTE among the camps' inhabitants. In September the authorities announced that they would allow some internally displaced people to leave, and from December 1 it allowed freedom of movement to all those held in camps. The Government presented a plan to assist people to return home and to rebuild houses in areas affected by the fighting. However, some people found it difficult to go back because of the presence of anti-personnel mines. In November it was estimated that 136,242 people remained in the camps, while almost 140,000 had returned.

It was estimated that about 900,000 people remained internally displaced in Pakistan

In the **Philippines**, the resumption of the armed conflict between the Army and the MILF forced 750,000 people to flee. At the end of the year, 250,000 remained displaced, living in highly unsanitary conditions in settlement camps, mainly in Mindanao Central. Fear prevented these people from going home, despite the resumption of peace talks. On October 27 the Government and the MILF reached an Agreement on the Protection of Civilian Component of the International Monitoring Team. Under the agreement, both sides committed to taking all the necessary precautions to avoid the loss of civilian lives and to prevent attacks that might harm the general population's interests, as well as facilitating access for humanitarian workers and the supply of aid material. At the same time, they agreed to expand the mandate of the International Monitoring Team to include protection of civilians and verification that both parties were complying with the accord. Various humanitarian agencies voiced their concern over the rise of inter-clan violence, known as *rido*, and the effects this might have on humanitarian assistance in the Mindanao region. WFP warned that half the population of the island was suffering from food insecurity and that rates of infant mortality and death in childbirth were respectively 30% and 80% higher than in the rest of the country. On the other hand, the serious impact of climatic phenomena since September forced the UN to launch an emergency appeal for $143.7 million to help 4.2 million people affected by typhoons and tropical storms.

WFP said that 40% of people in **DPR Korea** would need external help to cope with food insecurity in the country. However, the small amount of funds committed by donors meant that the agency could only assist a quarter of these 9 million people. South Korea's resumption of food aid supplies (which were suspended in February 2008 in order to put pressure on Pyongyang to end its nuclear program) might ease the situation. In **Nepal**, several agencies said that the political instability might have a serious impact on the financing of development projects and humanitarian aid, given that it reduced donor confidence. Some 60% of the national budget came from international funds. OCHA warned of the growing vulnerability of Nepalese communities, particularly in areas prone to natural disasters and where they suffered from food insecurity. The Working Group on internal displacement said more aid was needed for the resettlement of more than 50,000 people who did not wish to go home, given that the Government only had funded return programmes. At the same time in **Myanmar**, there was continuing displacement of people in the states of Shan and Karen, while reconstruction funds provided after the Nargis cyclone were insufficient for the recovery of the area and the implementation of early warning systems.

Middle East

Countries	Crisis factors
Iraq	Armed conflict, natural disasters, economic and political crisis
Palestine	Armed conflict, aid blocked, economic and political crisis
Yemen	Armed conflict, natural disasters, mass of refugees

The United Nations launched an emergency appeal for the reconstruction of **Gaza** after a 22-day Israeli offensive left 1,440 people dead, displaced half a million and left 21,000 families homeless. Throughout the year, there were constant demands on the part of NGOs and other agencies for the Israelis to lift the blockade on goods entering the Gaza Strip, which was creating difficulties for humanitarian aid and preventing the reconstruction of basic services such as drinking water supply. Various reports highlighted the serious impact of the blockade, imposed more than two years ago on a population where 75% of people go food insecure and 60% do not have a proper access to drinking water, as the majority of aquifers are contaminated, in some cases deliberately by the Israeli Government. According to an Amnesty International report, the Israelis only allowed Palestinians access to 20% of the main aquifers in the area and prevented part of this water from getting to Gaza, where people were forced to buy water from tankers or use the coastal aquifer, where 90% of the water is polluted.[18] Other reports examined the humanitarian impact of the wall on the **West Bank**, five years after it was declared illegal by the International Court of Justice, while Oxfam International condemned both the international community and parties to the conflict for putting their strategic objectives above the needs and rights of the **Palestinian** people. In this respect, new Israeli settlements continued to be built in the Occupied Territories, as did the expulsion of Palestinians from East Jerusalem. Also, attempts by Hamas to control the distribution of aid in Gaza forced organizations to suspend their activity on the ground.

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18. Amnesty International. *Demand Dignity: Troubled waters - Palestinians denied fair access to water*. AI, October 2009. <http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/asset/MDE15/027/2009/es/41cff16c-a5b1-4fc7-abc0-142218e77047/mde150272009es.pdf>.

Box 4.3. **The Palestine emergency: seven years of wall, two years of blockade**

In 2009, to coincide with the beginning of the blockade of the Gaza Strip two years ago and with the fifth anniversary of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice stating that the construction of the West Bank wall violates Israel's obligations under international law, the UN published two reports on the devastating impact that these measures were having on the Palestinian people.[19] After Hamas took power in Gaza in June 2007, the Israeli Government imposed a blockade on all the Strip's frontier crossings, leaving 1.5 million people literally imprisoned in the territory and causing an unprecedented humanitarian emergency in the area. The continuing restrictions on the movement of people and goods were an added factor to the crisis in Gaza triggered by the Israeli military operation in December 2008, contributing significantly to a rise in the number of victims and making it almost impossible to restore basic services such as the water supply and sanitation.

In economic terms, the blockade has meant that exports from Gaza have been paralyzed, and imports reduced to a minimum. The restrictions on people's movements have also impeded agricultural work, fishing in Palestinian waters and access to people's places of work. Unemployment in Gaza is at 40% and 120,000 people have lost their jobs thanks to the shrinking of the economic sector. Some 75% of the population is food insecure. The lack of construction materials has prevented the rebuilding of houses and the reparation of electrical supplies and the water distribution network. More than 20,000 people remain internally displaced. Access to healthcare has also been affected by the scarcity of medical supplies in the Strip, thanks to the blockade, and to the difficulty in obtaining permission for patients to be treated abroad, thus increasing people's vulnerability.

The second report shows the impact of the construciton of the West Bank wall, which began in April 2002. Some 58.3% of it is now complete, isolating around 10,000 people between the wall and the Green Line.[20] Once it is completed, 9.5% of the Occupied Territories will be inside this "security zone" which will affect the lives of 186,000 people who will be totally or partially isolated from the rest of the Palestinian territory. To this figure must be added the significant number of people whose economic activity is or will be affected because their land or workplaces are inside this security zone, to which access is strictly controlled and restricted by the Israeli authorities. The economic impact of the wall – which runs through ancient areas of Palestinian economic development, tourist centres and fertile land (more than 10% of the total in the area) – has led to a significant decrease in the incomes of the affected Palestinian families who have lost their harvests many times or have been obliged to sow fewer hectares, given restricted access to their land, for which they need a special permit which has to be renewed. To obtain this permit they have to prove that they are the owners of these lands in an area where the land forms part of the family inheritance and only on rare occasions has its title been registered. Among the other effects of the wall is the restricted access to health and education services, as well as the splitting up of families and social networks of communities that have become isolated between the walls.

The return of people displaced by the armed conflict and food insecurity were the humanitarian community's main topics of debate in **Iraq**. Since the beginning of the year, 141,150 internally displaced people – only 5% of the total – had voluntarily decided to return, along with fewer than 2% of Iraqi refugees (32,550 people), according to UNHCR figures up to October, and many organizations warned of the difficulties and the lack of sufficient support in the returning areas. A total of 37,513 families had received the Government's assistance packages. According to figures from the state agency Centre for Market Research and Consumer Protection, 60% of the population is dependent on food subsidized by the Government, which is not always of the best quality and is not always delivered to needy families in either a suitable manner or quantity, thus increasing food insecurity. The Centre said that 80% of food consumed by Iraqis was imported, making the country dependent on imports for its necessities and underlying that until the conflict began in 2003 Iraq enjoyed food sovereignty.

The deteriorating humanitarian situation in **Yemen** led OCHA to include the country within the Consolidated Appeal Process for 2010. The resumption of the armed conflict in the north led to the displacement of more than 75,000 people and forced UN agencies to launch a new flash appeal in August for $23 million. The number of displaced people in the area since the conflict began in 2004 rose to 175,000. Restricted access to the affected population and lack of security for humanitarian workers were the key elements in the Yemen crisis, with the added difficulty that the majority of the displaced people were not in camps and their dispersal complicates the duties of assistance. The creation in August of the High Level Inter-ministerial Committee for Relief Operations allowed the Government to open humanitarian corridors and to sign local cease-fires to facilitate access for humanitarian organizations. However, events such as the bombing of an IDP camp in September – in which 87 people died – and attacks on health facilities carried out by the Army, called in to question these expressions of goodwill. UNHCR reached an accord with Saudi Arabia to open a humanitarian corridor from the frontier. The same agency warned of the critical situation of the refugees and people seeking asylum in the country. Since the beginning of the year more than 50,000 people

Restricted access to the affected population and lack of security for humanitarian workers were the key elements in the Yemen crisis

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19. OCHA OPT. *Five Years after the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion. A summary of the humanitarian impact of the barrier.* Jerusalem: United Nations, July 2009; and Locked in: the humanitarian impact of two years of blockade on the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem:United Nations, August 2009.
20. That Green Line was fixed in 1949 after the first Arab-Israeli war and drew the frontiers between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria as well as the dividing line between Israeli and Palestinian territories.

have arrived in Yemen, having crossed the Gulf of Aden, most of them from Somalia. Yemen was listed as the most food insecure country in the region, as it is highly dependent on imports. In this regard the rise of oil prices led to a rise in the price of staple foods, further affecting people's ability to cope.

4.3. Assessment of humanitarian action in 2009

What follows is an analysis of various aspects related to humanitarian crises and humanitarian action during 2009, specifically the main difficulties encountered by aid organizations and the role played by donor countries.[21]

a) Main difficulties of humanitarian action

It has been another year in which humanitarian organizations and workers have faced constant obstacles and threats in carrying out their work. There have been a significant number of direct attacks, kidnappings and fatalities among the humanitarian community. Although as yet no exact data exists, the security of humanitarian workers is particularly threatened in Somalia, Sudan and Chad, as well as in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Palestine Occupied Territories. It should be noted that attacks by military forces on health facilities, as in the case of Afghanistan, Palestine and Yemen, violates International Humanitarian Law which states that such areas are inviolable, as is the case with IDP and refugee camps which were also attacked in countries such as Chad and Sudan.

Governments repeatedly and deliberately obstructed humanitarian organizations' access to people affected by armed conflict in Ethiopia, the Philippines, Sudan, Sri Lanka and Pakistan although in each instance they gave different reasons for blocking access. While in Sudan it was born of a strategy of putting on pressure after the International Criminal Court ordered the arrest of their president, in Pakistan the Government said the lack of security in areas affected by the conflict meant they were not safe for agencies and organizations. On the other hand, in Sri Lanka and the Philippines the authorities viewed the victims as possible members of insurgent groups and by isolating them hoped to avoid aid being diverted to combatants.

There was a clear attempt by the authorities in the Philippines, Palestine and Pakistan to control aid. In the case of Palestine, after the Israeli military's *Operation Cast Lead*, the Hamas Government asked NGOs in Gaza to provide them with a list of all their beneficiaries in order to coordinate the aid operations although many organizations refused to comply because they feared it would be used to deny assistance to presume Fatah supporters. Meanwhile, the official aid agencies in Pakistan aided mainly those they felt were closer to the Government, favouring some ethnic groups. In the Philippines, the Government imposed strict controls over the distribution of food to the displaced people of Maguindanao, and asked humanitarian organizations to reduce the rations they were distributing to people affected by the conflict avoiding the food was diverted to members of the armed group MILF. On the other hand, attempts by the Iraqi Government to control international funds destined to local organizations was strongly criticized by the NGOs in the country, which accused the State of putting into question their independence and neutrality. In **Somalia, US aid restrictions imposed to areas under the control of the armed Islamist group al-Shabab,** as part of its counterterrorist strategy, was one of the factors that led to the **closing of 12 WFP food centres in September,** which affected 100,000 children.

Humanitarian agencies and organizations were forced to either temporarily suspend their operations or withdraw their staff from the ground in practically all of the situations where violence prevailed, while a lack of coordination continued to be a serious problem in Afghanistan. In DR Congo, the Central African Republic, Chad and Sudan the lack of security was blamed on common criminals, whereas in Somalia and Pakistan insurgent groups were mainly responsible for the attacks. Areas of conflict where humanitarian organizations were explicitly barred from entering were in Ethiopia (Ogaden), Sudan, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Yemen and Palestine.

Humanitarian agencies and organizations were forced to either temporarily suspend their operations or withdraw their staff from the ground in practically all of the situations where violence prevailed

The report published by the Humanitarian Policy Group on the risks faced by humanitarian workers said there was an increased by 61%, in relative numbers, in the number of attacks carried out against aid organizations, demolishing the theory that the rise in violence was due to an increased number of these organizations on the ground.[22] In a clear indication that humanitarian personnel are the targets of armed groups, in 2008 the number of humanitarian workers killed exceeded that of the number of peace-keeping troops. Humanitarian workers have been explicitly singled out as targets in Pakistan and Somalia, where they were accused of spreading ideas and practices contrary to Islam, while in DR Congo there was double the number of attacks on humanitarian personnel compared to the previous year, with more than 100.

August 19 marked the **first World Humanitarian Day**, through which the United Nations wanted to raise the profile of aid work and humanitarian crisis situations throughout the world. The date was chosen to commemorate the 2003 attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad (Iraq) in which 22 people died, among them the person then responsible for the organization's humani-

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21. Humanitarian action is understood as all the activities whose aim is to save lives and alleviate suffering in humanitarian crisis situations. These activities are guided by the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Humanitarian action also includes the protection of civilians and the provision of basic aid.
22. Stoddard, Abby, Adele Harper and Victoria Didomenico. *Providing aid in insecure environments: 2009 update*. Humanitarian Policy Group, London: Overseas Development Institute, April, 2009. <www.cic.nyu.edu/Lead%20PDF/HPG_2009&20.pdf>.

tarian action, Sergio Vieira de Melho. On that day Ali Abdussalam Treki, the president of the UN General Assembly, condemned the increase in attacks on humanitarian personnel, reminding member states that, according to International Humanitarian Law, they were obliged to protect such people during the carrying out of their duties and to facilitate access to people affected by emergencies.

On the same occasion, a number of analysts and bodies (the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Humanitarian Policy Group and the Feinstein Centre) warned of the progressive reduction of the humanitarian space and the danger this implied for those responsible for aid work, as there was a tendency for greater integration between the political and humanitarian agendas in the context of armed conflict or social tension. This integration was regarded as one of the key factors contributing to the increase in attacks on humanitarian workers.[23]

b) The role of donors

In November 2008 the OCHA Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) focused on 10 humanitarian emergen-

cies and asked for $7 billion – almost double that of 2007 – in order to help 30 million people in 31 countries during 2009. In the same period, Humanitarian Action Plan were drawn up to deal with the crises in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Kenya, and seven flash appeals were launched,[24] five fewer than in 2008. Of these flash appeals, only two were related to situations of conflict or socio-political crisis (Madagascar and Yemen), while the rest were to deal with natural disasters sometimes combined with political instability or violence as was the case with the Philippines.

By the end of the year the donors had only committed 64% of the necessary funds to finance the CAP and the flash appeals for 2009, although the total figure obtained, $6.3 billion, was the biggest the CAP had ever achieved since it was established. To this it should be added that the financial disparity between the different appeals was the least recorded by the CAP, so that the majority got 60 or 70% of their request, with the exception of Côte d'Ivoire. However, if the same analysis is made per sector there is considerable disparity, with 83% of the financing destined to food sector and 35% for the safety and security of the staff and operations (although the amount requested for the latter was 50

Box 4.4. Humanitarian worker: a high-risk profession

Offering humanitarian assistance and basic services to people affected by conflicts in violent situations has in recent years become a high-risk profession for aid workers. This was revealed in a report by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) in 2009 which says that, during 2008, 260 humanitarian workers were killed, making it the deadliest of the last 12 years.[25]

Although one of the arguments commonly put forward to explain this rise is the increased presence of humanitarian organizations on the ground, HPG dismisses this theory, showing that in the past three years and in relative numbers –that is to say, taking into account the number of workers involved in the operations– this still represents a 61% increase in the number of attacks. In fact, more humanitarian workers were killed in 2008 than soldiers involved in UN peacekeeping missions during the same period. This raises questions about the motives of those who target humanitarian workers whose task is aiding civilian victims of conflict. The answer is clear: in the eyes of the aggressors in many cases humanitarian organizations are not independent, neutral or impartial, principles to which they must adhere. At the same time, when one of the main strategies of war is to lay siege to a civilian population anyone who seeks to assist the civilians automatically becomes an enemy.

In this regard, the HPG report points to a growing political motivation behind the attacks which go beyond assaults carried out by armed elements to steal humanitarian supplies or logistical material. It also points to the growing level of cooperation between criminal organizations and armed groups in the kidnapping of international personnel, a practice which seeks, apart from a large ransom, to increase the visibility of a conflict or a group's demands. This situation is particularly significant in Afghanistan and Somalia, and recently in Pakistan. Demonstrating impartiality, neutrality and independence has become a difficult task, partly because those NGOs that work in violent situations sometimes need military escorts to deliver aid to isolated populations. Furthermore, the use of humanitarian action as a strategy by political groups, national Armed Forces or occupying powers, or by the State itself, only increases the confusion. In general, aid organizations are perceived as part of the Western agenda in many conflict situations, as is the case in Afghanistan, and efforts to show their supposed independence don't always succeed.

The places with the highest level of attacks against humanitarian personnel are Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan (Darfur). As well as the growing number of attacks that have caused deaths, another worrying trend is the increasing number of kidnappings. Regarding the nationality of the victims, the majority are local people, although in recent years there has been a slight rise in the number of expatriates targeted, mainly from NGOs.

Together with strategies to demonstrate independence, another way of increasing security is the rapprochement and the dialogue with the armed elements to ensure that they accept the presence and work of the humanitarian organizations. In spite of the difficulties entailed in this and the need to regularly renew such commitments, the data available at the HPG report shows that this strategy brings results, although it doesn't mean that attacks may always be avoided.

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23. IRIN, "Analysis: humanitarian action under siege", IRIN 18 August 2009. <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=85752>.
24. Flash appeals are those launched by Governments via the United Nations in order to provide a response to a humanitarian emergency. They last for six months but can be extended.
25. Stoddard, op. cit.

times less than the amount asked for in regard to food). In this context, **OCHA emphasised the necessity for donors to be more flexible and to allow the organizations to distribute the funding between the different sectors in order to provide a comprehensive response to the emergency**, avoiding having funds allocated for a particular sector. For example, the response to a food insecurity emergency does not only involve the distribution of food but also the improvement of food production, educational access for children, better sanitation and health facilities, etc.

In December, global humanitarian funding reached $10,366 billion,[26] $1,756 billion less than in 2008, which OCHA blamed on the world economic recession, although underlining that the crisis had not seriously affected the capacity of the donor countries. For their part, organizations that depend on private donations saw a significant reduction of funding in 2009. However, **the flash appeals were the most affected ones**, having only achieved an average of 49.8% of funding, compared to 68.8% achieved in 2008, although the funds requested were less than those of the previous year.

Finally, the main donor countries in relation to their GDP were in general European, led by Luxembourg, Sweden, Monaco, Norway and Denmark. Kuwait was the first non-Western country on the list, in 13th place, above countries such as the US, Germany and Spain. In

Donors had only committed 64% of the necessary funds to finance the humanitarian appeals for 2009

general, most countries' donations shrank in correlation to their GDP, with official aid levels tied to internal economic growth. Next year, as stringent financial conditions are expected to continue, will put to the test the will of countries to continue to provide humanitarian aid, and whether they make it a priority and make the protection of the planet's population as a whole as important for governments as protecting their own citizens.

In a report issued with the annual CAP appeal OCHA makes special reference to slow-onset crises, in which a combination of accumulated factors together with a situation of chronic vulnerability create scarcely visible humanitarian emergencies, often confused with development needs, which require a coordinated response. The humanitarian crises in Madagascar or in West African countries are examples of this type of emergency. In these cases, food insecurity is not only caused by poor harvests, but by price rises, a fall in incomes and rising unemployment which reduces people's capacity to buy food. Organizations insist on the necessity to send emergency funds to places that face this situation, although donors may be confused that no natural or human disaster has caused the emergency. For this reason OCHA also wants emergency actions to include early recovery projects to reduce the gap between humanitarian and developmental activities, so as to bring together both types of action.

Graph 4.2. **Humanitarian funding overview (in millions of dollars)**

Source: OCHA. *Humanitarian Appeal 2010. Consolidated Appeal Process*, November 2009.

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26. Figures provided by OCHA Financial Track Service [accessed 23.12.2009] <http://www.reliefweb.int/fts>.

Countries with serious human rights violations according to HRIN (indicator no.8)

5. Human rights and transitional justice

- The Escola de Cultura de Pau's 2009 Human Rights Index lists 20 countries with the highest degree of vulnerability and lack of compliance with human rights and the IHL.
- The so-called war against international terrorism continued to undermine human rights on a global scale.
- The 20th anniversary of the Rights of the Child took place in the context of the persistent violation of the economic and social rights of children on a global scale.
- The International Criminal Court issued an international arrest order for the Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir, the first against a serving leader, while governments continued to fail to cooperate in the detention of suspects.
- The Spanish Congress imposed considerable limitations on the principle of universal jurisdiction without advancing a previous debate on this issue.
- The former Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori was found guilty of serious violations of human rights committed during his mandate.
- The Liberian Truth Commission presented its final report in which it recommended setting up a criminal court to try war crimes.

This chapter begins with a geographical analysis of the state of human rights and of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as well as questions such as the impact of the so-called war against international terrorism and some of the main subjects of debate in 2009. This first part concludes with the presentation of the results of the **2009 Human Rights Index (HRIN).** The second part deals with the most important elements of the current processes of transitional justice. The chapter begins with a map of the 20 countries with the highest degree of civilian vulnerability and noncompliance with human rights and the IHL.

5.1. Human rights: analysis of the situation on an international scale

a) Systematic violations of human rights

Many States carried out serious and systematic violations of human rights during 2009. What follows is a list of some of the situations that deserve special attention.

In the **context of Africa**, there were serious violations of human rights in **Algeria** amid a general climate of impunity regarding past and present abuses. In spite of introducing an amendment to the Penal Code in 2004, making torture a crime, human rights groups continue to receive many complaints of people being held incommunicado in unofficial centres and of detainees being tortured.[1] In **Chad** sexual violence against women continued and the Government restricted freedom of expression, as a result of which many journalists and people in the field of human rights were the victims of intimidation and arbitrary arrest. In **Côte d'Ivoire** the Government, which in September 2003 accepted the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), once again refused to receive an ICC mission to open an investigation into the serious violations of human rights committed in the country. In **Ethiopia** the security forces were responsible for torture, extrajudicial executions and arbitrary arrests, according to various NGOs. In **Guinea Conakry,** the virulence of the military repression of opposition movements reached a peak in September with the death of more than 150 people who were demonstrating over the demand that no member of the Military Junta could present themselves at the presidential elections. The UN International Commission charged with investigating this violence said the violent acts carried out in the country amounted to crimes against humanity. According to Amnesty International, the police continued to use torture against detainees and restricted freedom of expression through imprisonment. The kidnapping of exiled Equatorial-Guineans in neighbouring countries and their illegal transfer to secret detention centres in Equatorial Guinea was a common practice carried out with the connivance of officials in other countries.[2]

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1. Human Rights Watch. *World Report 2009*. New York: HRW, 2009, at <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2009>.
2. Amnesty International, *Equatorial Guinea: Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review*. AI, November-December, 2009, at <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR24/002/2009/en/19e4a019-8d7e-49f8-bb1a-8c3bf38d3ff6/afr240022009en.pdf>.

In **Nigeria** security forces continue to act with impunity in the oil-rich area of the Niger Delta, committing persistent and serious violations of human rights, such as extrajudicial execution of suspects, torture and extortion. In **DR Congo**, in May the UN condemned the growing violation of human rights perpetrated against the civilian population in the east of the country. In October, Philip Alston, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions, said after a visit to the country that there had been no decrease in the amount of sexual violence and that the number of known reports barely reflected the degree of violence prevailing in the area.[3] In **Somalia** journalists and human rights workers were in constant danger and the militias held thousands of people illegally. In **Sudan**, the people of Darfur were mistreated and tortured systematically and at a national level opposition politicians were held incommunicado in high-security cells for long periods. On the other hand, 103 people were condemned to death for their supposed part in an attempt by the JEM armed group to take the capital in May 2008, although none was executed.[4] Meanwhile, in **Uganda** the authorities continued to threaten the media and accused Government critics of sedition, defamation and promoting violence. In **Zimbabwe**, members of the MDC party, large numbers of civil society organizations and human rights activists continued to condemn persecution of their sympathizers by the security forces and veteran militias loyal to president Robert Mugabe.

Regarding the state of human rights on the American continent and the Caribbean, it should be pointed out that police violence and extrajudicial executions were persistently carried out in Brazil and that the overcrowded and inhuman conditions prevailing in Brazilian jails continued to be one of the main human rights issues during the year. Philip Alston, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions said that in **Colombia** extrajudicial executions of civilians attributed to the Army were carried out systematically, although the Government denied the scale of the problem.[5] There were also a growing number of murders of trade unionists, which reached the highest level in the world and of which, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), 96% of cases went unpunished.[6] In the **US** president Barack Obama who, on assuming the presidency had committed himself to closing Guantánamo prison in January 2010, reiterated his commitment to closing it but admitted it was not possible to do so by the proposed date and declined to set a new date. In mid-December Obama ordered the acquisition of a prison in Illinois to house some of the prisoners who were still in Guantánamo. In April, the Justice Department declassified four CIA memoran-

Police violence and extrajudicial executions were persistently carried out in Brazil

dums written between 2002 and 2005 which revealed the use of torture in the fight against terrorism. However, in July the Government rejected requests by Manfred Nowak, the UN's special rapporteur on torture, and Martin Scheinin, the special rapporteur on human rights and the fight against terrorism, to visit the prison. In May the US was chosen for the first time to form part of the UN Human Rights Council for a period of three years. On the other hand, attention should be drawn to the events on June 5 in Bagua, in northeast **Peru**, in which 34 people died during clashes with the police, which was the subject of a report by James Anaya, the UN's special rapporteur on the rights of indigenous people.[7] In early 2010 Peru's Supreme Court ratified the 25-year prison sentence handed down in 2009 to the former president Alberto Fujimori. The former Peruvian leader (1990-2000) was found guilty of culpable homicide, premeditated murder, causing serious injury and kidnapping during the massacres in Barrios Altos and La Cantuta, which cost 25 deaths in 1991 and 1992, as well as the kidnapping of the journalist Gustavo Gorriti and the businessman Samuel Dyer in 1992. According to Amnesty International, this ruling is one of the most important in recent years by making a head of state responsible for crimes committed by bodies that he ordered into existence.

As for Central America, in **Guatemala** impunity was not only the norm for crimes committed during the conflict but continued to be a problem in relation to more recent crimes, as was reported by Leandro Despouy, the UN's special rapporteur on the independence of magistrates and lawyers, during his visit to the country in July. In **Haiti** a dysfunctional and politicized judicial system contributed to the worsening conditions of overcrowding in prisons, which occasionally gave rise to serious illnesses that were not treated. Meanwhile, human rights defenders continued to be the object of threats and attacks.

On a continent of **Asia**, **Afghanistan** was caught up in the worst wave of violence since the fall of the Taliban government and widespread violations of human rights were committed with complete impunity. Women and girls were the most badly affected and insecurity meant that many girls didn't go to school for fear of attack. There continued to be very limited freedom of expression, with continued attempts to silence opposition through threats and intimidation. In **Banda Aceh** the government passed unanimously a law enforcing the strict application of sharia, with severe punishments for homosexuality and premarital relations, including stoning in the case of adultery. In **Bangladesh** the police and the Rapid Action Battalion (an elite force set up to fight crime and terrorism) continued to carry out extra-

3. Declaration by Philip Alston, UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions, on his mission to DR Congo from 5-15 October 2009 at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/executions/docs/PressStatement_SumEx_DRC.pdf>.
4. See Chapter 3 (Peace processes).
5. Declaration by Philip Alston, UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions on his mission to Colombia 8 - 18 June, 2009, at <http://www.ddhhcolombia.org.co/node/232>.
6. Human Rights Watch, *Obama must speak to Uribe about his human rights concerns*, June 2009, at <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/26/colombia-obama-debe-expresarle-uribe-preocupaci-n-por-derechos-humanos>.
7. Observations made by James Anaya, UN special rapporteur on indigenous people, on the situation of the indigenous people of the Amazon and the events of June 5 and on ensuing days in the Peruvian provinces of Bagua and Utcubamba, Peru, 20 July 2009, at <http://www.aprodeh.org.pe/documentos/anaya.pdf>.

judicial executions which were covered up by the authorities. In **China**, clashes between the Uigur and Han communities in Xinjiang, followed by state repression, led to 156 deaths, more than 50 disappearances and the detention of more than 1,400 people, nine of whom were punished with the death penalty.[8] In the **Philippines** there was an ever-growing number of murders at the hands of death squads while reforms designed to reduce the number of killings of dissidents and others and to guarantee that those in power would respond to the abuses committed, were not applied. In **India**, Amnesty International condemned the excessive use of force by the police during ethnic clashes and violence against religious and linguistic minorities. Explosions in various parts of the country killed hundreds of people and, by way of response, the Government arbitrarily arrested and tortured suspects.

Another pertinent event was the new three-year prison sentence given to activist Aung San Suu Kyi in August by a **Myanmar** court, which was later commuted to a further 18 months house arrest. In November, Tomás Ojea, the UN's special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar, urged the government to free political prisoners and prisoners of conscience before the 2010 elections so that they could take part. In **Pakistan** there were continued "honour killings" for alleged breaches of moral codes, particular in the case of adultery, with women the main victims, although there are no exact figures for 2009.

In the Philippines there was an ever-growing number of murders at the hands of death squads

In **Central Asia**, there were continuing cases of religious repression and harassment of human rights defenders and journalists. In **Kyrgyzstan** human rights defenders were arrested and in some cases held in psychiatric hospitals. In January the president ratified a law on religious practices which prohibited proselytism. Meanwhile, in **Uzbekistan** NGOs were closely watched by the State and were not allowed to receive funds from abroad. In the **Caucasus**, independent journalists were intimidated, arrested and sent to prison after staged trials in **Azerbaijan** and there were continued attacks and even murders of independent journalists. In April, the NGOs HRW, Memorial, Human Rights Centre and Russian Justice condemned the Russian Government for ignoring more than 100 rulings handed down by the European Court of Human Rights which said that **Russia** was responsible for serious violations of human rights in Chechnya. In July, and following the recommendation in May[9] by a Universal Periodic Review of Russia, seven UN human rights experts asked Russia for an invitation to visit the country in order to help the authorities carry out an independent investigation into the murder of activists in recent years. UN's special rapporteur on torture, who planned to visit the country in July, decided to postpone his visit when the Russian Government said that private interviews with detainees were against laws of the Russian Federation.

In **Europe**, according to a survey published in April by the EU's Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), racism and xenophobia prevailed throughout the year, with increasing attacks on Roma people being among the most widespread in Europe.[10] In **Bosnia and Herzegovina** thousands of women and girls who were raped during the war still have no access to justice and there was a prevailing climate of impunity in regard to this type of crime. In **Spain**, according to Amnesty International, the authorities continued to use the Criminal Justice Law, under which people can be held incommunicado for five days in all cases and up to 13 days if they are suspected of terrorist crimes.[11]

In the **Middle East**, **Saudi Arabia** carried out a campaign of harassment of human rights defenders with the pretext of fighting terrorism and continued to discriminate against Shia Muslims who make up between 10 and 15% of the population. In **Iran**, there were an increasing number of arrests of journalists who criticized the Government and who condemned the death and disappearance of many people after the presidential elections in June.[12] In **Iraq** there was an alarming increase in the number of executions (120 people were executed during the year) after unfair trials. Finally, a year after Israel's huge military offensive against the **Gaza Strip** no one had been called to account for the war crimes and other serious violations of human rights condemned by a UN research team and by Palestinian, Israeli and international human rights organizations.[13]

b) The International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and human rights in the context of armed conflict

During 2009 a large number of civilians were victims of armed conflicts. Rape continued to be used as a weapon of war and yet again many minors were used as child soldiers. Antipersonnel mines and other armaments continued to cause death and mutilation among civilians. In this regard, the Cartagena Summit, held in Colombia at the end of the year, reviewed progress and outstanding challenges 10 years after the Convention on the Prohibition of Antipersonnel Mines came into force. In the annual report to the UN Council on Human Rights, Radhika Coomaraswamy, the special representa-

8. Human Rights Watch, *We are afraid to even look at them*, October 2009, at <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/10/22/we-are-afraid-even-look-them>. Also see Chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).
9. Final Document of the Periodic report of the Human Rights Council of the Russian Federation, at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/135/87/PDF/G0913587.pdf?OpenElement>.
10. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *The Situation of Roma EU Citizens Moving to and Settling in Other EU Member States*. European Union, 9 November, 2009, at <http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/home/pub_cr_roma-movement_en.htm>.
11. Amnesty International, *Spain: Out of the shadows. Time to End Incommunicado Detention*. AI, 15 September 2009, at <http://www.es.amnesty.org/uploads/media/Salir_de_las_sombras.pdf>.
12. See Chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).
13. See Chapter 4 (Humanitarian crises).

tive for children and armed conflicts, expressed grave concern for the continuing violation of human rights committed against minors by parties to conflict, in flagrant violation of international norms, and said that the only measure against the recruitment of child soldiers and other serious abuses suffered by children was to bring those responsible to justice.[14]

In **Africa**, according to UN figures, the Army and armed groups in **Chad** recruited between 7,000 and 10,000 children. In the **Central African Republic** all parties involved in the conflict committed serious abuses against children, including rape and forced recruitment, with complete impunity. On the other hand, the conflict in **DR Congo** was completely entrenched and, according to Philip Alston, who visited the country in October, the situation could not be more desperate. The level of impunity for the massacres was such that even Bosco Ntaganda, wanted by the ICC for using child soldiers, occupied a senior position in the military operations of the past year. In September, UNICEF said that parties to the conflict in DR Congo had recruited and used more child soldiers than in any other conflict in the world. On a positive note, since the beginning of the year UNICEF succeeded in freeing 2,813 children, including 360 girls, from groups who were using them as soldiers, sexual slaves and workers in various African countries. Also in Africa, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, warned in July that there was proof of atrocities committed against civilians in **Somalia** and said that displaced people, human rights and humanitarian workers were the ones who are most vulnerable to these abuses. Sima Samar, a UN expert on the human rights situation in **Sudan**, expressed concern for the restrictions imposed by the Government on journalists and human rights defenders and emphasized the importance of guaranteeing freedom of expression and association in order to create an atmosphere suitable for elections scheduled for April 2010.

In **America**, Philip Alston, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, said that in **Colombia** there were a large number of so-called "false positives" (civilians murdered by of the army who were later listed as guerrillas or paramilitaries killed in combat). According to *The Report on the Situation of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in Colombia* which refers to 2008,[15] drawn up by the UN High Commission, approximately 1,800 of these false positives were counted in this period.

In **Asia**, it should be pointed out that **Afghanistan** signed up at the end of the year to the Additional Protocols (1977) of the Geneva Convention in relation to the protection of victims of international and other armed conflicts. Radhika Coomaraswamy, the UN special representative for children in armed conflicts, condemned the growing number of attacks against children by the Taliban and other armed groups in Afghanistan, as well

as the fact that the Taliban continued to use children for suicide attacks, attack schools and used acid to burn the faces of girls and teachers. At the same time, the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights condemned the numerous illegal detentions in Afghanistan, saying that in many cases those arrested did not enjoy the basic rights enshrined in the Constitution.

In the **Philippines**, Philip Alston, the UN's special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions confirmed that progress had been made since the recommendations drawn up during his visit to the Philippines in 2007 but condemned the lack of action regarding death squads, the murder of left-wing activists and the general climate of impunity. In **Sri Lanka**, both the armed group LTTE and the Armed Forces committed serious violations of the IHL, including war crimes. The LTTE took civilians by force in the conflict zone to use them as "human shields" against Government forces who in turn used heavy artillery, indiscriminately causing civilian deaths and injuries.

In **Europe**, a year after the conflict between **Georgia** and the **Russian Federation**, thousands of civilians remained displaced with little hope of returning home. Both they and the various thousands who were able to go home faced an insecure future. In April, Russia announced the end of the "anti-terrorist operation" that it had been carrying out for 10 years in Chechnya, saying that normality had returned. However, no one has been called to account for the serious violations of human rights committed during the last 10 years. Serious abuses continued, including kidnappings and disappearances. These were confirmed by local NGOs, such as Memorial, and international organizations such as the UN Committee on Human Rights and the human rights commissioner of the Council of Europe, who urged Russia to end the climate of abuse against civilians and allow independent investigations.[16] In **Ingushetia,** according to the organization Memorial, kidnappings continued at approximately the same level as in 2008. In October, the European Parliament awarded the Sakharov prize to Memorial for its human rights work in former Soviet territory.

In the **Middle East**, six years after the invasion of **Iraq,** the human rights situation there continued to be precarious and there was a prevailing climate of impunity. The organization HRW strongly condemned a wave of attacks against civilians after US troops withdrew from cities and villages on June 30. Regarding the conflict between **Israel and Palestine**, the UN mission led by the South Africa and Judge Richard Goldstone arrived in the Gaza Strip in June to investigate alleged war crimes committed by Israel and Hamas during Israel's offensive the previous December and January.[17] In October, the UN Human Rights Council approved a resolution based on the report presented by Goldstone which condemned Israel and the Islamist Palestinian group Ha-

14. See <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-49_E.pdf>.
15. United Nations, *Annual report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on human rights in Colombia*. A/HRC/10/32, March 9 2009, at <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2009.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/SNAA-7VD3FA-informe_completo.pdf/$File/informe_completo.pdf>.
16. See Chapter 1 (Armed conflicts).
17. United Nations, *Report of the UN investigating mission into the conflict in Gaza*. A/HRC/12/48 25 September 2009, at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf>.

mas for war crimes during the offensive. On November 5 the UN General Assembly approved a resolution asking that the secretary-general send the Goldstone report to the Security Council, while Israel rejected the report as biased. Meanwhile, in March the organization Breaking the Silence published a report with testimony from 54 Israeli soldiers who said they had received very "permissive" orders, such as that they could open fire on any building or person that to them appeared suspicious.[18] At the same time, the International Red Cross said that six months after the Israeli attack the Palestinians of Gaza faced growing poverty and deteriorating living conditions, among them the collapse of the health system and a lack of medicine.

c) Human rights and terrorism

The so-called war on international terrorism continued to undermine human rights on a world scale and States that resorted to banned practices under international law continued to claim that these were necessary in the name of national security. According to a report published by the group of human rights experts, Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, the war against terrorism adopted by countries all over the world since 2001 represents a serious threat to the integrity of the international human rights framework. The report condemned the fact that these policies, which were originally adopted as a provisional measure, have become permanent.[19] The UN's special rapporteur for human rights in the war against terrorism, Martin Scheinin, announced in March that a study was being prepared on the practice of **secret detentions** and said that this investigation, which was being carried out jointly with the rapporteur on torture Manfred Nowak, would examine the question in depth. The rapporteur warned that in some countries intelligence agencies have been given

The war against terrorism adopted by countries all over the world since 2001 represents a serious threat to the integrity of the international human rights framework

extended powers to interrogate, arrest and hold people and that the practice on the part of intelligence agencies of not presenting "confidential" evidence in court, instead of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, amounted to a threat to the rule of law. The report criticized the US for its policy of extraordinary rendition and censured the United Kingdom, Australia and other countries for offering to help the Americans. Scheinin, who has always spoken openly about the need to put limits on the powers of intelligence agencies, had already urged the UN in October 2008 to restructure or eliminate the existing terrorist blacklist.

As for torture, the four secret memoranda which the **US** Government decided to make public at the beginning of the year revealed the use of *waterboarding* (simulated drowning) and other maltreatment in the name of the struggle against terrorism. Barack Obama banned the use of this technique and annulled the legislation passed by the administration of his predecessor George W. Bush under which *waterboarding* was not regarded as torture. However, later announcements by Obama and the attorney-general, Eric Holder, confirming the impunity of those responsible for the tortures were, in the words of Amnesty International,[20] incompatible with the US's obligation under international law to bring those responsible to justice. By the end of the year it was not considered possible to honour Obama's commitment to close Guantanamo by January 2010, even though various European countries expressed their willingness to take in a number of prisoners. On a positive note, human rights organizations expressed satisfaction with the measure adopted by the Obama administration to suspend military tribunals in Guantanamo. However, the US Government blocked the publication of photographs showing the abuse of prisoners in US custody in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Box 5.1. **The Goldstone report on the Israeli military incursion into the Gaza Strip**

After a two-day debate, on November 5 the UN General Assembly approved a resolution which asked the secretary-general to send the Goldstone report, drawn up by the UN mission that investigated violations of human rights perpetrated during the Israeli military incursion in the Gaza Strip, to the Security Council. This report was the result of three months of research led by the South African judge Richard Goldstone, who said in his report that both Israelis and Palestinians were guilty of war crimes. The text of the resolution, promoted by the Arab League and the Movement of Non-aligned Countries, was adopted with 114 votes in favour, 18 against and 44 abstentions. The resolution backed the report and asked the secretary-general that he inform the General Assembly within three months on the advances made regarding the report's recommendations, with a view to adopting new measures. On the other hand, the document urged Israel and the Palestinians to carry out within the same period of three months an independent investigation into violations of international humanitarian law committed during the Israeli incursion from December 2008 to January 2009. Israel, the US, Poland and Australia were among the countries that opposed the resolution. The report recommended that evidence concerning war crimes be sent to the international Criminal Court if the parties (Israel and Hamas) didn't carry out independent investigations. Before the resolution was approved, many speakers underlined the importance of the Goldstone report, which was described as an important step to ending what was described as "Israel's impunity in its crimes against Palestinians". During the Israeli incursion 1,440 Palestinians and 13 Israelis died.

18. See testimonies 2009 at <http://www.shovrimshtika.org/news_item_e.asp?id=28>.
19. International Commission of Jurists, *Assessing Damage, Urging Action, Report of the Eminent Jurist Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights*. Geneva: ICJ, 2009, at <http://www.icj.org/IMG/EJP-Report.pdf>.
20. Amnesty International, *Impunity for CIA torture is incompatible with USA's international obligations,* AI, April 17, 2009, at <http://www.amnesty.org/es/news-and-updates/impunidad-torturas-cia-incompatible-obligaciones-eeuu-20090417>.

During the year there was growing pressure on the US Government to release details about secret prisons run by the CIA in which terrorist suspects were held. The Washington Post [21] revealed in 2005 that shortly after the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the CIA had set up secret prisons for people suspected of belonging to the al-Qaeda terrorist network in at least eight countries, among them Afghanistan and the Guantanamo military base in Cuba. The newspaper also said that some of these prisons were located in Eastern Europe, but did not reveal which countries were involved at the request of senior members of the US administration. However, HRW said that independent research showed that the CIA facilities in the region were in Poland and Romania.[22]

On the International Day Against Torture on June 26, Terry Davis, secretary-general of the Council of Europe, recalled the recommendations made in 2006 to member states in relation to so-called **"extraordinary rendition"** (rendition flights) and secret detentions in Europe and regretted the limited response. Davis warned European states that the secret CIA flights and illegal kidnappings would not be forgotten and urged governments to unconditionally reject these activities. Meanwhile, a report presented in August by the inspector-general of the CIA made it clear that Europe's role in practices that violated the European Convention on Human Rights has been much greater than was earlier thought. However, the number of activities listed in the report was incomplete as, according to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), various sections had been blanked out.[23] In regard to advances in the protection of human rights in the war against terrorism, one thing that stands out is the first sentence handed down in November by an Italian judge who condemned 23 former CIA agents to between five and eight years in prison for the kidnapping of the former Milan imam, Abu Omar, in February 2003. Omar was first taken to the Italian air base at Aviano and then to the German base at Ramstein before being sent to a high-security prison in Egypt, where he was held for four years and was allegedly tortured.[24]

d) Human Rights Index 2009

The Human Rights Index (HRIN) of the Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace, ECP) measures the degree of vulnerability of citizens and the failure of States to comply with human rights obligations in 195 countries (the 192 member states of the United Nations, as well as the Palestinian Authority, Taiwan and the Vatican) over a fixed period of time and according to different sources. It is made up of 22 specific indicators divided into three dimensions: a) the non-ratification of the main instruments of the International Human Rights Law, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), b) violation of International Human Rights Law and c) violation of the International Humanitarian Law.[25]

The following table shows the 20 countries offering the least protection and the lowest compliance with the human rights obligations of States according to the HRIN 2009.

Table 5.1. **Countries offering the least protection and with lowest compliance with human rights obligations according to the HRIN 2009**

Myanmar	Thailand	Iraq	Turkey	Congo, DR
Sudan	Russian Fed.	Sri Lanka	Yemen	Uganda
Pakistan	Somalia	China	Algeria	Ethiopia
Nigeria	India	Nepal	Afghanistan	Israel

These figures are in contrast with the eight countries that can count on a special geographical[26] procedure from the United Nations or were the subject of some type of resolution by the CDH or the UN during sessions held in 2009.[27]

In regard to the violation of the International Human Rights Law (dimension b of the HRIN) the 24 countries in the upper range are:

Table 5.2. **Countries that systematically violate the International Human Rights Law according to the HRIN 2009**

Myanmar	Mexico	Zimbabwe	India	Uzbekistan
Sudan	Pakistan	Algeria	Iraq	Burundi
Nigeria	Russian Fed.	Bangladesh	Malaysia	Cambodia
China	Thailand	Eritrea	Somalia	Ethiopia
Equatorial Guinea	Kenya	Guinea	Sri Lanka	

These indicators show that in a large number of countries (122) there was systematic discrimination (on grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation or place of origin) or cases of the abuse and exploitation of children. In 103 countries there was torture and maltreatment; 63 practised systematic arbitrary arrests and in 29 there were deaths in custody. The number of countries where there were extrajudicial executions rose to 63 and in another 78 a climate of impunity prevailed regarding the violation of human rights.

21. The Washington Post, *CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons*. 2 November 2005, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html>.
22. Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2009*. HRW, 2009 at <http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2009/european-union#_Poland_1>.
23. America Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is a US organization that protects and guards individual liberties guaranteed under US law and the Constitution. See *ACLU Obtains Detailed Official Record of CIA Torture Program*. 24 August 2009, at <http://www.aclu.org/human-rights_national-security/aclu-obtains-detailed-official-record-cia-torture-program>.
24. El País, *La justicia italiana condena a 23 agentes de la CIA por secuestro*, November 4 2009, at <http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/justicia/italiana/condena/23/agentes/CIA/secuestro/elpepuint/20091104elpepuint_15/Tes>.
25. Appendix VII contains data, a description of the indicators and the evaluation and weighting of the HRIN.
26. There are currently special proceedings relating to Burundi, Cambodia, North Korea, Haiti, Myanmar, the Palestine Occupied Territories (since 1967), Somalia and Sudan.
27. See appendix VI.

As for the indicator on the death penalty, according to Amnesty International, 2,390 people were executed in 25 countries during 2008. As in previous years, the countries with the highest number of executions were **China, Iran, Saudi Arabia**, **Pakistan** and the **US.** These countries accounted for 93% of all executions carried out during the year. The continent with the highest number of executions was Asia. In America there were 38 executions: 37 in the US and one in the state comprised of the islands of **St. Kitts and Nevis**. The region with the second highest level of executions (21%) was the Middle East and North Africa. There were at least two executions in sub-Saharan Africa, in **Botswana** and **Sudan**. In spite of being party to the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, **Liberia** reintroduced the death penalty for the crimes of theft, terrorism and the hijacking of aircraft, a regrettable step backward.[28] On the other hand, **Europe** may become the first region in the world that doesn't practice the death penalty. In 2008 there were at least four executions in **Belarus**. For the past 10 years there has been a moratorium in the **Russian Federation** on executions and death penalties, although there has not yet been legislation abolishing the death penalty.

Finally, the following table shows the 22 countries with the worst record of violating the IHL. In this regard state agencies or armed opposition groups in 31 countries violated some clause of the IV Geneva Convention within or outside their territory and 43 countries had regular or irregular forces that recruited children, according to the HRIN.

2009 marked the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child

Table 5.3. **Countries that systematically violate the IHL according to HRIN 2009**

Afghanistan	Lebanon	Somalia
Chad	Myanmar	Sri Lanka
Colombia	Nepal	Sudan
Congo, DR	Nigeria	Thailand
Philippines	Pakistan	Turkey
India	Central African	Uganda
Iraq	Republic	Yemen
Israel	Russian Fed.	

e) Principal debates

One of the most pertinent debates in the human rights field during 2009 has centred on the persistent violation of children's rights on an international scale, 20 years since the adoption of the Convention on Children's Rights; and the increasingly widely held view that on a world scale, poverty amounts to one of the most flagrant violations of human rights.

The year 2009 marked the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the **Convention on Children's Rights (CCR),** the main instrument of international law that obliges states to protect and guarantee the rights of children. The Convention, **adopted by every country in the world with the exception of the US,** brings together in 54 articles the rights to physical, intellectual and social development of children under 18. However, in spite of this historic landmark, failure to grant these rights in the majority of countries means that the violation of children's rights –especially social and economic rights– continues on a huge scale. To begin with it should be pointed out that every year 11 million children (that is to say, 30,000 a day) die before they reach the age of five, mainly through malnutrition. In several continents the situation is endemic. According to UNICEF figures, almost one and a half million under-fives suffer from chronic malnutrition.[29] **Infant mortality** is closely linked to poverty: advances in survival rates of the under-fives have happened much more slowly in poor countries and among the poorest of those countries with more resources. Improving public health services is a key element, as well as improving access to drinking water and better sanitation, the lack of which is the main cause of sickness and death in this age group.

In the field of education, the figures have improved, but UNICEF estimates that there are still 93 million children who do not go to primary school, most of them girls, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa and southern Asia. Another important statistic is the large number of child labourers. Although in some countries it is difficult to come by reliable statistics, it is estimated that there are some 246 million **child labourers** in the world. And according to UNICEF, some 1.2 million children are victims of **child trafficking** as demand increases for boys and girls who are employed either in the home or are sexually exploited.[30] In this regard, it is worth noting that the estimates regarding compliance with the Millennium Development Goals (MDO), which include various goals related to the social and economic rights of children, indicate that most countries have not complied with the majority of these objectives. According to the 2009 Report on the UN Millennium Development Goals,[31] although there have been clear advances, up to now these advances have been undermined by food, economic and environmental crises. A UNICEF report published at the end of 2009 provides statistical evidence of the impact of these events on children.[32]

28. Amnesty International, *Executions in 2008*. AI, 2008, at <http://www.amnesty.org/es/death-penalty>. Figures for 2009 published in March 2010.
29. UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children*. UNICEF, November 2009, at <http://www.unicef.es/documentacion/documentos_ampliado.htm?iddocumento=87>.
30. UNICEF, *Child protection from violence and abuse: the treatment of boys and girls*. UNICEF, September 2009 <http://www.unicef.org/spanish/protection/index_exploitation.html>.
31. United Nations, *Millennium Development Goals. Report 2009*. United Nations, 2009, at <http://www.un.org/spanish/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG_Report_2009_SP_r3.pdf>.
32. UNICEF, *Progress for Children: A report card on child protection*. UNICEF, September 2009, at <http://www.unicef.org/spanish/publications/files/Progress_for_Children-No.8_SP_081309.pdf>.

Finally, it should be highlighted that children are also the main victims of armed conflict. An estimated 20 million children live as **refugees** or have suffered **internal displacement** as a result of conflict. And every year, **landmines** kill or mutilate between 8,000 and 10,000 children around the world. There are also an estimated 300,000 **child soldiers** taking part in more than 30 conflicts[33] around the world in spite of the fact that international law prohibits the recruitment of children into the Armed Forces and armed groups and considers it a war crime.[34]

Another area on which human rights work is focused is **poverty**, one of the most flagrant violations of human rights on an international scale. Close to 1 billion people live on less than one dollar a day, while inequality within and between countries continues to grow. Furthermore, according to figures published by the FAO in October 2009, the number of people suffering from malnutrition has reached 1 billion, 100 million more than in 2008.[35] According to other important data from Social Watch, every day 100,000 people die from hunger –30,000 of them under five years old– and another 854 million people do not have enough food to cover their basic nutritional needs.[36] Faced with this, a number of human rights NGOs and international agencies demanded during 2009 that the question of poverty be treated from a perspective of human rights. In this regard, Irene Khan, the secretary-general of Amnesty International, said that poverty is a negation of social and economic rights, including food shortages and the use of food supply as a political weapon. She condemned the fact that, in their struggle to control the economic crisis, political and business leaders have given secondary consideration to problems related to human rights. The situation of extreme and widespread shortages continued and came to a head during 2009 because of the economic crisis. In spite of this, the UN declaration on human rights and poverty made on December 10, 2006 remains relevant. This states that, although poverty is clearly a cause and effect of the violation of human rights, it is rarely seen in a human rights perspective, and that the full relaxation of human rights, including the struggle against poverty, is a duty and not a mere aspiration.[37]

Box 5.2. **The Optional Protocols of the Rights of the Child**

In an effort to eliminate the growing abuse and exploitation of children throughout the world, in 2000 the UN General Assembly approved the Optional Protocols of the Convention which reinforced the protection of children from becoming involved in armed conflicts and sexual exploitation. A Protocol is "optional" as it doesn't apply automatically to states that have already ratified the Convention. There may be additional obligations that are usually more demanding than those contained in the original Convention. Fundamentally, the Optional Protocol on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography obliges governments to investigate and punish crimes related to these activities. It demands penalties not just for those who offer or supply children for sexual exploitation, organ transplants, profit or forced labour, but also to anyone who receives a child destined to take part in any of these activities. It is estimated that around 1 million children (mainly girls, but also a considerable number of boys) are victims of commercial sex networks. Up to now more than 100 countries have signed and ratified this Protocol but work is needed to involve other relevant sectors, such as the tourist industry.

The Optional Protocol on the participation of children in armed conflicts sets at 18 the minimum age for a compulsory recruitment and urges States to do everything possible to avoid under-18s taking part directly in hostilities. It also establishes that states must use judicial means to prohibit armed groups from recruiting children. According to figures from the most recent report by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Africa is the continent with the largest number of child soldiers, while in Latin America it is estimated that around 14,000 children are linked to armed groups in Colombia and the paramilitary groups backed by the Army. In Europe, it is thought that children are involved in various armed groups in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, although it is difficult to know the exact number because of the limited access to the area afford to the media and NGOs. In any case, figures show that it is a phenomenon that forms a part of the majority of current conflicts. As regards this type of crime coming to court, it is worth highlighting that in 2009 the International Criminal Court initiated what is up to now the first trial of such a case in which Thomas Lubanga, leader of the UPC in DR Congo, was charged with, among other charges, recruiting and using children. The Court also issued arrest warrants for crimes related to children against members of the armed groups of the DR Congo and Uganda, and the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone made history in 2007 when it sentenced various people for committing this type of crime.

33. See Chapter 1 (Armed conflicts).
34. See part c) on the International Humanitarian Law.
35. FAO, *The state of food security on the world 2009: Economic crises, impacts and lessons learned*. FAO, 2009, at <http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i0876s/i0876s00.HTM>.
36. Social Watch, *Report 2009. People First*, Social Watch, 2009, at <http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/default/files/SocialWatch-Informe-2009.pdf>.
37. See UN declaration on 10 December 2006 on human rights and poverty at <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/events/day2006/docs/Overview.HRD2006.FINAL_sp.pdf>.

5.2. Transitional justice

What follows is a review of some of the most important developments in relation to the process of transitional justice during 2009,[38] among them the question of universal jurisdiction, the work of the International Criminal Court and of mixed hybrid and international tribunals, as well as truth commissions and other investigative commissions.

a) Universal jurisdiction

Universal jurisdiction is an instrument to be used to circumvent international impunity whenever a State investigates and takes legal action against people who have allegedly committed crimes outside of their territory. It reflects equally the obligation of states, laid down in international treaties on human rights, to try or hand over those held responsible. Very often this principle is the last option open to victims to get to the truth and to obtain justice and reparations in those countries where it is difficult to investigate or bring to trial political or military figures that are still active or have occupied relevant positions in the country's political sphere, or other people close to them. The concept of universal jurisdiction is based on the idea that certain crimes are such atrocities for the international community as a whole that states are authorized, indeed obliged, to investigate and try the alleged perpetrators wherever they may have committed the crime and regardless of the nationality of the author or the victim of the crime. This principle is particularly important when it is borne in mind that in a large majority of countries, those assumed to have committed these crimes are rarely tried for lack of juridical capability or because of political pressure.

Since the end of the Second World War, more than 15 countries have used universal jurisdiction in investigations or trials of people suspected of having committed crimes against international law, among them Germany, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Spain, the US, Finland, France, Norway, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Senegal, while others, such as Mexico, have extradited people from other countries for trial under this principle. The **US** is proposing a law called "Crimes Against Humanity Act 2009" which, should it be passed, will make it a federal crime to carry out a widespread and systematic attack against civilians which involves murder, slavery, torture, rape, arbitrary arrests, extermination, taking hostages or ethnic cleansing. The law would cover this type of crime committed anywhere in the world by a US citizen or any other person present in the US, regardless of their nationality. However, while HRW expressed satisfaction with the plan, it was also concerned that the law departed from the international definition of crimes against humanity. In particular, the proposed law requires that an attack against civilians must be both widespread and systematic, while the normally accepted definition is "widespread *or* systematic".

Trials related to war crimes and crimes against humanity began in numerous countries during 2009. Among the most notable was the trial that opened on December 18, 2009 in **Argentina** of former military personnel active during the Argentinean dictatorship (1976 to 1983). Eighteen officials were accused of violations of human rights carried out in the Escuela Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA), one of the main torture centres in Latin America. When the Argentine army took power in 1976 it decided to apply the so-called "National Process of Reorganization" and during the following seven years between 9,000 and 30,000 people were murdered or disappeared. During the Process, the ESMA was the main detention centre in the country and served as a base for paramilitary units and special groups who kidnapped people from their homes or in the street. People who were taken to ESMA suffered terrible tortures and then disappeared. It is thought that 5,000 Argentineans passed through ESMA of whom 1,500 were anaesthetized and thrown into the sea from planes

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Box 5.3. **The restriction on the principle of universal jurisdiction in Spain**

On May 19, 2009, without any public debate, the Spanish Congress approved, by a large majority, a Government initiative to modify article 23.4 of the Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial (Organic Law on Judicial Power) which establishes the principle of universal jurisdiction. This reform limited the power of the Audiencia Nacional (High Court) regarding universal jurisdiction in cases where there were links to a "relevant connection" (a concept as yet not defined), Spanish victims or where those responsible for the crime were in Spain. The reform also established other formal criteria on admissibility that made the investigation and bringing to trial of a crime under this juridical regime more difficult. Under this new article, High Court judges will not be able to take action if an investigation or an "effective persecution" of the matter in hand was already open in the country where it had been committed or if an international tribunal or other competent court has opened an investigation into the matter. This requirement represents a *de facto* barrier to the admission of new cases, given that it is extremely difficult to research and prove that there is no case already open in the country of origin or in another country. On the other hand, it leaves the door open to hear the case within the national jurisdiction without the necessary judicial guarantees simply to stop any possibility of Spain acting under universal jurisdiction. The High Court currently has 15 cases open under this principle. These relate to the investigation of genocide in Guatemala, Rwanda and Tibet, war crimes in Gaza, torture in Guantanamo and, more recently, acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia. These trials can lay the foundations for jurisprudence such as in the 2005 sentence in the Scilingo case, the only trial completed till now in Spain that recognizes that states are competent to act in the interests of the international community.

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38. Transitional justice is understood to mean the combination of judicial and extrajudicial mechanisms put into play by societies in transition to deal with a past of violations and systematic abuse of human rights. Transitional justice's main strategies consist of bringing to justice (through international, mixed, hybrid and traditional courts), reform of State institutions (security forces and public office holders), truth commissions and historic clarification (official and unofficial and international commissions) reparations to victims (restitution, indemnity, rehabilitation, moral or collective memory compensation and guarantees against repetition) as well as efforts towards reconciliation.

in so-called "death flights". It is thought that fewer than 200 Argentineans survived being taken to the centre.

b) The International Criminal Court (ICC)

Throughout 2009 it was once again clear that there was a general lack of collaboration between states and the ICC in the arrest and handing over of those suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity, thus creating one of the main obstacles to the development of the Court's outstanding cases.[39] One thing that stands out in this regard was the controversy generated by the warrant issued in March for the arrest of the Sudanese president **Omar al-Bashir**, on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur, the first relating to an incumbent leader, which led to the presentation of a petition to the AU, later watered down, to the effect that the order should be ignored by member states. This was backed by a large number of African countries who felt that the ICC was ignoring violations of human rights committed on other continents, and was also heavily criticized by other African governments and local human rights NGOs. It should be borne in mind that Africa is a continent with the most representation –30 countries– in the ICC and as a result of which a large number of African countries have specific obligations under the Rome Statute. In any case, the arrest warrant for president al-Bashir restricted to a certain degree his international movements as he feared arrest.

In spite of the difficulty of arresting suspects, the judicial processes continued on course and the prosecutor said that investigations into crimes had been opened in Afghanistan, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Georgia, Guinea, Kenya and Palestine. In regard to ongoing cases, the court opened the way in October to confirm charges against Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, leader of the rebel group URF, and the first war crimes suspect to stand before the Court in relation to the situation in **Darfur**. The ICC Appeal Court confirmed that it was admitting the case against the former leader of the FRPI, **Germain Katanga,** although he alleged that the ICC had violated the principle of complementarity. **Jean-Pierre Bemba**, the former vice-president of DR Congo, arrested in May 2008, remained in detention awaiting trial in spite of a judge's decision to grant him provisional release. The Court chief prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, appealed against his ruling because he considered the suspect a flight risk and finally the order was suspended. The trial against Bemba, accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, allegedly committed in the Central African Republic between October 2002 and March 2003, is expected to begin in April 2010.

The trial of **Thomas Lubanga**, the leader of the UPC accused of war crimes and recruiting child soldiers be-

> *Throughout 2009 it was once again clear that there was a general lack of collaboration between states and the ICC in the arrest and handing over of those suspected of war crimes*

tween 2002 2003 in the east of DR Congo, began in January 2009 after a long delay during 2008 due to a procedural error. By the end of the year, the Chamber had heard testimony from some 30 people, 25 of whom had to be given special protection. Regarding crimes committed in **Kenya**, in July the former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan handed a sealed envelope to the Court prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, containing the names of at least 10 senior members of the government allegedly involved in a wave of violence that spread across the country after the presidential elections in 2007, leaving more than 1,500 people dead and around 300,000 people displaced. This act provoked a range of reactions but the Kenyan vice-president, Kalonzo Musyoka, expressed his concern and said that the former UN secretary-general had precipitated in handing over the list because the Government had not yet reached the deadline for passing a tribunal law, expected in August.[40] The Government eventually admitted that it was incapable of taking measures and said it was ready to cooperate with the ICC, after the failure to set up a special tribunal before September 30. At the end of November the Court prosecutor asked to open a *motu propio* investigation into the case.

c) *Ad hoc* international criminal tribunals

The International Criminal Court for Rwanda (ICCR)[41] saw the arrest of important suspects, plus numerous sentences and initiated particularly significant trials. However, it was also the subject of fierce criticism, one of which concerns the refusal to take cases within Rwandan jurisdiction. For this reason Martin Ngoga, the country's attorney-general, told the UN Security Council that the Tribunal's decision not to try outstanding cases in Rwandan courts undermined efforts to reform the country's judicial system and made national reconciliation more difficult. Tharcisse Karugarama, the Rwandan justice minister, said that the ICCR had not kept its promise that the Rwandan accused would be sent to serve their sentences in their country of origin and said he didn't understand why the tribunal had not sent prisoners to Rwandan prisons when these were considered adequate for the Special Tribunal on Sierra Leone. The Mpanga prison was built in 2004 to house 7,500 prisoners accused of genocide and one of its wings was set aside for prisoners from the ICCR which, however, has not as yet sent any of its detainees. Another important debate arose in August when HRW said the ICCR would lose credibility if it didn't try and condemn those members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) suspected of committing war crimes who were currently in power in Rwanda. However, the chief prosecutor of the ICCR, Hassan Jallow, said on numerous occasions that he had done everything possible to investigate crimes committed by all parties and had told the UN Security Council in June that there was no clear accusation

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39. See <http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC>.
40. See Chapter 2 (Socio-political crises).
41. This tribunal was set up by the UN Security Council under resolution 955 on November 8 1994 to bring to justice those responsible for genocide and other serious abuses of International Humanitarian Law in Rwanda and neighbouring countries between January 1 and December 31, 1994.

against the RPF. HRW believes that the attempt last year by Rwanda to try members of the RPF in their own country –known as the Kabgayi case– was in reality a political cover-up and proof of the malfunctioning judicial system.

The work of the **International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia** (ICTY) was marked by delays in the trial of **Radovan Karadzic**, president of the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who boycotted the trial until the third hearing. Faced with this situation, the tribunal asked for an official lawyer to represent Karadzic and announced that the trial would resume in March 2010 in order to give time for the defence to prepare. The tribunal rejected Karadzic's claim to immunity based on an agreement signed in 1996 with the then US ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke. The latter denied the existence of such an agreement and the prosecutor said that no documents had been found to confirm the existence of such a pact. Meanwhile the former Serbo-Bosnian president **Biljana Plavsic** was freed, having served two thirds of her sentence in a Swedish jail for war crimes committed between July 1991 and December 1992. Plavsic gave herself up voluntarily to the ICTY in 2001 and was jailed for 11 years. In May 2009, the Swedish prison service told the tribunal that in October Plavsic would have completed two thirds of her sentence and therefore under Swedish law she could be freed. At the end of the year the ICTY agreed to the freeing of Plavsic, known as the "Iron Lady", the highest ranking official in the former Yugoslavia who had been found guilty of taking part in the Bosnian war.

The work of the ICTY was marked by delays in the trial of Radovan Karadzic

In regard to the genocide at **Srebrenica**, Peter McCloskey, the tribunal's prosecutor, asked for life sentences for seven high-ranking Serbo-Bosnian military officers and policemen. Among the accused were people who had been close to Ratko Mladic, the Army Chief of Staff in the Republika Srpska, such as Colonel Ljubise Beara, the Serbo-Bosnian army's head of security and thought to be one of the main architects of the massacre. All seven pleaded not guilty to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In December 2009, the prosecutor Serge Brammertz once again demanded greater haste on the part of Serbia for the arrest of the two war criminals still on the run, **Ratko Mladic** and **Goran Hadžic**.[42] Quite aside from the legal question, it continued to be a vitally important political issue in regard to Serbia's aspirations to join the EU. Meanwhile, Patrick Robinson, the tribunal president urged the UN Security Council to established a reparations commission linked to the tribunal, given that currently no such mechanism exists, although it is one of the pillars of International Law.

d) Mixed, hybrid or internationalised criminal courts

The **Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone**[43] handed down some of its last sentences in Freetown, while asking for more resources to complete its mandate in 2010. The Tribunal, which is funded by countries' voluntary contributions, feared trials might be stopped, among them the trial of the former Liberian president Charles Taylor,[44] which began in January 2008 and whose verdict was expected at the beginning of 2010. This court, which has handed down some of the first sentences for forced marriages within an armed conflict and for the use of child soldiers, was also criticized for not bringing to trial some war crimes suspects and which has led to increasing popular discontent over the almost 10 years of its existence.

The **Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia**[45] had problems establishing themselves throughout the year, mainly because of corruption, lack of funds and Government interference, according to various local and international organizations. With the aim of dealing with corruption cases, the appointment of an independent assessor with the job of guaranteeing legal process was announced in August. This has been a key question as the Chambers have seen a significant reduction in funds because their credibility has been called into question. The UN, for example, stopped funding them in July 2008, leaving the Chambers entirely dependent on international donations. Government pressure on the judiciary was more than ever in evidence when it announced it was not possible to try more suspects apart from the five who were already in custody. As a result, the prosecutor Robert Petit resigned, presumably in part due to the position of his Cambodian counterpart Chea Leang, who was against more trials claiming that he was concerned about national security.

In spite of that, it is important to note that in 2009 the case against Kaing Guek Eav, alias "Duch", began, during which the accused admitted responsibility for the deaths of more than 10,000 people and expressed remorse. The prosecutor asked for a 40-year sentence for Duch who, at the end of the trial, unexpectedly asked for his freedom in what amounted to a complete about-face in his behaviour during the trial. In what was an innovation for transitional justice, in this trial civilian victims had legal representation, could take part in the investigation and were allowed to question witnesses, experts and the accused during the trial. However, this was not put into practice correctly, as it proved too traumatic for those victims who decided to take part in the trial, many of them ethnic Chams, who had suffered greatly under the regime.

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42. Ratko Mladic faces numerous charges, some of them related to the murder of 8,000 men and boys in Srebrenica in July 1995. Goran Hadžic is accused of murder, persecution, torture and other war crimes and crimes against humanity committed when he was president of the self-proclaimed state in southern Croatia in the early 1990s.
43. This tribunal tries people responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the civil war in Sierra Leone 1991-2002.
44. In 2006 the Security Council authorized holding the trial in The Hague on security grounds. If found guilty, Charles Taylor would serve his sentence in the UK. Taylor was accused of 11 crimes against humanity, including the murder and mutilation of civilians, kidnapping women and girls into sexual slavery and using children as combatants.
45. This tribunal was set up in 2003 to try leaders of the Khmer Rouge for serious human rights abuses committed 1975-1979 and is made up of Cambodian citizens and judges and foreigners.

In March, four years after the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri, the **Special Tribunal for Lebanon**, created by the UN in 2007 at the request of the Lebanese Government, opened in The Hague. Daniel Bellemare, a Canadian who had previously presided over the International Independent Investigation Commission (IIIC), which was based in Beirut, was appointed as the chief prosecutor. The Tribunal, which has a budget of $51.4 million –of which Lebanon has provided 49% while the rest is made up of voluntary contributions from UN member states– will deal with terrorist acts, rebellion, civil war and inter-religious conflict. Its establishment was a sensitive question in Lebanon, where there is considerable tension between the pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian tendencies. François Roux, a French lawyer, was named by the UN secretary-general to head the Defence Office of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon with the object of organizing the maximum possible training sessions, especially for lawyers from the Middle East who

Attention is drawn to the Liberian Commission's final report which recommended the establishment of a criminal court to judge war crimes

want to work in the tribunal, and thus to create a strong defence team.

e) Truth commissions and other clarification commissions

What follows is a review of the most significant advances and its setbacks during 2009 in the field of truth commissions and other clarification commissions. Attention is drawn to the Liberian Commission's final report which recommended the establishment of a criminal court to judge war crimes and serious violations of human rights and the IHL. The Commission put it this way an end to the legacy of human rights abuses that took place over 14 years of armed conflict. Formally established in June 2006, and after three years of work, the Commission also confirms the need to redress, both individuals and communities and to introduce institutional reforms in the country.

Table 5.4. **Truth and other commissions: advances and setbacks in 2009**

Korea, Rep.	In March the Truth and Reconciliation Commission confirmed that at least 3,400 civilians and prisoners in the Busan, Masan and Jinju jails were victims of soldiers and police from July to September 1950. This is the first official confirmation in the country of suspicions that members of the police force and military were involved in the indiscriminate murder of prisoners.
Liberia	In a preliminary report presented by the Commission at the beginning of 2009, its members recommended the establishment of a criminal court to judge war crimes, serious violations of human rights and of the IHL committed in Liberia between January 1999 and October 2003. While rejecting amnesty for these crimes, the delegates urged a general amnesty for children and other people who were forcibly recruited. In June the Commission presented its final report, including its conclusions on the roots of the conflict and its impact on women, children and Liberian society in general. It recommended that president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, be barred from holding public office for 30 years for her alleged involvement in the civil war and has support for Charles Taylor. The president, who had given evidence under oath to the Commission in February, asked to be pardoned and said she had only backed Taylor in order to get rid of the former Liberian dictator Samuel Doe. This revelation had a considerable impact on Sirleaf's image both inside and outside the country, given that she was the first woman to be elected president in Africa, while Commission members received death threats. The report also called for all the leaders of armed groups to be tried, including the former president Charles Taylor and 100 other people, for serious violations of human rights, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Among the list of accused were the names of various members of Sirleaf's Government. In August the Liberian Parliament postponed the implementation of the Commission's recommendations, which could include the prosecution of senior officials such as the president, and said that the electorate should be consulted first. On the other hand, the Liberian diaspora urged that the final report be implemented in full as well as the Commissions other recommendations, while other factions viewed this as tendentious. [46]
Togo	In June the Togo Government named the members of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission established after a consultative round in 2008. This Commission is supported by the OHCHR and is presided over by the Catholic Bishop Nicodéme Barrigah. The Commission is to look into events that occurred in Togo between 1959 and 2005, years of intense political violence.
Kenya	On July 30 the Government established a Commission for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation despite criticism from civil society, the Church and the international community, all of which insisted that what was needed was a special tribunal and that the creation of a commission was part of a strategy on the part of president Mwai Kibaki and prime minister Raila Odinga to protect some of their supporters implicated in the crimes. Florence Jaoko, the president of the National Commission on Human Rights, said that the two years allocated for this task were probably insufficient. The Commission, made up of six local and three international experts, was sworn in during August and its mandate includes the investigation into historic injustices from 1963 until the post-electoral violence that took place in 2008. [47]
Nigeria	The Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, known as Kayode Eso, and set up by the government of the Rivers State to look for ways of guaranteeing a lasting peace in the Delta region, presented its report and recommendations. Adolphus Karibi-Whyte, a retired Supreme Court judge, expressed serious doubts over whether the Commission could achieve its objective because he believed that a majority of people who had given testimony before it had not told the truth.

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46. For more information see <https://www.trcofliberia.org/>.
47. For more information see <http://www.knchr.org/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1>.

Other truth commissions (under preparation or discussion)

Brazil	At the end of the year the president Lula da Silva announced the establishment of a Truth Commission to investigate crimes committed under the military regime. The plan, which has received widespread criticism, envisages taking new testimony and staging reconstructions of murders, disappearances and torture. However, at the end of the year Lula agreed to amend the project before sending the final version to Congress in order to avoid a showdown with the Armed Forces.
Burundi	There was a continuing consultation process in regard to which instruments of transitional justice could be used in the country, in particular a Truth Commission.
Congo, DR	Throughout 2009 there were a number of proposals of how to get to the truth about crimes committed in DR Congo especially in Ituri, in the northeast, where for years massive human rights abuses have gone unpunished. Some NGOs, who believe that impunity for these crimes could revive tensions and lead to a violent reaction on the part of the victims, believe that a form similar to the Amani process (which means peace in Swahili) launched in January 2008 to restore peace in north and south Kivu would be useful, as would the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission designed especially for Ituri.
Ex Yugoslavia	The Regional Commission for Truth-seeking about War Crimes committed in former Yugoslavia (RECOM), a network made up of NGOs, associations and individuals once more called for the establishment of a regional truth commission to look into the serious human rights abuses committed in the area.
Philippines	The Catholic Bishop Pedro Arigo, the senior representative of the Episcopal Commission on Prison Pastoral Care, part of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, once again suggested the setting up of a Truth Commission to close the case of the double assassination of Benigno Aquino, leader of the opposition to the dictator Ferdinand Marcos, and Rolando Galman, a communist guerrilla. The Philippines government freed 10 former soldiers who have spent 26 years in jail for the murder of the former senator Aquino and of Galman in 1983 but the former senator's family protested at their release. Arigo said a Truth Commission could establish the facts and help victims to heal their wounds.
Solomon Islands	In April, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, whose five members were presided over by Father Ata, began work investigating the causes of the ethnic conflict that took place between 1998 and 2003. The commissioners began work three months before the Commission officially opened. The South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu gave his support during its inauguration.
Nepal	A lack of coordination between the ministers for the interior and for peace, concern about elections in April and a lack of political initiative meant that the law to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission over serious human rights abuses committed equally by the Government and the Maoists during the armed conflict from February 1996 to November 2007, remained paralyzed throughout 2009. The law, drawn up by the minister for peace, has been revised on four occasions because of a series of disagreements concerning a clause offering amnesty to people responsible for war crimes.
Pakistan	In September Asif Ali Zardari, the Pakistan president, said he wanted to set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission along the South African model. Asif Ali Zardari, said that Asma Jehangir, a widely respected human rights lawyer, might preside over the Commission.
Uganda	The Ugandan Congress urged the establishment of an Independent Truth and Reconciliation Commission that would bring together politicians from all sides to discuss how to prevent or resolve the country's civil wars.
Zimbabwe	In mid-2009 a group of religious organizations and Christian leaders urged setting up a commission to investigate cases of political violence that have occurred since 2008, decide how those responsible should be punished and how to indemnify victims. The Christian group includes Catholics, Protestants, Anglicans, Evangelicals and Pentecostals who said that the reconciliation campaign initiated by the government would not be effective unless it publicly revealed everything that happened during the electoral period. The group also insists that the Church must take a key role in the national reconciliation and peace process.

Finally, it should be noted that legal proceedings against companies suspected of involvement in human rights abuses during the apartheid in South Africa, took their course. The lawsuit filed in 2002 in a New York Court under the Alient Torts Calim Act against 33 US based companies - presently eight-, and known by the name "Case Khulumani" alleges that the companies were instruments that led to the abuses and that the apartheid system drew significant financial and logistical support from these companies. According to the judge overseeing the case, Ford, GM and Daimler provided, for example, special armoured vehicles to the country's security forces despite being aware of the crimes committed by the regime, and IBM provided identity documents with discriminatory remarks. This case raises many questions in post-apartheid South Africa but also raises new questions regarding the responsibility of transnational and non-state actors in human rights abuses committed during armed conflicts or dictatorial regimes.

Countries with serious gender inequalities (indicator no.9)

6. The gender dimension in peacebuilding

- There is serious gender inequality in 67 countries, of which 34 stand out in particular. Some 69% of armed conflicts where there is data available on equality take place in countries with serious inequality.
- During 2009 sexual violence was used as a weapon of war in the majority of armed conflicts, especially in DR Congo, Somalia, Sri Lanka (east), Colombia, Myanmar, India (Jammu and Kashmir) and Iraq.
- The UN secretary-general presented his first report on sexual violence in armed conflicts, saying that the combination of impunity and government inaction encouraged its spread.
- The UN Security Council approved resolutions 1888 and 1889 with the aim of improving the implementation of resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, as well as resolution 1820 on sexual violence as a weapon of war.
- The UN General Assembly approved the setting up of a new UN agency for women that would bring together existing bodies working around gender equality.

This chapter looks at the various initiatives taken by the UN and other international organizations and movements regarding peacebuilding from a gender perspective.[1] The gender perspective allows us to see the different ways in which armed conflicts impact on women and men, and also how and to what degree both participate in peacebuilding and the contributions women are making to this process. The chapter is structured in three main sections: the first reviews the worldwide situation regarding gender inequality, using the Gender Equality Index as an analytical tool, the second analyzes the gender dimension in the impact caused by armed conflicts, while the last section looks at peacebuilding from a gender perspective. The chapter begins with a map indicating those countries with serious gender inequalities according to the Gender Equality Index.

6.1. Gender inequality

The **Gender Equality Index (GEI)**[2] (indicator N° 9)[3] **measures gender equality across three dimensions: education (literacy and enrolment at all levels of education), economic activity (income and level of activity) and empowerment (involvement in technical and elected positions).** The importance of this indicator is that it doesn't just assemble information on the basis of sex, but analyzes this information in relation to the inequality between men and women. That is to say, it is a gender-sensitive indicator.[4]

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1. Gender is an analytical category which demonstrates that inequality between men and women is a product of society, not of nature, manifest in the social and cultural constructs that separate the sexes. Gender aims to make visible the social construct of sexual differences at work and in power. The gender perspective seeks to show that the differences between men and women are a social construct and a product of power imbalances rooted in the patriarchal system. Gender as an analytical tool aims to show the historic nature and situation of sexual differences.
2. Drawn up by Social Watch <http://www.socialwatch.org/es>.
3. See annex 1 (Table of countries, indicators and description of indicators).
4. Statistics broken down by sex furnish factual information about women and as a gender-sensitive indicator give direct evidence of women's status in relation a fixed standard or set of references, in this case men. Schmeidl, Susan and Piza-Lopez, Eugenia, *Gender and Conflict Early Warning: A Framework for Action*, International Alert, 2002, at <http://www.international-alert.org/publications/pub.php?p=80>.

Table 6.1. **Countries with serious gender inequality**

Countries with GEI between 50 and 60[1]

Albania	*Iran*	Surinam
Algeria	*Kenya*	Swaziland
Angola [2]	*Korea, Rep.*	*Syria*
Bangladesh	Malaysia	*Tajikistan*
Burkina Faso	*Mali*	Tanzania
Cape Verde	Malta	*Timor-Leste*
Ethiopia	Nicaragua	*United Arab Emirates*
Gabon	Qatar	*Uzbekistan*
Ghana	Samoa	Vanuatu
Guinea	*Senegal*	Zambia
Indonesia	***Sri Lanka***	*Zimbabwe*

Countries with a GEI below 50

|		
Bahrain	Guatemala	***Pakistan***
Benin	*Guinea-Bissau*	***Palestine*** [3]
Cameroon	***India***	São Tomé and Príncipe
Central African Rep.	Jordan	*Saudi Arabia*
Chad	*Lebanon*	Sierra Leone
Congo, Rep.	Malawi	***Sudan***
Côte d'Ivoire	*Mauritania*	Togo
Djibouti	*Morocco*	Tunisia
Egypt	*Nepal*	**Turkey**
Equatorial Guinea	*Niger*	**Yemen**
Eritrea	***Nigeria***	
Gambia	Oman	

1. The GEI establishes a maximum value of 100 to indicate complete equality. The world average is 60.
2. The countries marked in bold are those where there is one or more active armed conflict and those in italics countries where there have been one or more socio-political crises in 2009.
3. In the report by Social Watch, Palestine appears under the name of Gaza and the West Bank.

Source: Based on the GEI 2008.

Although the GEI doesn't deal with all facets of gender inequality, it allows us to see that the **situation of women is serious in 67 countries, and especially so in 34**.[5] In compiling this data it emerged that not a single country in the world can claim full gender equality, although there are some that have achieved this equality in terms of education. Comparing the indicator's data with that of countries in armed conflict reveals that in 12 of those countries where there is serious gender inequality there are one or several armed conflicts. It is important to point out that in five of those countries where there are one or more armed conflicts, there is no data about gender equality. This suggests that 18 of the 31 armed conflicts active during 2008 took place in countries where there are serious gender inequalities and that five of these conflicts were taking place in countries where there is no data on gender equality. **Some 69% of armed conflicts for which there is data about gender equality were taking place in a context of serious inequality**. Only in six of the where there was one or more armed conflict, the gender equality figures do not cross the thresholds for a serious situation established in this report. This supports the thesis put forward by various authors that in countries where there is a high level of gender equality there is a greater probability of internal armed conflict.[6]

Furthermore, in 34 of the countries with serious inequalities there were one or more situations of tension. This means that **41 of the 76 situations of tension during 2009 arose in countries where there is serious gender inequality, that is, 54% of the socio-political crises**.

Graph 6.1. **Countries with the worst GEI in 2009**

Source: Based on GEI 2008.

5. This classification has been made by the author of the study, not Social Watch.
6. Caprioli, Mary, "Gender equality and state aggression: the impact of domestic gender equality on state first use of force" en *International Interactions*, vol. 29, issue 3, pp. 195-214, 2003 and Caprioli, Mary, "Primed for violence: the role of gender inequality in predicting internal conflict" en *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 49, n.º2, pp. 161-178, 2005.

6.2. The impact of violence and conflict from a gender perspective

This section deals with the gender dimension in the conflict cycle, and in particular violence against women. The gender dimension is hugely important in armed conflicts. In the first place, through a gender analysis it is possible to dismantle the traditional view of armed conflicts as neutral realities and to question the assumption that they originate independently of the gender power structures in a society. Secondly, this perspective also raises serious doubts about an homogenized view of the consequences of conflict that does not take into account the gender dimension and gender inequality.

a) Sexual violence as a weapon of war and violence against women in the context of war

Sexual violence is a weapon of war widely used in practically all of the existing armed conflicts and is used to damage the social fabric of those communities affected by this war crime, as well as causing irreparable harm to those women who suffer from it.[7] Since 2008 sexual violence has become a matter of particular importance on the international agenda regarding armed conflicts, after the UN Security Council passed resolution 1820. During 2009 there were numerous reports about the use of sexual violence both in the context of armed conflicts and also in situations of political and social tension.

In Africa, the situation is particularly serious in DR Congo, where the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war has become endemic, and in Guinea, where sexual violence in the context of the repression of the political opposition had international repercussions.

In **DR Congo** sexual violence continues to play an alarming role within the framework of the armed conflict. OCHA said that during the first six months of 2009 there were 5,400 reports of rape in South Kivu province. Other sources said that from January to November, 7,000 women and girls were victims of sexual violence in the east of DR Congo.[8] Some NGOs also said that a growing number of men were victims of sexual violence and that as many as 10% of the victims of this type of crime were men. In its report *Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy*,[9] International Crisis Group (ICG) said that **ending impunity for sexual crimes was essential if there was to be lasting peace in the region.** According to this institution, arrest orders issued by the International Criminal Court for war crimes, including sexual violence, needed to be accompanied by reforms in the Congolese judicial system. The ICC said that vic-

In 2009 sexual violence was reported in DR Congo, Guinea, Somalia, Sudan, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and India among others

tims' fear of reporting this crime could lead to an explosion of tensions in local communities. On the one hand, this makes it more difficult to prosecute people for these crimes or to help victims, and at the same time shows the importance of the gender dimension in the dynamics of armed conflict and therefore the necessity of understanding its importance when seeking solutions.

One of the worst crimes of the year was the rape of at least 20 women in a prison in Goma when a group of inmates, most of them jailed for murder and rape, tried to escape. The MONUC said it had warned the Government about the urgent necessity to improve prison conditions. Furthermore, various NGOs allege that the rape of prisoners was a frequent practice in the country. UNICEF and UNHCR said that war crimes and crimes against humanity, among them sexual violence and the recruitment of children, were being committed on a daily basis in **Somalia** and **Sudan**. Internally displaced women had been the victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence.

In **Guinea**, numerous human rights organizations stated that at least 33 women were victims of sexual violence during incidents that took place on September 28, in which 157 people died as result of attacks on demonstrators protesting at a possible presidential candidacy of the head of the military junta Mousa Dadis Camara. In spite of government denials that there had been sexual violence, a number of witnesses, as well as the victims, defended the armed forces were responsible for rapes. A number of human rights organizations asked the Security Council to take urgent action.

In Asia, the NGO Caritas condemned the sexual violence in the context of the armed conflict in **Sri Lanka** where it was carrying out humanitarian work. There was a dire situation in camps for internally displaced people –established and controlled by the Government for Tamil people displaced as a result of the military offensive and clashes between the armed opposition group LTTE and the Armed Forces– where there was overcrowding and lack of privacy, which led to violence and abuse of women.

In **Myanmar** international organizations reiterated claims by local NGOs regarding the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war on the part of the Armed Forces, particularly during the offensive carried out in the first half of the year in Karen state against the insurgency of this ethnic group. A number of women were victims of sexual abuse by members of the Army in Myanmar who later murdered them. Various organizations claimed that during the past two decades at least 2,000 cases of sexual abuse carried out by the Armed Forces have been documented, but that the real figure could be much higher, given the difficulties women have in reporting this type of abuse.

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7. For more information on the different contexts of armed conflict and tension see Chapters 1 (Armed conflicts) and 2 (Socio-political crises).
8. IRIN, *DRC: Sexual violence prevention and re-integration funding "falls through cracks"*, IRIN, 4 November 2009.
9. International Crisis Group, *Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy*, Africa Report N°150, International Crisis Group, 11 May 2009, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6095&CFID=66705958&CFTOKEN=16975337>.

In the Indian state of **Jammu** and **Kashmir**, the rape and murder of two Muslim women at the hands of security forces led to angry demonstrations and social protests. Human rights organizations have repeatedly reported that the 600,000 troops deployed in the state have frequently abused civilians' rights. Both the Indian security forces and the Kashmiri insurgency have used sexual violence as a weapon of war during the conflict.[10]

In the Americas, Oxfam International published a report *Sexual violence in Colombia*,[11] in which it condemned the **widespread and systematic** use of this type of violence in the Colombian conflict as a weapon of war. The precise number of women who have been victims of sexual violence was impossible to calculate, given that only a small number of women reported the crime. Furthermore, according to Oxfam International, autopsy reports did not record this crime, which was viewed as a private matter and therefore of less importance than torture or murder. The report said of the 183 cases recorded by the Colombian Constitutional Court, 58% were blamed on paramilitaries, 23% on official forces, 8% on guerrillas and the remainder unknown. The use of sexual violence led to the forced displacement of a large number of women. Indigenous and Afro-Colombian women were particularly vulnerable as gender discrimination was one more factor, along with ethnic origin and poverty, that these communities suffered. Oxfam also pointed to the State's role regarding impunity in the case of sexual crimes, which were often covered up. According to the Oxfam report, the Colombian government has not carried out its responsibility to protect the victims. Caritas also claimed that around 20% of displaced women had moved as a result of sexual violence.

On the other hand, the UN secretary-general, in his report on the impact of the Colombian armed conflict on children, claimed that they suffered serious human rights abuses such as murder, torture, forced recruitment and sexual violence. The violence was particularly directed at girls.[12] Children in armed groups are frequently forced to have sexual relations at an early age and to use contraception that is injurious to their health, as well as being forced to abort should they become pregnant, according to the report.

During 2009 information became available about sexual violence committed against female members of **the US Armed Forces** by their Army comrades. According to the Veterans Affairs Department, 30% of women in the US military had been raped during their period of service, 71% have been victims of sexual aggression and 90% of them sexually harassed. Furthermore, the Defence Department recognized in its 2009 report on sexual abuse that approximately 90% of sexual attacks committed within the military ambit go unreported. This situation may be particularly serious among troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

b) Local and international response to the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war

There have been various initiatives in response to the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war upon the part of society as a whole as well as governments or the United Nations, among which we should highlight various initiatives taken at a national level and the UN Security Council's approval of resolution 1888.

The United Nations **Office of the Senior Adviser and Co-ordinator for Sexual Violence** in DR Congo **presented a Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in DR Congo.**[13] This strategy comprised four strategic components as well as for concrete objectives.

The United Nations and the **Liberian** Government also developed the Joint Program on Sexual and Gender Violence consisting of five pillars on which to base a response to this violence which, having been exacerbated during the years of armed conflict, has become an integral part of gender relations in the country.

The pillars are: 1) improve the psycho-social well-being of the survivors of sexual and gender violence; 2) improve the healthcare of survivors; 3) strengthen criminal justice including the setting up of a special court to try perpetrators; 4) integrated security and protection and assistance in the prevention and management of sexual and gender violence and improved access to safe houses for survivors; 5) improve the processes of training, management and coordination, especially in the Gender Ministry.

The DR Congo strategy and the Liberian program have much in common, with emphasis on the importance of developing preventative strategies and an integral approach to helping victims, and dealing with both the health and psycho-social dimension. One important aspect is the view that sexual violence should be dealt with within the framework of security, thus expanding on the traditional idea of security in which time this type of violence is not considered a threat but a private matter.

The **UN secretary-general** presented his **report on sexual violence** in accordance with resolution 1820 on sexual violence in the context of armed conflict approved by the UN Security Council.[14] The resolution urges the secretary-general to report on situations and on conflicts

10. Bastick, Megan, Karin Grimm y Rahel Kunz, *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict. Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector*, DCAF, Geneva, 2007.
11. San Pedro, Paula. *La violencia sexual en Colombia. Un arma de guerra*. Oxfam International, 2009. <http://www.intermonoxfam.org/es/page.asp?id=3628>.
12. Secretary-general's report on children and armed conflict in Colombia, 28 August 2009, S/2009/434, <http://www.un.org/spanish/docs/report09/repl09.htm>.
13. Office of the Senior Adviser and Coordinator for Sexual Violence, *Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in DRC*, March 2009 <http://www.stoprapenow.org/pdf/SVStratExecSummaryFinal18March09.pdf>.
14. Secretary-general's report conforming to requirements of resolution 1820 (2008) of the Security Council, July 15 2009, S/2009/362, <http://www.un.org/spanish/docs/report09/repl09.htm>.

Table 6.2. **Comprehensive Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in DR Congo**

Components	Objectives
Combating Impunity for Cases of Sexual Violence	Strengthen judicial institutions and develop a policy of criminal justice for sexual violence.
	Improve victims' access to justice.
	Guarantee the effective implementation of national laws on sexual violence.
	Guarantee reparation for victims.
Prevention and protection from sexual violence	Prevent and/or mitigate threats in order to reduce vulnerability and risk of suffering sexual violence.
	Strengthen survivors' resilience.
	Create an atmosphere of protection.
Security Sector Reform	Accountability: security forces must prevent and respond in an effective manner to sexual violence and guarantee that all perpetrators are brought to justice.
	Monitoring: incorporate mechanisms designed to exclude individuals with insufficient integrity, in accordance with international human rights standards.
	DDR/integration in the security forces: procedures to help survivors of sexual violence must be established.
Multi-sectoral response to survivors of sexual violence	Improve the frame of reference for a multi-sectoral response at the community and local level.
	Develop a national protocol for multi-sectoral assistance between the relevant ministries.

where this type of violence has been used in a widespread and systematic manner against civilians, analyze the trends and the prevalence of this violence, make proposals to reduce the vulnerability of women and girls, explain what plans there are to compile information on sexual violence, as well as the measures taken by the parties to the conflict in compliance with that established by resolution 1820, among other questions. The report recognizes that at present it is impossible to give an accurate number of victims of this type of violence, given that many victims prefer not to report the crime given the lack of protection and social stigma attached to it in many situations.

The secretary-general reiterated that **international jurisprudence considers sexual violence a form of genocide** and said that in those situations where it has been used as a weapon of war there is a high chance of it persisting once the conflict is over, presenting a serious obstacle to the consolidation of peace and the rebuilding of countries that have been in conflict. The report said that sexual violence is being used in **DR Congo, Sudan, Uganda, Chad, the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Iraq, Afghanistan, Myanmar and Nepal**.[15] Sexual violence may take the form of **ethnic cleansing, as a means of maintaining territorial control and intimidating the local population, controlling the social behaviour of women** and includes encouraging women to take part in suicide attacks, once their honour has been besmirched. Furthermore, in many cases women are used as sexual slaves by the combatants.

The UN secretary-general said in his report that **impunity and government inaction** in the face of sexual violence encouraged its spread and highlighted the necessity for states to take energetic measures to put an end to this impunity and to punish perpetrators. The report also said that violence against women that already existed before the war increased in times of conflict and that impunity was extended into the post-war period. He also said that sexual violence had an impact on the civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights of the victims.

In September the UN Security Council approved **resolution 1888** which recommends a series of concrete measures to counter sexual violence in armed conflicts and guarantee the protection of victims faced with this violence. The resolution urges:

a) the secretary-general names a special representative to lead and coordinate this work
b) that the secretary-general establishes a group of experts to deal with particularly serious situations in the context of armed conflict and strengthens the work of both the United Nations on the ground and the affected governments
c) that States pass legislative and judicial reforms that guarantee the bringing to justice of perpetrators of sexual violence as well as the protection of their victims
d) that the subject of sexual violence is on the agenda of all negotiations facilitated by the United Nations.

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15. The report only compiles information on those contexts that form part of the UN Security Council's agenda although it recognises that there are many other countries in which sexual violence is used as a weapon of war.

The resolution also expresses the intention of the Security Council to take into account sexual violence when considering the adoption or extension of selective sanctions in the context of armed conflict.

Radhika Coomaraswamy, the UN special representative for children in armed conflicts, also presented her annual report in which she denounced the fact that **sexual violence against children is an increasingly prominent characteristic of armed conflicts**.[16] Coomaraswamy said that this violence was particularly widespread in refugee and internal displacement camps and in the areas around these camps. Furthermore, children are particularly exposed to this violence during military operations in civilian zones and during military recruitment drives. Although it is girls who suffer most sexual violence, boys are also victims. On the other hand, fear of being attacked on the journey to school deprives many children of their right to education. In parallel with this report, the UN Security Council approved resolution 1882 on children in armed conflicts in which, among other questions, it condemned sexual violence against children.[17]

c) Gender violence in wartime

In considering the impact of **other types of violence within the context of armed conflicts**, **Afghanistan** stands out for a variety of reasons. First of all, the Shia Law on Personal Status was passed, legalizing various forms of violence against women. In spite of the protests this provoked in March, the amendments made by president Hamid Karzai hardly amount to substantial changes in the law, which permits rape within marriage, awards custody of children exclusively to fathers and grandfathers, says that women who wish to work must get permission from their husbands and allows rapists to go free if they pay financial compensation to the victim. This law covers the Shia population, who represent 10-20% of the Afghan population, and is in clear contradiction to the Constitution which prohibits any form of discrimination on grounds of sex.

Secondly, it should be emphasized that there were increased levels of violence against and coercion of women during the elections in August. Although the number of female candidates was the highest in any election since the fall of the Taliban regime –there were 326 women candidates in the provincial council elections– women's participation was seriously reduced through a variety of factors. A general climate of violence and insecurity, as well as specific threats made by the Taliban against women and the lack of women electoral staff, made it difficult for women to vote. At least 650 polling stations for women were closed, and women's participation was lower than in previous elections.

Afghan women suffered increased level of violence during the elections

6.3. Peacebuilding from a gender perspective

This section analyses some of the most outstanding initiatives for incorporating the gender perspective into the various areas of peacebuilding.

a) The international peace and gender agenda for 2009

The **UN secretary-general** presented his annual report on **the application of resolution 1325 on women, peace and security,** which covered both the measures adopted on the part of the United Nations in the period from October 2008 to October 2009 as well as recommendations to improve its implementation. The report emphasized the necessity to deepen and strengthen the application of this norm, given that armed conflicts have a serious impact in terms of gender. The secretary-general made various concrete proposals, among which the following were the most important:

a) That member states take the necessary measures to bring to justice those responsible for sexual violence in armed conflicts.
b) Guarantees on the part of member states that women be represented at all levels of decision-making.
c) That the UN Security Council implements a strategy that ensures that women are involved in all peace processes (negotiation, mediation, post-war reconstruction) as well as increasing the number of women designated as the UN secretary-general's special representatives.
d) That the UN Security Council guarantees that peace agreements take into account the needs and concerns of women and girls.
e) The Security Council insists that all reports presented to it by member states must include information on the consequences of armed conflict for women and girls, including data disintegrated by sex as far as is possible.

The Security Council approved **resolution 1889** in order to take concrete steps to improve the implementation of resolution 1325 on women, peace and security passed in 2000. The resolution urges member states and international and regional organizations to adopt measures to guarantee women's participation in all stages of peace processes, asking that the UN secretary-general draw up a strategy that increases the number of women acting in his name and that all reports presented to the Security Council include information on the effect of armed conflicts on women and girls. It also indicated the willingness of the Security Council to include measures to promote gender

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16. Report by the Secretary-General's Special Representative on the question of children in armed conflicts, 6 August 2009, A/64/254, <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/64/254&Lang=S>.
17. UN Security Council Resolution on children in armed conflicts, 4 August 2009, <http://www.un.org/spanish/docs/sc09/scrl09.htm>.

equality, among other measures, in its missions' mandates.

The national action plans related to resolution 1325 are one of the main means through which governments have taken concrete measures to show their commitment to the implementation of resolution 1325. Three governments –Liberia, Chile and Portugal– approved action plans in 2009.

The **Liberian Government** presented its **National Action Plan on resolution 1325** within the framework of the "International Colloquium for Women's Empowerment, Leadership Development, International Peace and Security", held in Liberia in the presence of the heads of state and government, ministers, general managers, presidents and executive directors, as well as heads of NGOs and communities. The Action Plan, **the first agreed in a country undergoing a process of post-war reconstruction**, was dawn up jointly between the Liberian government, the UN mission in the country –UNMIL– and the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW). The plan is to be implemented over a period of four years, during which time reports have to be presented both to the government and the Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and, eventually, to the Security Council.

The plan embraces a number of goals. Firstly, to strengthen and develop policies, procedures and preventative mechanisms, measures to protect women and to promote their human rights and guarantee their safety at a national and personal level. Secondly, it aims to promote the drawing up, development and institutionalization of economic, social and security policies that encourage the empowerment of women and girls to take a full and effective role in post-war peacebuilding at all levels, including decision-making. The third and final objective of this plan is to strengthen the coordination and coherence of all activities carried out from a gender perspective, according to the letter and the spiritual resolution 1325.

Chile launched its National Action Plan for the Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1325/2000 "Women, Security and Peace". The Chilean plan proposes the following: a) promote human rights both in Chile and beyond its frontiers in a gender context; b) promote the equal participation of women both in peacebuilding and in the decisions that affect them; c) view the drawing up, implementation and carrying out of international cooperation policy from a gender perspective in its widest sense; d) strengthen the technical capacity of public employees and society as a whole in relation to gender, security and conflict; e) promote the implementation of resolution 1325 in the region through an interchange of experiences, international cooperation, both bilaterally and in the regional peace operations in which Chile is involved.

Portugal also approved a National Action Plan for the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women Peace and Security (2009-2013). The plan has five principal objectives: a) increase women's participation and integrate the gender inequality dimension into all peace-strengthening phases and in all decision-making areas; b) guarantee the support of people taking part in peacebuilding, in issues of gender inequality and gender violence, as well as other key aspects of resolutions 1325 and 1820; c) promote and protect women's human rights in conflict areas and in post-conflict con-

Table 6.3. **Liberian National Action Plan on resolution 1325**

Pillar I. PROTECTION
Strategic goal 1: Provide psychosocial assistance and help women and girls with trauma. **Strategic goal 2:** Protect the rights and increase the safety of women and girls. **Strategic goal 3:** Improve access to quality health education, with a special emphasis on reproductive health and HIV/AIDS.
Pillar II. PREVENTION
Strategic goal 4: Prevent all forms of violence against women and girls, including gender and sexual violence.
Pillar III. PARTICIPATION AND EMPOWERMENT
Strategic goal 5: Promote the full participation of women at all levels in the prevention of conflicts and in peacebuilding processes and post-war reconstruction. **Strategic goal 6:** Empower women through better access to housing and natural resources, and increase their participation in caring for the environment.
Pillar IV. PROMOTION
Strategic goal 7: Encourage the participation of women's groups in implementing the Action Plan and seek better access to resources both on the part of the government and women's groups. **Strategic goal 8:** Encourage the participation of women in conflict prevention, early warning, peacebuilding, security and post-war reconstruction through education and training. **Strategic goal 9:** Increase the technical capacity of government institutions and society as a whole, including women's groups, to effectively implement the Action Plan. **Strategic goal 10:** Encourage women's groups' and full government and social involvement in monitoring and evaluating the Action Plan.

texts, taking into consideration the prevention and elimination of gender violence and the promotion of women's empowerment; d) deepen and spread understanding of issues related to women, peace and security to increase people's capacity and to increase awareness among politicians and the public in general; e) encourage society as a whole to help in the implementation of resolution 1325.

Several bodies such as IANSA and the Observatory on Gender and Armed Violence welcomed the approval of Portugal's action plan, but pointed out its shortcomings. They said it could have dealt with the insecurity experienced by women as a result of armed violence outside the context of armed conflict, dealing with questions such as disarmament and gun control, public safety and gender violence both in the national and international sphere.

At the same time, Gender Action for Peace and Security, a group of British women experts carried out the project "The Global Monitoring Checklist on Women, Peace and Security" in order to analyze the implementation of resolution 1325 in various countries that were in conflict or post-conflict (Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, DR Congo, Northern Ireland).[18] Some of the conclusions reached suggest that governments lack a broad and deep understanding of the different factors referred to in 1325, such as the relationship between women and issues such as the security sector reform, governance, legal reforms or peace negotiations. On the other hand, it is difficult to evaluate the implementation of 1325, given that there are no mechanisms to measure, monitor and evaluate progress in the sphere of women, peace and security. Furthermore, at all levels there is the lack of political leadership in advancing his agenda. What this means is that at the national level responsibility for 1325 is assumed by gender ministries, which lack financial resources, instead of those ministries with responsibility for peace and security. Government budgets for implementing resolution 1325 are limited and the funding of organizations that work in the field of gender, women, peace and security is inadequate. Gender Action for Peace and Security says that there also is not reliable and accessible official information about violence against women. At the same time, women continue to lack the power to participate substantially at all levels of public and political life, especially in high-level talks such as peace negotiations. Finally, levels of sexual and gender violence and impunity continue to be extremely high and there is a lack of coherent and well funded national strategies to deal with these problems.

b) The gender dimension in peace processes

In regard to incorporating the gender perspective into peace processes, it should be pointed out that the Philippines government named Annabelle T. Abaya as the presidential assessor for the peace process, replacing Avelino Razon. Abaya had previously sat on the government panel in the peace negotiations with the armed opposition group NPA. The new presidential assessor

Box 6.1. **UN Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security**

Since 2000 the UN Security Council has passed four resolutions on women, peace and security (1325, 1820, 1888 and 1889). The first of them, 1325, established the general framework for taking on the fundamental questions: the gender dimension in conflicts –in particular the consequences for women– and the role of women in peacebuilding. Later, at the instigation of the US government, the Security Council approved resolution 1820 on sexual violence as a weapon of war. The two new resolutions approved in 2009 were designed to improve the implementation of previous resolutions through concrete measures.

The inclusion of the question of sexual violence as a weapon of war in the Security Council's agenda, which probably reflects media interest in the issue, fundamentally as a consequence of it being used on a huge scale in the armed conflict in DR Congo, has meant that the issue of sexual violence has become an important part of debates on gender, peace and security. The Rome Statute of the high ICC and the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights take the view that rape can be a war crime or crime against humanity, an act of genocide or of torture depending on the circumstances in which it takes place.[19] Furthermore, the concept of rape has been extended to include other sexual abuses. Nevertheless, analysts and women's organizations have said that the significance of sexual violence as a weapon of war needs to be analyzed in a wider framework. Focusing attention exclusively on sexual violence as a weapon of war might lead to governments and international bodies focusing all their attention on the struggle against sexual violence, forgetting that gender issues must be integrated into all of the spheres and phases of peacebuilding, as set out in resolution 1325. Peacebuilding processes that incorporate the gender perspective will by necessity deal with sexual violence as a weapon of war, given that at present it is one of the main effects, in terms of gender, of armed conflicts. However, efforts centred solely against sexual violence can marginalize other issues, such as the involvement of women in peace negotiations, the establishment of gender agendas in these negotiations or the design of post-war peacebuilding processes from a gender perspective.

18. GAPS UK, *Global Monitoring Checklist on Women, Peace and Security*, <http://www.gaps-uk.org/img_uploaded/Global%20Monitoring%20Checklist%20full%20resource.pdf>.
19. See sentences of Akayesu in Rwanda, Furunzija in Yugoslavia, Mejía in the Inter-American Commission and Aydin in the European Court of Human Rights.

said that she wanted issues linked to women and indigenous people to form a significant part of the agenda for peace negotiations. Furthermore, Abaya said that she wanted a larger number of women to take a direct role in the Philippines peace process.

Within the exploratory peace framework established between Turkey and the armed Kurdish opposition group PKK,[20] various meetings took place between the families of Turkish soldiers and PKK guerrillas killed in the conflict. These were unprecedented meetings whose aim was to promote reconciliation between both parties to the conflict. At one of these meetings, which took place in the city of Diyarbakir, the mothers of PKK guerrillas offered white handkerchiefs to the mothers of Turkish soldiers as a symbol of peace.

In Colombia, on the International Day against Violence against Women, the Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres (Women's Peace Route) and other organizations held a demonstration under the slogan "Everyone at the table. A political settlement now" to demand a negotiated end to the armed conflict in a process in which social organizations and movements, political parties and society in general would have a role in peacebuilding.

Colombian women's organizations demanded a negotiated end to the armed conflict

Woman from India, Pakistan and Afghanistan met on various occasions during the year in Delhi (India), Peshawar (Pakistan) and Kabul (Afghanistan) with the aim of strengthening alliances between women's organizations in their three countries and taking up the question of women's participation in peace processes underway in the region. The participants emphasized the enormous obstacles presented by the prevailing discriminatory legislation in their countries and said it was necessary that women have a guaranteed presence in political forums, such as the Jirga (traditional assembly) between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

c) Sexual violence and peace negotiations

In spite of the fact that sexual violence has been recognized as one of the principal threats to peace and security, particularly in the context of armed conflict, it is still absent from most peace processes and, specifically, peace negotiations. In 2008 the UN Security Council, through resolution 1820 on sexual violence in armed conflict, recognized that it posed a threat for peace and international security, and demanded more attention to be devoted by all those involved in the prevention and resolution of conflicts as well as in the building and maintenance of peace. Including the question of sexual violence and peace negotiations would represent an important step forward at the same time as meeting the requirements of resolution 1820. The United Nations has made a series of recommendations to facilitate its

inclusion, directed both the parties in the conflict and to facilitate as mediators.[21]

Firstly, it is recommends that the issue of sexual violence be included in the preliminary agreements before signing cease-fires, in particular agreements that guarantee humanitarian access. This would allow, on the one hand, better attention for victims of sexual violence and, on the other, make it clear to the opposing parties that sexual violence could be considered a war crime and is a serious violation of international law.

The second recommendation is that cease-fires and cessations of hostilities must establish explicitly that sexual violence is prohibited and that those charged with monitoring these agreements will follow up possible cases of sexual violence and will be empowered to report them. The lack of such a specific reference up to now has led to a lack of monitoring during cease-fire agreements with cessations of hostilities.

Thirdly, it recommends that agreements on questions of security, whether through transitional arrangements, peacekeeping operations or post-war security bodies, include the prevention of sexual violence. Furthermore, DDR programs must deal with factors related to sexual violence: the needs of women and girls associated with armed groups; the risk that sexual violence may increase when demobilized combatants returned to their communities; and the challenge of preventing those responsible for human rights abuses, among them sexual violence, from joining the country's Armed Forces.

The fourth recommendation points to the need for the legal arrangements in peace accords to state that sexual violence will be given the same priority as other crimes under international law. The majority of agreements have ignored this type of violence, have not provided victims with adequate protection and have not pursued judicially those responsible for this type of violence.

Finally, it is recommended that peace accords bear in mind the need for the recovery of women who have been victims of sexual violence in the medium and long-term, by providing health and psycho-social services; creating job opportunities; educational reforms designed to put an end to the stigma and prejudices towards victims of sexual violence; reforms in the security sector; and the public commemoration of victims should they so desire.

Incorporating sexual violence into the agendas of negotiations involves taking a wider view of security issues. It requires a multi-dimensional view in which a threat to women is seen as a threat to security and not solely an individual aggression towards women. Including sexual violence on the agenda of peace processes implies an

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20. See chapter 3 (Peace processes) and the opportunity for peace "Initiative to resolve the Kurdish question in Turkey.
21. "Conflict Related Sexual Violence and Peace Negotiations: Implementing Security Council Resolution 1820". Report on the High-level Colloquium organized by DPA, DPKO, OCHA, UNDP and UNIFEM on behalf of UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, and in partnership with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 22-23 June 2009, Nueva York.

increased likelihood that this violence will be prosecuted and punished, and in the long run will open the door towards better protection of women survivors of violence. The explicit recognition of sexual violence in the text of peace agreements amounts to a significant change for many women and may have a real effect on improving their lives and might result in acts of sexual violence being excluded from the amnesties agreed at the end of armed conflicts. La cuarta recomendación apunta a la necesidad de que las provisiones de justicia que se contemplen en los acuerdos de paz establezcan que la violencia sexual sea considerada igual de prioritaria que otros crímenes según el derecho internacional. La mayoría de acuerdos de paz han ignorado este tipo de violencia, sin que se haya logrado proteger a las víctimas de manera adecuada ni se haya perseguido judicialmente a los responsables de este tipo de violencia.

d) UN gender architecture

The UN General Assembly unanimously approved a resolution for the creation of a **UN agency dedicated to women's rights and gender equality** which would bring together under one institutional umbrella the different bodies working on the issues of gender inequality and women's rights within the United Nations: the United Nations Development Fund for Woman (UNIFEM), the United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) and the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI). Since 2006 an international coalition of women's organizations -GEAR Campaign (Gender Equality Architecture Reform)–[22] has been discussing creating such a body to raise the political profile of gender issues within the United Nations. The new agency would be led by an assistant secretary-general. No other institution currently in existence has the political power or the economic resources of other UN agencies, such as UNICEF or UNDP.

Civilian organizations have asked that the person who is going to lead the organization be named as soon as possible so that it can be in operation during the process of the review of the commitments undertaken at the World Conference in Beijing, known as Beijing+15, which takes place in March 2010. Furthermore, they asked that donor countries commit at least $1 billion to guarantee sufficient financing.

The UN secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon, has to draw up a global plan to specify the relevant details of the new agency, such as how it will be organized and funded, as well as the composition of the executive committee that will supervise its operational activities.

Before it was agreed by the UN General Assembly, during the 53rd session of the Commission of the Status of Women, GEAR presented a document calling for the creation of a body, pointing to a lack of leadership as well to lack of mechanisms for putting into practice

much of the commitments undertaken in regard to gender equality. Among GEAR's recommendations were that such an entity should be led by a person with a status of assistant secretary-general, supplied with sufficient funds as well as having a powerful political and programmatic mandate.

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22. For more information on this campaign see <http://gear.collectivex.com/>.

Conclusions

Several conclusions can be drawn from the six chapters that make up the report. **In 2009, 31 armed conflicts were reported, although at the end of the year only 29 remained active.** In 2009 the military victory of the Sri Lankan Army over the LTTE and a decrease in hostilities in the Indian state of Nagaland meant that both contexts were no longer considered armed conflicts. Compared to last year, the number of armed conflicts remains unchanged (31) and the only variation is the inclusion of Sudan (south), which experienced a serious increase in violence. **The large majority of armed conflicts took place in Asia (14) and Africa (10), followed by Europe (3), the Middle East (3) and America (1).** In all of the cases analyzed, the State was one of the contending parties, although in many conflicts there is frequent fighting between non-state armed actors or episodes of community violence. All of the conflicts, except the dispute between Israel and Palestine, were internal (14) or internationalized internal (16).

Although armed conflicts have multiple causes, it is noteworthy that **almost two out of three conflicts (19 of 31) refer mainly to identity issues or demands for greater self-government**. On the other hand, **there are 14 cases where the main divergence is rooted in opposition to a specific government or to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a State**. Finally, there are several conflicts –Iraq, Nigeria (Niger Delta), Pakistan (Baluchistan), DR Congo (east), Sudan (Darfur) or Sudan (south)– where control of resources and the territory are the main issues behind the origin and dynamics of the fighting, although in many other cases control of resources and access to them do fuel and intensify the conflict. With regard to intensity, there were nine cases –Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, DR Congo (east), Pakistan (northwest), Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan (south) and Uganda (north)– with very high levels of violence that caused the death of around 1,000 people, although in some of these cases, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan (northwest), Iraq, Sri Lanka or Somalia, the number of fatalities was much higher. Similar to last year, most of the armed conflicts were medium intensity (15) and the remaining eight cases –India (Nagaland), Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf), Philippines (NPA), Myanmar, Central African Republic, Russia (Chechnya) and Russia (Ingushetia)– were low intensity.

The socio-political crises, as in previous years, were mostly in Africa and Asia. Of the **76 situations of tension recorded globally in 2009**, a total of 47 took place in these two regions, 25 and 22 respectively, and the rest were geographically distributed in the following order: Europe (13 cases), Middle East (9) and America (6). During this period, **most of these situations deteriorated or maintained similar levels of violence and political and social mobilization.** In less than one quarter of the cases there was a decrease in violence. Moreover, we should highlight that most of the socio-political cri-

ses were of medium or low intensity, 57% and 28% respectively. Nevertheless, on the world scene **eleven high intensity crises were ongoing**: Ethiopia, the Ethiopian region of Oromia, Guinea, Nigeria, Sudan, Pakistan, Iran, Sri Lanka, the Chinese region of East Turkestan, Peru and the Russian republic of Dagestan. It is obvious from this list that most of these high intensity tensions are taking place in Africa and Asia and follow the same geographical pattern of distribution as the aforementioned socio-political crises.

When considering the relation between the area where the socio-political crises take place and the actors involved, the 2009 data confirm the dynamic interplay of the different forces detected in previous years. **Most of these crises were of an internal nature**, followed by international crises and, lastly, by internationalized internal crises. The reasons behind these socio-political crises have also continued the trend from previous years. Although most of the cases had multiple causes, **the main triggering factor of the tension was linked to opposition to a government**. This factor was present in almost half (47%) of the crises, which were also linked to identity issues (43%), demands for self-government (31%), opposition to the established State system (21%), and fighting for control of resources (17%) or the territory (12%). We should highlight that in the 75 socio-political crises, governments were relevant actors and armed groups were present in almost half of the cases tracked in 2009.

During the year, negotiations with different armed groups were finalized in nine contexts of violence. Most noteworthy was the **peace agreement reached in Somalia between the Transitional Federal Government and the moderate faction of the opposition coalition ARS**, which is now part of the new Government. Compared to 2008, the number of processes that were consolidated increased, those that went on with interruptions decreased, but there was an increase in cases of conflicts where the peace process was either broken off or could not be started (32.3% of the cases). We should underscore the **failure of the negotiations in Sri Lanka** due to the military victory of the Armed Forces over the Tamil people grouped under the LTTE.

Generally speaking, in 2009 **36% of the negotiations went well or ended satisfactorily.** A similar percentage of the negotiations had serious problems, and 16% of them went very badly. One of the year's most significant developments was the **beginning of rapprochement between the Turkish Government and the PKK in the form of proposals from both sides that could open the door for the beginning of direct talks in 2010.**

During 2009 **humanitarian crises affected 30 countries** which, to some degree, are suffering armed conflicts or situations of political instability. This situation forced

humanitarian organizations to suspend their aid programs on many occasions during the year which contributed to making the situation worse for those affected by the crises. Humanitarian workers were once again the target of armed groups and criminals in the areas were they ran their programs. Of special concern was the situation in North Kivu (DR Congo) where there were more than a hundred attacks. The situation of the internally displaced population in the armed conflicts of Sri Lanka and the Philippines were of special concern due to restrictions on access to settlement camps imposed by Governments on humanitarian personal. In general, **the return of persons which had been displaced as a result of violence slowed down this year** in most of the regions affected by humanitarian crises because of the continuing state of insecurity. Furthermore, the figure provided by the WFP, which estimated that **one billion people were facing hunger** in the world demonstrated the prolonged impact of the 2008 food crisis and the need for a global response from the international community.

With regard to **donations** by the international community to fund humanitarian aid, a **15% global decline** compared to 2008 was highlighted. The appeals most affected by lack of funds were the emergency or flash appeals that were only able to collect 49% of the requested support, compared to 68% for 2008. OCHA attributed this reduction of donations to the global financial crisis. Furthermore, on the occasion of the celebration of the first World Humanitarian Action Day several analysts pointed out the **gradual shrinking of the humanitarian space** and the danger for those workers on the ground caused by the confusion of military and humanitarian activities in contexts of violence.

With regard to human rights, many States perpetrated serious and systematic violations of human rights in 2009 as shown in the indicators that make up the **2009 Human Rights Index of Escola de Cultura de Pau.** The indicators of this index, which measures the degree of vulnerability and failure of States to fulfil their obligations regarding human rights in 195 countries, also shows that in a large number of countries (122) discrimination was occurring because of race, ethnic group, religion, gender, sexual orientation or place of origin. In 103 countries torture and physical abuse took place; in another 66 countries arbitrary detentions systematically took place and the number of countries where extrajudicial executions were carried out rose to 63. Finally, in 78 States there was a climate of total impunity regarding the human rights violations that were committed. In this sense, it should be stressed the difficulties that numerous persons and organizations face daily to assert human rights and basic freedoms in most of the countries of the world. The groups most affected are minorities, media professionals, defenders of human rights and members of the political opposition. Furthermore, **the so-called war on international terrorism continues to undermine human rights** on all continents. States that had in previous years resorted to practices prohibited by international law with the promise that they would only be used provisionally, moved toward making their use permanent. Meanwhile, the celebration of the **20**th **an-**

niversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child took place in a climate of general violations of children's rights in a large number of countries. However, on a positive note, we should highlight that the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted by the General Assembly in December 2006, will most likely be ratified soon.

In relation to **transitional justice processes**, we must regret the lack of public debate around restrictions in Spain to the principle of universal jurisdiction. Reform of the law, approved in 2009, establishes admissibility criteria that make it more difficult to investigate and prosecute a crime under this system. On the other hand, it is important to highlight the controversy caused by the detention order issued in March by the International Criminal Court against the Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur. This was the first time an order was issued for a leader currently in office. Also, new investigations by this judicial body were launched during the year. In 2009, emblematic trials were held such as the one that brought Radovan Karadzic –former president of the self-proclaimed Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina– before the ICTY and which has not ended; or the trial against Kaing Guek Eav, alias "Duch", in Cambodia. The year was also marked by some sentences that are a milestone in the fight against impunity, such as the one against Alberto Fujimori, former president of Peru, who was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Finally, it is important to highlight the work done by various Truth Commissions, some of which ended their mandate, such as the one in Liberia, with a controversial report that implicated the country's president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and members of the Government, among others.

Finally, with regard to the **gender dimension in peacebuilding**, 67 countries have serious gender inequalities, with 34 of them being especially serious. In relation to the gender impact of armed conflicts, of note was the frequent **resort to sexual violence as a weapon of war** in 2009 in most of the armed conflicts currently active. In this sense, the armed conflicts in **DR Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka** stood out because of their extreme seriousness. Alongside this sexual violence, gender violence and violence against women was also a constant feature in all of the armed conflicts. The prominence this issue has acquired in the international sphere is noteworthy. This has resulted in the creation of new mechanisms for addressing the inclusion of the gender dimension in peacebuilding and the intervention in armed conflicts with the approval, for example, of two UN Security Council resolutions that attempted to provide specific measures to improve the implementation of resolution 1325 on women, peace and security and resolution 1820 on sexual violence as weapon of war.

On a less institutional level, **women's civil society organizations from different countries affected by armed conflicts attempted to support and drive peacebuilding processes in their countries of origin.** Noteworthy are

the women's initiatives in **Colombia, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkey**. Thus, although armed conflicts and violence continued to have a serious gender impact, at the same time numerous initiatives were undertaken, both at the institutional level and by the civil society, to include the gender perspective and the voice of women in peacebuilding processes. 2010 will mark the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1325 and could be an important opportunity to reinforce the gender and peacebuilding agenda. The United Nations, governments and the civil society should make the most of it.

Opportunities for peace in 2010

Following an analysis of conflicts and peacebuilding in 2009, the Escola de Cultura de Pau at the UAB highlights five scenarios which constitute opportunities for peace in 2010. These involve two scenarios of armed conflict in which measures are being taken that may bring about a resolution, as well as three items on the international agenda. In all of them there is a coming together of positive factors that might bring about significant advances during this year. The opportunities identified touch on three thematic areas and two geographical cases: the 10th anniversary of resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security; progress is in the process of ratifying the International Convention on the Protection of All People Against Forced Disappearances; the adoption of the African Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons; initiatives to resolve the Kurdish question in Turkey; and peace negotiations in the Niger Delta in Nigeria.

All of these opportunities for peace require a real effort and commitment on the part of everyone involved and also the support of international bodies in order for the existing synergies and positive factors to contribute to peacebuilding. In any case, the analysis presented by the Escola de Cultura de Pau is based on a realistic vision of these scenarios, making clear the difficulties that also exist and which could become obstacles on the road to peace.

1. Ten years of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security

In October 2000, after debating it for first time at their headquarters, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. This was the result of a campaign of much work and pressure brought to bear by an alliance of women's organizations that wanted the Security Council to recognize the importance of the gender dimension in armed conflicts and the crucial role that women play in peacebuilding in the context of widespread violence. Ten years since it was passed, this resolution has become a tool and a point of reference for large number of women's organizations all over the world, as well as for governments and international institutions. Resolution 1325 has also been complemented by three other resolutions intended to strengthen its implementation, as well as to clarify concrete questions that are considered central to peacebuilding from a gender perspective. Resolution 1820 (2008) focuses on the struggle against sexual violence as a weapon of war; resolution 1888 (2009) develops a series of concrete measures designed to put an end to this sexual violence; and resolution 1889 (2009), also passed in relation to 1325, proposes measures for its better implementation.

The objectives of resolution 1325 remain its main challenges: greater participation by women in peace processes, and the protection of women and girls in armed conflicts

While there remains a long way to go, important advances have been made since 2000. The first of them is that the gender dimension in armed conflicts and peacebuilding has pushed itself on to the international peace and security agenda. Up until 2000, the Security Council had not mentioned nor faced up to this question. Since then, there has been a specific debate every year on the question, and the UN secretary-general presents a report and various resolutions on the question, and references to resolution 1325 and the gender dimension are made in other reports by the secretary-general. Furthermore, the demands of women's organizations have been strengthened, given that the implementation of a Security Council resolution is an obligation for member states. Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out that civil society's commitment to this resolution -it has been translated into more than 100 languages across all continents and has served as a basis to articulate the demands of numerous women's organizations in the context of armed conflict- has not always led to concrete advances in relation to the obligations of the member states and the United Nations.

At government level, since resolution 1325 was approved, 16 countries (Austria, Belgium, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Denmark, Spain, Finland, Iceland, Liberia, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Uganda) have approved national action plans designed to strengthen the implementation of the resolution, both within their country's borders but also in regard to their foreign interventions in the context of peacebuilding.

However, there have not been that many concrete advances, and the objectives put forward by the resolution remain the main challenges: greater women's participation in peace processes, a greater female presence in peacekeeping operations and in decision-making, and protection of women and girls in armed conflicts. Furthermore, there is no standardized system for monitoring the implementation of the resolution, no indicators have been developed to measure the degree of compliance, the provision of economic resources is clearly insufficient and, at the moment, the office of the secretary-general has no dedicated special representative on the issue. For national plans to be more effective, more dialogue is needed between the representatives of civil society of those places affected by conflict as well as better cooperation between the different countries that already have plans of action. On the other hand, it is important to support the efforts being made to put forward new plans, especially in countries that are in situations of conflict or are going through a post-war peacebuilding process. Civil society, and especially women's organizations, must be the key players in these processes, given that resolution 1325 and the commitment to its implementation are the fruit not so much of governments as of women's organizations who have promoted gender agendas.

There is, therefore, an important roadmap on the table which must benefit from the commemoration of the 10th anniversary, when it is certain that the main institutions as well as the member states of the United Nations will reaffirm, even if only in a rhetorical manner, their commitment to 1325. Better still, taking into account that the anniversary coincides with the approval of new resolutions, expanding the number of legal instruments, as well as the creation of a new UN agency for women's rights and gender equality, approved in 2009. The synergy of forces between civil society, international organizations and governments born out of this resolution should serve to strengthen what has already been gained and redouble the efforts to achieve the challenges still to be met, that is, peacebuilding from a gender perspective.

2. The International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance

The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 20, 2006 was ratified at the end of 2009 by 18 countries. Only two short of the 20 necessary for it to come into force, it is hoped that this Convention becomes a new landmark in the struggle against impunity, as it obliges states to bring to justice any person involved in a forced disappearance. Since it was set up in 1980, the United Nations Working Group on Forced Disappearances has received more than 50,000 complaints from 78 countries, which reflects both the spread of a practice that is used systematically in a large number of countries, as well as the necessity to create a legal instrument of this type.

Forced disappearance is a clear violation of the International Law on Human Rights and the International Humanitarian Law, in that it violates civil and political rights (such as the right to life, not to be subjected to extrajudicial execution, the right to legal representation and to protection under the law, the right not to be tortured nor subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment) but also economic and social rights (among them, the right to work and to family life). Also, when it is practised on a systematic and massive scale, forced disappearances constitute a crime against humanity. This Convention defines forced disappearance as a person's arrest, detention, kidnapping and imprisonment at the hands of state agents, or of persons or groups of persons authorized by the state, and the refusal of the authorities to reveal and recognize the imprisonment or whereabouts of this person, or to provide information about what has happened. This Convention was the first worldwide treaty that offered judicial protection in these specific cases. Since the UN General Assembly first referred to this question in 1978, both the United Nations and the OAS have drawn up various initiatives to respond to this type of crime. In spite of the fact that various instruments of human rights already offered partial protection to the victims (Geneva Conventions, Rome Statute, the United Nations Declaration on Disappearances among others), numerous victims' associations and jurists have been demanding the UN a specific mechanism that would have legal status in member states.

In this regard, the Convention commits those states that are party to it that they will not practise, nor tolerate the practice, of forced disappearance within their territory, and will immediately investigate any such claim. The Convention, via a universal jurisdiction clause, obliges States to bring to justice those responsible for forced disappearances, whether they occur in their territory or in other jurisdictions. Furthermore States have an obligation to ensure that no one accused of this crime escapes justice, and must legislate to categorize it both as an individual crime and as a crime against humanity in their internal legislation. Thus, States also have a commitment to investigate and punish any person who commits, orders or induces the commission of a forced disappearance, intends to commit it, is complicit or participates in the crime. The Convention also takes into account the necessity to prosecute those in power for the activities of their subordinates in certain circumstances, and to make clear that obedience to a superior in hierarchy does not justify criminal acts.

The Convention establishes that the family of the disappeared person has to be informed where they are being sent and their whereabouts, and recognizes the right to truth; that is to say, the right to know all of the circumstances surrounding the action, the motives or reason for the arrest and the authority that ordered it. It also obliges the States that are party to it to repair damage caused to the victims and their relatives, to look for disappeared persons and, in the event of them being dead, find and bring back their remains. The Convention also covers cases of children who have disappeared or been adopted or held by their captors. In a number of countries, especially in Argentina, but also in Chile and Uruguay, the disappeared children were given up for adoption to military families or to families close to the military regime during the repression. In this regard, the Convention establishes the principle of restitution to the family of origin.

The Convention could become another tool in the struggle against the increasing practice of forced disappearance in the so-called war against terrorism.

Finally, and in common with other United Nations instruments, the Convention establishes a monitoring Committee made up of 10 independent experts charged with supervising its correct implementation, to study claims by individuals and States, and to prevent disappearances by taking urgent action and through *in situ* visits. This Committee will coordinate its activities with the other bodies and through special measures, and may include, in the case of massive and systematic violations, informing the UN secretary-general.

The adoption and the long-awaited coming into force of the Convention on Enforced Disappearance amounts to a recognition of the seriousness and scale of this practice, which a large number of people on all continents have suffered and continue to suffer, and which has become more pronounced in recent years as a result of the so-called war against international terrorism. Equally, it supposes a struggle against impunity and the legal recognition of the principles of truth, justice and reparation for victims and their families.

3. The African Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons

Currently, 11.6 million Africans live in a situation of internal displacement. Violence and natural or human disasters have forced these people to flee their homes and in many cases to live in precarious situations with little protection. It was this reality that led the Executive Committee of the African Union to suggest for the first time in 2004 the need to create an instrument that would provide assistance to these people and would prevent more people from being forced into the same situation.

A year later, the world Summit of Heads of State and Governments held in New York adopted the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement –originally presented in 1998 by Francis Deng, the representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, to the UN Commission on Human Rights– in recognition of their overriding importance as a legal framework for the protection of internally displaced people throughout the world. Although these principles are not legally binding, the fact that their content is derived from the International Humanitarian Law and the International Law on Human Rights obliges states to comply with them.

In 2009 Africa took the first step to include these principles within its countries' legal framework. The member states of the African Union signed in Kampala (Uganda) the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, the first instrument in the world with the legal means to deal with this task. Said document not only enumerated the rights of internally displaced persons (reflected in the Guiding Principles established by the United Nations), but also established concrete obligations of the State, international bodies and diverse groups regarding the protection of these people. Even more important, it establishes mechanisms to avoid the internal displacement and guidelines regarding compensation for the affected populations as well as the necessary help for them to return home or to be resettled.

As well as establishing the responsibility of the institutions of the State to ensure the full exercise of the rights of internally displaced people, and of providing them with protection, the Convention also says that in situations of armed conflict, insurgent groups are also obliged to protect this group of people, as well as facilitating access to humanitarian organizations in order to bring in aid and to avoid displacement of the civilian population.

Conscious of the growing impact of climate change is having and will have on the continent, the Convention also brings under its protection people displaced by climatological phenomena, as well as those who have had to abandon their homes because of development or public works projects, or through the actions of private companies.

In 2009 Africa took the first step towards inclusion of the protection of internally displaced people within the legal framework of their countries

In order for it to come into effect, the Convention now needs to launch an extensive campaign for its ratification by the States, as at least 15 countries have to approve it to come into force. However, mere ratification will not be sufficient in order for the norms that it contains to be respected and put into practice. One of the weak points of the Convention is the absence of instruments to enforce compliance, giving the signatory countries a wide margin for non-compliance. For this reason, African civil society must take an active role for the application of this convention, the spread of its content, adherence and implementation. In this sense, the governments that ratified it must include modifications within their own legal framework and new laws, necessary in order to support and comply with the Convention and to ensure that internally displaced people receive the necessary attention, as well as protecting the population as a whole from displacement.

The African Convention is an example to follow in other continents and countries, reinforcing the commitment to protect all human beings from forced displacement.

4. Initiative to resolve the Kurdish question in Turkey

Affected during more than 20 years by a conflict between the State and the PKK Kurdish armed group, which has left more than 40,000 dead and at least one million internally displaced people, in recent years, and especially in 2009, Turkey has begun exploring non-violent ways of resolving the Kurdish question. The coming together of local and international factors has opened an historic window of opportunity for peace. Nevertheless, the obstacles are considerable, as was seen in the deteriorating situation towards the end of 2009. A variety of elements have given rise to the new mood of incipient optimism.

One aspect has been the evolution of the international and regional scenario. Faced with the complex Iraqi scenario –affected by the high level of violence and the uncertainty caused by the withdrawal of all US troops by 2011– Turkey clearly needed to secure its frontiers and its immediate surroundings. It was felt that the possible resolution of the conflict with the PKK, which has bases in Iraqi Kurdistan, would make the north of Iraq more of a "buffer zone" and could contribute to the contention of the post-US Iraqi scenario. Furthermore, it would contribute to the normalization of relations between Turkey and the Kurdish administration in the north of Iraq, economically strategic for both parties but plagued by differences over the PKK and the Kurdish question.

At the same time, the process of Turkey's adhesion to the European Union, although uncertain and increasingly marked my mutual mistrust, has served to drive democratic reforms in Turkey which, although limited, have helped to advance the Kurdish question. In this regard, both the armed and civilian Kurds have tended to look to Europe as a platform for a path to solve the conflict.

At an internal level, there is also cause for cautious optimism. On the one hand, the cycle of conflict seems to have arrived at a stage at which all parties, including the Army, assume, at least implicitly, that the conflict cannot be resolved solely by military means. This has led to the exploration of other means, including the possibility of different forms of dialogue. In fact, this has led to a significant decline in violence during 2009. Nevertheless, the military way remains open –as was seen in the confrontations at the end of the year– and those involved disagree on the alternatives.

This new cycle of conflict coincides with other factors. The government of the AKP party, which took power in 2002, has taken an ambivalent stand on the Kurdish question, bringing in some reforms which improved the situation of the Kurdish people without taking on the fundamental questions. It has been a stage in which the door has remained open to a new *modus operandi* in the historically authoritarian treatment of the Kurdish people at the hands of the Turkish State. What stands out in this context is the "democratic initiative" that the government presented to Parliament in 2009, as a State project of cultural, political and social reform to improve the situation of the Kurds and, as well, to bring about the end of the PKK's armed struggle. This plan has included symbolic gestures, such as the official meeting between the Turkish prime minister and the leader of the pro-Kurdish DTP party.

At the same time, a section of the Kurdish electorate is seen as potential AKP voters, which makes it in the government's interest to get closer to them especially before the next general elections in 2011, and after the reverses suffered in the southeast in the local elections in March 2009, compared with the good results obtained by the DTP. Nevertheless, the limitations and ambiguities of the Government's reform plan, the banning of the DTP by the Supreme Tribunal in December and the ensuing Kurdish protests, pose serious questions for 2010.

On the other hand, also at a local level, during 2009 the PKK has also made various steps towards peace. Among them is its reiterated desire for a peaceful solution and dialogue with the government; the consolidation of a program which for several years has excluded mention of independence, bringing it closer to the State's agenda; the renewal in 2009 of his unilateral ceasefire, which caused dissension on the ground; the principal leader Abdullah Öcalan's drawing up of a "road map" to bring about an end to the conflict –although this still remains in the hands of the authorities, who haven't published it–; and a greater willingness on the part of the PKK to listen to criticism from other Kurdish sectors. That said, the attack on the Army last December by a PKK cell, acting without orders, and which left seven soldiers dead, shows the risk of a drift back onto the offensive.

This new stage in Turkey is still in its infancy. The obstacles it faces are many and considerable. Among them is the risk of a new outbreak of violence after the events at the end of 2009, the influence of the Army in political life and its historic defence of a military solution to the threat of the PKK, mistrust between the parties to the conflict, the open rejection of peace initiatives by the Turkish opposition, the imbalance between the aspirations of the various parties and the historic absence of forums for democratic discussion. Throughout 2009, with the exception of December, the overall climate has been one of optimism, with the first tentative steps towards a possible peace. For this reason, the challenge now is to help and encourage the new scenario.

> *During 2009, the first steps towards a possible peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question were taken, although in December the obstacles in the path of this process became clear*

5. Peace negotiations in the Niger Delta (Nigeria)

On 25 October, in response to a Government's offer of peace talks, the armed group MEND announced an indefinite ceasefire. The armed conflict in the Niger Delta region, bound up with control of oil profits and the environmental and socioeconomic impact of drilling for crude oil in the area, has its roots in the abandonment, lack of development and systematic marginalization of the region on the part of the government and oil companies. The dialogue initiated between the main leaders of the group and the executive of president Umaru Yar'Adua is a new window of hope for peace in the Delta.

The steps taken up to now are significant and suggest that things are going well. In the first place, the amnesty decreed by Yar'Adua for all combatants who gave up their arms within 60 days, which surpassed the initial demobilization targets set by the government, led to 15,000 combatants disarming and gathering in cantonment camps. Secondly, the freeing of one of the main leaders of MEND, Henry Okah (who was being tried for treason and trafficking), met one of the armed group's fundamental conditions for entering into dialogue. Thirdly, the proposal by the team of mediators presented by MEND, the *Aaron Team*, has been accepted by the government, which up to now has rejected any external interference. Fourthly, Parliament's approval of a budget of $66 million in order to train and reintegrate ex-combatants; and the agreement reached between government agencies and oil companies to create a Committee for the Supervision and Implementation of the Rehabilitation and Training of ex-combatants in which the multinationals are committed to offer training and financial assistance to anyone who joins the amnesty. And finally, the involvement of groups of young people, women and elders, whose participation is essential if peace is to develop.

However, and although the leaders of the different armed groups had demanded that the talks deal with the fundamental issues which affect communities of the Delta, there is scarcely any information about any contact and meetings held with the Government. For this reason, it is necessary to ensure that all of the groups and communities with a genuine interest in peace in the Delta be present at the negotiations, avoiding the situation where only those who bear arms get a hearing. Transparency regarding the terms of the agreements will be essential if there is to be proper social control over the agreement and also in order to reach a solution that addresses the problems of the region, avoiding the possibility that the negotiations become a mere sharing out of power and wealth between the armed groups and the Government. For this reason, regional bodies such as ECOWAS need to take a more relevant role when it comes to generating proposals and must bring pressure to bear for better management of the talks. Up to now, the talks have not been backed by international bodies.

It is important to make clear the amnesty is not enough to achieve peace. The armed groups are not the only ones responsible for violence in the Niger Delta and therefore responsibility for the armed conflict has to be shared by political institutions, security forces and the oil companies. This amnesty should not mean that the violations of human rights and war crimes perpetrated in the region since the beginning of the conflict in 2001 will be forgiven or forgotten. Political parties have been funding gangs and *cults* for decades, arming them and using them to threaten political rivals, especially during electoral campaigns. Furthermore, influential local politicians and members of the Armed Forces are linked to the sale of oil illegally extracted from the Delta pipelines (locally know as bunkering). On the other hand, the multinational companies have created groups charged with guarding their installations and which with the same arms, have brought about inter-communitarian confrontations over the control of oil-rich territory. Neither the companies nor local governments have met their obligation of bringing prosperity and development to the Delta, and for this they must face up to their responsibilities and show their commitment to the peace process, if they are to avoid becoming *spoilers*.

On the other hand, it is worrying that only 10% of the funds approved to finance program of demobilization have been received. A key challenge for the Yar'Adua administration is to ensure that these funds are immediately and effectively channelled in a measurable way to these programs of reinsertion and training. It also needs to be established that a percentage of the oil profits should go towards address the region's lack of development and employment for the young people. A transparent and effective administration of these funds is also a key factor for the success of the peace strategy in the Delta, so that this money does not end up in the hands of corrupt politicians and used to continue illegal practices that harm the Delta communities. Equally, the environmental recovery of territory and waters in the Delta must be a key factor in development projects in the area, creating new jobs and allowing communities to return to developing economic activities, such as agriculture, cattle and fishing, which pollution has destroyed.

The offer of an amnesty to the MEND opens a new window for dialogue

Annex I. Country and indicators table and definition of the indicators

The following table has been develop using a list of 10 indicators regrouped in four categories related to conflicts and peacebuilding, humanitarian crises, human rights and transitional justice, and gender. The indicators refer to 195 countries: 192 member states of the United Nations, the Palestinian National Authority, Taiwan and the Holy See. Although several chapters refer to the situation in Western Sahara and Kosovo, both recognised as States by several countries, these are not included in this year's table because their international legal status is still unclear at the moment.

Different interpretations can be drawn from the table, either by analysing the current situation of a country in the light of the different indicators or by comparing the situation in several countries in relation to a specific indicator. The bookmark attached shows the numbering and names of the indicators which facilitates its interpretation.

List of indicators

1. ARMED CONFLICTS

1. Countries with armed conflicts

2. SOCIO-POLITICAL CRISES

2. Countries with socio-political crises

3. PEACE PROCESSES

3. Countries with peace processes or negotiations formalised or at an exploratory phase

4. HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES

4. Countries facing food emergencies
5. Countries where at least one in every 1,000 people is internally displaced
6. Countries of origin where at least one in every 1,000 people is a refugee
7. Countries included in the 2010 Consolidated Appeal Process and countries that have submitted flash appeals during 2009 through the United Nations System

5. HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

8. Countries with serious human rights violations according to the Human Rights Index of the Escola de Cultura de Pau

6. GENDER DIMENSION ON PEACE-BUILDING

9. Countries with serious gender inequalities according to the Gender Equity Index (GEI)
10. Countries whose GEI has fallen compared to 2004

ARMED CONFLICTS

1. **Countries with armed conflict**
    SOURCE: ECP's follow up of the international situation based on information drawn up by the United Nations, international organisations, NGOs, research centres and regional and international media.

    This indicator shows the countries with one or more armed conflicts. An armed conflict is understood to be any confrontation involving regular or irregular armed parties with objectives perceived as incompatible in which the continuous, organised use of violence: a) causes at least 100 deaths in a year and/or have a serious impact on the area (destruction of infrastructures or environment) and human security (e.g. people wounded or displaced, sexual violence, food insecurity, impact on mental health and on the social fabric or disruption of basic services); b) is intended to achieve objectives that can be differentiated from ordinary crime and are normally linked to:

    - demands for self-determination and self-government or identity-related aspirations;
    - opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a State or the domestic or foreign policy of a government, which in both cases provides motives for a struggle to achieve or erode power;
    - or the control over natural resources or the territory

    ●   Armed conflict.

SOCIO-POLITICAL CRISES

2. **Countries with socio-political crises**
    SOURCE: ECP's follow up of the international situation based on information drawn up by the United Nations, international organisations, NGOs, research centres and regional and international media

    This indicator shows the countries with one or more socio-political crisis. A socio-political crisis is considered as any situation in which the pursuit of certain objectives or the failure to meet particular demands made by various agents leads to high levels of political and social mobilisation and/or use of violence with an intensity that does not reach the level of an armed conflict. It can include confrontations, repression, coups d'état and terrorism or other attacks where escalation could in certain circumstances, degenerate into an armed conflict. A socio-political crisis is normally linked:

    - to demands for self-determination and self-government or identity-related aspirations;
    - to opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of a State or the domestic or foreign policy of a Government, which in both cases provides motives for a struggle to achieve or erode power;

    - or the control over natural resources or the territory

    ●   Socio-political crisis.

PEACE PROCESSES

3. **Countries with peace processes or negotiations formalised or at an exploratory phase**
    SOURCE: ECP's follow up of the international situation based on information drawn up by the United Nations, international organisations, NGOs, research centres and regional and international communications media.

    It is understood that there is a peace process when the parties participating in an armed conflict have reached an agreement to proceed with negotiations making it possible to find a peaceful solution to the conflict and to regulate or resolve the basic incompatibility between them. The proceedings can be given various names, but in all cases a dialogue has begun, with or without the help of third parties. Negotiation processes may exist, whether they develop in a positive or negative way. The fact that a negotiating process exists is viewed independently of whether it is evolving well or badly. It is considered that a process or negotiation is at the exploratory stage when the parties are involving on a preliminary trial and consulting process without having reached a definitive agreement to open negotiations. This also includes the cases of peace processes that have been interrupted or failed in the past, where attempts to relaunch them remain ongoing.

    ■   Countries engaged in formal peace processes or negotiations during the year.
    □   Countries engaged in negotiations at an exploratory stage during the year.

HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES

4. **Countries facing food emergencies**
    SOURCE: Food and Agriculture Organization and Global Information and Early Warning System, *Crops prospects and food situation* n. 1, 2, 3, and 4 in 2009, FAO and GIEWS at <http://www.fao.org/giews/english/cpfs/index.htm>.

    FAO early warning system indicates countries suffering from food emergencies due to droughts, floods or other natural disasters, civil disturbance, population displacement, economic problems or sanctions. Countries with food emergencies are considered to be those facing (or which faced at some point in the year) unfavourable prospects for the current harvest and/or an uncovered deficit of food supplies which has required emergency foreign aid during the year.

    ●   Country facing food emergency.

5. Countries where at least one in every 1,000 people is internally displaced

SOURCES: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre <http://www.internal-displacement.org/> and United Nations Populations Fund, *State of the World Population 2009*, UNFPA 2009, at <http://www.unfpa.org/swp>.

The indicator assesses the seriousness of the displacement situation based on the percentage of internally displaced persons out of the total population of the country. People are considered to be internally displaced when they have been forced to flee and leave their home, particularly as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, generalised situations of violence or natural or human disasters and when they have not crossed a recognised international border. The countries and data appearing in this report show only the displacement situation as a consequence of armed violence.

- ● Country facing a very serious displacement situation: at least one in every 100 people is internally displaced.
- ○ Country facing a serious displacement situation: at least one in every 1,000 people is internally displaced or at least 5,000 people are internally displaced without reaching this percentage.
- ▲ Country where there are systematic internal population displacements but without figures on the number of people affected.

6. Countries of origin where at least one in every 1,000 people is a refugee

SOURCES: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *2008 Global Trends. Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons*, UNHCR, June 2009 at <http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html> and United Nations Populations Fund, *State of the World Population 2009*, UNFPA 2009, at < http://www.unfpa.org/swp/>.

The indicator assesses the seriousness of the displacement situation based on the percentage of refugees in relation to the total population of the country of origin. The figure indicates the number of refugees or people in a situation similar to refugee status,[1] in 2007. Refugees are people who are outside their country of origin or normal residence, whom have a well-founded fear of persecution due to their race, religion, nationality, belonging to a certain social group or political opinions and who cannot or do not want to receive protection from their country or return to it for fear of persecution.

- ● Country confronting a very serious refugee situation: at least one in every 100 people is a refugee.
- ○ Country confronting a serious refugee situation: at least one in every 1,000 people is a refugee, or at least 5,000 people are refugees without reaching this percentage.

7. Countries included in the United Nations Consolidated Appeal Process 2010 (CAP) and countries that have submitted flash appeals during 2009 through the United Nations system

SOURCES: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Humanitarian Appeal 2010. Consolidated Appeal Process*, OCHA November 2009, at <http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal> and Financial Tracking Service at Reliefweb, <http://www.reliefweb.org/fts>.

Since 1994, the United Nations has made an annual appeal to the donor community via OCHA, in an attempt to collect the funds required to deal with certain humanitarian emergency contexts. The fact that a country or region is included in this appeal means that there is a serious humanitarian crisis situation acknowledged by the international community. Meanwhile, extraordinary flash appeals are intended to provide a response to disaster situations for a period of six months, which can be submitted during the whole year.

- ● Country included in the United Nations CAP 2010.
- ■ Country which has submitted a flash appeal during 2009.
- ▲ Country included in the CAP 2010 and which has made a flash appeal during 2009.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

8. Countries with serious human rights violations according to the Human Rights Index of the Escola de Cultura de Pau

SOURCES: Amnesty International. *Amnesty International Report 2009. The state of the World's Human Rights*. London: AI, 2009, at <http://thereport.amnesty.org/en/download>; Amnesty International. *Death sentences and executions in 2008*. London: AI, 2009, at <http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/info/ACT50/003/2009/en>; Human Rights Watch. *World Report 2009*. New York: HRW, 2009, at <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2009>; Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. *Child Soldiers Global Report 2008*. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008, at <http://www.child-soldiers.org/home>; Coomaraswamy, Radhika. *Annual Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict*. A/HRC/12/49, July the 30th 2009 at <http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/HRC/12/49>; Office of the High Commissioner for

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1. "This category is descriptive in origin and include groups of people who are outside their country or territory of origin and who have a need for protection similar to that of refugees, but who have not been granted refugee status for practical or other reasons" according to *2007 Overall Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons*, UNHCR, June 2008, at <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4852366f2.pdf>

Human Rights at <http://www.ohchr.org> and International Committee of the Red Cross at <http://www.icrc.org>; and ECP's follow up of the international situation based on information drawn up by the United Nations, international organisations, NGOs, research centres and regional and international communications media.

The Human Rights Index (HRIN) measures the degree of non-fulfilment and breaching of obligations on the part of the States with regard to human rights and IHL in 195 countries in a given period of time and from different sources, as set out in Annex VII. The Index consists of 22 specific indicators divided into the following three categories: a) non-ratification of the main International Law and Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) instruments; b) violation of International Law and Human Rights and c) violation of International Humanitarian Law.

- ● Countries with a HRIN equal or above 6.
- ○ Countries with a HRIN between 3 and 6.
- – No data available.

GENDER AND PEACE-BUILDING

9. **Countries with serious gender inequality according to the Gender Equity Index (GEI)**
SOURCE: Social Watch, *Gender Equity Index 2008*, at <http://www.socialwatch.org/node/9269>.

The GEI measures gender equality based on three dimensions: education (literacy and registration for all educational levels), economic activity (incomes and activity rates) and empowerment (participation in elected and officer positions). The GEI establishes a maximum value of 100, which would indicate a position of full equality in the three dimensions. The GEI does not measure the welfare of men and women, but rather the inequalities between them in a particular country. The number 60 has been taken as a reference because it is the world average.[2]

- ● Countries with a GEI of less than 50.
- ○ Countries with a GEI of between 50 and 60.
- – No data available.

10. **Countries where the Gender Equity Index (GEI) has worsened as compared with 2004**
SOURCE: Social Watch, *Gender Equity Index 2008*, at <http://www.socialwatch.org/node/9270>

The GEI measures gender equality based on three dimensions: education (literacy and registration for all educational levels), economic activity (incomes and activity rates) and empowerment (participation in elected and officer positions). The GEI establishes a maximum value of 100, which would indicate a position of full equality in the three dimensions. The GEI does not measure the welfare of men and women, but rather the inequalities between them in a particular country. The number 60 has been taken as a reference because it is the world average.

- ▲ Countries where the GEI has worsened as compared with 2004.
- – No data available.

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2. The exact average world GEI for 2008 is 61.1.

Country	Conflicts and peacebuilding			Humanitarian crises				HR	Gender	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Afghanistan	●		□	●	○	●	●	●	—	—
Albania						○			○	▲
Algeria	●				▲	○		●	○	
Andorra									—	—
Angola		●		●	○	○		○	○	▲
Antigua and Barbuda								—	—	—
Argentina										
Armenia		●	■		○	○			—	—
Australia										
Austria										
Azerbaijan		●	■		●	○		○		
Bahamas										
Bahrain									●	▲
Bangladesh		●		●	○	○		○	○	▲
Barbados								—		
Belarus						○				
Belgium										
Belize										
Benin							●		●	▲
Bhutan						●		—	—	—
Bolivia		●								
Bosnia and Herzegovina		●			●	●			—	—
Botswana										▲
Brazil								○		
Brunei Darussalam								—		
Bulgaria										
Burkina Faso							▲		○	
Burundi		●		●	●	●		○		
Cambodia		●	■			○		○		
Cameroon						○		○	●	
Canada										
Cape Verde							●	—	○	▲
Central African Republic	●		■	●	●	●	●	○	●	▲
Chad	●	●	■	●	●	○	●	○	●	▲
Chile										
China		●	■			○		●		
Colombia	●	●			●	○		○		
Comoros								—	—	—
Congo		●		●	○	○		○	●	▲
Congo, DR	●	●	■	●	●	○	●	●	—	—
Costa Rica										
Côte d'Ivoire		●		●	●	○	●	○	●	▲
Croatia						●				
Cuba				●		○				
Cyprus		●	■		●					
Czech Republic										▲
Denmark										
Djibouti		●							●	
Dominica								—	—	—
Dominican Republic										

Country	Conflicts and peacebuilding			Humanitarian crises				HR	Gender	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Ecuador										
Egypt		●				○		○	●	▲
El Salvador						○	○			
Equatorial Guinea								○	●	
Eritrea		●	■	●	○	●		○	●	▲
Estonia										
Ethiopia	●	●	■	●	○	○		●	○	
Fiji						○		○	—	—
Finland										
France										
Gabon									○	▲
Gambia							●	○	●	▲
Georgia		●	■		●	○		○		▲
Germany										
Ghana						○	●		○	▲
Greece										
Grenada								—	—	—
Guatemala				●	▲	○		○	●	
Guinea		●		●		○	●	○	○	
Guinea-Bissau		●		●			●	○	●	
Guyana										
Haiti		●		●		○		○	—	—
Holy See								—	—	—
Honduras		●		●						
Hungary										
Iceland										
India	●	●	■□		○	○		●	●	
Indonesia		●				○	○	○	○	▲
Iran, Islamic Rep.		●		●		○		○	○	
Iraq	●			●	●	●		●	—	—
Ireland										
Israel	●	●	■□		●			●		
Italy										
Jamaica										▲
Japan		●								
Jordan									●	
Kazakhstan										
Kenya		●		●		○	●	○	○	▲
Kiribati								—	—	—
Korea, DPR		●		●				○	—	—
Korea, Rep.		●							○	▲
Kuwait									—	—
Kyrgyzstan		●								
Lao, DPR		●				○	○	○	—	—
Latvia										
Lebanon		●			●	○		○	●	▲
Lesotho				●						
Liberia				●	▲	●	●		—	—
Libyan, Arab Jamahiriya								○	—	—
Liechtenstein									—	—

Country	Conflicts and peacebuilding			Humanitarian crises				HR	Gender	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Lithuania										
Luxembourg										
Macedonia, FYR						○				
Madagascar		●		●			○			▲
Malawi				●					●	▲
Malaysia								○	○	▲
Maldives										▲
Mali		●	■				●		○	▲
Malta									○	
Marshall I.								—	—	—
Mauritania		●		●		●	●		●	
Mauritius								—		
Mexico					○	○		○		
Micronesia, Fed. Est.								—	—	—
Moldova, Rep. of		●	■			○		○		
Monaco									—	—
Mongolia										
Montenegro						○			—	—
Morocco		●	■					○	●	▲
Mozambique				●						
Myanmar	●	●	■□	●	○	○		●	—	—
Namibia							○			
Nauru								—	—	—
Nepal, FDR		●	■	●	○			●	●	
Netherlands										
New Zealand										
Nicaragua									○	▲
Niger		●	■	●	○		●	○	●	
Nigeria	●	●	■		▲	○	●	●	●	
Norway										
Oman									●	
Pakistan	●	●	■	●	●	○		●	●	▲
Palau								—	—	—
Palestine, NA	●	●	■	●	●	●	●	○	●	
Panama										
Papua New Guinea									—	—
Paraguay										
Peru		●			○	○				
Philippines	●	●	■	●	○		○	○		
Poland										▲
Portugal										
Qatar									○	
Romania										
Russian Fed.	●	●			○	○		●		
Rwanda		●			▲	○		○		
Saint Lucia								—		
Samoa								—	○	
San Marino								—		
São Tomé and Príncipe								—	●	
Saudi Arabia		●						○	●	

Country	Conflicts and peacebuilding			Humanitarian crises				HR	Gender	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Senegal		●			○	○	●	○	○	▲
Serbia		●	■		●	●			—	—
Seychelles								—	—	—
Sierra Leone				●		○	●		●	▲
Singapore								○		
Slovakia										▲
Slovenia										
Solomon I.									—	—
Somalia	●	●	■	●	●	●	●	●	—	—
South Africa										
Spain										
Sri Lanka	●	●		●	●	○		●	○	▲
St. Kitts and Nevis								—	—	—
St. Vincent and the Grenadines								—		
Sudan	●	●	■	●	●	○	●	●	●	▲
Surinam									○	
Swaziland				●					○	▲
Sweden										
Switzerland										▲
Syria, Arab Rep.		●	□	●	●	○		○	○	
Taiwan			■						—	—
Tajikistan		●		●					○	▲
Tanzania, United Rep.									○	
Thailand	●	●	■					●		
Timor-Leste				●	●				○	●
Togo						○	●		●	▲
Tonga								—	—	—
Trinidad and Tobago										
Tunisia								○	●	▲
Turkey	●		□		●	○		●	●	▲
Turkmenistan					▲				—	—
Tuvalu								—	—	—
Uganda	●	●	■	●	●	○	●	●		
Ukraine						○				
United Arab Emirates								○	○	
United Kingdom										
Uruguay										
USA		●						○		▲
Uzbekistan		●				○		○	○	▲
Vanuatu								—	○	
Venezuela, Bolivarian Rep.		●				○				
Vietnam						○		○		
Yemen	●			●	○		▲	●	●	
Zambia									○	▲
Zimbabwe		●		●	●	○	●	○	○	▲
TOTAL ●	23	64		44	24	13	25	20	34	
TOTAL ○					18	54	5	47	33	
TOTAL ■			29							
TOTAL □			6							
TOTAL ▲					6		2			47

Annex II. International missions in 2009

UN peace missions (15 PKO, 2 PO/PKO, 10 PO and PBO)[1]

Country (start-end of armed conflict)	Mission and type (initial mandate resolution)	Beginning – end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observ./ police	Special representative/head of mission (SR) special envoy (SE) personal envoy (PE) and special adviser (SA) (year of appointment)
AFRICA				
African continent				Special adviser for Africa and high representative for least developed countries, landlocked developing countries and small islands developing states, Cheikh Sidi Diarra (Mali) (2008)
West Africa Region	UNOWA, SR's Office (PO)	March 2002		SR Said Djinnit (Algeria) (2008) replacing Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania) (2002)
Great Lakes Region				SR Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria) (2008)
Burundi (1993-2006)	BINUB[2] (PO/PBO) S/RES/1719	January 2007	-/6/11	Executive representative, Youssef Mahmoud (Tunisia) (2007)
Congo, DR (1998-)	MONUC (PKO) S/RES/1279	November 1999	17,768/692/ 1,210	SR Alan Doss (United Kingdom) (October 2007), SE for eastern DR Congo, Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria) (2008)
Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2007)	ONUCI[3] (PKO) S/RES/1528	April 2004	7,028/192/ 1,158	SR Choi Young-Jin (Republic of Korea) (October 2007)
Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999)	UNOGBIS (PBO) S/RES/1216	March 1999		SR and head of UNOGBIS, Joseph Mutaboba (Rwanda) (2006)
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon				Special adviser of UN secretary-general and mediator of the border dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, Nicolas Michel (Switzerland) (September 2008)
Liberia (1989-2005)	UNMIL (PKO) S/RES/1509	September 2003	10,033/122/ 1,343	SR Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark) (October 2007)
Morocco-Western Sahara (1975-)	MINURSO (PKO) S/RES/690	September 1991	20/216/6	SR Hany Abdel-Aziz (Egypt) (2009) replacing Julian Harston (United Kingdom) (February 2007). Personal envoy for Western Sahara, Christopher Ross (USA) (January 2009)
Central African Rep. (1996-2000) (2002-2003)	BONUCA[4] (PBO) S/RES/1271	February 2000	-/-/6	François Lonseny Fall (Guinea) (2007) replacing Lamine Sissé (Senegal) (2001)
Central African Rep. (1996-2000) (2002-2003) and Chad (2006)	MINURCAT (PKO) S/RES/1778	September 2007	2,691/23/256	SR Victor da Silva Angelo (Portugal) (2008)
Sierra Leone (1991-2001)	UNIPSIL[5] (PBO) S/RES/1829	October 2008		Executive representative Michel von der Schulenburg (Germany) (2008) replacing Victor da Silva Angelo (Portugal) (2006)
Somalia (1988-)	UNPOS[6] (PO) S/RES/954	April 1995		Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania) (2008) replacing François Lonseny Fall (Guinea) (2005)
Sudan (1983-2004)	UNMIS[7] (PKO) S/RES/1590	March 2005	8,812/476/ 715	SR Ashraf Jehangir Qazi (Pakistan) (September 2007)
Sudan (Darfur) (2003-)	UNAMID[8] (PKO) S/RES/1769, joint AU-UN mission	July 2007	14,803/207/ 4,280	Current joint AU and United Nations SR, Henry Anyidoho (Ghana) (2009), chief African Union and United Nations mediator for Darfur, Djibril Yipènè Bassolé (Burkina Faso) (2008).

1. Peace-Keeping Operation (PKO), Political Office Mission (PO) and Peace-Building Operation (PBO). The figures given are based on ongoing UN missions during 2009 and therefore do not include the figures from representatives, envoys or special advisers, nor personal envoys that are not associated with a concrete mission. That said, the annex includes information about their presence. On the other hand, the political missions BINUB (Burundi) and UNAMA (Afghanistan) are led and backed by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, for which reason they are counted as hybrid missions PO/PKO.
2. It replaces the ONUB peace-keeping mission. This was preceded by the AU mission (AMIB) which was integrated into ONUB in June 2004.
3. There was previously a UN political mission (MINUCI, S/RES/1479) from May 2003, which included the 1,300 soldiers from ECOWAS (ECOMI-CI, ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire) to April 2004, supported by 4,000 French soldiers (Operation Licorne).
4. MINURCA (1998-2000) (PKO).
5. UNOMSIL (1998-1999) (PKO), UNAMSIL (1999-2005) (PKO), UNIOSIL (2006-2008) (PBO).
6. UNOSOM I (1992-1993) UNITAF (1992-1993, USA with mandate from the UN Security Council) UNOSOM II (1993-1995) (PKO). S/RES/954 established the closure of UNOSOM II and established that the UN would continue observing events in Somalia via a Political Office based in Kenya.
7. The functions of the political mission UNAMIS (set up in 2004) were transferred to UNMIS under S/RES/1590 of March 2005.
8. The AU mission, AMIS, set up in 2004, has been integrated in the new joint mission.

UN peace missions (15 PKO, 2 PO/PKO, 10 PO and PBO) (continuation)

Country (start-end of armed conflict)	Mission and type (initial mandate resolution)	Beginning – end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observ./ police	Special representative/head of mission (SR) special envoy (SE) personal envoy (PE) and special adviser (SA) (year of appointment)
AFRICA				
Uganda (1986-), DR Congo and Southern Sudan*		*2000-2009*		*SR for the areas affected by the LRA armed opposition group, Joaquim Chissano (Mozambique) (2006). Chissano left office in late 2009*
AMERICA				
Haiti (2004-2005)	MINUSTAH (PKO) S/RES/1542	June 2004	7,141/-/2,032	SR and head of the mission, Hédi Annabi (Tunisia) (2007). SE William J. Clinton (USA)
ASIA				
Central Asia	UNRCCA, United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (PO)	May 2008		SR and head of the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia, Miroslav Jenca (Slovakia) (2008)
Afghanistan [9] (2002-)	UNAMA (PO/PKO) S/RES/1401 (2002) S/RES/1662 (2006) S/RES/1746 (2007)	March 2002	-/17/8	SR Kai Eide (Norway) (2008), replacing Tom Koenigs (Germany) (2006)
Cambodia (1975-1979)		November 2005		SR on the human rights situation, Yash Gay (Kenya) (2005)
India-Pakistan (1946-)	UNMOGIP[10] (PKO) S/RES/91 (1951)	January 1949	-/43/-	Chief military observer, major-general Kim Moon Hwa (Republic of Korea)(2008) replacing colonel Jarmo Helenius (Finland)
Myanmar				*SA Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria) (2007), appointed to replace SE Razzali Ismail (Malaysia) (2000)*
Nepal (1996-2006)	UNMIN (PO) S/RES/1740	January 2007	-/73/-	SR Karin Landgren (Sweden) (February 2009) replacing Ian Martin (United Kingdom) (2007)
Pakistan				SE Jean-Maurice Ripert (France) (August 2009)
Timor-Leste (1975-1999)	UNMIT (PKO) S/RES/1704	August 2006	-/32/1,552	SR Atul Khare (India) (2006)
EUROPE				
Cyprus (1974-)	UNFICYP (PKO) S/RES/186	March 1964	858/-/68	SR Taye-Brook Zerihoun (Egypt) (2008) replacing Michael Moller (Denmark) (2006)
FYR Macedonia-Greece				Personal envoy for the Greece-FYR Macedonia talks, Matthew Nimetz (USA) (1999)
Georgia (Abkhazia) (1992-1993)	*UNOMIG (PKO) S/RES/849 S/RES/858*	*August 1993 – June 2009*	*-/129/16*	*SR Johan Verbeke (Belgium) (2008) replacing Jean Arnault (France) (2006)*
Serbia (Kosovo) (1998-1999)	UNMIK (PKO) S/RES/1244	June 1999	-/9/6	SR Lamberto Zannier (Italy)(2008) replacing Joachim Rücker (Germany) (2006)
MIDDLE EAST				
Iraq (2003-)	UNAMI (PO) S/RES/1546 (2004)	August 2003	221/10/-	SR Ad Melkert (Netherlands) replacing Staffan de Mistura (Sweden)(2007)
Iraq (2003-)				Special advisor to the UN secretary-general on the International Pact for Iraq and other issues, Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria) (2007)
Iraq-Kuwait (1990 - 1991)				High-level coordinator for compliance by Iraq with its obligations regarding the repatriation or return of all Kwaiti and third country nationals, Gennady P. Tarasov (Russian Fed.) (2008)
Israel-Palestine[11] (1948-)	UNSCO[12] (PO)	June 1994		Special coordinator for the Middle East peace process and personal representative of the UN secretary-general to the PLO and the PNA and UN secretary-general's envoy to the Quartet, Robert H. Serry (Netherlands) (2007)

9. The current phase of the armed conflict suffered by the country began with the attacks by the US and United Kingdom in October 2001, although the country has been in armed conflict since 1979.
10. UNIPOM (1965-1966) (PKO).
11. Although the armed conflict began in 1948, this report analyses only the last phase of the conflict, corresponding to the 2nd Intifada, beginning in September 2000.
12. UNEF I (1956-1967) (PKO) UNEF II (1973-1979) (PKO).

UN peace missions (15 PKO, 2 PO/PKO, 10 PO and PBO) (continuation)

Country (start-end of armed conflict)	Mission and type (initial mandate resolution)	Beginning – end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observ./ police	Special representative/head of mission (SR) special envoy (SE) personal envoy (PE) and special adviser (SA) (year of appointment)
MIDDLE EAST				
Israel-Syria (Golan Heights) (1967, 1973)	UNDOF(PKO) S/RES/350	June 1974	1,039/-/-	Military head of mission, major-general Wolfgang Jilke (Austria) (2007)
Israel-Lebanon (1967,1982-2000, 2006)	UNIFIL (PKO) S/RES/425 -SRES/426 (1978) S/RES/1701 (2006)	March 1978	12,341/50/-	Military head of mission, major general Claudio Graziano (Italy) (2007)
Lebanon	UNSCOL (PO) S/2008/236 and S/2008/237 (2008)	February 2007		Special coordinator, Michael C. William (United Kingdom) (2008)
Middle East (1948-)	UNTSO(PKO) S/RES/50	June 1948	-/151/-	Military head, general Robert Mood (Norway) (2006)
Middle East (1948-)				SE for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559, Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway) (2005)

OSCE Operations (18 missions)[13]

CENTRAL ASIA				
Kazakhstan	OSCE Centre in Astana (PC. DEC/797, 21/06/07), previously OSCE centre in Almaty (PC.DEC/243, 23/07/98)	July 1998		Ambassador Alexandre Keltchewsky (France) (June 2008), replacing Ivar Kristian Vikki (Norway) (2004)
Kyrgyzstan	OSCE centre in Bishek, PC. DEC 245, 23/07/98	January 1999		Ambassador Andrew Tesoriere (United Kingdom) (May 2008), replacing Markus Mueller (Switzerland) (2003)
Tajikistan	OSCE office in Tajikistan (PC. DEC/852, 19/06/08), previously OSCE centre in Dushanbe (1994)	June 1994		Ambassador Ivar Vikki (Norway) (September 2009), replacing Vladimir Pryakhin (Russian Federation) (2007)
Turkmenistan	OSCE Centre in Ashgabat (PC. DEC 244, 23/07/98	January 1999		Ambassador Arsim Zekolli (Macedonia FYR) (February 2009), replacing Ibrahim Djikic (Bosnia and Herzegovina) (2005)
Uzbekistan	OSCE Project Coordinator in Uzbekistan (PC.DEC 734, 30/06/06)	July 2006		Ambassador Istvan Venczel (Hungary) (2007)
SOUTHERN CAUCASUS				
Armenia	OSCE Office in Yerevan, PC/ DEC 314, 22/07/99	February 2000		Ambassador Sergei Kapinos (Russian Federation) (2007)
Azerbaijan	OSCE Office in Baku, PC/DEC 318, 16/11/99	July 2000		Blige Cankorel (Turkey) (April 2009), replacing Jose Luis Herrero Ansola (Spain) (2007)
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) (1991-1994)	Personal Representative of Chairman-in-office on the Conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference	August 1995		Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk (Poland) (1997)
Georgia (1992-1993)	*OSCE Mission to Georgia CSO 06/11/92*	*December 1992– December 2008/ June 2009[14]*		*SR ambassador Terhi Hakala (Finland) (October 2007), replacing SR Ambassador Roy Stephen Reeve (United Kingdom)*

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13. The number of missions excludes special representatives not associated with OSCE missions, centres or projects.
14. The mandate of the OSCE Mission in Georgia expired on 31 December 2008 after a failure to reach consensus about renewing it in the Permanent Council of the OSCE, in the context of the scenario following the war between Georgia and Russia. The Permanent Council of the OSCE decided on 19 August 2008 that the mandate of the 20 additional unarmed military observers deployed as part of the OSCE Mission in Georgia was to expire on 30 June 2009.

OSCE Operations (18 missions) (continuation)

Country (start-end of armed conflict)	Mission and type (initial mandate resolution)	Beginning – end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observ./ police	Special representative/head of mission (SR) special envoy (SE) personal envoy (PE) and special adviser (SA) (year of appointment)
EASTERN EUROPE				
Belarus	OSCE Office in Minsk, PC. DEC/526, 30/12/02	January 2003		Head-in-office, Jandos Asanov (Kazakhstan) (October 2009), replacing Ake Peterson (Sweden) (2005)
Moldova, Rep. of	OSCE Mission to Moldova CSO 04/02/93	April 1993		Ambassador Philip N. Remler (USA) (December 2007), replacing SR Ambassador Louis F. O'Neill (US) (2006)
Ukraine	OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine,[15] PC.DEC/295 01/06/99	July 1999		Coordinador de proyecto, Embajador Lubomir Kopaj (Slovakia) (abril 2008), en sustitución de James F. Schumaker (USA) (2005)
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE				
Albania	OSCE Presence in Albania, PC.DEC 160, 27/03/97; updated by PC.DEC 588, /12/03	April 1997		Ambassador Robert Bosch (Netherlands) (October 2007), replacing Ambassador Pavel Vacek (Czech Rep.)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, MC/5/DEC 18/12/95	December 1995		Ambassador Gary D. Robbins (USA) (October 2008), replacing Douglas Davidson (USA) (2004)
Croatia (1991-1995)	OSCE Office in Zagreb PC. DEC/836 12/12/07[16]	January 2008		Ambassador Jose-Enrique Horcajada Schwartz (Spain) (May 2009), replacing Jorge Fuentes Monzonis-Villallonga (Spain) (2005)
Macedonia, FYR (2001)	OSCE Spillover Monitoring Mission to Skopje to prevent the spread of conflict CSO 18/08/92	September 1992		Ambassador José Luis Herrero (Spain) (January 2009), replacing Giorgio Radicati (Italy) (2006)
Montenegro	OSCE Mission to Montenegro PC.DEC 732 29/06/06	June 2006		SR Ambassador Paraschiva Badescu (Romania) (2006)
Serbia	OSCE Mission to Serbia, PC. DEC/733, 29/06/06[17]	June 2006		Ambassador Dimitrios Kypreos (Greece) (September 2009), replacing Hans Ola Urstad (Norway) (2006)
Serbia (Kosovo) (1998-1999)	UNMIK (OSCE Mission in Kosovo) PC.DEC 305, 01/07/99	July 1999		Werner Almhofer (Austria) in October 2008 replacing Tim Guldimann (Switzerland) (2007)

NATO Missions (seven missions)[18]

Country (start-end of armed conflict)	Mission and type (initial mandate resolution)	Beginning – end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observ./ police	Special representative/head of mission (SR) special envoy (SE) personal envoy (PE) and special adviser (SA) (year of appointment)
Afghanistan (2002-)	ISAF S/RES/1386 20/12/01[19]	August 2003[20]	51,356/-/-	ISAF Commander, general Stanley A. McChrystal (USA). NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, ambassador Fernando Gentilini (Italy) (May 2008)
Europe-Mediterranean Sea	Operation Active Endeavour	October 2001		
Horn of Africa, Gulf of Aden	*Operation Allied Protector* Operation Ocean Shield, Atlantic North Council 17/08/09[21]	March-june 2009 August 2009		
Iraq (2003-)	NTIM-I, NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq, S/RES/1546	August 2004	211/-/-	NTIM-I Commander, lieutenant general Frank Helmick (USA) (July 2008)

15. It replaced the OSCE Mission in Ukraine (1994-1999) devoted to managing the crisis in Crimea.
16. OSCE Office in Zagreb was preceded by OSCE Mission in Croatia (PC.DEC/112, 18/04/96), closed in late 2007 after serving its term.
17. The OSCE mission in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, PC/DEC 401, 11/01/01, became OmiSaM (OSCE Mission in Serbia and Montenegro), PC.DEC 533, 13/02/03, and, finally, became the OSCE Mission in Serbia.
18. Figures of personal deployed in OTAN missions are taken from Sipri, *Sipri Yearbook 2009. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009.
19. The UN Security Council Resolution authorized for the first time the ISAF deployment, and successive resolutions renewed its mandate. NATO assumed the mission leadership in August 2003.
20. NATO assumed ISAF leadership in 2003, although ISAF was deployed in 2001.
21. The Ocean Shield Operation replaced two previous operations to combat piracy activities: Allied Provider Operation (October – December 2008) and Allied Protector Operation (March – June 2009).

NATO Missions (seven missions) (continuation)

Country (start-end of armed conflict)	Mission and type (initial mandate resolution)	Beginning – end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observ./ police	Special representative/head of mission (SR) special envoy (SE) personal envoy (PE) and special adviser (SA) (year of appointment)
Serbia (Kosovo) (1998-1999)	KFOR S/RES/1244 10/06/99 and Military – Technical Accord between NATO, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia	June 1999	14,411/-/-	KFOR Commander, lieutenant general Markus J. Bentler (Germany) (September 2009)
Somalia (1998-)	NATO assistance to AMISOM[22]	June 2007		

EU Operations (15 missions)[23]

EUROPE AND ASIA				
Asia Central (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan)	EU SR for Central Asia, Council Joint Action 2005/588/CFSP, Council Decision 2006/670/CFSP	July 2005		SR Pierre Morel (France) replacing Heikki Talvitie (Finland) (2006
Southern Caucasus	EU SR for the South Caucasus, Joint Action 2003/782/CFSP, 2006/121/CFSP	July 2003		SR Peter Semneby (Sweden) replacing Heikki Talvitie (Finland) (2006)
Afghanistan [24] (2002-)	EU SR for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Council Joint Action 2001/875/CFSP, subsequently amended	July 2002		SR Ettore Francesco Sequi (Italy), replacing Francesc Vendrell (Spain)
Afghanistan (2002-)	EUPOL AFGHANISTAN, EU Police Mission in Afghanistan, Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP, subsequently amended	June 2007	-/-/157	Head of Mission Kai Vittrup (Denmark) replacing Jürgen Scholz (Germany) (October 2008)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	EU SR in Bosnia and Herzegovina Council Joint Action 2006/49/CFSP Council Decision 2007/427/CFSP and Council Joint Action 2007/478/CFSP	2007		SR Valentin Inzko (Austria), replacing Miroslav Lajčák (Slovakia) (2007)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	EUPM, EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP, subsequently amended	January 2003	-/-/125	Steffan Feller (Germany) (November 2008), replacing Vincenzo Coppola (Italy) (November 2005).
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995)	EUFOR ALTHEA,[25] EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP	December 2004	1,953/-/-	Military head, Bernhard Bair (Austria) (December 2009), replacing Stefano Castagnotto (Italy) (December 2008)
Georgia	SR for the Crisis in Georgia, Council Joint Action 2008/760/ESDP	September 2008		Pierre Morel (France) (September 2008)
Georgia – Russia (2008)	EUMM, EU Monitoring Mission, Council Joint Action 2008/736/CFSP and 2008/759/CFSP	October 2008		Head of Mission, Hansjörg Haber (Germany) (September 2008)
Kosovo (1998-1999)	EULEX Kosovo, EU Mission for the Rule of Law in Kosovo, Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP	2008	-/-/1245	Head of Mission, Yves de Kermabon (France) (February 2008)

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22. NATO has carried out other interventions to support the EU, including the operation to assist the AU mission to Sudan (AMIS), started in 2005 and ended in 2007. NATO has also offered support to the hybrid mission in the Sudanese region of Darfur.
23. The total figures of missions excluded special representatives not associated with a concrete EU mission.
24. The current phase of the armed conflict suffered by the country began with the attacks by the US and United Kingdom in October 2001, although the country has been involved in armed conflict since 1979.
25. The UN Security Council drew up resolution s/res/1551 of 09/07/04 to provide a mandate to the mission, under the supervision of the Council. This mission is the continuation of the NATO SFOR mission, and its mandate is to implement the Dayton Accord of 1995.

EU Operations (15 missions) (continuation)

Country (start-end of armed conflict)	Mission and type (initial mandate resolution)	Beginning – end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observ./ police	Special representative/head of mission (SR) special envoy (SE) personal envoy (PE) and special adviser (SA) (year of appointment)
EUROPE AND ASIA				
Kosovo (1998-1999)	SR for Kosovo, Council Joint Action 2008/123/CFSP, 2009/605/CFSP	February 2008		Pieter Feith (Denmark) (2008)
Macedonia, FYR	EU mission in Macedonia, FYR (Special Representative's Office and European Commission Delegation), SR: Council Joint Action 2005/724/CFSP, subsequently amended	2001		Head of Mission and SR, Erwan Fouéré (Ireland) (2005)
Moldova	EU SR for Moldova, Joint Action 2007/107/CFSP	March 2005		SR Kálmán Mizsei (Hungary) (2007)
Myanmar	EU SE for Burma/Myanmar, Appointed by High Representative for the CFSP, November 2007	November 2007		SE Piero Fassino (Italy) (2007)
Moldova-Ukraine	EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) Council for Joint Action 2005/776/CFSP	November 2005		Head of Mission, Ferenc Banfi (Hungary) (2005)
AFRICA				
Africa	UE SR for the African Union (AU), Joint Action 2007/805/ CFSP, 6/12/07	December 2007		Koen Verbaeke (Belgium) (2007)
Great Lakes	EU SR for the Great Lakes Region, Council Joint Action 2007/112/CFSP and 2008/108/CFSP	March 1997		SR Roeland van de Geer (Netherlands) (March 2007)
Congo, DR (1998-)	EUPOL DR CONGO, EU Police Mission in DR Congo Council Joint Action 2007/405/CFSP, subsequently amended	July 2007		Head of Mission, Adilio Custodio (Portugal) (2007)
Congo, DR (1998-)	EUSEC DR Congo, Security Sector Aid and Reform Mission in DR Congo Joint 2005/355/CFSP	June 2005		Head of Mission, Jean-Paul Michel (France) replacing Michel Sido (France)
Guinea-Bissau	EU SRR Guinea-Bissau, EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau, Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP 12/02/08	June 2008		Head of Mission, Esteban Verástegui (Spain) (March 2008)
Somalia (1988-)	EU NAVFOR Somalia, S/RES/1816 (2008), S/RES/1838 (2008), Council Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP	December 2008		EU NAVFOR Operation commander, Peter Hudson (United Kingdom) (June 2009)
Sudan (1983-2004)	EU SR for Sudan and for EUFOR CHAD/RCA Operation, Council Decision 2007/238/ CFSP and Joint Action 2007/108/CFSP	April 2007		SR Torben Brylle (Denmark) (2007)
Central African Rep. (2006-), Chad (2006-)	*EUFOR TCHAD/RCA (PKO) S/RES/1778, Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP and 2008/110/CFSP[26]*	*January 2008 – march 2009*	*3,700 /-/-*	*Operation commander General Patrick Nash (Ireland) (2007)*
MIDDLE EAST				
Middle East (1948-)	EU SR for the Middle East Peace Process, Joint Action 2003 2003/537/CFSP	November 1996		SR Marc Otte (Belgium) (2003)

26. On 15 March 2009 EUFOR TCHAD/RCA Operation ended and was transferred to MINURCAT.

EU Operations (15 missions) (continuation)

Country (start-end of armed conflict)	Mission and type (initial mandate resolution)	Beginning – end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observ./ police	Special representative/head of mission (SR) special envoy (SE) personal envoy (PE) and special adviser (SA) (year of appointment)
MIDDLE EAST				
Iraq (2003-)	EUJUST LEX, Integrated EU Mission for the Rule of Law in Iraq, Council Joint Action 2005/190/CFSP	July 2005		Head of Mission Stephen White (United Kingdom) (March 2005)
Israel-Palestine (1948-)	EU BAM Rafah, Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories, Council Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP, subsequently amended	November 2005	-/-/13	Head of Mission, Alain Faugeras (France) (November 2008), replacing Pietro Pistolese (Italy)
Israel-Palestine (1948-)	EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS)[27], was set up within the Office of the EU SR for the Middle East, Council Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP and 2008/133/CFSP	January 2006		Head of Mission, Paul Robert Kernaghan (United Kingdom) (January 2009)

OAS (one mission)

Country (start-end of armed conflict)	Mission and type	Beginning – end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observ./ police	Special representative/head of mission
Colombia (1964-)	OAS Mission to support the peace process in Colombia (MAPP OEA), CP/RES/859	February 2004		Head of Mission, Marcelo Alvarez (Argentina) (2009)

Operations by Russia and the Community of Independent States (CIS)[28] (three missions)

Country (start-end of armed conflict)	Mission and type	Beginning – end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observ./ police	Special representative/head of mission
Georgia (South Ossetia)	*Joint Force in South Ossetia (Bilateral, 24/06/92)*	*July 1992- Aug. 2009[29]*	*1,519/-/-*	
Georgia (Abkhazia)	*CIS Peacekeeping Force in Georgia*	*June 1994- Aug. 2009[30]*	*2,542/-/-*	
Moldova (Transdniestria)	Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force (Bilateral, 21/07/92)	July 1992	1,278/10/-	Colonel Vyacheslav Sitchikin (Russian Federation) (September 2009)

ECCAS (one mission)

Country (start-end of armed conflict)	Mission and type	Beginning – end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observ./ police	Special representative/head of mission
Central African Rep. (oct. 2002-March 2003)	MICOPAX[31] (Mission de Consolidation de la paix en République Centrafricaine)	July 2008	504/-/-	

AU (one mission)

Country (start-end of armed conflict)	Mission and type	Beginning – end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observ./ police	Special representative/head of mission
Somalia (1988-)	AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), S/RES/1744	February 2007	5,150/-/-	Head of Mission, Nicholas Bwakira (Burundi) (November 2007)

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27. This mission emerged from the previous work of the UE Coordination Office to assist the Palestinian Police (EU COPPS), established in April 2005.
28. Figures of personal deployed in CIS missions were taken from SIPRI, *SIPRI Yearbook 2009. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009.
29. Georgia ceased to be an official part of the CIS on 18 August 2009, having asked to leave six months earlier, as a result of the war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008. Its exit from the CIS means that the peace operation carried out by the CIS in Abkhazia is ended. In practice, the mission was already dismantled in 2008.
30. Georgia ceased to be an official part of the CIS on 18 August 2009, having asked to leave six months earlier, as a result of the war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008. Its exit from the CIS means that the peace operation carried out by the CIS in South Ossetia is ended. In practice, the mission was already dismantled in 2008.
31. MICOPAX replaced the Multinational Force (FOMUC) of CEMAC regional organization.

Other operations (seven missions)

Country (start-end of armed conflict)	Mission and type (initial mandate resolution)	Beginning – end of mission	Soldiers/ Military Observ./ police	Special representative/head of mission (SR) special envoy (SE) personal envoy (PE) and special adviser (SA) (year of appointment)
Korea, DPR – Korea, Rep. of	NSC (Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission) Armistice Agreement	July 1953	-/10/-	
Solomon Islands	RAMSI Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (Biketawa Declaration) S/RES/1690	July 2003	220/-/306	RAMSI Special coordinator, Graeme Wilson (Australia) (January 2009
Israel-Palestine (1948-)	TPIH 2 (Temporary International Presence in Hebron)	February 1997	-/-/28	
Egypt (Sinai)	Multinational Force and Observers (Protocol to the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel 26/03/1979)	April 1982	-/1,673/-	
Iraq (2003-)	Multinational Force in Iraq (USA-United Kingdom) S/RES/1511	October 2003	124,000[32] /-/-	General commander Ray Odierno (USA) (September 2008)
Côte d'Ivoire (2002-)	Operation Licorne (France) S/RES/1464	February 2003	1,809/-/-	General Jean-François Hogar (June 2009)
Timor-Leste (1975-1999)	ISF (PKO) (Australia) S/RES/1690	May 2006	890/-/-	Stuart Campbell Mayer (Australia) (October 2009)

*In italics, the missions closed or duties completed in 2009.
Sources: Prepared by the authors and updated in December 2009, and SIPRI 2008, *SIPRI Yearbook 2009. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009.

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32. See O'Hanlon, Michael E., Livingston, Ian. Iraq Index, Brookings Institution, 20 November 2009, at <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/ Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index20091120.pdf>.

Annex III. Donors' response and CAP review in 2009

Donors' response in 2009

Main humanitarian appeals[1]	Main recipients by organization	Main recipients by sector	Main donor countries[2]	TOTAL
Aid provide through the United Nations system				
1. Madagascar *flash appeal* (83%)	1. WFP	1. Non-specified	1. USA (29.2%)	6,467 million dollars
2. Central African Republic (72%)	2. UNHCR	2. Food	2. Carry-over[3] (20.5%)	
3. Afghanistan (72%)	3. UNICEF	3. Coordination and support services	3. ECHO (7.6%)	
4. Pakistan (71%)	4. UNWRA	4. Multi-sector	4. Japan (4.7%)	
5. Palestine (71%)	5. FAO	5. Shelter and non-food items	5. United Kingdom (4.5%)	
Global humanitarian funding				
	1. WFP	1. Food	1. USA (28.7%)	10,366 million dollars
	2. UNHCR	2. Multi-sector	2. Carry-over (13.2%)	
	3. UNICEF	3. Health	3. ECHO (10%)	
	4. ICRC	4. Coordination and support services	4. United Kingdom (5.1%)	
	5. UNRWA	5. Non-specified	5. Norway (3.8%)	

1. Appeals issued through the United Nations System. The percentage reflects the quantity covered by donors in relation to the original appeal requirements and, indeed, the degree of commitment of the international community with that emergency situation.
2. The percentage underlines the contribution per donor in relation to the global funding, regardless of the donor's GDP.
3. Previous year's carry-over stocks and carry-over contributions not spent or used in the previous year and now to be applied to projects in the current year.
Source: elaborated by the ECP with data collected at OCHA Financial Track Service <http://www.reliefweb.int/fts> (accessed 2009.12.23).

Funds allocated to humanitarian appeals in 2009 (% of the appeal covered)

Source: elaborated by the ECP with data collected at OCHA Financial Track Service <http://www.reliefweb.int/fts> (accessed 2009.12.23).

Annex IV. Main human displacement crises

Country where at least one in 100 persons has been displaced by violence [1]	Internally displaced	Refugees
Afghanistan		2,833,128
Azerbaijan	573,000–603,000	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	124,593	74,366
Burundi	100,000	281,592
Bhutan		104,965
Chad	166,718	
Cyprus	At least 200,500	
Colombia	2,649,139–4,361,355	
Côte d'Ivoire	600,000	
Croatia		97,012
Eritrea		186,398
Georgia	252,000–279,000	
Iraq	2,842,491	1,903,519
Israel	150,000–420,000	
Kenya	400,000	
Lebanon	90,000–390,000	
Liberia		75,213
Mauritania		45,601
Pakistan	3,000,000	
Central African Republic	108,000	125,106
DR Congo	2,000,000	
Serbia	247,000	185,935
Syria	433,000	
Somalia	1,300,000	561,154
Sri Lanka	At least 350,000	
Sudan	4,900,000	
Palestine	24,500–115,000	4,700,000
Timor-Leste	30,000	
Turkey	954,000–1,200,000	
Uganda	710,000	
Zimbabwe	570,000–1,000,000	

Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre <www.internal-displacement.org> and UNHCR, *2008 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons.* June 2009.

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1. On italics countries confronting a very serious crisis of displacement both inside and outside their territory.

Annex V. Countries with flash appeals submitted through the United Nations system in 2009

Country (publishing data)[1]	Issue	Funds required (dollars)	% covered
Burkina Faso (10/09/09)	Floods	18,449,092	44%
El Salvador (18/11/09)	Hurricane Ida	13,125,999	30%
Laos (20/10/09)	Typhoon Ketsana	12,808,836	57%
Madagascar (07/04/09)	Political crisis and drought	22,347,522	83%
Namibia (28/03/09)	Floods	7,071,951	32%
Philippines (06/10/09)	Typhoon Ketsana	143,744,082	36%
Yemen (02/09/09)	Armed conflict and drought	22,668,500	67%
TOTAL / % medio alcanzado		**240,215,982**	**49.8%**

Source: elaborated by the ECP with data collected at OCHA Financial Track Service <http://www.reliefweb.int/fts> (accessed 2009.12.23).

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1. On italics countries whose appeals are linked, entirely or partially, to scenarios of violence or armed conflict.

Annex VI. Resolutions and decisions taken by the United Nations Human Rights Council

RESOLUTIONS
10th session of the
Human Rights Council
(Geneva, 2 – 27 March 2009)

10/1. Question of the realization in all countries of economic, social and cultural rights: follow-up to Human Rights Council resolution 4/1.
Requests the High Commissioner to continue to prepare and submit to the Council an annual report on the question of the realization in all countries of economic, social and cultural rights under agenda item 3; that is, the promotion and protection of all, civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights, including the right to development.

10/2. Human rights in the administration of justice, in particular juvenile justice.
Calls upon relevant special procedures of the Council to give special attention to questions relating to the effective protection of human rights in the administration of justice, in particular juvenile justice, and to provide, wherever appropriate, specific recommendations in this regard, including proposals for advisory services and technical assistance measures.

10/3. World Programme for Human Rights Education.
Encourages States Members of the United Nations to start taking steps for the preparation of their national evaluation reports on the first phase, with the assistance of international and regional organizations, as well as civil society actors, to be provided to the United Nations Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee on Human Rights Education in the School System early in 2010.

10/4. Human rights and climate change.
Decides to hold a panel discussion on the relationship between climate change and human rights at its eleventh session in order to contribute to the realization of the goals set out in the Bali Action Plan and to invite all relevant stakeholders to participate therein.

10/5. Composition of staff of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Encourages the General Assembly to consider further measures for promoting desirable ranges of geographical balance in the staff of the Office of the High Commissioner representing national and regional specificities and various historic, cultural and religious backgrounds, as well as the diversity of political, economic and legal systems.

10/6. Enhancement of international cooperation in the field of human rights.
Invites States and relevant United Nations human rights mechanisms and procedures to continue to pay attention to the importance of mutual cooperation, understanding and dialogue in ensuring the promotion and protection of all human rights.

10/7. Human rights of persons with disabilities: national frameworks for the promotion and protection of the human rights of persons with disabilities.
Encourages States, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, to collect and compile disaggregated data to measure national progress and to identify barriers that prevent or undermine the full enjoyment by persons with disabilities of their human rights, and to formulate appropriate steps to remove such barriers.

10/8. Draft United Nations guidelines for the appropriate use and conditions of alternative care for children.
Welcomes the progress made during consultations on the draft United Nations guidelines for the appropriate use and conditions of alternative care for children and decides to continue efforts to take action on them at its eleventh session.

10/9. Arbitrary Detention
Notes with concern that a persistent proportion of urgent appeals of the Working Group has been left unanswered, and urges the States concerned to give the necessary attention to the urgent appeals addressed to them by the Working Group on a strictly humanitarian basis and without prejudging its possible final conclusions.

10/10. Enforced or involuntary disappearances.
Urges the Governments concerned to intensify their cooperation with the Working Group on Enforced Disappearances; continue their efforts to elucidate the fate of disappeared persons and bring perpetrators to justice; make provision in their legal systems for victims of enforced or involuntary disappearances or their families to seek fair, prompt and adequate reparation and address the specific needs of the families of disappeared persons.

10/11. The use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination.
Condemns recent mercenary activities in developing countries in various parts of the world, in particular in areas of conflict, and the threat they pose to the integrity of and respect for the constitutional order of these countries and the exercise of the right to self-determination of their peoples, and commends the Governments of Africa for their collaboration in thwarting these illegal actions.

10/12. The right to food
Considers it intolerable that more than 6 million children still die every year from hunger-related illnesses

before their fifth birthday, that there are at least 963 million undernourished people in the world and that, while the prevalence of hunger has diminished, the absolute number of undernourished people has been increasing in recent years when, according to a study by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the planet could produce enough food to feed 12 billion people, twice the world's present population.

10/13. Human rights and arbitrary deprivation of nationality.

Calls upon States to ensure access of persons arbitrarily deprived of their nationality to effective remedies, including, but not limited to, restoration of nationality.

10/14. Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocols thereto.

Urges all States to develop or renew, as appropriate, national strategies for children, taking into account the Convention, setting out specific goals, and allocation of financial and human resources for monitoring and regular review of the above strategies.

10/15. Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism

Urges States, while countering terrorism, to protect all human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights, bearing in mind that certain counter-terrorism measures may have an impact on the enjoyment of these rights.

10/16. Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Deplores the grave, widespread and systematic human rights abuses in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in particular the use of torture and labour camps against political prisoners and repatriated citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and *deeply regrets* the refusal of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to recognize the mandate of the Special Rapporteur or to extend full cooperation to him, and allow him access to the country.

10/17. Human rights in the occupied Syrian Golan.

Determines that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken or to be taken by Israel, the occupying Power, that aim to alter the character and legal status of the occupied Syrian Golan are null and void, constitute a flagrant violation of international law and of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and have no legal effect.

10/18. Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan.

Deplores the recent Israeli announcements of the construction of new housing units for Israeli settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in and around occupied East Jerusalem, as they undermine the peace process and the creation of a contiguous, sovereign and independent Palestinian State and are in violation of international law and Israeli pledges at the Annapolis Peace Conference.

10/19. Human rights violations emanating from the Israeli military attacks and operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

Strongly condemns the Israeli military attacks and operations in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly the recent ones in the occupied Gaza Strip, which have resulted in the killing and injury of thousands of Palestinians civilians, including a large number of women and children, and also condemns the firing of crude rockets on Israeli civilians.

10/20. Right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.

Urges all Member States and relevant bodies of the United Nations system to support and assist the Palestinian people in the early realization of their right to self-determination.

10/21. Follow-up to Council resolution S-9/1 on the grave violations of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly due to the recent Israeli military attacks against the occupied Gaza Strip.

Calls upon the occupying Power, Israel, to abide by its obligations under international law, international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

10/22. Combating defamation of religions.

Expresses deep concern at the continued serious instances of deliberate stereotyping of religions, their adherents and sacred persons in the media, as well as programmes and agendas pursued by extremist organizations and groups aimed at creating and perpetuating stereotypes about certain religions, in particular when condoned by Governments.

10/23. Independent expert in the field of cultural rights

Decides to establish, for a period of three years, a new special procedure entitled "independent expert in the field of cultural rights", as set out in the relevant United Nations human rights instruments.

10/24. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: the role and responsibility of medical and other health personnel.

Condemns all forms of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including through intimidation, which are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place and can thus never be justified, and calls upon all States to implement fully the absolute prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

10/25. Discrimination based on religion or belief and its impact on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.

Condemns all forms of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief, as well as violations of the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.

10/26. Forensic genetics and human rights.

Encourages States to consider the use of forensic genetics to contribute to the identification of the remains of victims of serious violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law, and to address the issue of impunity.

10/27. Situation of human rights in Myanmar.
Condemns the ongoing systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms of the people of Myanmar.

10/28. United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Education and Training.
Urges all relevant stakeholders that have not yet submitted their responses to the questionnaire prepared by the Advisory Committee on the possible elements of the content of the Declaration to do so, and to take into account existing relevant instruments.

10/29. The Social Forum
Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Social Forum with all the services and facilities necessary to fulfil its activities, and also requests the High Commissioner to provide all the necessary support to facilitate the convening and proceedings of the Forum.

10/30. Elaboration of complementary standards to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
Endorses the road map adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Human Rights Council on the Elaboration of Complementary Standards during the second part of its first session as a guiding framework document for all future work in this regard.

10/31. From rhetoric to reality: a global call for concrete action against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.
Welcomes the report of the Intergovernmental Working Group on the effective implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action.

10/32. Assistance to Somalia in the field of human rights.
Calls upon the international community to stand by the legitimate Somali institutions and to provide adequate, timely and tangible support in order to enhance their capacity, as part of an integrated approach that encompasses political, security and human rights dimensions.

10/33. Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the strengthening of technical cooperation and consultative services.
Calls on the international community to support the establishment of a local cooperation mechanism by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the High Commissioner and the Human Rights Section of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, referred to as the *entité de liaison des droits de l'homme* and *calls on* the Office of the High Commissioner to increase and enhance, through its presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, its technical assistance programmes and activities, in consultation with the authorities of the country.

DECISIONS

10/101 to 100/117
Outcome of the Universal Periodic Review on: Botswana, Bahamas, Burundi, Luxembourg, Barbados, Montenegro, United Arab Emirates, Liechtenstein, Serbia, Turkmenistan, Burkina Faso, Israel, Cape Verde, Colombia, Uzbekistan, Tuvalu and the publication of reports completed by the Subcommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.

STATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

PRST/10/1. Reports of the Advisory Committee (A/HRC/10/2-A/HRC/AC/2008/1/2)

RESOLUTIONS
11th session of the Human Rights Council (Geneva, 2 – 19 June 2009)

11/1. Open-ended Working Group on an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child to provide a communications procedure.
Decides to establish an open-ended working group of the Human Rights Council to explore the possibility of elaborating an optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child to provide a communications procedure complementary to the reporting procedure under the Convention.

11/2. Accelerating efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women.
Strongly condemns all acts of violence against women and girls, whether they be perpetrated by the State, private persons or non-State actors, and calls for the elimination of all forms of gender-based violence in the family, within the general community and where perpetrated or condoned by the State, in accordance with the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women.

11/3. Trafficking in persons, especially women and children.
Affirms that it is essential to place the protection of human rights at the centre of measures taken to prevent and end trafficking in persons, and to protect, assist and provide access to adequate redress to victims, including the possibility of obtaining compensation from the perpetrators.

11/4. Promotion of the right of peoples to peace.
Reaffirming the obligation of all States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security, human rights and justice are not endangered, and *Encourages* States to settle their disputes as early as possible, as an important contribution to the promotion and protection of all human rights of everyone and all peoples.

11/5. The effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights.
Calls upon States, the International Monetary Fund and

the World Bank to continue to cooperate closely to ensure that additional resources made available through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and other new initiatives are absorbed in the recipient countries without affecting ongoing programmes.

11/6. The right to education: follow-up to Human Rights Council resolution 8/4.
Urges all States to ensure the right to education, an imperative in its own right, of persons in detention in the criminal justice system, and to provide appropriate education to foster reintegration into society and help reduce recidivism.

11/7. Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children.
Welcomes the accomplishment of the Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children and *Decides* to submit the Guidelines to the General Assembly for consideration with a view to their adoption on the twentieth anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

11/8. Preventable maternal mortality and morbidity and human rights.
Expresses grave concern at the unacceptably high global rate of preventable maternal mortality and morbidity, noting in this regard that the World Health Organization has assessed that over 1,500 women and girls die every day as a result of preventable complications occurring before, during and after pregnancy and childbirth, and that, globally, maternal mortality is the leading cause of death among women and of girls of reproductive age.

11/9. The human rights of migrants in detention centres.
Decides to hold a panel discussion on the matter at its twelfth session, with equitable geographic and gender participation of Governments, relevant experts and representatives of civil society, including national institutions.

11/10. Situation of human rights in the Sudan.
Decides to create the mandate of independent expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan for a period of one year, who shall assume the mandate and responsibilities set out by the Council.

11/11. System of special procedures.
Reaffirms that the code of conduct for special procedures mandate holders is aimed at strengthening the capacity of mandate holders to exercise their functions while enhancing their moral authority and credibility, and that it requires supportive action by all stakeholders, and in particular by States.

11/12. Intergovernmental Working Group on the effective implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action.
Decides to extend the mandate of the Intergovernmental Working Group on the effective implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action for a period of three years.

DECISIONS

11/101 to 11/112
Outcome of the Universal Periodic Review on:, Germany, Djibouti, Canada, Bangladesh, Russian Federation, Cameroon, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, China, Azerbaijan and Nigeria.

RESOLUTIONS
12th session of the Human Rights Council (Geneva, 14 September – 2 October 2009)

12/1. Open-ended Working Group on the review and functioning of the HRC.
Decides to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group with the mandate to review the work and functioning of the Council.

12/2. Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights.
Condemns all acts of intimidation or reprisal by Governments and non-State actors against individuals and groups who seek to cooperate or have cooperated with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights.

12/3. Independence and impartiality of the judiciary, jurors and assessors and the independence of lawyers.
Calls upon Governments to give serious consideration to responding favourably to the requests of the Special Rapporteur to visit their countries, and urges States to enter into a constructive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur with respect to the follow-up to and implementation of her recommendations so as to enable her to fulfil her mandate even more effectively.

12/4. World Programme for Human Rights Education.
Decides to focus the second phase of the World Programme on human rights education for higher education and on human rights training programmes for teachers and educators, civil servants, law enforcement officials and military personnel at all levels.

12/5. Protection of the human rights of civilians in armed conflict.
Invites the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to convene a second expert consultation on the issue and requests the Office to prepare a report on the outcome of the consultation.

12/6. Human rights of migrants: migration and the human rights of the child.
Calls upon States to promote and protect effectively the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all migrants, especially those of children, regardless of their status, in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights and the international instruments to which they are party.

12/7. Elimination of discrimination against persons affected by leprosy and their family members.
Expresses its appreciation to the Advisory Committee for the timely submission of the draft set of principles and guidelines for the elimination of discrimination against persons affected by leprosy and their family members, contained in the annex to its recommendation 3/1 (see A/HRC/AC/3/2) to the Council.

12/8. Human rights and access to safe drinking water and sanitation.
Recognizes that States have an obligation to address and eliminate discrimination with regard to access to sanitation, and urges them to address effectively inequalities in this area.

12/9. Human rights and international solidarity.
Calls upon the international community to promote international solidarity and cooperation as an important tool to help to overcome the negative effects of the current economic, financial and climate crisis, particularly in developing countries.

12/10. Follow-up to the seventh special session of the Human Rights Council on the negative impact of the worsening of the world food crisis on the realization of the right to food for all.
Expresses grave concern at the fact that the current world food crisis seriously undermines the realization of the right to food for all, and especially for one sixth of the world population, mainly in developing and least developed countries, suffering from hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity.

12/11. Human rights and transitional justice.
Invites relevant special procedures of the Council, as appropriate, in the framework of their mandates, to continue to address the relevant aspects of transitional justice in their work.

12/12. Right to the truth.
Welcomes the establishment in several States of specific judicial mechanisms and other non-judicial mechanisms, such as truth and reconciliation commissions that complement the justice system, to investigate violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law, and appreciates the elaboration and publication of the reports and decisions of these bodies.

12/13. Human rights and indigenous peoples.
Encourages those States that have not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries of the International Labour Organization (C169) to consider doing so, and to consider supporting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

12/14. Situation of human rights in Honduras since the coup d'état on 28 June 2009.
Strongly condemns the human rights violations occurring as a consequence of the coup d'état of 28 June 2009, and in particular following the return of President José Manuel Zelaya Rosales on 21 September 2009.

12/15. Regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights.
Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to hold a workshop on regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights on a regular basis and to convene the next one in the first semester of 2010.

12/16. Freedom of opinion and expression.
Stresses that condemning and addressing, in accordance with their obligations under international human rights law, including those regarding equal protection of the law, any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence is an important safeguard to ensure the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms of all, including persons belonging to minorities.

12/17. Elimination of discrimination against women.
Calls on States to ensure full representation and full equal participation of women in political, social and economic decision-making as an essential condition for gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls as a critical factor in the eradication of poverty.

12/18. The adverse effects of the movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products.
Strongly condemns the movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes, which have a negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights.

12/19. Draft guiding principles on extreme poverty and human rights.
Stresses that respect for all human rights, which are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated, is of crucial importance for all policies and programmes to fight extreme poverty at the local and national levels.

12/20. Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners in Myanmar.
Expresses grave concern at the recent conviction and sentencing of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and calls for her immediate and unconditional release.

12/21. Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms through a better understanding of traditional values of humankind.
Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to convene, in 2010, a workshop for an exchange of views on how a better understanding of traditional values of humankind underpinning international human rights norms and standards can contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

12/22. Human rights and unilateral coercive measures.
Condemns the continued unilateral application and enforcement by certain powers of such measures as tools of political or economic pressure against any country, particularly against developing countries, with a view to preventing these countries from exercising their right to decide, of their own free will, their own political, economic and social systems.

12/23. The right to development.
Emphasizes the urgent need to make the right to development a reality for everyone.

12/24. Access to medicine in the context of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
Stresses the responsibility of States to ensure access to all, without discrimination, of medicines, in particular essential medicines, that are affordable, safe, effective and of good quality.

12/25. Advisory services and technical assistance for Cambodia.
Encourages the Government of Cambodia and the international community to provide all necessary assistance to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, which would help ensure the non-return to the policies and practices of the past, as envisioned by the 1991 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict.

12/26 Assistance to Somalia in the field of human rights.
Expresses its deep concern at the human rights and humanitarian situation in Somalia and calls for an immediate end to all abuses.

12/27. The protection of human rights in the context of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS).
Calls upon all States to implement in full the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS adopted by the General Assembly at its special session on HIV/AIDS, on 27 June 2001, and the Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS, adopted by the Assembly at its Highlevel Meeting on HIV/AIDS on 2 June 2006.

12/28. Follow-up to the tenth special session of the Human Rights Council on the impact of the global economic and financial crises on the universal realization and effective enjoyment of human rights.
Decides to hold a panel discussion during the high-level segment of its thirteenth session, to discuss and evaluate the impact of the financial and economic crises to the realization of all human rights worldwide.

DECISIONS

12/101 to 12/116
Outcome of the Universal Periodic Review on: Central African Republic, Monaco, Belize, Congo, Malta, New Zeland, Afghanistan, Chile, Chad, Vietnam, Uruguay, Yemen, Vanuatu, Macedonia, Comoros and Slovakia.

12/117. Missing persons.
Welcomes the panel discussion on the question of missing persons held at its ninth session and the summary of the panel's deliberations prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

12/118. United Nations declaration on human rights education and training
Decides to hold a high-level discussion on the draft declaration during its thirteenth session.

12/119. The effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights.

Requests the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to assist the independent expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights in the implementation of the activities envisaged in Council resolution 11/5.

Special Sessions Of The Human Rights Council

9th special session (9th January 2009)

S-9/1. The Grave Violations of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory including the recent aggression in the occupied Gaza Strip.
Strongly condemns the ongoing Israeli military operation carried out in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, which has resulted in massive violations of the human rights of the Palestinian people and systematic destruction of Palestinian infrastructure.

10th special session (20th February 2009)

S-10/1. The Impact of the Global Economic and Financial Crises on the Universal Realization and Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights.
Calls upon all States to continue their financial contributions to international organizations, particularly to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

11th special session (26-27 May 2009)

S-11/1. Assistance to Sri Lanka in the promotion and protection of human rights.
Urges the international community to cooperate with the Government of Sri Lanka in the reconstruction efforts, including by increasing the provision of financial assistance, including official development assistance, to help the country fight poverty and underdevelopment and to continue to ensure the promotion and protection of all human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights.

12th special session (15-16 October 2009)

S-12/1. The human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.
Demands Israel, the occupying Power, to respect the religious and cultural rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the core international human rights in-

struments, the Hague Conventions, and the Geneva Conventions, and to allow Palestinian citizens and worshippers unhindered access to their properties and religious sites therein.

DECISIONS

Decision A/HRC/DEC/S-12/101

S-12/101 Decision adopted by the Human Rights Council
At its second meeting, on 16 October 2009, the Human Rights Council decided to request the President of the Council to transmit urgently resolution S-12/1, contained in the report of the Council on its twelfth special session (A/HRC/S-12/1), to the General Assembly for itsconsideration during the main part of its sixty-fourth session.

Annex VII. Human Rights Index

The Human Rights Index measures the degree of lack of protection or noncompliance of the obligations of States in regard to human rights and the IHL in 195 countries (the 192 member states of the United Nations, as well as the Palestinian Authority, Taiwan and the Vatican) over a fixed period of time –set out in detail for each indicator– and according to different sources. It is comprised of 22 indicators divided into the following three dimensions: a) the non-ratification of the main instruments of International Law of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), b) the violation of the International Law of Human Rights and, c) violation of the International Humanitarian Law.

 The indicators have been chosen based on the following criteria:
- the relevant data to determine the degree of lack of protection or noncompliance of the obligations of the State regarding human rights in a particular country;
- the availability of data from the maximum number of countries in the study;
- the reliability and transparency of the chosen sources.

The second section looks at the evaluation and weight given to each indicator in the configuration of the HRIN.

What follows is a description of the 22 indicators grouped according to the three dimensions mentioned above.

a) Description of the indicators

Dimension A:
Failure to ratify the principal international instruments of human rights and IHL

The indicators numbered 1 to 8 refer to those countries that have not ratified any of the principal instruments of human rights of the United Nations, the Protocol II of the Geneva Convention [1949] relating to the protection of the victims of non-international armed conflict, or the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court. In regard to the main instruments of the International Law of Human Rights, those covenants and conventions regarding the main violations of civil and political rights analysed in the chapter on human rights and transitional justice have been chosen. Protocol II is included because, increasingly, the civilian population is one of the main targets of armed groups. The inclusion of the Rome Statute reflects the need to show a State's degree of commitment to the struggle to prevent the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes going unpunished, as this is the main permanent, international judicial institution with the capacity to try these types of crimes.

The process of signing and ratifying international treaties assumes a step towards compliance on the part of states regarding their obligation to protect and promote human rights and on the other hand sets a legal framework which the international community can demand they adhere to in this respect. The non-ratification of these instruments reflects, therefore, a lack of will on the part of the State to protect and implement human rights within its frontiers.

A. Non-ratification of the main international instruments of human rights and IHL

1. A country that has not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).
2. A country that has not ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966).
3. A country that has not ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966).
4. A country that has not ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979).
5. A country that has not ratified the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishments (1984).
6. A country that has not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).
7. A country that has not ratified the additional Protocol (Protocol II) of the Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflict (1977).
8. A country that has not ratified the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (2002).

Data available for 192 countries. Year analysed: 2009.
SOURCES: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at <http://www.ohchr.org> and the International Committee of the Red Cross at in<http://www.icrc.org> [consulted 14.12.09].

Dimension B:
Violation of the International Law on Human Rights

The indicators nº. 9 to nº. 20 refer to violations of civil and political rights on the part of the State or state and para-statal agencies. The definition of abuse/violation contained in the UN international mechanisms of human rights has been used as a reference for the evaluation of these indicators. The term *widespread impunity* is used to imply a level of impunity in the State in regard to violations of human rights which translates, as a norm, into a prevailing failure to investigate, judicially prosecute and sanction those responsible.

B. Violation of the International Law on Human Rights

By type of violation:

9. A country which employs the death penalty.

10. A country where there are extra-judicial executions.

11. A country where people are forcibly dissapeared.

12. A country where people die in police custody.

13. A country where there is torture and other inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment or punishment.

14. A country where there is arbitrary arrest.

15. A country where there are trials without guarantees or where there are no trials.

16. A country where there is widespread impunity.

By person or group targeted:

17. A country with political prisoners and/or prisoners of conscience.

18. Our country where human rights defenders, representatives of NGOs, trade unions, members of political parties and/or lawyers are harassed or abused.

19. A country with discriminatory practices (on grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation or country of origin) as well as the abuse and exploitation of minors.

20. A country where journalists are harassed or abused.

Data available for 149 countries. Period analysed: 2008-2009.
SOURCES: Amnesty International. *Report 2009 Amnesty International. The state of human rights in the world*. London: AI, 2009, at <http://thereport.amnesty.org/en>; Amnesty International. D*eath sentences and executions in 2008*, London: AI, 2009, at <http://www.amnesty.org/es/library/info/ACT50/003/2009/es>; Human Rights Watch. *World Report 2009*. New York: HRW, 2009, at <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2009>; and the assessment by the authors of this report of the international situation based on information from the United Nations and international bodies, NGOs, research centres and national and international media.

Dimension C: Violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

The indicators 21 and 22 refer to violations of the IHL by the State, agencies of the state or opposition armed groups. This area refers to the lack of protection given to the civil population by any party to conflict, according to the terms of the IV Geneva Convention. Using the definition widely accepted by the international community, that a child soldier is a person under 18 years of age who takes part in some way in any type of armed conflict, indicator nº. 21 identifies those countries of origin of regular or irregular forces that recruit minors, whether to take part directly in hostilities or to operate as slaves, spies, informers or messengers.

Indicator nº. 22 asserts that protection of civilians is a fundamental principle of humanitarian law on the basis of which people who are not taking part in hostilities should not be the object of indiscriminate attacks or acts or threats of violence. Nor should the goods necessary for their survival be destroyed. Indicator nº. 22 refers to those countries which have violated some part of the IV Geneva Convention (1949) which protects civil-

ians, whether they are within or outside of their territory, from bombings or indiscriminate attacks, the use of anti-personnel mines, the destruction of their necessary goods, sexual violation or displacement.

C. Violation of International Humanitarian Law

21. A country of origin of regular forces or armed groups that recruit child soldiers.

22. A country that has violated some part of the Geneva Convention IV.

Data for 195 countries. Period analysed: 2004-2009.
SOURCES: Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers. *Child Soldiers Global Report 2008*. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, 2008, at <http://www.child-soldiers.org/home>; Coomaraswamy, Radhika. *Annual report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict*. A/HRC/12/49, 30 July 2009 at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/147/67/PDF/G0914767.pdf?OpenElement>; Amnesty International. *Amnesty International Report 2009. The state of human rights in the world*. London: AI, 2009, at <http://thereport.amnesty.org/es>; Human Rights Watch. *World Report 2009*. New York: HRW, 2009, at <http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2009>; and the assessment by the authors of this report of the international situation based on information from the United Nations and international bodies, NGOs, research centres, and national and international media.

b) Evaluation and weighting

The Human Rights Index is composed of the aggregate value of the sub indicators corresponding to the three dimensions (A, B, C) mentioned earlier, bearing in mind that each area has been assigned a weighted value, as in the following table. The objective of this weighting is to give a greater value to those components that demonstrate the most significant lack of respect for or lack of protection of human rights and of the IHL on the part of the State or armed groups, according to the analysis by the Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace).

Fields	Range	Weighting
A. Non-ratification of the principal instruments of international law of human rights and IHL	0 - 8	10%
B. Violation of International Law of Human Rights	0 - 24	65%
C. Violation of International Humanitarian Law	0-4	25%

Each indicator has been assigned a fixed value as shown in the attached table, in some cases bearing in mind the seriousness or the frequency of the violation.

Field	Evaluation
A. Support for the principal instruments of International Law of Human Rights and IHL	How many of the eight instruments of human rights and IHL have not been ratified by each country (●).
B. Violation of International Law of Human Rights.	An assessment across a range from 0 to 24 of the occurrence of violations of **International Law of Human Rights**. The 12 categories of violations are divided into two groups, on the one hand, those that refer to political and civil rights (such as extra-judicial executions, disappearances, deaths in custody, torture and/or mistreatment, arbitrary arrest, trials without minimum guarantees or the absence of trials altogether, and those countries in which the violations of human rights go unpunished). On the other hand, those that point to the existence of people or groups of people in a vulnerable situation such as political prisoners and/or prisoners of conscience, human rights defenders, representatives of NGOs, trade unions, members of political parties and/or lawyers, exploited minors, journalists or any person or group of people who are the object of discrimination on grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation or country of origin. A value of 2 (●) is assigned when there is reliable data concerning the **systematic violation** of human rights and a value of 1 when it is **not systematic** (○). RRegarding the indicator nº. 18, which refers to the death penalty, only those countries where the death penalty is used are given a score of 2 (●).
C. Violation of International Humanitarian Law (DIH).	Violations of International Humanitarian Law are evaluated across a range from 0 to 4. A value of 3 (●) is assigned when some part of the IV Geneva Convention has been violated. A value of 1 (●) is given to those countries of origin of regular forces or armed opposition groups that recruit child soldiers.

In accordance with the weighting and evaluation of each field it follows that

$$\text{HRIN} = \left(\frac{10A}{8} + \frac{65B}{24} + \frac{25C}{4} \right) / 10$$

Although sources of reliable and transparent data have been identified for each indicator for the majority of countries, in some cases there is no available data for certain indicators. A hyphen indicates that there is no available data according to the sources consulted.

The majority of the sources consulted refer to the period from 2008 to 2009. Only the indicator about child soldiers pertains to the period 2004-2007.

c) Table

The following table presents the data by the countries that make up the HRIN.

Human Rights Index 2009

Country	HRIN	Non ratification	HR violations	IHL violations	Civil Rights	ESCR	Racism	Women	Torture	Child	Prot. II	ICC	Total Non ratification	Death Penalty	Executions	Disapperances	Death under custody	Torture	Arbitrary detention	Unfair trials	Impunity	Political prisoners	HR defenders	Discrimination	Journalists	Total HR violations	Child soldiers	IV Convention	Total IHL violations
Myanmar	9.208	0.750	5.958	2.500	●	●	●		●		●	●	6	-	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	22	●	●	4
Sudan	8.292	0.375	5.417	2.500				●	●			●	3	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	20	●	●	4
Pakistan	7.875	0.500	4.875	2.500	●				●		●	●	4	●	●	●		●	●	●	●		●	●	●	18	●	●	4
Nigeria	7.771	0.125	5.146	2.500								●	1	-	●	●	○	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	19	●	●	4
Thailand	7.625	0.250	4.875	2.500							●	●	2	-	●	●		●	●	●	●		●	●	●	18	●	●	4
Russian Fed.	7.500	0.125	4.875	2.500								●	1	-	●	●		●	●	●	●		●	●	●	18	●	●	4
Somalia	7.333	0.500	4.333	2.500				●		●	●	●	4	●	●			●	●		●		●	●	●	16	●	●	4
India	7.208	0.375	4.333	2.500					●		●	●	3	-	●		●	●	●	●	●		●	●		16	●	●	4
Iraq	7.208	0.375	4.333	2.500					●		●	●	3	●	●			●	●		●		●	●	●	16	●	●	4
Sri Lanka	7.083	0.250	4.333	2.500							●	●	2	-	●	●		●	●		●		●	●	●	16	●	●	4
China	7.000	0.250	4.875	1.875	●							●	2	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	18		●	3
Nepal	6.542	0.250	3.792	2.500								●	2	-	●			●	●		●		●	●	●	14	●	●	4
Turkey	6.542	0.250	3.792	2.500							●	●	2	●	●	●		●	●	●	●		●	●	●	14	●	●	4
Yemen	6.417	0.125	3.792	2.500							●	●	1	-	●	●		●	●	●	●		●	●	●	14	●	●	4
Algeria	6.333	0.125	4.333	1.875								●	1	●	●			●	●	●	●		●	●	●	16	●	●	3
Afghanistan	6.292	0.000	3.792	2.500									0	●	●			●	●	●	●		●	●	●	14	●	●	4
Congo, DR	6.833	0.000	4.333	2.500									0	-	●			●	●	●	●		●	●	●	16	●	●	4
Uganda	6.292	0.000	3.792	2.500									0	●	●			●	●	●	●		●	●	●	14	●	●	4
Ethiopia	6.063	0.125	4.063	1.875								●	1	●	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	15		●	3
Israel	6.000	0.250	3.250	2.500							●	●	2	-	●	●		●	●		●		●	●		12	●	●	4
Philippines	5.875	0.125	3.250	2.500								●	1	●		●			●		●		●	●	●	12	●	●	4
Chad	5.750	0.000	3.250	2.500									0	-	●			●			●			●	●	12	●	●	4
Angola	5.625	0.500	3.250	1.875			●		●			●	4	●	●		●	●	●		●		●	●	●	12	●	●	3
Lebanon	5.458	0.250	2.708	2.500		●						●	2	-			●	●			●		●	●	●	10	●	●	4
Zimbabwe	5.354	0.125	4.604	0.625					●				1	-	●	●		●	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	17	●	●	1
Colombia	5.208	0.000	2.708	2.500									0	●	●	●		●			●		●	●	●	10	●	●	4
Bangladesh	5.083	0.125	4.333	0.625					●			●	1	●	●		●	●	●		●		●	●	●	16	●	●	1

Country	HRIN	Non ratification	HR violations	IHL violations	Civil Rights	ESCR	Racism	Women	Torture	Child	Prot. II	ICC	Total Non ratification	Death Penalty	Executions	Disappearances	Death under custody	Torture	Arbitrary detention	Unfair trials	Impunity	Political prisoners	HR defenders	Discrimination	Journalists	Total HR violations	Child soldiers	IV Convention	Total IHL violations
Malaysia	5.083	0.750	4.333	0.000	●	●	●		●		●	●	6	-			●	●	●	●	●		●	●	●	16			0
Central African Republic	5.063	0.125	2.438	2.500					●				1	-	●			●			●			●	○	9	●	●	4
Equatorial Guinea	5.000	0.125	4.875	0.000								●	1	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	18			0
Mexico	5.000	0.125	4.875	0.000							●	●	1		●	○		●	●		●	○	●	●	●	18			0
Guinea	4.958	0.000	4.333	0.625				●					0	-	●			●	●	●	●		●	●	●	16	●		1
Iran, Rep. Isl.	4.917	0.500	3.792	0.625					●		●	●	4	●	●			●	●	●	●		●	●	●	14	●		1
Georgia	4.854	0.000	2.979	1.875				●					0	-				○	○		●		○	●	●	11		●	3
Burundi	4.813	0.125	4.063	0.625								●	1	-	●			●	●	●	●		○	●	●	15	●		1
Eritrea	4.708	0.375	4.333	0.000					●		●	●	3	-			●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	16			0
Indonesia	4.667	0.250	3.792	0.625	●						●	●	2	●	●			●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	14	●		1
Kenya	4.604	0.000	4.604	0.000	●							●	0	-			○	●		●	●		●	●		17			0
Niger	4.583	0.000	2.708	1.875								●	0	-	○	●		●		●	○	○	○	●	●	10	●	●	3
Guatemala	4.542	0.125	3.792	0.625	●								1	-	●			●	●	●	●		●	●	●	14	●		1
Uzbekistan	4.458	0.125	4.333	0.000	●							●	1	-	●			●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	16			0
Senegal	4.313	0.000	2.438	1.875								●	0	-		●	○								●	9	●	●	3
Korea, DPR	4.833	0.500	4.333	0.000	●	●	●		●		●	●	4	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	16			0
United Arab Emirates	4.292	0.500	3.792	0.000	●	●			●			●	4	-				●	●				●	●	●	14			0
Haiti	4.250	0.375	3.250	0.625								●	3				●		●		●	●	●	●	●	12	●		1
Saudi Arabia	4.167	0.375	3.792	0.000	●		●		●			●	3	●	●			●	●	●	●		●	●	●	14			0
Cambodia	4.063	0.000	4.063	0.000							●	●	0	●	○			●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	15			0
Morocco	4.042	0.250	3.792	0.000							●	●	2	-				●	●	●	●		●	●	●	14			0
Syria, Arab Rep.	4.042	0.250	3.792	0.000	●	●						●	2	●	●			●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	14			0
Libyan, Arab Jamahiriya	4.000	0.125	3.250	0.625	●	●			●		●	●	1	●				●	●			●	●		●	12	●		1
Rwanda	4.000	0.125	3.250	0.625		●	●	●	●		●	●	1	-				●	●		●		●	●	●	12	●		1
Singapore	4.000	0.750	3.250	0.000	●	●						●	6	●	●			●	●					●	●	12			0
EE.UU.	3.958	0.625	2.708	0.625		●		●	●	●	●	●	5	●				●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	10	●		1
Egypt	3.917	0.125	3.792	0.000	●	●					●	●	1	●	●			●	●		●			●	●	14			0
Fiji	3.896	0.375	3.521	0.000		●							3	-			○	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	13			0
Côte d'Ivoire	3.854	0.250	2.979	0.625		●			●			●	2	●	●		○	●	●		●		●	●		11	●	●	1

Country	Total IHL violations	IV Convention	Child soldiers	Total HR violations	Journalists	Discrimination	HR defenders	Political prisoners	Impunity	Unfair trials	Arbitrary detention	Torture	Death under custody	Disappearances	Executions	Death Penalty	Total Non ratification	ICC	Prot. II	Child	Torture	Women	Racism	ESCR	Civil Rights	IHL violations	HR violations	Non ratification	HRIN
Guinea-Bissau	0			12	●	●	●		○	●	●				○		4	●			●		●		●	0.000	3.250	0.500	3.750
Gambia	0			13	●	○	●		●	●	●	●				●	1				●					0.000	3.521	0.125	3.646
Azerbaijan	0			12	●	○	○	●	●		●	●				-	2	●	●							0.000	3.250	0.250	3.500
Tunisia	0			12		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○			-	1	●								0.000	3.250	0.125	3.375
Congo	1		●	10		●	●			●					○	-	0									0.625	2.708	0.000	3.333
Palestine. NA	1		●	10	●				●		●	●	●		●	●	0									0.625	2.708	0.000	3.333
Brazil	0			12		●	●		●			●	●		●	-	0									0.000	3.250	0.000	3.250
Cameroon	0			11	○	●	●		●	●	●	●	●		●	-	1	●								0.000	2.979	0.125	3.104
Moldova, Rep. of	0			11	●	●	○	○					○		○	-	1	●								0.000	2.979	0.125	3.104
Vietnam	0			10	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●				-	3	●	●		●					0.000	2.708	0.375	3.083
Lao, DPR	1		●	8	●	●	●	○	●	○	○	●	●		○	-	2	●			●					0.625	2.167	0.250	3.042
Greece	0			11		●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●			-	0									0.000	2.979	0.000	2.979
Tajikistan	0			11	○	●	●		●	●	●	●			○	-	0									0.000	2.979	0.000	2.979
Gabon	0			11		●	●	○	●	○	●					-	0									0.000	2.979	0.000	2.979
Croatia	3	●		4	●	●		●	●			●	○				0									1.875	1.083	0.000	2.958
Armenia	0			10	●	●	○	●	●	●		●			●		1	●								0.000	2.708	0.125	2.833
Belarus	0			10	●	●	●		●	●		●			○		1	●								0.000	2.708	0.125	2.833
Kyrgyzstan	0			10	●	●	●		●		●	●			○		1	●								0.000	2.708	0.125	2.833
South Africa	0			10		●	●		●	●	●				●		1							●		0.000	2.708	0.125	2.833
Turkmenistan	0			10	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●					1	●								0.000	2.708	0.125	2.833
Venezuela	1		●	8	●	●	●		●	●	●	●			●		0									0.625	2.167	0.000	2.792
Bolivia	1		●	8	●	●	○		●	●	●	●	○		○	-	0									0.625	2.167	0.000	2.792
Italy	0			10							●				○		0									0.000	2.708	0.000	2.708
Jordan	0			10	●	●	●		●	●	●	●			●	-	0									0.000	2.708	0.000	2.708
Zambia	0			10	○	●	●			●	○	●				-	0									0.000	2.708	0.000	2.708
Honduras	0			10		●	●		●	●	●	●			●	-	0									0.000	2.708	0.000	2.708
Qatar	0			8	●	●	●		●	●	○	●				-	3	●						●	●	0.000	2.167	0.375	2.542
Montenegro	0			9	○	●	●		●		●	●			○		0									0.000	2.438	0.000	2.438
Mali	3	●		2	●	●										-	0									1.875	0.542	0.000	2.417

Country	Total IHL violations	IV Convention	Child soldiers	Total HR violations	Journalists	Discrimination	HR defenders	Political prisoners	Impunity	Unfair trials	Arbitrary detention	Torture	Death under custody	Disappearances	Executions	Death Penalty	Total Non ratification	ICC	Prot. II	Child	Torture	Women	Racism	ESCR	Civil Rights	IHL violations	HR violations	Non ratification	HRIN
Tanzania, United Rep.	0			8	●	●			●			●			●	-	2				●	●				0.000	2.167	0.250	2.417
Bahrain	0			8	○	●	○		●	●	○	○				○	1	●								0.000	2.167	0.125	2.292
Togo	0			8	●				●	●		●				-	1	●								0.000	2.167	0.125	2.292
Ukraine	0			8	●	●			●			●					1	●								0.000	2.167	0.125	2.292
Liberia	1		●	6	●	●				●							0									0.625	1.625	0.000	2.250
Timor-Leste	0			8		●			●	●		●			○	-	0	●			●					0.000	2.167	0.000	2.167
Bahamas	0			7		●			●			●				-	2	●								0.000	1.896	0.250	2.146
Cuba	0			6	●	●	●	●	●			●				-	4	●	●		●		●	●	●	0.000	1.625	0.500	2.125
Papua New Guinea	0			6		●			●							-	3									0.000	1.625	0.375	2.000
Sierra Leone	1		●	5	○	●		●	●	●						-	0									0.625	1.354	0.000	1.979
Peru	1		●	5	○	●	●		●			○				-	0									0.625	1.354	0.000	1.979
Austria	0			7	○	●			○	○	○	○	○				0									0.000	1.896	0.000	1.896
Korea, Rep.	0			7	○	●		●			●					-	0									0.000	1.896	0.000	1.896
Namibia	0			7		●			●			○	○				0									0.000	1.896	0.000	1.896
Jamaica	0			6		●			●						●	-	2	●			●					0.000	1.625	0.250	1.875
Mozambique	0			6		●			●		●	●			●		2	●						●		0.000	1.625	0.250	1.875
El Salvador	0			6		●			●			○			●	-	1	●								0.000	1.625	0.125	1.750
Djibouti	0			6	○		○	○	○	○		○					1						●			0.000	1.625	0.125	1.750
Australia	0			6		●			○	○	●						0									0.000	1.625	0.000	1.625
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0			6		●	●		○			○					0									0.000	1.625	0.000	1.625
Macedonia, FYR	0			6		●			●		●	●					0									0.000	1.625	0.000	1.625
Malta	0			6		●						●					0									0.000	1.625	0.000	1.625
Mongolia	0			6		●			●			●					0									0.000	1.625	0.000	1.625
Paraguay	0			6	●	●					○	○					0									0.000	1.625	0.000	1.625
Portugal	0			6		●			●			●					0									0.000	1.625	0.000	1.625
Serbia	0			6	●	●	●		●								0							●	●	0.000	1.625	0.000	1.625
Oman	0			4	●	●			●							-	4				●					0.000	1.083	0.500	1.583
Cyprus	0			5		○	○		●		●	○					1	●								0.000	1.354	0.125	1.479
Dominican Republic	0			5	○	●									●		1				●					0.000	1.354	0.125	1.479

Human Rights Indicators table (HRIN). Symbols: ● = filled, ○ = open, · = dash/no data, blank = none.

Country	Total IHL violations	IV Convention	Child soldiers	Total HR violations	Journalists	Discrimination	HR defenders	Political prisoners	Impunity	Unfair trials	Arbitrary detention	Torture	Death under custody	Disappearances	Executions	Death Penalty	Total Non ratification	ICC	Prot. II	Child	Torture	Women	Racism	ESCR	Civil Rights	IHL violations	HR violations	Non ratification	HRIN
Botswana	0			5	○	●	○					○				·	1							●		0.000	1.354	0.125	**1.479**
Solomon I.	0			4		○			●			○					3	●			●				●	0.000	1.083	0.375	**1.458**
Bhutan	1		●	0	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·		6	●	●		●		●	●	●	0.625	0.000	0.750	**1.375**
Bulgaria	0			5		●			●			○					0									0.000	1.354	0.000	**1.354**
Spain	0			5		●			○			○	○				0									0.000	1.354	0.000	**1.354**
United Kingdom	0			5		●			○	○			○				0									0.000	1.354	0.000	**1.354**
Madagascar	0			5	○		○		●						○	○	0									0.000	1.354	0.000	**1.354**
Argentina	0			4		○	○			○			○				1							●		0.000	1.083	0.125	**1.208**
Kazakhstan	0			4	●	●						●				·	1	●								0.000	1.083	0.125	**1.208**
Kuwait	0			4	●	●						●				●	1	●								0.000	1.083	0.125	**1.208**
Mauritania	0			4								●				·	1	●								0.000	1.083	0.125	**1.208**
Czech Republic	0			4		●		●				●					1	●								0.000	1.083	0.125	**1.208**
Taiwan	0			4		●										·	1							●		0.000	1.083	0.125	**1.208**
Trinidad and Tobago	0			4											●	·	1				●					0.000	1.083	0.125	**1.208**
Maldives	0			4	○		○		●			●				·	1	●								0.000	1.083	0.125	**1.208**
Canada	0			4		●			○			●			○		0									0.000	1.083	0.000	**1.083**
Estonia	0			4		●											0									0.000	1.083	0.000	**1.083**
Finland	0			4		●		●									0									0.000	1.083	0.000	**1.083**
Hungary	0			4		●						●					0									0.000	1.083	0.000	**1.083**
Japan	0			4		●						●				●	0									0.000	1.083	0.000	**1.083**
Malawi	0			4		●						●				·	0									0.000	1.083	0.000	**1.083**
Switzerland	0			4		●			○			○					0									0.000	1.083	0.000	**1.083**
Lesotho	0			4					○	●		○				·	0									0.000	1.083	0.000	**1.083**
Albania	0			3		○			○			○					0									0.000	0.813	0.000	**0.813**
Belgium	0			3		○				○		○					0									0.000	0.813	0.000	**0.813**
Benin	0			3						○	○				○		0									0.000	0.813	0.000	**0.813**
Chile	0			3		●						○				·	0									0.000	0.813	0.000	**0.813**
Slovakia	0			3		●						○				·	0									0.000	0.813	0.000	**0.813**
France	0			3		○			○			○					0									0.000	0.813	0.000	**0.813**

Human Rights Index table (countries sorted by HRIN). Columns are grouped; left block = reported violations, right block = treaty ratification/non-ratification, plus computed index components.

Country	HRIN	Non ratification	HR violations	IHL violations	Civil Rights	ESCR	Racism	Women	Torture	Child	Prot. II	ICC	Total Non ratification	Death Penalty	Executions	Disappearances	Death under custody	Torture	Arbitrary detention	Unfair trials	Impunity	Political prisoners	HR defenders	Discrimination	Journalists	Total HR violations	Child soldiers	IV Convention	Total IHL violations
Ireland	0.813	0.000	0.813	0.000									0				○	○						○		3			0
Romania	0.813	0.000	0.813	0.000									0		○									●		3			0
Kiribati	0.750	0.750	0.000	0.000	●	●	●		●		●	●	6		·	·	·	·	·	·	○	·	·	·	·	0			0
Tuvalu	0.750	0.750	0.000	0.000	●	●	●		●		●	●	6		·	·	·	·	·	·	○	·	·	·	·	0			0
Belize	0.667	0.125	0.542	0.000		●						●	1	–			○	○								2			0
Nicaragua	0.667	0.125	0.542	0.000					●				1							○	○		○		2			0
Surinam	0.667	0.125	0.542	0.000									1	–							○		○		2			0
Swaziland	0.667	0.125	0.542	0.000								●	1	–									○	○		2			0
Brunei Darussalam	0.625	0.625	0.000	0.000	●	●	●		●			●	5	–	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	0			0
Marshall I.	0.625	0.625	0.000	0.000	●	●	●		●		●	●	5		·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	0			0
Micronesia, Fed. Est.	0.625	0.625	0.000	0.000	●	●	●		●				5		·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	0			0
Nauru	0.625	0.625	0.000	0.000	●	●	●	●	●			●	5	–	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	0			0
São Tomé and Príncipe	0.625	0.625	0.000	0.000	●	●	●		●			●	5		·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	0			0
Tonga	0.625	0.625	0.000	0.000	●	●		●	●			●	5	–	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	0			0
Germany	0.542	0.000	0.542	0.000									0				○							○		2			0
Denmark	0.542	0.000	0.542	0.000									0											●		2			0
Ecuador	0.542	0.000	0.542	0.000									0					○						○		2			0
Slovenia	0.542	0.000	0.542	0.000									0											●		2			0
Ghana	0.542	0.000	0.542	0.000									0											●		2			0
Latvia	0.542	0.000	0.542	0.000									0	–										●		2			0
Lithuania	0.542	0.000	0.542	0.000									0											●		2			0
Netherlands	0.542	0.000	0.542	0.000									0											●		2			0
Poland	0.542	0.000	0.542	0.000									0											●		2			0
Sweden	0.542	0.000	0.542	0.000									0											●		2			0
Uruguay	0.542	0.000	0.542	0.000									0						●							2			0
Burkina Faso	0.542	0.000	0.542	0.000									0								○		○			2			0
Grenada	0.500	0.500	0.000	0.000			●	●	●			●	4	–	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	0			0
Saint Lucia	0.500	0.500	0.000	0.000	●	●			●			●	4	–	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	0			0
Vanuatu	0.500	0.500	0.000	0.000		●	●		●			●	4		·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	·	0			0

Country	HRIN	Non ratification	HR violations	IHL violations	Civil Rights	ESCR	Racism	Women	Torture	Child	Prot. II	ICC	Total Non ratification	Death Penalty	Executions	Disappearances	Death under custody	Torture	Arbitrary detention	Unfair trials	Impunity	Political prisoners	HR defenders	Discrimination	Journalists	Total HR violations	Child soldiers	IV Convention	Total IHL violations
Comoros	**0.375**	0.375	0.000	0.000	●	●			●				3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0			0
Palau	**0.375**	0.375	0.000	0.000	●	●			●				3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0			0
St. Kitts and Nevis	**0.375**	0.375	0.000	0.000	●	●			●				3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0			0
Samoa	**0.375**	0.375	0.000	0.000		●	●		●				3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0			0
Guyana	**0.271**	0.000	0.271	0.000									0	-				○								1			0
New Zealand	**0.271**	0.000	0.271	0.000									0											○		1			0
Panama	**0.271**	0.000	0.271	0.000							●		0								○					1			0
Andorra	**0.250**	0.250	0.000	0.000	●	●							2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0			0
Antigua and Barbuda	**0.250**	0.250	0.000	0.000		●			●				2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0			0
Dominica	**0.250**	0.250	0.000	0.000			●		●				2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0			0
Barbados	**0.125**	0.125	0.000	0.000									1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0			0
Cape Verde	**0.125**	0.125	0.000	0.000								●	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0			0
Monaco	**0.125**	0.125	0.000	0.000								●	1		-											0			0
Seychelles	**0.125**	0.125	0.000	0.000								●	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0			0
Costa Rica	**0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000									0													0			0
Iceland	**0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000									0													0			0
Liechtenstein	**0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000									0													0			0
Luxembourg	**0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000									0													0			0
Mauritius	**0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000									0		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0			0
Norway	**0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000									0													0			0
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	**0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000									0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0			0
San Marino	**0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000									0		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0			0
Holy See	**0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000									0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0			0
TOTAL ●					27	36	20	9	47	2	29	84		24	50	15	13	85	66	60	78	24	59	122	72		43	31	
TOTAL ○														2	14	1	16	23	7	8	17	6	19	15	14				

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Glossary

ADC: Alliance Démocratique pour le Changement (Democratic Alliance for Change)

ADF-NALU: Allied Defence Forces - National Army for the Liberation of Uganda

AI: Amnesty International

AIS: Armée Islamique de Salut (Islamic Salvation Army)

AKP: Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)

ALP: Arakan Liberation Party

AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia

AN: Alliance Nationale (National Alliance)

APCLS: Alliance de Patriots pour un Congo Libre et Souverain

APHC: All Parties Hurriyat Conference

APRD: Armée Populaire pour la Réstauration de la République et de la Démocratie (Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy)

AQIM: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

ARS: Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ATLF: All Terai Liberation Front

ATNM: Alliance Touareg Niger-Mali (Niger-Mali Tuareg Alliance)

ATTF: All Tripura Tiger Force

AU: African Union

BINUB: United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi

BLA: Baluch Liberation Army

BLF: Baluch Liberation Front

BONUCA: United Nations Peace-building Office in the Central African Republic

BRA: Balochistan Republican Army

CAP: Consolidated Appeal Process

CEEAC: Economic Community of Central African States

CEMAC: Monetary and Economic Community of Central Africa

CERF: Central Emergency Response Fund

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

CICS: Centre for International Cooperation and Security

CIS: Community of Independent States

CNDD-FDD: Congrès National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy)

CNDP: Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (National Congress for People's Defence)

CNF: Chin National Front

CNT: Congrès National du Tchad (National Council of Chad)

CODHES: Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (Advisory Council for Human Rights and Displacement)

CONAIE: Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador)

CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CPI-M: Communist Party of India-Maoist

CPLA: Cordillera People's Liberation Army

CPN (M): Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)

CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child

CVSJN: Conflict Victims' Society for Justice Nepal

DAW: Division for the Advancement of Women

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DDRNC: DDR National Commission

DFLP: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

DHD (J): Dima Halim Daogah, Black Widow faction

DHD: Dima Halim Daogah

DKBA: Democratic Karen Buddhist Army

DPA: Darfur Peace Agreement

DTP: Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party)

ECHO: European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

ECP: Escola de Cultura de Pau (School for a Culture of Peace)

EEBC: Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission

ELN: Ejército de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Army)

EPL: Ejército Popular de Liberación (Popular Liberation Army)

EPPF: Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front

ERG: Ejército Revolucionario Guevarista (Guevarista Revolutionary Front)

ESMA: Escuela Mecánica de la Armada (Navy Petty-Officers School of Mechanics of Argentina)

ETIM: East Turkestan Islamic Movement

ETLO: East Turkestan Liberation Organization

EU: European Union

EU BAM Rafah: European Union Border Assistance Mission in Rafah

EU NAVFOR SOMALIA: European Union Naval Force in Somalia

EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU: European Union Mission on Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau

EUBAM: European Union Border Assistance for Moldova and Ukraine

EUFOR: European Union Force

EUFOR ALTHEA: European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

EUFOR TCHAD/RCA: European Union Force in Chad and Central African Republic

EUJUST LEX: EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq

EULEX: EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

EUMM: EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia

EUPM: EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

EUPOL AFGHANISTAN: EU Police Mission in Afghanistan

EUPOL COPPS: EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories

EUPOL RD CONGO: EU Police Mission in DR Congo

EUSEC RD CONGO: EU Security Sector Reform Mission in DR Congo

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization

FARC: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)

FARS: Forces Armées Révolutionnaires du Sahara (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Sahara)

FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FDD: Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (Forces for the Defence of Democracy)

FDLR: Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)

FDPC: Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (Central African People's Democratic Front)

FECAT: Forum for Exiled Chadians in Central Africa

FFR: Front des Forces de Redressement (Front of Forces for Rectification)

FIS: Front Islamique du Salut (Islamic Salvation Front)

FLEC: Frente de Liberação do Enclave de Cabinda (Cabinda Enclave's Liberation Front)

FNI: Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes (Nationalist and Integrationist Front)

FNL: Forces Nationales de Libération (National Liberation Forces)

FOMUC: Force Multinationale en Centrafrique (CEMAC Multinational Forces in Central African Republic)

FPIR: Forces Progressistes pour l'Independence et la Renaissance (Progressive Force for Independence and Rebirth)

FRETILIN: Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste)

FRNF: Federal Republic National Front

FRODEBU: Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (Burundi Democratic Front)

FRPI: Forces de Résistance Patriotique d'Ituri (Front for Patriotic Resistance of Ituri)

FSLN: Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front)

FSR: Front pour le Salut de la République

FUC: Front Uni pour le Changement Démocratique (United Front for Democratic Change)

FURCA: Force de l'Union en République Centrafricaine (Union Force in the Central African Republic)

GAM: Gerakin Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GEAR: Gender Equality Architecture Reform

GEI: Gender Equity Index

GIA: Groupe Islamique Armé (Armed Islamic Group)

GRIP: Group on Research and Information on Peace and Security

GSPC: Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat)

HIV/AIDS: Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

HRC: Human Rights Council

HRIN: Human Rights Index of the Escola de Cultura de Pau

HRW: Human Rights Watch

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

IANSA: International Action Network on Small Arms

ICBL: International Campaign to Ban Landmines

ICC: International Criminal Court

ICCR: International Criminal Court for Rwanda

ICCFY: International Criminal Court for Former Yugoslavia

ICG: International Crisis Group

ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross

ICU: Islamic Courts Union

IDMC: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre

IDP: Internally Displaced Person

IFHR: International Federation for Human Rights

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IHL: International Humanitarian Law

ILO: International Labour Organization

IOM: International Organization for Migrations

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force

ISF Timor-Leste: International Stabilisation Force in Timor-Leste

ISS: Institute of Security Studies

JCC: Joint Control Commission

JEM: Justice and Equality Movement

JKLF: Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

JMB: Jama'at ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (Mujahideen Group of Bangladesh)

JTMM: Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (People's Terai Liberation Front)

KANU: Kenya African National Union

KCK: Kurdistan National Congress

KDP: Kudistan Democratic Party

KFOR: NATO Mission in Kosovo

KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army

KNA: Kuki Liberation Army

KNF: Kuki National Front

KNPP: Karenni National Progressive Party

KNU: Kayin National Union

KNU/KNLA: Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army

KPF: Karen Peace Force

KYKL: Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (Organization to Save the Revolutionary Movement in Manipur)

LRA: Lord's Resistance Army

LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MAES: Mission d'Assistance Électorale et Sécuritaire (African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission)

MB: Muslim Brotherhood

MDC: Movement for Democratic Change

MDG: Millennium Development Goals

MDRP: Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program

MEND: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

MFDC: Mouvement de las Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance)

MGK: Milli Güvenlik Kurulu (National Security Council)

MICOPAX: Mission de Consolidation de la Paix en République Centrafricaine (CEEAC Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic)

MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MINUCI: United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire

MINURCA: United Nations Mission in Central African Republic

MINURCAT: United Nations Mission in Central African Republic and Chad

MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

MINUSTAH: United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti.

MJLC: Mouvement des Jeunes Libérateurs Centrafricains (Central African Young Liberators Movement)

MLC: Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of Congo)

MMT: Madhesi Mukti Tigers

MNF-I: Multinational Force – Iraq

MNJ: Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (Nigerine Movement for Justice)

MNLF: Moro National Liberation Front
MONUC: United Nations Mission in DR Congo
MOSOP: Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
MPRF: Madhesi People's Rights Forum
MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctor's Without Borders)
MUP: Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova (Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia)
MVK: Madhesi Virus Killers
MRG: Minority Rights Group
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCP: National Congress Party
NDDSC: Niger Delta Defence and Security Council
NDF: National Democratic Front
NDFB: National Democratic Front of Bodoland
NDPVF: Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force
NDV: Niger Delta Vigilante
NGO: Non Governmental Organization
NLD: National League for Democracy
NLFT: National Liberation Front of Tripura
NMSP: New Mon State Party
NPA: New People's Army
NRF: National Redemption Front
NRMD: National Revolutionary Movement for Development
NSC: Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
NSCN-IM: National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isaac Muivah
NSCN-K: National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
NTIM-I: NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq
NWFP: North West Frontier Province
OAS: Organization of American States
OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLF: Oromo Liberation Front
OMISAM: OSCE Mission in Serbia and Montenegro
ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front
ONUB: United Nations Mission in Burundi
ONUCA: United Nations Observer Group in Central America
ONUCI: United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
OPM: Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Organization)
OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PALIPEHUTU-FNL: Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu-Forces Nationales de Libération (Party for the Liberation of Hutu People – National Liberation Forces)
PALU: Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (Unified Lumumbist Party)
PBC: Peace Building Commission
PBF: Peace Building Fund
PBCP: Purba Banglar Communist Party
PDLF: Palestinian Democratic Liberation Front
PDP: People's Democratic Party
PE: Personal Envoy
PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PKK: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Worker's Party)

PLA: People's Liberation Army
PLC: Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (Constitutionalist Liberal Party)
PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization
PNA: Palestinian National Authority
PNO: PaO National Organization
PONJA: Post-Nargis Joint Assessment
PPP: Pakistan People's Party
PPRD: Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie (People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy)
PREPAK: People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak
PRSP: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PUK: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
PWPB: Post-war Peacebuilding
RAFD: Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques (Coalition of Democratic Forces)
RAMSI: Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RDL: Rassemblement pour la Démocracie et la Liberté (Coalition for Democracy and Freedom)
RFC: Rassemblement des Forces pour le Changement (Coalition of Forces for Change)
RKK: Runda Kumpulan Kecil (Pattani State Restoration Unit)
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front
RUF: Revolutionary United Front
SA: Special Adviser
SADC: Southern Africa Development Community
SCUD: Socle pour le Changement, l'Unité Nationale et la Démocratie (Platform for Change, National Unity and Democracy)
SDF: Sudanese Defence Force
SE: Special Envoy
SEESAC: South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
SFOR: NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLA: Sudan Liberation Army
SLDF: Sabaot Land Defence Force
SOFA: Status of Forces Agreement in Iraq
SPLA: Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM: Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SR: Special Representative
SSA-S: Shan State Army-South
SSNPLO: Shan State Nationalities People's Liberation Organization
SSR: Security Sector Reform
SUDA: Somali Unity Defence Alliance
TAK: Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan (Kurdistan Freedom Falcons)
TFG: Transitional Federal Government
TMVP: Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (Tamil People Liberation Tigers)
TNG: Transitional National Government
TSJP: Tarai Samyukta Janakranti Party
TTP: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
TUSU: Thailand United Southern Underground
UEDF: United Ethiopian Democratic Forces
UFDD: Union des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Développement (Union of Forces for Democracy and Development)

UFDR: Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (Union of Democratic Forces Coalition)

UFR: Union des Forces de la Résistance (United Resistance Forces)

ULFA: United Liberation Front of Assam

UN: United Nations

UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNAMI: United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq

UNAMID: United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur

UNAMIS: United Nations Advanced Mission in Sudan

UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

UNASUR: Unión de Naciones Americanas (Union of South American Nations)

UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNEF: United Nations Emergency Fund

UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

UNHCHR: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF: United Nations International Children's Fund

UNIFEM: United Nations Development Fund for Woman

UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNIKOM: United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission

UNIOSIL: United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone

UNIPOM: United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission.

UNIPSIL: United Nations Peace-building Office in Sierra Leone

UNITAF: Unified Task Force

UNLF: United National Liberation Front

UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia

UNMIBH: United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

UNMIK: United Nations Mission in Kosovo

UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNMIN: United Nations Mission in Nepal

UNMIS: United Nations Mission in Sudan

UNMISET: United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor

UNMIT: United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

UNMOGIP: United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

UNMOVIC: United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission

UNOGBIS: United Nations Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau

UNOMB: United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville

UNOMIG: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

UNOSOM: United Nations Operation in Somalia

UNOTIL: United Nations Office in Timor-Leste

UNOWA: United Nations Office in West Africa

UNPOB: United Nations Political Office in Bougainville

UNPOS: United Nations Political Office in Somalia

UNPPB: United Nations Political and Peace Building Mission

UNRRCA: United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia

UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

UNSCO: United Nations Special Coordinator Office for the Middle East

UNTAC: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

UNTAET: United Nations Transitional Administration in Timor-Leste

UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine

UPDF: Uganda People's Defence Force

UPRONA: Union pour le Progrès National (Union for National Progress)

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

USA: United States of America

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

UWSA: United Wa State Army

WB: World Bank

WFP: World Food Programme

WPNLC: West Papua National Coalition for Liberation

ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front

Thematic and country index

Escola de Cultura de Pau

The *Escola de Cultura de Pau* (ECP - School for a Culture of Peace) was established in 1999 with the aim of **organizing academic, research and intervention activities** related to peace culture, analysis, prevention and transformation of conflicts, education for peace, disarmament and the promotion of human rights.

The ECP is mainly financed by the Catalan government, via the Catalan Agency for Cooperation and Development (ACCD). It also receives support from the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development (AECID), the International Catalan Institute for Peace (ICIP), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, local authorities, foundations and other entities. Its director is Vicenç Fisas, who also holds the UNESCO Chair on Peace and Human Rights at the Universitat Autònoma of Barcelona.

In accordance with its mission and objectives, the ECP focuses its work on the following areas:

• **Intervention in conflicts**, with the aim to facilitate dialogue between the parties.

• Academic activities such as a **postgraduate diploma** on **peace culture** (which entails 230 teaching hours with an average of 60 students per course on its 10 editions) and the elective subjects "peace culture and conflict management" and "educating for peace and in conflicts".

• **Awareness** initiatives related to peace culture in Catalan and Spanish society through various educational and formative activities.

• **Analysis and** daily monitoring of international events related to **armed conflicts, socio-political crises, humanitarian crises and gender** (Conflicts and Peacebuilding Programme).

• Monitoring and analysis of different countries undergoing **peace processes** or formal negotiations, and countries which are in an exploratory phase of negotiations (Peace Process Programme).

• Analysis of different issues linked to **disarmament**, with special attention given to the processes of Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants (Disarmament Programme).

• Monitoring and analysis of **peacebuilding in post-conflict contexts** (Post-war Rehabilitation Programme).

• Monitoring of the international situation regarding **human rights** and, in particular, transitional justice mechanisms, corporate social responsibility and the impact of multinationals in conflict contexts (Human Rights Programme).

• Promotion and development of the knowledge, the values and the capacities of **peace education** (Peace Education Programme).

• Analysis of the **contribution made by music and the arts** to peacebuilding (Art and Peace Programme).

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