Urban and Regional Planning in Colonial Morocco: From Protection to Exploitation

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During their colonial years in Morocco, both France and Spain adopted an official discourse that was protectionist and paternalistic: the supposed task of civilizing a "virgin space" where, from the perspective of progress and modernization, everything "had to be done" contributed to the elaboration of many urban and regional plans. Both the discourse and the plans masked an intention to exploit and control. Proximity to Europe, joint actuation with other colonial powers in Tangiers, and some rivalry with what Lyautey was doing in French Morocco, raised the level of Spanish colonizing operations. French interventions were the model to be followed: French urban planning offered an excellent example of systematic tactics for occupying, controlling, transforming, and exploiting Moroccan territory and Moroccan society. Yet although part of the Spanish colonial legacy in Morocco was an unusual effort to create many urban, regional, and thematic plans (this planning was even previous to and better than what was done in Spain), only a few parts of some of these plans were implemented. The result was that urban and rural Morocco were only partially modernized and in fact, only a few of the usual colonial processes of resource exploitation and popular submission were involved. Under Franco's regime the official justification for this lack of efficiency was a supposed tolerance of and respect for Moroccans.

Key words: urban planning, regional planning, colonialism, Morocco

Durant leurs années de colonisation au Maroc, la France et l'Espagne ont adopté un discours officiel protectionniste et paternaliste : la prétendue mission civilisatrice dans un "espace vierge" où, du point de vue du progrès et de la modernisation, "tout était à faire". Cela a conduit à l'élaboration de plusieurs plans d'aménagement urbain et régional. Dans les deux cas, français et espagnol, le discours et les plans ont dissimulé des visées d'exploitation et de contrôle. La proximité de l'Europe, l'action conjointe avec d'autres pouvoirs coloniaux à Tanger, et une certaine compétition avec ce que Lyautey faisait au Maroc français, ont élevé le niveau des opérations coloniales espagnoles. Les interventions françaises étaient le modèle à suivre : l'aménagement urbain français présentait un excellent exemple des tactiques systématiques mises en œuvre dans le but de contrôler, d'occuper, de transformer et d'exploiter le territoire et la société marocaine. Bien que l'héritage colonial espagnol au Maroc démontre un effort inhabituel de production de nombre de plans urbains, régionaux et sectoriels (cette planification étant antérieure et de qualité supérieure par rapport à ce qui se faisait en Espagne), seulement quelques parties de ces plans ont été réalisées. La résultante fut une modernisation partielle du Maroc urbain et rural qui n'a mis en œuvre que quelques-uns des processus coloniaux habituels d'exploitation des ressources et d'asservissement des populations. Pendant le régime franquiste, l'explication officielle de ce manque d'efficacité était une prétendue tolérance et le respect des Marocains.

Mots clé: aménagement urbain, aménagement régional, colonialisme, Maroc

Traditionally the Spanish colonial experience in North Africa has been considered by the Spanish people as a problem and as a source of conflict in an area that failed to offer clear opportunities for possible colonization.

However, the loss of the last Spanish colonies in America and Asia in 1898 encouraged a current of opinion in favour of Spain's recovering an honourable role in the club of European colonial powers through decisive colonizing activity. This catharsis would take the shape of a regeneration project that initially appeared in the form of certain proposals (consolidation of the region of Ceuta and Melilla, establishing communications across the Strait of Gibraltar, studying and modernizing the territory, etc.) that theoretically should have matched the effort to the dream.

The prolonged state of war and the subsequent subjection of land and society to military rule (together with the lack of interest of the republican authorities) were the reasons why a real colonization policy did not take form for almost three decades (basically between 1912 and 1936); the basic approaches to intervention in the region were just the hasty logic of the army and the overwhelming inertia of the commanders. The ominous and sometimes irreversible repercussions of all this were also felt after 1940 when, despite a surprising amount of work on drawing up sectoral and urban plans, Francoist rhetoric called for a colonizing effort with shades of patriotic redemption. The particular nature of Spanish planning in Morocco does not hide the fact that Spanish policy towards the region, plagued by repetitive arguments, blatant contradictions, tolerance of corruption, and demagogic leadership, failed.

Catharsis for a Decadent Empire: From the 1898 Disaster to the New Colonial Project

In 1898 the loss of the overseas colonies had, among many others, two immediate effects. Firstly, it led Spain into introspection at political, social, and economic levels, revealing the backwardness and underdevelopment of the country in practically all spheres. With the military defeat the army lost much of its prestige and the failure of the colonial adventure made it clear that Spain was not an economic power, given that it had not even been able adequately to channel the benefits that colonial markets could have provided for its industry. Instead Spain retained the image of a rural and essentially agricultural country. At the same time the repeated strikes by workers at the beginning of the 20th century provided evidence of clear social inequality.

Secondly, the disaster of 1898 firmly relegated Spain to a strictly European sphere. The contrast with its continental neighbours (especially France and the United Kingdom—both undoubted economic and colonial powers) made the weakness and subordinate position of Spain in the world geopolitical and geo-economic context even more noticeable. The confirmation that a large part of Spain's incipient industry played a secondary role and the fact that some key sectors of the national economy (like transport, energy production, mining, and even the largest banks) were in the hands of foreign capital, also promoted the image of a country that was colonized rather than colonizing.

It is in this context that the Spanish penetration of Morocco must be understood. The occupation of the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar was justified using historical or cultural arguments or by proclaiming the superiority of civilization, and in this way difficulties were exteriorized that, as was made clear by the disaster of 1898, had a strictly internal origin in evident political ineptitude and clear military incapacity.

Also in this context, occupationist arguments were advanced, based on the Spanish colonial tradition and the supposed civilizing vocation and imperialist projection of the European states (with which Spain was trying to compete), that occupation promised future economic growth for Spain. The simplistic and mistaken reasoning put forward by the political class and the Africanist lobbies was that Spain's progress (recovery from the disaster) would come as a consequence of colonial expansion, when in reality colonialism follows an inverse process: imperial-colonial expansion is always a product of the pre-existence of economic and political sta-

bility in the metropolitan territories.

This mistaken approach, which was taken from the start, confirms and is confirmed by the fact that there was no clear interest in the economic exploitation of Morocco: despite the active propaganda of the chambers of commerce and the corresponding pressure groups (most notable among which were the geographical and Africanist societies), the Spanish bourgeoisie was not interested in embarking on high-investment, risky ventures in hostile and obviously poor territories. Because the entrepreneurial impulse of the bourgeoisie (unaccustomed to ambitious operations, wanting short-term benefits, and conditioned by outside initiatives) was weak, economic activity usually depended on public companies or private initiatives encouraged and subsidized by the Spanish state. In addition, Moroccan territory offered limited possibilities for agricultural development and, despite its mineral resources' apparently having better potential, their profitability was not sufficient either. (This profitability was usually overestimated by the Africanist lobbies and by the authorities to justify the Spanish presence in Morocco, so costly to the public purse).

So the supposed historicaljustifications (which usually went back to the 16th century) here turned out to be anachronisms that did not compare with the arguments for occupation advanced by the other 20th century colonial powers. The civilizing or evangelical work that in other colonial powers was manipulated to make social control of the indigenous population easier and to favour the economic exploitation of their territories is revealed here more than ever as empty rhetoric, given that there was no real policy of occupying and exploiting Moroccan territory. On occasions it came to appear that a consolidated Spanish presence in Ceuta and Melilla alone was enough of an incentive to convince investors from the peninsula of the cost-effectiveness of the colonization process in Morocco.

The Role of Spain and the Strait of Gibraltar in the World Geopolitical Game

Together with historical arguments meant to justify territorial claims and occupation policies, "geographical" reasoning (geography here understood strictly in its cartographic sense) was a constant weapon from the time of the war of 1860 to the Francoist period. In this sense, physical proximity was presented as an overwhelming and irrefutable factor: intervention with respect to Moroccan territorial policy was essential not only because of the extreme closeness of the metropolis but because geostrategy gave to Spain responsibility for the physical relations between both sides of the Strait of Gibraltar[1] (see Figure 1). The facts that "as Africa is the continuation of Europe, Morocco is the continuation of Spain" (González-Quijano 1942, 429) and that "as we have seen when dealing with the geographical situation of the country, its roads (those of Morocco) are the continuation of Spain's" (Martínez de Velasco 1944, 16) were presented as an almost unarguable destiny. These claims should have led Spain to play a decisive role in the design and construction of infrastructure and in the control of movements that would securely link both continents.

Undoubtedly the main examples of the connective function supposedly served by Spain are the successive proposals to bore a tunnel or build a bridge (or a combination of both) across the Strait. Once again, the error of believing that the construction of this stable link would be the key to catapulting Spain into the select club of world powers in a supposed imitation of what had happened in other parts of the world (the Suez and Panama canals to mention two parallel and contemporary examples) was repeated. In fact, the process is always the inverse: it is the nature of political or economic power such as characterized France, the United Kingdom, or the United States at the time that impels the need to build infrastructure that contributes to maintaining and expanding the



FIGURE 1
Locational map of the Spanish protectorate in relatin to the Strait of Gibraltar

economic development and political dominance of the powerful nation. In the case of the Strait of Gibraltar, Spanish interests on the other side (public or private) were never important enough to justify a work of such magnitude and, in any case, the political will and, still less, the available finance, never existed to undertake such a venture.

Transport and Communications: Plans without Strategies

Another example of the lack of perspective and leadership observed in Spanish foreign policy is shown in how little interest there was in setting up communication infrastructures extending beyond the area of strictly Spanish influence, many of which would have involved nothing like the technical and financial complexity of works spanning the Strait. In this sense a good example might be the fact that between 1911 and 1923 in the French part of the Moroccan protectorate a military railway network of approximately 1 500 km was built. The procedure followed by the French was simple and pragmatic: using a line gauge of 0.6 m and following the sinuous landscape, little building work was required, so the railway was constructed quickly and allowed the easy occupation of territory. As civil lines were built (of normal width and at times parallel to the military lines), the military ones were taken up, often being laid again elsewhere.

This entire network broke the Franco-German agreement of 1911, according to which no other railway could be built before the opening of the Tangier-Fez line (Méchin 1928). By contrast, in the Spanish case, fears and warnings of international reprisals were constant and, although these were usually used as an excuse for ineffectiveness, the supposed geostrategic importance of Spanish and Moroccan communications gave way to the pressures, needs, and initiatives of other powers. So in the final stages of World War II Spain believed it would have to wait for the arrival of peace and a conference to deter-

mine the route of the "vertical (north-south) line" of penetration. Spanish engineers had their own proposals, which usually displayed an overall logic (and did not only benefit Spanish interests).[2] Therefore, after decades of proclamations, proposals, and debates and in spite of Spain's apparently unarguable centrality to world communication geostrategy, only a limited number of local roads and a few internal railways lines were constructed.

A Supposedly Protectionist and Modernizing Territorial Intervention

Spain's self-imposed task in Morocco assumed a protectionist and paternalist character different, it came to be said, from the colonizing and exploitative objectives of other European powers in their overseas territories. In fact this tone is associated not only with the traditional rhetoric of self-satisfaction but above all with a manifest inability to exploit and colonize. The proximity of the European continent and the joint (in the case of Tangiers) and concurrent (in comparison with what happened in French Morocco) participation of other Western powers in the colonial project would be some of the elements that elevated the stature of and increased the demands upon Spanish colonial ambitions (as Spain attempted to put itself on a par with the other powers) at the same time as they created useful distinctions.

The protective and paternalist character of the civilizing task and the claim that there was a virgin space where everything, from the point of view of progress and modernization, "still had to be done" would contribute to the profusion of plans for organizing and intervening in the region, plans meant to avoid the disastrous exploitation and plundering excesses that were characteristic of the methods of the other colonial powers. So from official arguments it might be assumed that public planning (sectoral, urban, regional) was the greatest example of progress (through the innovations introduced in administration, facilities, and infrastructure, for example) and of modernity (including dealing with things in a way practically unheard of in the peninsula) and was also the guarantee of that protective and paternal action. Land, economy, and society were being considered and planned by the supposedly objective state administration to ensure a free and fair balance of prosperity for all Moroccan citizens and avoid the underdevelopment and dependence that traditionally came with submitting to the European yoke.

But translating these arguments into reality would be something else. Of everything set out in the plans often all that was left was a pile of good intentions. This was in part because of the vicissitudes of Spanish politics and international events (the pacification of Morocco, changes in the Spanish regime from monarchy to republic to dictatorship, the Civil War, international wars, diplomatic pressures, etc.) and in part because Spain had no clear interest in the economic exploitation of Morocco and showed an obvious ineptitude for an ambitious colonial enterprise (for investment, exploitation, management, cost-effectiveness, etc.).

Reasons for and Objectives of Spanish Regional Planning Policy in Morocco

Between 1941 and 1946 several sectoral plans were approved, some of which used techniques and approaches that were very advanced for their age. On occasion these were surprisingly open and progressive, considering the ideology and social and political behaviour of the regime of General Francisco Franco, although at times they did use ideas and principles that had been set out earlier. From this period come the Water Works Plan, the Port Organization Plan, the General Roads Plan, the Agricultural Organization Plan, the Forestry Organization Plan, the Railway Plan, the Transport Organization Plan, and the Urban Organization Proposals (Albet 1999).

An equally important landmark was the work *Acción de España en Marruecos*

(Spanish Action in Morocco), published by the Spanish High Commission in Morocco (1948) (Albet et al. 1995). This began as a synthesis of sectoral plans but at the same time was an attempt to give them coherence using a single guiding thread. In this sense the work is probably one of the first examples from the Francoist period of integrated organization on a regional scale vastly superior to that usually reserved for town planning. At that time in the peninsula there was nothing comparable and this gives each of the plans and the overall work an exceptional character that is, in any light, hardly commonplace in the context of a country where regional planning was still in its shaky beginnings.

It is difficult to discover the precise reasons why the Francoist government threw itself into an ambitious regional planning policy (independently of whether it put that policy into effect or not). Although it was not always explicitly expressed, in the Francoist government and especially within the group of "Africanist" military leaders there was something of a feeling recognizing and identifying Morocco as the initial focus of the "National Rising." This could explain the making of certain political, social, cultural, and linguistic concessions towards the protectorate that contrast with the ferocious repression observed in the peninsula.

So too, at a time of extreme international isolation, the new Francoist regime considered action in Morocco a priority as a way of polishing a crumbling image and winning prestige in the forum of international powers. In Morocco Spain would present itself as a solid regime capable of exercising a protective colonial mission in a serious and coherent way. In this way the various plans and especially the work *Acción de España en Marruecos* appear from the start as propaganda instruments for the new regime that seek to ease its acceptance into the international community.

A Good Example: Urban Planning

In the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War the Spanish High Commission in Morocco consolidated concern for the planning of urban growth in the cities of the Protectorate: it was officially alleged that faced by the rapid growth of population and particularly the economic expectations raised by public works and new industrialization processes, adequate urban planning had become an urgent requirement "to determine zones and establish styles" (Rueda 1944).

Given the circumstances of the time, both that concern and its urgency are highly surprising: the period immediately after the war was not renowned for either demographic growth or economic expansion. Devastated by fascist activity and the toils of war, metropolitan Spain was faced by far more serious problems, even on an urban level, than those detected in Moroccan towns, which had not been affected at all by the ravages of the war. So while the foundations for reconstruction were being laid on the peninsula, in Morocco new expansions were being planned and the adaptation and aesthetic preservation of different architectural forms were coming under discussion (Alta Comisaría de España en Marruecos 1948, 641–725). The explanation for this apparent imbalance is undoubtedly related to the special consideration with which the Protectorate was treated by Francisco Franco's dictatorship. The dictatorship aimed to convert Morocco into an international showcase for the intentions and achievements of the new regime.

An equally surprising factor was the technical and conceptual solidity of the urban proposals. These showed interest in the zoning of the use of land (for the first time in Spain on an urban level) and in the coherent distribution of infrastructure and equipment and services. Certain proposals were drastic in nature (moving army barracks, conserving typical traditional districts, establishing open spaces, etc.). What is more, the Alta

Comisaría (under the command of General Luis Orgaz), in an attempt to centralize control of growth but also with the aim of harmonizing criteria and procedures, also promoted the publication of City Plans in the main towns and cities of the Zone. For these plans they employed a prestigious team of Spanish architects, headed by the first General Director of Architecture, Pedro Muguruza Otaño.

To facilitate collaboration between the General Service of Architecture and the Public Works Delegation, in September 1942 by Order of the High Commissioner a General Council for Urbanization in the Zone was created, with Local Councils for Urbanization constituted in settlements with a population of more than 5 000 people.

As a product of the work of the team of architects, in December 1943 a mobile Exhibition of Town Planning and Architecture was inaugurated to display the studies and projects that had been undertaken. As well as proposals that were strictly related to town planning, works related to the problems of hydraulics, agriculture, industry, and communication, etc. that each city had to cope with were also included. The three first General City Plans to be presented pertained to Ceuta, Xauen, and Tetuan-Rio Martin, to which Melilla, Villa Nador, Villa Sanjurjo and Targuist were added later, followed in a third stage by Alcazarquivir, Arcila, Larache, and Puerto Capaz (Muguruza 1944). The documentation included in these plans was renowned for its thoroughness and high quality. As well as a detailed analysis of problems and deficits, proposals for the future were put forward and evaluated, with special consideration given to aspects related to access by road and rail, the network of streets and avenues, and possible expansions. In each case, emphasis was always laid on zoning proposals that specified, for each block of buildings, the planned use of land.

Equally remarkable are the maps and plans that were used and produced, for although Morocco possessed high quality and complete cartography, apart from Tetuan not one city had an adequate map on which the appearance of the city could be drawn (Sierra 1960). This deficit was rectified with the announcement of a plan-drawing contest. The contest was won by a prominent geographical engineer, who offered to make the plans with the assistance of aerial photography, producing magnificent photographic maps shortly after beginning the task (Martorell 1946, 184).

Of the plans presented, the most debated was that of Tetuan, due both to the nature of the political hierarchy and population make-up of the city and to inherited problems. The expansion of Tetuan (the European district), erected between 1913 and 1921, was said to be "poorly located," being situated (as a result of pressure from the affected owners) on the opposite side from where logic and the projects had suggested. As well as this initial difficulty, there was also the problem that in a fever for construction in the period from 1921–36 this and other districts were completed with little regard for what had been planned (Limiñana 1936; Gutiérrez Trujillo1943, 7; Malo de Malina and Dominguez 1995).

The Tetuan City Plan presented in December 1943 was based on a general project (which, in turn, contained a partial interior reform plan and a program of rules and orders), with certain action bodies for deciding objectives and establishing the means by which they would be achieved (Sierra 1962, 81). One of the main problems to be detected by preliminary studies and which the plan aimed to confront was the lack of zoning. This would have led to the inappropriate use of certain available areas: factories and workshops and warehouses, as well as army barracks and administrative buildings occupying central areas of the city where there should have been green public and recreational spaces. The consequent urban congestion was made worse by the lack of new houses. Instead unhealthy "tin-can" districts had appeared, something which the plan also

aimed to eliminate through the further expansion, the planning of gardens around the old city walls, and the interior reform of communication routes (Gil 1936; Muguruza 1944; 1946).

Protective Action and Imperialist Exploitation: Competitive Colonization

The plans discussed above also have to be considered as a response to the regional and urban organizational initiative by the French in their protectorate zone, where a clear and consistent line of action consolidated over several decades benefitted from the particularly decisive impulse of characters like Lyautey (Rabinow 1989). The projects and plans drawn up by the Spanish also appear as a prestige operation to confirm Spain's rights over Morocco, demonstrating its capacity for colonial action at the same level as that of other European powers. The Spanish proposals support the argument that, in contrast to the policy of imposition and plunder followed by France and the United Kingdom, Spain put forward original alternatives that showed the distinctive, more respectful character of its colonial activities.[3]

Spanish rhetoric claimed that, in contrast to other powers whose colonial action had a clearly imperialist and exploitative tinge, Spanish action in Morocco should be seen as respectful and largely tolerant of local peculiarities and realities. In this sense the protective and civilizing effort of Spain presents itself as doubly complex, because it has to take this different reality into account:

> So it has to be taken into account that all these problems affect a civilisation, a culture, different from ours, which sees all human problems in a completely different way; and therefore techniques for resolving these problems have no alternative but to use this way of seeing the world, so as to (gradually) influence it, in the same way as it must make its impression on us (Muguruza 1946, 8).

Official arguments also stress respect for Morocco's historic heritage, in contrast with the policies of plunder usually practised by other colonial powers with the aim of filling the treasuries of the metropolitan museums:

> Finally, and this is a very important point, there is respect for the artistic, archaeological and monumental sphere, which forms part of the make-up of the Moslems, who are jealous of their people's heritage, and these are the fundamental points to take into account in the organisation plan (Muguruza 1946, 8).

There is no room to doubt that these claims come as a response (whether as an invidious comparison or as an argument to the indigenous powers) to the systematic and determined action carried out by the French administration in the Moroccan territory formally under its protectorate. Although legally the status of protectorate is radically different from that of colony, in practice the actions of the French administration took little notice of the distinction. So in French Morocco forms of intervention similar to those observed in other colonies, like Algeria, were found.

In spite of this, there is no doubt that French intervention in Moroccan territory was the model to follow. The forcefulness of French actions (the new suburbs in Rabat and Casablanca, the networks of roads, railways, and ports, etc.) not only surprised and astonished their neighbours, the Spanish, but were followed and admired by the rest of the world.[4] With some reticence and much regret Spanish planners recognized that "we are somewhat under the influence of the image of French Morocco" (Muguruza 1946, 8) and that the example of the actions of General Lyautey should be admired and followed (González Hontoria 1915).

Different Urban Proposals for the Same Strategies of Control, Occupation, and Transformation of Land and Society

Perhaps suspicions of and comparisons with

what the French were doing in their protectorate zone were most harsh and direct in the field of urban planning, but the proposals and projects drawn up in the Spanish sector nonetheless conformed to French practice. So in the presentation of plans for urban organization made by the Spanish it was stated that:

> We have to dedicate some lines of criticism to the urban solution that the French have developed in their zone and with which they seem very satisfied. This formula has consisted in building new cities, totally independent and isolated from the Moorish districts and with urban developments we might classify as European, based on wide avenues with a rectilinear layout and buildings of medium height (except in Casablanca) with a form of construction in which porticoes predominate on the ground floor and loggias on the upper floor. This French formula, which certainly does have its advantages, can only be maintained if plenty of plants are put in to give shade and attraction to such an exaggerated width of street, as is the case in Rabat, the city with the most successful urban development in French Morocco. We, the Spanish, need a completely different urban formula, firstly, because our system of colonisation is based on living together with the Moslem element and this is reflected in the cities which have development closely connected with the Moorish and Jewish areas, in many cases without gaps. Secondly, because the topography of the Spanish zone and the cities in it is much more hilly than in the French zone and requires layouts which are less geometric or spectacular and, thirdly, because, in two thirds of the peninsula we have, especially in Andalusia, a clearly Moslem urban tradition. We cannot break with this national tradition which fits perfectly with the spirit, atmosphere and climate of Spanish Morocco (Alta Comisaría España en Marruecos 1948, 612).[5]

If the topographical argument is, up to a certain point, genuine,[6] the others once again offer a rationalization for the neglect, ineffectiveness, and laziness of the Spanish administration of urban planning and territorial organization. The incoherence of the claim is demonstrated only a few paragraphs later, when details of the suburbs of, for example, Larache, Alcazarquivir, or Arcila (with great avenues and a perpendicular street layout) are presented. The refusal to build new cities must be set against the realities of Villa Sanjurjo or Villa Nador, not to mention the model settlement of El Zaio, populated by new colonists encouraged by the possibilities generated by the irrigation of the Muluya basin.

Certainly, French urban planning initiatives were models in that they included clear strategies for the control, occupation, and transformation of land and society. More than founding new cities, French intervention is characterized by the destruction of whole neighbourhoods and the building in their place of modern districts of a European architectural type, which would be occupied by the colonizing elites and the faithful local bourgeoisie. The urban planning processes observed in Casablanca and Rabat are in this sense exemplary, and in any case they are a clear demonstration of the power and social and territorial control of the occupying power (Dethier 1972, 8–11).

Anyway, given that Spanish Morocco was never seen as a "colony to be populated,"[7] the urban plans that were made almost always involved expansion projects and the installation of infrastructure and facilities intended to modernize the existing cities (especially the areas inhabited by Spaniards) or proposals to correct the disorder and imbalance caused by the military or by previous mistakes, but not the massive and systematic creation of new cities. Once more this reality is exploited by the official rhetoric of valuing local peoples and traditions, when in fact it was due to Spanish financial inability or the ineffectiveness of Spanish urban politicians.

The difference between what was planned and what was actually carried out was enormous: the reasons were the lack of a democratic tradition and the lack of respect for urban legislation, of which both citizens

and the administration generally took no notice, disregarding what was set out in the plans. The sheer impossibility of carrying out what was planned (at the levels of finance, technical and human resources, and social acceptance, etc.) should also be pointed out. As regards facilities (official and public buildings—schools, hospitals, post offices, hotels and luxury paradors, markets, slaughterhouses), public services (electric lighting, water supplies, sewers, telecommunications) and housing, both what was planned and what was carried out was minimal.

Conclusions

During their colonial years in Morocco, both France and Spain adopted an official argument that was protective and paternalistic: the supposed task of civilizing a virgin space where, from the perspective of progress and modernization, everything "still had to be done" contributed to the drawing up of many urban and regional plans. In both cases, the argument and the plans masked an intention to exploit and control.

Proximity to Europe, joint action with other colonial powers in Tangiers, and some rivalry with what Lyautey was doing in French Morocco raised the level of Spanish colonial operations. French intervention was the model to be followed: French urban planning offered an excellent example of systematic tactics for controlling, occupying, transforming, and exploiting Moroccan land and society.

Although part of the Spanish colonial legacy in Morocco was an unusual effort to create many urban, regional, and thematic plans (this work even predated and improved on what was done in Spain), only a few parts of some of these plans were implemented. The result was that only a few characteristics of modernization were introduced into Moroccan urban and rural areas and, in fact, only a few of the usual colonial processes of resource exploitation and popular submission operated. Under Franco's regime this lack of efficiency was hidden by a veil of supposed tolerance and respect towards the Moroccans far different than the imperialistic procedures of the other European countries. The legacy shows that the Spanish side of the Moroccan protectorate not only suffered the same imperialistic exploitation as the French side but, due to inefficiency and the absence of opportunities for the Spanish colonizers, even the minimum standards of progress and modernization were not met in the region.

Notes

1 The building of good communications between the peninsula and Morocco even came to be justified in the framework of possible confrontation with or war against the "Soviet peril" (Martorell 1953b, 7).

2 The French, for their own benefit, as well as failing to comply with international treaties (as for example in the case of the Tangier-Fez railway), on many occasions blatantly avoided the opportunity (or the need) for overall action in both protectorates at the same time, as they often simply openly ignored the very existence of the Spanish protectorate, taking for themselves the exclusive use of the name "Morocco" with its character of "protectorate"; examples of this (from different times and with different aims) are texts by Boysson (1954), Assouline (1962), and Dethier (1972).

3 Despite this and from an historical perspective, many local students of the theme respond with a negative judgement (Ben Jelloun 1984; Chaara 1994; Aziza 1997) or a neutral one (Benaboud 1999) when faced with the claim that the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of Spanish colonization failed to bring progress but also did not cause intense exploitation with its subsequent severe inequalities.

4 In addition to the abundant references in newspapers and magazines of the time, journalists and writers also pointed to the progress and modernity implied by this French action in Moroccan territory. Examples of this may be found in texts by Aurora Bertrana [1936] (1991) or Edith Wharton (1920).

5 Similar arguments, perhaps expressed even more forcefully, are reflected on pages 726–28 of the same work. For a comparison see Division du com-

merce et de la marine marchande (Bureau du plan) (1952) and Lourde (1985).

6 Morales (1986) even identifies the French zone as "useful Morocco."

7 That is to say, like a territory for which the economic opportunities and exploitation of resources would make feasible the start of a process of massive immigration from the metropolis: this was very noticeable when there was a considerable flow, largely towards Cuba and Argentina, at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. Proposals for massive migration were always very scarce and isolated (see García Faria 1906, 52; Bonmatí 1992, 217–26). Also, as Reparaz (1921–22, 13), pointed out, in contrast to the French colonists ("entrepreneurial and enlightened"), the Spanish emigrants to Morocco were usually "unscrupulous adventurers... coarse and illiterate," while many of the Spanish civil servants were characterized by their "narrowness of vision."

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