A good part of the Western press received the work of the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems (the MacBride Commission) with hostility, to the point that, in one of his last texts, Sean MacBride wrote that the campaign against Unesco and its director-general was "reminiscent of McCarthyism".

This situation, however, did not represent a novelty for this international organisation, but rather was the coherent conclusion to the climate of confrontation in the debates that had begun to take place within Unesco since the beginning of the 1970s. From then on, a new analysis approach could be appreciated, which focused on the causes and consequences of the imbalance in international communication flows that emphasised the Third World's news and cultural dependency and the centralisation of communication production in the most advanced countries. This approach involved revising the concept of development and questioning the North American doctrine about the free flow of information that had governed Unesco's work up until then.

The leap onto journalistic forums of the debates that for some years had been taking place within Unesco was made especially clear at the 1st Intergovernmental Conference on National Communication Policies for Latin America and the Caribbean, held in San Jose (Costa Rica) in July 1976. The approach of this conference unleashed a broad wave of criticism from professional associations and major private media groups.

Starting from an analysis of the content of the information and articles related with communication problems and the meetings organised by Unesco, Roger Heacock (1977) concluded there was a systematic campaign among diverse press organisations, with the support of news agencies and professional organisations. Among the entities that led the most critical positions, he identified the InterAmerican Broadcasting Association (AIR) and the InterAmerican Press Society (SIP), which represented media owners. The North American press also showed a practically unanimous condemnation of the conference. For Heacock, this position was in keeping with certain interests that felt threatened, particularly news agencies like Associated Press (AP) and United Press International (UPI).

In relation to the position of European media representatives, Heacock felt they were more 'relaxed', and attributed it to the greater familiarity and acceptance of the role of governments in the media, particularly with regard to the broadcast media.

The expressions favourable to the meeting on National Communication Policies for Latin America and the Caribbean came from only a small number of countries in the region (Cuba, Venezuela and Costa Rica). According to Heacock's study, in these countries, the press made use of the need to seek a better balance in news flows and highlighted the relationship between underdevelopment and dependency.

**Opposition to the Bogota and Quito Meetings**

The preparation of the intergovernmental summit of San Jose included two previous experts' meetings, held in...
Bogota (July 1974) and Quito (June 1975). As Beltrán (1993) has said, the experts that met in Bogota recommended that policies should promote access to mass-media messages, and that the media should be used for educational and cultural purposes. However, they did not suggest it should be replaced by state media monopolies. Beltrán says that, despite this, international associations of media owners and managers interpreted the recommendations of the Bogota meeting as a threat to press freedom and private business. They thus initiated an international campaign against the scheduled intergo-vernmental meeting on communication policies. The conclusions to this first experts’ meeting, says Heacock (1977, 32), provoked an outcry among the North American and Latin American press, which began to spread the idea that Unesco favoured government censorship of the media – an idea which would later become commonplace in the debate on communication policies.

In fact, Heacock (1977, 41) attributes the fact that Unesco refused to recognise the final report of the experts’ meeting in Bogota to the pressure exercised by the press. The AIR set out its critical position on the Bogota document in a meeting in Manaos, where it also said that one of its basic principles was business freedom. Unesco’s response, formulated from the office of the director-general himself⁶, stressed on the one hand that the document’s recommendations did not represent the organisation’s opinion but simply that of the experts who had prepared it, and, on the other hand, that it was not taking the document on board, as it considered it to be partisan and unfortunate.

With regard to the Quito meeting, the final report of the meeting indicated the need to ensure an optimal and balanced flow of information between Latin America and the Caribbean countries, to safeguard their sovereignty and promote the development of national and regional identity. It thus warned about the advisability of creating appropriate infrastructures such as national news agencies, and an agency for the whole of the Latin American region. The report also pointed out that the governments that participated in the establishment of the Latin American agency should arbitrate legal measures to facilitate it effective support against competition from foreign agencies. Another aspect set out in the conclusions was the promotion of cooperation with other regions, such as Africa and Asia. Heacock (1977:33) felt that these recommendations were circumspect, but even still they attracted criticism, mainly from newspaper and broadcast media owners’ associations and big agencies like UPI.

Towards the middle of March 1976, after the ‘triumph’ of the business positions that involved disassociating Unesco from the conclusions of the Bogota meeting and a few short months before the intergovernmental meeting was to be held in Costa Rica, Heacock said that the press campaign intensified and found a particularly prominent place both in US and Latin American newspapers⁵. Luis Ramiro Beltrán (1993) described this context, saying that the conference was held “under heavy attacks from the mass media”⁷.

**Points the Press Agreed On**

Heacock has observed certain uniformity in the arguments presented by a large part of the press throughout the American continent, something he relates to the fact that the dominant sources of information were identical and had similar interests in preserving the existing conditions of ownership and media flows.

At the heart of the criticisms about Unesco-promoted activities was the link between press freedom and democracy, against which was set, as a threat, Unesco’s supposed desire to protect censorship and government control, using appeals to nationalism and regional solidarity. The UN organisation was presented as an instrument in the hands of forces that aspired to restrict press freedom, fundamentally identified with projects by the Soviet Union in the area of information⁸. Other questions also regularly employed included illegality (of the proposals), corruption and conspiracy.

In November 1976, a few months after the San Jose conference on communication policies was held, the Unesco 19th General Conference, celebrated in Nairobi, agreed to create the Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, which would be headed up by Seán MacBride. The climate in the organisation was one of extreme confrontation. Criticism of the conference on communication policies had not only not died down but had intensified with one of the points on the Nairobi conference agenda. The Soviet Union again presented a proposal,
which it had already raised in 1970, calling for States to take responsibility for the international activity developed by the media that depended on their jurisdiction, which involved a government’s right to rectify information it considered erroneous or tendentious. It was rejected by the Western representatives, who understood it to involve an inadmissible control over the media that entailed a serious risk for the freedom of information.

The work of the Commission led by MacBride was carried out between 1977 and 1979, “under the well-fed fire of the media”, as Luis Ramiro Beltrán (1993) said. During this period, and more specifically during the celebration of the 20th General Conference in 1978, Unesco for the first time incorporated into its resolutions the concept of a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). The Commission’s final report was presented to the director-general in February 1980. As expected, the media that were most radically opposed to the idea of the New Order rejected it. One example of this rejection was shown at the annual assembly of the International Press Institute (IPI), held in Florence in May, where it was the object of criticism by numerous participants.

One World

However, there were also journalistic initiatives afoot in early 1980 that were in line with the idea that defended the need to establish a debate about news and communication flows at the international level. I would here like to mention the experience of the publication of the supplement entitled One World, which was presented with the subtitle Worldwide Supplement for a New World Economic Order. The project saw a number of newspapers pool together, including El País (Spain), Le Monde (France), La Stampa (Italy), Frankfurter Rundschau (Germany), To Vima (Greece), El Mujahid (Algeria), Indian Express (India), Jornal do Brasil (Brazil), Excelsior (Mexico) and Dawn (Pakistan). The consortium was established in 1979 at a meeting called by the newspaper Politika (former Yugoslavia). The stated aim of the supplement was to provide the participating media, particularly those from the Third World and UN organisations, the possibility of publishing their points of view about the new world order. The idea was to contribute to the dialogue needed, through the use of the supplement to establish a “more just, caring and effective economic order”.

The newspaper La Stampa contributed to the supplement with an article assessing the MacBride Report, saying it was the product of a compromise, which was why it both satisfied and disappointed at the same time. It also said it did not offer “clear answers” to the questions involved, but that despite its “shortfalls”, the article concluded that the report was “a great step forward towards better international understanding”.

For its part, the newspaper El País contributed to the supplement with an article about freedom of expression in Spain, in which it explained the tough restrictions imposed during the period of the dictatorship. It used this context to explain why the Spanish press was reticent about any proposal involving state intervention on the issue of information.

“One World is now emerging from the dark tunnel at precisely the moment when the worldwide society is looking at the need for a new information order. Many journalists and news firms in Spain will not be able to avoid a certain fear before some of the forms offered to achieve this just objective. Their experience over forty years under the control and tutelage of the Government tells them that State intervention on the issue of information has always been at the expense of freedom.”

A few months later, shortly before the 21st Unesco General Conference was to be held in Belgrade, where the MacBride Report was to be presented, El País published an editorial with a markedly critical tone about the report and about Unesco. It said the Commission’s report would not only fail to satisfy the expectations that had sprung up around it, but could also easily be used “by people who want to further restrict the few areas and modest ceilings of freedom of expression in the world”. In this editorial, the rejection of any type of State intervention in the field of information was more explicit and emphatic than the reservations that had been expressed in the article published in the One World supplement.

“What causes astonishment around this recommended balance between freedoms and responsibility, between
the rights and needs of individuals, groups and nations' is not the figure of tolerance, equality and solidarity as attributes of society, but the face of the censorial and inquisitorial State that cloaks its material interests and its interests in governing in the guise of the common good”.  

The final paragraph of the editorial echoed other common points among the criticism about Unesco: its politicisation and its bureaucratised nature.

“In short, the MacBride Report appears to be a major undertaking and a worrying reality. It is a shame that something designed in principle to raise the ceilings of freedom and mankind’s cultural development, such as Unesco, has ended up being a forum of political interests and pressures that seeks to guarantee whatever regimes that exist and keep the world’s high-ranking civil servants in their jobs”.

Distrust Towards the IPDC

After the Report was ratified by the General Conference, Le Monde published an editorial arguing that, because it had been ratified by consensus and without voting, the delegates to the Belgrade General Conference had accepted “a compromise full of misunderstanding” that had tried to bring the debate to an end.

Frequently, however, the criticism simplified and distorted the content of the Report to the point of tagging it part of a policy to limit freedom of information and, therefore, democracy itself. The reactions against it, in the form of news articles and editorials, emphasised the international press’s distrust towards the document and focused on the hypothetical restrictions of press freedom that its application would involve. For example, The New York Times said that “nations that respect the freedom of communication do not need the declarations or protections” and opposed any attempt to create an “international system of supervision”, alleging that private news media in the US would not accept it from their own government.

The suspicion with which Unesco’s initiatives were seen reached the point that the IPI even received with concern the agreement to start up the International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC), the product of a Western proposal and which, in fact, was an attempt to depoliticise Unesco by promoting a non-ideological line of action of an eminently technical nature.

The way the North American media covered the Belgrade General Conference was analysed by the National News Council (NNC), an independent US organisation created in 1973 to try to serve the public interest in the preservation of the freedom of communication and to promote good journalistic practices. The balance of the NNC report was critical of the North American press. The first thing the study said was that 80% of the news stories had come from the AP and UPI agencies. From the point of view of contents, it felt that attention had been overwhelmingly concentrated on issues relating to communication, without mentioning basic Unesco activities like the fight against illiteracy or the protection of historical monuments. In the analysis of the editorial articles dedicated to Unesco’s policy in relation to the worldwide circulation of information, it said that most (158 of 181) were very hostile and that a significant part (27, or nearly 15%) defended the US’s withdrawal from the organisation. Another aspect it mentioned was the pre-eminence of the perspective of the Western media, which was not contrasted with other points of view.

The Talloires Declaration

The coordination of the positions criticising Unesco was shown at a meeting held in Talloires (France) from 15 to 17 May 1981 under the title “Voices of Freedom”. The meeting brought together 63 representatives of communication companies (publishers, editors, journalists) from 21 countries, under the auspices of the World Press Freedom Committee. The agreements from the meeting were brought together in the Talloires Declaration, explicitly presented as a response by the ‘free world’ media to the formulation of the New World Information and Communication Order, considered the product of a campaign by the Soviet block and certain Third World countries to award Unesco the authority to outline the course of the media. The Declaration was a 10-point plan of principles for the so-called ‘free press’ to follow. The unanimously adopted agreements included a call to Unesco...
to abandon any attempt to regulate the press. It also called on the UN organisation to concentrate on applying ‘practical solutions’ for advancing the media of the Third World. The signatories to the declaration in turn agreed to expand the free flow of information at the international level and support the efforts of international organisations, governments and private agencies in cooperating with the Third World to improve its means of production and training.

Just a few days after the Talloires meeting, 300 publishers met in Madrid, at the 34th Congress of the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers (FIEJ), and declared their opposition to the NWICO proposals formulated at the Belgrade General Conference. The reasons set out were in line with the arguments made earlier at Talloires. For example, they insisted on the idea that Unesco neither respected the Western concept of press freedom, because it facilitated State interventionism in journalistic matters, nor helped the development of the media in developing countries. In a statement delivered at the congress, the director-general of Time Newspapers even raised the possibility of the ‘free countries’ abandoning Unesco, and called on the FIEJ to look into Unesco’s ‘real activities’.

The reaction of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries came in the same month of May 1981, at an intergovernmental meeting for the coordination of information, celebrated in Georgetown (Guiana), where they expressed their “complete support for Unesco activities concerning the promotion of the New World Order” and rejected “the destabilisation campaign promoted by the transnational centres of power against the international organisation” (Nordenstreng, Gonzales and Weinwächter 1986, 37).

The principles of the Talloires Declaration (1981) were reaffirmed at a new meeting of press representatives held in the same French city between 30 September and 2 October 1983. The participants at this congress denounced, among other matters, the proposals aimed at defining a right to communicate (they considered it a restriction of a universal right), governmental or intergovernmental measures to promote democratisation and participation in communication (they considered they threatened the press and were unnecessary if there was already a multiplicity of sources) and the imposition of codes of conduct.

In contrast, the Talloires conference of 1983 responded positively to a declaration contained in a resolution adopted at the Unesco Extraordinary General Conference of December 1982, which said that, “the media could make an important contribution by scrutinising all the actions that tend to produce abuses of power”. It was interpreted that this declaration recognised “the positive contribution the independent press can make to the protection of individual freedoms and the strengthening of a free society”.

In relation to national communication policies, the conference attendees did not reject them, so long as they were linked to promoting the development of private and independent media, and advised international organisations to follow this guideline in their work helping developing countries.

The conclusions to the meeting also included a recommendation on the tone of the international debate about communication:

“International debates about communication should stop with their recrimination, repression and pessimism. We are currently in the middle of an unprecedented development of all forms of communication, which benefits both those who are close and those who are far away, both poor and prosperous nations”.

**The Testimony of a Debate Among the Deaf**

Henri Pigeat, president of Agence France Press (AFP) from 1979 to 1986, was one of the people who attended the Talloires meetings. His testimony about the 1983 event was set out in a work whose title was itself a declaration of principles: *Le Noveau Désordre Mondial de l’Information* (‘The New World Information Disorder’). In it, he said the debate in Unesco between freedom of information and the demands of the Third World was “the perfect example of a debate among the deaf, certainly aggravated by the fiery temperament of its director-general” (Pigeat 1987, 216). According to Pigeat, two debates (one explicit and the other hidden) were superimposed at Unesco. The former involved an analysis of the causes for the debility of the Third World media and the reasons that stopped their voices from being properly heard. The latter, the essential debate, underlined the former and affected the very concept of information. Pigeat’s argument held that, as the majority of the Third
World media were government-owned, either for political or economic reasons, they involved a concept of information that advocated government control of the press. This meant that political leaders could determine particular goals for the media, e.g., to favour development. The next step in the reasoning of the Third World countries, according to Pigeat, was to think that the international media should not oppose the development tasks to which the Third World media were committed, thus justifying the adoption of measures to prevent occasional damage on the part of the international media, particularly the news agencies.

Le débat est ainsi très vite devenu une attaque en règle contre les agences mondiales, accusées tout à la fois d'empêcher le développement des agences locales et de nuire aux pays en voie de développement. Pigeat (1987, 220).

However, Pigeat's argument went beyond a simple attack on press freedom. In his opinion, the debate was not just political, but philosophical. What was at play was the questioning, in the name of development, of a series of values that constituted the basis of individual autonomy, which could affect Western democracies.

Le débat international sur l'information est donc un révélateur de l'affaiblissement de l'idée de liberté de la presse mais aussi de la valeur de l'esprit critique. C'est à cet égard qu'il est le plus pervers, au sens où il s'agit d'un empoissonnement sournois des idées et des principes. Le poison a déjà commence son œuvre et j'ai parfois pu constater que le débat sur l'information n'était pas sans écho en Europe ou en Amérique et fournissait des arguments à ceux qui, d'une manière ou d'une autre, voulaient contrôler les médias.


A Foretold Decision

In Pigeat's opinion, it was the debate about the international flow of information which led the US and later the UK to leave Unesco, not issues about funding or personal matters. However, the journalistic criticism that prepared the ground for the US to walk out of the organisation focused particularly on emphasising its bureaucratisation and exaggerated arguments against its director-general, who was held responsible for the climate of confrontation. Just a few days before the official announcement from the Reagan administration that the US would withdraw from Unesco, The New York Times published an editorial which decided that “a US withdrawal would not hurt any democratic cause or international understanding” and even said that, if properly explained, it could promote scientific and cultural values.

The US's withdrawal was announced in December 1983 and took effect one year later. Edward S. Herman (1989, 238) says that Unesco had roused little press interest before this announcement and that once the US and UK's exit were over, the organisation would again warrant scant attention. However, in the period between the official announcement and the withdrawal, the number of news stories intensified and focused particularly on the supposed situation of waste and corruption within the organisation.

Anthony Giffard (1989) – who analysed the terms in which the US media were positioned with regard to Unesco between 1983 and 1987 – says that the press established symbiotic relations with the State Department and particular interest groups to create a climate of public acceptance of the US's position in relation to Unesco. The image the press projected about the organisation was overwhelmingly negative, he said. Furthermore, in the way the debate was treated by the US media, there was a tendency to ignore the international context, e.g., the position of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in relation to press freedom and the rights of communication, which may have been able to offer different perspectives of interpretation. Giffard said the reason for this belligerence was that the proposal of a New World Information and Communication Order was perceived as a threat to US interests. With a broader perspective, however, the reasons should be sought in the difficulties the US and other Western countries had in adapting to the effects of a process of decolonisation which had seen the emergence of new voices in a forum aimed at international debate, like Unesco.
Notes

1 In the preparation of this text I was aided by a collection of press articles from the crucial years of the debate about the New World Information and Communication Order, kindly provided by Manuel Parés and Miquel de Moragas, whom I would like to take this opportunity to thank.

2 Preface to the work by Preston, Herman and Schiller (1989).

3 Heacock's work was initially done upon the request of civil servants from the international organisation itself, although it was sponsored by the Graduate Institute of International Studies, based in Geneva. A first draft was presented at the 19th Unesco General Conference in Nairobi (October-November 1976), but, according to Heacock, Unesco showed little interest in the report as it was, at the time, under pressure from the US and was trying to win over Western critics and "moderate the conflict" (Heacock 1977, 6).

4 The National College of Journalists of Venezuela approved a document supporting the San Jose conference.

5 From January 1974 it was Senegal's Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow.

6 The author says that the harshest criticisms with regard to Unesco's roles were made by the Latin American press before the San Jose conference. Once the conference had ended, the criticism became more moderate, although it was broadly disseminated by US media outlets. Heacock feels that this turnaround in the attitude of the Latin American press may have been produced as a result of regional governments' public positions in favour of national communication policies.

7 The result of the meeting was a declaration "equivalent to a creed to the democratisation of communication" said Beltrán (1993). Around 30 recommendations were also approved with the aim of getting each country to apply the policy most appropriate to its circumstances.

8 The argument did not analyse the correlation of forces that existed within the organisation, which did stay out of the emergence of the Non-Aligned Countries in the international order, often supported by the Soviet block. In fact, as Heacock (1977, 52) said, Unesco's role was distorted, as it was presented as an actor with a specific role and not a debate forum in which decisions were made using democratic procedures, either by majority vote or consensus.

9 The British daily The Observer published an article entitled "Unesco's Original Sin" the same week as the 20th General Conference was held, criticising the dialogue process promoted by Unesco and, more particularly, the MacBride Commission, on key concepts about communication, such as the freedom of information: "Countries where the Government controls the press, and countries where the Government does not control it, cannot share a common code of values, or issue valid common declarations, on the subject of freedom of information. Obviously, it suits governments that control their own press to pretend publicly that they are champions of freedom of information" (The Observer, 22 October 1978).

10 El País, 8 May 1980. A few months later, the same newspaper published comments made by the president of IPI saying that the MacBride Report contravened press freedom because it favoured government intervention (El País, 24 January 1981). It also later published an interview with the Unesco director-general in which the latter accused the IPI of being systematically against Unesco and of attributing to it "false points of views and attitudes" (El País, 8 March 1981).

11 Among others, the supplement was published by Le Monde on 28 March 1980 and by El País on 4 April.

12 El País, 4 April 1980. "One World" Supplement, III.

13 At this General Conference, held in October 1980, not only was the Report accepted by consensus, but a resolution was approved establishing the bases of the New World Information and Communication Order, and the director-general's mandate was renewed until 1987.


16 A good example was the article by the North American journalist Paul Chutkow (who attended by Belgrade conference as a correspondent for AP) that *La Vanguardia* published in two parts under the title “Challenge to the West” (Desafío a Occidente). The article mentioned the possibility that some Western governments might re-assess their participation in the international organisation (*La Vanguardia*, 18 and 19 March 1981; previously published in *L'Express*, 7 and 8 March). He also put his name to an article published in the *International Herald Tribune* on 22 October 1980 which said that William Harley, head of the US national commission secretariat for Unesco, had presented a statement at the 21st General Conference which represented an attack on Unesco’s official representatives and announced a future confrontation between the West and a coalition of communist and Third World countries. However, *Le Monde* (18 March 1981, p. 42) reported Harley’s surprise at this version of his report, in which he had indicated his support for Unesco general-director M’Bow’s proposals.

17 27 October 1980.

18 The NNC was not able to impose penalties. It worked for a period of 10 years. Although it found support among some large companies, such as CBS, overall the media did not support it very much and some influential journalists even spoke out against its existence, either because they considered it a superfluous organisation or because they thought it constrained press freedom. For a reflection on the NNC, see Mike Wallace's article “Why My Mind Has Changed about the Value of a National News Council” online at [http://www.news-council.org/articles/95wal.html](http://www.news-council.org/articles/95wal.html).


20 The Committee, created in 1976, brought together the North American Newspapers Association, the AP and UPI agencies, and the International Federation of Journalists.


22 Edward S. Herman says that, in the discourse about the mass media, the free press is implicitly or explicitly in private hands, financed mainly by advertising and not subject to government control or any other type of compulsory regulations about social responsibility. Edward S. Herman (1989). “U.S. Mass Media Coverage of the U.S. Withdrawal from Unesco”. In: Preston, Herman and Schiller.

23 *El País* and *Avui*, 26 May 1981.

24 The event was entitled “Voices of Freedom 83: Free Press, Free People” and it was organised by the International Press Institute as well as the World Committee on Press Freedom. See “Voces de Libertad 83: prensa libre, pueblo libre”. Final document of the Talloires meeting. *Cuadernos de Información*, no. 1 / 1984. Faculty of Communications. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile ([www.uc.cl/fcom/p4_fcom/site/artic/20041217/pags/20041217164740.html](http://www.uc.cl/fcom/p4_fcom/site/artic/20041217/pags/20041217164740.html)).

25 Pigeat later worked with Unesco, forming part of the consultative committee for the *World Communication and Information Report 1999-2000*.

26 Although opposed to the reform proposals that came from the less developed countries, Pigeat (1987, 221) has highlighted the predisposition of the news agencies to participate in development programmes in favour of Third World countries. In particular, he says that AFP provided aid in the creation of agencies in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, which included the intervention of Unesco.

27 16 December 1983.

28 José Maria Carrascal, writing in the conservative daily *ABC* (30 December 1983, p. 31), said the *New York Times* article was the trigger for the US’s withdrawal from Unesco because “the Reagan Administration could not allow the *The New York Times*
Bibliography


HEACOCK, ROGER. Unesco and the Media. Ginebra: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, 1977


