

Contextualized Measures of Public Service Motivation: the Case of Spain

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Introduction

The discussion concerning the motives that induce individuals to choose to work for the community and to perform a public or social service (Brewer and Selden 1998; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999; Vandenabeele 2007) has attracted a lot of attention among public management scholars and created a growing international research subarea on public service motivation (PSM). However, early studies already warned that PSM is a value-laden concept and that some values may be more important in some countries than in others, questioning the appropriateness of applying the same concept, items and dimensions to measure PSM across countries (Norris 2003; Vandenabeele and van de Walle 2008). The issue of the cultural differences is an important one, not only because the literal translation of some of the items used to measure PSM may sound differently to the ears of public and non public employees in different countries, but because the ideas of “helping others” and “doing good for others and society” might be interpreted differently in countries with different views on the roles of the state, the private sector or civil society.

Since the initial PSM concept and measures were developed in the US, various studies measuring PSM in different countries have raised concerns relating to some of the items and dimensions of the construct (Coursey and Pandey 2007; Vandenabeele 2008, Giaque *et al.* 2011, Kim *et al.* 2012). Research has followed a rather conservative approach building on Perry’s PSM dimensions and items to measure PSM (Perry 1996) with two different orientations: in one case, a group of scholars from twelve countries tried to develop and test a revised measurement instrument for PSM (Kim *et al.* 2012); in other cases, researchers have tried to supplement the four original dimensions of the original construct with a fifth dimension to capture the prevailing values in the public service regime of the specific country (Vandenabeele 2008; Giaque *et al.* 2011) sometimes omitting one dimension or combining two dimensions and creating a new one (Castaing 2006; Taylor 2007; Coursey and Pandey 2007, Coursey *et al.* 2008).

In this paper we follow this second orientation, combining two of the four original dimensions and creating a new dimension with the aim of creating a culturally-specific supplement. In order to do so, we only consider public employees in the upper ranks of the administration who have chosen to make their professional career in the public sector and we focus on public values as we understand that one dimension of PSM should concentrate on public values that are influenced by the administrative tradition, a concept that takes into account the state vision and work values. The results suggest that

it is possible to adapt the concept and measurement instrument of PSM to each specific case by taking into account specific public values. This is important as it confirms that modified measures provide a better empirical foundation for the measurement of PSM. At the same time, it confirms the difficulty to make comparisons of PSM across countries. We hope that this paper is a starting point for the study of PSM in Spain and a contribution to the study of PSM in groups of countries with similar political and administrative traditions.

Pursuing the measurement of PSM

The most commonly used definition of PSM was proposed by Perry and Wise in 1990 as “an individual’s predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions“(Perry and Wise 1990, 368). There are many other definitions of PSM but only a few refer explicitly to beliefs and values. According to Vandenabeele, the foundation of PSM is the “beliefs and values that transcend self and organizational interests on behalf of a larger political entity” (Vandenabeele 2007, 547). This is particularly interesting since beliefs and values connect the individual with the political and administrative environment and culture. With regard to the measurement of PSM, the majority of PSM studies use some variation of Perry’s dimensions: “attraction to policy making”, “commitment to the public interest”, “compassion” and “self-sacrifice” (Perry 1996). This is the main model that has been used to measure PSM even though there is an ongoing discussion on the number of dimensions and the convenience to redefine those dimensions.

According to the original conceptualization by Perry and Wise (1990), PSM reflects three categories of motives: rational, norm-based and affective. Rational motives are present when individuals want to participate in policy making to pursue their political agenda or when individuals commit to a public program because they personally identify with it. Norm-based motives are generated by a desire to pursue the public interest, and they include a sense of patriotism, civic duty or loyalty to the government. Finally, affective motives refer to behavior motivated by emotional responses to different social contexts and are characterized by a desire to help others.

This initial conceptualization of PSM received several critiques. Some scholars argued that “rational” motives may include self-interested motives or some other form of individual gain or advancement of special or private interests (Wise 2000; Wright and Pandey 2008). They also argued that “normative” and “affective” motives could overlap (Wright and Pandey 2008) or that the items of compassion do not always represent affective motives (Moynihan and Pandey 2007; Wright, 2008). Others found in their empirical analysis that “commitment to the public interest” and “self-sacrifice” could be reduced to one dimension (Castaing 2006; Taylor 2007), while others argued that “attraction to policy making” captures two attitudes that may not align with each other: attraction to policy making and attraction to politics, and therefore results could express

dissatisfaction with politicians rather than a low interest in public policy-making (Coursey and Pandey 2007, Coursey *et al.* 2008).

In this regard, the most complete revision of the original motives proposed a distinction among “instrumental” motives, “value based” motives and “identification” motives (Kim and Vandenberg 2010). “Instrumental” motives refer to the methods used to perform a meaningful public service such as working in the public sector and participating in the policy making process. “Value based” motives concern the public values that individuals seek to promote, and “identification” motives are related to the people that public employees identify with because of their situation of vulnerability. On the basis of this distinction, Kim *et al.* (2012) conceive PSM as a four dimensional construct with self-sacrifice as “the foundational concept representing the altruistic or pro-social origins of PSM” and three other dimensions that they rename “Attraction to Public Participation”, “Commitment to Public Values”, and “Compassion”. According to this distinction, the project proposes new items that represent those motives.

This new conceptualization of PSM is better designed to capture self-sacrifice, affective commitment, and the idea of pursuing certain public values: equity, concern for future generations, accountability and ethics. It also excludes the idea of attraction to politics to concentrate on participation in policy making and other activities that contribute to the community and society. However, it brings together in one dimension items related to public participation and commitment to public interest sacrificing in this case part of the homogeneity of indicators that was achieved in the other three dimensions. In its effort to select items that are meaningful across various national contexts, this new conceptual structure does not include items that reflect the particular regime of civil servants or other public service employees in one country.

The measurement of PSM in one specific country

There are now many studies of PSM in countries other than the US. Empirical studies have looked at PSM in Belgium (Vandenberg *et al.* 2004), France (Castaing 2006), Malta (Camilleri 2006), Italy (Cerase and Farinella 2006), Australia (Taylor 2007), the Netherlands (Steijn 2008), Switzerland (Ritz 2009), South Korea (Kim 2009), China (Liu, Tang and Zhu 2008), Germany (Ritz and Waldner 2011) and Switzerland (Giauque *et al.* 2011). Various US studies have tested models that left out one of the dimensions (Coursey and Pandey 2007, Coursey *et al.* 2008) or created a new dimension combining items from two original dimensions (Moynihan and Pandey 2007).

In the European context, most researchers have focused on administrative values to explore a complimentary dimension of PSM that is culturally contingent and that reflects the values of public service. The first study to attempt that research strategy tested a fifth dimension labeled “democratic governance” that was based on public administration work values (Vandenberg 2008). Another study based on Denmark

focused on “support for a universal welfare state” to identify the relevant public values and develop a new PSM dimension (Hansen 2009). A somewhat different strategy was taken by a more recent study that established the Swiss specificities of the PSM concept from four constitutional principles (Girauque *et al.* 2011).

These specific studies are based on the idea that institutions and their measurement may differ across cultures and need to be adapted, an idea that is developed in the work by (Girauque *et al.* 2011). From this perspective, public service is also an institution based on values and behaviors that are culturally contingent and, therefore, the theoretical construct and measurement of PSM should also be culturally specific. The question is to identify the nationally pertinent public service values, select items that reflect those values and test whether the contextualized dimension of PSM enhances the validity of the construct.

Relation with the administrative tradition

According to Peters (2008), the concept of administrative tradition goes beyond the concepts of political culture or administrative culture to refer to the ideas that the elite may have about the role of public administrations, public policies and the relations between state and society. “By administrative tradition we mean an historically based set of values, structures and relationships with other institutions that defines the nature of appropriate public administration within a society” (Peters 2008:118)

One major administrative tradition is the “Napoleonic tradition” which is based in the public sector model developed by Napoleon I in France, later developed and spread throughout other countries, particularly in Southern Europe. From this perspective it can be stated that countries like Italy, Portugal or Spain have the same “administrative DNA” as France and adopted the same vision, ideas and beliefs with respect to the role of public administrations. Peters (2008) provides a framework of seven dimensions to understand administrative traditions that can be applied to the Napoleonic tradition and to the Spanish case. The two first ones are more important while the other five can be seen as consequences of the first two.

The first dimension is the relationship between the state and the society. In the Napoleonic tradition this relationship is viewed as an “organic” relation more than a “contractual” one (Peters 2008). High civil servants in Napoleonic countries should share this “state centric” conception that sees the state as the means of integrating society. Closely related with that dimension is the importance given to the values of “equality” and “uniformity”. The idea that citizens should be treated “fairly and equally” is probably a defining element of any good public administration in a democratic regime (Peters 2008). The idea of uniformity in administration is more related to the state centric view that sees the state as the instrument that is necessary to build a cohesive and integrated political system.

The second dimension refers to the nature of administrative work. In the Napoleonic tradition, the idea is that “good administration” is seen as employing the law effectively to achieve public purposes (Peters 2008). Accordingly, accountability is formal and legalistic, controls are exercised ex ante and civil servants must gain approval before making decisions and implementing them. A consequence of this conception affects the relationship between politicians and civil servants. In the Napoleonic tradition, civil servants are not expected to be politically active or committed. On the contrary, they are expected to be loyal but autonomous from politics in their administration of the law. This conception of civil service as being neutral has limits since in all administrative systems there is a point of contact with political leaders (Peters 2008). Another consequence is that in the Napoleonic view, administrative and political careers are supposed to be separate and the civil service career is viewed as distinct from the private career. From this perspective, civil servants tend to remain in administrative positions for their entire working life. Mobility within the public sector is the exception and if they move to the private sector it is for a limited period of time and they are expected to return to the public sector (Peters 2008).

Spanish public administration and the Napoleonic tradition

Many of the basic traits of the Spanish public administration were taken from France starting with the Napoleonic invasion in the beginning of the nineteenth century. French troops were expelled but the intellectual links with the French elites, their ideas and beliefs influenced Spain during most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Parrado 2008). The Spanish state was built following the French model of a centralized state in which the uniformity in the implementation of the law was assured by a provincial administration. However, since the transition to democracy in 1978, Spain changed considerably. The federalization process, the entry in the EU and in the European Monetary Union and the expansion of the welfare state contributed to expand the number of public administrations, their volume and the way they deliver public services.

In parallel, various governments adopted several administrative reforms over the last thirty years with varying degrees of success (Parrado 2008). The main reforms affected financial management, budgeting and auditing in the eighties; the privatization of public enterprises, also in the eighties; the rationalization of public entities and the provincial administration in the nineties; the introduction of quality management and the transformation of the tax administration and the social security administration, also in the nineties; the reform of the legislative framework regulating local government in 2006 and again in 2014 with the focus on efficiency in the provision of local services; finally, the reform of the legislative framework creating a number of public agencies with aim to promote contracts and management by results in 2011.

The concept of administrative tradition provides a sense of “stability” but it does not mean public administrations cannot change over time particularly with relation to the

administrative workload produced by contextual changes. Spain is very much influenced by the EU and the OECD. Besides, the economic and financial crisis starting in 2008 has put an enormous pressure to improve efficiency and reduce public expenditures. However, along all those years, the basic rhetoric of the administration has not changed because the civil service regime has been maintained with a mixture of tenured functionaries and employees contracted under regular labor law (Gallego 2003), and the system continues to work through administrative law as a separate body regulating public activities and the relations between private citizens and public administrations.

A fifth PSM dimension, administrative tradition and public values

As said before, in order to build a fifth PSM dimension the question is to identify the pertinent public sector values. Previous research on public values has produced various typologies. In the US, Selden, Brewer and Brudney (1999) defined five profiles of public administrators depending on whether they were interested in the definition of public policies, efficiency, neutrality and administrative procedure, social equity or they were pragmatists giving priority to getting things done over other values. Kim et al. (2012) created a new dimension of PSM including public values that were selected by an international group of researchers. Before that, Vandenabeele (2008) tested values related with equality (neutrality and objectivity), values that he understood were related with public bureaucracies in general, and values that reflected a customer orientation. On the other hand, Hansen (2009) selected values that were related to the Danish welfare state and Girauque et al. (2011) values that they found in the Swiss constitution.

Our strategy to build a supplementary PSM dimension was to follow the literature including similar values. At the same time, we tried to adjust our selection to the characteristics of the Napoleonic administrative tradition as described by Peters and applied to the Spanish case. We chose values from a survey including forty questions related to public values and we grouped values with a motivational potential in four groups. The first group of values we tested as a supplementary PSM dimension was related to the idea of the state as a means to achieve higher levels for “equity”, “social justice”, “efficiency” and various combinations of those values. The second group was related to the idea that the “good administration” in the Napoleonic tradition means “employing the law effectively” and acting with “neutrality” and “objectivity”. The third group captured one aspect of the relationship between politicians and civil servants that is characteristic of the Napoleonic tradition: the idea of political loyalty and civil servants perceiving their role as implementing the decisions taken by the political level. The fourth and last group we tested is related with the same idea, but expressed in opposite terms to what is characteristic of the Napoleonic tradition, that is, high civil servants should be proactive, advance their own program, mobilize support, and act according to their initiative. We understand these four groups of values cover the state centric conception and the specific characteristics of the administrative work in the

Napoleonic tradition that can be summarized with the ideas of giving priority to the law and acting with political loyalty.

Therefore, we tested four models, supplementing the original measurement of PSM with each of the four potential additional dimensions. We tested other possibilities such as collapsing in a single supplementary dimension various combinations of values that could be representative of different aspects of the Napoleonic tradition. We also attempted a different strategy to contextualize the original dimensions of PSM adding items to the “attraction to policy making” dimension, and to the “commitment to the public interest” dimension. Finally, we also tested whether the PSM measurement model was performing better combining in one dimension the three items of the “commitment to the public interest” and the single item of “self-sacrifice”.

According to the previous discussion, our main hypothesis was:

H1. The original measurement of PSM will improve with a new dimension including values that are representative of the administrative tradition

More specifically, the analysis contrasted three aspects of the Spanish administrative tradition (having a state centric conception, the belief that administrative work is employing the law effectively and acting with neutrality and objectivity, and being career neutral but loyal to the political level) and one aspect that is more characteristic of the new public management to test whether the values have changed (being politically proactive or favoring a committed public service).

Data

This research is based on a survey to a sample of high-ranking civil servants working for the Spanish central government. The survey was administered face to face during the months of April and May of 2009 by a group of seven postgraduate students who were coordinated by a professional pollster to a sample of high-ranking civil servants belonging to the group “A” (group “A” requires a university degree, the sample only included civil servants in the six uppermost levels, 25 to 30). Since a list with all the individuals in the population was not available, survey data was obtained using a two stage non-proportional stratified random sample. The study defined two strata with the same number of interviews, one composed of high-level civil servants from ministries and the other one with civil servants from other public entities (autonomous organisms, social security entities, agencies and corporations).

In the initial sample there were 54 primary (organizational units) and 400 secondary sampling units (civil servants). Organizations included agencies that can be considered “administrative”, “managerial” and “results-oriented” including the sixteen ministries, the social security administration, employment services, the Post Office, social services

for older people, traffic administration, the national institute of statistics, the sports council, among others. The final sample size was 423. Specific instructions were given to the surveyors about how to introduce themselves, conduct the survey and proceed when they failed to contact a respondent. Some administrators did not initially cooperate to make the random selection in their organizational unit and in the end the total number of interviews was higher than 400 due to last minute permission to proceed with the survey.

The characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 1. As explained, it was decided to have the same number of high-level civil servants from ministries and from other public entities. In the final count, the non-ministry stratum was slightly overrepresented (56% against 44%) over the ministry stratum. Respondents did not significantly differ from the general population in terms of sex or rank. Those are the two characteristics that were used to select employees within each organization.

Table 1 about here

Method

Various three and four dimensional models of PSM were tested with confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), using three items for each dimension except for “commitment to the public interest” that included four items when the single indicator of “self-sacrifice” was added. The design did not allow factors to load on multiple items, restrained factor variances to 1 and permitted the factors to correlate among each other. The models were estimated by LISREL using Diagonally Weighted Least Squares (DWLS) and robust standard errors in order to take into account the lack of multivariate normality in the data (Satorra and Bentler 1994).

Regarding the items used for estimate the PSM latent dimensions, the survey questionnaire included nine items from Perry’s measurement instrument and forty questions on public values. Obviously it would have been better to have a 24-item scale for measuring a four-dimension PSM and to add a fifth dimension. However, many PSM studies have used many fewer than 24 items and it is quite common to use models with just five items (Alonso and Lewis 2001; Brewer, Selden and Facer 2000; Kim, 2005; Pandey, Wright, and Moynihan, 2008; Wright and Pandey, 2008; Christensen and Wright, 2011). Some scholars have also justified a shortened scale or a three-dimensional PSM construct on the basis of practicalities as they consider that a 24-item scale is too long for inclusion in a typical public administration questionnaire (Coursey & Pandey 2007).

There were no data limitations with regard to the two first dimensions of PSM. The only observation relating to the first dimension was the non literal translation of “Politics is a dirty word” for “Politics is necessary for the welfare of society” as the original

expression did not seem fit to the administrative context and Spanish language. However, the survey only provided two items to measure “compassion” and one item to measure “self-sacrifice”. Since the survey included one item that could be integrated in the compassion dimension (“I worry about the welfare of the most disadvantaged”) it was used to improve the measure of “compassion”. With regard to “self-sacrifice”, it was possible to exclude the dimension, a possibility already mentioned by Perry (1996) that later studies confirmed (Vandenabeele 2008), arguing that “self-sacrifice” was highly correlated with the “Commitment to the public interest” dimension, that three and four dimensional models of PSM had quite similar measures of overall goodness of fit and that the model with three dimensions fit the three-dimensional psychological model of rational (attraction to policy making), norm-based (commitment to public interest) and affective motives (compassion). Before excluding the “self-sacrifice” item from Perry’s original instrument, it seemed reasonable to test the possibility of a combined dimension with the three items of the “Commitment to the public interest” dimension and one from “self-sacrifice”.

Therefore, the survey did provide enough items to obtain a good estimation of PSM using either three dimensions (“attraction to policy making”, “commitment to the public interest” or “commitment to the public interest” combined with the “the self-sacrifice” item and “compassion”) or four dimensions, given the possibility to test a contextualized dimension based upon the public values that, as discussed in the previous sections, are representative of the administrative tradition. The 13 items used in the analysis and their translation into Spanish are presented in Table 2.

Table 2 about here

Results

The model supplementing the original measurement of PSM with administrative work values representing the idea of political loyalty of civil servants (as opposed to a model of proactive civil servant that is committed and involved in politics) performed better than any other model that was tested. This model also combined in one dimension the three items of the “commitment to the public interest” and the single item of “self-sacrifice”. This result leads us to accept hypothesis H1 and, therefore, to state that the original measurement of PSM improves with a fourth dimension including values that are representative of one aspect of the administrative tradition: the hierarchical relations between the technical and political levels but clear separation of responsibilities. Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of both, the initial three dimensional model (Model 1) and the four dimensional model including the political loyalty - administrative work values (Model 2).

Table 3 about here

The first part of the table displays the standardized lambda coefficients, the robust standard errors and the corresponding R^2 . At a glance we observe that in both models all the parameters except one are significant and have the expected sign. The values of standardized lambda coefficients represent how well each indicator measures the latent dimension. For each factor there is a minimum of one indicator with a lambda value higher than 0.7, except for “Commitment to Public Interest” for which the bigger lambda is 0.66 and there are only two factor loadings less than 0.4. This fact along with the significance of the estimates and the correctness of their signs confirms the validity of the items as indicators of the four dimensions. The R^2 are the proportions of each indicator variance accounted by the model. In both models they range from 0.09 to 0.67 telling us that not all items are equally reliable indicators of the latent dimensions. A simplified version of both models excluding Q9 – the only variable that is not significant - were also estimated. The results did not improve and the Modification Index had quite high values compared to models including Q9.

The second part of Table 3 shows the composite reliabilities (CR) for the four dimensions of PSM. Composite reliability assesses the internal consistency of a measure (Fornell and Larcker, 1981) and is a better measure than the widely used Cronbach Alpha that usually underestimates the true reliability (Hair et al., 1998)¹. Cut-off values for CR are the same than for Cronbach Alpha, being values between 0.6 and 0.7 considered acceptable (Hair et al., 1998).

The third part of the same table shows the interfactor correlations as well as its robust standard errors. Only one in the three-dimensional model and two in the four-dimensional model are significant, which demonstrates the discriminant validity of the model. The high correlation estimated between the second and the third factors might indicate that the dimensions, “commitment to public interest” and “compassion” respond to motives that people often have simultaneously.

Comparing the fit statistics of the two models, as presented in Table 4, they both indicate good model fit. The robust Satorra-Bentler Chi-Square statistic is extremely low and, consequently, non-significant. This means that no significant differences between the data and the model were found. The Root Mean Error of Approximation (RMSEA) -the best measure of absolute fit according to Coursey and Pandey (2007) - is near zero, the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR) is below the 0.08 threshold and the Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), the Normed Fit Index (NFI) and the Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) take values

¹ It would be preferable to report Raykov’s rho as a measure of composite reliability but the software used does not provide this statistic.

about 0.98 or higher. Finally, all the Modification Indices were zero or negligible. The maximum Modification indexes were 2.36 in Model 1 and 2.56 in model 2.

Finally, a scaled difference Chi-square test for comparison of nested models (Bryant & Satorra, 2012) was also performed with a non-significant result, telling us that the four-factors model fits the data as well as does the three-factors model². The test was unable to detect significant differences in fit between the two models. However, taking into account all the measures of fit presented in table 4 - and not just the scaled difference Chi-square test – it can be seen that two of the measures, SRMR and AGFI, have better values in model 2 than in model 1 and that the value of RMSEA - a measure that accounts for model complexity (Hair et al., 2006) – is nearly zero not only in Model 1 but also in Model 2. Therefore, it can be concluded that although both models for PSM fit the data the four-dimensional model fits the data slightly better.

Table 4 about here

Discussion

The analysis tested various combinations of public values to observe how they affect the factorial structure of PSM and determine whether there are additional dimensions to the original model that can be used to increase its validity. The main reason for this type of analysis was the concern often expressed in the literature (Vandenabeele 2008; Hansen 2009; Girauque *et al.* 2011) that the original model developed for the United States needed to be contextualized before measurement in each country to take into account the differences in administrative tradition.

The final model includes three of the classic dimensions and one supplementary dimension with the aim to capture one aspect of the administrative tradition affecting the provision of public services. This result is in line with previous research showing that culture-specific public values should be included as a dimension. Logically, the specific values that worked in the Spanish case are different from those that worked for Denmark or Switzerland (Hansen 2009; Girauque *et al.* 2011). They should be closer to the values in Southern European countries given the common influence of the French model in the development of their public administrations (Vandenabeele 2008). However, the contextualization strategy used specific items and, thus, the need for more coordinated research at the European level to use similar items and see the similarities between countries with similar administrative cultures.

With regard to the research strategy consisting of keeping the classical four dimensions and trying to contextualize them one by one by adding new items, our experience is that it is not a good strategy because the dimensions lose homogeneity and the results are worse. On the contrary, in the case of the “attraction to policy making” dimension,

² The original scaled NTWLS difference test is 2.40 with 27 degrees of freedom.

previous research already indicated the need to treat separately the “politics” and the “policy” aspects (Camilleri 2006; Coursey and Pandey 2007; Coursey et al. 2008; Ritz 2011). Our analysis also indicates the need to treat separately the “attraction to politics” one person may feel, the perception on how the “relations between professionals and politicians” should be and the interest to participate in the various stages of policy development.

Finally, although the data did not provide enough items to measure the “self-sacrifice” dimension, the final model with the three items of the “commitment to the public interest” and the single item of “self-sacrifice” combined in one dimension performed well. This is not an argument to reject the “self-sacrifice” dimension but it shows that it is possible to use different scales of PSM and thus the need to adapt it to each specific context. There is also an argument in favor of suppressing the “self sacrifice” dimension in the measurement of PSM in some specific contexts like Spain as it may create an uncomfortable situation when public servants are asked about personal issues in the professional environment. The tradition of separating private affairs, including religion, from the professional world makes some questions uncomfortable for respondents.

Conclusions

This paper shows, as it was expected, that PSM can also be measured in Spain and that it can be measured with Perry’s original model or with an adapted model that includes an “administrative tradition- political loyalty” dimension that contextualizes the PSM measure. We believe this second option is better as it captures a dimension that was found to exist, which improves the measurement of PSM in the specific context of Spanish public services and, at the same time, gives support to the universal character of PSM. The values that were included in the supplementary PSM dimension are related with the political loyalty of civil service and they are one of the characteristic aspects of the Napoleonic administrative tradition. They favor the concept of a career neutral public service against public management reform movements demanding a more committed and politically active public service.

The strategy followed here consisted of capturing the public values that may be representative of the administrative tradition shared by the high-ranking civil servants who were interviewed. Although half the sample worked for ministries and half the sample for other semi-autonomous agencies, they work in a similar environment and share a common administrative culture. It may well be that the instrument that is proposed needs further adjustments when trying to measure PSM in a different level of government or in another type of public service organization whether it is third sector or private. This is a clear limitation of the research strategy which is dependent on the ability to combine public values and the data available. Of course, it would be better to have a universal measure of PSM that works in any national or sub-national context or for different types of public service organizations, but this was precisely the problem this research was trying to address.

After a number of national studies trying to develop an adapted and contextualized measure of PSM (Vandenabeele 2008; Hansen 2009; Giaouque *et al.* 2011) it appears that the differences between contextualized and non contextualized measures of PSM are not striking. One could conclude it is not so important to find an improved measurement of PSM for the specific country. Certainly it is perfectly possible to use different types of measures already available, including single survey items, uni-dimensional scales and multi-dimensional scales to measure PSM. However, this is not contradictory with the convenience to develop further research to capture one of the aspects that is essential in PSM research: the loyalty to the public service “regime”, understood as a combination of state vision and work values. This can be pursued through the concept of PSM and by groups of countries with similar political and administrative environments. Research should not be limited to public employees as social services are increasingly provided through third sector and private organizations in Europe and national culture may have similar or different effects on PSM depending on sector. This line of research can also be applied to the study of antecedents to better understand the formation of PSM in countries with different perceptions on the relations between the state and society, the purpose and the intensity of public services. For that matter, deep economic crisis like the one starting in 2008 provide an interesting context to control for the expectations of public servants with regard to social problems and to see the effects on their PSM of public action.

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Table 1 Sample characteristics (N=423)

Organization*	Level*	Gender *	Age	Years Worked	Education
Ministries 44,4%	>27 34,4% (39,9%)	Male 43,2% (48,2%)	<40 18,2%	<15 23,0%	Law 30,2%
Agencies ** 55,6 %	=<27 62,2% (60,1%)	Female 56,8% (51,7%)	40-55 61,4%	15-30 52,5%	Social Sciences 22,9%
	Missing 3,4%		>55 20,4%	>30 24,5%	Sciences & Engineering 22,5%
					Humanities 18,6%
					Other/missing 5,8%

* Criteria used for the sample. In parenthesis, data for the population, *Registro Central de Personal 2009* **Including autonomous entities and corporations, official statistics group employees in those entities with employees ministries.

Table 2 Items included in the analysis and equivalence with Perry's items

PSM dimension	Perry 1996	Item in English	Q #	Item in Spanish
Attraction to Policy Making	PSM 11	Politics is a dirty word (rev)	Q1	La política es necesaria para el bienestar de la sociedad
	PSM 27	The give and take of public policy making doesn't appeal to me (rev)	Q2	El "toma y daca" de la negociación de las actuaciones públicas no me atrae
	PSM 31	I do not care much for politicians (rev)	Q3	No me interesan mucho ni los políticos ni la política
Commitment to the Public Interest	PSM 30	Meaningful public service is very important to me	Q4	Para mí es muy importante que el servicio público tenga un verdadero impacto en la sociedad
	PSM 39	I consider public service my civic duty	Q5	El servicio público va más allá de ser funcionario, es un deber cívico
Self-sacrifice	PSM 12	Serving citizens would give me a good feeling even if no one paid me for it	Q6	Hacer algo por la sociedad me realiza independientemente de si me pagan por ello
Compassion	PSM 2	I am rarely moved by the plight of the underprivileged (rev)	Q7	Me conmueve ser testigo de las necesidades de los socialmente menos favorecidos
	PSM 10	I seldom think about the welfare of people whom I don't know personally (rev)	Q8	Me preocupa el bienestar de la gente a la que no conozco
Commitment to the Public Interest	PSM 3	Most social programs are too vital to do without	Q9	Las políticas sociales son demasiado importantes como para prescindir de ellas
Compassion		I worry about the welfare of the most disadvantaged citizens	T37	Me preocupa el bienestar de los ciudadanos más desfavorecidos
Administrative tradition - Political loyalty		My commitment to public service is to carry out the decisions of politicians	T11	Mi compromiso con el servicio público consiste en llevar a cabo las decisiones de los políticos
		Officials must carry out policies designed by politicians	T13	Los funcionarios debemos llevar a cabo las políticas diseñadas por los políticos
		It is my duty to accept the directives of my political boss	T16	Es mi deber aceptar las directivas del cargo político superior a mi puesto

Table 3. Standardized estimates of the PSM dimensions (N=423)

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Lambda		R ²	Lambda		R ²
	Coefficient	St. Error		Coefficient	St. Error	
<i>F1 Attraction to Policy Making</i>						
Politics is positive for society	0.62 ***	0.21	0.38	0.69 ***	0.17	0.48
Public policy making appeals to me	0.40 ***	0.17	0.16	0.41 ***	0.15	0.17
I'm interested in politics and politicians	0.82 ***	0.27	0.67	0.75 ***	0.16	0.56
<i>F2 Commitment to Public Interest</i>						
Meaningful public service is very important	0.46 *	0.17	0.21	0.46 *	0.17	0.21
I consider public service a civic duty	0.50 **	0.22	0.26	0.51 **	0.22	0.26
I feel good doing something for society	0.69 ***	0.20	0.48	0.69 ***	0.20	0.47
Social policies are too important to do Without	0.61	0.35	0.37	0.61	0.36	0.39
<i>F3 Compassion</i>						
I am moved to witness the less favored	0.74 ***	0.12	0.54	0.74 ***	0.12	0.55
I worry about the welfare of people	0.78 ***	0.10	0.60	0.78 ***	0.10	0.60
I worry about the welfare of disadvantaged	0.31 *	0.15	0.09	0.31 *	0.15	0.09
<i>F4 Administrative tradition – political loyalty</i>						
My commitment to public service is to carry out the decisions of politicians				0.57 ***	0.12	0.32
Officials must carry out policies designed by politicians				0.72 ***	0.08	0.52
It is my duty to accept the directives of my political boss				0.44 ***	0.08	0.20
Scale reliability						
	F1	F2	F3	F4		
Composite reliabilities	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.60		
Interfactor correlations						
	Correlation	St. Error		Correlation	St. Error	
Correlation (F1, F2)	0.10	0.29		0.11	0.27	
Correlation (F1, F3)	0.18	0.17		0.19	0.17	
Correlation (F1, F4)				0.32 **	0.14	
Correlation (F2, F3)	0.88 ***	0.23		0.88 ***	0.22	
Correlation (F2, F4)				-0.03	0.19	
Correlation (F3, F4)				-0.01	0.11	


*** significant at the level $\alpha < 0.01$; ** significant at the level $\alpha < 0.05$; * significant at the level $\alpha < 0.10$


Table 4. Model fit statistics

	SB χ^2 (df)	RMSEA	SRMR	GFI	CFI	NFI	AGFI
Threshold		0.08	0.090	0.95	0.90	0.90	0.80
Model 1	2.19 (32)	0.00	0.076	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.98
Model 2	4.17 (59)	0.00	0.063	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.99

APPENDIX

Figures 1 and 2. Three and four factor models of PSM





Chi-Square=4.17, df=59, P-value=1.00000, RMSEA=0.000