Migration and the local transformation of overseas development aid: An analysis of migrants’ access to ODA funds in Catalonia¹

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the linkages between migrant transnationality, locality and the transformation of local government practices within the field of overseas development assistance (ODA). A growing literature critically analyses how migrant as development agents are embedded in, as well as challenge, local and transnational power hierarchies. This research field is not only centred on the dynamics in the countries of migrant origin, but also on the interaction between the social and institutional context in the receiving country and the transnational development practices of migrants.

We explore these wider issues through an analysis of the overall trends in migrant access to ODA among Catalan local governments, which have dedicated a (small) part of their annual budget to ODA activities since the 1980s. We set up an original database with information from four consecutive comprehensive surveys of ODA practices of Catalan local governments between 1999 and 2008, each cohort representing more than 90% of the total Catalan population. Subsequently, we show that variation in migrant access to ODA funds across different local governments and migrant nationalities is related to both the size and diversity of municipalities and a range of institutional/political variables. These include the overall ODA spending of the local government, which party is in power and the extent to which local governments pool their ODA resources within a regional development association for municipalities. In this way, the analysis contributes to our understanding of the potential of migration and migrant transnational practices to transform local institutional practices.
INTRODUCTION
In the context of migration studies there is a growing attention to the transformative potential of migrants’ cross-border economic, political and social activities in countries of origin and residence (Faist, 2008; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2013; Portes et al., 2008; Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Vertovec, 2004). One dimension of this research field are the ways in which migrant transnationality links up with local institutional changes (Faist, 2010). In order to further explore these dynamics, this paper focuses on the extent to which immigration and the presence of migrant associations with a transnational development agenda have led to a transformation of the local governance of overseas development assistance (ODA) in countries of residence. We question to what extent and why local governments include migrant associations in general, and some migrant nationalities in particular, in their allocation of public funds for overseas development assistance. Which configurations of migration, ethnic diversity, and the political institutional characteristics of municipalities, render local governments more inclusive of migrant transnational development projects?

An important point of departure is that local governments, when confronted with migrant development projects, may already be active in policy areas with a wider global or transnational dimension such as migration and overseas development aid. In this case they already have a transnational outlook. A transnational outlook may refer to a whole host of cross-border practices, but in this paper we define it as the extent to which local governments allocate resources to address social, economic or political issues in other countries. Notably within the field of development cooperation, local governments can be involved in decentralized cooperation, either through direct cooperation with local actors in other countries or through allocating funds to development NGOs (Alberdi Bidaguren, 2010; Hafteck, 2003; van Ewijk, in this issue). The question is to what extent this type of transnational outlook and attention to inequality elsewhere is transformed by the growing presence of international migrants and migrant associations wishing to access the policy field of development assistance.

Recent studies have shown that a limited number of local governments in Spain, Italy, France and the Netherlands have funded migrant led projects on development in their countries of origin (de Haas, 2007; Fauser, 2014; Lacroix, 2009; Nijenhuis and Broekhuis, 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011; Piperno and Stocchiero, 2006). These largely qualitative studies locate government ODA funding practices in wider national or international policy trends of codevelopment. A wide range of public policies connecting migration and development are related to codevelopment, but in this context it is mainly relevant to mention that it includes public funding of migrant development initiatives in their countries of origin. The rationale behind codevelopment policies is contested. Codevelopment has been associated with a policy agenda of migration control (de Haas, 2010; Faist, 2008), including at the local level in Spain (Fauser, 2014). Other studies suggest that local government codevelopment practices aim to foster migrant local incorporation (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011). So far these studies are mainly qualitative and there are no systematic analyses of what motivates the responsiveness of local governments.
to applications from migrant associations in the public calls for funding of ODA projects.

Moreover, these same studies of codevelopment in Europe have uncovered how in particular Sub-Saharan, North African and Latin American migrants employ their transnational and local resources in order to navigate local policies of codevelopment and decentralized development cooperation. Migrant access to ODA funds is explained with reference to the configuration of migrant local and transnational resources and the political opportunity structures in their localities of residence and origin. However, again, there are no systematic comparisons of why some migrant collectives access more ODA funds than others.

In order to explore the linkages between migration, migrant transnationality and local transformation of ODA we choose the case of Catalonia, Spain because three main trends over the past decades provide an interesting setting. First, Catalonia has experienced high rates of immigration in the period 1999-2009, increasing the percentage of foreign-born residents from 3.4% to 17.4% of the Catalan population. Second, the overall spending on foreign development assistance of local Catalan entities has increased by 115% in the same period. Finally, there has been an emerging policy field of codevelopment during the period of study, which encourages local governments to collaborate with migrants on development projects.

The following analysis is based on an original database with information from four consecutive comprehensive surveys of ODA practices of an average of 565 Catalan local governments between 1999 and 2008, and data derived from national statistics. We present and subsequently test a theoretical framework regarding both migration-related and political/institutional hypotheses. As will be detailed in the next section, this includes on the one hand local levels of migration, ethnic diversity and the size of municipalities. On the other hand, it includes the transnational outlook and political colour of local governments, and their embeddedness in networks of governance and policies of overseas development aid.

**TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL DEVELOPMENT AID**

An analysis attempting to identify processes of local transformation brought about by migration and migrant transnationality needs an understanding of what type of local change signifies a local transformation. In the context of migration studies, social transformation has been defined as ‘rapid and generalized change’ (Castles, 2010). This definition is aimed at capturing broader processes of transformation. With a view to understanding local transformation of overseas development aid we seek to identify changes in local overseas development practices along two main indicators: First, the extent to which local governments, during one decade, have decided to extend funding to migrant associations wishing to undertake development projects in their country of
origin. Second, if they in so doing prioritize certain migrant collectives over others.

Recent calls for further attention to the linkages between migrant transnationality and processes of local change encourage an analytical framework that pays attention to connections between localities (Castles 2010) and includes a multi-level perspective (Faist, 2010; Fauser and Nijenhuis, in this issue). This is a challenging agenda for the analysis of the influence of migration on local government ODA funding practices. We therefore propose an analytical framework that pays attention to both the local presence and transnational connectedness of migrants and the extent to which local governments have a transnational outlook and are involved in policy networks with or associations of other local governments.

Why do local governments extend ODA funding to migrant associations?

Size and diversity of municipalities
One set of explanations for why local governments extend funding to associations of migrants centre on local patterns of growing ethnic diversity. Local governments have become more prominent in studies of political responses to international migration. The idea is that it is often at the local level that the state is confronted with the challenges and potential stemming from an increasingly diverse local population (Penninx, 2009). An example of local government responses to a growing presence of migrants can be the extension of public funds to migrant associations as part of a non-electoral political incorporation of migrants on either side of the Atlantic (de Graauw et al., 2012; Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2009; Morales and Echazarra, 2013). Most of this analysis focuses on relations between local governments and migrant associations within the policy field of migrant settlement. Still, a growing body of literature extends this analysis to local funding of migrant transnational development activities (de Haas, 2007; Fauser, 2014, 2012; Lacroix, 2009; Nijenhuis and Broekhuis, 2010; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011; Piperno and Stocchiero, 2006).

In this literature there is a tendency to mainly study big cities, which have received a large number of migrants. Yet, recent studies of immigration in Spain highlight patterns of significant immigration into also smaller municipalities (less than 10,000 inhabitants) (Collantes et al., 2013). This breaks with the binary perceptions of ethnically diverse cities versus homogenous small localities, albeit there is, at least in the Spanish case, still an overall correlation between size and diversity (Morales and Echazarra, 2013). The lack of systematic comparison between the size and diversity of a locality and the propensity of local governments to collaborate with migrant associations means that the general assumption that larger localities with more migrants tend to extend funding to migrant associations still needs to be tested also within the field of overseas development assistance. We therefore propose the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Size matters. Larger municipalities (in terms of size of population) are more likely to prioritize migrant associations’ access to ODA.

Hypothesis 2: Presence of migrants and level of diversity matter. Municipalities with more migrants and higher levels of diversity allocate more ODA to migrant associations.

The other question is whether these characteristics of localities (size and diversity) also translate into a differentiated treatment of migrant collectives based on their local presence. So far studies have mainly focused on only one or a few selected migrant collectives already engaged in transnational development activities. Yet, if the local government combines the issue of growing diversity and a need for collaboration with migrant associations with ODA practices, does this lead to a prioritization of the most numerous migrant collectives in the constituency? If so this would strengthen the idea of local government responses to migrant transnationality being influenced by local concerns with the governance of an increasingly diverse local population. Given the lack of systematic analysis of the relationship between the numerical local presence of migrants and their local access to public funds of any kind we propose the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: The access of a particular migrant collective to ODA funds is proportional to their relative presence over total migrant population in that locality.

Transnational outlook and political colour of local governments
An alternative set of explanations for the collaboration between local governments and migrants relates to the political characteristics and practices of the local government in charge. First we propose to look at the extent to which local governments have a transnational outlook. In this context we measure the transnational outlook of a local government as their overall local government spending on overseas development aid (controlling for municipality’s size: ODA per capita). We argue that the extent to which local governments reserve part of their budget to address social, economic or political processes in other countries indicates a transnational outlook, which could translate into a more inclusive attitude towards migrants as development actors:

Hypothesis 4: The degree of transnational outlook of a local government makes it more likely to extend funding to migrant associations.

Government spending on ODA has been related to the political colour of the ruling party. For instance, at the national level in Spain, left-wing governments tend to be more in favour of public spending on ODA (Larrú and Tezanos Vázquez, 2012). In the context of migration, left-wing and pro-migrant governments have been identified as more open to extending public funds to migrant associations than are right wing governments which are generally in favour of reducing public spending or may even pursue an anti-migrant agenda (Koopmans and Statham, 2000). Other studies have not found that the political
colour of local governments explains funding of migrant associations both in Europe (Caponio, 2005) and in the USA (de Graauw et al., 2012). Still, combining the literature on ODA spending and funding of migrant associations we suggest that,

Hypothesis 5: Local governments are more likely to extend ODA funds to migrant associations if the most voted party is leftwing.

Local governments’ networks of collaboration: the role of associations of municipalities

Another dimension of the political configurations of local governments is their embeddedness in networks and processes of governance with both other local governments and other levels of government. In this context we are particularly interested in the role of policy networks among local governments both at the regional and national levels. Municipalities can be influenced by their horizontal networks and multi-level linkages within the fields of environmental policies (Bulkeley, 2010, 2005). Moreover, municipal networks can also be coordinated by associations or agencies at the national or regional level as is the case of the Agency of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG International), Association française du Conseil des Communes et Régions d’Europe (AFCCRE) or the Catalan Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament (Fons-Català) (Bontenbal, 2010; Gómez Gil, 2008; Hafteck, 2003). These associations not only help promote interests and coordinate practices among local governments, but can also connect local governments to broader agendas and priorities at other levels of government both inside and outside the state in question (Bontenbal, 2010; Hafteck, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011). The question is to what extent these networks and multi-level linkages and associations may influence the priorities of individual local governments within the local policy field of overseas development cooperation in general and the allocation of ODA funds to migrant associations in particular. Moreover, in the context of ODA the policy priorities of the association of municipalities could be thought to influence the practices in especially smaller localities which count on less personnel and expertise in development cooperation. We therefore propose that a municipal government membership of - and transfer of funds to - associations or agencies of networks of municipalities influence their local prioritization of ODA funds both in terms of how many and which migrant associations they support financially:

Hypothesis 6: Those municipalities that have delegated their ODA budget to an association of municipalities are more likely to fund migrant associations if this is a policy priority of that association.

Hypothesis 7: Those municipalities that have delegated their ODA budget to an association of municipalities are more likely to fund migrant collectives coming from countries that are prioritized by the association of municipalities or other levels of government.
CATALONIA: KEY TRENDS IN IMMIGRATION AND LOCAL FUNDING OF
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

During the first decade of the 2000s, Spain underwent an important transformation from defining itself as an emigrant country to being an immigrant country. Catalonia is one of the autonomous communities in Spain that has experienced the most intense immigration over the past decade. According to National Statistics the number of foreign-born residents increased from 3.4% in 1999 to 17.5% in 2010. Regional and local governments throughout Catalonia have therefore been faced with the challenge of formulating a policy response to the rapidly growing presence of migrants (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011; Garcés-Mascareñas, 2011; Zapata-Barrero et al., 2011).

The three main migrant origin regions are North Africa, EU and Latin America (see Figure 1).\(^2\) Within these regions certain nationalities dominate. Moroccan migrants are by far the largest migrant group in Catalonia during the period (236,090 Moroccans, 20.38% of the total population of migrants in 2013). The second largest migrant group are Romanians (103,815/8.96%) followed by Ecuadorians (51,003/4.40%). Sub-Saharan migrant groups, such as the Senegalese (20,785/1.79%) or Gambians (16,544/1.43%) constitute much smaller migrant collectives.

Regarding the governance of aid, local governments are embedded in both horizontal and vertical networks, institutions and policy frameworks. In the Spanish decentralised system local governments have had autonomy to formulate their own development policies and priorities since 1998, with the passing of the first national cooperation law (OECD, 2005, pp. 17–18). This was before the current institutional architecture for international cooperation was in place at the national or regional levels. Even though the Spanish cooperation system can be traced back to the 1970s, the Spanish development agency was not created until 1988, and it did not publish the first of its 3-year policy plan on development cooperation until 2001. At the regional level, the Catalan regional agency was created only in 2003. These national and regional agencies have gained importance in establishing frameworks, values, recommended practices or priority countries within a context where local entities were already active and had competences. Yet, although local governments have had a long-standing competence to formulate their own policy and priorities, then not all the municipalities have had the capacity to undertake such activities. And among those that have undertaken overseas development assistance, not all have the resources to align and harmonize their activities with the policy plans of regional or national levels of government (Boni et al., 2011).

\(^2\) In this research, data related to Oceania and North America, and European regions is omitted because these regions are not key ODA recipients. Moreover, ODA flows towards European countries are not considered because most of the European population residing in Catalonia are from EU countries. Besides, even if non-EU countries such as Albania or the countries of the Former Yugoslav Republic can be found in the DAC list of OECD recipients 2012, these are not prioritized by Catalan local actors.
One area where there is a harmonization of policy priorities across different levels of government is in terms of the geographical prioritization of ODA funds. Latin America, a region with past and present close ties to Spain, has traditionally been the most important recipient region of both local government, regional Catalan and Spanish bilateral ODA. Figure 2 shows the tendencies of bilateral ODA channelled per regions by the 3 levels of government (National, Regional, Local)\(^3\).

In terms of horizontal networks and collaboration, an important actor in the field of local government ODA during the considered period is the agency for development cooperation of Catalan municipalities \(\text{Fons-Català}\), created in 1986. The \(\text{Fons-Català}\) serves as an association for the municipalities. It coordinates the development activities of the municipalities and provides technical assessment and expertise. By 2010, 278 (out of 946) municipalities were members of the \(\text{Fons-Català}\) and paid an annual quota. The \(\text{Fons-Català}\) uses these contributions to fund different types of development projects and also develops projects that municipalities can help finance if they want to. Moreover, municipalities can delegate the evaluation of their public calls for ODA projects to the \(\text{Fons-Català}\) rendering the municipal association an important actor in the allocation of these funds. Importantly, the \(\text{Fons-Català}\) was a very vocal advocate for codevelopment activities during the period under scrutiny in this paper (FCCD, 2005; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2011)\(^4\).

DATA AND METHODS

In order to examine which are the relevant factors accounting for migrant associations access to municipal ODA funds in Catalonia we have set up an original data base drawing on different statistical sources and data from four consecutive surveys of decentralized aid practices among local Catalan governments in 1999, 2001, 2004 and 2008. The survey, carried out by the \(\text{Fons-Català}\), is sent to all the 946 Catalan municipalities and collects information on their ODA spending. The survey includes questions on whether the municipality does overseas development assistance, the size of the municipal ODA budget and which projects are undertaken over the past year. In case of indirect cooperation, the survey asks which NGO(s) are executing the projects.

The \(\text{Fons-Català}\) already has the relevant information for the close to 300 municipalities that are members of the association. As can be seen from table 1 below not all of the remaining municipalities choose to answer the survey. Still, we have access to data from a fairly comprehensive number of Catalan local governments. Table 1 reveals that more than a third of Catalan municipalities do undertake ODA activities and that this third represents around 90% of the Catalan population.

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\(^3\) It is worth highlighting that the study considers a period when the economic crisis suffered by Spain was not yet affecting the aid system. Only since 2009 has overall ODA spending been decreasing.

\(^4\) See also the strategic plans and annual reports of \(\text{Fons-Català}\)’s http://www.fonscatala.org/recursosDocumentals/index.php?id_pagina=87 [last accessed 5/Apr./2014]
The other information in the database regarding migration and size of population has been compiled from data provided by the Catalan Statistical Office, which draws on information from official municipal registers. Municipal elections’ results are from the Ministry of Interior.

In order to evaluate migrant access to ODA funds we first compiled and analysed information on all ODA projects solicited by migrant associations. A key challenge in that respect was to identify the migrant associations among the very long list of associations that have accessed ODA funding from 1999-2008. We focus on those associations that are non-profit organizations legally registered (such as an association or foundation) and we classify them as migrant associations if they do so themselves (Lacroix, 2009; Portes et al., 2008) or when, at a minimum, about half of its members or half of its leadership is of migrant origin (Morales and Jorba 2009).

We then estimated five models in order to test our hypothesis regarding two dependent variables. The first dependent variable is the total amount of ODA accessed by migrant associations over the total ODA given within each municipality. This variable is analysed in two stages. In the first stage we include a dichotomous variable, which is equal to 1 if funds have been allocated to migrant associations and 0 otherwise (model 1). In the second stage we include the actual variable of the relative amount of ODA funding (model 2) given to migrant associations. This two-step analysis is motivated by the fact that migrants only receive funds in 171 of the 1134 observations of municipalities funding overseas development activities of associations in Catalonia. The second dependent variable is the share of ODA accessed by different migrant origin associations over the total ODA given within each municipality. We have divided the migrant origins into ‘regions’ and compare Sub-Saharan, Northern Africa and Latin America (model 3, 4, 5).

For the analysis of the overall access of migrant associations to local ODA funding, the size of the municipality is operationalized as the logarithmic transformation of the population. The presence of migrants is measured as the number of foreign-born migrants (the EU and North America excepted) over the total local population. Moreover, we measure the diversity of a municipality as an exponential function of Theil’s Entropy Index (Reardon and Firebaugh, 2002, p. 39). The local government commitment to transnational overseas development assistance is the total ODA spending per capita (to control for size of municipality). The collaboration with the Fons-Català is measured as the percentage of ODA funding a municipality delegates to the Fons-Català. The effect of this variable is also analysed in interaction with the logarithmic function of the size of the municipality’s population. In order to explore the extent to which the most voted political parties affect the ODA accessed by migrant associations we use a categorical variable based on the most recent municipal

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5 This statistical information does not include the socio-economic differences, GDP/capita among municipalities.

6 Asia is excluded from the second set of regressions because no migrant association from that continent has accessed local ODA.
electoral results before each survey. This variable is equal to 1 if the most voted party is the Catalan Socialist party (PSC), equal to 2 if the most voted party is the nationalist right-wing Convergence and Union party (CiU) and equal to 0 for if another party than takes most votes. During the considered period the PSC and the CiU are the most voted parties in 78% of our observations. The rest of the most voted parties consist of a myriad of other political parties, making the statistical inference more difficult. It should be noted that the most voted party can govern in coalition with other parties although the PSC and CiU do not tend to form coalitions with each other.

For the comparative analysis of the allocation of funds to migrant associations of different origin (that is, North-Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and LA) we use some of the same variables as for models 1 and 2 and add new ones. Importantly the local presence of a particular migrant group is calculated as the share of that migrant group over the total number of migrants. Also, because we are more interested in analysing the relationship between the relative presence of different migrant groups and their share of municipal ODA resources, we measure the involvement of Fons-Català as their importance in managing funds to migrants rather than managing ODA funds in general. We include a variable that takes value 1 for those municipalities with 100% of migrant ODA being decided by Fons-Català and 0 otherwise. The dichotomous nature of this variable is justified by the observation that almost all of the municipalities that do give ODA to migrants (171) let the Fons-Català either decide on 100% or none of the funding. Only 13 observations let the Fons decide on a fraction of the ODA given to migrants. All models (for both the first and second dependent variables) include dummies for the years of the survey and for the 4 provinces the municipalities belong to. Nonetheless, they are not reported in any of the models.

**FINDINGS**

**ODA accessed by migrant associations over the total ODA given by municipalities**

A descriptive analysis shows that the number of migrant associations accessing local government ODA funds has tripled during the period 1999-2008 and the percentage of migrant associations over the total number of Catalan entities receiving ODA has doubled (table 2). Moreover, the number of municipalities extending ODA funding to migrant associations increased from 10,6% in 1999 to 19% in 2008.

If we look at the actual amount of money involved the trend is quite similar (table 3). The overall ODA to migrant associations almost tripled during this period with especially a 104% increase between 2004 and 2008.

In order to understand what may motivate local governments to fund migrant associations we estimate two models. In the first model, we study the
determinants of the decision of a municipality to channel ODA to migrant led projects. The first model shows that the probability of a migrant association accessing ODA is positively affected by the size of the population as well as by the presence of migrants and the local level of diversity. All of these relations are statistically significant and confirm the hypotheses 1 and 2, which propose that larger and more diverse municipalities are more likely to extend ODA funding to migrant associations. The transnational outlook of local governments (ODA per capita) is strongly positively related to the likelihood of migrant associations accessing ODA funds, thus confirming hypothesis 4. In terms of political parties, the model shows that, when the most voted party in a municipality is the Catalan Socialist party (PSC), that municipality is more likely to channel ODA to migrant associations. This confirms hypothesis 5. Finally, the coefficients of the two variables representing the % of total ODA allocated by the Fons-Català and its interaction with size jointly imply that the effect of the degree of involvement of the Fons-Català in local ODA decision-making positively affects the probability to fund migrants (hypothesis 6). Moreover, this effect is significantly related with the size of the municipality. So the smaller the municipality the more likely it is that the Fons-Català collaboration positively influences the decision to extend funds to migrants.\(^7\)

\(^7\)We ran auxiliary regressions which clarify that the degree of involvement of the Fons-Català positively and significantly affects the probability to give money to migrants for all municipalities except the 25% largest ones. Please note that all small municipalities that are members of the Fons-Català are automatically included in the survey while those small municipalities which are not members may not be included because they have not answered the survey. However, those small municipalities that do not answer the survey are very likely those who are not engaged in ODA and therefore this problem is not very likely to bias the results.
In the second model we analyse the factors related to the amount of ODA funding allocated to migrant led projects considering only those municipalities that do fund migrant associations. The dependent variable is the percentage of ODA being channelled to migrant associations over the total ODA that a municipality invested. The regressors are the same as in model 1.

In contrast to the results of model 1, the size of the population is negatively statistically significant in model 2. This indicates that everything else equal, the smaller the municipality the larger the share of ODA funds may be given to migrant associations. Diversity still has a positive and significant effect, but the percentage of foreign born is not significant. The transnational outlook continues to be significant, but again in contrast to model 1 it is now in the reverse so that the smaller the ODA budget is, the larger share do the migrant associations take once their project is selected. The effect of the degree of involvement of Fons-Català in local ODA decision-making on allocation of funds to migrants is positive and more statistically significant than in model 1. Again this influence on municipal funding of migrant ODA projects interacts with size of the municipality rendering the effect of Fons-Català cooperation stronger the smaller is the municipality. The political party taking most seats in the local government is not significant for the share of ODA given to migrant associations.

Overall, the models highlight interesting dynamics related to both migration and the institutional characteristics of local governments. Model 1 shows that migrant associations are more likely to access ODA funds in larger and more ethnically diverse municipalities with a strong transnational outlook in the sense of a large ODA budget. However, model 2 shows that the share of these funds given to migrant associations is more significant in smaller localities with a relatively smaller ODA budget. In both models, municipal networked collaboration with Fons-Català is more important the smaller the size of the municipality. A leftwing local government is more likely to extend ODA funds to migrant associations, but the political colour is not relevant for how many funds migrant associations receive in cases of municipalities that do include migrants in ODA allocation.

**ODA accessed by migrant associations per regions of origin over the total ODA given by municipalities.**

A descriptive analysis of the distribution of funds across different migrant groups reveals that by far the largest share of the funds is being allocated to Sub-Saharan (largely Senegalese and Gambian) migrant associations followed by North-African (largely Moroccan) associations (Figure 3).

This distribution roughly corresponds to the number of migrant associations successfully soliciting ODA funds across the different regions: although the
population of Sub-Saharan migrants is relatively small, there are many more Sub-Saharan than Latin American or North-African associations accessing local ODA (Table 4).

In order to understand what may motivate this very differentiated access to ODA across different migrant collectives we present 3 multivariate regressions related to the migrant collectives from Sub-Saharan Africa, Northern Africa and Latin America (see Models 3,4,5).

The results show a very mixed set of dynamics across the different migrant collectives both in terms of the predictors related to migration and size and the political institutional characteristics of the municipality. In the case of Sub-Saharan migrant associations, access to municipal ODA increases with more local presence of Sub-Saharan migrants in the locality, but decreases with the size of the overall population. These two coefficients are statistically significant. By contrast, the relative size of the North-African and Latin-American migrant population is not a relevant factor for understanding the access of associations to ODA funds. The size of the municipal population is statistically significant for access of the North-African associations but in contrast to the case of the Sub-Saharan associations, North-African associations access more ODA funds the larger the municipality.

In terms of political and institutional dynamics, the transnational outlook (ODA per capita) is positive and significant in the case of Sub-Saharan migrant associations, showing that those municipalities reserving a bigger part of the budget for transnational development projects are more likely to fund associations from this region. However, this relationship is not significant in the case of North-African and is even negatively significant for Latin-American migrant associations. Also, the most voted political party in the last municipal election is not a good predictor for the share of ODA accessed by different migrant collectives.

Interestingly the role of the Fons-Català is statistically significant for both North-African and especially Latin-American migrant associations but in opposite ways. To the extent that Fons-Català is making the decision on the migrant-led projects in the municipalities then Moroccan migrants take a larger share and Latin Americans a smaller share of the ODA funds allocated to migrant associations. This reflects the findings of other studies, which have argued that the Fons-Català have made an effort to mobilize the Moroccan migrant collective around themes of co-development, especially between 2004 and 2008 (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2011). The role of the Fons-Català is not significant in the case of the Sub-Saharan migrant associations. An unconditional correlation between the share accessed by Sub-Saharan associations and the percentage of ODA that is decided by the Fons-Català show that these two variables are highly related (correlation coefficient equal to 60%). But this relation is not visible once the other variables are included in the regression

Hence, our hypothesis 3 regarding the positive relation between the local presence of a migrant group and its share of local ODA funds is only confirmed in
the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. The result for Sub-Saharan Africa is consistent with the descriptive analysis showing that at the level of all of Catalonia this group takes a very large share of the total ODA funds allocated to migrant associations while constituting one of the smaller migrant collectives compared to say North-Africans and Latin-Americans. So where there are concentrations of Sub-Saharan migrants they are likely to take a larger share of ODA funds. It is still somewhat surprising that the relationship between the relative presence of a certain migrant collective and their access to funds is not confirmed for the other groups. Further studies including other dynamics, such as the local number and density of migrant associations might shed further light on this.

Besides, we cannot explain the prioritization of migrant associations per origin with a reference to overall geographical ODA prioritization (hypothesis 7) since Latin-America is by far the largest recipient at both the municipal, regional and national of government. An alternative explanation could be the dynamics of competition for ODA funds among migrant associations and ‘autochthonous’ Catalan development NGOs. The latter group has tended to concentrate their expertise in the regions of North Africa and Latin America in line with the overall prioritization of ODA at all levels of government. This pattern renders the geographical area of Sub-Saharan Africa relatively less competitive and perhaps therefore easier to access for migrant associations soliciting ODA funds for transnational development projects in this region.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The analysis of inclusion and exclusion of migrant transnational development projects among Catalan local governments highlights several interesting issues that are not usually at the forefront of our understanding of the relationship between migrant transnationality and local transformation of policy fields. Admittedly, the overall volume of migrant led projects and funds involved are small. Yet, the overall increase in migrant led projects does indicate a change in the ODA practices of local Catalan governments. The growing inclusion of migrant associations in ODA reflects the adaptability of local governments faced with more ethnically diverse local populations brought about by immigration.

Three main results stand out from the estimations of the incentives of local governments to give ODA funds to migrant associations. First, there is a significant relationship between the transnational outlook of the local government and its propensity to extend funding to migrant associations. Second, the results challenge a dichotomous view of small ethnically homogenous and unconnected localities versus large urban ethnically diverse and transnationally connected cities. Collaboration with migrants on ODA is not just reserved for larger urban settings as also a range of smaller municipalities extends their ODA budgets to fund the transnational activities of migrant associations. Third, these smaller municipalities are, however, not always acting alone. They pool their resources through their municipal association for development. The results show that this collaboration may connect local governments with wider policy trends and priorities. This connection, at least in
smaller localities, supports a trend towards local funding of migrant associations within overseas development assistance. With regards to the effect of the political colour of the local governments the analysis indicates that more right-wing political parties are less likely to channel ODA to migrants. Further studies, including a data-set that considers also the particular government coalitions of local governments, could explore these dynamics further. For now, we note that these local dynamics are parallel to the overall tendency of Spanish right-wing political parties to reduce ODA spending at the national level.

The patterns of inclusion and exclusion of different migrant collectives in overseas development assistance provide an interesting opening for further research. In this analysis, the extension of ODA funds to migrant associations is not proportional to the overall size of the migrants at the Catalan level. Curiously, only in the case of the numerically smallest migrant groups from Sub-Saharan Africa is there a relationship between local concentration of migrants and local access to ODA funding. Further research to explore these dynamics is needed. For instance, an analysis of the local visibility of migrant collectives that takes into account the number and agency of migrant associations may reveal different dynamics than an analysis based on number of resident migrants. In that respect a closer look at the local processes of governance, the different historical local trajectories of migration, the associational density and civic presence of different migrant collectives as well as their transnational resources may add to our understanding of how migrant associations navigate their access to local fields of ODA.

The analysis of the migrant transnationality and local transformation of overseas development aid in Catalonia points to the relevance of a dynamic view of how local funding practices change. Through ODA practices, local governments may already address challenges of globalization and seek to initiate or contribute to processes of economic, social and political transformation in other countries. Migrant transnationality intersects with these ongoing processes of change both in terms of the local increase in ODA funds reflecting a growing transnational outlook and the embeddedness of the local in wider horizontal and vertical structures and policy fields. In this optic, the processes of local interactions between the transnational outlook of local government and migrant transnationality emerge as a dynamic area of study in need of further comparative analysis.

REFERENCES


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Fons Catalá de Cooperació al Desenvolupament, Barcelona.


Morales, L., Echazarra, A., 2013. Will We All Hunker Down? The Impact of Immigration and Diversity on Local Communities in Spain.


Østergaard-Nielsen, E., 2013. Transnational migration, in: Rath, J., Martinello, M. (Eds.), International Migration and Immigrant Incorporation: The


### Table 1 Number of municipalities and represented population in the surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities from which Fons-Català has information (out of 946)</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalan population represented by the municipalities over total Catalan population</td>
<td>93,10%</td>
<td>91,90%</td>
<td>91,70%</td>
<td>92,56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities from the sample doing ODA</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catalan population represented by municipalities doing ODA</td>
<td>90,90%</td>
<td>88,60%</td>
<td>90,20%</td>
<td>88,93%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Number of migrant associations accessing to local government ODA in the considered years (1999, 2001, 2004, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) Total number of Catalan organisations accessing to local governments ODA</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B) Number of considered migrant associations</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Migrant associations over total (B/A)</td>
<td>5,4%</td>
<td>5,3%</td>
<td>8,5%</td>
<td>10,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C) Number of municipalities channelling ODA</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D) Number of municipalities channelling ODA to migrant associations</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of local governments channelling ODA towards Migrant associations over those doing cooperation (D/C)</td>
<td>10,6%</td>
<td>13,8%</td>
<td>10,5%</td>
<td>19,0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration from Fons-Català studies
Table 3 Local governments ODA (in €) directed to migrant associations over the total local government ODA in the considered years (1999, 2001, 2004, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ODA from Catalan local</td>
<td>13,304,677</td>
<td>15,480,412</td>
<td>18,835,960</td>
<td>28,599,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entities from which Fons-Català obtained information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA accessed by Migrant associations</td>
<td>316,886</td>
<td>334,898</td>
<td>449,311</td>
<td>920,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly increase in migrant share of local ODA</td>
<td>5,7%</td>
<td>34,2%</td>
<td>104,9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration from Fons-Català studies
Model 1. Multivariate logistic regression. Dependent variable: Positive access to municipal ODA by migrants (dichotomous variable)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Robust Standard errors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipality's total population (log)</td>
<td>0.899***</td>
<td>(0.186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA per capita</td>
<td>0.308***</td>
<td>(0.0590)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Foreign (not European) population over total pop.</td>
<td>10.81***</td>
<td>(3.348)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>0.529**</td>
<td>(0.209)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties (ref. CiU, Catalan Nationalist right)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>(0.309)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC (Socialist)</td>
<td>0.431*</td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total ODA allocated by Fons-Català</td>
<td>5.474**</td>
<td>(2.149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total local ODA allocated by Fons-Català in relation to municipalities’ population</td>
<td>-0.566**</td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-12.65***</td>
<td>(1.864)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations (N)</td>
<td>1,134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-348.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald $\chi^2$ (Wald chi-squared)</td>
<td>142.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.2764</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt; $\chi^2$</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors adjusted for 389 clusters in municipalities. The dependent variable takes value 1 when some percentage of municipal ODA has been given to migrant associations, 0 otherwise. The dummy variable for the CiU is omitted. The models include dummies for the years of the survey, and for the four provinces the municipalities belong to (not reported).

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Model 2. Multivariate linear regression. Dependent variable: % of ODA accessed by migrant associations over the total municipal ODA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Robust Standard errors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipality's total population (log)</td>
<td>-0.0420**</td>
<td>(0.0185)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA per capita</td>
<td>-0.0206**</td>
<td>(0.00796)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Foreign (not European) population over total pop.</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>(0.491)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>0.0653**</td>
<td>(0.0280)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties (ref. CiU, Catalan Nationalist right)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-0.0753</td>
<td>(0.0514)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC (Socialist)</td>
<td>-0.0431</td>
<td>(0.0439)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total ODA allocated by Fons-Català</td>
<td>0.738**</td>
<td>(0.300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction % of total local ODA allocated by Fons-Català in relation to municipalities' population</td>
<td>-0.0544*</td>
<td>(0.0289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.419*</td>
<td>(0.223)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations (N) 171  
R² 0.491  
Prob > F 0.0000  

Note: Standard errors adjusted for 103 clusters in municipalities. Regression conditional to those municipalities given a percentage of ODA to migrants (i.e. %ODA different from 0) The models include dummies for the years of the survey and for the four provinces the municipalities belong to (not reported).  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 4 Number of associations accessing local ODA, per their regions of origin, in the considered years (1999, 2001, 2004, 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration from Fons-Català studies
Models 3, 4, 5. Multivariate linear regressions. Dependent variables: % of ODA accessed by migrant associations from Sub-Saharan Africa, Northern Africa and LA over the total municipal ODA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
<td>Latin-Amer. Associations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of considered migrant group over total migrant population</td>
<td>0.836** (0.326)</td>
<td>0.199 (0.176)</td>
<td>-0.0949 (0.123)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality's total population (log)</td>
<td>-0.0742*** (0.0265)</td>
<td>0.0601*** (0.0218)</td>
<td>0.0117 (0.0172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA per capita</td>
<td>0.0324** (0.0153)</td>
<td>-0.0181 (0.0135)</td>
<td>-0.0155* (0.00893)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100% of migrant ODA allocated by Fons-Català</td>
<td>0.0313 (0.0895)</td>
<td>0.172** (0.0662)</td>
<td>-0.198*** (0.0752)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties (ref. CiU, Catalan Nationalist right)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.0363 (0.0935)</td>
<td>-0.0935 (0.0605)</td>
<td>0.0703 (0.0636)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC (Socialist)</td>
<td>0.0321 (0.0858)</td>
<td>-0.0415 (0.0652)</td>
<td>0.0279 (0.0637)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.296*** (0.324)</td>
<td>-0.582** (0.278)</td>
<td>0.199 (0.212)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations (N)</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prob &gt;F</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors adjusted for 103 clusters in municipalities in parentheses.
Regressions conditional to those municipalities given a percentage of ODA to migrants (i.e. %ODA different from 0)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 1 Evolution of foreign population by regions of origin residing in Catalonia (2000, 2004, 2008, 2012)

Source: Own elaboration from Idescat®

Figure 2. % of ODA over that year’s total ODA channelled per regions by Spanish, Catalan, and local Catalan governments

Source: Own elaboration from *Fons-Català* Studies, reports in ACCD website and OECD Stats⁹

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Figure 3 ODA (in €) directed to migrant associations from Catalan local governments
(amount of funding per considered year, main migrant associations' regions of origin)

Source: Own elaboration from Fons-Català studies