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## **A scrutiny of the Linz-Moreno question**

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### **Abstract**

In this research note we delve into the Linz-Moreno question –one of the most employed measures of national and regional identity in political science– by analysing three different assumptions that the indicator relies upon: First, we test whether this instrument captures a negative linear trend between identities. Second, we examine whether the Linz-Moreno question also captures identity intensity. Third, we focus on the middle-identity category and examine whether it encapsulates people's dual sense of belonging where there are two different national identities. Using data from the MEDW Project for the Spanish/Catalan case, we show that the Linz-Moreno question meets the assumptions of linearity, intensity and the meaning of the role of the central category when capturing Catalan identity feelings. However, it fails to capture Spanish identity intensity and preferences, which over-represents the dual-identity middle category. Our empirical findings have crucial consequences for researchers working in the field of national/regional identities.

*Keywords: Linz-Moreno question, identities, linearity, intensity.*

For several decades, scholars have placed great emphasis on trying to define and find a suitable instrument to operationalise the concept of *national identity*. The task, however, has not been easy, given the wide variety of conceptualisations and definitions of identity that make the phenomenon ‘elusive, slippery, and amorphous’ (Abdelal et al. 2006). Researchers on decentralisation processes (Cole 2006), nationalism (Muñoz and Tormos 2014), immigration (Rodon and Franco-Guillén 2014) and political behaviour (Lago and Montero 2009), are amongst those who have relied on the classical Linz-Moreno question. While other measures have not been discarded (Goyder 2003), this measure of national identity has clearly been the most popular within empirical quantitative political science.<sup>1</sup>

This question, first developed by the political scientist Juan Linz in the context of Spain (Linz et al. 1981, 519–548), asks respondents to choose a single national identity from a range of options along a single dimension whose extreme points are “I feel only [national]” and “I feel only [regional]”. Despite its widespread use, the measure has been the focus of some criticism. Sinnott (2006), for instance, in a study of national and European identity, concludes that the measure is neither a valid nor an effective instrument for measuring people’s identity. He finds that the best measure to tackle European identity is an identification question –belong to, identify with, think of yourself as, feel attached to– alongside scales that rate the salience of the identification.

By drawing on this debate, we delve further into the Linz-Moreno question and analyse three assumptions that the instrument relies upon: First, we test whether this indicator is capturing a negative linear trend between competing identities. Second, we examine whether the Linz-Moreno question also captures identity intensity. Third, we place special attention on the dual-identity category (“I feel both [national] and [regional]”) and examine whether it is really

capturing a mixed sense of belonging where there are two competing identities. These aspects are tested in the Spanish/Catalan case, which offers a unique environment to test how such a popular instrument behaves. Our findings reveal that the Linz-Moreno question has shortcomings in tackling Spanish identity positions, which results in an inflation of the mixed identity category.

### **MEASURING IDENTITY IN A SUBNATIONAL CONTEXT**

The role of identity on the study of voting behaviour, political preferences or public opinion has long been central to different fields of scientific research. From psychology to political science, the study of identity has produced a substantial body of theoretical and empirical work, and interest in the field has recently been stimulated by the potential impact of national identity on responses to globalisation (Ariely 2012), immigration (Devos and Mohamed 2014) or even by the recent secession attempts by stateless nations such as Catalonia or Scotland (Muñoz and Tormos 2014).

In particular, identity has been a key variable in the subfield of regional politics. Empirical studies have employed this instrument in order to answer multiple and relevant social science questions. When designing an empirical strategy, researchers have been faced with the need to find a valid and effective measure to operationalise an individual's national identity. The main dilemma has revolved around how to capture the different dimensions that conform people's sense of belonging. This has normally been conceptualised as a social category that varies along two dimensions: content and contestation. Content describes the meaning of a collective identity. Contestation refers to the degree of agreement within a group over the content of the shared category (Abdelal et al. 2006).

Notwithstanding this fruitful tradition, the conceptualisation of national identity in the context of subnational or regional politics has been subjected to far less scrutiny. In the context of states with multiple identities, some citizens share their institutional loyalties at both levels of political legitimacy (the region and the state) without any apparent fracture between them (Brewer and Gardner 1996; Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001), while others only identify with the minority nation that coexists within the State. Despite the fact that this multilevel complexity (nation-state versus subnational identities) poses greater difficulties for grasping the identity dimensionality, in quantitative political science studies there seems to be an unwritten consensus about the instrument to be used to measure both national and regional self-reported identities. Hitherto, most of the literature (see, for instance, Cole 2006; Lago and Montero 2009; Muñoz and Tormos 2014) has employed the so-called ‘Linz-Moreno’ question (Moreno 1995).<sup>2</sup> Although the exact wording changes slightly across surveys and countries, the aim of the question was initially geared towards the identification of dual identities or balancing identities existing in a given country or region (Moreno, Arriba, and Serrano 1998). The most common version allows individuals to identify themselves along a five-category scale, ranging from ‘only regional’ to ‘only national’<sup>3</sup>:

- a) I feel only [regional]
- b) I feel more [regional] than [national]
- c) I feel as [national] as [regional]
- d) I feel more [national] than [regional]
- e) I feel only [national]

Up to now, most of the literature on regional politics has used the Linz-Moreno question to assess the presence of dual identities in territories with a strong regional cleavage coupled with

demands for higher self-government or even secession. The question has also been employed as a measure of regional/national identity in territories without identity-regional claims (see, for instance, Guinjoan & Rodon [2013] for the Spanish case, or Cole [2006] for France) or as a means to assess the identification with supranational levels of government (e.g. Medrano and Gutiérrez [2001] on Spanish and European identities).

### **THE LINZ-MORENO QUESTION AND ITS POTENTIAL FLAWS**

The consistent use by most of the literature on regional politics of the Linz-Moreno question has masked the debate over the potential shortcomings and limitations of the instrument. In this research, we reopen the debate on the suitability and adequacy of this popular operationalisation of identity by examining three assumptions that the instrument makes about linearity, intensity and the role of the central category.<sup>4</sup>

First, it is often assumed that the instrument considers that both the regional and the national/statist identity are negatively linearly related. As previous research has shown (Moreno 1995; Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001), in some countries, the State identity coexists with regional identities despite the fact that they are often based on different cultural traits, sense of collective solidarity or territorial integrity. These individuals do not express attachment to a “local” or “folkloric” identity, but to a whole system of values and culture with a different basis than the other identity. In these scenarios, researchers build upon the assumption that if an individual scores a high figure in one identity, he/she should also score a low figure in the other. This is why they are often referred to as two exclusive identities. However, we do not know whether this linearity assumption is really captured by the Linz-Moreno instrument. In fact, recent research performed with alternative measures of identity has shown that the relationship between two

confronting identities may not only be negatively correlated, but also positively or even uncorrelated (Phinney and Ong 2007).

Second, the conventional view is that the Linz-Moreno question is able to obtain the intensity of people's sense of belonging. If intensity is captured, this will imply that obtaining a high score in the index means that you feel "very identified" with a particular identity. Therefore, a switch to one category up or down will not only mean a difference in identity hierarchies, but also in identity intensity. This evidence is in line with Yip and Fuligni (2002) who showed that ethnic intensity was higher for those with a strong ethnic identity. Making the assumption that the instrument also captures identity intensity has an obvious shortcoming and the following example will suffice to illustrate the problem. Take an individual who chooses the "more [regional] than [national]" category; what does this position mean in terms of intensity? For instance, this individual could very well be located at number 8 on a 0 to 10 regional-identity scale and on number 2 on the national-identity scale. However, the same individual could also be located at number 8 on the regional-identity scale and at number 6 on the national-identity scale. 'Intensity preference' situations are very different –identity intensity is much higher in the first example than in the latter– but the Linz-Moreno question could be grouping them under the same category.

Finally, it can be argued that the middle category (I feel "as [regional] as [national]") is not entirely capturing an individual's dual identity. The central category in the Linz-Moreno question does not identify whether the respondent has a moderate identity stance or if his/her position is extreme (or mild) on both identity scales. Would individuals that choose "as national as regional" have chosen the middle category on two separate regional and national-identity scales, had they been offered the option to do so? Consider an individual that chooses the middle

category on two separate regional and national-identity scales (number 5). Consider also another respondent that chooses another position on the same scales (i.e. position number 7 on the two scales). In the previous scenarios, both respondents would be locating themselves on the same place in both the regional and the national-identity scale. Would both cases be captured by the middle category on the Linz-Moreno question? Ultimately, if different roads lead to the middle category, this option can result in a hotchpotch of people with different national identities or respondents without a clear sense of identity. Additionally, as previous research on ideology has shown (Rodon 2014), the centre category may not be capturing mixed identities because it may be ambiguous and attract respondents who do not feel committed to a response or even those who do not have a clear idea of what position they want to pick. Thus, the middle location could be a concealed form of non-response chosen because of a social pressure mechanism or because individuals feel ashamed to choose the dk/na option. If this were true, centrist individuals in both nationalism scales should have lower political sophistication than their counterparts.

## **DATA, METHODS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE**

We address these three assumptions in the context of Catalonia, a region of Spain with a strong sense of subnational identity and where demands for higher levels of self-government and secession have grown over recent years. Catalonia represents a suitable case of study for substantive, methodological and contextual reasons. First, similarly to what occurs in Quebec (Canada) or in Scotland (United Kingdom), Catalan and Spanish identities are ‘competing’, in contrast to ‘complementary’ identities, where the regional identity is a mere regional characteristic or trait of the main national (‘Statist’) identity. Second, the various ways in which self-conceived identity is operationalised in the survey we employ will help us in testing the assumptions outlined



above. The Internet survey conducted by the project ‘Making Electoral Democracy Work’ (MEDW) taken from the Catalan regional election in 2012, represents, to the best of our knowledge, the unique survey including alternative measures on regional and national identity, different from the classical Linz-Moreno question.<sup>5</sup> Third, the campaign of the 2012 Catalan regional elections mainly revolved around the referendum proposal, bringing together many aspects related to Spanish and Catalan identity. Although parliament was officially mandated until the end of 2014, the Catalan President called a snap regional election in order to get popular support for organising a referendum on independence. This entails a hard test for our argument, as national identity (Catalan or Spanish) was a relatively important issue in the public debate and the nationalist axis had more weight in voters’ decision-making processes than the traditional ideological conflict (left-right). Although this could slightly alter our empirical results (for example it represents a harder test of the idea that the “middle-of-the-road” category is ambivalent), it had the clear advantage of making people think about their national identity, either directly or indirectly.<sup>6</sup>

Table 1 displays the frequencies of the Linz-Moreno question. The figures show that an important part of the Catalan population (32.85 percent) chooses the middle category ‘I feel as Catalan as Spanish’. The second option is ‘I feel more Catalan than Spanish’ (34.14 percent) and the third one ‘I feel only Catalan’ (23.95 percent). As has been the norm over recent decades, these frequencies also show that Catalans’ self-expressed identity in the Linz-Moreno question is skewed towards Catalan identity positions. In other words, those citizens identifying themselves as ‘only Spanish’ or ‘more Spanish than Catalan’ are relatively few in number. Over recent years, surveys from the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* and the *Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió* (the Spanish and Catalan poll institutes, respectively) have shown that the percentage of citizens

selecting the Catalan identity positions has grown, depressing the middle category and increasing the unique Catalan identity option.<sup>7</sup>

[Table 1 about here]

As previously mentioned, the MEDW survey allows us to compare the Linz-Moreno responses with two additional measures of the intensity of Catalan and Spanish identity. The wording of the question is: “On a scale of 1–10, which national identity do you relate more closely with, where 0 is the minimum level of Catalan/Spanish identity and 10 the maximum level of Catalan/Spanish identity”.

Figure 1 shows the Kernel densities distribution for the Catalan and Spanish nationalist scales. Kernel densities show that the distribution of the Catalan and the Spanish nationalist scale is different. While values for the Catalan national scale are skewed towards higher nationalist positions, values for the Spanish identity scale are more concentrated on the centre and on low levels of Spanish nationalism. The Spanish identity scale displays two clear modes, whereas the Catalan identity scale follows a platykurtic distribution skewed towards the right. The distribution of both scales does not visually seem to fit a perfect (negative) linear relationship.

[Figure 1 about here]

Notwithstanding the previous evidence that linearity is not perfect, we need further evidence to test it. Table 2 shows the correlation between the Linz-Moreno question and two different

indicators for national identity, one on the Catalan/Spanish nationalist scale (previously used), and the other on regional/national attachment. The wording of this latter question is: “On a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 means that you don’t feel any attachment and 10 that you feel strong attachment, which is your level of attachment to Catalonia/Spain?”. The highest correlation is found between the Linz-Moreno question and the Catalan nationalism scale (0.78,  $p < 0.01$ ). The correlation with the Spanish nationalist scale is the second highest (0.69,  $p < 0.01$ ). Interestingly, although the Pearson correlation is still significant, the relationship between the Linz-Moreno question and the indicators of attachment towards Spain or Catalonia show more moderate values (especially in the latter). This is because the variable identifying affection to Catalonia is skewed to the right. This implies that, in general, Catalans express attachment to Catalonia, irrespective of their identity in the Linz-Moreno question. In contrast, the variable attachment to Spain, which is more normally distributed, seems to be more sensitive to the identity of individuals.

This correlation offers a first hint that the Linz-Moreno question does not seem to capture a perfect linear negative trend between the two national indicators: while linearity is fairly observed for the Catalan nationalist scale, the same does not hold for the Spanish nationalist scale, and even less for measures of attachment – neither the Catalan nor the Spanish one.

[Table 2 about here]

Is the Linz-Moreno question however, encapsulating the individual’s level of intensity towards either Catalan or Spanish nationalism? To test this idea, we first ran a multinomial logistic model in which subjective national identity (dependent variable) is regressed on the Catalan and the

Spanish identity scale, together with controls of gender, language spoken, size of town, political sophistication, age and income.<sup>8</sup> Secondly, we simulated different scenarios in which an individual is expected to be located on a particular position on both the Catalan and the Spanish nationalist scale. Finally, we computed the predicted probability for this hypothetical individual to locate himself/herself on the different categories of the Linz-Moreno question.

Table 3 shows the values for the estimates, together with the 95 percent confidence intervals. Thus, the first column simulation is based on an individual who locates himself/herself on the position number 8 on the Catalan nationalist scale and on position number 2 on the Spanish one. According to the predicted probabilities taken from the model, he/she is more likely to choose the category “More Catalan than Spanish”. Interestingly, when the values are reversed (2 on the Catalan nationalist scale and 8 on the Spanish scale), the category “As Spanish as Catalan” is more likely (instead of the “more Spanish than Catalan” category).

[Table 3 about here]

In fact, simulations performed through a multinomial model in which we introduce a variable capturing the Euclidean distance between the self-reported position on the Catalan and on the Spanish scales confirm that increasing the distance between Spanish and Catalan positions on the nationalism scales generates a different effect depending on the direction of identity change. In this variable, negative values indicate higher levels of Spanish than Catalan nationalism, and positive values the other way around; the 0-value corresponds to an individual scoring equally on both the Spanish and Catalan nationalist scale. Figure 2 corroborates this argument. Graphs show

the probability of changing from the category “only Spanish” to the category indicated in the subtitle as a function of the distance between Catalan and Spanish nationalism (positive values indicate more pro-Catalan positions and negative values more pro-Spanish positions).<sup>9</sup>

The graph on the upper-left indicates the probability to change from the category “Only Spanish” to “More Spanish” as the distance between Catalan and Spanish nationalism changes. Predicted probabilities monotonically decrease, thereby indicating that, as the distance between Catalan and Spanish positions narrows, the probability to choose the “More Spanish” category decreases. Interestingly, the same pattern is not mirrored in the case of the “more Catalan” category (bottom-left figure). The probability of choosing this category reaches its peak when the distance between the Catalan and the Spanish scale is +5 (towards Catalan positions), but then it starts to decrease.

These contrasting results indicate that linearity and intensity are not equally applicable to the relationship between the Spanish and the Catalan nationalist scale and the Linz-Moreno question. Thus, when the distance between the self-reported Catalan position and the Spanish position increases (in favour of the former), the probability to choose the “More Catalan” category starts to decline. The bottom-right graph illustrates this process: when the distance towards Catalan positions hits 6, individuals suddenly become more likely to choose the “Only Catalan” category. The same logic is not reported when the distance increases towards Spanish national positions: the probability to choose “more Spanish than Catalan” increases monotonically, but it does not decrease when the distance equals -5 (or lower values), as occurs in the Catalan nationalist scale. This corroborates that while Catalan positions on the Linz-Moreno question tackle the intensity of Catalan identity (in a linear way), Spanish positions are not entirely able to do so.

[Figure 2 about here]

Finally, simulations in Figure 2 also show that the “Dual-identity” category also deviates from what would be expected if it were capturing both Catalan and Spanish identity to the same degree. Instead of portraying a symmetrical distribution with two tails, the graph (top-right) shows positive skewness, which brings us to the test relating to the third assumption: does the dual category of the Linz-Moreno question (“As Catalan as Spanish”) represent moderate positions on both identities?

Figure 3 plots the probability of being self-located on the dual-identity category according to different simulated scenarios. All simulations take the same position on both the Catalan and the Spanish identity scale across all values, from 0 to 10, and calculate the probability to choose the dual-identity category. Contrary to what could be expected, the 5-5 simulation (the centre position on both the Catalan and the Spanish scale) does not generate the highest probability of being on the dual-identity category. In fact, the probability of being on the dual-identity category does not decline as the pair-simulated scenarios move away from the centrist pair (5-5). Individuals scoring 4-4, 3-3, 2-2, 1-1 or even 0-0 on both identity scales are equally likely to choose the dual-identity category. Conversely, scoring higher than 5-5 on both scales decreases the probability of choosing it. These simulations indicate that individuals with moderate values on both scales are equally likely to be in the middle category on the Linz-Moreno question. This implies that the middle category acts as a recipient for different profiles, thereby eroding its capacity to act as a dual-identity category. Besides the idea that the mixed identity category may be harbouring politically unsophisticated individuals is not confirmed by our analysis –centrist individuals on both nationalism scales do not have a lower level of political sophistication. Similarly, individuals

choosing the ‘dk/na’ option in other measures of identity (scales or attachment, where there is no central position) are not more likely to be on the dual-identity category.

[Figure 3 about here]

## CONCLUSIONS

Despite the widespread popularity of the Linz-Moreno indicator, the debate over how well the instrument performs is still open. Although the literature in psychology has made important efforts in finding an effective way to tackle national identity (Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004), few methodologists in quantitative political science have theoretically and empirically questioned the Linz-Moreno question. This research note represents a further step towards understanding an instrument that still presents more questions than answers. In particular, we have dealt with three assumptions about this self-subjective national identity instrument: linearity, intensity and the role of the central category.

These assumptions are put to the test in the Catalan case, a context in which the Linz-Moreno question is very often employed to tackle both Spanish and Catalan self-perceived identity. The empirical analysis has shown that both the linearity and intensity assumption hold, but only for the Catalan identity values. Thus, when the individual attaches more strength to the Catalan identity (as opposed to the Spanish identity), his/her position on the identity scale moves towards Catalan identity values in a linear trend. Yet the same trend is not reported for Spanish identity. Higher values on the Spanish identity scale do not imply a linear move downwards on the identity scale – that is, towards pro-Spanish values. In fact, our empirical analysis has shown that individuals with

pro-Spanish identity positions tend to choose the dual-identity category (“As Catalan as Spanish”). As previous research has argued, this may have to do with the strong connections that most Catalan citizens make between Spanish identity and right-wing values, which are still seen as rooted in the Francoist dictatorship tradition (Dinas 2012). From a more theoretical perspective, the phenomenon could also be explained by the higher importance that minority groups attribute to identity –in our case study, the Catalan identity– when compared to the members of the dominant majority – the Spanish one (Phinney and Alipuria 1990).

All in all, our empirical analysis demonstrates that the Linz-Moreno question has strong shortcomings. Although the instrument correctly captures identity preferences (whether an identity is preferred over the other), it fails to properly capture identity intensity or linearity with national feelings. Additionally, our analyses have shown that the dual-identity category does not entirely encapsulate mixed identities. Individuals choosing the middle category on both the Spanish and Catalan nationalist scale are a heterogeneous group, thus hindering its ability to create a proper measure of dual identity. Our supplementary analyses have shown, however, that individuals in the dual-identity category do not record lower levels of political sophistication, as one may expect.

Overall, this paper should encourage future researchers to validate national identity instruments in empirical research, especially in contexts where multiple identities coexist. At the same time, greater efforts should be put into constructing alternative instruments to capture different dimensions of regional identities. Sinnot’s proposal for “an identification question [...] incorporating or followed by a scale that rates the importance or salience or intensity of the identification involved” (2006, 22) would only solve some of the shortcomings identified in the present research, namely the intensity of identity, but would still fail to overcome the linearity and middle category issues. Additionally, a two-question measure may not be parsimonious



enough to be used in empirical quantitative analysis, and some people may not be able to distinguish policy from saliency positions (Spoon 2011).

In sum, this research note represents progress towards the necessity to test these assumptions in other contexts and ultimately to develop a fully-fledged instrument to correctly tackle national and regional identity.

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## Tables

Table 1: National Self-Identification According to the Linz-Moreno Question

	Frequencies
I feel only Spanish	2.94
I feel more Spanish than Catalan	6.12
I feel as Catalan as Spanish	32.85
I feel more Catalan than Spanish	34.14
I feel only Catalan	23.95
Total	100

Table 2: Pearson correlation between National Identity Indicators

	<b>Linz- Moreno</b>	Catalan nationalism	Spanish nationalism	Attachment Catalonia	Attachment Spain
Linz-Moreno	<b>1</b>				
Catalan nationalism	<b>0.78*</b>	1			
Spanish nationalism	<b>-0.69*</b>	-0.52*	1		
Attachment Catalonia	<b>0.52*</b>	0.55*	-0.27*	1	
Attachment Spain	<b>-0.66*</b>	-0.51*	0.64*	-0.02	1

\*p<0.01

Table 3: INS position according to simulated values in the Catalan and Spanish nationalist scale

	First simulation	Second simulation
	Catalan nationalism: 8 Spanish nationalism: 2	Catalan nationalism: 2 Spanish nationalism: 8
Only Spanish	0.01 [-0.01-0.01]	0.01 [-0.01-0.05]
More Spanish than Catalan	0.01 [-0.01-0.01]	0.15 [0.06-0.25]
As Spanish as Catalan	0.06 [0.03-0.08]	<b>0.84</b> [0.73-0.94]
More Catalan than Spanish	<b>0.79</b> [0.74-0.85]	0.01 [0.00-0.01]
Only Catalan	0.15 [0.09-0.19]	0.01 [-0.01-0.01]

## Figures

Figure 1: Level of Catalan and Spanish Nationalism in Catalonia (Kernel estimates)




Figure 2: Probability of Changing from Only Spanish to another Category and Distance between Catalan and Spanish Nationalism







Figure 3: Probability of Choosing “As Catalan as Spanish” under similar pair simulated position on the Spanish and Catalan identity scale



## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> According to Google Scholar, the Linz-Moreno question has been used in more than 230 academic articles/papers/book chapters from 2005 to 2015 (last accessed 29<sup>th</sup> April, 2015).

<sup>2</sup> The question is normally called the ‘Moreno question’. The instrument is named after Luis Moreno, who popularized it, although he himself credits Linz with originally designing the question. From a theoretical point of view, it is worth mentioning that a self-reported national identity measure such as this one does not capture all dimensions of the means by which individuals express or live their identity (Smith 2010). We stick to this measure due to its popularity in quantitative regionalism or nationalism studies, while we acknowledge that there is a prolific camp of study on identities that approaches the phenomenon from a qualitative perspective. Among these scholars, the Linz-Moreno question is not the most popular and instead they employ longer and more encompassing measures of identity.

<sup>3</sup> The order of the categories is sometimes reversed. A sixth category, the *don't know/no answer* options is normally included. Some surveys also include the category “I feel neither [regional] nor [national]”, although this option is rarely present. Finally, a few surveys have not included the dual identity answer (“I feel as national as regional”) in order to force individuals to place themselves on one of the two sides.

<sup>4</sup> It is not the purpose of this research to assess the meaning individuals attach to the scale or its dimensionality. It is well known by scholars that different individuals may attach a different meaning to the same measure –the content, in Abdelal et al's. (2006) words; likewise, identities are multifaceted constructs that may include a large number of dimensions (Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004).

<sup>5</sup> Questions on regional and national feelings are very rarely included in the same survey. In Quebec and Scotland, these questions had not been performed yet, whereas in Spain, the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (CIS) has only included in a few surveys a measure on regional nationalism (Catalan, Basque, etc.), along with the Linz-Moreno question. However, the same question regarding the Spanish nationalist has not been asked. Instead, only once a question on Spanish ‘feeling’, together with the regional ‘nationalism’ and the Linz-Moreno question was performed in 2006 (CIS 2667). Results using this database for the Basque country go in the same direction to the ones presented here. Results are available upon request.

<sup>6</sup> The Catalan election took place on 25 November, 2012. The survey was conducted between 16 November and 23 November, 2012. A representative sample of 993 individuals were interviewed. All these surveys have been conducted by Harris International, relying on their panel of respondents. The sampling was based on a stratified, quota-based approach. Quotas were set by controlling for age, gender, education and status. For further details see Blais (2010). This is a single snapshot survey which does not allow for a longitudinal analysis. As more surveys become available, future research can analyse whether the findings suggested here are congruent when different time-periods are considered.

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<sup>7</sup> People's identity may not be stable and can be subject to contingent factors, such as the macroeconomic context (Abrams and Vasiljevic 2014). Group perceptions may therefore not be stable and even linearity can be altered. Due to the lack of longitudinal data, this possibility cannot be fully tested.

<sup>8</sup> These are conventional controls in studies on nationalism (see, for instance, Rodon and Franco-Guillén 2014; Muñoz and Tormos 2014). The use of these controls does not modify the findings of the models.

<sup>9</sup> The multinomial model includes the same control variables as in previous models. Full estimates will be made available upon request.