

"There Are the Pyrenees!" Fortifying the Nation in Francoist Spain

Abstract

Literature on war and the environment has examined a wide range of militarized landscapes, but massive fortification systems such as the Maginot or Siegfried lines, which are symbols of a military trend in vogue during the interwar period, have largely been ignored. These military walls interwove natural and national values and constituted massive landscape interventions, aimed at reinforcing political borders, embedded in—and relying upon—geographical features. This article examines a late example of this trend: the fortification of the Pyrenees border that the Spanish dictatorship carried out during the 1940s. Particularly after the liberation of France in 1944, the Francoist regime engaged in a serious effort to build a fortification system in the Pyrenees, fearing a potential invasion; by the early 1950s, several thousands of bunkers formed what became the Pyrenees Line. Through these efforts, the Francoist

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army attempted to convert what Spanish fascists regarded as a spiritual wall—the political border with France—into a truly physical separation. Today, the remaining fortifications are material ruins of the Spanish isolation after the Second World War, when the Francoist regime closed in on itself, until the Cold War, when Francisco Franco became a US ally. Altogether, the case of the militarization of the Pyrenees shows how walls, fences, and other forms of fortification can be a fertile ground for environmental history to explore the mix of culture and nature as well as the political implications of the concept of natural borders.

DEFENSE LINES, BORDERS, AND NATURE

On the final days of the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), fascist poet and soldier Ernesto Giménez Caballero was at the head of the triumphant Francoist military units occupying Catalonia. As the troops reached the Pyrenees border, following on the heels of the fleeing loyalist army, one of the first prophets of fascism in Spain went into ecstasy.¹ He called the Francoist victory a “seismic movement in History,” one that would return the Pyrenees—“a spiritual mountain range”—to its position as a healthy division between France and Spain.² In the view of the Spanish fascists, French ideological influences had debilitated the true essence of imperial Spain since 1700 when, upon the crowning of his grandson Philip V as king of Spain, Louis XIV of France had allegedly stated: “The Pyrenees are no more” (“*Il n’y a plus de Pyrénées*”), thereby seemingly erasing the political significance of the mountains.³ Nearly 250 years later, the Francoist occupation of the Pyrenees inspired Giménez Caballero to publish an account, which he titled (in direct response to the French king): “There are the Pyrenees!” (“*¡Hay Pirineos!*”).⁴

By the mid-twentieth century, Giménez Caballero’s jubilant dream for the Pyrenees had materialized in unexpected forms. Scattered along the Spanish side of the Pyrenean border, from the Bay of Biscay to the Mediterranean and ranging to a depth of sixty kilometers from the frontier, approximately 4,500 fortifications, built on the top of hills and cliffs, stood guard over roads and valleys—the result of a vast project conceived early after the Civil War and secretly put into use as the collapse of the Axis armies approached in 1944. Although these fortifications of the so-called Pyrenees Line were the subject of discussion at the United Nations in 1946 and were analyzed by the US Joint Chief of Staff in 1947, they began to fall into oblivion after the consolidation of the Cold War and the 1953 Pact of Madrid, which signaled the rapprochement between Spain and the United

States. The US military, after all, was interested in building naval and air bases in the Iberian Peninsula, not in obsolete field defenses along the French border. In 1959, General Francisco Franco, the former devotee of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, toured the streets of Madrid accompanied by Dwight Eisenhower, the first US president ever to visit Spain, while Giménez Caballero, the once-admired poet and recently appointed ambassador to the Latin American republic of Paraguay, had become an uncomfortable reminder of the fascist heyday.

Although short-lived, the Pyrenees Line constituted a late example of a military trend much in vogue during the interwar period.⁵ The Maginot and Siegfried defense lines, in France and Germany respectively, are probably the most famous examples of the fortification fever that took Europe by storm.⁶ These colossal military walls constituted massive landscape interventions aimed at reinforcing political borders, embedded in—and relying upon—geographical features regarded as obstacles under the prevailing military doctrine prior to the Second World War. Growing out of the muddy trenches of the First World War, these neat fortification systems inextricably mixed nature with culture, forests with concrete, and mountains with steel. Guarding the national borders, disguised in the landscape, they were often seen as embodying the natural values of the homeland. However, when they were finally put to the test, they proved of little use in a new war based on the mechanization of warfare, and most failed to accomplish their purpose.

Fortifications—from simple walls and forts to the imposing Maginot Line—have been used to create, mark, or reinforce social and political borders, often relying on geographical and landscape features. But, above all else, they have been erected, developed, and perfected to prevent the entry of those regarded as being undesirable. “Fortress Europe,” for example, widely used today as a critical allusion to the European system of migrant detention centers and border patrols, was originally a term for the 1940s German fortifications built in occupied Europe to prevent Allied landings.⁷ The Pyrenees Line served the same multiple purposes, intended to protect Spain from military invasion and to clearly delineate Spanish cultural and political boundaries.

By examining the symbolic and material development of the Francoist Pyrenees Line, this article contributes to the historiography of twentieth-century Spain, the Francoist regime, and the growing literature on war and environment.⁸ First, it explores the construction of fortification systems as militarized landscapes, underlining the use of discourses interweaving nature and nation and the importance of social control. Second, in providing a Spanish case study, it contributes to the literature on the environmental history of war with significance beyond the European context, as demonstrated by the close

attention that US military planners devoted to the region during the early Cold War.⁹

Francoist Spain's border with France was fortified first through rhetoric that made the Pyrenees a natural and spiritual bastion separating the country from the degeneration of liberal democracy. But the case of the Pyrenees also illustrates that in order to fulfill the main aim of a fortification project—that is, breaking the socioecological continuum—control over people and space was at least as important as the capability to design and build a system of defenses and bunkers. As put by Marco Armiero in his study of the Italian mountains, it could be said that Francoism changed the Pyrenees “with words and with bombs,” sculpting a whole region as a battlefield for a war that did not occur in the end.¹⁰

NATURAL OBSTACLE, SPIRITUAL EARTHQUAKE

The Pyrenean mountain range extends for almost 500 kilometers, separating the Iberian Peninsula from the rest of continental Europe. From the Mediterranean Sea to the Bay of Biscay, several peaks exceed 3,000 meters and form a geographical feature of great historical and symbolic meaning, containing one of the first national parks established in Spain.¹¹ Nonetheless, beyond its cultural significance, the Pyrenees are not a homogeneous unit. The 200-kilometer-long central region of the massif, between the Roncal and Segre rivers, averages more than 2,000 meters in elevation and marks a fairly clear line between the northern and southern climate and biota. On the two extremes of the Pyrenees, however, the situation is fairly different. Neither the western nor the eastern Pyrenees represent considerable obstacles, nor do they constitute a sharp separation between climatic or biotic regions. The lowest mountain pass of the massif, the Col du Perthus, connects southern France with Catalonia at an elevation of 290 meters. Accordingly, these regions at the eastern and western ends of the Pyrenees are more permeable, and they have experienced the frequent circulation of peoples and influences as well as of armies.¹²

Today, as in 1939, the political border in force in the region goes back to the 1659 Treaty of the Pyrenees, which put an end to the French–Spanish wars of the previous decades. After a revolt in Catalonia in 1640, French troops helped the rebels to defeat the Spanish army and took control of the region.¹³ The 1659 treaty sanctioned the French annexation of the territories north of the Pyrenees and thus modified the eastern part of the border. However, it took more than two centuries to formally establish, delimit, and enforce the border's precise demarcation on the ground. In parallel, the new

political border, and the differences it established on each of its sides, contributed to the slow formation of two national identities.¹⁴

By 1939, almost three centuries later, the newly born Francoist regime coveted the French colonial possessions in northern Africa but showed few signs of quarreling over the older borders with France.¹⁵ However, the fascist celebration of the Pyrenees' spiritual reemergence that was encapsulated in Giménez Caballero's words, "There are the Pyrenees!" represented an explicit rejection of liberal Europe, which was shared by many Francoist supporters.¹⁶ "Spain is not Europe, it never was," claimed General Alfredo Kindelán, one of the top officers of the Spanish army. In the pages of the prominent military publication *Ejército*, he argued that Spain was a small continent in itself, separated from Europe by an almost insurmountable barrier: the Pyrenees. His views display the significant influence that National-Socialist notions of geopolitics enjoyed among part of the Spanish military. Kindelán argued that the Spanish nation configured "an exceptional geopolitical subject," featuring a substantial unity in weather, orography, customs, and race. In his opinion, in the late eighteenth century, France had infected Spain with the virus of revolution through the Pyrenees border, but after a century and a half of illness, the shock therapy of the Spanish Civil War had cleansed the body of the Spanish nation. Once sanitized, the nation was ready to attain its geopolitical "vital space."¹⁷

Despite initially adopting a neutral position during the Second World War, Spain declared itself non-belligerent amid the French downfall of June 1940. This position involved support for the Axis forces but not a direct involvement in military operations. As Paris fell to the Nazis, Francoist forces occupied the Tangier international zone in northern Morocco as a temporary wartime measure and laid claims over Gibraltar. However, no further escalation followed, and Franco did not enter the war despite extensive collaboration with Italy and Germany.¹⁸ Its most symbolic intervention was probably the Blue Division ("División Azul"), a unit of 50,000 volunteers that became a German army division and fought in the Eastern front starting in the summer of 1941. The course of the war frustrated Spanish colonial ambitions in northern Africa, but the view of the Pyrenees as a "natural border" endured, permeating school textbooks and cinema productions.¹⁹ As a Spanish schoolbook explained in 1943, God had placed the Pyrenees as a natural border to "separate us eternally from freethinking France."²⁰

As the tide of the Second World War turned against the Axis forces and the Spanish regime, Francoist officials became uneasy. The oversized Spanish army—close to 500,000 mobilized men—was a giant with feet of clay, lacking access to modern equipment, fuel, motorized vehicles, and air power. In this context, military theorists clung to the theoretical advantages that a mountain landscape offered.

According to views widely held in their circles at the time, mountains and forests could compensate for the lack of armored divisions and even air power. Making a virtue of necessity, military theorists argued that in case of war the Spanish armed forces had to make the best of its landscape and enhance its natural qualities when possible.²¹

Accordingly, the defensive potential of Spain's nature ranked high among its national attributes. In the Pyrenees, Giménez Caballero saw a representation of the Spanish nation.²² As the main Francoist newspaper put it in early 1944, nature had favored Spain with the masculine side of the Pyrenees—arid, rocky, uncomfortable, apt for mountaineers, and good for defense—whereas the French side was feminine, deemed fit for tourists, and without defensive value.²³ Along with this celebration came an emphasis on the virtues of the Spanish soldier, who must exploit the advantages granted by his land despite lacking modern equipment. Naturally, images combining mountain landscapes with stoic Spanish soldiers are featured in the military press of the period (see [figure 1](#)). Well into the 1940s, during a conference on the strategic value of the border, a general and military professor underlined that the Spanish armed forces had to adapt to the national terrain. The defining characteristic of the Spanish geography, as he put it in front of the future top commanders of the army, was encapsulated in the prefix “anti”: “Nature has indelibly inscribed this spirit in our geography, which is almost completely anti-tank, anti-aircraft, anti-airlift and, maybe, anti-atomic.”²⁴

In the eyes of high-ranked Francoist officers, it was this natural superiority of Spain's topography that the French—“our neighbors on the other side of the Rif and the Pyrenees”—had intended to wipe out. They noted that the French adopted different approaches to these mountainous divides. While, in Morocco, the French built few connecting roads, in the Pyrenees, they promoted interconnection with Spain, with no fewer than seventeen roads and four railroads crisscrossing the border. “France certainly wanted to level the Pyrenees,” they concluded.²⁵ In order to reverse this trend, Francoist authorities cancelled road and train projects aimed at improving connections with France and mocked the incipient tourist development of the border region, which was eventually abandoned.²⁶ Top-ranking officials actually celebrated the lack of a good transportation infrastructure in Spain, regarding it as an advantage in case of conflict.²⁷

Yet, despite their faith in the natural virtues of the Spanish geography, military planners were not blind to the differences in the Pyrenees mountain range. They conceded that on each side of the massif a door swung open, a weakness aggravated by the regions involved: the Basque Country and Navarra in the west and Catalonia in the east. As one Francoist general put it, on each side of the Pyrenees' natural bastion grew “poisonous plants” that periodically threatened



Figure 1. Cover of the Spanish military magazine *Ejército*, no. 115 (August 1949). Credit: Biblioteca Virtual del Ministerio de Defensa (<http://bibliotecavirtualdefensa.es>).

the social, moral, and political virtues of Spain.²⁸ After the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939, the military occupation of these regions came hand in hand with an effort to seal off the border and insulate Spain from foreign influences. Imagining the Pyrenees as a potential theatre of war, the military intervened to enhance the defensive features of the landscape, building fortifications as a way of reinforcing nature. Yet, to transform the Pyrenees into the solid separation that Francoism yearned for, the Spanish regime had to change not only its landscape but also its people.

PERFECTING NATURE THROUGH WORK

Military officers and Francoist ideologues believed that the fortifications erected along the Pyrenees border had both spiritual and natural foundations. But the mortar that hardened these defenses was political violence and social control. The Francoist victory in 1939 gave birth to a “New Spain” where there was no space for political opposition. The new regime aimed at pulling the weeds out by the root; at least 130,000 political opponents were executed during the

Spanish Civil War, plus 20,000 more in the years that followed.²⁹ Autarky, the socioeconomic system championed during the first years of the Francoist dictatorship, advocated top-down self-sufficiency, which was closely associated with tight social control and privileged military expenditure.³⁰ Although military operations finished in 1939, the state of war remained in force until as late as 1948, ensuring the absolute prevalence of the army over civil authorities.³¹ In the border region, where the Spanish Maquis—the guerrilla resistance against Franco—endured and became particularly active between 1944 and 1948, the boundaries between war and post-war were even more blurred.³²

Organizing a defense line and preparing a future battlefield first meant imposing tight control over the space in dispute. The regulation of movement was a central part of this process. Francoist authorities legally established a “frontier zone” where safe-conduct documents were mandatory for anyone circulating out of his or her town of residence. Although the exact limits of this strip of territory kept changing, it reached up to a depth of eighty kilometers from the border. The safe-conduct document was required to use any public or private transport in this area, and anyone stopped without carrying a valid and stamped document was to be fined and could be arrested. Activities such as hunting and tree cutting were controlled. The “frontier zone” and its legal requirements remained in force until as late as 1955.³³

Sanitizing the border region by getting rid of those individuals regarded as suspicious was part and parcel of its militarization. Thousands of people had already gone into exile when the war finished. Yet anyone who had served a prison sentence faced enormous difficulties if she was to set her residence inside the limits of the frontier zone, and those listed as politically unreliable were legally banished from this area repeatedly. At the very same time, thousands of soldiers and officers occupied the region during the 1940s. Lacking garrisons, troops inhabited vacant spaces and buildings, while officers usually lived in private houses.³⁴ The very efforts of fortification were one more layer of military occupation, a permanent materialization of their authority in the territory. The presence of military forces also contributed to the obstruction of the Spanish Maquis moving into the region from France, who reported the activity of Francoist troops throughout the border landscape and made efforts to get hold of forged safe-conduct passes.³⁵

The building of fortifications thus became intertwined with military occupation and social control. Work started as soon as the Spanish Civil War finished, and these construction projects made use of one of the few abundant and cheap resources of autarkic Spain: labor power.³⁶ Militarized units of political prisoners participated in public works and reconstruction projects all over the country, but, in

the border region, some also engaged in building fortifications and military infrastructure, usually very close to the border line. In 1939 and 1940, 7,800 prisoners worked on these projects in the Basque region, under very poor material conditions, while approximately 3,800 did so in Catalonia.³⁷ These early efforts were not part of an integral plan and stopped around 1941; most military engineers during these years were busy fortifying the region of Gibraltar and North Africa instead.

The course of the Second World War forcibly changed the priorities of the Francoist regime. In late 1943, Franco abandoned the ambivalent “non-belligerent” position and returned to neutrality while announcing the withdrawal of the Blue Division from the Eastern front. Survival for the regime was to become the top priority. Around this time, the Spanish chief of staff established directives for the fortification of the Pyrenees. These directives certified the military’s trust in the terrain by classifying territories into three categories—A, B, and C—according to its orography and the communications that crossed it. High mountain passes were regarded as “passive” areas (C), where field fortifications and military patrols would suffice, whereas flat regions with good communications and roads were considered critical spaces (A) that required all kinds of fortification efforts (see figures 2 and 3).³⁸ In other words, it was the terrain that determined the effort of fortification needed.³⁹

Early in 1944, disguised as civilians, senior officers travelled through the region categorizing the lands under these typologies and determining the locations where the “natural obstacles” should be reinforced with fortifications. They also accounted for the local resources and defense possibilities of each area.⁴⁰ As Nazi-occupied France collapsed during the summer of 1944 and the infiltration of Spanish Maquis with experience in the French resistance increased, fears of invasion haunted the Francoists.⁴¹ On August 23, 1944, right before the liberation of Paris by the Allies, the Spanish chief of staff signed an order setting in motion an integral project of fortification for the border region with France.⁴² Less than two months later, in October 1944, the Spanish Maquis launched an ambitious operation to occupy the Val d’Aran, the only Spanish valley situated on the Atlantic watershed of the Pyrenees. Despite being rapidly defeated by the Francoist army, this operation seemed to confirm the fears of Francoist officials regarding external attacks.⁴³ By the end of 1944, several regiments of engineers had been deployed in the border region along with other military units, and works were underway.⁴⁴

In contrast to previous fortification works, it was regular conscript soldiers who bore the brunt of the building effort after 1944, with no prisoners taking part.⁴⁵ Quite significantly, however, Franco appointed as the head engineer of the Pyrenees fortification system the colonel who had devised and directed the vast system of forced




Figure 2. Distribution of resistance centers along the border with France, Fourth Military Region, Catalonia, eastern sector. Credit: Map created by author based on archival materials from the Archivo Intermedio Militar Pirenaico (AIMP), 2018.




Figure 3 Distribution of resistance centers along the border with France, Fourth Military Region, Catalonia, western sector. Credit: Map created by author based on archival materials from the AIMP, 2018.

labor throughout Spain.⁴⁶ Juan Petirena, a veteran military engineer with experience in the colonial war in Morocco and the Civil War, organized the conscript labor.⁴⁷ Under his guidance, the hobbled metabolism of autarkic Spain started pumping tons and tons of concrete, along with thousands of soldiers, to the Pyrenees to bring the ambitious plans to fruition.⁴⁸ In the following years, the physical work of conscript soldiers transformed the borderlands and became inscribed on the landscape in the form of reinforced concrete bunkers.⁴⁹

Lacking machinery and fuel, the work that concealed hundreds of defenses and shelters throughout the Spanish border was largely manual. Unlike the massive fortification systems undertaken by France or Germany during the interwar period and the Second World War, the efforts of the Spanish army were those of a low-energy society relying almost completely on the labor of both animals and humans. The military transported building materials to the border region first by railway and then to the main towns by truck. However, on the final stretch of the journey to the fortification sites, animal draught still remained essential. As pointed out by a former lieutenant deployed in the region, “a mule was a treasure”, and the injuries and deaths of animals usually led to long legal enquiries against the officers in charge.⁵⁰ Conscript soldiers, who were more abundant and less valued, substituted for animal draught when mules were not available, as was often the case, and working days could extend from ten to fourteen hours.⁵¹ Several former conscripts recalled the work conditions as dire; they were badly equipped for work, especially in mountain environments, and had limited food available. Fearing encounters with guerrillas, armed sentinels oversaw the work, and officers sometimes hid their own rank insignias to prevent Maquis from distinguishing them from regular soldiers.⁵²

In order to make up for the limited technology available and the quality of the fortifications themselves, military officers placed great emphasis on embedding the fortifications in the Pyrenees landscape. When giving detailed building instructions, military directives on paper and officers on the ground highlighted the importance of “imitating nature” by concealing bunkers in the terrain through excavating caves and galleries so that the fortifications would become part of the landscape.⁵³ Creating structures that mimicked nature was only part of the goal; officers encouraged soldiers to take advantage of the protection and concealment nature already provided. Military publications of the time portrayed mountain environments as the best allies of the Spanish soldier and explicitly associated the features of the mountains—rough, brave, hard—with Spanish racial traits.⁵⁴ Many of the shelters were excavated in rock, and others imitated natural features as well as shepherd huts and terracing walls in the hillsides.⁵⁵

Along the border, the structure of the fortification system was based on “resistance centers,” following the A, B, and C categories established in 1943, that were intended to defend themselves autonomously. With the exception of a few advanced fortifications, these resistance centers were not placed right on the border but, rather, inside Spanish territory, covering the main lines of penetration. Certain valleys and regions directly bordering the French territory—like the one chosen by the Spanish Maquis for their failed invasion in late 1944—were considered indefensible and therefore not covered by the fortification system. Each resistance center was assigned the defense of a specific area and was composed of several types of fortifications, from large anti-tank bunkers to small machine-gun pillboxes or shelters, among others. Before work slowed down in 1948, most of the military effort was concentrated in the areas along the main roads and penetration lines, where the density of the completed bunkers was remarkable.⁵⁶ On the other hand, most of the fortifications planned for passive zones, where the natural obstacles were regarded as insurmountable, remained only on paper. As a result of the military’s faith in terrain, the distribution of the fortifications constructed throughout the border region became quite unequal. Few bunkers were built in the higher mountain passes, while significant concentrations of fortifications were placed in valleys that were regarded as strategic and also along the main penetration lines (see [figures 4 and 5](#)).

AN INCOMPLETE PROJECT: A COLD WAR STORY

In early 1946, an incident between France and Spain increased the tension in the border region. Cristino García Granda, a member of the Spanish Maquis and also a hero of the French resistance, was arrested in Madrid and sentenced to death. Despite the protests of the French government, he was executed on February 21, 1946. In response, the French government ordered the border with Spain closed, and international condemnations against Francoist Spain grew.⁵⁷ A few weeks later, in early April 1946, Oskar Lange, the Polish representative in the United Nations (UN)—which Spain had not been invited to join—petitioned the UN Security Council to study the situation in Spain. Keeping Franco in power, noted Lange, was creating international tensions. One of the reasons he used was the militarization of the border region, and he highlighted the presence of thousands of soldiers and the erection of fortifications.⁵⁸

As a result of the Polish petition, a subcommittee on the so-called “Spanish Question” was formed to look into the activities of the Francoist regime. Not only did it find evidence of Francoist support of the Axis powers during the war, but it also gathered information on




Figure 4. Fortifications completed in the resistance centers of the Fourth Military Region, Catalonia, by January 10, 1950, eastern sector. Credit: Map created by author based on archival materials from the AIMP, 2018.




Figure 5. Fortifications completed in the resistance centers of the Fourth Military Region, Catalonia, by January 10, 1950, western sector. Credit: Map created by author based on archival materials from the AIMP, 2018.

the fortifications built in the Pyrenees. The memorandums provided by the British, American, and French governments stated that the fortifications in the Pyrenees were of a defensive nature.⁵⁹ However, on the basis of all of the information collected by the end of 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring that Francoism was a “fascist regime patterned on, and established largely as a result of aid received from, Hitler’s Nazi Germany and Mussolini’s Fascist Italy.”⁶⁰ The declaration recommended UN members to take diplomatic action and keep Spain away from international institutions until an acceptable government was formed. The Francoist regime responded to this diplomatic isolation by increasing military mobilization and declared itself ready to confront foreign intervention, as graphically shown in some of the military publications of the time (see figure 6).

During the following years, as the Cold War unfolded, US military planners carefully examined the European theatre. Successive reports produced by the US Joint Intelligence Staff and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 1946 and 1947 underlined the critical strategic value of the Pyrenees region in the event of a Soviet invasion of Europe,



Figure 6. Cover of the Spanish military magazine *Ejército*, no. 87 (April 1947). Credit: Biblioteca Virtual del Ministerio de Defensa (<http://bibliotecavirtualdefensa.es>).

conceding that the Red armies would probably occupy the continent and reach the Pyrenees rapidly. Lacking aerial support, the JCS judged that neither the mountain range nor the Spanish army would represent a serious obstacle, concluding that the Soviet army could cross the Pyrenees in twenty days and reach Gibraltar in forty more days, easily overrunning the large, but ill-equipped, Spanish army and its outdated fortifications.⁶¹

After 1948, the efforts of the Francoist army to build fortifications in the Pyrenees decreased. Most of the anti-tank bunkers had been completed and the state of war in Spain was finally at an end.⁶² Around this time, and after suffering heavy losses, the Spanish Communist Party also started reconsidering the guerrilla strategy, and France reopened its border with Spain.⁶³ As the Cold War alliances became defined, Spanish propaganda presented the Iberian Peninsula as an island of security and Franco as the first general who had defeated communism. The growing tensions of the Cold War contributed to a progressive change of the US position towards Spain, whose strategic value and collaboration was now deemed to be critical by military planners.⁶⁴ However, this value did not reside in the strength of the Pyrenees as a natural border but, instead, in the potential role of the peninsula "as a site for air and naval bases from which to control the western Mediterranean and its Atlantic approaches."⁶⁵ The slow but constant rapprochement between the United States and Spain culminated in 1953 with the Pact of Madrid, which allowed the United States to build several naval and air bases in Spain in exchange for economic and military aid but left the fortifications untouched. The diplomatic agreement ended the period of Spanish isolation and facilitated Spain's incorporation into the UN two years later, although Spain remained out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).⁶⁶

During the 1950s, the tight control exerted by the military in the border region slowly eased. The compulsory use of safe-conduct documents was lifted in 1955, the same year that the Spanish government approved the creation of a second national park in the Pyrenees.⁶⁷ The remaining units of engineers devoted most of their efforts to maintaining and perfecting the fortifications' camouflage, policing logging, and regularly patrolling the region.⁶⁸ By the late 1950s, when the fortification project was abandoned, approximately 4,500 different defenses and shelters had been built throughout the border zone.⁶⁹ The stability granted by the new international status of the dictatorship, along with an economic crisis, brought political changes. In 1959, a new Francoist government shelved the autarkic policies, which had been in decline since 1951, and approved the so-called Stabilization Plan. This coincided with the breakthrough of tourism, which became probably the most symbolic banner of Spanish liberalization.⁷⁰ In 1960, as the military units of engineers

that had scattered bunkers throughout the border finally disbanded, the Spanish government published its first official studies for the touristic organization of the Pyrenees.⁷¹ Some of the road and communication projects that had been abandoned in 1939 would be resumed for tourism purposes.⁷²

In the following years, the urban developments required to improve access and grant accommodation to the growing numbers of visitors to the Catalan coast or the expanding ski resorts of the Pyrenees inevitably led to clashes with regional military authorities, as they exposed fortification buildings or rendered them inoperable. Starting in the 1960s, a new wave of concrete covered the Catalan coast, this time in the form of urbanization. In the mountains, the construction of new houses sometimes obstructed fortification firing lines, raising the opposition of local military authorities.⁷³

The building of roads and the growth of the Spanish economy has had other dramatic consequences in the Pyrenees. Starting in the mid-1950s, the slow process of depopulation in the mountain range, which has been ongoing since the late nineteenth century, accelerated dramatically.⁷⁴ As in other mountainous regions of the Mediterranean, the population loss has brought with it the abandonment of agricultural activity on the slopes of the many valleys, and forests have grown rapidly during the following decades.⁷⁵ When the Spanish army carried out a general revision of the state of the fortifications between 1969 and 1971, officers and conscript soldiers struggled to find many of them. Some had already been eaten up by the forests, while others were exposed by roads or ski resorts and even flooded by newly built reservoirs.⁷⁶

CONCLUSIONS

When Spain finally joined both NATO and the European Union in 1986, international commentators blew the dust off the old metaphors to announce—one more time—that the Pyrenees had ceased to represent a separation between Spain and Europe. The last revision of the fortification structures built along the border, carried out as a military exercise, took place that very same year.⁷⁷ Several of the old bunkers, never occupied by the army or legally expropriated, had been taken over by local inhabitants who used them as warehouses or livestock pens, and some were familiar to local hikers. During the 1990s, projects aiming to conserve some of them started up.⁷⁸

As contemporary ruins, these bunkers are testimonies of the shifting political and economic regimes and their national projects of transformation.⁷⁹ Today, many of Franco's pillboxes are gone, devoured by forests, flooded by reservoirs, buried by tourist-oriented urban development, or razed to the ground by new roads and the high

velocity railway connecting Barcelona with Paris. The remaining structures are material ruins of Spain's isolation after the Second World War. They are a symbol of the autarkic years of Francoism, which closed in on itself when its German and Italian counterparts were defeated and when Cold War urgencies converted Franco into a US ally. The Francoist project of fortification was an attempt to convert what Spanish fascists regarded as a spiritual wall—the political border with France—into a truly material separation, thereby perfecting a natural obstacle—the Pyrenees—by building defenses and shelters with different forms of forced labor. The thousands of bunkers constructed were part of an effort to correct “nature’s mistakes,” enhancing the defensive features of the landscape. It was not possible to make the Pyrenees taller, but thousands of tons of concrete were poured to make them into a stronger barrier, despite the resounding failure of the fortification systems during the Second World War. As shown by the celebration of mountain landscapes and environments that accompanied the fortification of the Pyrenees, the militarization of the border created “a hybrid environment in which the nationalization of nature was particularly strong.”⁸⁰ The progressive abandonment of the autarkic political economy and the liberalization of the Spanish economy, which is often symbolized by its emergence as a tourist destination, were accompanied by a reduction of the military role along the border and the final abandonment of the project.

The militarization of the Spanish border with France demonstrated how ideological premises concerning nation and nature transformed the landscape of the Pyrenees together with social control and the material construction of fortifications. Sealing off the border required taking care of the “social weeds” as much as it did building a wall disguised in the landscape. The military occupation of space established a layer of control over movement and economic activity and cleansed the region through repression and banishments. The bunkers, on which human and animal work were clearly inscribed, were erected on top of these layers of control. They remain among the last visible, material records of the history of military occupation in the region.

Writing in 1939, fascist poet Giménez Caballero asserted that if Spanish history had to be summarized in one sentence, it should be: “To have or not to have the Pyrenees.”⁸¹ In September 1940, a very different visitor arrived in the town of Portbou, the same place where Giménez Caballero had announced the reemergence of the “spiritual mountain range.” Fleeing the Nazi occupation of Europe, Walter Benjamin reached Spain with a group of Jewish refugees to find that the Francoist government had cancelled their transit visas and that police had orders to return the migrants to France. Fearing deportation, he committed suicide on September 27, 1940.⁸²

Although the Pyrenees Line is no longer a functioning obstacle to movement of people and ideas, in the late 1990s Spain built another

wall. As part of the new “Fortress Europe,” the reinforced fences around Ceuta and Melilla, some of the last Spanish settlements in Africa, have been erected to prevent migrants from coming into Europe.⁸³ Walls, fences, and other forms of urban and military fortification remain tools for exclusion and marginalization. Their historical foundations are fertile ground for environmental historians to critically explore the mix of culture and nature and the political implications of the concept of natural borders and militarized landscapes.

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Notes

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1. On Giménez Caballero’s pioneering role in the propagation of fascism in Spain, see José-Carlos Mainer, “Conversiones: sobre la imagen del fascismo en la novela española de la primera postguerra,” in *La Novela en España: siglos XIX-XX*, ed. Paul Aubert (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 1995), 175–92; see also Ismael Saz, *España contra España: Los Nacionalismos Franquistas* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003), 105–18.
2. Ernesto Giménez Caballero, *¡Hay Pirineos! Notas de un Alférez en la IVª de Navarra sobre la Conquista de Port-Bou* (Barcelona: Editora Nacional, 1939), 14.
3. Voltaire attributed the quote to the French ambassador in Spain at the time, while others point to the Spanish representative in France. Voltaire, *Le Siècle de Louis XIV* (London: Publie par M. de Francheville, 1752), 297. José María Iribarren, *El Porqué de los Dichos*, 7th ed. (Pamplona: Departamento de Educación y Cultura, 1994), 235.
4. Giménez Caballero, *¡Hay Pirineos!*.

5. Interest on the Francoist fortifications of the Pyrenees started during the mid-1990s. The first article on the topic was authored by Jean-Louis Blanchon, Lluís Esteve, and Pere Serrat, "Années 40: La Ligne de Fortification des Pyrénées Espagnoles," *Études Roussillonnaises*, no. 13 (1994–95): 147–59. The same team of authors further expanded their work with two more publications that detailed the main characteristics of the fortifications. See Jean-Louis Blanchon, Pere Serrat, and Lluís Esteve, "La 'Línea P': La Ligne de Fortification de la Chaîne des Pyrénées," *Fortifications & Patrimoine*, no. 2 (1997): 43–50; Jean-Louis Blanchon, Pere Serrat, and Lluís Esteve, "La Línea P. Topographie et Conception d'un Système de Défense," *Fortifications and Patrimoine*, no. 3 (1997): 36–42. These early efforts have given way to a few regional monographs, mostly from a military history perspective. For the central Pyrenees, see José Manuel Clúa, *Cuando Franco Fortificó los Pirineos: La Línea P en Aragón—Introducción: La Jacetania* (Zaragoza: Katia, 2004). In Catalonia, see Josep Clara, *Els Fortins de Franco: Arqueologia Militar als Pirineus Catalans* (Barcelona: Rafael Dalmau, 2010). Current studies for the Basque Country and Navarra have focused on specific areas fortified in 1939–40, but no accounts of the fortification efforts developed later have been published so far. See Juan Antonio Sáez García, *La fortificación "Vallespín" en Guipúzcoa (1939–1940)* (San Sebastián: Ingeba, 2010).
6. A central reference, including cases from more than fifteen European countries and an appendix with a brief account of the Pyrenees fortifications is J. E. Kaufmann and Robert M. Jurga, *Fortress Europe: European Fortifications of World War II* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2002).
7. On fortification, see Kaufmann and Jurga, *Fortress Europe*, and on migration, see, for instance, Matthew Carr, *Fortress Europe: Inside the War against Immigration* (London: Hurst Publishers, 2015).
8. See, for example, Edmund Russell, *War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World War I to Silent Spring* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Richard Tucker and Edmund Russell, eds., *Natural Enemy, Natural Ally: Toward an Environmental History of War* (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2005); J. R. McNeill, "Woods and Warfare in World History," *Environmental History* 9, no. 3 (2004): 388–410; Lisa M. Brady, "The Wilderness of War: Nature and Strategy," *Environmental History* 10 (2005): 421–47; Chris Pearson, "'The Age of Wood': Fuel and Fighting in French Forests, 1940–1944," *Environmental History* 11, no. 4 (2006): 775–803. On militarized landscapes, see Chris Pearson, *Scarred Landscapes: War and Nature in Vichy France* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Chris Pearson, Peter Coates, and Tim Cole, *Militarized Landscapes: From Gettysburg to Salisbury Plain* (London: Continuum, 2010); Peter Coates, Tim Cole, Marianna Dudley, and Chris Pearson, "Defending Nation, Defending Nature? Militarized Landscapes and Military Environmentalism in Britain, France, and the United States," *Environmental History* 16, no. 3 (2011): 456–91; Marianna Dudley, *An Environmental History of the UK Defence Estate 1945 to the Present* (London: Continuum, 2012). The Maginot Line, undoubtedly the more iconic fortification system of the interwar period, is briefly reviewed in the indispensable monograph by Chris Pearson, *Mobilizing Nature: The Environmental History of War and Militarization in Modern France* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), 148–50.
9. The lack of militarized landscapes studies regarding the Spanish Civil War is explicitly underlined by Chris Pearson in his review of the literature, "Researching Militarized Landscapes: A Literature Review on War and the Militarization of the Environment," *Landscape Research* 37, no. 1 (2012): 115–33, see especially 126. For a recent contribution, see Santiago Gorostiza, Hug March, and David Sauri,

- "Urban Ecology under Fire": Water Supply in Madrid during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939)," *Antipode* 47, no. 2 (2015): 360–79.
10. Marco Armiero, *A Rugged Nation: Mountains and the Making of Modern Italy* (Cambridge: White Horse Press, 2011), 87.
 11. The national park of Ordesa y Monte Perdido was established in 1918 on the basis of the National Parks Act of 1916. See José Luis Ramos Gorostiza, "Gestión Ambiental y Política de Conservación de la Naturaleza en la España de Franco," *Revista de Historia Industrial*, no. 32 (2006): 99–138.
 12. Lluís Solé i Sabarís, *Los Pirineos: El Medio y el Hombre* (Barcelona: Alberto Martín, 1951), 229–40.
 13. On the Catalan revolt, see John Huxtable Elliott, *The Revolt of the Catalans: A Study in the Decline of Spain (1598–1640)* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
 14. Peter Sahlins examined the history of the Pyrenean valley of Cerdanya, divided between France and Spain after 1659, to compose a classic study on the relation between state building and the production of identity in border regions. See Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
 15. Nonetheless, the Roussillon was sometimes listed among the territories ambitioned by Spain, as published in several of the early 1940s pro-expansionist literature. Stanley G. Payne, *Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 129.
 16. Ernesto Giménez Caballero, *Casticismo, Nacionalismo y Vanguardia. Antología, 1927–1935* (Madrid: Fundación Santander Central Hispano, 2005), xxix (prologue by José-Carlos Mainer).
 17. Alfredo Kindelán, "Tiempos Inciertos: España y el Momento," *Ejército*, no. 14 (1941). On the development of fascism and geopolitics in Spain, see Antonio Reguera, "Fascismo y Geopolítica en España," *Geocrítica* (1991), <http://www.ub.edu/geocrit/geo94.htm>.
 18. On the pro-Axis activities of Spain during the war, see Manuel Ros Agudo, *La Guerra Secreta de Franco, 1939–1945* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2002).
 19. On school textbooks, see José María Hernández Díaz, "'A Dios Gracias, África Empieza en los Pirineos': La Negación de Europa en los Manuales Escolares de la España de Posguerra (1939–1945)," *Historia de la Educación: Revista Interuniversitaria* 20 (2001): 369–92. On cinema, see Luis Mariano González González, *Fascismo, Kitsch y Cine Histórico Español (1939–1953)* (Cuenca: Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2009), 178–94.
 20. Federico Torres Yagües, *Horizonte Imperial* (Madrid: NP, 1943), 19.
 21. Juan Carlos Losada Málvarez, *Ideología del Ejército Franquista: 1939–1959* (Madrid: Istmo, 1990), 189–93.
 22. Ernesto Giménez Caballero, "Los Pirineos y la Bandera Española," *Sí. Suplemento semanal de Arriba*, January 16, 1944, 3. However, this identification of the Spanish nation with mountain landscape was not new. Before the Spanish Civil War, the Guadarrama mountain range, in particular, had been central in the representation of Castile as the heart of the Spanish nation. See Nicolás Ortega Cantero, "Paisaje e Identidad: La Visión de Castilla como Paisaje Nacional (1876–1936)," *Boletín de la Asociación de Geógrafos Españoles* 51 (2009): 25–49. On the relation between landscape and nationalism during early Francoism, see Zira Box, "Paisaje y Nacionalismo en el Primer Franquismo," *Hispanic Research Journal* 17, no. 2 (2016): 123–40.
 23. J. R. Alonso, "Cara y cruz de los Pirineos," *Sí. Suplemento semanal de Arriba*, 16 January 1944, 10.

24. José María López Valencia, *Los Pirineos: Notas para un Reconocimiento Estratégico. Conferencia pronunciada en la Escuela Superior del Ejército* (Copia mecanografiada, 1947), 35.
25. José Díaz de Villegas and José Bustamante, *El Estrecho de Gibraltar* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1941), 161–62.
26. Antonio Merino Mora, “El Circuito Pirenaico y el Valle de Benasque,” *Guayente*, no. 104 (2016): 5–9. There is a mocking comment to the development of roads and tourism connections during the Republican years in José Díaz de Villegas, *España, Potencia Mundial: La Omnipotencia Geográfica Española* (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1949), 352.
27. Losada Málvarez, *Ideología del Ejército Franquista*, 193.
28. López Valencia, *Los Pirineos*, 41.
29. On the death toll of the war and the dictatorship, see Paul Preston, *El Holocausto Español* (Barcelona: Círculo de Lectores, 2012), 17, 24.
30. The dual character of the concept of autarky, encapsulating the ideas of self-sufficiency and social control, as well as its connections to fascism, have been highlighted both by historians of science and technology and researchers on Spanish contemporary history. See, respectively, Tiago Saraiva and M. Norton Wise, “Autarky/Autarchy: Genetics, Food Production, and the Building of Fascism,” *Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences* 40, no. 4 (2010): 419–28; Michael Richards, *A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco's Spain, 1936–1945* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 94–95. Along these lines, on the militaristic character of autarkic reforms in Spain, see Santiago Gorostiza and Miquel Ortega Cerdà, “‘The Unclaimed Latifundium’: The Configuration of the Spanish Fishing Sector under Francoist Autarky, 1939–1951,” *Journal of Historical Geography* 52 (2016): 26–35. Finally, regarding military expenditure during the 1940s, see Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, *Las Políticas de la Victoria: La Consolidación del Nuevo Estado Franquista (1938–1953)* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2000), 38.
31. On the 1936–48 temporality and on political violence during the Spanish Civil War and the Francoist dictatorship, see Javier Rodrigo, *Hasta la Raíz: Violencia durante la Guerra Civil y la Dictadura Franquista* (Madrid: Alianza, 2008), 29, 42, 69, 182–83.
32. On the guerrilla against Francoism, see Julio Aróstegui and Jorge Marco, eds., *El Último Frente: La Resistencia Armada Antifranquista en España, 1939–1952* (Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata, 2008); Secundino Serrano, *Maquis: Historia de la Guerrilla Antifranquista* (Barcelona: Temas de hoy, 2006).
33. On social control in the Catalan Pyrenees, see Josep Calvet Bellera, “Control Social a la Zona Fronterera: El Pirineu de Lleida (1939–1945),” *Actes del seminari “El Primer Franquisme a les Terres de Lleida, 1938–1950”* (Lleida: Institut d’Estudis Ilerdencs, 2002), 99–121. On the safe-conduct document, see Clara, *Els Fortins de Franco*, 18–19.
34. See Calvet Bellera, “Control Social a la Zona Fronterera,” 108–12. Several interviewees, both officers and conscript soldiers, refer to the occupation of private houses and of spaces belonging to the municipality. General Juan Rotger and Jordi Bonet, personal communication (June 3, 2012, and January 3, 2011, respectively).
35. “Informe de Jové sobre un viaje a Cataluña. Informando sobre las fortificaciones de la frontera,” July 27, 1946 (Jacq. 156) and “Informe sobre las fortificaciones en la frontera y sobre el cambio de formato sufrido en los salvoconductos y células,” undated (Jacq. 100), 11–3, Buró político, comité ejecutivo, equipo de pasos,

- Informes sobre viajes, Archivo Histórico del Partido Comunista de España, Madrid.
36. On labor as a cheap resource in post-war Spain and its use for water public works, see Erik Swyngedouw, "Technonatural Revolutions: The Scalar Politics of Franco's Hydro-Social Dream for Spain, 1939–1975," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 32, no. 1 (2007): 9–28. On the organization of forced labor in Francoist Spain, see, among others, Gonzalo Acosta Bono, José Luis Gutiérrez Molina, Lola Martínez Macías, and Ángel del Río Sánchez, *El Canal de los Presos (1940–1962)* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2004). For a comparative analysis of the Francoist concentration camps within the fascist model of internment, see Javier Rodrigo, "Exploitation, Fascist Violence and Social Cleansing: A Study of Franco's Concentration Camps from a Comparative Perspective," *European Review of History* 19, no. 4 (2012): 553–73.
 37. On the use of forced labor to build roads and fortifications in the Basque Country and Navarra during these years, see Juan Antonio Sáez García, *La fortificación "Vallespín" en Guipúzcoa (1939–1940)* (San Sebastián: Ingeba, 2010), 20; Fernando Mendiola Gonzalo and Edurne Beaumont Esandi, *Esclavos del Franquismo en el Pirineo* (Tafalla: Txalaparta, 2006). For Catalonia, see Oriol Dueñas Iturbe, *Els Esclaus de Franco* (Badalona: Ara Llibres, 2007), 169–81.
 38. The directives established three types of territory: A (active), B (dangerous), and C (passive). B category referred to zones that had no direct penetration lines but could facilitate the advance of the enemy. "Directivas para la Fortificación de la Frontera Pirenaica," November 11, 1943, collection 32, box 10, folder 3, record 10, Archivo Intermedio Militar Pirenaico (AIMP), Barcelona. After the archival collections of the AIMP were transferred to the Archivo General Militar de Ávila (AGMA), military authorities have denied access to part of these collections, arguing that they are classified as secret. On the controversy about the restrictions to access this and other archival collections connected to the Spanish military and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Juan Carlos Pereira and Carlos Sanz Díaz, "'Todo secreto': Acuerdos secretos, transparencia y acceso a los documentos históricos de Asuntos Exteriores y Defensa," *Ayer* 97 (2015): 243–57. The author of this article consulted the cited documents when they were available at AIMP.
 39. As put it by one of the officers posted to the region, the density of fortifications varied depending on the difficulty represented by natural obstacles. Colonel Arcadio del Pozo Senillosa, personal communication (January 14, 2010).
 40. Such reviews included water, building materials, wood, and grazing areas for pack animals. Colonel Arcadio del Pozo Senillosa, personal communication (January 14, 2010).
 41. In July and August 1944, Spanish military and intelligence reports pointed to the fears that the Maquis could organize an invasion of Spain and receive support of external forces. See Reports dated on July 11 and August 5, 1944, collection 33, box 56, folder 11, AIMP. Later in 1946, a British report suggested that the erection of fortifications by the Spanish army was related to Franco's fear "that France may go Communist and become a military danger to Spain, or at least, failing this, will endeavour to arm and introduce into Spain many thousands of Republican refugees who have been in France throughout the war." "Report on the Spanish army by the Military Attaché to the British Embassy at Madrid," file FO 371/60462, The National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom.
 42. "Instrucción C-15 sobre organización defensiva de los Pirineos," August 23, 1944, collection 32, box 1, folder 2, record 1, AIMP; see also Clara, *Els Fortins de Franco*, 57.

43. On the maquis and the failed invasion of Aran valley, see Secundino Serrano, *La Última Gesta: Los Republicanos que Vencieron a Hitler (1939–1945)* (Madrid: Punto de Lectura, 2006), 580–604. For a perspective from the Spanish military, see Fernando Martínez de Baños Carrillo, *Hasta Su Total Aniquilación: El Ejército contra el Maquis en el Valle de Arán y en el Alto Aragón, 1944–1946* (Madrid: Almena, 2002).
44. Clara, *Els Fortins de Franco*, 57.
45. See Note by J. Petirena, February 1945, file IDD (09)007.001, Servicio de Colonias Penitenciarias Militarizadas, box 51/04881, Archivo General de la Administración, Alcalá de Henares, Spain; see also Gonzalo Acosta Bono, *El Canal de los Presos (1940–1962): Trabajos Forzados: De la Represión Política a la Explotación Económica* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2004), 84–85.
46. Juan Petirena Aurrecoechea (1885–1956), personal military record, Archivo General Militar de Segovia, Segovia, Spain. On Petirena's role in the Spanish Civil War, see Santiago Gorostiza and David Saurí, "Salvaguardar un recurso precioso: la gestión del agua en Madrid durante la guerra civil española (1936–1939)," *Scripta Nova* 17, no. 457 (2013), <http://www.ub.es/geocrit/sn/sn-457.htm>.
47. The similitudes between prisoners' forced labor and that of the conscript soldiers have already been highlighted by Josep Màrius Climent i Prats, "27 Batallón Disciplinario de Soldados Trabajadores 1940–1942: Violencia y Control Social sobre los Vencidos de la Guerra Civil Española," *Hispania Nova, Revista de Historia Contemporánea*, no. 14 (2016): 170.
48. The production of concrete was controlled by the state and its use very restricted. According to a Francoist general at the time, much of the concrete available in Spain during the second half of the 1940s was taken to the Pyrenees. Carlos Martínez de Campos y Serrano, *Ayer* (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1946), 2:297. During 1946, the monthly supply of concrete to the military in Catalonia was 665 tons, but 1,500 tons were required. Note by General García Valiño to the Dirección General de Fortificaciones y Obras, July 20, 1946, collection 32, box 13, folder 10, document 1, 108, AIMP.
49. On the study of work examining landscape as evidence of past human labor, see Stefania Barca, "Laboring the Earth: Transnational Reflections on the Environmental History of Work," *Environmental History* 19, no. 1 (2014): 3–27.
50. General Juan Rotger, personal communication (June 3, 2012).
51. Regarding the importance of animal draught, see collection 32, box 9, folder 6, documents 27, 28, 30, 32, AIMP. For a reference to the penalties to officers in charge of injured mules and the 10–14-hour workdays, see letter of Luis Ferrer Vilaró to Ángel Menéndez Tolosa, August 23, 1947, collection 32, box 13, folder 10, document 1, 119–20, AIMP.
52. Ramon Rull and General Juan Rotger, personal communication (April 3, 2011, and June 3, 2012, respectively).
53. "Instrucción Particular 6-C. Protección indirecta de las obras," August 30, 1945, collection 32, box 10, folder 2, document 7, AIMP; see also "Detalle de las normas a seguir para la entrega de obras a fuerzas desplegadas en la zona pirenaica," February 28, 1947, collection 32, box 10, folder 2, document 4, AIMP. Several interviewees also refer to the importance bestowed to camouflage during the 1950s. Ramon Fígols and Antonio Berruezo, personal communication (April 7, 2011, and December 15, 2010, respectively).
54. Francisco Javier F. Trapiella, "Tropas de montaña: Cursos especiales de esquí y escalada," *Ejército*, no. 61 (February 1945): 17–24. Fascist narratives in Italy also underlined the connection between Italian mountains and the making of the

- "New Italian." See Marco Armiero, "Making Italians Out of Rocks: Mussolini's Shadows on Italian Mountains," *Modern Italy* 19, no. 3 (2014): 261–74.
55. Jordi Bonet and Ramon Rull, personal communication (January 3, 2011, and April 3, 2011, respectively); see also Clara, *Els Fortins de Franco*, 48. For a photo collection of fortifications, taken during the 1940s, see memorial book, 1943–49, Archivo del Servicio Militar de Construcciones, Madrid.
 56. See Clara, *Els Fortins de Franco*, 29–38, 57–62, 139–40.
 57. Ángel Viñas, *En las Garras del Águila: Los Pactos con Estados Unidos, de Francisco Franco a Felipe González (1945–1995)* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2003), 35–39.
 58. Florentino Portero, *Franco Aislado: La Cuestión Española, 1945–1950* (Madrid: Aguilar, 1989), 162.
 59. "French delegation's submission, United Nations Security Council 1946," file S-0020-0001-01, United Nations Archives, New York; "Factual Findings Concerning the Spanish Situation: Supplementary Memorandum to the Report of the Sub-Committee Appointed by Security Council on 29 April 1946," May 31, 1946, 51–54, <http://hdl.handle.net/11176/89012>. Spanish diplomatic authorities informed the UK and US embassy that Spanish Maquis, with the support of French communists, were attempting to instigate new border incidents. See Note verbale, April 17, 1946, file R-3509, 22, Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, Madrid.
 60. United Nations General Assembly, "Relations of Members of the United Nations with Spain," Doc A/RES/39(I) <http://hdl.handle.net/11176/146316>. However, given its later evolution, different interpretations concerning the political nature of the Francoist regime have traditionally clashed in the historiography. For a review of the debate, see Javier Rodrigo, "La Naturaleza del Franquismo: Un Acercamiento desde la Perspectiva Comparada de los Fascismos Europeos" in *Universo de Micromundos: VI Congreso de Historia Local de Aragón*, ed. Carmelo Romero and Alberto Sabio Alcutén (Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico, 2009), 47–64; see also Ferran Gallego, *El Evangelio Fascista: La Formación de la Cultura Política del Franquismo, 1930–1950* (Barcelona: Crítica, 2014); Ismael Saz, *España contra España: Los Nacionalismos Franquistas* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2003).
 61. Paul Kesaris, ed., *A Guide to Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Library of Congress, Washington DC), Part II: 1946–1953, The Soviet Union* (Washington, DC: University Publications of America, 1979), reel 2: "Invasion of the Iberian Peninsula by USSR," 19; see also reel 3: "The Soviet Threat against the Iberian Peninsula and the Means Required to Meet It, Short Title: DRUMBEAT," particularly 19, 31. For an evolution of the role of the Iberian Peninsula in Western military planning, see Antonio Marquina, *España en la Política de Seguridad Occidental: 1939–1986* (Madrid: Servicio de Publicaciones del EME, 1986).
 62. 78 percent of the total bunkers built in the Catalan region had been completed by 1947, according to Clara, *Els Fortins de Franco*, 139.
 63. Secundino Serrano, *Maquis: Historia de la Guerrilla Antifranquista* (Barcelona: Temas de hoy, 2006), 325–31.
 64. On the trajectory of US–Spain relations between 1945 and 1950, see Viñas, *En las Garras del Águila*, 23–83.
 65. Central Intelligence Agency, "The Political Future of Spain," Doc ORE 56, December 5, 1947, 3, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0000256629>.
 66. Viñas, *En las Garras del Águila*, 86–285.
 67. On the safe-conduct document, see Clara, *Els Fortins de Franco*, 11. On national parks during Francoism, see Ramos Gorostiza, "Gestión Ambiental y Política de Conservación."

68. Several works were completed in the isolated mountain passes of the central Pyrenees during the 1950s. See José Manuel Clúa, *Cuando Franco Fortificó los Pirineos: La Línea P en Aragón. Ribagorza y Sobrarbe* (Zaragoza: Katia, 2007). On the maintenance activities, see Clara, *Els Fortins de Franco*, 61–62; Antonio Berrueto, personal communication (December 15, 2010).
69. Colonel del Pozo Senillosa, personal communication (January 14, 2010). In total, 2,900 fortifications were built in the Catalan region, according to Clara, *Els Fortins de Franco*, 139. There are currently no studies with figures for the total works completed in the central and western Pyrenees.
70. Sasha D. Pack, *Tourism and Dictatorship: Europe's Peaceful Invasion of Franco's Spain* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 83–103.
71. Secretaría General para la Ordenación Económico-Social, *Estudio para la Ordenación Turística del Pirineo Español* (Madrid: Presidencia del Gobierno, 1960).
72. Mora, "El Circuito Pirenaico."
73. Colonel del Pozo Senillosa, personal communication (January 14, 2010); see also letter by the Colonel of 4th Regiment of Engineers, September 30, 1968, collection 32, box 7, folder 7, document 2, AIMP.
74. Francisco García Pascual and Josep Mateu González, "Cambios y Permanencias en las Dinámicas Sociodemográficas de los Pirineos Españoles: El Papel de los Movimientos Migratorios," *Ager: Revista de Estudios sobre Despoblación y Desarrollo Rural* (2003), 29–73.
75. J. R. McNeill, *The Mountains of the Mediterranean: An Environmental History* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992). On forest expansion in the Pyrenees during the second half of the twentieth century, see, for instance, Aitor Améztegui, Lluís Brotons, and Lluís Coll, "Land-Use Changes as Major Drivers of Mountain Pine (*Pinus Uncinata* Ram.) Expansion in the Pyrenees," *Global Ecology and Biogeography* 19, no. 5 (2010): 632–41.
76. Clara, *Els Fortins de Franco*, 83–87, 182–89.
77. See for instance "Informe que formula el teniente de infantería de la E.E.M. sobre el reconocimiento efectuado al CR número 54 de la zona de Martinet durante los días 23 al 28 de junio del presente año," July 4, 1986, collection 33, box 28, AIMP.
78. See "La línea Gutiérrez," *La Vanguardia*, 6 April 1996, 19. A museum was inaugurated in the Catalan Pyrenees in 2007, <http://www.bunquersmartinet.net/>.
79. Alfredo González Ruibal, "Time to Destroy," *Current Anthropology* 49, no. 2 (2008): 247–79.
80. Armiero, *A Rugged Nation*, 87.
81. Giménez Caballero, *¡Hay Pirineos!*, 13.
82. On European refugees and the Pyrenees during the Second World War, see Josep Calvet, *Las Montañas de la Libertad: El Paso de Evadidos por los Pirineos durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial, 1939–1944* (Madrid: Alianza, 2010). On the death of Walter Benjamin, see Esther Leslie, *Walter Benjamin: Overpowering Conformism* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 215.
83. On the Ceuta and Melilla fences and the Spanish-Moroccan border, see Xavier Ferrer-Gallardo, "The Spanish—Moroccan border complex: Processes of geopolitical, functional and symbolic rebordering," *Political Geography* 27, no. 3 (2008): 301–321. See also "African Migrants Look Down on White-Clad Golfers in Viral Photo," *The Guardian*, October 23, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/23/sp-african-migrants-look-down-on-white-clad-golfers-in-viral-photo>.