Violence and visibility in oil palm and sugarcane conflicts: the case of Polochic Valley, Guatemala

ABSTRACT Over the last two decades, the expansion of oil palm and sugarcane plantations in the Polochic Valley (Guatemala) has exacerbated the historical struggle of Maya-Q’eqchi’ peoples for land rights. Based on a mixed-methods approach, I examine the dynamics of the conflict between 1998 and 2014, focusing on the visibility, manifestation and intensity of violence and the role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and peasant organizations in opposition to oil palm and sugarcane plantations. I show that the evolution of the conflict can be explained by changes in the strength of organizations' alliances due to tensions and lack of coordination, as well as the fear of state repression and the funding context of these organizations. These results allow me to discuss how violence, the role of these organizations and the dynamics of related events have influenced the visibility of the conflict associated with the expansion of oil palm and sugarcane plantations in the Polochic.


Introduction 23
In recent decades, the expansion of large areas of so-called flex-crops 1 , such as oil palm 24 (Elaeis guineensis) and sugarcane (Saccharum officinarum), has led to major social and 25 environmental change in Southeast Asia and Latin America (Borras et al 2011;FAO 26 2014). This expansion started in 1990 (Asia) and 2000 (Latin America) due to the 27 intensifying demand in the Northern Hemisphere for agrofuels 2 , edible oils, industrial 28 lubricants and cosmetics in the case of oil palm. Sugarcane was similarly sought after in 29 order to produce agrofuels, animal feed or fertilizers. Demand for both flex-crops has 30 also been driven from emerging centers of international capital in the Southern 31 Hemisphere, the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and 32 some middle-income countries (MICs) (Borras et al 2015). Forecasts suggest that by 33 2020 the variety and quantity of products fabricated from both crops will only continue 34 The expansion of these two crops alone has already led to widespread and major social 40 and environmental changes. In Latin America, they have often prevented local 41 communities from accessing their main livelihoods, as oil palm has been grown on land 42 that communities could use to sow staple crops and native forests, which constitute their 43 principle sources of food, water and building materials (Cardenas 2012;Alonso-44 Fradejas 2012). Likewise, both sugarcane and oil palm plantations have reduced soil 45 1 Flex-crops are commodities that have multiple and interchangeable commercial destinations. For example, palm oil can be sold as food, agrofuel or as an industrial product, while sugarcane can be an agrofuel or food (see Borras et al 2014). 2 The term 'agrofuel' was coined by the international Via Campesina movement to avoid the use of the prefix 'bio' that refers to life and to stress that the prime materials used for fuels come from agrarian ('agro') sources (Joao Pedro Stedile, MST-La Vía Campesina 6/06/07). In this article, I use agrofuel as a synonym for biofuel.
In this essay, I consider NGOs 5 as the organizations that give support to local 119 communities and act as advocacy groups (Clarck 1991). I treat peasant organizations 120 (CUC and UVOC) separately as I recognize they are based on grassroots memberships. 121 In the text I will use the general term "organizations" when I refer to both of them. currently under the control of two oligarchic families, and even the communities that 153 fled to forested areas are now in conflict with company and/or government-controlled 154 protected areas, hydroelectric dams and mining projects (Hurtado 2014). 155 It was after the liberal reforms of the late 19 th century that the state granted most of the 156 land in the Polochic as private estates to foreign families and companies, in order to 157 develop an export-oriented economy based on cattle, cotton, bananas and coffee 158 plantations (Hurtado 2008;Grandia 2006). The Maya-Q'eqchi' population that had 159 previously lived in "Indian Villages" was forced to migrate or work on the estates as 160 mozos-colonos or bonded laborers (Hurtado 2008). The patron provided a small piece of 161 land on the estates for bonded laborers to grow their own food and, despite poor wages, 162 forced families to purchase food from his own over-priced shop. Families were thus 163 kept on estates under a flexible debt system (Piedrasanta 1977). 164 The period of greatest violence and visibility of these conflicts on a transnational scale 165 occurred during the 36 years of the Guatemalan civil war and concluded with the 166 signing of the Peace Accords in 1996 (Sanford 2009, Grandin 2004). One of the most 167 violent events happened in Panzós in 1978, when the army massacred fifty-three Maya-168 Q'eqchi' peasants demanding access to land (CEH 1999). Thousands of people fled 169 from the Polochic during the civil war (Grandia 2006). In the early 2000s the coffee 170 crisis ended the mozos-colonos system (Wagner 2001), breaking the fetter between 171 patrons and the bonded laborers' families. In the wake of this rupture, some families 172 were expelled from the estates without receiving any labor benefits and became landless 173 while others stayed on the land as 'squatters' or became seasonal workers (Hurtado 174 2008, Grandia 2006.   (Table 2). 298

Silenced conflict (1998-2011) 300
Oil palm plantation expansion in the Polochic began silently in 1998. While conflicts 301 were generated by this expansion (Hurtado 2008), they were not framed as such in the 302 printed press 10 . However, the expansion of sugarcane from 2005 was reported in two 303 news articles as an opportunity to develop the local economy (see Dürr 2016 for a 304 critical perspective). Oil palm and sugarcane underwent their greatest expansion during 305 10 There are many possible reasons why the media did not report land grabbing conflicts and why there were no mobilizations. Although conflict related to land was still present, I think that the media and NGOs were focused on the discussion and promotion of 1996 Peace Accords. Land issues and indigenous rights were approached from this supposedly "post conflict phase". Therefore, NGOs somehow left these conflicts behind and the media did not want to show a possible failure of the Peace Accords. compared to the negligent value of sugarcane was starkly apparent: 356 'All the food collected in our home makes us who we are, but maize is our body. 357 Sugarcane is not of us, we do not sow it. We harvest beans, maize and chili.  (Table 2). 370

Revealed conflict (2011-2012) 371
In this phase the Polochic conflict became known nationally and internationally through 372 news articles and opinion pieces published in national and international media ( Table  373 2), including a documentary about the evictions broadcasted on national television. This  (Table 2). community-based and grassroots organization. In all cases, nonetheless, organizations 518 recognize the need to "overcome the broken ties between organizations" 519 (Interview#10). 520

Discussion 521
The results section analyzed the typologies and visibility of the conflict in the Polochic 522 from a multi-scale and temporal approach. They showed how the interrelations between 523 violence/threat, the role of the state, and the type, strategies and alliances of NGOs and 524 peasant organizations have influenced the visibility and dynamic of the conflict at 525 different scales. The agrarian and human rights conflict was visible at all spatial scales 526 (regional, national and international); the environmental conflict was only visible at 527 peasant meetings. 528

The role of violence and fear in the Polochic conflict 529
The expansion of flex-crops in the Polochic has exacerbated the historical land dispute 530 between the Maya-Q'eqchi' communities and the oligarchic families. These 531 communities have struggled for more than 500 years to recover the land they had been 532 In Guatemala, the threat of violence as a means to generate fear has been systematically 562 used to muffle the peasant struggle for land in the past and in the present (Ibarra 2009). 563 Scott (1986) argues that in contexts of strong repression and violence like those 564 described earlier, the oppressed population develops silent resistance strategies and its 565 oppositional arguments are only shared in secret. Scott (2008) argues that it is only 566 when fear is overcome that visible rebellions and protest actions occur. However, the 567 Maya-Q'eqchi' occupied lands without having overcome their fear, driven instead by 568 the need to feed themselves, by their indigenous identity that attributes a sacred value to 569 the land and maize, and by the historic support of peasant organizations. However, the 570 state accused such occupiers of exercising violence, invading private property and 571 fueling the conflict. 572

The role of organizations competing types, strategies and alliances in the conflict 573
The role and alliances between NGOs, peasant organizations and communities were 574 also key factors for visibilizing the conflict on a national and international scale, in 575 The latter refers to the damage to marginalized populations that occurs continuously 617 through time and space, causing almost imperceptible socio-ecological changes (ibid.). 618 In this case, slow violence is the process of dispossessing the Maya-Q'eqchi' population 619 of their resources through contamination process and the persistent denial of historical 620 rights to land of indigenous communities. This process has provoked, malnutrition, 621 poverty, labor exploitation and the loss of biodiversity (Alonso-Fradejas 2012, 622

Mingorría et al 2014). 623
As opposed to direct violence, this kind of "structural" or "slow violence" is more 624 difficult to denounce in front of the IACHR or national courts since international NGO 625 donors neither finance nor support long processes of denunciation. Difficulties also 626 emerge from the mechanisms and language that would need to be used for such a 627 purpose, requiring human rights "professionals", and the coordination between national 628 and international organizations and local communities. In addition, such "slow 629 violence" is occurring in a falsely named post-conflict context. In the Polochic case, 630 international human rights NGOs only intervened to denounce the incidents of direct 631 violence when there was "proof"photographs and witnessesto present to 632 international agencies. 633 The intervention and exit strategies of organizations also caused the conflict to be 634 NGOs. This has prevented local communities' strategies from taking center stage. As a 675 result of these dynamics, the Polochic conflict is publicly touted as one that is resolved 676 although a concealed, conflict remains.