Evaluations of the Quality of the Representative Channel and Unequal Participation

Enrique Hernández[1]

Macarena Ares[2]

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This paper analyzes how individual-level assessments of the quality and functioning of the representative channel affect citizens' likelihood to turn out to vote and to engage in alternative forms of non-institutionalized participation, and whether these relationships are moderated by individual resources as measured by education. Relying on novel data from the sixth round of the European Social Survey on how European citizens evaluate different aspects of democracy we show that negative evaluations of the quality of the representative channel discourage voting, but only promote participation in demonstrations among the highly educated. These findings highlight potential inequalities in citizens' ability to voice their political demands: while highly educated individuals are likely to translate their negative evaluations of the institutional channel of representation into non-institutionalized forms of participation, in the presence of negative evaluations low educated individuals are simply more likely to withdraw from politics.

Keywords: Political participation, Voting, Demonstrations, Democracy, Evaluations

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[1] Enrique Hernández. Department of Political and Social Sciences European University Institute. Via dei Roccetini 9, 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy. Email: Enrique.Hernandez@EUI.eu

[2] Macarena Ares. Department of Political and Social Sciences European University Institute. Via dei Roccetini 9, 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy. Email: Macarena.Ares@EUI.eu

1. INTRODUCTION

Political participation is a crucial characteristic of democracies, since it constitutes the main tool for citizens to channel their demands to policymakers. This is manifested in numerous studies that analyze the determinants of political participation. One strand of this research focuses on the impact of characteristics of the electoral process on citizens' motivations to turn out to vote. This research has generally relied on macro-level factors, reflecting the competitiveness of elections or other characteristics of electoral systems, to account for the incentive structures surrounding specific elections (Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Franklin, 1996; Franklin and Hirczy, 1998). Following a similar logic, recent studies have analyzed how individual-level assessments of the integrity of the electoral process affect citizens' likelihood to participate in politics (Birch, 2010; Carreras and İrepoğlu, 2013; Norris, 2014). Combining the insights of these two literature strands, in this paper we construct a measure that captures Europeans' assessments of the quality of the representative channel. Adapting the motivational approach to understanding political participation (see Norris, 2002, pp. 61–72) and Verba et al. (1995) civic voluntarism model we argue, first, that these assessments affect citizens' participation decisions by altering their motivations to engage in politics through different means, and, second, that individual resource inequalities play a moderating role in this process.

Citizens' subjective assessments of how much they can influence governments' composition and policymaking through elections should affect their motivations to express their demands through the representative channel. Hence, we expect that positive evaluations of the functioning of this channel will be positively related to participation in elections. When such evaluations are negative and, as a consequence, elections do not provide the proper means to influence policymaking, citizens might choose to engage in non-institutionalized forms of participation to voice their demands. Hence, positive evaluations of the quality of

the representative channel should relate negatively to the likelihood of demonstrating. However, from the literature on political participation we know that resources can moderate how and when motivations get translated into behavior, although differently for voting and demonstrating. As we argue below, these moderating effects might give raise to inequalities in political influence in the presence of a malfunctioning representative channel.

Our empirical analysis, based on novel data from European democracies, reveals that, on the one hand, there is a positive relationship between citizens' assessment of the quality of the representative channel and their likelihood of turning out to vote. On the other hand, we find a negative correlation between these assessments and participation in demonstrations. Our hypotheses about the moderating role of individual resources are also confirmed. Results show that education is a significant moderator in the relationship between individual evaluations and participation in demonstrations, but not in the case of voting. An extension of this analysis reveals that when the representative channel is judged to be malfunctioning only those with higher education are more likely to resort to demonstrating as an alternative or supplemental form of expressing their demands, while those with lower levels of education are more likely to simply withdraw from politics.

This paper proceeds as follows. We first lay out the theoretical framework for the analysis of citizens' assessments of the quality of the representative channel, and next we hypothesize how it relates to individual participation decisions. Next, we summarize the data and methods. Section four discusses the main results, while section five presents robustness checks. Section six concludes.

2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

2.1 The quality of the representative channel

There are different aspects of a political system that can affect the quality of the representative channel. We consider that in established democracies this quality is a function of four characteristics: the degree to which elections are conducted freely and fairly; the capacity of organized opposition parties to effectively contest elections; the ideological differentiation of political parties; and the decisiveness of elections in determining the composition of governments. These are aspects that are likely to modulate citizens' capacity to transmit their political demands and affect policymaking through their vote. Hence, since participation is motivated by the will to exert influence over policymaking, citizens' subjective evaluations of these different aspects should affect their motivations to participate in politics (see below).

Free and fair elections is the first condition that a democracy, where citizens are meant to exercise influence over policymakers through their votes, must fulfill. If elections are tampered in any way, or they are not celebrated in an environment free from coercion, citizens' capacity to exercise influence over policymakers will be limited. As Birch (2010) argues, elections that are not free and fair are less meaningful and consequential. Hence, the quality of the representative channel depends, first, on whether elections are conducted in a free environment and the rules regarding the process are fairly applied.

Even if free elections are important to ensure that citizens can route their political demands through the representative channel this is by no means sufficient, since elections must also be contested. That is, opposition parties must be able to effectively compete with each other for votes to ensure that all of them have a real chance of winning office (Przeworski et al., 1996). To effectively compete in elections it is fundamental that all parties are free to criticize the government. If opposition parties are constrained in their capacity to

criticize government actions, opposition parties will only have a slim probability of effectively running for office.

In established democracies citizens' capacity to transmit their demands through the representative channel not only depends on the integrity of the electoral process (i.e. elections being free and contested), but also on the ideological differentiation of political parties. One of the aspects that makes the choices in an election process meaningful is that the parties contesting it are distinguishable in terms of ideology (Wessels and Schmitt, 2008). In the presence of a sufficiently differentiated partisan offer it is likely that all sectors of society will be able to find a party that represents their interests and preferences (Norris, 2002). In its absence, some sectors of society will remain unable to express their true policy priorities through the conventional channel of representation, since they will find no party to vehicle their demands.

The different options offered to citizens, no matter how broad or narrow they are, become meaningless if citizens are not able to determine the composition of governments and reward and punish the incumbent government through their vote. That is, elections must be consequential and citizens must be capable of "throwing the rascals out" (Wessels and Schmitt, 2008). If this is the case, elections grant citizens the means to exercise control over political institutions and the political agenda through the representative channel (Morlino, 2009). Conversely, if elections are not decisive citizens' will not be able to sanction and hold the government accountable through their vote.

Empirically, earlier research documented the impact of characteristics of the electoral process such as the breadth of the partisan offer, the number of parties, the closeness of elections and the frequency of government change on aggregate turnout (Adams and Merrill, 2003; Blais, 2006; Jackman, 1987; Wessels and Schmitt, 2008). While this work analyzed how macro-level characteristics of the electoral process and the institutional system affect

turnout by allegedly influencing individual incentives to vote, some recent studies have considered how individual assessments of aspects related to the integrity of the electoral process, mainly the freedom and fairness of elections, affect political engagement (Birch, 2010; Carreras and İrepoğlu, 2013; Hiskey and Bowler, 2005; Levin and Alvarez, 2009; McCann and Domínguez, 1998; Norris, 2014). These studies have shown that when citizens judge that elections are conducted freely and fairly and the electoral process is not tampered they are more likely to vote and less likely to protest.

Although these studies constitute an important contribution because they moved from contextual factors to subjective evaluations of specific aspects of the electoral process, they have certain limitations. With the notable exceptions of Levin and Alvarez (2009) and Norris (2014), prior studies focus exclusively on voting, and disregard other forms of participation. More importantly, all these studies focus on evaluations of the integrity and incorruptibility of the electoral process, and most of them rely on a single indicator about trust in elections or the extent to which elections are conducted freely and fairly.[1] Electoral integrity considerations might be more relevant for citizens' behavior in non-fully established democracies like those analyzed in most of these studies.[2] However, in a context of established democracies, where the prospects of elections being conducted in accordance with the highest democratic standards are high, we need to incorporate elements that go beyond electoral integrity and malpractice (e.g. the ideological differentiation between parties and the decisiveness of elections).[3] Moreover, it is also necessary to consider these processes in broader models of political participation that account for the potential moderating role of individual resources.

2.2 *Evaluations of the quality of the representative channel, resources, and political participation*

Verba's et al. (1995) civic voluntarism model underlines the importance of motivations, resources and mobilization for participation decisions. In this paper we focus on the first two sets of factors, and begin by considering how subjective evaluations of the quality of the representative channel relate to motivations to participate in politics. The motivational or instrumental model of political participation sustains that citizens are rational actors who intend to affect the course of public policy through their actions (Franklin, 1996; Norris, 2002, pp. 61–72). Although it might appear naïve for individual citizens to expect to influence policymaking through their individual behavior, research has shown that the desire to influence policies is among the most relevant considerations motivating citizens' participation in elections and demonstrations (Verba et al., 1995). Hence, citizens' assessment of the probability that their actions will have any impact on policymaking should influence their decisions to participate, as well as the means through which they participate (see Birch (2010); Carreras and İrepoğlu (2013); Norris (2014) for a related view).

The quality of the representative channel modulates the extent to which citizens are able to vehicle their political demands through institutionalized means of participation. In the absence of free, competitive and decisive elections, or ideologically differentiated partisan alternatives citizens will have a low capacity to influence policymaking through the conventional channel. If citizens perceive that the representative channel does not work well, they should consider that their vote is less likely to be effective in transferring their demands to the political system. Hence, given that motivations to ultimately affect policymaking will play a central role in citizens' participation decisions, we expect that *more positive evaluations of the quality of the representative channel will be positively associated with the likelihood of turning out to vote* (H_1).

A logical consequence derived from our first hypothesis is that those with negative evaluations of the representative channel will be less likely to turn out to vote. However, even when the evaluations of the representative channel are negative, citizens might still desire to influence the political process. Protest has become increasingly present in contemporary democracies, and it constitutes an important tool to exert influence over policymaking (Dalton et al., 2010). Historically, demonstrations have been a tool for those lacking access through the conventional channel of representation, and studies of protest argue that with limited means of conventional political access citizens' likelihood to demonstrate may increase (Dalton et al., 2010; Kitschelt, 1986; Marien and Christensen, 2013). Hence, as citizens perceive the conventional channels to be blocked or inadequate, they may opt to vehicle their demands through demonstrations, either in addition to or as an alternative to voting. As a consequence, we expect that *more negative evaluations of the quality of the representative channel will be positively associated with the likelihood of participating in demonstrations* (H_2).

Although a citizen might or might not participate in elections and take part in demonstrations depending on how she evaluates the functioning of the representative channel, this choice is constrained by her individual resources and the different resource demands imposed upon her by each of the forms of participation. This implies that the role of motivations stemming from subjective assessments of the quality of the representative channel cannot be analyzed in isolation, and that one must also consider the role played by individual resources that are relevant for particular forms of political participation. Previous research has recognized the importance of personal resources to explain political participation. Resources such as education or income enable citizens to participate, since they provide the necessary skills and means to be active in politics (Verba et al., 1995).

Resources have not only been considered a direct correlate of participation, but also a moderating factor, affecting the relationship between political grievances or motivations and actual political actions. Following the argument put forward by Gamson (1968), the relationship between grievances and participation is considered to involve complex interactions (Levi and Stoker, 2000), since resources are assumed to be necessary for individuals to translate motivations into action. One strand within this literature has focused on the moderating effect of resources such as education or income (Chan, 1997; Citrin, 1977; Kriesi and Westholm, 2007), while others have predominantly focused on the moderating effect of political attitudes such as political interest, political efficacy, or regime support (Christensen, 2014; Craig and Maggiotto, 1981; Hooghe and Marien, 2013).

In comparison to other forms of participation, demonstrations are considerably more demanding in terms of resources (Dalton, 2006, pp. 73–74). As a consequence, not all citizens that asses the quality of the representative channel negatively will be equally likely to reroute their political demands through demonstrations. Protests and other direct action methods are considered high information activities, and, as such, the requirements to participate in terms of civic skills are higher than for other forms of participation (Dalton, 2000, pp. 929–930). These civic skills are fostered by citizens' education (Verba et al., 1995). Thus, education is likely to affect citizens' capacity to grasp and exploit the opportunities to influence the policymaking process through demonstrations. We hence expect *more negative evaluations of the quality of the representative channel to have a stronger effect on the likelihood to demonstrate for those who are more educated* (H_3). In fact, it might be that (when holding negative evaluations of the representative channel) only those who are more educated are able to add another form of participation to their political repertoire or to bypass the representative channel altogether to ensure that their demands are channeled into the

political system. That is, a minimum level of education might be necessary for individuals to be able to resort to alternative means of participation.

In contrast to demonstrations, voting is one of the most common and least demanding forms of participation, since the act of voting makes only modest demands on citizens in terms of cognitive and material resources (Verba et al., 1995). In comparison to other forms of participation, voting has a "low-cost" nature (Aarts and Wessels, 2005, p. 81). Research on the determinants of voting in Europe has shown that there is barely any educational effect for voting and that, as a consequence, voting can be considered one of the most democratic forms of participation (Marien et al., 2010). Topf (1995) argued that since the 1960s all Europeans appear to possess the skills to participate in national elections. Hence, while educational attainment generates pronounced unequal participation patterns in most non-institutionalized forms of political participation, people of all educational levels participate at similar rates in elections (Marien et al., 2010, p. 197; Teorrell et al., 2007, p. 395).[4] As a consequence, we do not expect educational attainment to moderate the association between respondents' evaluations of the representative channel and their likelihood to turn out to vote. Hence, *we should not find any differences in the effect of evaluations of the representative channel on the likelihood of voting for individuals with different levels of education* (H_4). That is, the impact of negative evaluations on the likelihood of withdrawing from electoral participation should be the same across individuals with different levels of education.

If confirmed, our first two hypotheses imply that negative evaluations of the quality of the representative channel should not be considered a threat for the correct functioning of contemporary democracies. Those who hold negative evaluations would not withdraw from politics altogether, but they would just be more likely to adjust the way in which they channel their demands into the political system. The "critical citizens" thesis argues that dissatisfied citizens may eschew institutionalized forms of participation to engage instead in protest

activities. Within this framework, a critical outlook towards the functioning of political institutions is not seen as a symptom or precursor of political alienation, but as a healthy attitude, which, even if it may discourage participation through conventional means, it is also likely to motivate citizens' to remain vigilant and engage in alternative forms of political participation (Hofferbert and Klingemann, 2001; Norris, 1999; Rosanvallon, 2008). Although this conclusion would be reassuring, this might not always be the case.

Our third and fourth hypotheses imply that more negative assessments of the functioning of the representative channel would entail that all citizens, independently of their level of education, would be less likely to vote. However, negative evaluations would only imply a greater likelihood to demonstrate for those who are more educated. As a consequence, for those who are less educated, negative evaluations would entail an increasing likelihood of withdrawing from politics (i.e. political alienation). Conversely, for those who are more educated, negative evaluations imply that these individuals are more likely to participate in demonstrations, and this could be done as an alternative to voting or in addition to it.

It is possible that those who demonstrate more as their perceptions of the representative channel worsen still participate in elections, since citizens can also express dissatisfaction through voting (e.g. by casting a vote for protest parties). In fact, recent studies suggest that protest might be an instrument that some citizens add up to their participation repertoires, instead of being a tool predominantly used by those who decide to withdraw from conventional politics (Saunders, 2014). In terms of the participation outcomes we study, we expect that given their lack of resources individuals with lower levels of education will simply withdraw from politics when they have negative perceptions of how the representative channel works. At the same time, we expect those with higher education to be more likely to adapt their behavior either by only demonstrating, or by incorporating this

form of participation to their repertoire as a way of adding strength to their voices in the presence of a malfunctioning representative channel. Hence, the joint consideration of both motivations and resources leads us to expect that only a resourceful fraction of the population will behave as the ideal "critical citizen", who does not withdraw from the political process in the presence of a malfunctioning representative channel.

3. DATA AND METHODS

Our empirical analyses draw on data from the European Social Survey (ESS), a cross-national survey frequently used to study political participation. In its sixth round, conducted between 2012 and 2013 in 29 countries, the ESS includes a rotating module in which citizens are asked to evaluate different elements of their democracies, among them several aspects related to the functioning of the representative channel.[5] This rotating module inquires to what extent citizens evaluate that, in their countries, elections are free and fair, opposition parties are free to criticize the government, parties offer clear alternatives to one another, and government parties that have done a bad job while in office are punished in elections.[6]

The main independent variable (individual evaluations of the quality of the representative channel) is operationalized with these four survey items. This operationalization is consistent with the discussion in the theory section, which summarizes the theoretical rationale underpinning the aggregation of these different indicators. The empirical analysis confirms that these indicators can be combined into a single measure. An exploratory factor analysis (table 1) yields a one-factor solution, with only one factor extracted with an eigenvalue higher than one, and with all indicators loading strongly on this single dimension.[7] The Cronbach's alpha for these indicators equals 0.72. We estimate our main independent variable based on the factor scores, which take higher values for better evaluations of the quality of the representative channel. The resulting index ranges between

(-1.7) and (0.9), with Kosovo being the country with the lowest/worst average evaluations and Sweden the country with the highest/best.[8]

<TABLE 1>

With regard to our dependent variables, voting takes the value 1 for those who voted in the last national election and 0 for those who did not.[9] Following Saunders' (2014) recommendations, we restrict our analysis to participation in demonstrations without incorporating to our measure any other non-conventional activity. The demonstration variable takes the value 1 for those who participated in lawful demonstrations in the last 12 months and the value of 0 for those who did not. These two variables are combined to generate our third dependent variable which classifies respondents in four different categories: *neither votes nor demonstrates, only votes, only demonstrates, votes and demonstrates.*

Together with the evaluations of the representative channel, education is a key independent variable. The ESS includes two measures of education. A categorical variable capturing the highest level of education achieved by a respondent, and a continuous variable measuring the number of years a respondent spent in full time education. Although the latter has been extensively used in political science research, survey and education research questioned its use in cross-national analyses (Müller, 2008; Schneider, 2007). As a consequence, we rely on the ISCED categorical education variable to group respondents in three categories: primary education or less, secondary education, and university education.

All models include a control variable that identifies respondents that support any of the parties in government. It is important to account for the potential confounding effect of "winners and losers", since being a winner affects citizens' assessment of the fairness of elections (Birch, 2008), while at the same time it might also alter citizens' decisions to join

demonstrations (Anderson and Mendes, 2006). Hence, those who identify with a government party receive the value 1 while those who do not, either because they identify with another party or do not identify with any party, receive the value 0.[10] Other variables that have been shown to affect the propensity to participate in politics are included in the analyses as additional controls. Political interest is used as a proxy for citizens' intrinsic motivations to participate in politics. Feeling about current income is introduced as a control for the impact of monetary resources. In order to account for citizens' embedment in mobilization networks, two variables measuring whether respondents are members of unions or whether they work or participate in any other kind of organization are used. Finally, age and gender are also included in all models.

We estimate models in which the dependent variable is binary through logistic regression, and models in which the dependent variable has four categories through multinomial logistic regression. Listwise deletion is used in all models. Our data has a hierarchical structure (individuals nested into countries). Since our interest is to estimate the effects of level-1 predictors (individual level factors) we take into account the hierarchical structure of the data by estimating country fixed-effects models. Fixed-effects are warranted in our case since this approach controls for country-level heterogeneity and takes care of the nesting of units, allowing us to concentrate on the effects of individual level predictors (Allison, 2009; Huang, 2014; Möhring, 2012). The advantage of fixed-effects over the common alternative of random-intercepts (multilevel) models is that this approach is conservative and parsimonious, since it controls for unobserved differences between countries through a series of country-dummies, and does not require us to assume that the covariates are uncorrelated with the country-level error term (Allison, 2009).[11]

4. RESULTS

Our first hypotheses refer to the association between evaluations of the quality of the representative channel and the likelihood of voting and demonstrating. *Table 2* summarizes the results from four logistic regression models with vote and participation in demonstrations specified as the dependent variables.[12] The first key findings from these analyses are the coefficients associated to the evaluations in the first and the second model. These coefficients provide initial support for hypotheses 1 and 2. Evaluations are positively associated to voting and negatively associated to participation in demonstrations, with both coefficients being statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Hence, more negative evaluations of the quality of the representative channel discourage voting, while they foster participation in lawful demonstrations.

<TABLE 2>

For a better assessment of these effects *figures 1 and 2* plot the average adjusted predictions of voting and demonstrating (respectively) for different values of the evaluations. The adjusted prediction of voting changes by 0.10 points when moving from the lowest to the highest level of the evaluations. The probability of voting for a person with the worst evaluation is 0.72 and it increases to 0.82 when the evaluation takes the highest value.[13] This substantial change in the likelihood of voting is similar to the one estimated by Birch (2010) for her measure of perceptions of electoral fairness, and stronger than the one estimated by Carreras & İrepoğlu (2013) for Latin American countries. To further evaluate the significance of this change we compare it to one of the most relevant attitudinal predictors of voting: political interest. The analysis reveals that the estimated change in the probability of voting is

higher than the one associated to moving from being hardly interested in politics to being quite interested in politics.

<FIGURES 1 AND 2 >

In the case of participation in demonstrations the change in the adjusted prediction is smaller when moving from one extreme of the evaluation index to the other. The adjusted prediction of demonstrating is 0.10 for those with the worst evaluations, and it decreases to 0.06 when the evaluation index takes its maximum value, a change of just 0.04 points. Hence, while H_1 is clearly confirmed by these results, H_2 is only weakly supported. It is possible that the marginal effect of the evaluations of the representative channel is smaller when explaining participation in demonstrations than voting because, as we hypothesized above, in the case of demonstrations we expect this effect to vary according to educational levels, with flatter slopes for those with low levels of education.

The third and fourth hypotheses focus on the moderating effect of education on the association between evaluations of the representative channel, voting and participating in demonstrations. *Models 3 and 4* in *table 2* summarize the results of the two interactive models specified to test these hypotheses. In both cases the evaluations of the quality of the representative channel have been interacted with education levels (with the level of primary education or less set as the reference category). The coefficients reported in *model 4* reveal that in the case of participation in demonstrations the interactive effect between the evaluations and secondary and tertiary education are both significant at least at the 0.01 level. However, these interactive terms fail to reach conventional levels of significance in the model in which voting is specified as the dependent variable (*model 3*). These results provide preliminary support for H_3 and H_4. However, since interactive effects in logistic regression

models are not easily interpreted by raw coefficients we turn to *figures 3* and *4* for a better assessment of these results.

<FIGURE 3>

Figure 3 summarizes the average adjusted predictions of voting for different levels of the evaluation factor and education (computed from *model 3*). The slopes for the different education categories are similar. Although the absolute probability values are different for the three groups (with tertiary educated individuals showing greater predispositions to vote) the marginal increase in the likelihood of turning out to vote when the evaluation of the quality of the representative channel improves is similar across education levels. Moving from the lowest to the highest point in the evaluation scale increases the probability of voting by 0.11 points for those with tertiary education, by 0.10 points for those with secondary education, and by 0.11 points for those with primary education or less. Hence, education does not appear to moderate the relationship between evaluations of the quality of the representative channel and voting.[14]

<FIGURE 4>

Figure 4 summarizes the average adjusted predictions of participating in demonstrations for different values of the evaluation factor and levels of education. A comparison of *figures 3* and *4* clearly highlights the relevance of the moderating effect of education on the likelihood of participating in demonstrations. While in the previous figure there were barely any differences in the slopes for the different levels of education, we find substantial variation in the marginal effects of the evaluations on the likelihood of

participating in demonstrations for the three different levels of education considered. For those with university education, the adjusted prediction of participating in demonstrations decreases by more than 50 percent as evaluations of the quality of the representative channel improve (from 0.15 for the worst evaluations to 0.07 for the best evaluations). These predicted probabilities also decrease for those with secondary education, but the change is considerably smaller (from 0.09 to 0.06). In the case of individuals with primary education or less the relationship between evaluations of the representative channel and the probability to participate in demonstrations not only is different (as we hypothesized) but it also changes signs and becomes positive, with the predicted probabilities rising from 0.03 for the most negative evaluations to 0.07 for the most positive.[15] To assess the significance of these effects we compare them again to one of the most important attitudinal predictors of engagement in demonstrations: political interest. In the case of individuals with university education the change associated with moving from the best to the worst evaluations (0.08 increase in the likelihood of demonstrating) appears to be substantial, since it is similar to the change associated with moving from being not at all interested in politics to being very interested in politics (0.09 increase in the likelihood of demonstrating).

We have shown how variation in the evaluations of the quality of the representative channel, moderated by educational attainment, is associated to the probability of voting and demonstrating separately. In the next step of the analysis, we consider the role of these variables on a typology of participation that can take four different values. Respondents can either: only vote, neither vote nor demonstrate, only demonstrate, or both vote and demonstrate. The classification reveals that most respondents only vote (70 percent of the sample) or neither vote nor demonstrate (23 percent).[16] In line with Saunders (2014), among those who demonstrate (7 percent of the sample), 16 percent only demonstrate and 84 percent both vote and demonstrate.[17] This classification of respondents according to what

combination of these two activities they perform allows us to investigate further the impact of evaluations on political involvement, and, more importantly, to determine if negative evaluations can be considered a mobilizing or an alienating factor depending on citizens' resources. *Table 3* summarizes the results of two multinomial logistic models in which *only votes* is set as the base outcome.

<TABLE 3 >

The first model replicates the non-interactive specification using the categorical dependent variable. The results reveal that more positive evaluations of the quality of the representative channel encourage *only voting* versus all other possible outcomes. The negative coefficients of the evaluations for the comparisons of *neither votes nor demonstrates*, *demonstrates only* and *votes and demonstrates* with respect to *only voting* imply that the chances of only voting relative to these three categories are higher as evaluations improve. The association is the strongest for the comparison between *only voting* and *only demonstrating*. A one unit increase in the evaluations factor (which corresponds to a two standard deviations change) decreases the odds of only demonstrating versus only voting by 45 percent, while this change in the odds is of 20 percent for voting and demonstrating, and of 24 percent for neither voting nor demonstrating. Hence, worsening evaluations of the quality of the representative channel are associated with the possibility of not participating (*neither votes nor demonstrates* category), but also clearly associated to the possibility of engaging in demonstrations (*demonstrates only* category), or even of supplementing electoral participation with participation in demonstrations (*votes and demonstrates* category). Our previous analysis suggests that individuals' resources are likely to play an important role for which of the three possible alternatives citizens opt for.

The second model introduces the interactive term between the evaluations and educational attainment. In accordance with the evidence for H_4 examined above, we find that there is no moderating effect of education on the relationship between the evaluations and the probability of *only voting* versus *neither voting nor demonstrating*. More negative evaluations of the representative channel increase the odds of neither voting nor demonstrating (versus *only voting*) to a similar extent independently of educational attainment. There is, however, a significant moderating role of education for the likelihood of *only demonstrating*, and of *voting and demonstrating* versus *only voting*. Negative evaluations of the representative channel only increase the odds of *voting and demonstrating* for those respondents with secondary or university education. While positive evaluations do not significantly decrease the odds of *voting and demonstrating* versus *only voting* for those with primary education (as revealed by the coefficient for the evaluations constitutive term in the interaction), an increase in two standard deviations in the evaluations factor decreases the odds of voting and demonstrating versus only voting by 41 percent for those with secondary education relative to those with primary, and by 51 percent for those with university education relative to those with only primary.[18] Similarly, while positive evaluations hardly have any impact on the odds of *demonstrating only* versus *only voting* for those with primary education, for those with university education the odds of *only demonstrating* versus *only voting* decrease by 57 percent for an increase in two standard deviations of the evaluations factor (compared to those with primary education or less). For those with secondary education these odds decrease by 42 percent compared to those with primary education, although in this case the difference between these two groups is not statistically significant.[19]

These results confirm the findings based on two separate measures of participation and show that in the presence of negative evaluations only those who possess greater resources are more likely to react by engaging in demonstrations, either as an alternative or as

a complement to voting. For those respondents with lower levels of education, variation on evaluations of the quality of the representative channel only significantly alter their likelihood of either voting (when evaluations are good) or withdrawing from politics (when they are bad). Hence, negative evaluations should be considered as either a mobilizing or alienating factor depending on individuals' resources.

5. LIMITATIONS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

Like most studies analyzing attitudes and behavior, our analyses are susceptible of being affected by endogeneity.[20] Respondents might rationalize and edit their answers to the attitudinal questions according to their behavior. For example, it is possible that respondents who did not vote provide worst evaluations of the representative channel to appear consistent, avoid cognitive dissonance, or justify a socially undesirable behavior (Birch, 2010; Norris, 2014). The act of voting itself might also reinforce citizens' evaluations of the functioning of the representative channel. Although Birch (2010) showed, using UK panel data, that prior perceptions of electoral fairness affect subsequent voting decisions, in our case endogeneity might bias some of our results, especially in the case of voting.

If endogeneity biases our findings, it is more likely to affect some of the variables of our index of the quality of the representative channel than others. Of the four questions we use to operationalize evaluations of the representative channel only one directly refers to the electoral process (elections being conducted freely and fairly). The remaining three questions ask respondents about their opinion on elements that are related to the functioning of the representative channel, but without explicitly mentioning elections. As a consequence, the likelihood of respondents rationalizing and editing their answers according to their behaviors should be lower for these three questions. We exploit this feature of the dataset in order to assess the robustness of our findings.

Tables in appendix B replicate our models with an evaluation variable generated from a factor analysis that excludes the free elections question. Overall, our findings are robust to the use of this alternative specification. Only in the case of the model in which voting is specified as the dependent variable the effects of the evaluations weaken, but still remain significant. This might suggest that, for voting, a share of the direct effects we estimate could be endogenous. However, the interaction effects are not modified. For participation in demonstrations the results are also unaltered by the different specification of the main independent variable. Lastly, in the case of the multinomial logistic analysis, the results are only slightly weaker. Hence, in spite of the inherent limitations of cross-sectional data to address potential endogeneity biases, these analyses increase our confidence in the robustness of our findings, by showing that the exclusion of the question most susceptible of being affected by this bias does not substantially alter our findings.

Another limitation of our paper stems from the fact that we consider only one form of non-conventional participation (demonstrations), and citizens may rely on other forms of non-conventional participation to channel their demands to policymakers. Although different forms of non-conventional participation may not be entirely comparable (Saunders, 2014), we re-specify our demonstration variable to include a larger number of non-conventional actions, and we re-estimate all our models.[21] The results (available upon request) are very similar to the ones obtained with the measure based on demonstrations only. Negative evaluations of the quality of representative channel are associated with a greater likelihood of engaging through non-conventional forms of participation only for respondents who are more educated.

6. CONCLUSION

With this paper we contribute to the field of political participation studies by implementing a measure that captures one of the determinants of citizens' motivations to engage in politics: their evaluations of the quality of the representative channel. Our initial hypothesis contended that those citizens who evaluate positively the functioning of the representative channel should be more motivated to vote. At the same time, those who evaluate it negatively should be more likely to choose extra-institutional forms of participation as a mechanism to channel their demands into the political system. Our empirical results support these initial hypotheses but with certain caveats, namely that individual resources play an important moderating role in the case of participation in demonstrations.

In line with studies analyzing attitudes on electoral integrity (e.g. Carreras and İrepoğlu, 2013; Norris, 2014), our results indicate that negative evaluations of the representative channel increase the likelihood of withdrawing from electoral politics. Yet, our analyses also add further nuances to the relationship between evaluations of institutional channels of representation and political participation by showing the presence of a moderating effect of education in how these assessments relate to participation in demonstrations, but an absence of this effect for voting. These results underline the importance of considering these specific attitudes in light of the potential moderating role of individual resources and the different resources demands of each form of political participation. Our analyses also point to the pertinence of going beyond electoral integrity considerations when accounting for individual assessments of the functioning of the representative channel, especially more so when studying established democracies.

These findings also have broader implications for the functioning of European democracies. For those who are more educated, negative evaluations of the quality of the representative channel are less likely to imply a withdrawal from the political process,

because these citizens have a greater likelihood of adapting the repertoire through which they vehicle their demands into the political system. Conversely, for those with low levels of education, negative evaluations are more likely to imply a withdrawal from the political process altogether. For these citizens, who have fewer resources to engage in demanding forms of political participation, negative evaluations are not translated into a greater likelihood to engage in demonstrations and, in the same way as for those who are more educated, they are associated with a lower likelihood to vote. This finding qualifies the optimistic view of the "critical citizens" thesis, which contends that in post-industrial societies negative orientations towards the political system might not be problematic for the functioning of democracy, since those who are dissatisfied, disenchanted or critical are more likely to change their repertoire of political actions but they will not withdraw from politics. Our findings show that, whenever the channel of representative politics is judged to be malfunctioning, only the most resourceful citizens are likely to reroute their political demands through alternative channels. Hence, a low quality of the representative channel is more likely to politically alienate those with fewer resources.

Given that political participation is one of the main mechanisms linking citizens' preferences to the policymaking process, the logical implication of these findings is that when perceptions of the representative channel are negative not all citizens are equally likely of making their voices heard. This would violate democracy's ideal that all citizens' needs and preferences should be given equal consideration, since there is evidence that policy makers are likely to neglect the preferences of those groups that are less likely to participate (Bartels, 2008). There are, however, alternative forms of political participation other than demonstrating that could mitigate these inequalities in the presence of negative evaluations, as long as engagement in them is not conditional on individual resources. A succinct analysis of other forms of participation included in the ESS indicates that inequalities are also

apparent in them, but further research should analyze other emerging forms of participation (e.g. online participation). Besides considering other forms of political participation, further extensions of these analyses could consider the role played by contextual factors (e.g. the strength of mobilization agents or characteristics of the political opportunity structure) in how negative perceptions of the representative channel relate to participation decisions, and how this relationship is moderated by individual resources like education.

Notes

[1] Although still focusing on the integrity of the electoral process Carreras and İrepoğlu (2013) and Norris (2014) rely on more than one indicator to operationalize their electoral integrity/malpractice measures.

[2] The studies by Hiskey and Bowler (2005), and Levin and Alvarez (2009) focused on Mexico where allegations of electoral fraud have been common in the last decades. Carreras & İrepoğlu (2013) focused on Latin American countries, which clearly differ in their levels of democracy. Although Norris' (2014) analysis adopted a global outlook, a great number of the 18 countries included in her sample cannot be considered full democracies as attested by their scores in Freedom House indexes, and the few established democracies included in her analysis (Australia, Chile, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Uruguay) functioned as a control (Norris 2014: 64). The exception to this pattern is Birch's (2010) study, which included a great number of established democracies.

[3] Carreras and İrepoğlu (2013 p. 612) show that while distrust in the fairness of elections is quite high in regions like Latin America this is not the case in Europe.

[4] Some recent studies challenge the view that differences in turnout across education groups are small in all countries. Gallego (2015) uncovered substantial country differences in turnout inequalities related to education. Likewise, Armingeon and Schädel (2015) recently argued that there are remarkable cross-country and temporal differences with respect to voting inequalities related to education. In any case, Gallego (2015: 25) points that in most countries the overall differences in turnout rates for citizens with different levels of education are moderate in size, and Armingeon and Schädel (2015) identify an average difference in turnout rates between those with the highest and the lowest education of just 4.9 percent (for the 1999-2009 decade).

[5] Our final sample includes 27 countries. We exclude Russia and Ukraine because they cannot be considered fully democratic. None of these countries had a score above 6 in the Polity IV dataset .We exclude countries that are not fully democratic because voting and demonstrating, as well as answers to questions related to the functioning of democracy, might be distorted by the non-democratic character of these regimes.

[6] The question wording and descriptive statistics of all items used in this paper can be found in appendix A.

[7] The same factor solution is obtained when factor analyzing these indicators in each of the countries separately. In all countries only one factor with an eigenvalue higher than one is extracted, and in all cases all indicators have a factor loading above the 0.3 threshold.

[8] If instead of relying on the factor scores we rely on an index obtained through the sum of the four indicators we obtain very similar results that lead us to the same conclusions for all the analyses presented below (results available upon request).

[9] Respondents not eligible to vote have been excluded from all the analyses.

[10] This choice is motivated by the fact that it is not possible to directly measure winner/loser status according to the party voted by the respondent, because this variable predicts success perfectly in non-linear models in which voting is specified as the dependent variable.

[11] To ensure that our results are not driven by our model estimation decisions we replicate all the analyses using random-intercepts logistic and multinomial logistic models. Empty random-intercepts models reveal that the amount of variance at the country level is 8.6 percent for voting, and 13.7 percent for demonstrating. Following recent analysis of political participation (Braun and Hutter, 2014; Dalton et al., 2010; Marien and Christensen, 2013) we introduce in these models a country-level control for the openness of the political system. To operationalize this variable we follow Dalton et al., (2010) who rely on the World Bank rule of law indicator to measure system openness. This choice is motivated by this being the only system openness proxy (among the ones used in previous studies) that is available for all the countries in our sample. These multilevel models also include a country-level variable measuring the enforcement of compulsory voting in national elections. These models, which can be found in appendix C, do not alter the substantive results and lead us to the same conclusions.

[12] Independent variables are rescaled so that numeric inputs represent the effect of the mean ± 1 standard deviation. Binary predictors are not rescaled.

[13] We have re-estimated these predictions relying on adjusted predictions at representative values (APRs) instead of average adjusted predictions (AAPs). We have estimated APRs of the likelihood of turning out to vote for a young individual with a low level of political interest. In this case the adjusted predictions of voting change from 0.46 for an individual with the worst evaluations to 0.62 for and individual with the best evaluations. That is, in this case the change in the adjusted prediction of turning out to vote is of 0.16.

[14] In the case of voting a contrast of the statistical significance of the average marginal effects of the evaluations reveals that there is no statistically significant difference in the effect of the evaluations between the three education groups.

[15] In the case of demonstrating a contrast of the statistical significance of the average marginal effects of the evaluations reveals that there are statistically significant differences in the effect of the evaluations between all these three education groups. The negative average marginal effects of the evaluations are statistically significant at the 0.001 level for those with secondary and university education. The positive average marginal effect of the evaluations fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance for those with primary education.

[16] The high proportion of voters in the sample is likely to be caused by turnout overestimation due to social desirability bias.

[17] Even if only 503 respondents fall in the *only demonstrates* category, it is meaningful to separate those respondents from those who *both vote and demonstrate* since their attitudinal profile is likely to be quite different (e.g. they should have more negative evaluations of the functioning of representative channel than those who both vote and demonstrate).

[18] For those with university and secondary education, the average marginal effects associated to a one-unit change in the evaluations factor indicate that, for them, more negative evaluations statistically significantly increase the likelihood of *both voting and demonstrating*, while this is not the case for those with primary education.

[19] As in the previous case, for those with university and secondary education, the average marginal effects associated to a one-unit change in the evaluations factor indicate that, for them, more negative evaluations statistically significantly increase the likelihood of *demonstrating only*, while this is not the case for those with primary education. .

[20] Birch (2010) and Norris (2014) acknowledge this potential pitfall when analyzing the relationship between electoral integrity and political participation.

[21] This variable measuring non-conventional activity takes the value 1 if the respondent performed any of the following actions in the last twelve months: joined a demonstration, boycotted a product or signed a petition. The categorical variable of participation is also re-estimated with the category of *only demonstrates* becoming *only non-conventional*, and the category *both votes and demonstrates* becoming *both votes and non-conventional*.

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Table 1. Factor analysis

To what extent in your country…	Loadings
National elections are free and fair	0.7865
Opposition parties are free to criticize government	0.7618
Parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job	0.6921
Parties offer clear alternatives to one another	0.7117

Note: Entries are the result of a principal-component factor analysis. 1 component extracted, eigenvalue 2.184. Number of observations included in the analysis 44,582

Table 2. Logistic fixed-effects regression results

VARIABLES	(1) Vote	(2) Demonstrate	(3) Vote	(4) Demonstrate
Evaluations	0.274***	-0.227***	0.268**	0.329*
	(9.347)	(-4.874)	(3.298)	(2.008)
Education (cat). Reference: primary				
Secondary	0.164**	0.257**	0.162***	0.245**
	(3.279)	(2.810)	(3.187)	(2.666)
University	0.591***	0.578***	0.594***	0.570***
	(10.30)	(6.010)	(10.24)	(5.920)
Interaction: Evaluation * Education				
Evaluation * Secondary			-0.0138	-0.526**
			(-0.160)	(-3.059)
Evaluation * University			0.0800	-0.723***
			(0.800)	(-4.082)
Supports winner	1.003***	-0.0846	1.003***	-0.0811
	(22.98)	(-1.643)	(22.96)	(-1.576)
Political interest	1.052***	0.949***	1.052***	0.949***
	(33.72)	(20.58)	(33.71)	(20.57)
Association member	0.438***	1.141***	0.438***	1.139***
	(8.619)	(23.13)	(8.609)	(23.09)
Female	-0.126***	0.0449	-0.127***	0.0458
	(-4.671)	(1.088)	(-4.703)	(1.108)
Age	0.935***	-0.736***	0.934***	-0.735***
	(29.64)	(-14.67)	(29.61)	(-14.63)
Union member	0.482***	0.645***	0.482***	0.646***
	(10.50)	(12.48)	(10.49)	(12.51)
Feeling about income	-0.308***	0.185***	-0.309***	0.186***
	(-10.07)	(3.901)	(-10.10)	(3.924)
Constant	1.962***	-3.228***	1.961***	-3.219***
	(17.63)	(-20.54)	(17.58)	(-20.44)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nagelkerke R2	0.23	0.19	0.23	0.20
Observations	40,381	40,381	40,381	40,381

z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Figure 1: Average adjusted predictions (AAPs) of voting for different values of the evaluations (with 95% confidence intervals)



Figure 2: AAPs of demonstrating for different values of the evaluations (with 95% confidence intervals)



Figure 3: AAPs of voting for different values of the evaluations and levels of education (with 95% confidence intervals)



Figure 4: AAPs of demonstrating for different values of the evaluations and levels of education (with 95% confidence intervals)



Table 3. Multinomial logistic fixed-effects regression results

	Non-interactive model			Interactive model		
Reference category: Only votes	Neither votes nor demonstrates	Demonstrates only	Votes and demonstrates	Neither votes nor demonstrates	Demonstrates only	Votes and demonstrates
Evaluations	-0.268***	-0.600***	-0.217***	-0.263**	-0.0151	0.342
	(-8.907)	(-5.799)	(-4.244)	(-3.181)	(-0.042)	(1.867)
Education (cat). Reference: primary						
Secondary	-0.148**	-0.112	0.292**	-0.143**	-0.191	0.294**
	(-2.900)	(-0.544)	(2.899)	(-2.761)	(-0.908)	(2.909)
University	-0.583***	-0.0771	0.584***	-0.580***	-0.194	0.595***
	(-9.899)	(-0.349)	(5.558)	(-9.735)	(-0.858)	(5.640)
Interaction: Evaluation * Education						
Evaluation * Secondary				0.0132	-0.543	-0.533**
				(0.150)	(-1.436)	(-2.776)
Evaluation * University				-0.0685	-0.838*	-0.711***
				(-0.665)	(-2.112)	(-3.617)
Supports winner	-1.018***	-0.854***	-0.122*	-1.018***	-0.850***	-0.119*
	(-22.69)	(-5.050)	(-2.280)	(-22.68)	(-5.025)	(-2.221)
Political Interest	-1.060***	0.0880	0.874***	-1.060***	0.0882	0.874***
	(-32.74)	(0.827)	(17.24)	(-32.73)	(0.829)	(17.24)
Association member	-0.442***	0.799***	1.122***	-0.441***	0.796***	1.120***
	(-8.051)	(6.104)	(21.62)	(-8.030)	(6.089)	(21.58)
Female	0.121***	0.259**	0.0347	0.122***	0.260**	0.0351
	(4.365)	(2.600)	(0.778)	(4.391)	(2.611)	(0.787)
Age	-0.917***	-2.174***	-0.682***	-0.916***	-2.173***	-0.680***
	(-28.43)	(-15.93)	(-12.60)	(-28.40)	(-15.92)	(-12.55)
Union member	-0.469***	0.148	0.641***	-0.468***	0.150	0.642***
	(-9.797)	(0.994)	(11.84)	(-9.785)	(1.008)	(11.86)
Feeling about income	0.318***	0.417***	0.221***	0.319***	0.417***	0.222***
	(10.12)	(3.824)	(4.284)	(10.14)	(3.824)	(4.304)
Constant	-1.971***	-5.288***	-3.214***	-1.973***	-5.207***	-3.219***
	(-17.23)	(-12.68)	(-19.10)	(-17.20)	(-12.47)	(-19.07)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nagelkerke R2	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29
Observations	40,381	40,381	40,381	40,381	40,381	40,381

z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix A. Descriptive statistics and question wording

Variable	Wording	Valid N	Mean	SD	min	max
Dependent Variables						
Vote	"Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]?" Coded 0 for No, and 1 for Yes	45,800	0.76	0.42	0	1
Demonstrate	"There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?. Taken part in a lawful demonstration?" Coded 0 for No, and 1 for Yes	49,823	0.07	0.26	0	1
Types of participation (Categorical):	Variable based on vote and demonstration variables. Four different categories: neither votes nor demonstrates; only votes; only demonstrates; both votes and demonstrates.					
	- Neither votes nor demonstrates	10,274	0.23			
	- Only votes	32,153	0.7			
	- Only demonstrates	503	0.01			
	- Both votes and demonstrates	2,724	0.06			
Independent variables						
Evaluations quality representative channel (Factor)	Four indicators capturing citizens evaluation of different aspects of their democracies (see below for question wording). Variable calculated through principal components factor analysis with regression scoring assumed.	44,582	0	1	-3.37	1.72
Age	Age in years	49,885	48.41	18.60	15	103
Political interest	"How interested would you say you are in politics- are you: very interested, quite interested, hardly interested, or not at all interested". Higher values correspond to higher levels of political interest.	49,835	2.35	0.92	1	4
Gender	Gender of the respondent. Coded 1 = female	49,994	0.46	0.50	0	1
Union membership	"Are you or have you ever been member of a trade union or similar organization? If Yes, is that currently or previously?". Coded 1 for those who are member currently and 0 for all other responses	49,694	0.17	0.38	0	1
Association membership	During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following?. Worked in an organization or association?" Coded 0 for No, and 1 for Yes	49,833	0.14	0.35	0	1
Supports winner	"Is there a particular party you fell closer to than all the other parties? Which one? Coded 1 if respondent identifies or feels close to any of the parties in government.	50,011	0.21	0.41	0	1

Education (Categorical):	"What is the highest level of education you have successfully completed?" Categories adapted to each country in which the survey was conducted and later recoded into the ESS Education Detailed ISCED Coding Frame. From this categories and according to the ISCED classification we divided the sample in three different groups: Primary or less; Secondary; University					
	- Primary	5,653	0.11			
	- Secondary	30,563	0.61			
	- University	13,438	0.27			
Feeling about income	Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays? (1) Living comfortably on present income. (2) Coping on present income. (3) Finding it difficult on present income. (4) Finding it very difficult on present income. Higher values correspond to more difficulties on present income	49,425	2.15	0.91	1	4
Compulsory voting (country-level)*	Coded 1 for those countries that enforce compulsory voting according to IDEA database, coded 0 for all other countries	50,011	0.06	0.24	0	1
System openness (country-level)	Variable measuring the openness of the political system following Dalton et al. (2010). Based on the World Bank rule of law indicator. Higher values indicate higher openness	50,011	1.15	0.67	-0.57	1.95
Indicators evaluations quality representative channel						
Introductory statement common to all questions	"Now some questions about the same topics, but this time about how you think democracy is working in [country] today. Again, there are no right or wrong answers, so please just tell me what you think. Using this card, please tell me to what extent you think each of the following statements applies in [country]. 0 means you think the statement does not apply at all and 10 means you think it applies completely."					
Free elections	National elections in [country] are free and fair.	48,081	7.24	2.80	0	10
Parties freedom	Opposition parties in [country] are free to criticize the government .	47,647	7.55	2.36	0	10
Vertical accountability (elections decisiveness)	Government parties in [country] are punished in elections when they have done a bad job.	46,985	5.60	3.07	0	10
Differentiated partisan offer	Different political parties in [country] offer clear alternatives to one another.	47,029	5.62	2.55	0	10

Note: All values correspond to the original variables before rescaling. See endnote 12 for further information. Valid N corresponds to the answers for given item after excluding non-response (don't know, no answer and not applicable categories). Non-response figures for each variable can be obtained by subtracting the valid N from 50,011, which corresponds to the sample size.

* In Switzerland only the canton of Schafhausen enforces compulsory voting. Hence Switzerland is coded as 0

Appendix B.

Table B1. Logistic fixed-effects regression results

VARIABLES	(1) Vote	(2) Demonstrate	(3) Vote	(4) Demonstrate
Evaluations	0.199***	-0.235***	0.251**	0.297
	(7.114)	(-5.313)	(3.131)	(1.868)
Education (cat). Reference: primary				
Secondary	0.156**	0.262**	0.150**	0.255**
	(3.151)	(2.867)	(2.988)	(2.781)
University	0.590***	0.577***	0.586***	0.568***
	(10.37)	(6.007)	(10.20)	(5.912)
Interaction. Evaluation * Education				
Evaluation * Secondary			-0.0667	-0.503**
			(-0.780)	(-3.008)
Evaluation * University			-0.0276	-0.685***
			(-0.278)	(-3.980)
Supports winner	1.013***	-0.0877	1.013***	-0.0847
	(23.37)	(-1.709)	(23.37)	(-1.651)
Political interest	1.067***	0.953***	1.066***	0.952***
	(34.44)	(20.75)	(34.43)	(20.73)
Association member	0.441***	1.143***	0.441***	1.141***
	(8.699)	(23.21)	(8.695)	(23.17)
Female	-0.120***	0.0468	-0.120***	0.0478
	(-4.463)	(1.138)	(-4.486)	(1.159)
Age	0.931***	-0.737***	0.931***	-0.735***
	(29.75)	(-14.71)	(29.74)	(-14.66)
Union member	0.485***	0.643***	0.485***	0.643***
	(10.62)	(12.47)	(10.62)	(12.47)
Feeling income	-0.321***	0.190***	-0.321***	0.190***
	(-10.58)	(4.017)	(-10.58)	(4.019)
Constant	1.899***	-3.198***	1.904***	-3.190***
	(17.20)	(-20.50)	(17.21)	(-20.41)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nagelkerke R2	0.23	0.19	0.24	0.2
Observations	40,751	40,751	40,751	40,751

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table B2. Multinomial logistic fixed-effects regression results

	Non-interactive model			Interactive model		
Reference category: Only votes	Neither votes nor demonstrates	Demonstrates only	Votes and demonstrates	Neither votes nor demonstrates	Demonstrates only	Votes and demonstrates
Evaluations	-0.194***	-0.532***	-0.222***	-0.244**	-0.0566	0.314
	(-6.731)	(-5.333)	(-4.599)	(-2.991)	(-0.159)	(1.776)
Education (cat). Reference: primary						
Secondary	-0.141**	-0.0848	0.294**	-0.133**	-0.137	0.300**
	(-2.793)	(-0.413)	(2.925)	(-2.599)	(-0.654)	(2.968)
University	-0.582***	-0.0724	0.582***	-0.573***	-0.176	0.591***
	(-9.966)	(-0.328)	(5.549)	(-9.727)	(-0.781)	(5.604)
Interaction. Evaluation * Education						
Evaluation * Secondary				0.0623	-0.413	-0.517**
				(0.715)	(-1.104)	(-2.784)
Evaluation * University				0.0453	-0.743	-0.664***
				(0.444)	(-1.885)	(-3.497)
Supports winner	-1.027***	-0.882***	-0.124*	-1.027***	-0.878***	-0.121*
	(-23.06)	(-5.223)	(-2.324)	(-23.07)	(-5.200)	(-2.274)
Political Interest	-1.075***	0.0786	0.878***	-1.075***	0.0782	0.878***
	(-33.44)	(0.742)	(17.36)	(-33.44)	(0.739)	(17.35)
Association member	-0.443***	0.784***	1.126***	-0.442***	0.782***	1.124***
	(-8.097)	(6.010)	(21.73)	(-8.087)	(5.995)	(21.70)
Female	0.114***	0.266**	0.0341	0.114***	0.268**	0.0343
	(4.136)	(2.684)	(0.765)	(4.150)	(2.708)	(0.771)
Age	-0.913***	-2.173***	-0.681***	-0.912***	-2.171***	-0.679***
	(-28.54)	(-16.00)	(-12.61)	(-28.53)	(-15.98)	(-12.55)
Union member	-0.472***	0.142	0.640***	-0.472***	0.142	0.640***
	(-9.903)	(0.956)	(11.83)	(-9.910)	(0.954)	(11.83)
Feeling about income	0.331***	0.425***	0.229***	0.331***	0.423***	0.229***
	(10.64)	(3.916)	(4.445)	(10.64)	(3.902)	(4.445)
Constant	-1.909***	-5.170***	-3.184***	-1.917***	-5.107***	-3.189***
	(-16.82)	(-12.48)	(-19.06)	(-16.85)	(-12.30)	(-19.04)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nagelkerke R2	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29
Observations	40,751	40,751	40,751	40,751	40,751	40,751

z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix C

Table C1. Multilevel random-intercepts logistic regression results

VARIABLES	(1) Vote	(2) Demonstrate	(3) Vote	(4) Demonstrate
Evaluations	0.276***	-0.229***	0.270***	0.327*
	(9.425)	(-4.921)	(3.316)	(1.995)
Education (cat). Reference: primary				
Secondary	0.159**	0.249**	0.157**	0.237**
	(3.196)	(2.725)	(3.106)	(2.582)
University	0.585***	0.569***	0.588***	0.561***
	(10.21)	(5.925)	(10.15)	(5.835)
Interaction: Evaluation * Education				
Evaluation * Secondary			-0.0134	-0.525**
			(-0.155)	(-3.056)
Evaluation * University			0.0818	-0.723***
			(0.819)	(-4.088)
Supports winner	1.001***	-0.0889	1.000***	-0.0854
	(22.96)	(-1.729)	(22.94)	(-1.661)
Political interest	1.052***	0.950***	1.052***	0.950***
	(33.76)	(20.61)	(33.75)	(20.60)
Association member	0.443***	1.141***	0.442***	1.139***
	(8.713)	(23.15)	(8.704)	(23.12)
Female	-0.126***	0.0452	-0.127***	0.0461
	(-4.669)	(1.096)	(-4.701)	(1.116)
Age	0.933***	-0.737***	0.932***	-0.736***
	(29.59)	(-14.71)	(29.56)	(-14.66)
Union member	0.495***	0.641***	0.495***	0.643***
	(10.79)	(12.45)	(10.78)	(12.47)
Feeling about income	-0.308***	0.184***	-0.309***	0.185***
	(-10.09)	(3.887)	(-10.11)	(3.910)
Compulsory voting	0.612*		0.613*	
	(2.061)		(2.068)	
System openness	-0.179	-0.399*	-0.179	-0.391
	(-1.639)	(-1.998)	(-1.642)	(-1.958)
Constant	1.146***	-3.164***	1.146***	-3.159***
	(7.570)	(-11.43)	(7.570)	(-11.42)
Random effects parameters				
Constant (var)	0.154***	0.531***	0.154***	0.529***
	(3.481)	(3.562)	(3.480)	(3.562)
Observations (countries)	27	27	27	27
Observations (Individuals)	40,381	40,381	40,381	40,381

z-statistics in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table C2. Multilevel random-intercepts multinomial logistic regression results

	Non-interactive model			Interactive model		
Reference category: Only votes	Neither votes nor demonstrates	Demonstrates only	Votes and demonstrates	Neither votes nor demonstrates	Demonstrates only	Votes and demonstrates
Evaluations	-0.270***	-0.674***	-0.237***	-0.258**	-0.0709	0.276
	(-9.084)	(-6.723)	(-4.827)	(-3.121)	(-0.199)	(1.556)
Education (cat). Reference: primary						
Secondary	0.0199	-0.505**	-0.150	0.0247	-0.593**	-0.147
	(0.399)	(-2.583)	(-1.578)	(0.485)	(-2.961)	(-1.532)
University	-0.412***	-0.505*	0.102	-0.408***	-0.626**	0.113
	(-7.117)	(-2.404)	(1.027)	(-6.959)	(-2.917)	(1.138)
Interaction: Evaluation * Education						
Evaluation * Secondary				0.00845	-0.570	-0.470*
				(0.0960)	(-1.535)	(-2.532)
Evaluation * University				-0.0878	-0.836*	-0.676***
				(-0.854)	(-2.143)	(-3.560)
Supports winner	-0.952***	-0.950***	-0.292***	-0.952***	-0.946***	-0.289***
	(-21.51)	(-5.728)	(-5.624)	(-21.50)	(-5.701)	(-5.559)
Political Interest	-1.024***	0.101	0.894***	-1.024***	0.103	0.894***
	(-32.24)	(0.944)	(17.78)	(-32.25)	(0.967)	(17.78)
Association member	-0.476***	0.839***	1.155***	-0.476***	0.841***	1.155***
	(-8.741)	(6.567)	(23.19)	(-8.737)	(6.583)	(23.20)
Female	0.114***	0.278**	0.0358	0.115***	0.279**	0.0366
	(4.121)	(2.816)	(0.823)	(4.150)	(2.821)	(0.840)
Age	-0.874***	-2.207***	-0.788***	-0.872***	-2.208***	-0.786***
	(-27.26)	(-16.87)	(-15.16)	(-27.22)	(-16.86)	(-15.11)
Union member	-0.482***	-0.0387	0.645***	-0.482***	-0.0321	0.648***
	(-10.33)	(-0.269)	(12.66)	(-10.33)	(-0.223)	(12.71)
Feeling about income	0.313***	0.369***	0.187***	0.314***	0.372***	0.190***
	(10.13)	(3.469)	(3.739)	(10.17)	(3.500)	(3.786)
Compulsory voting	-0.614*	-0.973*	-0.394	-0.616*	-0.982*	-0.403
	(-2.308)	(-2.421)	(-1.428)	(-2.329)	(-2.447)	(-1.465)
System openness	0.157	-0.167	-0.300**	0.157	-0.162	-0.296**
	(1.604)	(-1.337)	(-2.940)	(1.616)	(-1.297)	(-2.923)
Constant	-1.246***	-3.981***	-2.569***	-1.249***	-3.894***	-2.576***
	(-9.063)	(-15.93)	(-15.90)	(-9.112)	(-15.58)	(-15.96)
Random effects parameters						
Constant (var)	0.122***	0.122***	0.122***	0.121***	0.121***	0.121***
	(3.501)	-3.501	-3.501	(3.499)	-3.499	-3.499
Observations (countries)	27	27	27	27	27	27
Observations (individuals)	40,381	40,381	40,381	40,381	40,381	40,381

z-statistics in parentheses

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05