Energy Research & Social Science 53 (2019) 159–169 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Energy Research & Social Science journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/erss Complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity: Implications for European Union T energy governance Zora Kovacica, Louisa Jane Di Feliceb, ⁎ a Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities (SVT), University of Bergen, Parkveien 9, 5020 Bergen, Norway b Institut de Ciencia i Tecnologia Ambientals, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Edifici Z, Campus UAB, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Keywords: Energy security is an ambiguous concept. Growing academic interest has aimed at defining, conceptualising and Science-policy interface measuring energy security, often through indicators. Energy policy in the European Union (EU) is not concerned Policy-making with energy security’s ambiguous conceptualisation, nor does it use energy security indicators, but it refers Indicators consistently to security as one of its primary aims. In this paper, by analysing the use of energy security both in Definition scientific publications and in EU policy, we argue that the ambiguity of the concept plays a function in the policy Energy security process and is only seen as a problem in the academic literature. Building on the uncertainty literature, we conceptualise ambiguity as the type of uncertainty that emerges from complexity. Complexity leads to the ex- istence of multiple representations of a system, which may serve different purposes in the policy process, gen- erating ambiguity. Uncertainty is mobilised to frame energy policy as a matter of security. This has implications for the science-policy interface: on one hand, the analysis suggests that science’s aim of providing holistic as- sessments and clarifications may not serve its desired instrumental purpose in policymaking; on the other, ambiguity allows for materially ineffective policy measures to persist in the name of energy security. 1. Introduction a renewable transition [4–6]. Challenges and solutions offered by spe- cific primary energy sources, such as gas, coal, uranium, shale gas and Energy security has received growing attention in European Union variable renewable sources have also contributed to the proliferation of (EU) and United States (US) public policy since the early 2000s, re- definitions of energy security. In the EU, security concerns became viving a concept that had been predominant during the oil crises of the central to the energy policy agenda following the 2005–09 gas and oil 1970s [1]. While persisting as a priority in national agendas, its defi- disputes between Russia and Ukraine, and between Russia and Belarus nition has evolved in time. Up to World War II, energy security was tied [7]. As the electrification of energy systems gradually increases to in- to the supply of fuels for the military [1], linking the concept of security corporate a higher share of renewable energy, energy security has also to the military narrative. According to Lippman, “a nation is secure to evolved to incorporate dimensions that are unique to electricity, such as the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, the security of transnational grids [8]. if it wishes to avoid war, and is able … to maintain them by victory in The reintroduction of energy security in policy agendas has sparked such a war” [2]. With the oil embargo of the 1970s, energy security academic debates that can be grouped under the field of energy security became part of political diplomacy and geopolitical concerns. In this studies. The view that energy is a key input to all economic processes is context, it referred to the risks of depending on oil imports, and on the widespread in these studies [9,10], and in disciplines such as ecological vulnerability of oil trade to international diplomacy and political in- economics [11–13]. Characterisations of energy security range from the stability in producing countries. With the publication of the report “The availability of primary energy sources [10], to the stability of internal limits to growth” (Meadows et al. 1972), security was also tied to the markets [14], to the affordability at consumer level [3]. While avail- possibility of physical scarcity of non-renewable energy sources. ability and affordability are the two dimensions most commonly asso- Starting from the 2000s, the term has been increasingly associated with ciated with energy security [3,10,14–18], it has been linked to a resilience based on a complex systems perspective [1], with the re- number of other aspects, including for example sustainability [3], so- source scarcity narrative based on concerns for the depletion of fossil vereignty and resilience [1]. The ubiquity of energy security, and its fuel reserves [3], and with renewable energy based on the challenges of context-dependent nature [18,19], have been the object of a branch of ⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail address: louisajane.difelice@uab.cat (L.J. Di Felice). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.03.005 Received 19 October 2018; Received in revised form 6 March 2019; Accepted 7 March 2019 2214-6296/ © 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/). Z. Kovacic and L.J. Di Felice Energy Research & Social Science 53 (2019) 159–169 security papers exploring the ambiguity of the concept. Ciută [9] ex- ambiguity, mentioned in scientific publications and EU policy docu- plains the multiplicity of definitions of energy security as a result of the ments. Section 3 introduces the materials and methods used. The results fact that “energy security is a complexity model with interlocking (Section 4) show the multiple scales of analysis used to define energy segments and levels of interaction” [p. 132]. Energy security studies security and the types of uncertainty associated with it. Based on our recognise that the security of modern energy systems has different results, we return to the discussion of how this type of uncertainty does characteristics than those attributed to the concept in the 1970s, among not lead to paralysis in the policy process in the EU context, but rather other factors because of the increased importance of renewable energy, provides a rationale for materially ineffective policy measures. We and attempt to handle the multiple dimensions that are associated with conclude the paper by arguing that our finding about the (non-)issue of this polysemic concept [19], which sometimes mixes technical and energy security definitions at the science-policy interface has theore- colloquial definitions of energy security. tical implications for the role of ambiguity as distinct from other dif- From a policy perspective, the growing focus given to energy se- ferent types of uncertainty in policy processes, which requires a careful curity in EU policy from the early 2000s follows a trend of securitisation consideration of the limits of holistic assessments in guiding policy. of energy issues [20], i.e. “a process where governments frame energy as an existential threat to state interests” [21, p.114]. This is in contrast with previous framings of the 1990s, when energy had been mostly 2. Conceptualising ambiguity relegated to the technical domain, as highlighted by Kuzemko [22] for the case of the UK. Energy security has long been a recurring theme for In general terms, energy security is recurrently linked to risk [26], many national agendas of countries that are poor in primary energy uncertainty [29] and ambiguity [9,16–19,25,26,29–31]. Because of the sources, often used as a justification for disparate policy measures. This extensive use of these terms, it is important to clarify their meaning. In was highlighted for the US by MIT economist Paul Joskow [23]: “There this paper, we draw upon the work of Knight, Stirling and Wynne is one thing that has not changed since the early 1970s. If you cannot [32–34] on uncertainty, and of Funtowicz and Ravetz, Zellmer et al., think of a reasoned rationale for some policy based on standard eco- Strand, Kovacic and Giampietro [35–38] on complexity. nomic reasoning, then argue that the policy is necessary to promote Knight [32] first introduced the distinction between risk and strict ‘energy security’” [p. 7]. uncertainty in economics in his foundational work in the 1920s, de- From a governance perspective, energy security is used both as a fining risk as a situation in which the possible outcomes are known and means to mobilise uncertainty and as a material issue. The multiple the probabilities associated with each outcome can be calculated. Strict definitions provided by academia and the overflow of information do uncertainty is defined as a situation in which the possible outcomes are not lead to paralysis-by-analysis, as proven by the fact that the concept known but the associated probabilities cannot be calculated. We speak of energy security is recurrently used in policy. It is due to the very of “strict uncertainty” to distinguish the technical definition of un- existence of multiple definitions that one may view energy security as certainty from the general study of uncertainty, which includes risk, characterised by ambiguity. Focusing at the interface between science strict uncertainty, ignorance, indeterminacy and ambiguity. In the case and policy, there is a clear gap between the conceptualisations and of energy security, strict uncertainty can be associated with events such measurements of energy security in academia, and the (non-)issue of as price volatility [26], and disruptive events such as tsunamis [29], ambiguity in policymaking [24]. which are known to occur, but cannot be precisely predicted. The no- Although some authors recognise that ambiguity plays a role in velty introduced by Knight is that uncertainty is conceptualised as a policy-making [25–27], scientific literature largely sees ambiguity as a matter of degrees of (lack of) knowledge1 . problem and aims at reducing this type of uncertainty. Stirling [27] Building on the idea of degrees of uncertainty, Wynne [34] identi- argues that ambiguity is a type of uncertainty due not to lack of fies four types of uncertainty: (i) risk, in which the odds are known, (ii) knowledge, but to the existence of “contradictory certainties”. He strict uncertainty, in which “we know what we don’t know”, (iii) ig- submits that the real challenge at the science-policy interface is the norance, in which “we don’t know what we don’t know”, and (iv) in- failure to recognise this type of uncertainty and to reduce all scientific determinacy or systemic uncertainty, in which “causal chains or net- advice to risk assessment. However, this insight has fallen through and works are open”. With regard to energy security, ignorance may be scholars that analyse the science-policy interface still argue for reducing associated with geopolitical threats derived from “insecure political and ambiguity. We argue that the role of ambiguity in governance is poorly unstable economic environments” [39], as well as with the emergence understood and that reducing ambiguity may not always be functional of new technologies, such as fracking, which introduce unforeseen in policymaking. This is in contrast with the predominant view that opportunities and risks. Indeterminacy is associated with systemic scientists should work towards the clarification of slippery concepts: changes, or what some authors call phase changes. “Threats like de- Wellstead et al. [28], for example, recognise that policy problems and livery disruptions or global warming of more than 2 °C can be seen as solutions can be framed in different ways, leading to ambiguity, yet phase changes, because in addition to having a direct impact on con- argue that scientists should take a normative stand and support a spe- sumers they also change the way in which the system works” [13 p.11]. cific framing in order to reduce said ambiguity. In the context of indeterminacy, uncertainty is irreducible, as systemic The aim of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of changes reduce the possibility of knowing. ambiguity as distinct from other types of uncertainty, drawing from Stirling [33] reorganises Wynne’s levels of uncertainty in a 2 × 2 complexity theory. We use energy security as our empirical reference. matrix, which ranges from known to unknown outcomes and known We analyse and compare the multiple representations of energy se- and unknown probabilities, and introduces ambiguity as an additional curity in scientific literature and in EU policy documents, and assess the type of uncertainty. Once again, risk is defined as known outcomes and level of uncertainty associated with each representation. Even though known probabilities, strict uncertainty as known outcomes and energy security is recurrently described as an ambiguous concept, to our knowledge no attempts have been made at conceptualising ambi- 1 Knight’s definition of risk has been criticised in the literature for not taking guity in this context, nor to theorise the role of ambiguity in energy into account “how people perceive uncertain phenomena and how their inter- governance. pretations and responses are determined by social, political, economic and Because the contribution of this paper is primarily theoretical, we cultural contexts, and judgments” [32 p. 237]. The concept of risk is thus not first develop a theoretical background that conceptualises ambiguity as fully captured by a technical definition of calculable probabilities and effects. the type of uncertainty created by complexity, and we discuss the im- Renn et al. [93] criticize the reduction of risk to calculable probabilities for this plications of ambiguity for the science-policy interface. We use text concept may lead to the use of “technocratic, decisionistic and economic analysis to identify the different types of uncertainty, including models of risk assessment and management” [p. 234]. 160 Z. Kovacic and L.J. Di Felice Energy Research & Social Science 53 (2019) 159–169 unknown probabilities, and ignorance as unknown outcomes and un- semiotics [54], the study of signs as a triadic relation between re- known probabilities. According to Stirling, ambiguity is defined as a presentation, application and interpretation of experiences. That is, situation in which probabilities are known but outcomes are unknown. knowledge cannot be separated from action. As Strand [37] argues The ambiguity of outcomes is not necessarily due to lack of knowledge, “craftsmanship and tacit quality judgments play an integral part in the but to the fact that one cannot predict which of the known outcomes process of transformation from a scientific finding to a fact.” Rather will be realised [27], because of divergent and contested perspectives than the study of systems “out there,” complexity is the study of “ho- on the justification, severity or wider meanings associated with a per- lons” [55], that is, the relationship between (i) the knowledge gener- ceived threat [40]. In their historical analysis of the evolution of energy ated, (ii) the choice of narratives defining causality between ob- security, Cherp and Jewell [1] discuss how the concept has been used to servables [38], and (iii) the choice of a temporal scale of the model, pursue different outcomes. The concept of ambiguity thus suggests that determining how knowledge is updated with experience (as an appli- uncertainty may be mobilised to pursue different goals, not because of a cation of the knowledge itself) [43]. lack of information, but because a plurality of representations can be Similar to uncertainty, complexity poses a challenge to the interface accommodated. between science and policy. Complexity theory is used by many authors In the context of uncertainty, the linear model of science speaking to critique the use of reductionist science to guide decision-making truth to power is questioned, not only because science may produce [44–46], and is used to encourage more pragmatic, humble, reflexive incomplete knowledge, but also because social and political threats and adaptive approaches to policy making [37,38,45,56]. Complexity is indicate that decisions cannot be reduced to rational, utility-max- also used to describe the policy process as affected by negative and imising, get-the-facts-then-act models [41,42]. With regard to energy positive feedbacks, attractors and path dependence [44,46]. In line with security, distinguishing between different levels of uncertainty is cri- our aim of conceptualising ambiguity and its role in governance, we tical for decision-making. For example, after the Fukushima accident, build on the relational understanding of complexity as a means to cri- experts declared that new designs for nuclear power plants took into tically re-think the implications of limited and contradictory knowledge account the risk of earthquakes [43]. Better designs, however, do not for decision-making. Semiotics can be used to argue that science plays a solve the uncertainty linked to the unpredictability of earthquakes and role in the creation of emergent complexity [35]. For instance, through tsunamis. Safer designs refer to advances in the reduction of operating technology, scientific research is also a form of intervention in the risk at the level of the power plant. Strict uncertainty about earthquake world [37]. forecasting (higher levels of uncertainty) cannot be factored into new We argue that the contribution of complexity theory consists not so nuclear designs. The undistinguished reference to uncertainty with much in the type of science advice that can be derived from the con- disregard to the type of uncertainty in question may create a false il- cepts of emergence, non-linearity, open causality, self-organisation, etc. lusion of control, and a diffuse understanding of the role, and limits, of Geyer and Cairney [44] correctly remark that these concepts are scientific knowledge in decision-making. newish, as the messiness of policy making has been long studied in Stirling’s reference to open causality and unpredictability invokes political science with no need to make reference to complexity. Rather, complexity. Many authors have studied the implications of complexity we submit that complexity theory is most usefully deployed in ques- for governance and public policy [35,37,44–46]. In this literature, tioning the relationship between science and policy. Rather than complexity is often defined in opposition to simplicity [37,45], and as a speaking a more nuanced and complex truth to power, relational criticism of the instrumental understanding of the system to be gov- complexity makes it possible to analyse the mutual relation between erned through the lenses of reductionism, determinism, predictability science, scientific truths and power. The linear model relies on the ra- and mono-causality. Positive definitions of complexity, however, are tional use of scientific facts produced by supposedly neutral scientists. many and contrasting. Questioning the linear model requires taking a critical stance also with Strand [37] distinguishes between thin and thick complexity, Geyer regard to scientific facts and the role of experts. The epistemic pluralism [47] speaks of reductionist complexity, soft complexity and complexity [57] of complexity is an alternative concept to monolithic and unifiable thinking as a new epistemology of science, and Salthe [48] provides truths of Newtonian science. Therefore, the study of ambiguity may five definitions of complexity ranging from measurable complexity to lead to insights about the role of experts. ontological complexity. Thin and reductionist complexity can be used Building on Stirling’s definition of ambiguity as a type of un- as a means to recognise “reality” as differentiated and changing. A certainty, we conceptualise ambiguity as the uncertainty created by the system is defined as complex if the whole presents emerging properties existence of multiple non-equivalent representations of the same issue. that cannot be inferred by analysing only the components of the system. Ambiguity is thus not just a matter of different opinions, as may be the The non-linearity and emerging properties of complex systems chal- case of the rise in the price of oil (perceived as beneficial by oil pro- lenge predictability. Thin complexity departs from the positivist and ducers and problematic by oil importers). In linking ambiguity to reductionist use of scientific facts that underpins the linear model of complexity, we argue that this type of uncertainty is caused by the science speaking truth to power. In this case, complexity is also used to existence of incommensurability in the knowledge base. That is, al- reject post-modernism [49], and to postulate the existence of a complex though a lot of information can be produced about energy security, “reality” out there, whose complexity is independent of the observer. there is no univocal way to combine these representations, as can be Concepts of thick complexity and complexity thinking, as well as seen in the proliferation of energy security indicators [17,25,39] and of Salthe’s [48] insistence on the role of the observer in all definitions of academic papers dedicated to the conceptualisation of energy security complexity, create an understanding of complexity as a consequence of [26,31]. analytical choices as much as of what is observed. In this view, com- The role of ambiguity in policy has been widely analysed in the plexity requires the use of multiple scales of analysis [36,50,51], so that literature [33,58–61]. According to Matland [58], ambiguity is neces- both local rules of interaction between system components and emer- sary to limit conflict (ambiguity of goals), and to define policy when ging properties of the whole can be observed. These multiple ob- there is uncertainty over the technology needed or over the role that servations, however, are not reducible to one another, leading to the various organisations are to play in the implementation process (am- existence of non-equivalent descriptive domains [38,52]. biguity of means). With reference to the EU, Zahariadis [59] explains The epistemology of complexity does not refer to knowledge about that ambiguity is an integral part of the policy making process in complex systems, but rather yields a relational understanding of contexts where there is a plurality of, often contrasting, interests, a knowledge as the correspondence between what is observed and what is multiplicity and high turnover of actors, and highly bureaucratic sys- modelled, building on Rosen’s modelling relation [53]. For this reason, tems that cause a fragmentation of the policy process. Shackley and both Salthe [48] and Kovacic and Giampietro [38] refer to Peirce’s Wynne [62] suggest that ambiguity may not only be preferred over 161 Z. Kovacic and L.J. Di Felice Energy Research & Social Science 53 (2019) 159–169 Table 1 Definitions of energy security from the scientific literature. Paper Framing (definition/dimensions) of energy security Uncertainties Scales Bahgat [66] Security defined differently w.r.t. price: “security involves Risk: Global, energy system achieving a state where the risk of rapid and severe In relation to price volatility: “In respect of price, security Long-term fluctuation of prices is reduced or eliminated”. W.r.t. involves achieving a state where the risk of rapid and technology: “Energy security depends on sufficient levels severe fluctuation of prices is reduced or eliminated”. of investment in resource development, generation Risk of dependence. capacity and infrastructure to meet demand as it grows”. Threats can be geological or geopolitical. W.r.t. to diversification: “Security of supplies can be enhanced by an overall diversification of supply”. Bielecki [10] Definition: “reliable and adequate supply of energy at Risk: Global, national reasonable prices” “Short-term security covers the risks of disruption to Long-term, short-term existing supplies due to technical problems, extreme weather conditions or political disruptions. By contrast, the long-term security focuses on the risks that new supplies may not be brought on stream on time to meet growing demand” Cherp & Jewell [1] Three perspectives: sovereignty (political science), Ambiguity Global, national robustness (engineering), resilience (economics/complex Energy security challenges are increasingly entangled so systems) that they cannot be analysed within the boundaries of any single perspective Chester [19] Six aspects: 1) risk management; 2) reliance on imports; 3) Risk: “the risk of interrupted, unavailable energy supplies; International, national strategic use of the term; 4) its temporal dimension; 5) the risk of insufficient capacity to meet demand; the risk of Short, medium and long term differences between energy markets and 6) how different unaffordable energy prices; the risk of reliance on actors have different perspectives on security unsustainable sources of energy. These risks may be caused by energy market instabilities, technical failures or physical security threats” Ignorance: “The meaning of energy security differs over the short, medium and long term because the probability, likelihood and consequences of different risks or threats to supply will vary over time.” Ciuta [9] Three logics: a logic of war for energy security (what Risk: Global and international, states do war with/over), a logic of subsistence (energy Can also be called “challenges” or “threats” and “vary from energy system need, complexity model of interacting parts) and a logic of market failures and price volatility to investment risks, ‘total’ energy security (ubiquity and reflexivity) network disruptions and import dependency”. Ambiguity: “Energy security clearly means many different things to different authors and actors, and even at times to the same author or actor.” Costantini et al. [64] Refers to IEA definition “Energy security is defined as the Strict uncertainty: International, national, availability of a regular supply of energy at an affordable Makes the distinction between reserves and resources: the consumers price” and to the dimensions identified by the European more the energy system depends on resources, the more Short-term and long-term Commission: physical, economic, social and uncertain it is. There is great uncertainty about oil supply environmental from Middle East & Africa. Gas supply is less uncertain. Hughes [5] Refers to IEA definition: "the reliable supply of energy at Indeterminacy: Global energy market, energy an affordable price". 4 R.s: review of supply and In many of the above examples, replacement policies that system, consumer infrastructure; reduce through conservation and were introduced to improve energy security have, efficiency; replace insecure supplies with secure ones overtime, become energy-security problems in their own through diversification and renewables; restriction of new right. This reflects the temporal nature of replacement demand programs based upon finite supplies, from natural gas to agricultural energy crops. Jansen & Seebregts Affordably and competitively priced, environmentally Strict uncertainty: National, regional, society, [31] acceptable energy end-use services by the term energy Resilience as a means to reduce uncertainty - “Enhancing consumers services security (ESS) societal resilience against long-term price volatility in the Long-term face of the strong inertia of national or regional energy systems” Jun et al. [17] "Energy security can be defined as a reliable and Risk and strict uncertainty Global, international uninterrupted supply of energy sufficient to meet the Related to reliability of supply dynamics, national needs of the economy at the same time, coming at a Dependence of OECD countries on oil supplied from reasonable price" politically unstable regions; increasing energy demands worldwide for the next few decades in line with emerging economies and rapidly growing developing countries; increasing concerns for oil and other fossil fuel depletion, localized geopolitical instability Kiriyama & Kajikawa A shift from ensuring self-sufficiency of primary energy to Risk and strict uncertainty: National, energy system [29] diversification of secondary energy supply Risks are quantified: “to appropriately assess the types of risk posed by hazards, we should consider essential societal changes— macro or micro, economic, political, social, environmental, scientific, technological, human health, etc.—taking into account future uncertainties.” Ambiguity: The degree of ambiguity “resulting from energy security being open to more than one interpretation when bibliometrics are applied” is quantified. Ambiguity here (continued on next page) 162 Z. Kovacic and L.J. Di Felice Energy Research & Social Science 53 (2019) 159–169 Table 1 (continued) Paper Framing (definition/dimensions) of energy security Uncertainties Scales arises from the multiple perspectives of energy security literature. Kruyt et al. [15] 4 dimensions: availability (geological), accessibility Risk: Global, international, energy (geopolitical), affordability (economical) and Supply and disruption risks, political stability risks, price system acceptability (environmental) movement risk Long-term, short-term Strict uncertainty: Uncertain reserves estimates Leung [18] A supply-based definition for China, where the quest is for Ambiguity: National, energy system a "reliable and adequate supply of oil" ‘energy security’ is not a self-explanatory concept and Medium to long-term researchers should formulate and contextualize it when applying it to a given country. “China’s current energy security measures aim at the quest for a ‘reliable and adequate supply of oil,’ but pay less attention to the maintenance of ‘reasonable prices.’ It is because ‘reasonable prices’ per se is an elusive goal and is judged by subjective criteria.” Mansson et al. [4] Security has evolved from meaning security of oil supply Risk: For the case of markets, makes the distinction National, energy system, to including energy carriers. In industrialized countries, between specific, systematic and systemic risk. Specific: consumers, industry and “energy security tend to be more closely connected to diversifiable (unique to every exported and supply route); service sectors provision of energy access to the poorest in rural areas systematic: market risk; systemic: the risk of market and, in urban areas, access for the rapidly expanding collapse. industry and service sectors”. Two dimensions: physical and economic Natorski & Surallés Security in the EU framed in terms of energy supply and Strict uncertainty: Global, EU, national [65] dysfunctions in global energy markets “These observations were further aggravated by other uncertainties surrounding energy, such as the perspectives for global demand, price volatility, and the actual capacity of producer countries to supply the energy demanded due to the lack of necessary investments.” “Uncertainty could be further aggravated by natural disasters or other accidents having a negative impact on energy, especially on prices and accessibility” Sovacool & Brown 4 dimensions: availability, affordability, efficiency and Ignorance: Global, national [16] environmental stewardship Difficult to determine the extent to which countries are responding to ES challenges related to climate change Ambiguity: As a problem to solve: “This study provides precision, breadth, and standardization to the often ambiguous concept” Sovacool & Mukherjee 5 dimensions: availability, affordability, technology Ambiguity: Global, national, energy [25] development, sustainability, and regulation “The concept has become diffuse and often incoherent”. system “Energy security is integral to modern society, yet its very Short and long term ubiquity makes it prone to market failure and under- distribution” Sovacool et al. [3] “How to equitably provide available, affordable, reliable, Risk: Global, national efficient, environmentally benign, proactively governed “The security of supply and the concentration of energy and socially acceptable energy services to end-users”. It fuels among countries, theories about peak oil, rising has 5 dimensions: availability, affordability, technology prices, and energy poverty, to name only a few, have all development, sustainability and regulation become prominent concerns among policymakers and investors” Umbach [6] Security as a geopolitical issue (security of supply) Strict uncertainty: Global, EU Of oil production, oil and gas reserves, of investments, of Mid to long-term mid-term challenges, of reliance on gas imports Winzer [26] "The continuity of energy supplies relative to demand" Ambiguity: Global, consumers The concept is blurred, elusive, slippery, difficult to define, umbrella term Risk and indeterminacy: “Threats like price volatility or marginal rises of global temperature can be seen as small changes in the sense that they have an impact on consumers but don’t change the way the system works. And threats like delivery disruptions or global warming of more than 2C can be seen as phase changes, because in addition to having a direct impact on consumers they also change the way in which the system works” Yergin et al. [14] The definition of security depends on the country: can be Risk and strict uncertainty: National, energy system security of demand, control over strategic resources, “The growth of Russia's output slowed substantially last concern over price changes, ability to adjust to new global year because of political risks, insufficient investment, markets, diversification, whether to build new nuclear uncertainties over government policy, regulatory obstacles, plants, etc. and, in some regions, geological challenges.” “The tens of billions of dollars required to bring the industry's output back up to its 1978 peak of 3.5 million barrels per day have not been invested both because of the continuing attacks on the country's infrastructure and work force and because of uncertainty about Iraq's political and (continued on next page) 163 Z. Kovacic and L.J. Di Felice Energy Research & Social Science 53 (2019) 159–169 Table 1 (continued) Paper Framing (definition/dimensions) of energy security Uncertainties Scales legal structures and the contractual framework for investment” Indeterminacy: “Part of that challenge will be anticipating and assessing the "what ifs." And that requires looking not only around the corner, but also beyond the ups and downs of cycles to both the reality of an ever more complex and integrated global energy system and the relations among the countries that participate in it” Yusta et al. [78] Energy has evolved from supply of affordable energy to a Risk: Supranational, national, broader concept including: "price stability, diversification “The term “risk’’ refers to a combination of what can energy system of energy resources, energy storage, economic happen, how likely it is, and its consequences. The term investments, infrastructure protection, political and “threat’ is more related to harmful acts to infrastructure. military power balance, geopolitics, homeland security, ‘Vulnerabilities’’ refers to the weakness level of a system to energy efficiency, energy markets, sustainability" failures, disasters or attacks” “In case an emergency arises decision makers must understand the interdependences in the underlying infrastructure.” Zhang et al. [39] Related to import risks Risk: Global, international, energy Four dimensions relating to: external dependence system (dependence risks), supply stability (supply risks), trade economy (economic risks) and transportation safety (transportation risks) knowledge in decision-making, but may also provide more robust sci- at informing EU policy [6,26,64–66], and (iii) energy security has been entific tools than those generated by a precise knowledge base. Un- a high priority of the EU policy agenda since the 2008 gas crisis with derstanding the function of ambiguity in the policy process has im- Russia [1,6,10,14,66]. portant consequences for the interface between science and policy. Three branches of EU documents are considered: the Energy Whereas numerous studies argue for more holistic and integrated Security Strategy (2014) [67], the Clean Energy for All Europeans conceptualisations of energy security [1,25,29], Matland warns against package (2016) [68] and energy directives in force [69–72]. Ad- the dysfunctional effects of clarity in policy implementation. ditionally, the 2015 State of the Energy Union report [73] is analysed. The literature on energy security is replete with examples of para- The aim of the policy analysis is to obtain an overview of the role doxes and inconsistencies that emerge from the multiple definitions of played by energy security in EU policy, of which measures have been energy security [1,9,25]. According to Sovacool and Mukherjee [25], a proposed as a means to increase security, of which issues are seen as paradox arises as “energy security is integral to modern society, yet its problematic and of how uncertainty is handled. Therefore, the policy very ubiquity makes it prone to market failure and under-distribution” analysis is not constrained to legal documents, but also includes press [p. 5343]. That is, complexity is manifested in the multiple, non- releases and fact-sheets [74–77], as they can provide valuable insights equivalent representations, conceptualisations and quantifications of into the underlying narratives surrounding energy security in EU policy. energy security and the resulting heterogeneity of policies. Building on The texts are coded for definitions of energy security and policy our analysis of energy security, we will return to the theoretical dis- measures, scales and dimensions of analysis, as well as uncertainties, cussion of how ambiguity challenges the relationship between science risks and ambiguities. The categorisation of energy security into dif- and policy in the discussion section. ferent disciplines, domains, dimensions, pillars and principles is pop- ular in the literature and the terms, often referring to different scales, are sometimes used interchangeably. Without delving deep into this 3. Materials and methods categorisation, our interest lies in the different scales and types of un- certainty. The term scale is used here to refer to geographical dimen- Following our theoretical focus on uncertainty and complexity, we sions (e.g. city, province, nation, region, world), temporal dimensions use text analysis to identify how these concepts are articulated with (short-term, long-term), and to hierarchical levels of analysis (energy regard to energy security. The aim of this analysis is to identify the system, energy sector, renewables, wind power, wind farm). There is no multiple representations of energy security across scales, and their level 1:1 mapping between geographical dimensions and hierarchical levels of uncertainty. Both scientific literature and policy documents are of analysis: the energy sector, for example, may refer to a specific analysed. As can be expected, scholarly articles focus predominantly on country or to the global economy. This broad category of scale is used defining and measuring energy security, and policy documents focus on in this paper to capture the multiple levels of granularity used in the identifying different policy measures to increase energy security. literature to describe energy security. Having identified scales, defini- For the literature review, twenty-three papers on energy security tions or dimensions (for academia) and measures (for policy) linked to were analysed, published between 2002 and 2014. The papers are energy security, the next section discusses the role that complexity among the most cited on the topic, and provide a comprehensive plays in the energy security knowledge base, and the role that the spectrum of how energy security is assessed in academia. They include ambiguity arising from complexity plays in policy. perspectives from economics, engineering, geopolitics, policy, tech- nology, political science, finance and geology, and were selected using citation indexes from Web of Science and the snowballing technique 4. Representations and uncertainties of energy security [63]. On the policy side, focus is given to the EU, which we chose as case Results start with the analysis of energy security, as approached in study because (i) energy security has been part of EU policy since the literature. Focus is given to the definitions and dimensions used to creation of the EU [1,9], (ii) many of the scientific articles analysed aim characterise energy security, as well as the type of uncertainty that is 164 Z. Kovacic and L.J. Di Felice Energy Research & Social Science 53 (2019) 159–169 discussed in relation to these dimensions, and to the relevant scales of of supply (availability and reliability), and (ii) security of demand analysis (Table 1). While the first two columns of the table refer to what (affordability). The need to match supply and demand requires hand- was found directly in the text of each article, the third column was ling the interplay of constraints posed by elements external to socio- added in order to discuss the multi-scalar character of the concept of economic systems, such as the availability of fossil fuels, solar radiation, security. The distinction between risks, strict uncertainty, in- water courses, and elements internal to socio-economic systems, such as determinacy and ambiguity follows the levels of uncertainty discussed geopolitical concerns, import dependencies, diversification of suppliers, in the theoretical framework. We analyse all types of uncertainty transportation, infrastructure, technologies, distribution and accessi- mentioned in the documents in order to show how the general argu- bility issues, and price volatility. The external-internal duality perme- ment for reducing uncertainty is applied indiscriminately to all types of ates energy security definitions. Moreover, energy security applies to uncertainty, including ambiguity. Stirling [27] argues that whereas risk multiple hierarchical levels of analysis. Demand issues refer to the may be usefully described using scientific assessments, strict un- distribution of resources at a global, regional and national scale with certainty and ambiguity require humility and the recognition of the regard to energy markets, infrastructure and economic sectors, and at limits of scientific knowledge. Limits are not to be confused with lack of the individual level with regard to consumers. As a consequence, the validity, but are a request for more modest claims. Responding to our concept of energy security is based on the interdependence between aim of theorising the role of ambiguity in policy processes, we will add different hierarchical levels of analysis and the external-internal ob- to this argument and show that different types of uncertainty have servation duality. different functions in the policy process. Uncertainty is central to the concept of energy security. Degrees of Energy security is connected by different authors to a large number uncertainty can be seen in the distinction between different threats. of dimensions, from availability and affordability to resilience and Threats coming from price volatility and technical problems are defined technological development. These dimensions are linked to different as risks to the system. Reliability of supply and geopolitical concerns scales, ranging from individual technologies to global economy, climate may be defined as strict uncertainties (known but not quantifiable). and reserves. The most common type of uncertainty discussed is risk, Threats such as peak oil, increasing demand and climate change are which is strongly linked to security discourses. Ambiguity is also seen as sources of indeterminacy that may cause changes in the system. mentioned, mostly as a problem to be solved, and different types of Uncertainty is seen as a property of the system with regard to the high uncertainties are identified by different authors, mostly linked to global dependence of non-oil producing countries on foreign oil, the high level resources and supply stability [15,17,64,79] and price volatility of inertia of the energy system, and the ubiquitous use of energy in [31,79]. Natural disasters are also mentioned [26,79]. Following the economic activities. Risk, strict uncertainty and indeterminacy have a distinction proposed by Wynne, these events fall under the category of central role in the definition of energy security. Contrary to ambiguity, indeterminacy. these types of uncertainty provide a common ground for the definition The results of the text analysis of policy documents are shown in of energy security for both science and policy. Tables 2a and 2b. Table 2a refers to direct measures, which are cited in In policy documents, the interest lies in the sources of uncertainty. the Energy Security Strategy. Table 2b refers to indirect measures Different sources of uncertainty are used as a means to define and present in wider EU energy policy, linked to energy security as one of classify policy measures. Uncertainty of supply is the most recurrent many aims. The uncertainties reported in the tables are not mentioned source of uncertainty mentioned. It is related to import strategies, to directly in the policies but were identified based on the type of measure market instability and to technological development. Uncertainty of proposed. demand is also present and is related to improvements in efficiency, Looking at the characterization of energy security in science and moderating consumption, and reducing carbon emissions. Contingency policy, the results of both tables show that: (i) there is interdependence measures reveal an additional source of uncertainty, related to ignor- across scales of analysis, (ii) uncertainty is central to energy security ance. They include protection and back-up infrastructure, reserves of and (iii) ambiguity is treated differently in science and policy. critical energy sources, and contingency planning. There is interdependence across scales of analysis in the dimensions Ambiguity plays very different roles in science and policy. While of energy security used both in the scientific literature and in policy ambiguity is mentioned in most of the scientific articles analysed, and is documents. Energy security is framed as the combination of (i) security often the central motivation for the work of clarification, Table 2a Direct measures of energy security in EU energy security strategy [80], their scales and uncertainties. Pillar Measures Scales Uncertainties 1. Immediate actions aimed at increasing the EU's capacity to Enhance storage capacity, develop reverse flows, develop EU, regional, forms of Risk of disruption overcome a major disruption during the winter 2014/ security plans at regional level, explore potential of LNG energy, energy system 2015 (short term) 2. Strengthening emergency/solidarity mechanisms Maintain minimum reserves of crude oil and petroleum EU, national, energy Contingency measures to including coordination of risk assessments and products, invest in back-up infrastructure, physical sector, forms of energy, reduce ignorance contingency plans; and protecting strategic protection of critical infrastructure, contingency planning/ energy sector infrastructure (short term) stress tests 3. Moderating energy demand (short term) Speed up measures to achieve 2020 efficiency targets, Building & industry Uncertainty of demand focusing on buildings and industry sectors 4. Building a well-functioning and fully integrated internal Discuss decisions at EU level, develop an internal EU, electricity sector Uncertainty of supply market (medium to long term) electricity market, build key interconnectors (market) 5. Increasing energy production in the European Union Increase renewables (which will require smart energy EU, national level, forms Uncertainty of supply (medium to long term) grids and storage capacity), carbon capture & storage of energy, energy system 6. Further developing energy technologies (medium to long Invest in energy research & innovation, financial EU, national level Technological term) instruments to leverage greater investments from industry uncertainty 7. Diversifying external supplies and related infrastructure Strengthen relationships with existing suppliers, open the EU, global, types of Uncertainty of supply way to new sources, accelerate nuclear safety directive, energy ensure new nuclear plants do not depend on Russian fuel 8. Improving coordination of national energy policies and Build an energy union, include energy issues in political EU Ambiguity speaking with one voice in external energy policy dialogues 165 Z. Kovacic and L.J. Di Felice Energy Research & Social Science 53 (2019) 159–169 Table 2b Indirect measures of energy security in EU energy policy and their scales, grouped under their uncertainties. Indirect measures Scales Uncertainties Increasing diversification of sources [73,81], investment for a more secure grid [68], bioenergy [68], EU, international, national Uncertainty of supply increasing diversification of supply from third countries [81], reducing energy imports [81], deployment Forms of energy, energy of domestic sources [81], incentives to transmission and distribution operators [82], facilitating cross- system border access to new electricity suppliers [83], renewable energy [84] [81], decentralised energy production [84], biomass fuels converted into electricity and heat [84] Energy efficiency [85] [68], reducing gas imports through efficiency [85], decarbonisation of the heating & EU, national Uncertainty of demand cooling sectors [84] Forms of energy, industrial sector Regional co-operation [81] Regional and EU Ambiguity EU interconnections [82] EU, energy system Technological uncertainty Short term markets and scarcity pricing [82], a well-functioning and transparent energy market [82] EU, national, energy sector Uncertainty of supply (market) Achievement of EU energy and climate policy goals [86] EU, all economic sectors Indeterminacy conceptualisation and/or classification of energy security, the worry ambiguity of goals is accepted (energy security), in order to reduce about ambiguity is virtually absent from policy documents. Despite the ambiguity of means (coordination is needed). ambiguity of the concept highlighted in the literature, energy security is an important priority in EU policy. This finding is consistent with the 5. Discussion study of the use of energy security in the UK [87]. Energy security is mentioned consistently throughout all EU energy policy documents 5.1. Implications of complexity and ambiguity for energy security analysed, although less so in the non-legal documents of the Clean Energy for All Europeans package, where, as the name suggests, focus is The more one digs into the materiality of energy security, the more shifted to consumers. trade-offs, bottlenecks and lock-ins emerge. With reference to the nu- Ambiguity is used in EU energy policy in a variety of instances. For clear power industry in France, Hecht [88] argues that policy effec- example, the definition of energy efficiency is linked to a plurality of tiveness relies on material effectiveness. That is, the ability to deliver on accounting methods. According to the directive, “energy efficiency material changes legitimizes policy, and the use of scientific evidence. means the ratio of output of performance, service, goods or energy, to In the case of energy security, this relationship seems to lean not on input of energy” [71] [our emphasis]. The metrics used to measure effectiveness but on uncertainty. Material effectiveness is elusive in the services (e.g. contribution to GDP) and energy (e.g. megaJoules) are not context of complexity because of non-linearity and open causality, and equivalent to each other and generate ambiguity in energy efficiency policy relies on ambiguity. indicators. Ambiguity is also present in target setting procedures: “Each Uncertainty can be explained with reference to the complexity of Member State shall set an indicative national energy efficiency target, energy systems. Comparing the current state of the EU’s energy system based on either primary or final energy consumption, primary or final with the measures in EU documents, it becomes clear that (i) some energy savings, or energy intensity” [71]. Vagueness can be seen in the energy security measures play minor roles in the overall energy system, renewable energy directive of the EU. For instance, the sustainability neglecting larger lock-ins, and can be better understood as performing a requirement is defined as: “Biofuel production should be sustainable. symbolic role; (ii) measures targeting different components or stages of Biofuels used for compliance with the targets laid down in this Direc- the energy system may generate important trade-offs and systemic tive, and those that benefit from national support schemes, should changes. For example: therefore be required to fulfil sustainability criteria” [69]. A distinction should be made between ambiguity and vagueness. - Technical security: increasing renewables may present challenges Ambiguity is the uncertainty that emerges from complexity, while va- for electric grid control due to the higher penetration of variable gueness refers to the lack of clarity or specificity with which a term is sources into the electricity system [89]; used. Both may be useful in policy processes, and may help generate - Market security: a higher integration of renewables in the electric consensus, but vagueness is a political decision (e.g. the term energy grid may also lead to increased prices for consumers due to feed-in- security is used in relation to geopolitical concerns to avoid explicit tariffs. In Germany, for example, an increase in renewable electricity mention of specific countries and regions, to which different member generation led to lower prices for electricity producers and higher states may have different relations), and ambiguity has to do with in- prices for consumers [90]; commensurability in the knowledge base and the governance of un- - Nexus security: biofuels may increase energy security but pose certainty. Ambiguity makes it possible for a plurality of knowledge threats to food security, as documented extensively in the literature claims to be taken into account, extending the political space. (see, for example, [91]); It should be noted that, although the framing of ambiguity is very - Geopolitical security: decreasing reliance on imports may decrease different in policy and in science, the uncertainty that arises from the security threats caused by geopolitical issues, such as the Russian presence of multiple perspectives is seen as problematic in some in- gas halts, but may also reduce diversification of supply routes and stances also in the policy realm. For example, a high priority for the EU sources, making the system more vulnerable in times of unexpected is the coordination of national energy policies, as expressed by the idea crises. This is referred to as import availability [4]; of building an ‘Energy Union’ and including energy security in political - Environmental security: domestic production of energy carriers may dialogues (last pillar of Table 2a). According to Natorski and Surallés, increase local environmental impacts, such as water contamination; “attempts to frame energy as a security issue in order to gain support for - Technological security: increasing the use of nuclear power may a Common Energy Policy have been of limited effect, precisely because improve the security of electricity supply but pose other concerns, the security framing contributed to the further legitimisation of EU both of plant security and uranium dependence. member states’ reluctance to cede sovereignty in the energy domain” [65]. This policy measure can be interpreted as the pursuit for the ex- Many of these trade-offs are acknowledged in the policy documents plicit discussion of topics otherwise left vague and ambiguous. Fol- analysed. The directives analysed mention grid control problems caused lowing Matland [58], this instance can be interpreted as a case in which by the increase in renewable energies, the dependence on fossil fuels for 166 Z. Kovacic and L.J. Di Felice Energy Research & Social Science 53 (2019) 159–169 transport, and the possible impacts of biofuels on food production [69]. definitional clarity [19], to the support of “multilateral approaches and The recurrent reference to risks, threats and urgency are means concrete cooperation models” [6], “anticipating and assessing the ‘what through which the lack of effectiveness in energy governance is recast ifs’” [14], diplomatic and economic dialogues [66]. While we are as a security challenge. We argue that uncertainty (in the form of risk, sympathetic to these suggestions, we refer to relational complexity to strict uncertainty and indeterminacy) is mobilised to frame energy argue that through ambiguity, multiple knowledge claims and multiple governance in terms of security. In this context, the use of a plurality of sources of expertise are brought to bear on the policy process. Policy is policy measures, and the inconsistencies or trade-offs that arise from informed not only by scientific evidence, but also by political, economic such plurality reinforce the uncertainty element of energy security. and social considerations. Ambiguity makes it possible to maintain a Ambiguity is thus functional to this mode of governance, and the dialogue with a wide range of actors, including but not limited to sci- multiple representations that are produced by the scientific knowledge entific experts. We argue that it is important to take into account who base reinforce the construction of energy security as a challenge of would benefit and who would loose from the clarification of ambiguity, uncertainty, which requires governing. and to assess what is at stake behind different uses of the term. Ambiguity in this context makes it possible to avoid a paralysis in decision-making due to higher level uncertainties, and makes it possible 6. Conclusion to form coalitions between different actors and discourses. By linking all of the above measures to energy security, the complexity of the issue In this paper, we refer to energy security as an entry point to the- is compressed to allow for decisions to be taken. Energy security is orise the role of ambiguity in governance. Energy security is an am- almost always bundled up within a mix of justifications which tend to biguous term, with many competing and contradictory definitions. We include climate change and economic growth, as can be seen for ex- use complexity theory to argue that the multiple definitions refer to ample in the recast proposal for renewable energy directive of 2016: non-equivalent representations of energy security, and cannot be re- “Moreover, renewable energy is also emerging as a driver of inclusive conciled or unified without losing relevant information. We conducted economic growth, creating jobs and reinforcing energy security across a text analysis of academic publications and policy documents to Europe” [86]. Here, ambiguity is used both to group measures together compare which types of uncertainty are mobilised, with a particular (ambiguity/vagueness of means), and to group targets such as security focus on ambiguity, defined as the type of uncertainty arising from and economic growth (ambiguity/vagueness of goals). complexity. Many authors have focused on reducing the ambiguity of definitions 5.2. What does ambiguity imply for science advice to policy? of energy security and have provided broad definitions that can capture its multiple facets [16,17,26,31]. On the other hand, the definition of Recognising the relevance of ambiguity in decision making, the energy security does not necessarily arise as a problem in EU public discussion is now directed to how this affects the science-policy inter- policy. This incongruence between science and policy is not a problem face. Clarifying the concept of energy security would mean showing per se. Academia has different interests than policy, and what can be inconsistencies between representations, indicators and associated interesting from a research perspective (conceptualising an ambiguous measures. Therefore, reducing ambiguity may make scientific advice term) may not be a priority in policymaking. Moreover, the interactions less useful to governance. This observation runs counter to some of the between science and policy are rarely direct (with scientific evidence ethos of science for policy, which is manifested in the goals of in- guiding policymakers), and the effects of conceptualisation literature creasing clarity [25], providing a holistic view [25,29], putting can be diffuse [9], in helping to advance a field that may eventually boundaries on the term [26], distinguishing between different logics of have impacts on policies. Since we relied only on secondary informa- energy security and investigating their political and normative con- tion through text analysis, the differences in the treatment of ambiguity sequence [9]. between science and policy would benefit from further research based A recurrent recommendation is that uncertainty should be analysed on primary data through, for instance, interviews with both scientific and communicated [5,39,78]. The results presented here, however, experts and policy-makers. suggest that the communication of uncertainty at the science-policy The results and discussion suggest that it is important to pay at- interface needs to take into account what type of uncertainty one is tention to what is at stake before clarifying ambiguities at the science- dealing with. While risks, indeterminacy and ignorance are flagged as policy interface. This critical reflection should by no means be under- problematic in policy, ambiguity plays a different role. Before aiming to stood as a call for irresponsible politics or post-factual decision-making. reduce ambiguity, it is important to take into account which policy Rather, it is important to understand the “network of artefacts, processes may be affected, and even disrupted, by reducing ambiguity. knowledges and institutions” [62, p.257] that constitute energy gov- “For example, the call for clear, explicit, and consistent goals contra- ernance before prescribing good practice. To this purpose, we rely on a dicts much of what is known about how legislation is passed” [52, relational understanding of complexity, which relates representation to p.147]. the institutions and the uses of knowledge. Returning to the debate Matland [58] argues that ambiguity is a means to reduce conflict raised by Wellstead et al. [28] about the need to reduce ambiguity, we and hold together coalitions. The use of energy security as a recurrent argue that from a complexity point of view, reducing ambiguity would justification for a wide range of measures indicates that the term is used entail (i) a normative choice of some scientific facts over others, and (ii) to form coalitions, or mobilise existing ones. Meritet [92], for example, a poor understanding of how plural and ambiguous knowledge is used highlights how energy security measures and discourses in France are in policy processes, which would widen the gap between science and very different to those in other EU countries, given the role played by policy, rather than closing it. In contrast, discussing the role of ambi- nuclear power. Ambiguity thus helps maintain coherence at the EU guity in policy can help manage this gap and may foster an environment level, glossing over national differences. for better dialogue between science and policy. The analysis of the role of ambiguity in policy processes shows that ambiguity is not a deficit of knowledge, and that therefore it is not a Declarations of interest matter for scientific experts to “solve.” These considerations open the debate about the role of science and science advice to policy in the None. context of complexity and uncertainty. Policy recommendations in the energy security literature are varied, ranging from “the institution of a Acknowledgments consultative process towards broadly accepted (…) fuel-specific pre- miums” [31], the provision of a detailed analysis of risk [39], and The authors would like to thank Silvio Funtowicz for his comments 167 Z. Kovacic and L.J. Di Felice Energy Research & Social Science 53 (2019) 159–169 on the theoretical framework, three anonymous reviewers for their 2018.1458397. constructive suggestions and the editors for their comments and sup- [29] E. Kiriyama, Y. 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