Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463) 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 290–300 DOI: 10.17645/pag.v8i1.2567 Article Managed Globalization 2.0: The European Commission’s Response to Trade Politicization Patricia Garcia-Duran 1 , Leif Johan Eliasson 2, * and Oriol Costa 3 1 Department of Economic History, Institutions and Policy and World Economy, University of Barcelona, 09034 Barcelona, Spain; E-Mail: patriciagarciaduran@ub.edu 2 Department of Political Science and Economics, East Stroudsburg University, East Stroudsburg, PA 18301, USA; E-Mail: jeliasson@esu.edu 3 Faculty of Political Science and Sociology, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Cerdanyola del Vallès, Spain; E-Mail: oriol.costa@uab.cat * Corresponding author Submitted: 18 October 2019 | Accepted: 17 February 2020 | Published: 31 March 2020 Abstract Several studies have sought to explain the politicization of European Union’s (EU) trade policy during negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement be- tween the EU and Canada (CETA). This article contributes to the literature on the politicization of trade by assessing how politicization is addressed by those tasked with the content and implementation of trade policy, namely the European Commission (hereafter Commission). We identify the origin and definition of managed globalization (MG), and thereafter identify, through a qualitative content analysis of EU Trade Commissioners’ speeches from 2013 to late 2017, how the doctrine re-emerged as the leitmotif of EU trade policy. The Commission’s initial response to civil society organizations’ contestation over TTIP and CETA was to insist on the economic benefits of the agreements. As contestation intensified, we find indirect references to MG, as the Commission focused on clarifying that upholding European values was equally important to market access in EU trade policy. Then, from late 2016 until late 2017, the Commission’s messaging was di- rected primarily at populist fears of trade and globalization; emphasizing that protectionism was unnecessary, and that globalization could be controlled, culminating in the emergence of explicit references to MG. The article expands on exist- ing research on MG by identifying trade politicization as a factor that prompted a modification and expansion of the MG doctrine and its use, while also discussing some accompanying policy changes. Keywords Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement; European Commission; managed globalization; politicization; trade; trade policy; Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Issue This article is part of the issue “Politicization of EU Trade Policy across Time and Space” edited by Dirk De Bièvre (Univer- sity of Antwerp, Belgium), Oriol Costa (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain/IBEI, Spain), Leif Johan Eliasson (East Stroudsburg University, USA) and Patricia Garcia-Duran (University of Barcelona, Spain). © 2020 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu- tion 4.0 International License (CC BY). 1. Introduction Partnership (TTIP) between the US and the EU, and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Several studies have sought to explain the politiciza- (CETA) between the EU and Canada (e.g., Laursen tion of European Union’s (EU) trade policy during ne- & Roederer-Rynning, 2017; Young, 2018), as well as gotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment the European Commission’s (hereafter Commission) re- Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 290–300 290 sponse (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2019; Siles-Brügge, gues that the Commission “over-generalized from an ex- 2018; Young, 2019). This article contributes to these ef- treme case” and pursued a policy “characterized more forts, but more importantly, it focuses on the larger ques- by continuity than by change” (p. 3). While we do not as- tion of the politicization of trade by arguing that the sess whether the Commission’s response to politicization Commission’s response to mobilization against TTIP and was sufficient to permanently address civil society’s con- CETA was neither completely new, nor specific to these cerns over trade (cf. Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2019), we agreements, but rather a modification and expansion of take a slightly longer historical perspective, which further a previously applied doctrine. This matters because the enhances our understanding of how the Commission re- trade doctrine adopted by the Commission is today in- sponded to trade politicization in the context of TTIP ne- tended to not only quell, but also incorporate, expressed gotiations and their aftermath. concerns about the expansion of new issues in trade ne- An analysis of the Commission’s response is also rel- gotiations; it is also used to address rising populism and evant to the literature on the politicization of EU integra- concerns about globalization. tion. For some, the politicization of European integration In this article we argue that the EU responded to in- spells the end of the permissive consensus and the be- creased politicization by invoking, modifying, and adopt- ginning of an era of “constraining dissensus” (Hooghe & ing a doctrine originating in 1999. Managed globalization Marks, 2009), while others (Beck, 2013; Hix, 2006) see (MG) initially emerged in 1999, in a different context, and politicization as a democratic necessity and a precondi- was applied by the Commission for some years there- tion for the legitimacy of further European integration. after. We tap into the literature about that period to de- Our case study provides insights on how the targets of fine MG, and then explore the EU’s messaging during and politicization deal with the challenging relationship be- after TTIP negotiations (although negotiations on CETA tween politicization and legitimacy. began prior to TTIP negotiations, CETA was not politicized until linked with TTIP). 2.1. Politicization and Responsiveness We show that the Commission’s rhetorical response to the most politicized trade negotiations in EU history The literature shows that politicization includes rhetor- (on TTIP) was incremental, with three distinct phases, ical strategies, and that it is a cause of change in inter- leading to an invocation and solidification of a mod- national institutions and the EU. Drawing on the defini- ified MG as the Commission responded to contested tions outlined by de Wilde (2011) and Gheyle (2019), we trade policies, rising populism, and fears of globalization. define trade politicization as an increase in the salience Explicit references to a modified MG emerged just as of trade negotiations, institutions, and rules, a rise in the TTIP negotiations were frozen, indicating that the the number and type of actors mobilizing and participat- Commission deemed it a useful way of signaling a per- ing in debates on trade policy, and the polarization of manent shift in trade policy. In this context an explana- their opinions. tory note is appropriate: A doctrine is a belief system that From the time the negotiations on TTIP were an- may guide policy; a policy is the principles and the rules nounced, there was a steadily rising chorus emanating adopted by an organization; a strategy is a way of convey- from civil society organizations (CSOs) arguing that the ing and implementing a policy. agreement threatened to undermine EU standards and The next section presents politicization and respon- safety regulations, as well as governments’ abilities to siveness, and justifies our argument on theoretical regulate in the public interest (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, grounds, while section three explains the methodol- 2016; Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2017). CSOs, some labor ogy. The analysis is presented in sections four and five. unions, and a few political parties, sought to convince the Section six concludes. public that TTIP would harm product safety, public poli- cies, and democracy (see also van Loon, 2020, in this the- 2. Rhetorical Responses to Politicization and the matic issue). Opposition emerged across Europe, though Managed Globalization Doctrine concentrated in the western half of the European conti- nent and the UK. Many groups staged their own events, The objective of this article is to improve our understand- but many also learned from, and most coordinated with, ing of the Commission’s response to politicization over others, sometimes under the pan-European heading TTIP and CETA. We argue that: 1) the Commission’s re- StopTTIP! (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2019; Young, 2017). sponse was part of a rhetorical counter-strategy, and CSOs largely refrained from attempting to undermine 2) that the response was grounded in the MG doctrine proponents’ claims of the economic and geopolitical ben- introduced by Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy in 1999. efits of TTIP, choosing instead to focus on the fear of Our study contributes to the literature on the evolu- losing precious European achievements, such as high tion of the EU’s trade policy pertaining to both values food and safety standards, and the welfare state. TTIP and market access (Drieghe & Potjomkina, 2019). Our was presented as a trade-off between neo-liberalism research also complements, and partly challenges, the (or “wild-west capitalism”) and “popular sovereignty” analysis carried out by Young (2019), who, when com- (Friends of the Earth Europe, 2016; cf. IG Metal, 2014). paring the EU’s 2010 and 2015–2017 trade strategies, ar- CSOs framed Investor State Dispute-Settlement (ISDS)— Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 290–300 291 a long-established practice intended to ensure that for- 2.2. Managed Globalization and Politicization eign investors have access to a de-politicized legal pro- cess to pursue compensation, but not legislative changes, CSOs contested trade and globalization in late 1999 and through third-party arbitration when a host country’s early 2000, before, during, and after the World Trade government violates the terms of an investment treaty— Organization’s (WTO) ministerial meeting in Seattle (the in TTIP as a carte blanche for US corporations to sue “Battle of Seattle,” e.g., Scholte, 2000). As Abdelal and European governments over any public policy that could Meunier (2010, p. 355) argue, “the anti-globalization reduce corporate profits, such as new environmental movement was gaining traction in public opinion with or public health laws. Both taxpayers and public poli- its widely publicized successes at the WTO conference in cies would therefore be ‘on the hook’ of US compa- Seattle in 1999 and later at the World Social Forum.” As nies’ actions (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2019, pp. 61–68). a result, “other European countries embraced the French Transparency (or rather, the lack of) was another issue vision that globalization ought to be accompanied by new chosen to signal the detrimental effects of TTIP; the ar- regulations and flanked by policies to soften its impact” gument being that nothing negotiated by representa- (Abdelal & Meunier, 2010). The protests were at that time tives behind closed doors can produce a good agreement directed primarily at the WTO rather than the EU, but as (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2016; Gheyle & De Ville, 2017). a major player (along with the US, Japan, and Canada) it CSOs consistently paired big business or corporations provoked a significant response by the Commission. with something negative, implying that the Commission Pascal Lamy, Trade Commissioner from 1999 to 2004, was unable to withstand US pressure, thus jeopardizing introduced the term MG in his hearing at the European European standards (e.g., Seattle to Brussels Network, Parliament in September 1999, and was subsequently 2015). TTIP was portrayed by the Corporate Europe able to make it “the guiding doctrine of EU trade pol- Observatory as a losing proposition for Europeans, a “ve- icy” (Meunier, 2007, p. 910). The adoption of MG also hicle to facilitate deregulation” threatening each side’s served to calm internal tensions about EU trade pol- democratic right to regulate “even when doing so re- icy between those advocating trade liberalization and sults in divergent standards that businesses may find those concerned with the preservation of public stan- inconvenient” (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2013a). dards, including demands for trade protection (Meunier TTIP would “open the floodgate to GMOs [genetically & Nicolaïdis, 2006, p. 921). Existing European prefer- modified organisms]” and “TTIP will lower regulations ences on food safety, cultural diversity, public provision on food safety…and will lead to more industrialized, in- of education and health care, or welfare rights, could— tensive food production that undermines the health of it was argued—legitimate protection against foreign en- people and the planet. Trade policy should be for the trants, and “such a philosophy [of protection]…might be benefit of people and the environment, not corpora- the ultimate condition for sustaining public support for tions” (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2013b, p. 1, 2014, an overall strategy of relatively open-access to EU mar- p. 8). The message sent throughout 2013–2016 was that kets” (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, p. 922). However, af- TTIP meant sacrificing European values and standards ter 2004, MG ceased appearing in speeches and strat- (cf. Buonanno, 2017; Young, 2017). egy papers, and was “replaced in 2006 by shorter- Zürn (2014) argues there is a sizeable degree of re- term, more trade-centred and mercantilist objectives” sponsiveness by international institutions to politiciza- (Meunier, 2007, p. 906). The primary goal of EU trade pol- tion, thus we should expect the EU to respond to this fear- icy was no longer the “more remote goal of managing grounded rhetorical strategy with some form of counter- globalization” but instead “creating markets abroad for rhetoric. The EU is considered a “hothouse” for participa- European companies” (Meunier, 2007, p. 916). While still tion of different types of actors (Peterson, 1995, p. 69), affirming the primacy of multilateralism, the EU’s aban- and we expect this to strengthen the effect of politiciza- doned its moratorium on bilateral trade agreements, and tion on the incentive structure of policy-makers, making the stated priority was no longer to balance openness them more responsive. De Bruycker (2019, p. 1) using a with rules, but rather to ensure market access. panel data analysis on EU responsiveness finds that “un- der politicized conditions, the adoption of EU policy de- 3. Managed Globalization as a Response cisions is preceded by increased public support and fol- to Politicization lowed by decreased public support for EU policy change.” This indicates that, in the face of politicization, decision- We analyze the Commission’s rhetoric on TTIP, CETA, makers adjust policy to social demands (policy respon- and trade policy in general from 2013 to 2017. This siveness), after which the public again adjusts their de- section presents the methodology, while justifying the mands in light of those policy changes (public respon- choices made. siveness; Zürn, 2014, pp. 59–60). Such changes can be fostered by accountability mechanisms, including close 3.1. The Commission’s Rhetorical Response scrutiny by voters and elected officials; again, given the EU’s structure, we should expect it to be more responsive We analyze the Commission’s communication on TTIP to politicization than (other) international institutions. and CETA negotiations in particular, and on EU trade pol- Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 290–300 292 icy in general, from around the time TTIP negotiations of messaging being more conciliatory than the first. The were announced in January 2013 until September 2017. “intransigent” rhetoric includes “mutual support” (which The analysis covers 79 speeches (European Commission, is positive messaging; actions will generate benefits with- 2012–2016, 2016–2017; see the Supplementary File for a out jeopardizing the status quo), and “dangers of in- list of all speeches, in this article they are referenced only action” (negative messaging; inaction results in harm). by “European Commission, month day, year”), represent- “Democracy friendly” rhetoric entails conciliation, mov- ing more than 50% of speeches between January 2013 ing beyond intransigent postures, and engaging in de- and October 2016, and all 22 speeches on EU trade policy liberation. This represents a “mature” approach, where between November 2016 and September 2017. We end the risks of both action and inaction are “canvassed, in September in 2017 because it was one year after TTIP assessed, and guarded against to the extent possible,” negotiations ended—providing sufficient time to cap- and where uncertainty is recognized (Hirschman, 1991, ture any changes in rhetorical strategy vis-à-vis ongoing p. 153). A “functional” rhetorical approach (Brink, 2009) negotiations, as well as the rise in the populist backlashes is when supporters or advocates use the language and against trade and globalization. The Commission also standpoints of opponents, but without changing policy published its first report on the implementation of the preferences. Such a response differs from a democrat- 2015 trade strategy, Trade for All (European Commission, ically friendly one, in that rather than conveying a will- 2015), that month. Thus, we should be able to ascertain ingness to change the policy or negotiating position, sup- whether the MG doctrine had taken hold by fall of 2017. porters would continue claiming the same or a similar We chose to analyze speeches made by the Trade position, but apply language used by opponents. In the Commissioner because the Commission oversees all TTIP case where opponents positioned themselves as the trade negotiations, and the Trade Commissioner is the protectors of European values (exigent standards) and official representative of and spokesperson on EU trade. democracy (public policies), a functional response would What the Commissioner says should reflect where the be to accept and state that values and democracy should Commission stands and what it will do on trade. We be at the forefront of EU trade policy. do not distinguish between Trade Commissioners (Karel Thus, we differentiate between intransigent positive De Gucht was Trade Commissioner in 2013 and for messaging (e.g., TTIP will improve status quo), intran- most of 2014, while Cecilia Malmström assumed office sigent negative messaging (e.g., status quo in danger in November 2014) because the objective is to assess without TTIP), conciliatory messaging (e.g., TTIP’s costs the Commission’s response rather than the impact of should be considered) and functional messaging (e.g., each Commissioner. European values and democracy are more important We carry out the analysis using qualitative content than material or geopolitical benefits), which we iden- analysis. This method was chosen because it identifies tify in the qualitative content analysis. Due to oppo- key discursive elements through a deductive rather than nents’ focus on the need to protect EU values, the more inductive procedure, while adopting an interpretative fo- functional or democratically friendly the messaging, the cus on framing and changes in discourse (Kohlbacher, more likely the invocation of the MG doctrine. We find 2006). To analyze the framing and changes in dis- that the Commission was consistently conciliatory re- course we draw on Hirschman (1991) and Brink (2009). garding ISDS, while its rhetoric on the other issues of con- These scholars identify different rhetorical strategies. tention (economic and geopolitical benefits, and EU stan- Hirschman (1991) distinguishes between three types of dards) shifted from mainly intransigent (through both rhetorical responses, or “rhetoric of reaction” used by positive and negative messaging), to increasingly func- opponents of a proposed change or reform. The “perver- tional rhetoric. sity thesis” assumes that a proposal would only “serve to exacerbate the condition one wishes to remedy” (p. 7) 3.2. Operationalizing the Managed Globalization because there will be unintended consequences or side- Doctrine effects due to imperfect foresight. The “futility thesis” holds that attempts at social transformation would fail To assess whether there is evidence of the MG doc- to change society because the basic structures of soci- trine in the Trade Commissioner’s speeches from 2013 to ety are unchangeable; “human actions pursuing a given November 2017, we need to operationalize the MG doc- aim are nullified” (p. 72). Finally, the “jeopardy thesis ar- trine. To do so, we draw on the work of Meunier (2007) gues that the cost of the proposed change or reform is and Jacoby and Meunier (2010). too high as it endangers some previous, precious accom- According to Meunier (2007, p. 906), MG refers to plishment” (p. 7); while the proposed change may be de- an encompassing doctrine that subordinates trade policy sirable in itself, it involves unacceptable costs (p. 81). to a variety of non-trade objectives, such as multilateral- When opponents use a thesis based on a fear of los- ism, social justice, and sustainable development. As such, ing benefits inherent in the status quo, as in the case MG means “going beyond the simple removal of regula- over TTIP (a “jeopardy thesis”), recipients may resort to tions and making some effort to shape and regularize the three types of rhetorical responses: intransigent, democ- competitive order,” thus establishing “rule-based glob- racy friendly, and functional; the second and third type alization” (Meunier, 2007, pp. 303–304), which “shows Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 290–300 293 the voters that politicians are firmly in control” (p. 301). itly returned as a guiding principle for trade policy in 2015. Jacoby and Meunier (2010, p. 302–303) add that this doc- This shift towards the MG doctrine is consistent with the trine is placed between the extremes of protectionism evolution in the type of rhetoric used by the Commission. and complete laissez-faire (“ad hoc globalization”), thus As summed up in Table 1, the use of MG language coin- implying an effort to both tame and harness globaliza- cides with an increasing use of functional messaging. tion. The Commission’s rhetorical compatibility with MG is also assessed by comparing it against the five charac- 4.1. 2013–2014: A Focus on Economic Benefits teristics of MG outlined by Meunier (2007). In practical terms, Meunier argues, MG means building a set of con- TTIP was promoted as bringing economic benefits and straining trading rules, promoting multilateralism, widen- providing economic growth, thanks to ‘scale’ (the size ing the definition of trade issues subject to rule-making, of the partners’ commercial relationship would create exporting the EU model, and redistributing the benefits a multiplier effect for all new liberalization), integration and costs of globalization. (extensive economic interpenetration means better inte- In the following sections we first look for messages grated value chains), confidence (companies would be regarding the objectives of EU trade policy in the Trade able to plan for the future), and because the costs of Commissioner’s speeches, focusing on the messages’ po- inaction (to the status quo) would be high (Eliasson & sitioning on the laissez-faire/protectionism continuum, Garcia-Duran, 2019, p. 83). In 2013, prospective eco- and the strategy employed by the Commission. The MG nomic benefits were quantified, as were TTIP’s impact on doctrine is not present if the objective is at one of the third countries (European Commission, March 2, 2013). extremes; either pure market access or no trade agree- In 2014, the Commission presented specific examples of ment. If values are placed at least on the same level economic benefits, and began emphasizing how small as economic interests, we accept that the MG doctrine and medium enterprises were going to benefit (e.g., is being used by the Commission. We find that while European Commission, May 22, 2014). the Commission only explicitly began referring to MG af- The Commission also progressively enlarged the ter the freezing of TTIP negotiations in late 2016, MG number of arguments it used to promote TTIP in the had already implicitly returned as a guiding principle for face of CSOs’ claims that the agreement would rad- trade policy in 2015, manifest in Trade for All (European ically change the status quo for European standards Commission, 2015). Section five goes further, examining and democracy. Countering opponents’ arguments, the the Commission’s approach and messaging in regards the Commission maintained that the status quo was not an five aforementioned characteristics of MG. We find that option, because both partners were simultaneously ne- while the Commission proposed a trade policy consistent gotiating and signing other bilateral trade agreements with these characteristics, the promotion of multilateral- (European Commission, December 5, 2012). If the US and ism is implicit, through bilateralism, and there is a new the EU were unable to reach agreement on regulatory preoccupation with trade defense instruments. convergence, then “others” would exercise leadership in regulatory matters (European Commission, October 10, 4. The Directorate General for Trade’s Response to 2013, p. 6). Moreover, regulatory convergence would Politicization from 2013 to 2017 not lead to a race to the bottom because “the world’s most advanced, most revolutionary, experiment in reg- The Commission’s initial messaging—when contestation ulatory cooperation”—the European Single Market— began—was devoid of any references to MG. The fo- showed that “there doesn’t need to be a trade-off be- cus was on economic benefits (i.e., on market ac- tween high standards and open markets” (European cess). Thereafter, as contestation intensified in late 2014 Commission, October 10, 2013, p. 3). In 2014, TTIP was and evolved into the politicization of trade policy, the said to allow the EU to shape world norms because “if Commission used language more consistent with MG. we want to continue to shape the norms, rules, standards The focus shifted to countering CSOs’ fears that TTIP en- and disciplines that are so important in a globalized econ- dangered European values. We find that the Commission omy, we have to realise that we cannot do this without only explicitly began referring to MG after the freezing partners” (European Commission, May 22, 2014, p. 4). of TTIP negotiations in late 2016, and then mainly when The Commission was more conciliatory regarding countering demands for protectionism (fear of globaliza- ISDS. This issue only started appearing in speeches tion) by populist parties, but that MG had already implic- around the same time as the Commission’s commitment Table 1. Type of messaging and consistency with MG. Period Language consistent with MG Type of messaging 2013–2014 No Mainly intransigent 2015–2016 Yes, implicitly Shift towards functional 2016–2017 Yes, explicitly Mainly functional Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 290–300 294 to making the negotiation “as transparent and open of European society in order to get those benefits….In to public scrutiny as possible” (European Commission, our new approach, trade is not just about our eco- April 10, 2014, p. 5). The purpose of a public consulta- nomic interests but also about our values….Actively tion launched by the Commission in 2104 was “to cre- managing change is therefore essential to making ate a new, improved type of investment agreement” sure the benefits of globalisation are fairly distributed (European Commission, April 10, 2014, p. 4). In May and negative impacts are mitigated. The social con- 2014, while clearly supporting the need for investment sequences of market opening must be addressed. protection in TTIP, the Commission accepted “that there (European Commission, October 19, pp. 5-6, 11) is room for debate, interpretation or improvement” (European Commission, May 22, 2014, p. 2) and empha- The Commission stressed that the EU can export its sized that “it is our chance to set a model for future agree- values and shape globalization through its trade agree- ments all around the world” (p. 3). ments, using access to its market as a recognized bar- As protests by CSOs intensified, the messaging— gaining chip to obtain changes in the domestic arena of while still mainly intransigent and focused on the eco- its trading partners (European Commission, October 10, nomic benefits of TTIP—shifted from promoting TTIP’s 2015, p. 1, November 9, 2016, p. 2). The Commission ex- benefits for growth and jobs to consumer benefits. The plained that “we should use it to promote European val- agreement was said to “give consumers better access to ues like sustainable development, human rights, fair and a wider range of high quality goods and services at bet- ethical trade and the fight against corruption” (European ter prices” (European Commission, May 22, 2014, p. 3). Commission, 2015, p. 6, cf. February 25, 2016 and In November 2014, the Commission implied conciliation March 15, 2016). The new trade strategy was based on when stating that “the only valid measure of the success three core principles: effectiveness, transparency, and of this negotiation will be whether it improves people’s values, which address the “widespread concern that lives”; TTIP can do so by addressing “the full range of con- trade policy is more about the large companies and the sumers’ needs” (European Commission, November 18, investors than about individual European citizens….[It is] 2014, pp. 1, 3). a trade policy which is in tune with European values” (European Commission, November 30, 2015, pp. 4–5). 4.2. January 2015–November 2016: Implicit Managed This aligned with the core of MG. The Commission rec- Globalization ognized that people “need reassurance that we will not use trade agreements to put economic advantage By early 2015, the Commission’s rhetoric was in- above our other goals, like consumer and environmen- creasingly conciliatory regarding investment protection tal protection or the rights of workers,” while promot- (downplaying its risks and emphasizing its necessity in ing “the kind of trade agenda that can both find legiti- protecting European business, while agreeing that the macy among EU citizens and deliver economic results” process could be improved). There was also positive (e.g., (European Commission, September 22, 2016, pp. 2, 4). TTIP would improve the status quo) and negative (e.g., Within this framework, the Commission applied the the status quo would be in danger without TTIP) intransi- concept of a “progressive trade agreement,” hailing gent messaging in response to CSOs’ arguments about CETA as its standard bearer—the term was initially used TTIP lowering standards. The same applied when em- in 2015 by the Obama administration to describe the phasizing the geopolitical and economic benefits of TTIP Transpacific Partnership Agreement, and then in August (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2019). However, the tenor of 2016 by Sigmar Gabriel, Vice Chancellor of Germany, re- the messaging began to change; functional rhetoric be- ferring to CETA. CETA was said to be a progressive trade came more prevalent as the Commission attempted to agreement that guarantees transparency (“negotiators lessen the polarization over TTIP. in close contact with civil society and closely watched Attempts at addressing fears of TTIP now included over by Member States and the European Parliament”) using opponents’ language and positions to stress the and the protection of public services (“There is no obli- overriding importance of defending European values gation to privatize anything. And no block on renational- and democracy, while simultaneously defending TTIP izing an already privatized service”); the right regulatory (see Garcia-Duran & Eliasson, 2018a). Trade for All, the cooperation (“enshrines our right to regulate in the pub- Commission’s October 2015 trade policy strategy, ex- lic interest. And, while it encourages regulatory authori- emplifies this effort (European Commission, 2015). The ties to cooperate, it does not oblige them to do so”), and strategy was heralded as evidence that the Commission investment protection (“much-needed reform of inter- was addressing people’s concerns by redesigning the national investment protection agreements”) (European EU’s trade policy strategy: Commission, September 20, 2016, p. 4). The Commission argued that CETA would allow the EU to benefit from We have learned from the TTIP debate. On the one trade and investments, while prioritizing and exporting hand, we have learned that people do want more high EU standards, and agreeing to rules that tame un- trade….But on the other hand, we have learned that bridled competition (and which could set standards for they don’t want to compromise on the core principles other agreements). Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 290–300 295 4.3. November 2016–September 2017: Explicit chored in a rules-based system” (European Commission, Managed Globalization 2017b, p. 2). By balancing free trade with defending values, the lan- 5. The Commission’s Approach and Its Fit with guage used since 2015 fits the MG doctrine. However, Managed Globalization it was only after TTIP negotiations paused in November 2016 that the Commission moved from ‘progressive In this section we assess how MG, as used by the trade agreements’ to ‘managed globalization.’ This was Commission since 2015, comports with the five practical concurrent with a shift in both the source (more par- characteristics of the MG doctrine: building a set of con- ties and labor unions) and focus (away from trade agree- straining trading rules, promoting multilateralism, widen- ments to trade and globalization generally) of contesta- ing the definition of trade issues subject to rule-making, tion, as anti-TTIP and anti-CETA protests waned, but did exporting the EU model, and redistributing the bene- not vanish; anti-CETA protests continued in Brussels dur- fits and costs of globalization both within the EU and at ing the agreement’s 2017 ratification process. the global level. We present the results without distin- Explicit reference to MG first reappears in a speech guishing between the periods of implicit and explicit ref- on November 9th, tellingly titled “Shaping Globalisation erences to MG because we find that the Commission’s through EU Trade Policy,” where the Commissioner ar- rhetoric generally fits these characteristics even before gues that “shaping globalisation is also about ensuring November 2016. However, through greater acceptance that people in Europe feel they have influence over of bilateralism, as well as a re-enforcement of trade de- the global rules that are affecting them” (European fense measures, we identify a modification of the EU’s Commission, November 9, 2016, p. 1). The first ref- application of the doctrine. erence to populism appeared two months prior, and The Commission continuously communicated the by late November the Commission acknowledged that need for redistributing the costs and benefits of global- the political realities of the time included both people ization both within the EU and at the global level. Trade who perceived themselves economically disadvantaged for All meant “making sure the benefits of trade are by globalization (and fed the anti-trade populist and widely spread” by helping fair trade, worker adaptation, nationalist movements), and people who were skepti- small firms’ provisions, and trade opportunities for EU cal about a number of trade agreements and negotia- developing partners (European Commission, October 19, tions because they saw them as endangering European 2015, p. 6). The Commission came to advocate a re- values (European Commission, November 29, 2016). In vision of the European Globalization Adjustment Fund subsequent speeches, references to protectionist de- (to assist with worker adaptation), longer transition pe- mands by populists complemented or substituted for riods for the most sensitive products, and closer ties CSOs’ demands of preserving European values. The between trade policy and development through the Commission’s answer came through functional rhetoric Economic Partnership Agreements, Everything but Arms, referencing MG. Aid for Trade, and the General System of Preferences The Commission thus shifted the emphasis of its of the EU (European Commission, November 7, 2015, discourse from primarily value preservation to dealing February 25, 2016, September 22, 2016, November 9, with globalization, arguing that trade openness com- 2016, January 24, 2017). ports with EU interests and ideas, “trade must be seen The Commission also advocated strong, empow- to deliver. By using trade policy as a vehicle for our val- ered international institutions with clear rules of the ues, we can shape globalization, rather than merely sub- game and an institutional architecture to monitor those mitting to it, or letting others shape it for us” (European rules through its support for a rules-based ISDS sys- Commission, January 24, 2017, p. 4). The emphasis tem. While addressing concerns about globalization and was also on the need for an open, progressive, trad- corporate power over governments, the Commission ing system, without compromising standards or values, progressively built an argument that TTIP constituted “while shaping globalization” (European Commission, an opportunity to modernize investment protection March 28, 2017, p. 1, 4). The Commission’s September (European Commission, June 22, 2015, November 17, 2017 progress report on Trade for All emphasizes how 2015, January 12, 2016), before deciding to reject a tra- the 2015 strategy should continue guiding the EU’s ap- ditional ISDS in TTIP and instead promoting a new inter- proach to making “globalization work for all Europeans” national court that would be fair, transparent, and ac- (European Commission, 2017a, p. 2). The report explains countable (European Commission, September 14, 2016, how the EU is using all available tools to implement January 24, 2017, February 27, 2017; see also European its trade strategy and enforce its commitments, while Commission, 2017a, 2017b; a mandate was also pro- “shaping globalization into an opportunity” (European vided by the European Parliament in 2018), a system Commission, 2017a, p. 4). In an accompanying commu- judged compatible with EU by the EU Court of Justice on nication the Commission also proposes new initiatives April 30, 2019. to proactively shape and manage global trade “to en- The EU used access to its market as a bargain- sure it is fair, projects values and remains firmly an- ing chip in order to obtain changes in the domestic Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 290–300 296 arena of its trading partners: “We are also using the in trade agreements. Immediately following the publi- importance of our economy to shape globalisation” cation of Trade for All, the Commission promised to (European Commission, November 9, 2016, p. 2). The include “anti-corruption provisions in EU trade agree- Commission clearly recognized that the EU can export its ments,” while also addressing services, digital trade, mo- values and shape globalization through its trade agree- bility, and labor rights (such as collective bargaining), and ments (European Commission, October 10, 2015, p. 1). protecting endangered species (European Commission, “We should use it to promote European values like October 19, 2015, p. 7, November 30, 2015, p. 4, sustainable development, human rights, fair and ethi- March 15, 2016). One year later the Commission de- cal trade and the fight against corruption” (European clared that “All new trade deals include chapters on trade Commission, November 30, 2015, p. 6, cf. February 25, and sustainable development, including labor rights and 2016, March 15, 2016). the environment” (European Commission, March 22, Regarding multilateralism, the Commission ex- 2017, p. 2, cf. on November 9, 2016, and January 24, panded the number of issue areas it included when 2017). Table 2 summarizes our argument over how MG explaining how its trade policies would best serve EU as applied from 2015 to 2017 related to its 1999 version. citizens. Long a champion of multilateralism, its primacy Finally, another difference in the EU’s explicit refer- appeared to wane with each bilateral agreement pur- ences to MG was the emphasis on trade defense instru- sued by the EU. Bilateralism is now touted as a path- ments, which were strengthened in order to respond to way (complementing multilateralism) to incrementally unfair competition, while the Commission argued that spread EU standards globally (Garcia-Duran & Eliasson, more should be done to help workers adapt (European 2018b). The EU trade strategy still involves “working Commission, November 29, 2016, pp. 3–4, see also for progress at the WTO. [But] it also involves a com- January 24, 2017, May 9 and 23, 2017, and European prehensive set of negotiations for bilateral free trade Commission, 2017a). In 2016 the Commission referred to agreements” (European Commission, June 1, 2015, p. 2, a crisis in the steel industry provoked by excess Chinese see also March 23, 2015), and since progress in the capacity, and how in China “too often the state is more multilateral system “has been too slow…the EU has a participant than an independent regulator” (European put new emphasis on bilateral free trade agreements Commission, March 10, 2016, p. 3). As one example of with key partners since 2006” (European Commission, the staying power of this expansion to MG, European February 25, 2016, p. 4–5). Plurilateral agreements are Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker explained in also accepted: “If it’s a choice between making progress 2018 that “the EU believes in open and fair trade but we with a smaller number of partners or no progress at all, are not naïve free traders.” “Make no mistake,” he added, then we will choose to move forward—plurilaterally” “we will do whatever it takes to defend European produc- (European Commission, April 26, 2016, p. 2, also May 2, ers and workers when others distort the market or don’t 2016). The shift towards bilateral and plurilateral agree- play by the rules” (European Commission, 2018). ments is compatible with MG since “bilateral and re- gional deals like TTIP can support the multilateral system 6. Concluding Discussion by acting as policy laboratories of sorts”, and “We are building a network of agreements all across the world Our analysis of the European Commission’s rhetoric so that we can link into the world economy and build regarding TTIP, CETA, and EU trade policy in general, truly global value chains that will bring prosperity home” from 2013 to 2017, indicates that the Commission re- (European Commission, May 2, 2016, p. 3, September 14, sponse to trade politicization in 2015–2017 was part of 2016, p. 2). a rhetorical counter-strategy, and that it was grounded As a result, bilateral (and plurilateral) agreements in the MG doctrine. We identify three distinct peri- play a role in another of the MG characteristics, namely ods in the Commission’s rhetoric: from 2013 through expanding the number of issues subject to rule-making 2014, early 2015 through mid-2016, and mid-2016 to Table 2. MG doctrine characteristics. MG doctrine characteristics EU’s application 2015–2017 Redistributing the benefits and costs of globalization both within Present the EU and at the global level Building a set of constraining trading rules Present Exporting the EU model Present Promoting multilateralism Through bilateralism and plurilateralism Widening the definition of trade issues subject to rule-making Present Not present Re-enforcement of trade defense measures Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 290–300 297 (at least) September 2017. During the first period, the openness (market access) and rules, where the defense Commission was predominantly defending its trade pol- of certain values (principles) is now as prominent as mar- icy and negotiations with the US on the basis of eco- ket access. nomic benefits—using predominantly intransigent mes- The fact that explicit references to MG emerged just saging (TTIP would improve the status quo, and with- as the TTIP negotiations were frozen, and they persisted out TTIP the status quo would be in danger). In 2015– one year later, indicate that the Commission deemed it 2016, the second period, the Commission responded to useful as a way of signaling a permanent shift its trade intensifying claims by CSOs that EU standards and val- policy. Thus, by late 2017 a modified and expanded MG ues were in danger. Elements of the MG doctrine were had become the EU’s leitmotif on trade; only future re- used to lessen polarization, but without touting the doc- search covering periods of less contentious trade nego- trine. During this period there was also a shift in the tiations can assess whether MG endures. What we have messaging, from mainly intransigent to more functional shown in this article is that politicization of trade affected (European values cannot be endangered). The third pe- the Commission’s reaction, response, and messaging on riod entailed a reframed rhetoric directed primarily at trade, and ultimately its trade doctrine (guiding trade pol- populist arguments and demands for protectionism; the icy and strategy). Commission’s language was framed in explicit MG lan- guage, with emphasis on how trade serves European cit- Acknowledgments izens, and globalization can be controlled (i.e., no need for protectionism). This reframed rhetoric was communi- We would like to thank all participants at a 2018 cated mainly through functional messaging (using oppo- workshop at Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals nents’ language and standpoints). (IBEI), Barcelona, and the panelists at EUSA 2019 These results add to our understanding of the im- in Denver, Colorado, for helpful comments on previ- pact of politicization on trade policy, by showing how ous versions of this article. We also thank the three the Commission’s rhetoric changed in response to mo- anonymous reviewers for Politics and Governance for bilization. It therefore appears the Commission is seek- their valuable comments and suggestions. This work ing legitimation through ideas, that is, trying “to per- was supported by the National R+D Plan of the suade citizens or other EU institutional actors of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competiveness un- EU’s political responsiveness to citizens needs and de- der Grant CSO2016-79205-P, “EU-NormCon, Normative mands” (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2018, p. 761). Not only Contestation in Europe: Implications for the EU in a did trade politicization over TTIP elicit an expansive re- Changing Global Order.” sponse from the Commission, but that response largely conformed to the MG doctrine as defined in section Conflict of Interests three. Nevertheless, the MG doctrine has been adapted to respond to the changing sources and focus of con- The authors declare no conflict of interests. testation during and after TTIP negotiations. While the shift from multilateralism to bilateralism and plurilater- Supplementary Material alism, and the new importance of trade defense mea- sures could be interpreted by some as a shift towards pro- Supplementary material for this article is available online tectionism, our assessment is quite different. The EU’s in the format provided by the authors (unedited). contemporary and expanded application of the MG doc- trine includes a recognition that a multilateral approach References is not the primary means by which to manage globaliza- tion. Instead, bilateral and plurilateral agreements are Abdelal, R., & Meunier, S. (2010). Managed Globaliza- pursued as stepping-stones to global, multilateral, rules tion: Doctrine, practice and promise. Journal of Eu- and standards. Furthermore, 21st century geopolitical ropean Public Policy, 17(3), 350–367. and economic shifts, and the protests they have birthed, Beck, U. (2013). German Europe. 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She has published in several refereed journals, including the Journal of European Public Policy, Journal of European Integration and the Journal of World Trade. Leif Johan Eliasson is Professor of Political Science at East Stroudsburg University. His research focuses on European trade policy and transatlantic trade relations. In addition to three books, he has published in journals such the Journal of European Public Policy, Journal of European Integration, World Economy, and the Journal of World Trade. Oriol Costa is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB). He is also a Senior Research Associate at the Barcelona Institute of International Studies (IBEI). His research deals with EU external relations, and has focused more recently on whether and how it has become more politicized and contested. He has published in journals such as Journal of European Public Policy, Comparative European Politics, Cooperation and Conflicts, Mediterranean Politics, and Cambridge Review of International Affairs. Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 290–300 300