Ecological Economics 184 (2021) 107004 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Ecological Economics journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon Analysis Commons grabbing and agribusiness: Violence, resistance and social mobilization Jampel Dell’Angelo a, *, Grettel Navas b, Marga Witteman a, Giacomo D’Alisa c, Arnim Scheidel b, Leah Temper b, d a Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands, b Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA-UAB), Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain c Center for Social studies, University of Coimbra, Portugal d Department of Natural Resource Sciences, McGill University, Montreal, QC, Canada A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T Keywords: The recent phenomenon of large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) is associated with what has been described as a Large-scale land acquisitions global agrarian transition. New forms of land exploitation and concentration have led to profound socio- Social mobilization environmental transformations of rural production systems in Latin America, South-East Asia and Sub Saharan Violence Africa. Scholars have pointed out that the expansion of transnational land investments is often associated with Land grabbing Commons grabbing detrimental social outcomes, has negative environmental impacts and can represent a potential impediment to Environmental conflicts the achievement of many SDGs. In this paper, our primary concern is on the mounting evidence that LSLAs preferentially target the commons, in the process altering long-standing customary resource governance systems. While it has been shown that in many instances of commons grabbing associated with LSLAs, different types of social conflict emerge, it is less clear what forms of social mobilization and organized collective re-actions are taking place to defend the commons and contest such processes of dispossession and enclosure. The main aim of this contribution is to fill this gap by synthesizing and describing the different typologies of social mobilization and collective re-actions that emerge as a result of commons grabbing associated with the transnational expansion of the agribusiness frontier. In order to do this our research synthesizes information from the Envi­ ronmental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas) shedding light on some of the key characteristics associated with the different forms and dynamics of social mobilization that are organized in reaction to agribusiness-related commons grabbing. 1. Introduction recently described as a new “global land rush” (Borras et al., 2011; Cotula, 2012)). The year 2008 was a watershed moment in this process. The history of capitalism is a history of enclosures of the commons The triple interwoven conjuncture of the financial, climatic and food (Linebaugh, 2009). Dispossession of the commons is a process that can security crises triggered an escalating expansion of transnational Large- be traced back to different historical moments. Commons dispossession Scale Land Acquisitions (LSLAs). LSLAs have become a structural has been associated with the alienation of small-scale farmers, tradi­ component of agribusiness development and are playing a central role in tional land users and indigenous people from the land and the natural the redefinition of the key features of the current global agrarian tran­ resources that support their systems of production and identity, and in a sition (Cotula, 2012; Messerli et al., 2014; Davis et al., 2020; Müller broader sense, their existence (Perelman, 2007; Wily, 2011a, 2011b, et al., 2021). Some estimates exceed 48 million hectares of arable land (i. 2012, 2013). An infamous depiction of injustice, subjugation, violence e., more than five times the entire area of Portugal) acquired globally and eradication is the leitmotif of colonialism that echoes and resounds since then (The Land Matrix 2020). in many of the dynamics of contemporary neoliberal globalization It is clear that in this reconfiguration of the relations of land, natural (Harvey, 2005; Glassman, 2006). This wave of coercion, dispossession resources, and people, is the commodification force which subordinates and “commons grabbing” gained new momentum with what has been social relations and the natural environment in which they develop, to * Corresponding author. E-mail address: jampel.dellangelo@vu.nl (J. Dell’Angelo). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107004 Received 15 August 2019; Received in revised form 31 January 2021; Accepted 22 February 2021 Available online 19 March 2021 0921-8009/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). J. Dell’Angelo et al. Ecological Economics 184 (2021) 107004 the economic system (Polanyi, 1944; Cotula, 2013). This “new frontier Common-pool resources are types of goods that are usually identified in historical shifts between social embeddedness and commodification based on the double simultaneous characteristic of high difficulty of in land relations” (Cotula, 2013: p. 1623) is happening through social exclusion (i.e. it is difficult to exclude others from appropriation or use dynamics that are characterized by evident imbalanced power relations, of the considered resource) and high subtractability (or rivalry) (i.e. the conflict and violence (e.g Linebaugh, 2009; De Angelis, 2012; Caffentzis appropriation or use by an agent/s reduces the ability of another agent/s and Federici, 2014; Federici and Linebaugh, 2018). to benefit from the same resource) (Ostrom et al., 1994). Common The social implications of LSLAs have been thoroughly discussed in property regimes in contrast are an institutional category. Since the an emerging body of scholarship on land and water grabbing (see special classic Roman jurisprudence, the main four categories of institutional issues in The Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 2012; Water arrangements and property systems have been described as private, Alternatives, 2012; Development and Change, 2013; Globalisations, public, common property and open access. Cole & Ostrom, (2012: 42) 2013; The Journal of Peasant Studies, 2012; Third World Quarterly, explain that in common property systems “each member of the ownership 2013; Dell’Angelo et al., 2018). A meta-study of this literature showed group has the right to access and use group-owned resources in accordance that the large majority of the cases of land acquisitions happened in with access and use rules established collectively by the group, and a duty not contexts of small-scale farming usually under common property regimes to violate access and use rules”. However, it is rare that these categorical or multiple ownership claims and that coercion was a key dynamic definitions perfectly fit real-world cases because generally institution­ (Dell’Angelo et al., 2017). This meta-analytical synthesis pointed at ally hybrid situations and overlapping property regimes are diffused “commons grabbing” as a central dimension of the contemporary global (Dasgupta, 1995; Wily, 2011a). For example, the land is often de jure land rush. The result is not surprising considering that most LSLAs are property of the government while de facto managed and used through happening in countries where communal and customary land entitle­ customary, collective, community-based rules of access, use and exclu­ ments and management are prevalent (De Schutter, 2011; Fuys et al., sion (D’alisa, 2013; Villamayor-Tomas and García-López, 2018). 2008; Kugelman, 2012; Pearce, 2012; Wily, 2011a, 2011b). Very often, Nevertheless, resources such as forests, rangelands, fisheries and small-scale farmers and traditional natural resource users rely on land groundwater have the defining biophysical features of common-pool that is governed by customary, and indigenous systems of common resources (high difficulty to exclude and high subtractability) and are property. For instance, it has been estimated that almost 70% of all the often governed (yet not exclusively) through common property regimes land in sub-Saharan Africa, can be categorized as customary common and customary or indigenous practices. It is on this specific intersection property and community-based tenure regimes (Deininger, 2003; Wily, between natural resources and institutional arrangements that much of 2011a, 2011b, 2012). the traditional literature on the commons has focused (eg. Ostrom, 1990; A fundamental question associated with the study of the contem­ Dietz et al., 2003; Armitage, 2005; Cox et al., 2010). porary global land rush that has been raised is ‘what are the political Dell’Angelo et al. (2017) build on different political economy and reactions from below’? (Hall et al., 2015: 1). A collection of articles political ecology perspectives (Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Agrawal, 2005; published in the special issue Global land grabbing and political reactions Clement, 2010; Poteete et al., 2010; Borras et al., 2011; Ostrom, 2011) to ‘from below’ address this question looking at the wider responses that go propose an operational heuristic framework associated with the defini­ beyond direct resistance and include different types of forms of mobi­ tion of grabbed commons. This definition has been specifically devel­ lization and counter-mobilization in different case studies (The Journal oped to address the issue of ‘commons grabbing’ in the context of the of Peasant Studies, 2015). contemporary global land rush and agrarian transition with specific Complementing this work, the objective of this paper is to deepen the attention to transnational agribusiness development (see Fig. 1). The scope of analysis and provide a new systematic synthesis and charac­ authors articulate their analysis of commons-grabbing in three di­ terization of the different dynamics of social mobilization that emerge as mensions. The first dimension is related to the type of agricultural sys­ a result of commons grabbing specifically associated with global agri­ tem of production, ranging from small-scale/subsistence to commercial/ business expansion. We do this by analyzing data from the Environ­ speculative. The second dimension is related to different institutional mental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas1). The paper is structured as follows, regimes and includes the different types of property systems and claims Section 2 introduces the theoretical background by referring to an on the land that exist in a given place. The third dimension refers to operational definition of commons grabbing and reviewing different coercion as a constitutive condition of commons grabbing. theories of resistance; Section 3 explains our methods of analysis and According to this framework, commons are grabbed when large- provides information on the EJAtlas and data selection criteria; Section scale land investments target land that is claimed by a multiplicity of 4 illustrates the results of the synthesis; in Section 5 we discuss some theoretical reflections on the patterns emerging from our analysis; we finally conclude with some overarching reflections on the meaning of this study in Section 6. 2. Theoretical background 2.1. Commons grabbing: an operational definition The Ostromian approach explains the commons combining bio­ physical and institutional perspectives. The notion of commons is often analytically explained from the biophysical perspective (eg. Ostrom et al., 1994), from the political-institutional one (eg. Velicu and García- López, 2018) or from the combination of both perspectives (Cole and Ostrom, 2012). Ostrom et al. (2002) clarify the importance to distin­ guish between common-pool resources and common property regimes. 1 See: Temper, L., Demaria, F., Scheidel, A., Del Bene, D., & Martinez-Alier, J. (2018). The Global Environmental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas): ecological distribu­ Fig. 1. Multidimensional definition of commons grabbing from Dell’Angelo tion conflicts as forces for sustainability. Sustainability Science, 13(3), 573–584. et al., 2017, p.3. 2 J. Dell’Angelo et al. Ecological Economics 184 (2021) 107004 actors, in a context of imbalanced power relations between agribusiness proposes an analysis that goes beyond the boomerang effect. Echoing investors and prior land users, which are often manifested through the allegorical nature of projectile devices that could be employed in different levels and mechanisms of coercion. Last, this framework un­ social resistance, she introduces the “catapult model” (2018, p. 20). veils how commons grabbed by agribusiness are frequently pushed into What this model refers to is the inverse of the boomerang effect: situa­ a transition from subsistence farming and/or small-scale uses of land tions where transnational NGOs find allies on the ground to promote (and other natural resources), to large-scale commercial agriculture reforms and push forward their agenda of resistance. This approach and/or speculative investments. restores agency to actors on the ground. It also raises relevant questions This framework has a central role in our paper for two reasons. that may be further empirically tested in our analysis regarding the Firstly, as explained in detail in the methods section, it is used for our effectiveness of coalitions in collective mobilizations and the role of case selection. Secondly, in our analysis, we zoom in and investigate the international actors as well as a diversity of local actors joining in dynamics of social mobilization, collective reaction, resistance and common cause. collective action associated with one of its three dimensions, that of The different theoretical bodies of scholarship on the politics of “coercion”. collective re-action provide a wide range of analytical perspectives that can explain what are the collective “reactions from below” to land 2.2. Theorizing resistance against commons grabbing grabbing. Building on these theoretical perspectives, as mentioned earlier, we focus our analysis on the coercion and collective re-action Villamayor-Tomas and García-López (2018) recently described the dimension of agribusiness commons grabbing providing a synthesis of emerging force of social movements and mobilizations as a reaction to a large number of cases from the EJAtlas. the different threats to the commons. Their systematic analysis confirms the interpretation of critical commons scholars, who depict the history 3. Methodology of the commons, as one characterized by a dialectic tension between the systemic push for capital accumulation on one side, and the resistance of 3.1. Data sources commoners and social movements on the other (e.g. De Angelis, 2012). Resistance has also been theorized in specific relation to the contem­ The analysis draws on the great wealth of information that has been porary land grabbing phenomena. Borras and Franco (2013) describe gathered through the Environmental Justice Atlas (Temper, 2019; the different types of struggles that local communities engage with: Martínez-Alier et al., 2016). With global coverage of 3300 cases by against expulsion, for incorporation, against land appropriation and November 2020, the EJAtlas is the largest database on environmental concentration and for redistribution and recognition. Other authors conflicts and mobilizations worldwide Environmental Justice Atlas offer theoretical models which help explain resistance or absence of (EJAtlas), 2021. resistance to land grabbing and the dynamics of such mobilizations (Hall Each EJAtlas entry documents an environmental conflict and related et al., 2015). The Marxist (or Marxian) perspective on collective action social mobilizations in a standardized manner. Conflicts are categorized focuses on the process of enclosure of the commons that has originally in one of ten mutually exclusive types (also referred to as “1st level” and continuously granted capital accumulation on an expanded scale categories) that indicate the sector of the main project in dispute (e.g. (Linebaugh, 2009; De Angelis, 2012; Caffentzis and Federici, 2014). mining, fossil fuels, water management, waste management, nuclear, Capital expansion dispossesses different social groups which resist by land and biomass use, and others). Moreover, and aiming to show the means of common political projects and class politics (Harvey, 2003; complexity of these conflicts, the EJAtlas provides more than 50 detailed Federici and Linebaugh, 2018). The theoretical corpus represented by non-exclusive sub-categories of conflict types (also referred to as “2nd the heterodox theories of social movements argues that there is more level category”), such as land acquisition conflicts, hydroelectric dams, than just the individualistic Homo oeconomicus behaviours or class or the like. For instance, a mining conflict can be linked to land acqui­ consciousness theories. According to this perspective, people uniting in sition conflicts and toxic waste treatment and many other sub- struggle and resistance can be explained by looking at the role of emo­ categories. Furthermore, each entry includes detailed information on tions and affective ties in social movements (Hall et al., 2015). the commodities involved, relevant actors and companies, the intensity Another body of scholarship examines the dynamics of resistance in of conflict in terms of the scale of mobilizations and level of violence, the greater detail. For example, Temper, 2019, positions her analysis groups mobilizing for more just and sustainable resource uses, the forms referring to the literature on transnational activism, agrarian resistance of mobilization used, the social, health and economic impacts, as well as and politics of scale. Citing (Risse and Sikkink, 1999) and Tarrow key conflict outcomes. Information is provided both as qualitative (1998), she points at how the constructivist approach to study social descriptive texts, as well as codes that can be used for quantitative an­ movements highlights how social groups develop norms, beliefs and alyses. For a definition of these variables see Scheidel et al. (2020). shared expectations of given actors. The act of ‘framing’ –the strategic The EJAtlas only documents conflicts that are verifiable through (re-)creation of ideas that generate beliefs– drives, motivates and defines previously published secondary sources. Data collection is based on a strategies and interventions of collective action. Temper also refers to collaborative process during which academic researchers, journalists, the ‘scalar politics’ framework from political ecology, which helps in civil society actors, social movement and non-governmental organiza­ explaining why social activists move from the local up to the interna­ tions members, can register in the EJAtlas to identify environmental tional level of contention in order to pursue their objectives. In Temper’s conflicts and provide information and secondary sources on conflict review, the work of Tarrow (2005) is central in explaining the different events. Data are gathered and cross-checked from a variety of secondary mechanisms of contentious politics which include: “global framing, sources, including academic articles, civil society reports, news articles, internalization, diffusion, scale shift, externalization and coalition lawsuits, formal complaints or petitions. Such non-academic informa­ forming” (p. 10). Temper examines the ‘boomerang effect’ (Keck and tion sources on local conflict dynamics and events are frequently used in Sikkink, 1999) which argues that weak non-state actors seek allies in the diverse research on environmental conflicts and social mobilizations (e. international arena to impact repressive policies in their country. This g. Escobar, 1998; Earl et al. 2004; Gerber, 2011). hypothesis suggests that transnational support is fundamental in those One frequent concern arising from the use of diverse non-academic places where actors don’t have enough resources to counteract internal sources is about potential bias, such as conflict coverage, which we high levels of repression. However, in response to critiques that the discuss below, or descriptions of violent events by, or against, protesters. boomerang promotes a paternalistic vision of transnational solidarity, For the case of newspaper sources, Earl et al. (2004) show that ‘hard where ideas, tactics and know-how, as well as material resources, are facts’, such as violent events, tend to be reported quite accurately, while generated in the core countries and spread to the periphery, Temper biases are more frequently introduced for ‘soft facts’ such as actor 3 J. Dell’Angelo et al. Ecological Economics 184 (2021) 107004 opinion, or protest motivations. Where possible, triangulation of infor­ as “land acquisition conflicts” (2nd level category), and involved at least mation through various information sources is an important step to one of these commodities related to agribusiness: coffee, cotton, cellu­ enhance data quality. Such quality checks of the provided information, lose, corn/maize, jatropha, rubber, palm oil, soybeans, sugar, ethanol, particularly on sensitive information such as violent events, are pursued wheat, rice, cut flowers, fruits and vegetables, live animals, fish, through a permanent team of case moderators who also assures shrimps, timber, eucalyptus, pine, carbon offsets, biological resources. consistent coding of conflicts through the EJAtlas data form. See Temper This resulted in a total of 253 conflicts. During the second step, et al. (2015) and Temper (2016) for further explanation of the EJAtlas’ following Dell’Angelo et al.’s (2017) definition of grabbed commons in methodology and mapping process. the context of agribusiness development, we further selected only those The resulting EJAtlas database represents a large convenience sam­ conflicts overlapping with agribusiness activities. This included cases ple of an unknown total of recent environmental conflicts worldwide. with at least one the following 2nd level categories: “Plantation conflicts These sample characteristics entail several implications and limitations including pulp”, “deforestation”, “Intensive food production mono­ for data analysis and interpretation that should be considered. First, due culture and livestock”, “Agrofuels and biomass energy plants”, “Water to a lack of coverage, information and collaborators for different re­ access rights and entitlements”, “Logging and non-timber extraction”, gions, the EJAtlas has an uneven geographical coverage and should not “Agrotoxics” and “GMOs”. In this process, 36 cases were excluded as not be considered as a statistically representative sample. Some regions and relevant, resulting in a sample of 217 cases. For instance, land acquisi­ countries are documented with a greater number of conflicts than tion conflicts related to large-scale tourism projects or as a result of others, not necessarily because there are more conflicts on the ground, conservation and biodiversity regarding REDD+ were excluded. During but also because of better availability of conflict documentation and the third step, we screened the qualitative information by revising the collaborators. This limits, for example, the possibilities for comparisons “description” and “project details” fields, to further identify whether the across countries and continents and the data employed here should not case was linked to agribusiness activities or not, which led to the further be used to compare countries regarding specific conflict events. Second, exclusion of 32 cases. A total of 185 cases were eventually analyzed the lack of coverage of some regions may particularly affect the repre­ (Fig. 2, A). From the total of cases only 18 report an “end date” which sentation of specific actors affected by commons grabbing in these re­ means that 167 of these conflicts (90%) are ongoing, or no information gions. Specifically, the entire EJAtlas database, as well as the subset of was available on whether the conflict ended. In addition, from the 185 cases analyzed in this article, has limited coverage on Central Asia, cases, we further narrowed down and specifically conducted a second Central Africa, and Mongolia. Given that in these regions, there are round of analysis for a subset of 72 cases that are classified as “high diffuse commons used by pastoralist (eg. Brondizio and Le Tourneau, intensity conflicts” (Fig. 2, B). 2016), we are aware that pastoralist conflicts are underrepresented in From a total of 185 analyzed cases, 64 countries, mostly from the this study. This implies that it may make up a larger share of commons global South, were included. Specifically, the following countries had conflicts than indicated by our results. the majority of cases: Indonesia (32 cases), Brazil (15 cases), Cambodia (15 cases), Colombia (7 cases) and Mozambique (6 cases). All these were cases of agribusiness related conflicts which were associated with spe­ 3.2. Sample selection cific agricultural commodities and resources. Among these commod­ ities, the top 5 reported categories are land (n = 107), palm oil (n = 73), To characterize patterns and main features of social mobilization, timber (n = 44), water (n = 23) and sugar (n = 33). resistances and organized collective re-actions that are taking place as a response to commons grabbing produced by agribusiness Large-Scale 4. Results Land Acquisitions, this paper provides an analytical synthesis of all the EJAtlas agribusiness cases related to land acquisition conflicts. The We first direct our analysis to address five overarching questions: 1. operational assumption here is that, following Dell’Angelo et al.’s What types of actors are mobilizing? 2. When did the mobilization begin? 3. (2017) framework for “commons grabbing” in the context of agribusi­ What forms of mobilization are happening? 4. What type of outcomes did the ness development, we are dealing with cases that can be illustrative of reactions lead to? 5. What is the level of mobilization and intensity of violence the dynamics of commons dispossession. The case selection was done associated with the conflict? 6. What typologies of violence affect different through a three-step screening process, during which the entire EJAtlas types of actors? After addressing these questions, we focus on the database (including all cases registered up to December 2018, n = 2641) dimension of coercion in commons grabbing and unpack the variety of was reduced to 185 cases relevant for this study. dynamics that can be related to it by analyzing the subset of 72 cases that During the first step, we filtered for all cases that were characterized Fig. 2. A. Geographical distribution of all selected land acquisition conflict cases (n = 185); B. high intensity land acquisition conflict cases subset (n = 72). 4 J. Dell’Angelo et al. Ecological Economics 184 (2021) 107004 Fig. 3. Frequency of group mobilized in land acquisition conflicts related to agribusiness. Own elaboration from EJAtlas data, (n = 185). Note that groups are not mutually exclusive. are classified as “high intensity conflicts” to specifically illustrate the environmental negative effects), ‘latent’ when there is no visible resis­ features and characteristics of cases with higher levels of confrontation tance, but mobilizations might appear anytime soon, and ‘unknown’ and violence. when there is no information available on protest start. The selected cases were mostly categorized as ‘reactive’ protests (65%), occurring 4.1. What types of actors are mobilizing? during the construction or operation of the project that lead to a land grabbing process. In 22% of the cases, the mobilization was ‘preventive’ According to EJAtlas data, the groups that mobilize most frequently and finally, in 5% of the cases the mobilization took action for ‘repa­ in land acquisition conflicts related to agribusiness are ‘Local EJOs2’ rations’. Latent conflicts reach 4% (Fig. 4). (69%), ‘indigenous groups’ (66%) ‘farmers’ (66%) and ‘neighbors, citi­ zens communities’ (36%). ‘Women’ (20%) and ‘landless peasants’ (18%) appears to be also relevant group of protesters. As Fig. 3 shows, ‘inter­ 4.3. - What forms of mobilization are happening? national EJOs’ (58%), ‘scientists’ (23%) and wider ‘social movements’ (22%), “often play a role in supporting locally organized movements. It There is a variety of actions and mobilizing forms that take place in is worth to note that of most of the analyzed cases involve several response to the studied agribusiness LSLAs (Fig. 5). These forms range groups, and that protesters may belong to different social groups. from oppositional collective actions such as strikes (~5%), occupation Furthermore, governmental actors are sometimes drivers of land con­ of public spaces (~6%), boycotting -both products or official proced­ flicts, but in different occasions they can also act as supporters to ures- (~4%), street protests (~51%) and land occupation (~ 21%) to environmental and land defenders. For instance, ‘local governmental less confrontational actions such as public campaigns (~35%), official and political parties’ mobilize against agribusiness land acquisition in letters and petitions (~59%) and to more reformative and propositional 22% of the cases”. approaches such as the development of alternative proposals (~21%). Judicial activism (~ 39%) (the use of state institutions, national and 4.2. When did the mobilization begin? international legal tools to leverage land struggles) is common. Some forms of mobilization may be potentially violent, such as property The EJAtlas gives information about the temporality of reaction from damage (~ 16%) and sabotage (~5%). Moreover, in the majority of the mobilizing groups against the conflictive projects. It categorizes in cases (65%) local movements built alliances with NGOs and Interna­ five excluding categories, in ‘reaction’ (referring to mobilizations that tional Organizations. Mobilizing forms are not mutually exclusive, on happen after the project implementation started, or during the operation average more than 5 forms of mobilizing are used for each case. For of the project), ‘preventive’ (referring to mobilizations that start before instance, on March 8th 2006, 3000 women from the Landless Workers’ project implementation), ‘for reparation’ (referring to mobilizations that Movement (MST) and la Via Campesina jointly occupied eucalyptus start after the project has already produced tangible socio- nurseries in Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil, they used a diversity of mobi­ lization forms and only eventually destroyed more than five million seedlings EJAtlas (2017b). They denounced “the social and environ­ 2 Local Environmental Justice Organizations (EJOs) refers to civil society mental consequences of the advance of the monoculture of eucalyptus in organizations or informal collectives involved in the conflicts at a local scale. their lands and condemned what they called “green latifundia” and/or They thus have a local profile, as their scope and influence focusses on a specific “green deserts”. They made claims against the high use of water in these territory, or on country level. They include NGOs and grassroots organizations monocultures and because of the use of chlorine in the bleaching process such as formal and informal associations. of the eucalyptus pulp which might cause health damages. 5 J. Dell’Angelo et al. Ecological Economics 184 (2021) 107004 Fig. 4. Frequency of temporality of reaction against the project. Own elaboration from EJAtlas data, (n = 185). Note that variables are mutually exclusive. Fig. 5. Frequency of mobilizations forms reported to protest in land acquisition conflicts related to agribusiness. Own elaboration from EJAtlas data, (n = 185). Note that variables are not mutually exclusive. These forms of actions vary in terms of degree of contestation modifications to the project. The most frequent outcomes are described ranging from propositional approaches and formal procedures, building in the different forms that violence against those who mobilize takes networks and alliances, generating new information, to different types shape. Repression (37%), migration and displacement (35%), violent of confrontational actions, non-violent and potentially violent ones targeting (32%) and criminalization of activists (32%) are some of the (Fig. 9). most frequently described categories with several instances of environ­ mental and land activists assassinated (24%). The occurrence of 4.4. What type of outcomes did the reactions lead to? repression for this data sample is substantially higher than the global average of cases reported for all EJAtlas cases (see Scheidel et al., 2020), A variety of key events and outcomes have been coded in the EJAtlas which points to the coercive nature of commons grabbing. It appears that occur over the duration of the land acquisition conflicts (Fig. 6). that in these types of land acquisition conflicts, institutional responses They range from different forms of repression to policy changes and available through state apparatus, public officials and implementation 6 J. Dell’Angelo et al. Ecological Economics 184 (2021) 107004 Fig. 6. Frequency of outcomes of land acquisition conflicts related to agribusiness activities. Own elaboration from EJAtlas data, (n = 185). Note that outcomes are not mutually exclusive; cases involve commonly several outcomes. of laws and policies, such as the application of existing regulations 4.5. What is the level of mobilization and the intensity of violence (17%), the creation of new legislation (11%), and in general, institu­ associated with the different conflicts? tional changes (8%), are relatively less frequent. This might be the case in many conflicts mapped in Brazil, where grassroots movement lever­ The ‘intensity level’ is a variable that combines both levels of direct aged policy and institutional frameworks for the creation of “Reservas and physical violence within the conflict and the scale of the mobiliza­ Extractivistas” which are a legal instrument for the creation of protected tions (number of people involved) (Fig. 7). The largest share (37% of areas where the traditional populations can continue its activities with analyzed cases), are conflicts of ‘high intensity’, characterized by mass no risk of being expropriated. mobilizations and/or arrests, criminalization, violence and even mur­ ders. Key examples of such high intensity conflicts include the “Massacre Fig. 7. Frequency of intensity level of land acquisition conflicts related to agribusiness. Own elaboration from EJAtlas data, (n = 185). Note that variables are mutually exclusive. 7 J. Dell’Angelo et al. Ecological Economics 184 (2021) 107004 of Curuguaty”, in Paraguay where on June 2015, 11 peasants and six 4.7. Zooming in: high intensity conflict cases policemen were killed as a result of violent evictions of peasants who had occupied the lands of Marina Kue to stop the increased sowing of From the 185 cases we further narrow down our analysis to 72 cases transgenic soybeans (EJAtlas, 2017a). Another example is the Garifuna that are classified as ‘high intensity conflicts’. Of these 72 high intensity resistance in Honduras against land grabbing for palm oil plantations conflicts, the highest number occurred in Brazil (9 cases) Cambodia (9 where local communities “are threatened by eviction, displacement, cases) and Indonesia (8 cases). These are followed by Colombia (5 intimidation and criminal violence” (EJAtlas, 2015a). This subset of cases), Mexico (4 cases), Paraguay, India and Thailand (3 cases each), ‘high intensity conflicts’ is analyzed more in detail in Section 4.7. In 32% and several more countries in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and of the cases, conflicts fall under the definition of ‘medium intensity’, Asia with one or two cases. which refers to visible mobilizations such as street protests but occurring at a smaller scale, and without an excessive level of violence. Low in­ 4.7.1. Conflict types tensity conflicts account for 21% of the cases and usually refer to some All these 72 cases are classified as ‘land acquisition conflicts’, of local mobilizations and dissent. 6% is unknown and 5% latent (4%) these, as non-exclusive sub-categories, 51% are described as ‘plantation which refers to those conflicts where there is no visible resistance conflicts’, 39% associated with the issue of ‘deforestation’, 33% related beyond the everyday forms of resistance termed “weapons of the weak” with ‘intensive food production, monocultures and livestock’, 18% with by Scott(Scott, 2008) but signals that there might be in future. Such ‘agrofuels and biomass energy production’, 18% associated with ‘log­ cases also include those where NGOs are mobilizing but no outright ging’ and 13% with issues of ‘water access rights and entitlements’. mobilization by the local community. 4.7.2. Agricultural commodities The types of agricultural commodities that are more frequently listed 4.6. What typologies of violence affect different types of actors? include ‘palm oil’ (35%), ‘timber’ (29%), ‘sugar’ (19%), ‘eucalyptus’ (11%), ‘soybean’ (8%), ‘fruits and vegetables’ (8%), ‘cellulose’ (8%), Small-scale farmers, indigenous people, landless peasants, pastoral­ and ‘rubber’ (6%). ists and traditional forest users are the actors that are most directly affected by land and commons grabbing (Dell’Angelo et al., 2017). In 4.7.3. Actors mobilizing this study, we find that for those cases where these groups are mobilizing The frequencies for the types of actors that mobilize in high intensity groups- repression and criminalization are occurring systematically conflicts are similar to the broader sample. Also, for high intensity (Fig. 8). Moreover, in a large number of cases violent targeting and also conflict cases, farmers (76%), indigenous groups (71%), local environ­ killings are reported. Fig. 8 shows the frequency of deaths in cases where mental justice organizations (69%) and international environmental pastoralists, landless peasants, indigenous groups or small-scale farmers justice organizations (56%), communities (49%) and landless peasants were involved in the mobilization. We see that respectively in 20%, (32%) are the main categories of groups that mobilize most frequently. 39%, 27% and 27% of the analyzed conflicts in which pastoralists, landless peasants, indigenous groups or small-scale farmers were 4.7.4. Forms of mobilization involved in some form of social mobilization and resistance, the killing A visible characteristic of the high intensity conflicts cases subset is of one or more activists involved was reported. the increased use of specific mobilization forms. Particularly high fre­ Frequency of repressive outcomes associated to the involvement of quencies, compared with the broader sample, are reported for ‘street different actors depending on the commons. protests’ (76%), ‘public campaigns’ (49%), ‘blockades’ (42%), ‘land Fig. 8. Frequency of repressive outcomes associated with the involvement of different actors impacted by the agribusiness operations. Own elaboration from EJAtlas data (n = 185). Note that variables are not mutually exclusive. 8 J. Dell’Angelo et al. Ecological Economics 184 (2021) 107004 Fig. 9. Characteristics of mobilization forms for all cases (n = 185) and for high intensity conflict cases subset (n = 72). Own elaboration from EJAtlas, major changes in values highlighted in red. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) occupation’ (44%), ‘occupation of public spaces’ (17%), ‘boycotts of direct violence, suffer a variety of socio-economic impacts (see Fig. 10). official procedures’ (10%), ‘boycotts of companies and products’ (10%), The most prominent ones include land dispossession, loss of livelihood ‘property damage’ (28%) and ‘threats to use arms” (13%). and displacement. For instance, in Sumatra Indonesia, PT Tor Ganda annexed over 10, 000 acres of forest and subsistence land for mono­ 4.7.5. Forms of repression and violence culture conversion, supposedly without permits. The march which was In line with the high intensity classification of this subset, these cases subsequently organized by the local farmers was attacked by “hoodlums are subject to a variety of dynamics of violent ‘repression’ (63% of the and police”, which burned over 100 houses, wounding 30 and killing 1. cases) with visible increase in ‘militarization’ (49%) and ‘violent tar­ Further resistance could not be mounted and villages definitively lost geting of activists’ (67%). In the majority of cases ‘violation of human their land and thus livelihood (EJAtlas, 2016). rights’ (71%) is denounced and ‘criminalization of activists’ (56%) is common practice. In 78% of cases, killing of an activist was a reported 4.7.7. Alliances outcome. For instance, Human Rights Watch (2014) published a report In high intensity conflicts, alliances between local actors affected by about the land conflict in Bajo Aguán, Honduras, titled “There Are No land and commons grabbing and other groups supporting their struggle Investigations Here”. Politicians have apparently aided the allocation of play a fundamental role. In the majority of cases analyzed protesters are land rights to private companies through a string of agrarian reform composed of a variety of actors operating at different scales, such as laws. In this case, Dinant Corporation started to evict local peasants from international environmental justice organizations (involved in 56% of their lands for the purpose of monoculture Palm Oil plantations. cases), national and international NGOs (63%), and local environmental Reportedly, protest was met with torture, arson, intimidation, disap­ justice organizations (69%) (Fig. 11, below). Researchers, scientist and pearances and murder of activists, the majority of which was not professionals on the ground are often involved (31%) as well as social investigated (Edelman and León, 2013; EJAtlas, 2014a). movements (29%). In a large part of the sample (47%), one of the strategies of resistance and mobilization is explicitly developing a 4.7.6. Socio-economic impacts network for collective and coordinated action. An infamous example is The groups that are subject to high intensity conflict, in addition to the KDC land grab case in Cambodia. In this case numerous villagers 9 J. Dell’Angelo et al. Ecological Economics 184 (2021) 107004 Fig. 10. Frequency of socio-economic impacts on impacted groups in high intensity violence cases. Own elaboration from EJAtlas data, (n = 72). Note that variables are not mutually exclusive. Fig. 11. Frequency of key allies in high intensity violence cases. Own elaboration from EJAtlas data, (n = 72). Note that variables are not mutually exclusive. were evicted from their farmland by the Cambodian company KDC, 5. Discussion owned by political elites. After a first appeal the courts ruled against the local farmers. Formal complaints were rejected and the KDC started to In this paper we identify and synthesize emerging patterns of evict families by force and destroy farmers’ houses. Eventually, the violence, resistance and social mobilization through an analysis of 185 involvement of 25 NGOs and human rights organizations lead the UN to cases of land acquisition conflicts related to agribusiness development start an investigation. These activities lead to a temporary suspension of which following Dell’Angelo et al. (2017) framework for “commons the eviction activities (EJAtlas, 2015b). grabbing” are cases illustrative of the dynamics of commons disposses­ sion in the context of the global land rush. 10 J. Dell’Angelo et al. Ecological Economics 184 (2021) 107004 In terms of types of actors that mobilize, local organizations are the reactions when the project is already in advanced planning phase. This actors that mobilize most frequently in the analyzed cases (Fig. 3). This gives some important insights on the level (and lack) of participation highlights the important role of communities in forms of collective re­ and how these communities are involved (or excluded in most cases) in actions. This key role of the collective dimension of land struggles the decision-making processes associated with agribusiness develop­ against coercive measures is frequently overseen in media reports, who ment. What clearly emerges is that most of the times local communities tend to depict the stories of individual land defenders, and invisible in seem to become aware of the project implications once it is already recent global statistics of killings of land and environmental defenders launched. For example, in a case involving the Texas- based Nile Trade (cf. Scheidel et al., 2020). Recognition of the collective nature of these Development, the local community only discovered the deal three years struggles is however important, to unveil the efforts as well as risks faced after the initial signing (EJAtlas 2014b). by the collectives to which they belong to, in protecting and defending Another aspect that emerges from this work, which we believe is a the commons against outside appropriators. Indigenous people, pasto­ novel contribution to the theory of the commons, is that organized ralists, and to a certain extent small-scale farmer, are typically the users collective (re)actions are critical not only in the maintenance and most affected through processes of commons grabbing because of their governance of the commons, but they evidently play a role in their de­ dependence on land (Dell’Angelo et al., 2017). This is reflected in the fense. In terms of the forms of mobilization, it is interesting to observe that frequent appearance of indigenous and farmers as mobilizing groups, in the majority of the cases the actions were peaceful, often following both in the broader sample (Fig. 3) and in the ‘high intensity conflicts institutional and propositional approaches rather than confrontational sub-set, whereas we explain the lower observed frequency of pastoralists ones. However, there are some relevant differences between the fre­ due to our geographical sample distribution (Fig. 2, see also Section 3). quency in all cases and the ones in the high intensity conflicts sub-set. Resistance can throw historically antagonistic actors, such as farmers For the high intensity conflicts confrontational actions are reported and pastoralists into “marriages of convenience” or temporary alliances more frequently. For example, occupations of public spaces, boycotting (Temper, 2016), as they strategize together how to stop communal land, formal procedures, companies and products, blockades, street protests, with its overlapping and contested land claims, from being converted land occupation, property damage, and threat to use arms occur much into commercial private operations. more often in the high intensity conflict sub-set. The prominent role of international organizations in these conflicts is A disconcerting outcome from this synthesis is that while on the side clear. International Environmental Organizations are involved in 58% of of the collective re-actions it seems clear that the prevailing patterns of the conflicts analyzed and 63% of those which are high intensity. This organization are peaceful, the social outcomes that result are frequently rate of involvement is about double the global average for all cases violent, involving also assassinations (see also Del Bene et al., 2018). registered in the EJAtlas (30%, as reported in Scheidel et al., 2020). This More than a third of the cases that we analyzed were described as ‘high frequency may signal a bias in reporting of cases with international intensity conflicts’. Among the ‘high intensity conflicts’, in 30% of the campaigns pushed by international organizations, and points to the cases direct violence against the mobilizing groups is reported. In different models of resistance described by Temper (2019), where alli­ particular the social outcomes resulting from the mobilizations show a ances between local and international actors, either through high level of oppression and violence. Repression, displacement, violent “boomerang” or “catapult” models, shape the dynamics of commons- targeting, criminalization and assassination of activist are much more grabbing resistance. It is also an indication of the high capacity and frequent than other non-violent social outcomes such as legislative and prominence of agrarian and rural social movements to mobilize on the institutional changes. In addition to confirming one of the main results global policy and advocacy stage. As McKeon (2013) argues, they have from Dell’Angelo et al. (2017), that the dynamics of commons grabbing exploited the political window of opportunity opened up by global are inherently characterized by power imbalance, coercion and attention on land-grabbing to push for representation and rights for violence, this synthesis brings novel information and characterizations peasants in spaces such as in the Committee on World Food Security, the about the ways in which coercion and violence manifest more negotiation of Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of frequently. What results from this work is that there seems to be a Land, Fisheries and Forests and the UN Declaration on the Rights of structural dynamic of oppression that starts from the violation of com­ Peasants and other people working in rural areas, adopted by the UN munities and collective interests, which then leads to collective re- General Assembly in December 2018. This last declaration includes actions, that eventually are suppressed through coercion and violence. specific safeguards for the commons, as in Article 17, which affirms We have not investigated in this paper how this repression might cause peasants’ right to land individually or collectively and which charges backfire leading to increased public outrage and support and eventual that States shall recognize and protect the natural commons and their government accommodation to the protesters demands (Hess and Mar­ related systems of collective use and management (UN General Assem­ tin, 2006). However, given the paucity of positive outcomes in high bly, 2018). Threats from globalization seem to produce globalized an­ intensity cases, it appears that such dynamics are rare. tidotes. Transnational alliance building among peasants, rural peoples The fact that violence is a recurrent pattern to suppress environ­ and national and international organizations defending the commons mental defenders is very problematic (Navas et al., 2018). In addition to thus demonstrates the potential for greater organization and its human rights violation aspect, it suppresses fundamental emerging effectiveness. forces for sustainability (Scheidel et al., 2018). The way in which the These aspects confirm precedent theoretical elaborations. First it commons are being threatened through the advancement of neoliberal raises attention on the role of social movements in governing the com­ frontiers of transnational resources exploitation, and the way in which mons, which has been extensively described by Villamayor-Tomas and the resulting organized social re-actions displayed in defense of these García-López (2018) in supporting collective re-actions and defending commons are systematically suppressed, raise environmental and po­ the commons. Actors affected by commons grabbing are not only united litical concerns. There is evidence that commons systems are often able in dealing with the same threats, but they actually organize in collective to ensure environmental sustainability (Cox et al., 2010) and it has been re-actions. The term ‘re-action’ is particularly appropriated to describe clearly explained how ecological distribution conflicts play a key role in the development of these collective actions. Looking at when the mobi­ denouncing and proposing alternatives to mechanisms of natural lization begins, it is clear that in the large majority of the cases these resource exploitation that are unsustainable (Scheidel et al., 2018). In groups mobilized in reaction to the projects and the acquisitions that this light, the collective reactions organized to resist commons grabbing they confronted. This aspect brings to light several important aspects, should be seen, recognized and safeguarded as valuable forces for one is that it raises the concern that despite the narrative on ‘informed sustainability. consent’ that is often invoked when describing the implementation of A key issue lies in the problematic role of governments and the social large-scale agribusiness ventures, local actors seem to resort to collective and economic forces that hegemonize the State apparatuses and 11 J. Dell’Angelo et al. Ecological Economics 184 (2021) 107004 organizations in governing the commons in the contemporary era of movements and environmental justice networks could play in commons neoliberal globalization. According to Mansbridge (2014), the State governance, as well as the role that the collective re-actions organized to could potentially support the autonomous self-organization of common defend the commons, will have in producing positive political change property systems thorough (i) the imposition of intermediate solutions and development of social and environmental alternatives (Aydin et al., when local parties cannot reach a shared agreement, (ii) the provision of 2017; Villamayor-Tomas and García-López, 2018) against the relatively neutral information, (iii) the provision of an arena for nego­ advancement of socially and environmentally exploitive systems of tiation and agreement discussion, and (iv) the social infrastructure for natural resources grabbing. monitoring, compliance and sanctioning mechanisms. However, the critical arguments about the deficiencies associated with state-centric forms of commons governance are amply debated and touch upon Declaration of Competing Interest even more fundamental questions on self-organization, participation, democracy and cooperation (see Cumbers, 2015). As seen in our results The authors declare they have no conflict of interests. (Fig. 6), available institutional measures, such as the use of existing laws to safeguard the environment and human rights, or the creation of new Acknowledgments laws to protect people and commons land, are often not implemented. The problematic role of the State apparatuses and organizations is also a We are grateful to the two external reviewers and the special issue critical aspect that emerges from the recent body of literature on the editor for their excellent and very helpful comments. This work was global land rush. As synthesized in Dell’Angelo et al. (2017), when it supported by the National Socio-Environmental Synthesis Center comes to economically powerful interests such as the ones associated (SESYNC) under funding received from the National Science Foundation with transnational large-scale land investments, the “face” of the State DBI-1639145. J.D.A. acknowledges support from the European Union’s that more often manifests, is the one exhibited by national governments Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie that have a key role in allocating exclusive land concessions to powerful Skłodowska-Curie Action (MSCA) Innovative Training Network (ITN) foreign investors. This happens not only by disregarding the traditional grant agreement No. 861509 – NEWAVE. A.S. acknowledges funding users that rely on these resources, but also through the active suppres­ from the Beatriu de Pinós postdoctoral programme of the Government of sion by governmental forces, often violent, of any type of reactions and Catalonia’s Secretariat for Universities and Research of the Ministry of claim organized by the communities and people affected by these Economy and Knowledge (2017 BP 00023). G.N. and A.S. acknowledge investments. support from the ERC project ‘EnvJustice’ (GA 695446). GDA ac­ knowledges the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology 6. Conclusions (UID/SOC/50012/2019). L.T. acknowledges the support of the Leader­ ship for the Ecozoic Program. Thank you to Kyle F. Davis for his help Commons grabbing has been described as a constitutive element of with the map. the contemporary global agrarian transition. The recent global land rush, catalyzed through transnational agribusiness expansion, is References happening at the expenses of the commons. Large-scale land acquisitions resulting from agribusiness development are a key driver of this esca­ Agrawal, A., 2005. Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making of Subjects. Duke University Press, Durham, NC. lating process (eg. Wily, 2011a, 2011b; Dell’Angelo et al., 2017). There Armitage, D., 2005. Adaptive capacity and community-based natural resource is evidence that commons grabbing is perpetuated through coercive management. Environ. Manag. 35 (6), 703–715. means and violence (Dell’Angelo et al., 2017). Using a different data­ Aydin, C.I., Ozkaynak, B., Rodríguez-Labajos, B., Yenilmez, T., 2017. Network effects in environmental justice struggles: an investigation of conflicts between mining base, this study confirms a similar depiction of coercion and violence companies and civil society organizations from a network perspective. PLoS One 12 associated with agribusiness related commons grabbing. While it has (7), e0180494. been shown that in many instances of commons grabbing associated Borras, S.M., Franco, J.C., 2013. Global land grabbing and political reactions ‘from below’. Third World Q. 34 (9), 1723–1747. with LSLAs, different types of social conflict emerge, it is less clear what Borras, S., Hall, R., Scoones, I., White, B., Wolford, W., 2011. Towards a better forms of social mobilization and organized collective re-actions are understanding of global land grabbing: an editorial introduction. J. Peasant Stud. 38 taking place to defend the commons against such processes of dispos­ (2), 209–216. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2011.559005. Brondizio, E., Le Tourneau, F.M., 2016. Environmental governance for all. Science 352 session. This paper addressed this gap shedding light on some of the (6291), 1272–1273. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf5122. fundamental questions associated with the fundamental characteristics, Caffentzis, G., Federici, S., 2014. Commons against and beyond capitalism. Commun. forms and patterns of collective re-actions and mobilizations that are Develop. J. 49 (suppl_1), i92–i105. organized in defense of the commons. This is a novel contribution to the Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 2012. Special issue on “land grabbing in Latin America”. Can. J. Develop. Stud. 33 (4). scholarship and theory of the commons, which has prevalently focused Clement, F., 2010. Analysing decentralised natural resource governance: proposition for on the conditions and dynamics of collective actions that are associated a “politicised” institutional analysis and development framework. Policy. Sci. 43 (2), with sustainable maintenance of common pool resources, but has placed 129–156. Cole, D., Ostrom, E., 2012. The variety of property systems and rights in natural less focus on the exogenous drivers of change and external pressures. resources. In: Cole, D., Ostrom, E. (Eds.), Property in Land and Other Resources. With this paper we describe some emerging features, strategies and Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Hollis, New Hampshire, pp. 37–67. patterns associated with the mobilizations that different actors organize Cotula, L., 2012. The international political economy of the global land rush: a critical appraisal of trends, scale, geography and drivers. J. Peasant Stud. 39 (3–4), 649–680. as collective reactions against commons grabbing. Considering the Cotula, L., 2013. The new enclosures? Polanyi, international investment law and the concerning levels of dispossession, violence and coercion, the necessity global land rush. Third World Q. 34 (9), 1605–1629. of alliances and coordinated strategies between communities, local and Cox, M., Arnold, G., Tomás, S.V., 2010. A review of design principles for community- based natural resource management. Ecol. Soc. 15 (4). international actors, becomes of fundamental importance in defending Cumbers, A., 2015. Constructing a global commons in, against and beyond the state. the commons. Space Polit. 19 (1), 62–75. The recent wave of land grabbing associated with the contemporary D’alisa, G., 2013. Bienes comunes: las estructuras que conectan. Ecol. Polit. (45), 30–41. Dasgupta, P., 1995. An inquiry into well-being and destitution. Oxford University Press, global land rush clearly raises some new challenges for the commons. As New York. scholars interested in the commons, in sustainability and social and Davis, K.F., Koo, H.I., Dell’Angelo, J., et al., 2020. Tropical forest loss enhanced by large- environmental justice we have to deal with new emerging theoretical scale land acquisitions. Nat. Geosci. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41561-020-0592-3. challenges to some of the fundamental tenets of the theory of the com­ De Angelis, M., 2012. Crises, movements and commons. In: Borderl. E-J. New Spaces Humanit, 11, p. 4. mons. New challenges are raised but there are also emerging opportu­ De Schutter, O., 2011. Green Rush: the global race for farmland and the rights of land nities. In this light, particularly important is the role that social users. Harv. Int. Law J. 52, 503. 12 J. Dell’Angelo et al. Ecological Economics 184 (2021) 107004 Deininger, K., 2003. Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction World Bank Policy Messerli, P., Giger, M., Dwyer, M.B., Breu, T., Eckert, S., 2014. The geography of large- Research Report. The World Bank, Washington, DC. scale land acquisitions: analysing socio-ecological patterns of target contexts in the Del Bene, D., Scheidel, A., Temper, L., 2018. More dams, more violence? A global global South. Appl. Geogr. 53, 449–459. analysis on resistances and repression around conflictive dams through co-produced Müller, Marc F., Penny, Gopal, Niles, Meredith T., Ricciardi, Vincent, Chiarelli, Davide knowledge. Sustain. Sci. 13 (3), 617–633. Danilo, Davis, Kyle Frankel, Dell’Angelo, Jampel, et al., 2021. Impact of Dell’Angelo, J., D’Odorico, P., Rulli, M.C., Marchand, P., 2017. The tragedy of the transnational land acquisitions on local food security and dietary diversity. grabbed commons: coercion and dispossession in the global land rush. World Dev. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118 (4). 92, 1–12. Navas, G., Mingorria, S., Aguilar-González, B., 2018. Violence in environmental conflicts: Dell’Angelo, J., Rulli, M.C., D’Odorico, P., 2018. The global water grabbing syndrome. the need for a multidimensional approach. Sustain. Sci. 1–12. Ecol. Econ. 143, 276–285. Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the Commons. Cambridge University Press. Development and Change, 2013. Special issue on “Governing the global land grab: the Ostrom, E., 2011. Background on the institutional analysis and development framework. role of the state in the rush for land”. Dev. Chang. 44 (2). Policy Stud. J. 39 (1), 7–27. Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., Stern, P.C., 2003. The struggle to govern the commons. Science 302 Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., Walker, J., Walker, J., 1994. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool (5652), 1907–1912. Resources. University of Michigan Press. Edelman, Marc, León, Andrés, 2013. Cycles of land grabbing in Central America: an Ostrom, E., Dietz, T., Dolsak, N., Stern, P., Stovich, S., Weber, E. (Eds.), 2002. The Drama argument for history and a case study in the Bajo Aguán, Honduras. Third World Q. of the Commons. National Academy Press, National Research Council, Washington, 34 (9), 1697–1722. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.843848. DC. EJAtlas, 2014a. Oil palm plantations in the Bajo Agúan, Hondura. In: Atlas of Pearce, F., 2012. Land grabbing: the new tragedy of the commons. Just Conservation. Environemtnal Justice. https://ejatlas.org/conflict/oil-palm-plantations-in-the-bajo- Retrieved: http://www.justconservation.org/land-grab-bing-the-new-tragedy-of-th aguan-honduras. e-commons (last accessed on July 1st 2016). EJAtlas, 2014b. Nile trading and development. In: Atlas of Environmental Justice. http Perelman, M., 2007. Primitive accumulation from feudalism to neoliberalism. Capital. s://www.ejatlas.org/conflict/nile-trading-and-development-kinyeti-mysterious-lan Nat. Social. 18 (2), 44–61. https://doi.org/10.1080/10455750701366410. d-deals-in-mukaya-payam-central-equatoria-state-south-sudan. Accessed on June Polanyi, K., 1944. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our 2019. Time. Beacon Press, Boston, MA. EJAtlas, 2015a. Garifuna resistance in Vallecito against land grabbing for palm oil Poteete, A., Janssen, M., Ostrom, E., 2010. Working Together: Collective Action, the plantations and drug trade, Honduras. In: Atlas of Environmental Justice. https: Commons, and Multiple Methods in Practice. Princeton University Press, Princeton, //ejatlas.org/conflict/garifuna-resistance-in-vallecito-land-grabbing-for-palm-oil-pl NJ. antations-and-drug-trade. Accessed on June 2019. Ribot, J., Peluso, N., 2003. A theory of access. Rural. Sociol. 68 (2), 153–181. https://doi. EJAtlas, 2015b. KDC International land grab conflict, Kampong Tralach district, org/10.1111/j.1549-0831.2003.tb00133.x. Cambodia. In: Atlas of Environmental Justice. https://ejatlas.org/conflict/kdc-int Risse, T., Sikkink, K., 1999. The socialization of international. The power of human ernational-land-grab-conflict-kampong-chhnang-cambodia. Accessed on June 2019. rights: International norms and domestic change 66, 1. EJAtlas, 2016. Tor Ganda Conflict, Paraguay. In: Atlas of Environmental Justice. Scheidel, A., Temper, L., Demaria, F., Martínez-Alier, J., 2018. Ecological distribution https://ejatlas.org/conflict/massacre-of-curuguaty. Accessed on June 2019. conflicts as forces for sustainability: an overview and conceptual framework. EJAtlas, 2017a. Massacre of Curuguaty, Paraguay. In: Atlas of Environmental Justice. Sustain. Sci. 1–14. https://ejatlas.org/conflict/massacre-of-curuguaty. Accesed on June 2019. Scheidel, A., Del Bene, D., Liu, J., Navas, G., Mingorría, S., Demaria, F., Martínez- EJAtlas, 2017b. Women against “green deserts” (eucalyptus monoculture). In: R.G. do Alier, J., 2020. Environmental conflicts and defenders: a global overview. Glob. Sul, Brazil (Ed.), Atlas of Environmental Justice. https://ejatlas.org/conflict/women- Environ. Chang. 63, 102104. agaist-the-expansion-of-eucalyptus-monoculture. Scott, J.C., 2008. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. Yale Environmental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas). Available at www.EJAtlas.org last visited on University Press. March 2021. Tarrow, S., 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Escobar, A., 1998. Whose knowledge, Whose nature? biodiversity, conservation, and the Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. political ecology of social movements. Journal of Political Ecology 5 (1), 53. Tarrow, S., 2005. The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge University Press, New Earl, J., Martin, A., McCarthy, J.D., Soule, S.A., 2004. The Use of Newspaper Data in the York. Study of Collective Action. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 30 (1), 65–80. Temper, L., 2016. Who gets the HANPP (Human Appropriation of Net Primary Federici, S., Linebaugh, P., 2018. Re-enchanting the World: Feminism and the Politics of Production)? Biomass distribution and the bio-economy in the Tana Delta, Kenya. the Commons. PM Press. J. Polit. Ecol. 23 (1), 410–433. Fuys, A., Mwangi, E., Dohrn, S., 2008. Securing Common Property Regimes in a Temper, L., 2019. From boomerangs to minefields and catapults: dynamics of trans-local Globalizing World. The International Land Coalition, Rome. resistance to land-grabs. J. Peasant Stud. 46 (1), 1–29. Gerber, J.F., 2011. Conflicts over industrial tree plantations in the South: Who, how and Temper, L., Del Bene, D., Martínez-Alier, J., 2015. Mapping the frontiers and front lines why? Glob. Environ. Chang. 21 (1), 165–176. of global environmental justice: the EJAtlas. J. Polit. Ecol. 22 (1), 255–278. Glassman, J., 2006. Primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 2012. Special issue on “green grabbing”. J. Peasant Stud. accumulation by ‘extra-economic’means. Prog. Hum. Geogr. 30 (5), 608–625. 39 (2). Globalisations, 2013. Special Issue on “land grabbing and global governance”. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 2015. Special issue on Global land grabbing and political Globalisations 10 (1). reactions from below. J. Peasant Stud. 42 (3-4). Hall, R., Edelman, M., Borras Jr., S.M., Scoones, I., White, B., Wolford, W., 2015. The Land Matrix, 2020. The Land Matrix Database. Retrieved from: http://www. Resistance, acquiescence or incorporation? An introduction to land grabbing and landmatrix.org/en/. political reactions ‘from below’. J. Peasant Stud. 42 (3–4), 467–488. Third World Quarterly, 2013. Special issue on “global land grabs”. Third World Q. 34 (9). Harvey, D., 2003. The New Imperialism. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York. UN General Assembly, 2018. A/RES/73/165, Annex, United Nations Declaration on the Harvey, D., 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas. Hess, D., Martin, B., 2006. Repression, backfire, and the theory of transformative events. Velicu, I., García-López, G., 2018. Thinking the commons through Ostrom and Butler: Mobilization 11 (2), 249–267. boundedness and vulnerability. Theor. Cult. Soc. 35 (6), 55–73. Human Rights Watch, 14 February 2014. There Are No Investigations Here - Impunity for Villamayor-Tomas, S., García-López, G., 2018. Social movements as key actors in Killings and Other Abuses in Bajo Aguán, Honduras. ISBN: 978-1-6231-31043, governing the commons: evidence from community-based resource management available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/52fe1b204.html [accessed 29 cases across the world. Glob. Environ. Chang. 53, 114–126. November 2020]. Water Alternative, 2012. Special Issue on “Water grabbing? Focus on the (re) Keck, M.E., Sikkink, K., 1999. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in appropriation offinite water resources”. Water Alternativ. 5 (2), 193–468. International Politics. Cornell Univ. Pr, Ithaca. Wily, L., 2011a. “The law is to blame”: the vulnerable status of common property rights Kugelman, M., 2012. The Global Farms Race: Land Grabs, Agricultural Investment, and in sub-Saharan Africa. Dev. Chang. 42, 733–757. the Scramble for Food Security. Island Press, Washington, DC. Wily, L., 2011b. The Tragedy of Public Lands: The Fate of the Commons under Global Linebaugh, P., 2009. The Magna Carta Manifesto. Liberties and Commons for All. Commercial Pressure. The International Land Coalition, Rome. University of California Press. Wily, L., 2012. Looking back to see forward: the legal niceties of land theft in land rushes. Mansbridge, J., 2014. The role of the state in governing the commons. Environ. Sci. Pol. J. Peasant Stud. 39 (3–4), 751–775. 36, 8–10. Wily, L., 2013. The global land grab: The new enclosures. In: Bollier, D., Helfrich, S. Martínez-Alier, J., Temper, L., Del Bene, D., Scheidel, A., 2016. Is there a global (Eds.), The Wealth of the Commons: A World beyond Market & State. Levellers Press, environmental justice movement? J. Peasant Stud. 43 (3), 731–755. Amherst and Florence, MA. McKeon, N., 2013. ‘One does not sell the land upon which the people walk’: land grabbing, transnational rural social movements, and global governance. Globalizations 10 (1), 105–122. 13