Supplementary Information to Attitudinal Polarization Towards the Redistributive Role of the State in the Wake of the COVID-19 Crisis Table S.1 Question wording of outcome variables Income redistribution To what extent do you agree with the following statements: For a society to be fair, income differences should be small. 1 Disagree strongly 2 Disagree 3 Agree 4 Agree strongly Social services as a strain on the economy To what extent do you agree with the following statements: Social benefits and services in [COUNTRY] place too great a strain on the economy. 1 Disagree strongly 2 Disagree 3 Agree 4 Agree strongly Aggregate preferences towards welfare state expansion and retrenchment To what extent do you agree with the following policy reform proposals? The government should… … increase old age pension benefits … increase the availability of good-quality childcare services … expand access to good-quality university education for students from lower-income families … increase unemployment benefits … expand services that help reintegrate the long-term unemployed into the labour market 1 Disagree strongly 2 Disagree 3 Agree 4 Agree strongly To what extent do you agree with the following policy reform proposals? The government should… … reduce old age pension benefits … increase the fees for public childcare services … increase student fees for university education for students from middle- and higher-income families … reduce unemployment benefits … provide labour market reintegration services only to the long-term unemployed (rather than all unemployed) 1 Disagree strongly 2 Disagree 3 Agree 4 Agree strongly 1 Ideological placement In politics, people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Where would you place yourself on a scale where 0 means "left" and 10 means "right"? 0 left … 10 right Tradeoffs in welfare policies To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Nowadays, the welfare state can’t offer everything that one may wish for. If you increase benefits for some people, sooner or later someone else will have to accept lower benefits” 1 Strongly disagree 2 Disagree 3 Agree 4 Strongly agree Fiscal constraint To what extent do you agree with the following statement: “Taxes are already high. The government should not levy more money from citizens via taxes anymore.” 1 Strongly disagree 2 Disagree 3 Agree 4 Strongly agree State effectiveness In general, do you think that in your country, political decisions are generally implemented effectively? 1 not implemented effectively at all … 10 implemented effectively Welfare state efficiency Some people say that the money that goes into the welfare state in the [COUNTRY] is used efficiently, while others say that a lot of money is wasted. What do you think? 1 A lot of money is wasted … 10 The money is used efficiently Political trust In general, do you trust politicians in your country? 1 I do not trust politicians at all … 10 I completely trust politicians 2 Figure S.1: Country-specific average predicted attitudinal differences between waves (with 95% confidence intervals) 3 Table S.2: Additive regression models on attitudes – pooled sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Income Social services as Welfare state Ideological Tradeoffs in Fiscal State Welfare state Political trust redistribution strain expansion placement welfare constraint effectiveness efficiency policies Wave 2 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.06*** -0.01 0.13*** 0.01 0.12*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Lagged ideology -0.04*** 0.05*** -0.02*** 0.03*** 0.04*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Age 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** -0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.00*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Male 0.01 -0.02 -0.01* 0.03*** -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Social class (ref. Higher-grade service class) Lower-grade 0.04*** 0.03* -0.01 -0.03** -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.05*** -0.03* service class (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Small business 0.04 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.04* -0.05* -0.03 owners (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Skilled workers 0.09*** 0.04** 0.01 -0.01 -0.03* 0.06*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.06*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Unskilled 0.11*** 0.02 0.03** -0.05*** -0.04* 0.05*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.07*** workers (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Parent 0.00 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Country-FE ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Constant 0.77*** 0.22*** 0.76*** 0.50*** 0.45*** 0.64*** 0.45*** 0.49*** 0.39*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Observations 3653 3648 3527 3660 3658 3641 3649 3655 3653 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 4 Table S.3: Additive regression models on attitudes – Germany (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Income Social services Welfare state Ideological Tradeoffs in Fiscal State Welfare state Political trust redistribution as strain expansion placement welfare constraint effectiveness efficiency policies Lagged ideology -0.02*** 0.05*** -0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wave 2 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.06*** -0.02 0.19*** 0.03* 0.17*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00* (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Male 0.01 -0.04* -0.00 0.02* -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Social class (ref. Higher-grade service class) Lower-grade service 0.04* 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.05** -0.01 -0.06*** -0.03 class (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Small business 0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.07** 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.09** -0.02 owners (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Skilled workers 0.09*** 0.04* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.08*** -0.03* -0.08*** -0.06*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Unskilled workers 0.12*** 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.05** -0.08*** -0.11*** -0.13*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Parent 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02** -0.01* -0.01* -0.02** (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Constant 0.71*** 0.16*** 0.78*** 0.52*** 0.34*** 0.63*** 0.42*** 0.48*** 0.36*** (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Observations 1504 1503 1469 1513 1511 1507 1506 1508 1505 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 5 Table S.4: Additive regression models on attitudes – Spain (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Income Social services Welfare state Ideological Tradeoffs in Fiscal State Welfare state Political trust redistribution as strain expansion placement welfare constraint effectiveness efficiency policies Lagged ideology -0.03*** 0.04*** -0.01*** 0.04*** 0.04*** -0.01* -0.02*** -0.01*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wave 2 -0.04** 0.02 -0.00 -0.01 0.07*** -0.01 0.10*** -0.01 0.06*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age 0.00 -0.00*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 0.00 0.00* (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Male 0.02 -0.02 -0.02* 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) Social class (ref. Higher-grade service class) Lower-grade service 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.06* -0.09** 0.02 -0.03 0.00 class (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Small business 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 owners (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Skilled workers 0.06** -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.12*** -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Unskilled workers 0.09*** -0.05* 0.05*** -0.07** -0.11*** 0.02 -0.03 -0.00 0.00 (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Parent -0.00 0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02* 0.01 0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Constant 0.77*** 0.43*** 0.77*** 0.40*** 0.58*** 0.71*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.15*** (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) Observations 1106 1106 1067 1105 1105 1101 1102 1106 1107 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 6 Table S.5: Additive regression models on attitudes – Sweden (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Income Social services Welfare state Ideological Tradeoffs in Fiscal State Welfare state Political trust redistribution as strain expansion placement welfare constraint effectiveness efficiency policies Lagged ideology -0.05*** 0.05*** -0.02*** 0.03*** 0.06*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wave 2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.05** -0.02 0.09*** 0.01 0.10*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00* -0.00 0.00** -0.00 0.00* (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Male -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.06*** 0.01 0.01 -0.01 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) Social class (ref. Higher-grade service class) Lower-grade service 0.05* 0.04* -0.01 -0.07** -0.01 0.03 -0.02 -0.05** -0.05* class (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Small business 0.04 -0.09 -0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 owners (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) Skilled workers 0.10*** 0.08*** -0.02 -0.06** -0.02 0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.12*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Unskilled workers 0.11*** 0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.10*** -0.09** (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Parent 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Constant 0.72*** 0.18*** 0.70*** 0.59*** 0.49*** 0.31*** 0.49*** 0.55*** 0.53*** (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) Observations 1043 1039 991 1042 1042 1033 1041 1041 1041 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 7 Table S.6: Interactive regression models on fiscal constraint – pooled and by-country analyses (1) (2) (3) (4) Fiscal constraint Fiscal constraint Fiscal constraint Fiscal constraint pooled Germany Spain Sweden Lagged ideology 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.06*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wave 2 -0.06** -0.02 -0.10** -0.05 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) Wave 2*Lagged ideology 0.01* 0.00 0.02** 0.01 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age -0.00* 0.00 -0.00*** -0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Male -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.06*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) Social class (ref. Higher-grade service class) Lower-grade service class 0.01 0.05** -0.09** 0.03 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) Small business owners 0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) Skilled workers 0.06*** 0.08*** -0.01 0.08*** (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Unskilled workers 0.05*** 0.05** 0.02 0.04 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) Parent 0.00 0.02** 0.00 -0.01 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Country-FE ✔ Constant 0.66*** 0.63*** 0.76*** 0.33*** (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) Observations 3641 1507 1101 1033 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 8 Table S.7: Interactive regression models on state effectiveness – pooled and by-country analyses (1) (2) (3) (4) State effectiveness State effectiveness State effectiveness State effectiveness pooled Germany Spain Sweden Lagged ideology -0.01** -0.00 0.01* -0.03*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wave 2 0.23*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.14*** (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Wave 2*Lagged ideology -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.01 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Male 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) Social class (ref. Higher-grade service class) Lower-grade service class -0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Small business owners -0.04* -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) Skilled workers -0.04*** -0.03* -0.03 -0.08*** (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Unskilled workers -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.03 -0.05 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) Parent -0.00 -0.01* 0.02* -0.01 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Country-FE ✔ Constant 0.40*** 0.37*** 0.27*** 0.47*** (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) Observations 3649 1506 1102 1041 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 9 Table S.8: Interactive regression models on welfare state efficiency – pooled and by-country analyses (1) (2) (3) (4) Welfare state Welfare state Welfare state Welfare state efficiency pooled efficiency Germany efficiency Spain efficiency Sweden Lagged ideology -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.00 -0.03*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wave 2 0.07*** 0.08* 0.11*** 0.04 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Wave 2*Lagged ideology -0.01*** -0.01 -0.03*** -0.00 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Male 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) Social class (ref. Higher-grade service class) Lower-grade service class -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.03 -0.05** (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Small business owners -0.05* -0.09** -0.03 0.03 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) Skilled workers -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.02 -0.08*** (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Unskilled workers -0.07*** -0.11*** -0.00 -0.10*** (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) Parent -0.00 -0.01* 0.01 -0.00 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Country-FE ✔ Constant 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.26*** 0.54*** (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) Observations 3655 1508 1106 1041 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 10 Table S.9: Interactive regression models on political trust – pooled and by-country analyses (1) (2) (3) (4) Political trust Political trust Political trust Political trust pooled Germany Spain Sweden Lagged ideology -0.01*** -0.01 0.01* -0.02*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wave 2 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.17*** (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) Wave 2*Lagged ideology -0.02*** -0.02* -0.04*** -0.01* (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Male -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) Social class (ref. Higher-grade service class) Lower-grade service class -0.03* -0.03 0.00 -0.05* (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Small business owners -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) Skilled workers -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.01 -0.12*** (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Unskilled workers -0.07*** -0.13*** 0.00 -0.09** (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) Parent -0.01** -0.02** 0.00 -0.01 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Country-FE ✔ Constant 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.07* 0.49*** (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) Observations 3653 1505 1107 1041 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 11 Table S.10: Additive regression models on attitudinal change between waves 1 and 2, controlling for economic risk – pooled sample (1) (2) (3) (4) Fiscal constraint State effectiveness Welfare state Political trust Attitudinal change Attitudinal change efficiency Attitudinal change between w1 & w2 between w1 & w2 Attitudinal change between w1 & w2 between w1 & w2 Lagged ideology 0.03*** -0.18*** -0.12*** -0.19*** (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Sociotropic economic risk 0.01 0.10 -0.03 -0.00 (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) Age -0.00 0.01** 0.01* 0.01 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Male -0.04 -0.05 0.00 -0.26** (0.04) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) Social class (ref. Higher-grade service class) Lower-grade service class 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.23 (0.05) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) Small business owners -0.13 0.10 -0.28 -0.07 (0.10) (0.28) (0.28) (0.24) Skilled workers 0.02 -0.02 -0.10 0.06 (0.05) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) Unskilled workers -0.03 0.21 0.12 0.25 (0.06) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) Parent -0.00 -0.09 -0.09* -0.05 (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) Country-FE ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Constant -0.16 1.57*** 0.61 2.22*** (0.12) (0.36) (0.35) (0.31) Observations 1800 1808 1814 1812 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 12 Table S.11: Interactive regression models controlling for election winner/loser – pooled sample (1) (2) (3) (4) Fiscal constraint State effectiveness Welfare state Political trust efficiency Lagged ideology 0.03*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Wave 2 -0.05* 0.24*** 0.07*** 0.22*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Wave 2*Lagged ideology 0.01 -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02*** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Election winner/loser (ref: loser) Winner -0.08*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.15*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Age -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00* (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Male 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Social class (ref. Higher-grade service class) Lower-grade service class 0.02 0.00 -0.05*** -0.02 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Small business owners 0.01 -0.02 -0.05* -0.03 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Skilled workers 0.07*** -0.04*** -0.08*** -0.07*** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Unskilled workers 0.05** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.08*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Parent 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Country-FE ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ Constant 0.68*** 0.34*** 0.43*** 0.28*** (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) Observations 2870 2874 2878 2877 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 13 Table S.12: Interactive regression models with party voted for in last election – Germany (1) (2) (3) (4) Fiscal constraint State effectiveness Welfare state Political trust efficiency Party voted for last election, lagged (Ref. CDU) SPD -0.05 -0.08** 0.02 -0.10** (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) The Left -0.09** -0.17*** -0.02 -0.22*** (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Greens -0.03 -0.09*** -0.02 -0.12*** (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) AfD 0.12*** -0.25*** -0.17*** -0.36*** (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) FPD 0.03 -0.12*** -0.10** -0.19*** (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) Wave 2 -0.02 0.21*** 0.03 0.19*** (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) SPD*Wave 2 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) The Left*Wave 2 0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.01 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) Greens*Wave 2 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) AFD*Wave 2 0.00 -0.09* -0.05 -0.11** (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) FPD*Wave 2 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.01 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) Age 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Male -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Social class (ref. Higher-grade service class) Lower-grade service class 0.06** 0.01 -0.07*** -0.01 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Small business owners 0.02 -0.03 -0.07* -0.01 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) Skilled workers 0.07*** -0.02 -0.09*** -0.03 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) Unskilled workers 0.06* -0.06* -0.12*** -0.09*** (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) Parent 0.02* -0.01* -0.01 -0.02* (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Constant 0.73*** 0.50*** 0.45*** 0.47*** (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) Observations 1242 1238 1240 1238 Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 14