Klio 2021; 103(1): 42–58 Javier Verdejo-Manchado* – Borja Antela-Bernárdez* IG II2 1623, 276–285. Athens versus Pirates: between Recovery, Need and Patriotism https://doi.org/10.1515/klio-2020-0302 Summary: Scholars have usually understood the epigraphical evidence for an Athenian naval mission led by Diotimos as an example of the treaties in the framework of the Corinthian League and Athens’ role as guarantor of security on the seas. Nevertheless, a close look at the main characters involved in the inscription and the mission of Diotimos, as well as to the historical context and the rise of the Macedonian hegemony, seems to allow a new interpretation of the evidence, in order to shed some light on the nature of Diotimos’ mission. Keywords: Diotimos, Lycurgus, Athenian Navy, Corinthian League, Alexander the Great The inscription catalogued as IG II2 1623 contains the inventory of Athenian ships recorded by the inspectors of the dockyards (ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν νεωρίων), corre- sponding to the year 334/333 BC (ἐπὶ Κτησικλέους ἄρχοντος). Between lines 276 and 285, it reports the use of two ships (Νεμεάς and Δύναμις, mentioned in the preceding lines, 245 and 260, respectively) from the previous year, 335/334 BC (Εὐαινέτου ἄρχοντος), in a military operation promoted by the orators Lycurgus of Boutadai and Aristonicus of Marathon and carried out under the command of General Diotimos of Euonimon. As the inscription says, the purpose of the expe- dition was the protection against pirates. The text of the inscription, which poses no reading problems, says: τριήρεις αἵδε (sc. Νεμεάς καὶ Δύναμις) ἐξέπλ/ευσαν μετὰ στρατηγ(οῦ) / Διοτίμου ἐπὶ τὴν / φυλακὴν τῶν λεισ/τῶν κατὰ ψήφισμα / δήμου, ὃ εἶπεν Λυκ/οῦργος Βουτά(δας) καὶ Ἀ/ ριστόνικος Μαραθώ, / ταχυναυτοῦσαι ἐπὶ / Εὐαινέτου ἄρχοντος. “These ships (sc. Nemea and Dynamis) went to sea under the command of General Diotimos as protection against pirates by decree of the people proposed by Lycurgus of Boutadai and Aristonicus of Marathon, due to their speed, in the archonship of Evenetus (335/4 BC).ˮ *Kontakt: Javier Verdejo-Manchado, E-Mail: verdejojavier@uniovi.es; Borja Antela-Bernárdez, E-Mail: borja.antela@uab.cat  IG II2 1623, 276–285. Athens versus Pirates 43 The supervision of a naval expedition by Diotimos, the son of Diopeithes, also appears in Plutarch (Mor. 844a),1 with an epigraphic parallel in IG II2 414a2 (= IG II3 336). According to the honours, the orator Lycurgus vowed for Diotimos in 334/333 BC, probably because he had brought the expedition against pirates launched one year earlier to successful fruition.3 Traditionally, the text of the inscription and its honorific correlate have been summarily related to the situation of the general context of Athens in the second half of the 4th century BC, that is, the outcome of the maritime instability caused by Athens’ weakness.4 In this sense, considering the starting date, 335/334 BC, and its mission to counter pirates, it has even been associated with the bilateral treaties that Athens reached with Alexander the Great over the renewal of the League of Corinth in 336 BC,5 with the understanding that Athens’ cleansing of the seas had been part of the preparations organised by Alexander and the Mac- edonians prior to the start of their invasion of Asia in 334 BC.6 However, these interpretations almost exclusively take the mission of the campaign into account, the importance of which, furthermore, seems to have eclipsed the other infor- mation we have on it, such as its agents or the socio-political context in which it was undertaken to the extent that they are hardly considered or are consid- 1 Roisman – Worthington – Waterfield 2015, 59. 2 Schweigert 1940, 335–343; cf. Lambert 2004, 108 = 2012, 43, n. 79, who expresses doubts con- cerning the reconstruction of the inscription and its parallel in the literary sources. 3 E.g., Schweigert 1940, 341; Davies 1971, 164; Burke 2010, 399, no. 24. 4 Durrbach 1890, 73–75; Schweigert 1940, 341 (cf. Pritchett 1991, 88, 337 f.; Develin 2003, 373; De Souza 1999, 41; Burke 2010, 399, no. 24); Garnsey 1988, 154–164; Rhodes – Osborne 2003, 525; Gabrielsen 2007, 301, 306, n. 60. Durrbach also links this mission to the pirates’ capture of Eresus, an event dated sometime during the reign of Alexander the Great (cf. IG XII, 2 526). Rhodes – Osborne 2003, 525 dated the campaign erroneously to 334/333 BC (ἐπὶ Κτησικλέους ἄρχοντος) and linked it to Athens’ struggle to erase Etruscan piracy (cf. infra). Thus, albeit in a less specific way, Gabrielsen (1994, 157–206; 2007, 259–272) considers the goal of this campaign to be guaranteeing the security of merchant ships (cf. infra). We cannot agree with Serrat 2013, 328 f., who assigns a mercenary purpose to this campaign. According to Serrat, Athens rented its own troops as a way to strengthen its finances as it had many other times during the first half of the 4th century BC. Nevertheless, Serrat does not seem to take the details we know about this campaign into account, including dates, participants etc., so his theory seems unfeasible, vid. infra. On the other hand, we find it quite surprising that this campaign has not been noted by Ormerod 1924, who does not even mention it. 5 In fact, as far as we know, only Lambert 2012, 43 no. 79 has expressed doubts about the iden- tification of the mission of Diotimos in the context of Macedonian rule and the international regulation over the poleis held by the League of Corinth. 6 Regarding the League of Corinth, vid. Hammond – Griffith 1979, 639; Bosworth 1988, 187–196 for an overview of the problematics and main issues regarding the League of Corinth. Also, see Antela-Bernárdez 2011 with full bibliography. 44 Javier Verdejo-Manchado – Borja Antela-Bernárdez ered only independently. The purpose of this article is to analyse all the infor- mation we have on the campaign in order to place it within its most immediate context,7 offering a plausible and coherent explanation of the reasons leading it to be conducted, beyond the generality ἐπὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν λειστῶν mentioned in the inscription. Finally, bearing all of this information in mind, we shall strive to provide a satisfactory justification of this generality, which we do not view as coincidental. A brief glance at the Athenian prosopography serves to reveal that the three agents who appear in the inscription, Diotimos of Euonimon, the general in command of the campaign, and the orators who spearheaded it, Lycurgus of Boutadai and Aristonicus of Marathon, are all very prominent figures in Athe- nian society of the time, with clearly defined patriotic, anti-Macedonian political leanings.8 Yet there is also certain information on their lives that leads us to the conjecture of a close political cooperation among them. Diotimos of Euonimon9 had a brilliant political career, including posts as trierarch and general which he occupied several times throughout his life. His patriot and anti-Macedonian political positioning is easily deductible from Dem- osthenes’ mentions of Diotimos,10 whom we know to be an Athenian general in 338 BC.11 Diotimos also donated, along with Charidemus, a series of shields after the battle of Chaeronea,12 which must have earned them numerous honours 7 For an overview of 4th-century BC Athens, Ferguson 1911, 1–14; Mossé 1973; Habicht 1997; and the recent, although popular, Scott 2010. On the other hand, for the age of Alexander in Athens, Mitchel 1965; Schwenk 1985; Faraguna 1992; Landucci Gationi 1994 and 1995; Antela-Bernárdez 2005. 8 Faraguna 2011, 68–70 presents a very interesting reflexion that sums up the reality of Lykour- gan Athens as being under the control of a compact elite. 9 PA 4384 (Davies 1971, 163–165); PAA 365865. 10 Despite his support for Meidias against Demosthenes, our sources linked Diotimos with the Athenian political collective that opposed Macedonian hegemony, cf. Dem. 18.70.75. 11 IG II2 1628, 396–397; 1629, 915–916; 1631, 2–11. Likewise, Bosworth 1980, 94 f. 12 Dem. 18.114, 116; cf. Kroll 1977, 146, no. 169. On the reasons for this donation, Friend 2009, 81: “The donation of shields made by the strategoi Diotimos and Charidemus immediately after Chaeronea should be seen as an attempt to reequip those citizens who had lost their shields in the battle rather than an effort to furnish hoplite arms for the thetes who had never possessed them (Dem. 18.114, 116). The gifting of the shields was one of the emergency measures under- taken in the aftermath of Chaeronea, when the Athenians manned the city walls with every adult male capable of bearing arms in the expectation of a Macedonian assault on Athens.” Likewise, no. 74, “While Sekunda [Sekunda 1992, 345 f.] recognizes that these shields were issued in the crisis after Chaeronea, he does not take into account that a minority of the 5,000 Athenian hop- lites who were not killed at Chaeronea would have returned to Athens with their panoply intact: (1) The 2,000 citizens captured on the battlefield would have been despoiled of their arms (cf. Vaughn 1991, 46 f.). (2) Many of the remainders who fled to Athens would have thrown away  IG II2 1623, 276–285. Athens versus Pirates 45 and recognition of importance13 that may even be regarded as exceptional, as Low has suggested.14 Indeed, Pseudo-Plutarch’s “Life of Demosthenes” explic- itly mentions this bond of political alliance between Demosthenes and Diotimos, both prominent members of the group of Athenian politicians against Philip. In our sources, Diotimos is often associated with other prominent figures from this faction, such as Demosthenes and Lycurgus himself,15 as a quite active partici- pant. On the other hand, we know that Diopeithes of Sounion, who probably had family ties with Diotimos,16 had also most likely been an active Athenian soldier in the opposition against Philip of Macedonia. In fact, his responsibility in the struggle against Macedonia after the Peace of Philocrates (345 BC) is particularly important for our analysis, when he is mentioned in the story of a series of naval operations in Chersonesus and Thrace in 341 BC.17 Likewise, in his speech “On the Crown”, Demosthenes mentioned Diopeithes as a member of the group of politicians opposed to Macedonia.18 It is likely that Diotimos’ political position was determined by his economic activity. Diotimos possessed a vast fortune mainly based on the exploitation of the mines of Laureion. His father Diopeithes of Euonimon appeared back in their shields and other items in order to save themselves (cf. Archil. Fr. 5 West; Hdt. 5.95.1). The interpolated decree in Demosthenes, if genuine, explicitly says that Charidemus supplied the shieldless neaniskoi who had been disarmed (18.116; cf. Kroll 1977, 146 no. 16). Demosthenes’ equipping of citizens who lacked arms (καθώπλισε τοὺς πολίτας τῶν ἐλλειπόντων) may also refer to those Athenians who fought in the battle and who had lost their arms afterwards ([Plut]. Mor. 851A), though all that can be deduced from Demochares’ decree (since the events depicted are not in chronological order) is that Demosthenes made the gift at some point in 338/7–337/6.” On Charidemus, Landucci Gattioni 1994, esp. 44–50. 13 Dem. 18.114 and 116. 14 Low 2011, 81. Low assures that honorific decrees were very unusual for Athenian generals, a fact that also confirms that the honours Diotimos received, according to Plutarch (v. supra), because of the expedition we are analysing here, are actually very unusual. Nevertheless, Liddel 2016, no. 21 has stressed the existence of other exceptions similar to that of Diotimos’ honorific decree: SEG XXVIII 45 and the information we have on the honours to Conon, Chabrias and Timotheus (Dem. 20.69–70; Paus. 1.3.2–3; Nep. Timoth. 2.3; Chabr. 1.2–3), but these few examples seem to us very exceptional indeed. 15 Plut. Mor. 844 f, where Diotimos is mentioned with Hyperides, Nausicles, Polyeuctus and Demosthenes (v. infra, n. 38). 16 Brun 2005a, 146, who equates Diopeithes of Sunion with the Diopeithes I of Davies 1971, 163, father of Diotimos. 17 Dem. 8.26; 12.3–5; cf. Ormerod 1924, 118; Sealey 1993, 163, 167, 181; Ryder 2000, 77–79; Worth- ington 2014, 76 f. 18 Dem. 18.70 and 75. 46 Javier Verdejo-Manchado – Borja Antela-Bernárdez 367/366 BC as the owner of a plot of land and a workshop near the mines,19 both of which were used to process the material extracted.20 Diotimos, in turn, appears throughout his lifetime as the owner of two workshops, one in Laurion and the other in Anaphystos, as well as a plot of land, part of which he must have inher- ited from his father. Furthermore, he also appears as the recorder and lessor of the mining concessions.21 Based on the information we have, we can deduce that Dio- timos’ investment in the mining operation must have been considerable, since it encompassed all phases of the process: extraction, washing and processing, and this investment was only affordable if he held a large fortune.22 However, the Macedonian rule resulting from Chaeronea was a huge threat to Diotimos’ business and many other Athenian fortunes earned from mining operations,23 and therefore it was a threat to their social and political standing as well. Philip’s and Alexander’s campaigns gave rise to the sudden entry of pre- cious metals into Greece.24 This led not only to a decline of the value of silver but to this precious metal being largely transformed into coin. Philip, and to an even greater extent so Alexander, created a monetary system adapted to their own pro- jects and the new situation, so in trade relations within the Greek world, Mace- donian coinage quickly replaced Athenian coins, which until then had been the leader in all markets.25 These changes were quite harmful to Laurion’s prosperity. Furthermore, even though silver had been devalued because of the increase in the stock of precious metals,26 the production costs in Attica had not dropped, so the mine became less profitable. And since there was a surplus of silver in trade, the outflow of silver from Laurion was restricted. Despite the fact that mining activity in Laurion was much lower in the 4th century BC than it had been in the previous century, silver mining was still a major asset in the Athenian economy.27 Around the time of the inscription, mining in Laurion experienced a surge,28 precisely at a time when one of the promoters of 19 Crosby – Young 1941, 2, ll. 53, 54, 55 and 78. 20 Ardaillon 1897, 21–58; Hopper 1953, 200–210. 21 For a detailed exposition of the details about Diotimos’ links to the mining activities at Lau- rion, Lauffer 1957, 289–292; cf. Hopper 1953, 243. 22 Bissa 2008, 263–273. 23 Lauffer 1957, 291 f. (vid. contra, Strauss 1984, 418–427); Faraguna 1992, 238 and no. 111. 24 Milns 1996, 763 f. 25 Cf. Bellinger 1963, 2, 60. Likewise, for a review before Bellinger’s, vid. Ardaillon 1897, 159–161; Cary 1932, 139–142; Crosby 1950, 190. 26 Loomis 1998, 240–250. 27 Ardaillon 1897, 18; Crosby 1950, 190; Hooper 1953, 248–254. 28 E.g., Ardaillon 1897, 158.  IG II2 1623, 276–285. Athens versus Pirates 47 the campaign, Lycurgus of Boutadai, held the role of administrator of the Treas- ury of Athens.29 Indeed, the mining operation in Laurion must have played an important role in the economic recovery of Athens’ finances during Lycurgus’ era.30 There is no information that allows us to make a detailed reconstruction of all the measures adopted to reactivate the economy, but bearing in mind the pernicious effect of Macedonian policy on mining in Laurion, the measures must have at least partly consisted of restrictions on the entry of precious metals fostered by the new dom- inant power into Athens, as well as hurdles to hinder the implementation and dissemination of the new monetary system. Diotimos must have been one of the major beneficiaries of the administration’s new policy, and he, in turn, must have participated actively in the recovery through a loan to the public treasury, some- thing which was common among the holders of vast fortunes during that time, as mentioned by Lycurgus’ honorific decree in the year 307/306 BC (Plut. Mor. 852b). The third agent who appears in the inscription as the second promoter of the campaign, Aristonicus of Marathon, is perhaps the less known character for us. However, the information available is sufficient to ascertain his political profile.31 A collaborator of Lycurgus, he soon appears associated with other contemporary figures from the anti-Macedonian party, such as Demosthenes. We should prob- ably identify him as the Athenian of the same name mentioned by the 4th-cen- tury BC playwright Alexis (frs. 130–131 Kassel-Austin),32 who refers to the post of νομοθέτης he held, probably at a time of shortage in Athens.33 But what interests us the most in this study – for the moment – is that Alexis mentions his vast fortune, which even further cements his association with Lycurgus and the eco- nomic recovery, in the same way that it does with Diotimos. Therefore, based on this web of economic interests that were reciprocally beneficial for both Athens and their fortunes, it is easy to see a close partnership 29 Despite this character’s prime role in Athenian history, the bibliography is quite short. For some basic works, see Durrbach 1890, esp. 1–114; Conomis 1961, 72–152; Colin 1928, 189–200; Renehan 1970; Salamone 1976; Humphreys 1985; Merker 1986; Oikonomides 1986; Mossé 1989; Brun 2005b. 30 Ardaillon 1897, 158; Hopper 1953, 252; Faraguna 1992, 289–322 and 2003, 121; cf. Burke 2010, 396 for a reconsideration of his importance. 31 PA 2028; PAA 174070. 32 Lewis 1959, 241; Arnott 1996, 363–365. 33 On the grain supply problems in Athens during the Classical Age, cf. the classic work by Ger- net 1909, and also Mck Camp 1982; Garnsey 1988, 150–164 and 2004. Likewise, cf. Whitby 1998, 102–128; Braund 2007. On the grain shortage in Greece during Alexander’s campaigns, Milns 1996; Antela-Bernárdez forthcoming. 48 Javier Verdejo-Manchado – Borja Antela-Bernárdez between the three agents who appear in the inscription, beyond just their polit- ical affinity.34 In short, this relationship leads us to suspect the concurrence of all three in the promotion and development of the campaign in the way we shall outline below. In view of this information, it is already possible to reject the hypothesis that the mission against pirates led by Diotimos may have been motivated more specifically by a previous action within the framework of the bilateral treaties between Macedonia and Athens which regulated its adhesion to the League of Corinth. It is difficult to accept that a mission so closely associated with Macedo- nian politics, especially with the preparations for Alexander’s Asian campaign, could have been proposed by figures who were so openly anti-Macedonian like Lycurgus and Aristonicus, and left in the hands of someone like Diotimos, who shared the same political stance. Likewise, it seems difficult to accept that Lycur- gus would have promoted a tribute to Diotimos (Plut. Mor. 844a, IG II2 414a [= IG II3 339]) in relation to a mission that would benefit Macedonian politics, if indeed its aim was to cleanse the seas for Macedonian profit and to ensure the safety of the campaign against Asia being planned by Philip and carried out by Alexander. On the other hand, if the political and economic background of the agents participating in the campaign is revealing in terms of interpreting the inscription, so is the date when it happened: 335/334 BC (ἐπὶ Εὐαινέτου ἄρχοντος). Without a doubt, this was an extraordinarily significant time for Greece in general and Athens in particular. Indeed, it was a time of great social and political upheaval. Philip had recently been assassinated (336 BC) and Alexander’s foray in the territory on the Thracian border35 led to a spate of rumours of his death, which sparked the flame of rebellion among the Greeks. Athens’ satisfaction with Phil- ip’s death was no secret,36 and liberation from the Macedonia yoke seemed closer than ever. However, these hopes were soon dashed when Alexander razed Thebes in 335 BC, putting a sudden end to any questioning of his power.37 At that time, before the Athenians’ petition for peace, Alexander had demanded that they turn 34 Although Davies thinks Lycurgus could not have been sufficiently wealthy to perform lit- urgies, Plut. Mor. 842a–b suggests his wealth (the authors owe this observation to J. Roisman). 35 Antela-Bernárdez 2016a, esp. 113–117 for the case of Thrace-Ilyria, with bibliography. 36 Before the death of Philip, the Athenians voted for a decree accepting the possible extra- dition of anyone who would assassinate Philip and ask for refuge in Athens (Plut. Dem. 22.2; cf. Aeschin. 3.160). Nevertheless, as soon as Philip was assassinated by Pausanias, they voted on a crown for the killer, and sacrifices were made to celebrate the good news (Plut. Dem. 22.3; Aeschin. 3.77). On the inconsistency of Athenian behaviour, vid. Sealey 1993, 202. 37 Diod. 17.8–15; Plut. Alex. 11.6–12.2; Arr. An. 1.7–1.9; Just. 11.3.6. Likewise, Antela-Bernárdez 2012, esp. 82–90 and 2015.  IG II2 1623, 276–285. Athens versus Pirates 49 over a group of important figures in Athenian politics, including Lycurgus and Diotimos, whom he accused of being the instigators of the uprising.38 Considering that Thebes was destroyed in October 335,39 it is theoretically impossible to know whether Diotimos’ expedition took place before or after the uprising. Indeed, the archons of Athens took their posts in summer at the start of the month of Hekatombaion (July), so the expedition may have taken place in either 335 or 334 BC. However, given that two of the agents in the campaign were summoned by Alexander the Great after the destruction of Thebes, it is difficult to imagine that the Athenians not only did not turn those persons over but also approved the initiative of another of those involved, Lycurgus, to send a mission to cleanse the seas under the mandate of another person involved, namely Dio- timos.40 It is more logical to assume that the campaign happened prior to the destruction of Thebes and the end of the uprising. Furthermore, it is difficult to grasp the way this expedition would have been arranged if it had happened after the uprising in Thebes was put down. If this was promoted by this time, Diotimos’ mission would be the only proof confirming the existence of military actions outside the regulatory capacity of the League of Corinth,41 something which does not seem feasible. We know that back in 343/342 BC, Philip had showed his intention to join Athens in the military oper- ations against the pirates; this operation had a twofold purpose – as the Atheni- ans were keenly aware at the time – of both eliminating the threat of piracy and controlling Athens’ naval movements.42 It is obvious that the political situation 38 Arr. An.1.10; cf. Suda α 2704. Plut. Dem. 23.4, in a confusing list, mentions five names but not Diotimos, although it is possible that his presence on the list may have been erased by some other erroneous names, cf. Sealey 1993, 204. If we believe Plut. Mor. 852b (cf. Plut. Mor. 852c; IG II2 457 and 3227, fr. b, 16–17), there were also references to this fact in Lycurgus’ honorific decree, although only the name of the orator is mentioned. 39 E.g., Bury 2015, 848; Gabriel 2015, 87. Actually, it is commonly accepted that the destruction of Thebes is likely to have happened during autumn: for example, Whibley 1921, 109. Bellinger 1963, 97 goes further and adds a specific date for the siege of Thebes: 8 to 12 October, 335 BC (cf. Plut. Cam. 19.6, during the Mysteries in Athens). 40 It is not possible to argue that Lycurgus might have imposed his own opinion over the decision of the Athenian people. As has been amply shown (Ober 1989, 293–328; Harding 1995, 105–125; Burke 2010, 394), after the death of Pericles, the Athenian people dominated the city’s political decisions, especially on matters of foreign affairs. Therefore, the orator’s role was to talk and act following the lines which the people considered to be beneficial and profitable for their interests. 41 Indeed, apart from this inscription, scarce data exist about Athens running other naval oper- ations in the years following Chaeronea, cf. Durrbach 1890, 72. On other Athenian naval mis- sions, vid. [Dem.] 17.20 (dated to 332). 42 Dem. 7.14–15. In fact, the use of piratical practices by both Athens and Philip before Chaero- nea are known by Dem. 18.145; 19.145. 50 Javier Verdejo-Manchado – Borja Antela-Bernárdez at that time was very different to the time of the decree on Diotimos, and that Athens was still able to question and reject the proposals coming from Macedo- nia. However, after Chaeronea, any naval military action of this kind had to be led by the League of Corinth,43 as happened years later with Amphoterus’ campaign in the Aegean in 332 BC (Arr. An. 2.20.5 and Curt. 4.8.15).44 However, the arrange- ment of the expedition is perfectly understood in the context of the situation prior to 335 BC, before the destruction of Thebes and after Philip’s death, when the power of his son Alexander was being questioned; in short when there were the necessary conditions to start a campaign as an individual initiative, without the support or approval of Macedonia. Now that the identities of the agents participating in the campaign have been established, along with their possible personal relationships, their associa- tion with Athens’ economic recovery and the exact date of the campaign, we are poised to attempt to ascertain their motivation by providing specifics, if possible, on that indeterminate phrase “protection against pirates”. As is known, during the period when Lycurgus was at the helm of Athens’ finances, there was a considerable increase in the city’s revenues, which, accord- ing to the sources (Plut. Mor. 841b, 842 f and 852b) reached very high levels.45 One of the most important cornerstones in the restoration of Athens’ finances and the increase in its revenues, even more than the exploitation of the mines, was the restructuring and stimulation of maritime trade to and from Piraeus,46 making it the main trading hub in the Aegean. The measures adopted47 neces- sitated the indispensable prerequisite of the protection of the seas. To this end, according to modern estimates,48 Athens had around 60 vessels plying the seas49 43 As Durrbach 1890, 70 says, it is quite telling that the campaign led by Diotimos was the only Athenian naval operation with a military command registered during the years after Chaeronea. This fact is a main argument in the explanation we have been defending for dating it, and it elim- inates the possibility that the naval operation would have happened at a different time. 44 On Amphoterus’ mission, Arr. An. 2.20.5; Curt. 4.3.11; cf. Hauben 1972 and 1976; Bosworth 1975; Heckel 2006, 107 f., no. 231. 45 E.g., Mitchel 1965 and 1970. 46 E.g., Burke 1985 and 2010, 395–401; Bosworth 1988, 206 f.; Faraguna 1992, 119–124; 2003, 120 f. and 2011, 67 f.; Oliver 2011; Roisman – Worthington – Waterfield 2015, 203. 47 Burke 2010, 396–398, with discussion. 48 Burke 2010, 398, with bibliography. 49 The Athenian naval force was truly superior. If we accept the numbers given by Dem. 14.13, in 354 BC the fleet had 300 triremes, and in 330/329 BC it reached more than 400 (IG II2 1627, 266–269, 275–278). Nevertheless, the fleet could not operate as a wholly mobilised navy because of the unaffordable expense. Likewise, at that time, the rule of Philip of Macedon would have surely forbidden it. For a discussion of the Athenian naval force based on epigraphy, Ashton 1977; Gabrielsen 1994, 126–131; Burke 2010, 398 f.  IG II2 1623, 276–285. Athens versus Pirates 51 sailing in small squadrons as a constant defence against possible attackers, pro- tecting the trade and circulation of goods to and from Piraeus. The campaign we are studying seems to have been part of the same administrative programme and therefore had the same purpose, namely to protect the seas. However, the above mentioned tasks were ordinary monitoring and protection which required no specific decrees to be approved, much less the oversight of a general like Dioti- mos. Thus, it seems that there should have been some exceptional situation that required both the approval of the Assembly and the participation of Diotimos in the decreed campaign. Was this situation the protection against pirates (ἐπὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῶν λειστῶν) as the inscription says? Piracy in Greece is consubstantial with its history. There is information on its existence since the very early years, as well as on the attempts to combat it, with greater or lesser success.50 Indeed, far from being an occasional, specific problem, it extends over space and time and was more or less widespread. Its development involved a large number of people of varied provenances acting independently and with different settlements. Therefore, its total elimination could only have happened if the pirates’ bases were eradicated, which required not only a huge investment and a great deal of manpower but also the participa- tion of different cities exerting, on the points in their territory affected by piracy, the pressure required and preventing pirates from finding refuge there.51 In theory, the economic boom which Athens’ finances were experiencing could have financed an expedition of this kind, especially bearing in mind that piracy was only aggravated during times of war. However, the true effectiveness of a mission like the one led by Diotimos is questionable, and it would probably have been minimal since it was an individual initiative with such a small contin- gent: two ships, as we seem to be able to glean from the information provided by the inscription. Furthermore, we should bear in mind that in this year, 335 BC, after the news of the swift movements of Alexander the Great’s troops, the Athe- nians voted to retract their troops and put the walls in a state of defence.52 In this situation, the Athenian people would have been unable to approve an expedition of this kind, which would have tied up troops whom they could not spare. Therefore, it is quite likely that a much more specific, modest, although important, purpose was concealed under the generic name of “protection against pirates”, while if we accept Plutarch’s testimony as referring to the same cam- paign, it ended in less than one year. Furthermore, considering the fact that refer- 50 On the record of the actions against the pirates directed by the different Greek states from the 5th to 2nd centuries BC, vid. De Souza 1995, 189–192. 51 Cf. De Souza 1995, 189–191, with discussion. 52 Sealey 1993, 202. 52 Javier Verdejo-Manchado – Borja Antela-Bernárdez ence is made to the speed of the ships (ταχυναυτοῦσαι), it must have been a quick and very specific intervention at a specific location in the Mediterranean. The dates on the inscription lead us to consider the grain shortage which had been besieging Athens since Chaeronea53 and was aggravated during Alexander’s campaign precisely before the destruction of Thebes, in 335 BC,54 when the expe- dition was undertaken. Indeed, in Athens the supply, escort and protection of the grain transport was a prerogative of the State (Arist. Ath. 43.4; Dem. 18.301, IG II2 212, 13–15), and at times a military operation was decreed to ensure the supply (Dem. 50.6, cf. IG II2 1628, 37–42). In theory, all of this concurs with the campaign recorded in this inscription in the sense that it could have been aimed at combatting the attackers on a given maritime route. In fact, the unease concerning the grain supply that Lycurgus expressed after Chaeronea in his “Against Leocrates” is well known.55 And during his time as the νομοθέτης, Aristonicus also showed a great deal of concern over the availability and distribution of food in Athens, according to the comedian Alexis (see supra).56 However, it is clear that these observations cannot be viewed as arguments in favour but instead, if viewed as a whole, they are somewhat par- allel. In our opinion, the most important information is the presence of Diotimos as the general at the helm of the campaign. Indeed, among the numerous hon- orific decrees dedicated to merchants during this period, there is one particu- larly relevant to our case at hand, IG II2 408 (= IG II3 339): an inscription which should be dated to around 335 BC, according to Tracy.57 The text on the inscrip- tion contains the honours decreed to two grain suppliers, Memnon and Callias. But it also mentions Diotimos’ intervention as a general (1.9) in one specific supply run which brought wheat and barley from Sicily (l.12). And precisely here, on the route through the Tyrrhenian Sea, is where piracy must have increased substantially during that time, judging by the references in the lost speeches of Dinarchus, “The Tyrrhenian Speech” (Τυρρηνικός, 12, p. 91–92 Conomis) and Hyperides, “On Defence against the Tyrrhenians” (i.e., pirates) (περὶ τῆς φυλακῆς τῶν τυρρηνικῶν, 56 Jensen). This increase in piracy must have lain at the root of the need for a military intervention.58 53 Antela-Bernárdez 2016b and 2017. 54 See Dem. 34.38–9. For example, Hopper 1953, 250; Garnsey 1988, 154; Tracy 1995, 33 f. For the epigraphical evidence, cf. Moreno 2007, 169–208. 55 Antela-Bernárdez 2016b, 77–80. 56 Arnott 1996, 365 suggests that he probably occupied his post during a time of shortage, which Arnott links – without arguments – to the crisis in around 320 BC, but the truth is that there are other possible dates and contexts which can be related to this campaign. 57 Tracy 1995, 34. For a discussion, cf. Lambert 2007, 113 f. = 2012, 156. 58 Cf. Rhodes – Osborne 2003, 525; Gabrielsen 1994, 157–206 and 2007, 259–272.  IG II2 1623, 276–285. Athens versus Pirates 53 In view of this information, it is extremely likely that the two inscriptions, IG II2 1623, 276–85 and II2 408, refer to the same event, the campaign led by Dio- timos, whose specific purpose was therefore to protect the Sicilian grain supply from Tyrrhenian pirates. Indeed, the inscription we are studying has a clear par- allel form another inventory of ships from the ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν νεωρίων, dated to the years 326/325 BC (IG II2 1628, 37–42). This inventory references the use of the quadriremes mentioned in a military operation under the command of General Thrasybulus, whose purpose was to ensure the grain transport. The similarity between the two inscriptions is clear: [τετρήρεις τ]άσδε ἔδομεν / [κατὰ ψήφισ]μα δήμου, ὃ Πο/[λύευκτος Κ]υδαντίδης εἶπε, / [μετὰ στρατ]ηγοῦ Θρασυβού/[λου Ἐρχιέω]ς ἐπὶ τὴν / [παραπομπὴ]ν τ[οῦ] σίτου “We grant these quadriremes via the decree of the people proposed by Polyeuctos Cinan- tides under the command of General Thrasybulus Erchieus to escort grain.” The wording of both is similar; they only differ in the mention of the aim of the expedition. Therefore, while Diotimos’ campaign had, as pointed out, a specific objective, we should wonder why the inscription refers to such a generic mission, yet one that is also as important as “protection against pirates”. In our viewpoint, this lack of determinacy is no coincidence but instead clearly intentional. In fact, at his death, Diotimos left some naval debts (IG II2 1629, 539–541 and 622–629). This fact reveals that part of his fortune was clearly linked to the silver mines at Laurion, but other parts of his fortune came from trade or merchant investments, or other kinds of naval activities, as his positions in the fleet and naval experience seems to stress.59 As is known, one of the most frequent arguments that Athenian orators wielded against Macedonia was the exaltation of Athens’ glorious past as the standard of Hellenism.60 In this sense, we should recall that piracy and its erad- ication had indeed already been one of the most important purposes and justifi- cations of the ancient Attic-Delian League.61 Furthermore, as the legacy of those times, Athens still believed that the protection of the seas was its own prerogative (Dem. 58.53–56), as recognised by Philip himself (Dem. 7.14–15). During the 4th century BC, particularly owing to Athens’ precarious economic situation, signs of its inability to stem the problems occasionally caused by pirates had been already shown, such as the seizure of the island of Halonnesus in 343 BC (Dem. 7). However, the situation in 335 BC prior to the destruction of Thebes was, as seen, 59 IG II2 1629, 539–541, 622–629, cf. Lambert 2012, 158. 60 Allen 2000, 10 f.; Antela-Bernárdez 2016b. 61 Ormerod 1924, 108–110; Meiggs 1972, 153; Hornblower 2011, 246; cf. De Souza 1995, 189. 54 Javier Verdejo-Manchado – Borja Antela-Bernárdez totally different. In this situation, two patriotic politicians, namely Lycurgus and Aristonicus, goaded by the chance and taking advantage of the need to ensure the city’s grain supply, were able to promote a military campaign. This was the first one since Chaeronea, which, judging from how it is reported in epigraphy, must have been presented and glorified as the start of a struggle against the pirates. However, this goal was much more ambitious and far from reality, but one that contained a clear message of the restoration of Athens’ past naval power, in line with what was happening in other spheres of society, namely the economy and politics. In this sense, the fact that Diotimos of Euonimon led the expedition must not have been coincidental; instead, he must have been chosen with the utmost care. Diotimos, as mentioned above, was a close collaborator of the State, a renowned politician who already had experience with the navy as a trierarch, and was fur- thermore a renowned general who had commanded a part of the Athenian fleet at such a decisive juncture in Athens’ history in particular and Greece’s history in general as in 338 BC. Therefore, his reputation preceded him and made him the perfect candidate to command the mission. Acknowledgements: The authors would like to express their gratitude to L. Sancho and mostly to J. 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