Ecological Economics 191 (2022) 107247 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Ecological Economics journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon ANALYSIS On thin ice – The Arctic commodity extraction frontier and environmental conflicts Ksenija Hanaček a, *, Markus Kröger b, Arnim Scheidel a, Facundo Rojas c, Joan Martinez-Alier a a Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA), Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB), Spain b Faculty of Social Sciences, Global Development Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland c Grupo de Historia Ambiental-IANIGLA-CONICET, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Argentina A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T Keywords: This article contributes to the discussion on socio-environmental conflicts and extractive projects in the Arctic Commodity frontier region. Fifty-three socio-environmental conflicts are analysed, using data from the Global Atlas of Environmental Arctic Justice. Based on descriptive statistics, regression and network analysis, the paper reveals that socio- Coloniality environmental conflicts predominantly overlap with Indigenous peoples’ territories, from which a transversal Environmental conflict opposition takes place, including Indigenous, non-Indigenous and international actors alike. The main com­ EJAtlas modities involved in these conflicts are related to fossil fuels, metals, and transport infrastructure. Associated large-scale extractive activities are bringing negative socio-environmental impacts at the expense of Indigenous groups, fishermen, and pastoralists, with loss of traditional knowledge and practices being significantly higher in Indigenous territories of high bio-cultural values associated to the environment. Our findings suggest that repression against activists is significantly more likely to occur in absence of preventive mobilization, and in Arctic countries with low rule of law. The chances to achieve the cancellation of a conflictive extractive project are significantly higher if dependency on natural resource rents in a country is low. 1. Introduction lands began in the mid-sixteenth century (Coates, 1985). Old and new commodities (gold, oil, natural gas) were and still are extracted at The Arctic region is rapidly warming and experiencing vast sea ice substantial social and environmental costs (Shadian, 2018). Arctic and permafrost loss (Landrum and Holland, 2020). The region experi­ peoples, such as Indigenous groups, pastoralists and fishermen rely on enced its warmest summer on record in 2020, with the second-lowest sea the land and its natural resources (Stotts, 2017). Hence, such large-scale ice cover, almost reaching the lowest 2012 levels (NASA, 2020a, 2020b). extractive investments, together with contemporary climate change, The sea ice loss contributes to expanding extractive activities, facili­ pose threats to the communities’ livelihood, socio-environmental, and tating new shipping routes and, consequently, faster global trade cultural well-being (Alvarez et al., 2020). The threats manifest in the (Landrum and Holland, 2020; Saebi et al., 2020). As one of the inability of communities to access their land, their loss of territorial remaining land regions with extensive areas of mineral exploration and rights, adverse effect on their health, biodiversity loss, as well as the loss extraction potential, the Arctic is of particular interest to extractive in­ of culture and identity linked to changes in their surrounding icescapes dustries (Boyd et al., 2015). The World Economic Forum Global Agenda (Herrmann and Heinämäki, 2017; John, 2016; Kumpula et al., 2011). Council on the Arctic estimates that total mining, oil, natural gas, and While the term ‘resource frontiers’ relates to processes of land infrastructure investments will reach 1 trillion USD by 2030 (Roston, appropriation and exploitation of nature, commoditizing resource 2016). frontiers refers to the extensive biophysical and socio-environmental However, climate change and economic interests in the Arctic cannot transformation of ‘underused’ areas such as the Arctic today, for be separated from local struggles against historically unjust and extraction and trade purposes (Kröger and Nygren, 2020; Moore, 2000). disproportionate socio-environmental impacts in areas predominantly As the extraction of raw materials and energy in the Arctic increases, inhabited by Indigenous groups (Avango and Peder, 2003; Cameron, socio-environmental conflicts, as recorded in the Global Atlas of Envi­ 2012; Keil, 2014; Martinez-Alier, 2002). European colonization of Arctic ronmental Justice (EJAtlas), are also expected to increase (Haberl et al., * Corresponding author. E-mail address: ksenija.hanacek@uab.cat (K. Hanaček). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107247 Received 10 January 2021; Received in revised form 9 September 2021; Accepted 13 September 2021 Available online 13 October 2021 0921-8009/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). K. Hanaček et al. Ecological Economics 191 (2022) 107247 2019; Kumpula et al., 2011; Martinez-Alier, 2015; Muradian et al., Further, the article, focuses on the human geographies of resource 2012). Even if economic growth would not occur, the extraction of extraction, such as land degradation, threats to cultural traditions, the materials and energy and the disposal of waste, needed to sustain the environment, and the marginalization of local communities. current world economy, would expand, because energy dissipates and materials are only recycled to a small extent (Haas et al., 2015, Haas 2. Commodity frontiers and socio-environmental conflicts in the et al., 2020). The world economy is not circular; rather, it is entropic Arctic (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Martinez-Alier, 1987). New resource and extractive frontiers bring an unequal distribution In essence, frontiers can be merely resource frontiers (prior to any of socio-environmental well-being for local Indigenous and non- large scale trade), commodity frontiers for trade purposes (Moore, Indigenous peoples (Kröger, 2022; Peluso and Lund, 2011). However, 2000), or a combination of both (Kröger and Nygren, 2020). Commodity opposition and resistance at the extractive frontiers arise globally to frontiers are based on two interrelated processes. Namely, commodity protect land, traditional economies and customary ways of life (Scheidel widening, such as through the expansion and occupation of lands and Schaffartzik, 2019). This resistance against extractive industriali­ destined to extraction (e.g. in the Arctic region), and commodity deep­ zation results in socio-environmental conflicts (Martinez-Alier, 2002; ening, which involves intensification of existing commodity production Martinez-Alier et al., 2010). Such conflict is expressed as collective through socio-technical innovation (e.g. nickel mining, oil drilling, new mobilization against investment projects that cause socio-environmental infrastructure) (Banoub et al., 2020). Commodity frontiers have inher­ harm (Martinez-Alier et al., 2016; Temper et al., 2018). Depending on ently extractive and exploitative characteristics (Moore, 2000), which the location, the actors involved, and the socio-environmental assets at often involve environmental injustice, inequalities, and degradations at stake, conflict can take many different forms and directions, at different the expense of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples (Beckert stages and of differing duration (Silva-Macher and Farrell, 2014). et al., 2021; Martinez-Alier, 2002). Another important characteristic Socio-environmental conflicts, for instance, can arise over access to that frontiers have frequently in common is the resistance of people to and control of land (Ribot and Peluso, 2003) through land enclosure or injustice, inequality, and degradation (Conde, 2017; Temper et al., its appropriation by state authorities, multinational companies, or social 2015; Schneider, 2020). However, mobilization and resistance are not elites (Robbins, 2012). Conflicts often develop over environmental in­ present across all the cases of frontier expansions, but these depend on justices based on class, race, gender, and ethnicity discriminations the fostering of contentious agency by particular would-be resistance (Pulido, 2017; Sultana, 2020). The literature further indicates that socio- actors, typically local communities, there being a wide variety of local environmental conflict occurs not only as resource conflicts but as a responses to extractivist expansions (Kröger, 2020). social struggle to preserve the human-nature relationships that are In the specific case of the Arctic region, frontier occupation and threatened through extractive use and management of the environment, extractivism on commons and Indigenous lands are not new (Muller- by either state or private entrepreneurs (Coombes et al., 2012). Wille, 1987; Stuhl, 2016). The Arctic resource frontier came into exis­ Furthermore, conflict can manifest openly, with evident mobilization of tence in the sixteen century through the colonial geography of the West, individuals and groups, and can ultimately become a social movement mainly via the Nordic countries, other major countries in the West, and (Temper et al., 2015). However, conflict can also take more latent forms, Russia, all of which were subsequently motivated by large-scale and without visible protests (Beltrán, 2015). intensive industrial extraction for trade and profit (Avango et al., 2014). Through these different forms of mobilization, people confront new For instance, the Dutch and the British established whaling stations and extractive frontiers, and call for new and different interpretations of coal extraction processes on Svalbard in 1610; the Ivigtut cryolite de­ social justice (Schlosberg, 2013; Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010). posit extraction began in Greenland in 1854; the 1898 Klondike gold Socio-environmental resistance against resource extraction is thus an rush occurred between Skagway, Alaska and Yukon in Canada (Boyd essential component in understanding worldview alternatives to harm­ et al., 2015), among others. ful extractive trajectories (Brown et al., 2010; Cressey, 2011; Kröger, What is new to the current wave of frontier expansion, however, is 2020; Zabala, 2019). The many attempts to base resistance against the increased rapidity and volume of extraction occurring in the region extraction on the grounds of ethno-territorial rights is an example (Kröger, 2019). Climate change is facilitating access to some resources in (Kröger and Lalander, 2016). the Arctic (Landrum and Holland, 2020; Saebi et al., 2020), while Activities at extractive frontiers involve processes of occupation, bio- changing political and economic agendas are attempting to legitimize physical transformation and depletion of local socio-environmental as­ new pathways towards extraction, thereby creating destructive attitudes sets (Muradian et al., 2012). Large-scale extraction has reached Indig­ to the environment and to Arctic peoples (Bennett, 2016; Huntington, enous and non-Indigenous lands of the Arctic – awaking the resistance of 2016). Such agendas are generally applied without the full consultation local communities and others to these activities (Kröger, 2019; Kröger, and participation of the affected people, especially Indigenous groups 2016; Lassila, 2020; Lassila, 2018). People are calling for more active (Cameron, 2012). Thus, the present wave of Arctic extractivism con­ involvement in determining issues related to physical exploitation and tinues to maintain patterns of the colonial ‘past’ (Escobar, 2008; Körber climate change in the region (Dorough, 2014; Nuttall, 2013) that chal­ et al., 2017; Stuhl, 2016). However, for many Arctic people, the land is lenge extractive industries, the states, and others with economic in­ not a commodity which can just be acquired at will, but an important terests who jeopardize the environment and the traditional way of life of element for interrelated and interdependent environmental and socio- local communities (Dwyer and Istomin, 2009; Kröger, 2019; Naykan­ cultural well-being (Nuttall, 1998; The Arctic Council, 2015a). china, 2012). Thus, an analysis of socio-environmental conflict in the The effect of this resource depletion is a threat to the continuation of Arctic beyond specific countries and commodities is called for to gauge Indigenous traditions, identities, and human-nature relationships when the impact of economic extraction of natural resources on the traditional large-scale extraction occupies their lands (Naykanchina, 2012; ways of life and survival of affected Arctic communities (Alvarez et al., Coombes et al., 2012; Lassila, 2020). This extraction and exploitation 2020; Lassila, 2020; Muradian et al., 2012). has pushed local communities in the Arctic and their traditional system To do so, this article analyses fifty-three socio-environmental con­ of beliefs to the margin (Bennett, 2016). Yet, the benefits of extractive flicts across the entire Arctic as a single regional unit. Based on mixed economies are meant for a few local actors or distant foreigner investors methods of descriptive statistics, regression and network analysis, we (Moore, 2018), while the cost of extractive economies are imposed upon systematically investigate protests against ongoing and projected Indigenous people, pastoralists and fishermen (Cameron, 2012; Dwyer resource extraction in the Arctic. The main focus is on social struggles in and Istomin, 2009). the context of the global economy and resource extraction and the To maintain political and economic control of the Arctic (Muller- biophysical transformation of the region (Krausmann et al., 2008). Wille, 1987), two contradictory trends can be seen in the global resource 2 K. Hanaček et al. Ecological Economics 191 (2022) 107247 politics of the region (Naykanchina, 2012, p.20). Namely, a vast increase citizen support for expanding Arctic resource extraction (Morgunova, in extractive activities and infrastructure projects on traditional Indig­ 2020). Russia has a particularly strong state rhetoric, which tries to build enous lands undermine the recognition of Indigenous territorial rights legitimacy for hydrocarbon expansion in the Arctic as an emblem of and traditional land-use, such as reindeer herding, hunting and fishing Russian nationalism, tying these two in a problematic way, which ne­ (Herrmann et al., 2014; Herrmann and Heinämäki, 2017; Naykanchina, glects the climate emergency (Tynkkynen, 2018). This narrative, how­ 2012). Therefore, common lands and traditional ways of life in the ever, has been successful in gaining support in Russia for Arctic Arctic are being rapidly replaced by metal mining, fossil fuel extraction, extraction. In both Russia and Norway, there is extensive state support wind-power parks, transport infrastructure and hydropower projects for especially hydrocarbon but also mining expansion. The key Norwe­ (Naykanchina, 2012). Consequently, the high levels of industrialized gian corporations are Statoil and Yara, but foreign oil corporations could extraction and utilization of resources are causing often irreversible also follow to the Arctic if Norway decides to expand its offshore drilling. socio-environmental damage. This is giving rise to intense socio- In Finland and Sweden, there is a marked expansion of forestry environmental conflict in the region (Ahtuangaruak, 2018; Keil, 2014; extractivism, especially for constructing a mega pulp mill in Kemi, Nuttall, 2013; Nuttall, 1998). Finland, which would use fibrewood from very slow-growing Arctic forests to make pulp (Kröger, 2022). Sweden and Finland both have 3. Global trends and the Arctic received rising criticism of the trend to replace forests with tree plan­ tations, for the sake of wood energy and pulp production. In Fenno­ Geographically, the Arctic is a polar region of approximately 30 scandia, there are also a rising number of other land-use related conflicts million square kilometres, spanning three continents and eight states: around wind farm, infrastructure and tourism expansions – all sectors Alaska in the US, the Northern Territory of Canada, Arctic Russia, supported by a large array of political parties and state institutions. Greenland, Iceland, Northern Finland, Sweden, and Norway (The Arctic Fennoscandia has also a host of different kinds of mines and mining Council, 2015b). The Arctic includes any location in high latitudes expansion projects, ranging from established underground mines in where the average daily summer temperature does not rise above 10 Kiruna, Sweden, and Kemi, Finland, to produce iron ore and chromite by degrees Celsius (NSIDC, 2020). This includes the Subarctic area of the national companies, to open-pit mines by Canadian and other foreign southern tip of Greenland, the southern coast of Iceland, and the operators, for gold, rare earth and battery minerals (Kuokkanen, 2019). northern part of Kamchatka, Russia. These are also largely state supported, but there is difference in mining The Arctic region also contains security and military interests of policies, Sweden and Norway being less accessible to foreign capital nation-states, as well as political and economic interests (Heininen, than Finland (Kröger, 2016). 2014). For instance, integral parts of modern industrialized nation-states Greenland is the most visible example of the tensions between sov­ include Sápmi in Fennoscandia, the Yukon in the Northwest territories ereignty, indigeneity, and foreign and local pressures to extract re­ and Nunavut in Canada, and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous region of sources (Kuokkanen, 2019). The European Union, the United States and the Russian Federation. In short, almost all Indigenous homelands have Canada all have a stake in these politics, and a growing number of other been claimed and controlled by nation-states to the south of the Arctic. rising powers, particularly China, aim to enter as well (Dodds and Different state-corporate nexuses, located outside the circumpolar Nuttall, 2019). The Greenland mining hype, contentiously framed as a North, impose their own economic interests for which both land and way to secure independency by some, has recently experienced a resources are needed (Muller-Wille, 1987). In the process, Indigenous blowback due to rising resistance (see e.g. Duxbury, 2021). While there peoples of the Circumpolar North lose access to and control over their are many obstacles and risks to future expansion, our analysis indicates land and its traditional use. that the 2000–2020 period has shown a marked commodity extraction Within this context, development projects and planning in the Arctic expansion in the Arctic. This could have been much stronger without are being driven by ideas of advanced technological progress and eco­ sanctions to Russia, climate crises and concerns, and rising resistance. In nomic growth (Egerman et al., 2003). Some of its regions are integral Russia, especially in Siberia, permafrost and its melting has deterred parts of modern industrialized nation-states (although this is not the case extractive operations as there are massive and rising costs involved in for Greenland, an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of trying to rebuild sunk infrastructures (Kröger, 2022). Denmark) (Muller-Wille, 1987; Nuttall, 2012). These states cater to However, the Arctic region is not a terra nullius or an ‘empty polar particular economic sectors and corporations in different extractive region’ to be exploited and extracted at will (Gritsenko, 2018). On the sectors, easing their access to Arctic Indigenous and other territories. contrary, it is home to approximately four million people, 12% of whom The Canadian state is notorious for supporting via diplomacy, spying are Indigenous (except for Iceland) (The Arctic Council, 2015b). There is and other operations the global expansion of the mining industry a diversity of cultural, historical and economic backgrounds among (Bélanger, 2018; Keeling and Sandlos, 2015). The Canadian state- Arctic peoples, and there are many examples of Indigenous respect for mining nexus continues to provoke major socio-ecological injustices in the elements of nature that are deemed to be sacred (Herrmann and many parts of the world including the Arctic, as in the forceful expansion Heinämäki, 2017). The Arctic lands, waters, coasts and icescapes are to Fennoscandia and particularly Finland by Canadian gold and other places of Indigenous mobility and occupancy (Aporta et al., 2014). mining companies (Kröger, 2016). Arctic Indigenous peoples include, for example, the Sámi in northern In Alaska, the oil and gas extraction business has been marked by Finland, Sweden, Norway and Northwest Russia, the Nenets, Khanty, recent attempts of the Trump administration (2017–2021) to open up Evenk and Chukchi in Russia, the Aleut, Yupik and Inuit (Iñupiat) in drilling in conservation areas. Arctic policies may change with govern­ Alaska, the Inuit (Inuvialuit) in Canada and the Inuit (Kalaallit) in ment fluctuations following, however, a general trend to extractive Greenland. expansion. Besides Russia, the United States has been an important Each September, Arctic sea ice reaches its minimum (NASA, 2020a). player building major logistical and military infrastructures in the The average Arctic sea ice extent in September 1979 was equal to 7.05 Arctic. After the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, these infrastructures million square kilometres. A sharp decline was recorded by September are currently being rebuilt, to serve resource extraction and great power 2020 to 3.92 million square kilometres of ice extent. Accordingly, competitions (Dodds and Nuttall, 2019). These militaristic goals play a September Arctic sea ice has been declining at a rate of 13.1% per major role in the Russian contemporary attempts to claim sovereignty decade since the beginning of satellite records in 1979 (NASA, 2020a). over Arctic territories and resources. Other Arctic powers, especially the This rapid and disruptive ice change in the Arctic has led to high Nordic states, seem to be much less inclined to expand militarily and hopes among powerholders for investment, development, and economic forcefully to grab territories or resources (Kröger, 2019). growth (Kröger, 2019; Kröger, 2016). Melting ice means that the Arctic Currently, Russia and Norway are the states with the strongest Ocean is accessible to navigation and commodity shipping through the 3 K. Hanaček et al. Ecological Economics 191 (2022) 107247 Northern Sea Route, the Northwest Passage, and the future Trans Arctic 4.2. Data analysis shipping route via the North Pole. These new sea trade routes shorten travel time between the main ports of Asia, Northern America and For the analysis of the fifty-three socio-environmental conflicts, we Northern Europe. Furthermore, the ice melts allow a greater range for used descriptive statistics, network analysis and a regression analysis to icebreakers: ships that are indispensable to the development of polar understand both the patterns as well as some of the determinants of key trade routes, that cut both the ice and the distance between important conflict outcomes. ports in the region (Drewniak et al., 2018). Descriptive statistics of the datasets were used to explore the general What is occurring in the Arctic can be seen as a microcosm of the characteristics of conflicts located at the Arctic commodity frontier. world as a whole, mirroring the speed at which socio-environmental Analysed variables from the EJAtlas dataset include i) conflict locations; well-being and values – often incommensurate with monetary values – ii) conflict intensity, referring to the scale of mobilizations and level of are sacrificed to the altar of extraction and economic growth (Martinez- violence present in a given conflict; iii) conflict type according to eco­ Alier, 2002; Stammler, 2005). The following sections of this article nomic sectors causing a conflict, iv) the most frequent commodities systematically analyse resource and commodity frontier expansion in related to socio-environmental conflicts, v) the frequency of different the Arctic, the associated emergence of socio-environmental conflicts, types of groups protesting, and the network size, which refers to the number and resistance to the extractive frontiers in the region. of different organizations identified to be involved within the cases. The latter variable was identified through the codification of the qualitative 4. Methods conflict descriptions in Nvivo software. Network analysis (Fuhse and Gondal, 2015; Golbeck, 2013) was used 4.1. Data sources to identify the social actors who participated in the conflicts. The aim was to obtain the pattern of connections among the actors by using The cases of conflict analysed in this paper were gathered from the modularity or community detection algorithm (Newman, 2006). For this, Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (www.EJAtlas.org), an online we used variables of the type of groups protesting, the different orga­ open access database and interactive map that documents socio- nizations involved, and their country of origin identified in each of the environmental conflicts in a standardized manner (Temper et al., cases. Modularity measures both dense connections between actors 2015). The EJAtlas has become the most comprehensive database on within modules and sparse connections between actors in different environmental conflicts globally available (Scheidel et al., 2020). As modules throughout network (Ji et al., 2015). Next, we used betweenness Drozdz (2020) remarks, the collaborative maps from the EJAtlas provide centrality algorithm to detect which actors act as ‘bridges’ in the examples of how critical mapping can reframe the dominant top-down network. As a measure of influence, the centrality algorithm calculates cartographic narrative. the number of times an actor lies on the shortest path between other The EJAtlas project started in 2012 and reached 3500 environmental actors, by taking whole network into account, not only the local con­ conflict cases as of July 2021. Although a global inventory, the EJAtlas nectivity that an actor belongs to (Golbeck, 2013). does not cover with the same intensity countries and regions. Further to Finally, we used binomial regression analysis to model two levels of this, some cases of the EJAtlas might have more detailed information nominal outcomes (dependent variables) as a linear combination of the than others. As a database, the EJAtlas is mainly based on secondary predictor variables. We specifically analysed the following reported sources, such as newspapers, NGO reports, legal proceedings, and aca­ outcomes: i) repression, referring to acts of subduing protests by gov­ demic studies which are more abundant and available for some places ernment, security staff, militias, or corporate actors; ii) loss of traditional than others.1 This is especially the case for countries or regions where knowledge, practices, cultures; and iii) whether a conflictive project was free media in general and media coverage of environmental problems in cancelled or not in relation to the specific conflict. We selected predictor particular, is restricted. Three of the authors of this article are among the variables that according to the literature may have potential influence group of editors of the EJAtlas. They have revised the existing infor­ on these outcomes (see below explanation of each model). The predictor mation on the Arctic and added new cases in collaboration with other variables include actor characteristics of the conflict, i.e., whether the scholars and activists. cases involved Indigenous people or not; protest strategies, i.e., preventive Beckert et al. (2021, p.3) indicate that studying “how and why mobilizations, describing whether resistances started before project commodity frontiers have expanded, moved and adapted over time is a implementation or not; and the count of different mobilization forms key element for understanding global capitalism”, however, an impor­ employed, which is an indicator of the tactical diversity of resistances; tant challenge remains: “how to account for the enormous variety and and external variables to control for structural factors of the country and specificity of actors and places involved in this history”. The EJAtlas is a year in which the conflict is taking place, i.e., indicators for the rule of valuable global database for studying the places where commodity law, intentional homicides, and total natural resource rents (as % of GDP). frontiers are expanding, as well as the affected actors calling for socio- The index of the rule of law is a 0 to 1 ranked portrait of jurisdictions in environmental justice. For the purpose of this study, we include fifty- the eight Arctic countries based on eight factors: constraints on gov­ three socio-environmental conflicts, most of them above latitude 65◦ , ernment powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental and all of them north of 55◦ . Thus, some cases are located in the so-called rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, and ‘Subarctic area’ (see Appendix A for the list of analysed cases). To criminal justice (worldjusticeproject.org; Butt et al., 2019). The index of achieve this sample, conflict cases that were already registered in the the rule of law varies across the Arctic region. For instance, the rule of EJAtlas were selected and updated by the authors (n = 30). New cases law was 0.89 for Norway and 0.47 for the Russian Federation for the were added to the platform (n = 23) to increase the initial sample size. year 2020. Intentional homicides2, expressed as murders per 100,000 All newly identified cases were entered, moderated and published in the people, is an indicator of the structural patterns of violence and crime EJAtlas by the authors based on available secondary information. For prevalent in a country and year in which a conflict unfolds (Jeffords and four cases, the authors also performed field research - case 20 (both Thompson, 2016). Total natural resources rents (%GDP)3 are the sum of Kirkenes and the nickel plant in Petsamo), case 27 (Kiruna), case 30 (Inari), case 32 (Talvivaara) – which further informed the authors’ un­ derstanding of extraction dynamics in the Arctic commodity frontier. 2 World Bank via UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s International Homicide Statistics database: Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people) https://data. worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IHR.PSRC.P5 1 3 For more information on the EJAtlas database, see Scheidel et al. (2020); World Bank: Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) https://data.wor Temper et al. (2018, 2015). ldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS 4 K. Hanaček et al. Ecological Economics 191 (2022) 107247 oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and 5. Results forest rents, expressed as percentage of a country’s GDP. It is an indi­ cator of a country’s dependence on natural resource exploitation (Le 5.1. Extractivism and environmental conflicts Billon and Lujala, 2020). A priori the regression analysis, we conducted and assured assump­ Of the fifty-three socio-environmental conflict cases identified, eight tion checks. Namely, collinearity or variance inflation factor (VIF) of are situated in the United States (Alaska), six in Canada, two in independent variables for both binominal regression, where VIF < 2.5 Greenland, three in Iceland, five in Norway, another five in Sweden, and Tolerance >40. When VIF was higher than 2.5 between independent three in Finland and twenty-one in Russia. Moreover, the geography of variables, we conducted secondary models, so that highly corelated in­ these environmental conflicts overlaps with predominantly Indigenous dependent variables are not used in a model simultaneously (Kock and peoples’ territories (Fig. 1). Lynn, 2012; Wheeler, 2007). Further, we conducted secondary models In general, conflict intensity in Arctic countries is of medium in­ also because our data sample is small (n = 53) and the significance in­ tensity, characterized by visible mobilizations, such as street protests, dicators thus easily disperse in multiple regression; and by omitting marches and rallies. There were also some low intensity conflicts, corelated variables we reduce multicollinearity and dispersion (Midi without visible mobilizations. However, some high intensity conflicts, in et al., 2010; Mosteller and Tukey, 1977). Full models predicting which repressive reaction with violence has taken place (e.g., arrests and dependent variables can be found in Appendix B to D. violent targeting of individuals or groups protesting against the projects) The models included the following predictor variables: are found in some instances in Alaska, Iceland, Norway and Russia (Fig. 2). a) Repression (dependent variable) * preventive mobilizations to test Conflicts include cases around the Arctic with common, comparable whether the timing of mobilizations, identified by Scheidel et al. characteristics, and a variety of economic activities (Fig. 3). These (2020) as a successful resistance strategy to achieve positive conflict frequently include oil and gas exploration, extraction or refining, or outcomes, may influence occurrence of repression; * Count forms of transport infrastructure networks, such as pipelines across Canada, the mobilization, to test whether tactical diversity, identified as another US and Russia. Mineral ore exploration and the associated tailings from successful resistance strategy (ibid), influences the occurrence of mines are frequent in Canada, Russia, and in the European Arctic repression; * Rule of law, to test whether a higher rule of law, (Greenland, Sweden, Finland and Norway). Conflicts over land acqui­ including the better protection of human rights, may result in lower sition and water access rights were found, for instance, in Iceland and levels of repression (Butt et al., 2019); * Intentional homicides, to test Norway. Conflicts caused by climate change, such as vanishing glaciers whether occurrence of repression may be explained by the more and small islands, were common in Alaska, US. general patterns of violence occurring in a country in which conflicts The commodities that most frequently related to socio- are located (Jeffords and Thompson, 2016; Le Billon and Lujala, environmental conflicts were crude oil, electricity, and natural gas, as 2020); * Natural resources rents (%GDP), to test whether a country’s well as iron ore and copper (Fig. 4). Looking at each country, oil and gas higher dependency on natural resources increases pressure to extraction was observed for high latitudes in the US, Canada and Russia. implement a conflictive project by private and state actors, even at In the lower latitudes of the US and Canada, we found gold and copper higher social and environmental costs, including repression (Le mining conflicts. In Greenland, there were environmental conflicts Billon and Lujala, 2020). related to copper and uranium extraction, whereas in Iceland the con­ b) Loss of traditional knowledge/practices/culture (dependent variable) * flicts concern dams and water distribution for electricity production for Involvement of Indigenous people, where our hypothesis is that when aluminium smelting. In Sweden, Norway, and Finland mining-related Indigenous people are affected traditional knowledge/practices and conflicts included those relating to copper, iron, nickel, uranium, and, cultures could be lost more frequently compared to cases where again, hydropower for electricity. In Russia, besides oil and gas extrac­ Indigenous people are not present, because Indigenous people pre­ tion, there were socio-environmental conflicts related to coal, copper serve traditional knowledge/practices and cultures (Barnhardt and and nickel extraction. Angayuqaq, 2005; Naykanchina, 2012); * Count forms of mobilization where we test whether tactical protest diversity can contribute to 5.2. The network of social groups on the frontline against extractivism in avoid knowledge loss (Scheidel et al., 2020); * Preventive mobiliza­ the Arctic tion, with which we test whether the timing of mobilization can contribute to avoid knowledge loss (Scheidel et al., 2020); * Rule of The most frequent groups protesting against extractive projects in law, to explore whether effective laws that assure adequate project the Arctic region are local environmental justice organizations (EJOs), implementation, including the protection of human rights and mi­ Indigenous or traditional communities, neighbours, citizens, and inter­ norities, could support to avoid knowledge loss; * natural resources national EJOs, followed by local scientists and local government or rent (%GDP) to explore whether a high dependency on natural re­ political parties (Fig. 5). Within the general groups in Fig. 5, we iden­ sources means that state and private pressure to implement a project tified 31 different local EJOs, 34 Indigenous groups, 23 International is high, even at the cost of social impacts such as knowledge loss (cf EJOs, 3 local governments and 1 organization of scientists/professionals Le Billon and Lujala, 2020). involved in resistance against the projects. Frequent forms of protest c) Project Cancelled (dependent variable) * Count of mobilization forms, include media-based activism, development of networks and collective to test whether tactical diversity may influence higher rates of action, creation of alternative knowledge reports, and street protest/ project cancellation (Scheidel et al., 2020); * Preventive mobilization, marches (Fig. 6). to test whether the timing of mobilization influences project According to network analysis, resistance against extractive projects cancellation (Scheidel et al., 2020); * Rule of law, to test whether with in the Arctic region is transversal (Fig. 7). The modularity class algorithm higher levels of democracy, more legal and formal means are avail­ of the network analysis revealed transversal resistance within seven able to stop a project that does not meet human rights standards, cluster groups across the Arctic that intervened in joint protests. In each environmental regulations, and other legal concerns (Raftopoulos, of the clusters detected, Indigenous people were present. Based on the 2017); * Natural resources rent (%GDP), to explore if more dependent betweenness centrality algorithm of the network analysis, neighbours, a state is on resource incomes, the higher the pressure to push a citizens and local Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities are the project through, the more difficult to achieve project cancellation (cf social actors with most influence in protests at the network level. Le Billon and Lujala, 2020). Clusters are formed by the frequency of connections among the appearing social groups in all the fifty-three conflicts analysed. Cluster I 5 K. Hanaček et al. Ecological Economics 191 (2022) 107247 1. Kivalina climate change court case, Alaska 2. Oil Drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, Alaska 3. Climate Change Displacement of Native Alaskans 4. Pebble gold and copper mine in Bristol Bay, Alaska 5. Shell's drilling for oil in the Arctic, Alaska 6. Northstar oil field, Alaska 7. Red Dog mine toxic tailings to Kotzebue and Kivalina, Alaska 8. Iñupiat people resist offshore oil drilling and gas development plans in Point Hope, Alaska 9. Mackenzie Valley Pipeline 10. Yellowknife gold mine and arsenic pollution 11. Iron Ore mining in Baffin island, Nunavut territory 12. Hamlet of Clyde River v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., Nunavut 13. Peel Watershed Regional Land Use Planning Conflict 14. Diavik Diamond mine by Rio Tinto, kimeberlite waste, Northwest Territories 15. Greenland Mineral Ltd.'s Kuannersuit/Kvanefjeld Rare Earth-Uranium Project 16. Isua Iron Ore Mining Project 17. Kárahnjúkar dam 18. Hydroelectric Power Station, Laxá River, Skútustaðahreppur 19. Thjórsárver reservoir 20. Protest against heavy pollution from Russian nickel plant, Kirkenes 21. Oil drilling, Lofoten 22. Reppardfjord-Nussir copper mining case 23. The People versus Arctic Oil litigation 24. Alta River Hydro Power Plant 25. Large-scale Wind Farm in Sami reindeer land 26. Rönnbäcken Nickel Mine, Västerbotten 27. Relocation of Kiruna town due to iron ore mine 28. Vindelälven hydel project 29. Gállok-Kallak Iron Mine 30. Saami-Metsähallitus Forest Conflict, Inari 31. Hanhikivi Nuclear Power Plant, Pyhäjoki 32. Talvivaara nickel mining company 33. Gazprom's Obskaya – Bovanenkovo railroad Yamal Peninsula 34. Sabetta port 35. Closure/modernisation of Monchegorsk nickel and copper smelter, Kola peninsula 36. Coal mining in Arctic's natural reserve, Taymyr 37. Prirazlomnoye oil field 38. Oil Extraction at Numto Nature Preserve 39. Norilsk pollution (nickel) 40. Gas and oil extraction in Kamchatka 41. The right to fish in the Kamchatka region 42. Shiyes Landfill in Arkhangelsk region 43. Timber logging in the Dvinsky Forest 44. Floating nuclear power plant, Pevek 45. Oil spills in Komi Republic 46. Oil Spills in Khanty-Mansi Region 47. Yamal mega natural gas project 48. Bovanenkovo – Ukhta 2 undersea gas pipeline Baydaratskaya Bay 49. Potassium mining sinkholes in Berezniki 50. Arctic Oil Spill in Norilsk, Russia 51. Liquefied natural gas project -LNG 2, Gydan peninsula, Arctic Russia 52. Resistance against diamond mines, Sakha, Russia 53. Copper/gold mining, nuclear power in Nagleyngyn, Arctic Russia Fig. 1. Arctic commodity extraction frontiers, Indigenous territories, and environmental conflicts documented in the EJAtlas. Own elaboration with data from: Crump et al., 2017; Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat of the Arctic Council; Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (CAFF, 2013); and Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme of the Arctic Council. 6 K. Hanaček et al. Ecological Economics 191 (2022) 107247 Russia, and Canada alike; thereby building up a social movement (white). Cluster II (blue) comprises international as well as local EJOs in Iceland, Norway, Greenland, and Russia, including the Indigenous communities of those countries (except for Iceland) (19.64%). Cluster III (red) includes local EJOs and Indigenous groups in Norway, Russia and Canada, political parties, and farmers and fishermen in the countries (18.75%). Cluster IV (orange) is made up of local EJOs in Finland, groups that have experienced ethnic or racial discrimination, Indigenous people of Russia and Canada, recreational users, and women (8.04%). Cluster V (white) indicates social movements involving the International Indige­ nous Treaty Council and local EJOs in Norway and Russia (8.04%). Cluster VI (pink) involves local EJOs in Canada and Alaska and their Indigenous peoples (7.14%). Cluster VII (yellow) includes local EJOs in Finland and Alaska (US) as well as Alaskan Indigenous communities (4.46%). 5.3. Repression, socio-environmental consequences at stake, and project cancellation Fig. 2. Socio-environmental conflict intensity per country. The larger the cir­ cle, the more intense the socio-environmental conflict trajectory, in terms of Repression against protesters can involve diverse acts of subduing, levels of mobilization and violence (e.g. arrest or violent targeting of pro­ including violent targeting of activists, criminalization of dissent, or testers). High intensity conflicts are found in Alaska (US), Iceland, Norway and increased police and military presence. In total, ten of the fifty-three Russia. N = 53. cases reported some form of repression. According to the regression analysis (Table 1), there is a negative and significant relation of (green) represents neighbours, citizens, and local Indigenous and non- repression and preventive mobilizations, indicating that repression is Indigenous communities as central actors, both at local cluster level less likely to occur if mobilizations start when an extractive project is not and network level. This cluster encompasses 33.93% of all social groups. yet implemented. Further, there is a positive and significant correlation The central actors closely relate to local environmental justice organi­ for diversity of mobilization forms and repression; suggesting that when zations (EJOs) in Sweden and Russia, and Indigenous groups in Sweden, more diverse forms of mobilizations are employed by protesters, conflict Fig. 3. Socio-environmental conflicts in the Arctic according to specific economic sectors and activities. Variables are not mutually exclusive. N = 53. 7 K. Hanaček et al. Ecological Economics 191 (2022) 107247 Fig. 4. The most frequent commodities related to socio-environmental conflicts. Variables are not mutually exclusive. N = 53. Fig. 5. Frequency of type of groups protesting across the 53 analysed conflict cases (blue); number of different groups/organizations identified within the analysed cases (orange). Note: Frequency of types of groups protesting are not mutually exclusive; EJOs refers to Environmental Justice Organisations. N = 53. cases more frequently involve incidences of repression. Moreover, we GDP) in a country at the time of conflict start, and a negative correlation identified a positive correlation of repression with the level of inten­ between repression and rule of law. Although the models show a high tional homicides and the dependency on natural resources rents (% statistical significance, individual model coefficients for the trends 8 K. Hanaček et al. Ecological Economics 191 (2022) 107247 Fig. 6. Forms of mobilization. Frequency of cases (grey) and percentage of all cases (blue). Variables are not mutually exclusive. N = 53. Indigenous people are involved in the resistance (positive correlation). Even though loss of traditional knowledge, practices, and culture ap­ pears in the model to be more likely the case when rule of law is high (positive relation) and dependence on total natural resources rents (% of GDP) is low (negative correlation), the statistical significance for both coefficients was not confirmed. Similarly, there is an indication that loss of traditional knowledge, practices, and culture decreases (negative correlation) with diverse mobilization strategies but without confirmed statistical significance. The variation in the loss of traditional knowledge according to two factors, preventive and Indigenous resistance, can be explained with 61%. The models predicting project cancellation show statistical signifi­ cance; and while there is a positive and significant correlation for project cancellation and preventive resistance, there is a negative significant correlation between project cancellation and dependency on natural resource rents (%GDP). Furthermore, the results show positive correla­ tion between rule of law and project cancellation, where statistical significance was close but not confirmed in this case. 6. Discussion 6.1. Colonial resource and commodity frontiers of the circumpolar North Fig. 7. Transversal resistance with the involvement of different social groups The Arctic is typically assumed to be situated geographically in the against extractive projects in the Arctic. The more central the cluster and the “Global North”. However, our results on the Arctic commodity frontiers bigger its circles, the higher its influence in protests at the network level. In this suggest that crisp Global South-North divides are hard to support case, the central cluster is formed of neighbours, citizens and local Indigenous analytically. The increased resource extraction in the Arctic region and non-Indigenous communities (Cluster I (green)). Indigenous communities suggests rather the claim that commodity frontiers move globally, intervened in each of the seven clusters. N = 53. leading to the peripheralization and damaging of regions around the world. There are many pockets now in the Arctic and other parts of the between repression and intentional homicides, natural resources rents assumed “Global North” that increasingly fulfil the role of supplier of (% GDP), and rule of law was not confirmed. raw materials at cheap prices but with a heavy socio-environmental cost. Both models predicting loss of traditional knowledge, practices and These processes sustain hegemonic or partially colonial relations be­ culture are highly significant. According to the regression analysis, the tween core economic states (e.g. US, Russia, Canada, Finland, Norway, probability of socio-cultural loss due to extractive activities, such as Sweden) and the Circumpolar North ‘periphery’– home to local com­ traditional knowledge, practices, and culture, is significantly higher if munities and Indigenous groups (Cameron, 2012; Muller-Wille, 1987). the mobilization stage is not preventive (negative correlation) and when In fact, this has been the case already for long, as the Arctic 9 K. Hanaček et al. Ecological Economics 191 (2022) 107247 Table 1 Binominal regression model coefficients. R2 Overall p Estimate SE z p Repression Rule of law 0.382 0.003** − 2.521 2.018 − 1.250 0.211 Preventive mobilisation1 − 2.837 1.395 − 2.034 0.042* Forms of mobilization 0.367 0.139 2.643 0.008** Total natural resources rents (% GDP) 0.376 0.003** 0.0874 0.0744 1.17 0.240 Preventive mobilisation1 − 2.8464 1.3829 − 2.06 0.040* Forms of mobilization 0.3420 0.1364 2.51 0.012* Intentional homicides 0.371 0.002** 0.0398 0.0467 0.852 0.394 Preventive mobilisation1 − 3.2957 1.3840 − 2.381 0.017* Forms of mobilization 0.3615 0.1383 2.614 0.009** Loss of traditional knowledge, practices, cultures Rule of law 0.591 < 0.001*** 1.316 1.838 0.716 0.474 Preventive mobilisation1 − 3.703 1.138 − 3.255 0.001** Forms of mobilization − 0.262 0.162 − 1.622 0.105 Indigenous involved1 3.035 1.076 2.822 0.005** Total natural resources rents (% GDP) 0.594 < 0.001*** − 0.0640 0.0764 − 0.838 0.402 Preventive mobilisation1 − 3.7372 1.1497 − 3.250 0.001** Forms of mobilization − 0.2515 0.1630 − 1.542 0.123 Indigenous involved1 3.0482 1.0893 2.798 0.005** Project cancelled Rule of law 0.113 0.058* 3.40 2.01 1.69 0.090 Preventive mobilization 0.200 0.027* 1.8336 0.915 2.004 0.045* Forms of mobilization 0.0445 0.103 0.434 0.664 Total natural resources rents (% GDP) 0.179 0.016* − 0.209 0.109 − 1.91 0.056* Notes: For variable Preventive mobilization the contrasts are: Preventive mobilization1 = 1–0; for variable Indigenous involved the contrasts are: Indigenous involved1 = 1–0. Each table row indicates one model. For regression analyses including all variables in the same model, see Annex. Indigenous populations whose sovereignty and territories have been Social Responsibility or to achieve so-called SLO while increasing their violated have witnessed. The Arctic has been a colonized territory and business. In contrast, we put socio-environmental injustices ocurring in remains partly colonized through the expansion of new commodity the region into a more systematic and historical perspective, which frontiers. It supplies land for new transport infrastructure (ports and shows that the Arctic has been, and is becoming more and more, a pipelines), fossil fuels and metals (iron ores, nickel, copper, and gold) commodity extraction frontier, a commodity transport frontier, and, to across all territories. Thus, beyond the South-North distinction, this some extent, a waste disposal frontier. The ecological distribution con­ article shows how historical trajectories of resource extraction, and the flicts arising at these frontiers contest the associated negative socio- current expansion of commodity frontiers manifest themselves in pe­ environmental impacts, and in the case of the Arctic, have contributed ripheral regions beyond North-South divides. Environmental conflicts to the cancellation of damaging projects in about 20% of cases. Thus, arise in both the Global South and the “South in the North”. effective resistance at the frontlines of extractivism can lead to a social One can regard the Arctic as a semi-colonial resource and commodity transition towards the reaffirmation of Indigenous sovereignty (Temper frontier (Egerman et al., 2003; Körber et al., 2017), where the areas with et al., 2020) and towards a more sustainable and just economy (Scheidel ethno-territorial rights present pockets of autonomy, while the many et al., 2018; Temper et al., 2018). cases of expanding extractivisms are colonial-type violations of local people’s rights. Accordingly, the geography and the changing climate in 6.2. Transversal resistances across the Arctic the Arctic present important considerations in this resource frontier (like permafrost melting and new sea routes) in the longue durée of the region, Resistances against the expansion of commodity extraction, trans­ moving to a greater extractivist push amid increasing uncertainties and port and waste disposal frontiers was found through, across, and beyond risks (Kröger, 2022). This process is already evidenced by the number of the Arctic region. This transversal opposition is important for consid­ extractive commodity projects and significant socio-environmental ering how the Arctic is transformed both physically and socially consequences suffered by local communities who complain accord­ (Anguelovski and Martínez Alier, 2014; Martinez-Alier et al., 2016). ingly about their impact. While there are, of course, important structural differences across the Furthermore, increasing carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil Arctic countries, including different degrees of democracy, structural fuels contributes to rising greenhouse gases that are melting the sea ice. patterns of violence, or dependency on natural resource rents, there are This also allows for greater resource extraction, consequently leading to also important similarities across the Arctic commodity frontier. That is, further sea ice melting, with strong negative impacts on local, global and the commodities extracted in the different territories of the Arctic are Arctic environments (Kröger, 2016). In this sense, oil and gas, mining rather similar, and the aggrieved populations (often Indigenous peoples and the shipping industries are the biggest drivers and possible benefi­ and pastoralists) present comparable claims through common reper­ ciaries of the Arctic ice melt. To see the Arctic as a resource extraction toires of collective action. frontier is not new. The term ‘extractivism’ from Latin American polit­ In this context, the question can be asked: Is there an environmental ical ecology (Svampa, 2019) has already been used in studies of Arctic justice movement across the Arctic, i.e., within the eight countries (with environmental conflicts. their provinces) in which the selected fifty-three conflicts have taken or A special issue on the Arctic in the journal Extractive Industries and are taking place? As we have seen, network analysis shows some Society (Wilson and Stammler, 2016) focused on whether costs and transversal connections that resist socio-environmental harms. The benefits are shared in such a way that current extractive projects obtain clusters in the network do not coalesce around single countries (Canada, a so-called social license to operate (SLO), meaning approval or acqui­ Russia, etc.), while Indigenous groups appear in all clusters, connected escence to the investments. However, this article does not aim to give to other social actors, such as EJOs (national or international), to advice to private or public companies on how to exercise Corporate neighbours and citizens, to professionals or scientists, and to other 10 K. Hanaček et al. Ecological Economics 191 (2022) 107247 Indigenous groups. The qualitative network analysis sustains the fact structural factors of the countries in which environmental conflicts that protests are in essence “related” by a joint effort of connected actors occur. As our results have shown, the higher a country’s dependence on and groups that mobilize against coloniality (Gritsenko, 2018; John, natural resource rents, the lower may be the chances for activists to 2016) and calling for socially and environmentally more just pathways successfully stop socially conflictive and environmentally damaging (Temper et al., 2018). projects, arguably, because the state’s pressure to implement conflictive resource use projects is higher (cf. Le Billon and Lujala, 2020). This 6.3. Impacts and outcomes of socio-environmental conflicts in the Arctic shows how colonial and current commodity frontiers shape not only the specific places where commodities are extracted and processed, but also Social mobilizations in the Arctic against coloniality and for envi­ the political economy of the countries in which conflicts and mobiliza­ ronmental justice may come, however, with a substantial burden for tions occur. activists and affected groups. Instances of repression, which appear to be more likely among conflicts marked by numerous and diverse forms of 7. Conclusion mobilizations, reflect not only the suppression of protest actions but also undermine different understandings of sustainability and worldviews This article investigated fifty-three socio-environmental conflicts in (Del Bene et al., 2018). If open demonstrations are restrained, the region the Arctic region. The Arctic has been used to expand commodity is more likely to suffer both social and environmental degradation and a extraction frontiers, especially for metals and fossil fuels. Despite of continuation of extractive projects. As Gobby et al. (2021) put it, crim­ being located in the Global North, the Arctic frontier shares similar inalization of activists can derail environmental defence struggles. Further­ political ecologies with resource and commodity extraction frontiers in more, extractive projects tend to affect disproportionately environments the so-called Global South. This suggests that clear-cut distinctions for populated by Indigenous and other marginalised populations (Scheidel North and South do not always apply, but both peripheral regions in the et al., 2020). This global trend is also reflected in the Arctic, where South and the North are being targeted by extractive capital. Indigenous people are involved in 64% of the analysed conflict, and However, people confront coloniality, weak governments, and where loss of traditional knowledge caused by conflictive projects is repression, because of the harm that extractive tendencies perpetrate on significantly more likely to occur when Indigenous people are affected. the environment and on socio-cultural well-being. Correspondingly, However, it is important to recognize that Indigenous peoples, while there is a growing number of environmental conflicts across all the being severely affected, are also key actors contesting the colonial and Arctic countries and provinces. While state-corporate hybrids tend to current expansion of the Arctic commodity frontier. In line with Lassila, impose settler colonial relations through extractive projects, interwoven 2020, the long history of colonial extraction is opposed by claims of in different forms of repression, these projects operate on thin ice, as traditional cultural significance of the environment in different places their socio-environmental impacts are far reaching, and resistances that precisely promote decolonization. Here, we see again how tradi­ against these projects are mounting. We observe a strong social response tional cultures oppose the continuous domination of modern, colonial, by interconnected local protagonists, often Indigenous communities, extractive tendencies. Orta-Martínez and Finer, 2010, similarly found from which a transversal movement for socio-environmental justice that conflicts in the Peruvian Amazon against oil extraction were mainly takes place. Their bottom-up, preventive, peaceful struggle tends to expressed in a language of Indigenous identity and territorial rights, and defend and preserve environmental and socio-cultural well-being, call­ also in the language of risks to health. ing for environmental sustainability, equity, and justice. In this regard, Arctic peoples have continually, traditionally and sustainably protected the environment, with a responsibility to maintain Declaration of Competing Interest and enhance the environment for future generations (Ahtuangaruak, 2018). A strong attachment to community land, fertile pasture, or None. sources of medicine is central to the communities’ customs and cultural beliefs (John, 2016). Arctic peoples, therefore, rely on the environment Acknowledgments not only for their physical, but also for their cultural and spiritual needs, thereby protecting and maintaining environmental and cultural re­ We are grateful to anonymous referees for their invaluable comments lationships (Krumpen et al., 2019; Kumpula et al., 2011). and suggestions provided. We thank all those who contributed cases to In this context, preventive mobilizations that anticipate potential the EJAtlas, moderated them or offered information on environmental adverse socio-environmental impacts in order to protect and maintain conflicts in the Arctic region. We are thankful to Brototi Roy, Naw Thiri the environment for future generations play an important role to achieve May Aye, Dalena Tran, Eleonora Fanari, Daniela Del Bene, Aida Lopez, positive outcomes. According to our analysis, preventive mobilizations Mariana Walter, Bowen Gu, Yannick Deniau and Teresa Sanz for their can play a key role for achieving the cancellation of conflictive projects, comments and suggestions provided during the writing process. Our the avoidance of repression of activists, as well as the prevention of research benefited from financial support from the European Research negative project impacts, such as loss of traditional knowledge, prac­ Council (ERC) Advanced Grant ENVJUSTICE (grant number 695446); tices, and cultures in the Arctic. However, successful preventive mobi­ the Academy of Finland (grant number 316725); and the Catalan lizations do not occur in a social vacuum but are shaped further by AGAUR Beatriu de Pinós grant (2017 BP 00023). Appendix A. List of socio-environmental conflict cases analysed in this article No. Case Country Latitude Longitude Type of conflict 1 Kivalina climate change court case, Alaska USA 67.63 − 164.52 Fossil Fuels / Climate Change 2 Oil Drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, Alaska USA 69.80 − 148.19 Biodiversity Conservation 3 Climate Change Displacement of Native Alaskans USA 66.228 − 166.121 Fossil Fuels / Climate Change 4 Pebble gold and copper mine in Bristol Bay, Alaska USA 59.90 − 155.28 Mineral Ores 5 Shell’s drilling for oil in the Arctic, Alaska USA − 156.858 Fossil Fuels /Climate Change 71.348 6 Northstar oil field, Alaska USA 70.44 − 148.79 Fossil Fuels/Climate Change (continued on next page) 11 K. Hanaček et al. Ecological Economics 191 (2022) 107247 (continued ) No. Case Country Latitude Longitude Type of conflict 7 Red Dog mine toxic tailings to Kotzebue and Kivalina, Alaska USA 68.052 − 162.141 Mineral Ores 8 Iñupiat people resist offshore oil drilling and gas development plans in Point Hope, Alaska USA 68.34 − 166.82 Fossil Fuels /Climate Change 9 Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Canada 69.34 − 133.94 Fossil Fuels / Climate Change 10 Yellowknife gold mine and arsenic pollution Canada 62.45 − 114.37 Mineral Ores 11 Iron Ore mining in Baffin island, Nunavut territory Canada 67.19 − 69.12 Mineral Ores 12 Hamlet of Clyde River v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., Nunavut Canada 70.47 − 68.59 Fossil Fuels /Climate Change 13 Peel Watershed Regional Land Use Planning Conflict Canada 63.66 − 136.54 Infrastructure and Built Environment 14 Diavik Diamond mine by Rio Tinto, kimeberlite waste, Northwest Territories Canada 64.49 − 110.28 Mineral Ores 15 Greenland Mineral Ltd.’s Kuannersuit/Kvanefjeld Rare Earth-Uranium Project Greenland 60.98 − 45.99 Mineral Ores 16 Isua Iron Ore Mining Project Greenland 65.50 − 50.33 Mineral Ores 17 Kárahnjúkar dam Iceland 64.91 − 15.85 Industrial Utilities 18 Hydroelectric Power Station, Laxá River, Skútustaðahreppur Iceland 65.308 − 17.166 Water Management 19 Thjórsárver reservoir Iceland 64.567 − 19.248 Industry and Utilities 20 Protest against heavy pollution from Russian nickel plant, Kirkenes Norway 69.72 30.05 Industry and Utilities 21 Oil drilling, Lofoten Norway 68.47 13.86 Fossil Fuels / Climate Change 22 Reppardfjord-Nussir copper mining case Norway 70.46 24.26 Mineral Ores 23 The People versus Arctic Oil litigation Norway 74.97 37.04 Fossil Fuels /Climate Change 24 Alta River Hydro Power Plant Norway 69.92 23.30 Water Management 25 Large-scale Wind Farm in Sami reindeer land Sweden 65.44 15.38 Energy/Climate Change 26 Rönnbäcken Nickel Mine, Västerbotten Sweden 65.53 15.41 Mineral Ores 27 Relocation of Kiruna town due to iron ore mine Sweden 67.85 20.19 Mineral Ores 28 Vindelälven hydel project Sweden 65.93 16.30 Water Management 29 Gállok-Kallak Iron Mine Sweden 66.70 19.12 Mineral Ores 30 Saami-Metsähallitus Forest Conflict, Inari Finland 69.26 27.91 Biomass and Land 31 Hanhikivi Nuclear Power Plant, Pyhäjoki Finland 64.46 24.26 Nuclear 32 Talvivaara nickel mining company Finland 63.97 28.06 Mineral Ores 33 Gazprom’s Obskaya – Bovanenkovo railroad Yamal Peninsula Russia 70.31 68.39 Infrastructure and Built Environment 34 Sabetta port Russia 71.25 72.11 Infrastructure and Built Environment 35 Closure/modernisation of Monchegorsk nickel and copper smelter, Kola peninsula Russia 67.95 32.87 Industry and Utilities 36 Coal mining in Arctic’s natural reserve, Taymyr Russia 73.50 80.50 Fossil Fuels /Climate Change 37 Prirazlomnoye oil field Russia 69.25 57.34 Fossil Fuels / Climate Change 38 Oil Extraction at Numto Nature Preserve Russia 63.52 61.31 Fossil Fuels/Climate Change 39 Norilsk pollution (nickel) Russia 69.34 88.20 Mineral Ores 40 Gas and oil extraction in Kamchatka Russia 55.71 155.76 Fossil Fuels / Climate Change 41 The right to fish in the Kamchatka region Russia 57.20 156.88 Biomass and Land 42 Shiyes Landfill in Arkhangelsk region Russia 61.90 48.91 Waste Management 43 Timber logging in the Dvinsky Forest Russia 63.28 43.08 Biomass and Land 44 Floating nuclear power plant, Pevek Russia 69.70 170.25 Nuclear 45 Oil spills in Komi Republic Russia 66.02 57.51 Fossil Fuels /Climate Change 46 Oil Spills in Khanty-Mansi Region Russia 61.48 68.89 Fossil Fuels /Climate Change 47 Yamal mega natural gas project Russia 70.56 67.53 Fossil Fuels /Climate Change 48 Bovanenkovo – Ukhta 2 undersea gas pipeline Baydaratskaya Bay Russia 68.65 68.25 Infrastructure and Built Environment 49 Potassium mining sinkholes in Berezniki Russia 59.40 56.74 Mineral Ores 50 Arctic Oil Spill in Norilsk, Russia Russia 69.14 89.37 Infrastructure and Built Environment 51 Liquefied natural gas project -LNG 2, Gydan peninsula, Arctic Russia Russia 71.78 76.72 Fossil Fuels /Climate Change 52 Resistance against diamond mines, Sakha, Russia Russia 65.02 117.09 Mineral Ores 53 Copper/gold mining, nuclear power in Nagleyngyn, Arctic Russia Russia 69.15 168.68 Mineral Ores Appendix B. Full model predicting Repression Names Effect Estimate SE t p Rule of law Rule of law − 0.1615 0.5173 − 0.312 0.756 Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) 0.0104 0.0201 0.519 0.606 Preventive mobilization1 1–0 − 0.3200 0.1307 − 2.448 0.018* Count forms of mobilization Count forms of mobilization 0.0478 0.0166 2.879 0.006** Appendix C. Full model predicting Loss of traditional knowledge, practices, cultures Names Effect Estimate SE t p Rule of law Rule of law 0.15556 0.5187 0.300 0.766 Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) Total natural resources rents (% of GDP) − 0.00809 0.0202 − 0.400 0.691 Count forms of mobilization Count forms of mobilization − 0.02677 0.0166 − 1.611 0.114 Preventive mobilization1 1–0 − 0.58872 0.1343 − 4.384 < 0.001*** Indigenous presence1 1–0 0.42407 0.1183 3.586 < 0.001*** 12 K. Hanaček et al. Ecological Economics 191 (2022) 107247 Appendix D. 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