Social Choice and Welfare https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01380-5 CORRECTION Correction to: The doctrinal paradox: comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework Aureli Alabert1 · Mercè Farré1 © The Author(s) 2021 Correction to: Social Choice and Welfare https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01372-5 The production team incorrectly processed the author names in the reference list by mistake in the original publication of the article. The corrected reference list is given below: References Ahn DS, Oliveros S (2014) The Condorcet jur(ies) theorem. J Econ Theory 150:841–851 Boland PJ (1989) Majority systems and the Condorcet Jury Theorem. J R Stat Soc Ser D (Stat) 38(3):181–189 Bonnefon J-F (2010) Behavioral evidence for framing effects in the resolution of the doctrinal paradox. Soc Choice Welf 34(4):631–641 Bovens L, Rabinowicz W (2004) Voting procedures for complex collective decisions: an epistemic perspective. 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Theor Decis 45(1):19–36 Terzopoulou Z, Endriss U (2019) Optimal truth-tracking rules for the aggregation of incomplete judgments. In: Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT-2019) Terzopoulou Z, Endriss U (2019) Strategyproof judgment aggregation under partial information. Soc Choice Welf 53(3):415–442 The original article has been corrected. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. 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