The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx Contents lists available at ScienceDirect The Extractive Industries and Society journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/exis Letter to the Editor Reply to Orihuela et al’s “Extractivism of the poor” A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T Keywords According to the EJAtlas, of 97 environmental conflicts in Peru, 20 are deemed as successes, generally meaning « Ecological distribution conflicts stopped projects ». Violence in Peruvian environmental conflicts is much higher than the average in the EJAtlas. Environmentalism of the poor However, not all investment projects in the extractive industries or infrastructure are conflictive. We discuss the Environmental justice sources of information on investment projects and on those which are conflictive, to give a stronger background Peru to our findings. « SUCCESS » IN ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS IN PERU as “successes” in environmental justice, generally meaning (though not always) projects stopped. Assume there are one hundred projects, and 1. Introduction that forty are conflictive, if 20% are “blocked”, this means 8 projects blocked, not 20. In other words, the percentage of “successes” is calcu­ Here we defend the findings in the EJAtlas, in particular those lated over the number of conflictive projects in the EJAtlas, not over all relating to Peru, against some of the strong arguments by Orihuela et al. projects. In the 97 conflicts from Peru registered by September 2021 in (2021) against «statistical analyses backing Joan Martinez-Alier the EJAtlas, 20 are deemed as ”successes”, 49 as “failures” and the rest (2002)’s thesis on the environmentalism of the poor. In their collabo­ are “not sure, don’t know”. We agree with Orihuela et al. that the rative Environmental Justice Atlas (EJAtlas), their Peru sample reports a “success” cases deserve special analysis. “Success” in the EJAtlas very success rate of 24% in stopping projects ». Orihuela et al. contend that often coincides with project stopped (Ozkaynak et al., 2021). No social successful resistance represents not 24% but only 2.5% of the total movement can long survive unless it obtains a success from time to time universe of Peru mining conflicts. Their claim « is built on the study of but the failures and “don’t knows” are also important for any social 517 conflicts in Peru between 2005 and 2019, as registered by the movement. Ombudsperson’s Office. The evidence suggests, moreover, that conten­ tious collective action commonly subordinates environmental justice 3. Growth in social metabolism and environmental conficts as causes to conventional economic concerns and resolutions, resulting in two sides of the same coin mining conflicts unfolding into compensation schemes and better deal settlements. » We would like to have all conflictive projects in the EJAtlas. But we Four main points are made by Orihuela et al. (2021). First the rate of have only some of them, and we obviously lack the new ones from 2021, « success » is much lower than what we say (rather 2% than 20%) 2022, 2023… The number of conflicts tends to increase around the because there are many more conflictive projects than we allow for. world at the frontiers of commodity extraction and waste disposal. Our Second, the relevance of extractivism is measured in money terms by argument is that rapid increases and changes in the social metabolism Orihuela et al., and not in physical terms. Third, conflicts are often (in physical terms, joules of energy and tons of materials) are one factor stopped by monetary compensation while we tend to exaggerate the « explaining the environmental conflicts in Peru and anywhere else. Fig. 1 valuation contests », i.e. the display of incommensurable valuation in Orihuela et al. is not wrong but it is misleading. It gives export figures languages in such conflicts (Martinez-Alier 2002). This article replies from Peru 1990–2019 in percentages by sector (mining, oil and gas, mainly to the two first contentions. The third one is easily disputed by fishmeal) calculated in money terms showing a rather stable situation looking to the narratives of the conflicts in the EJAtlas, but we do not while extraction of materials was increasing rapidly. The increase in deny that monetary compensation (particularly after « battles » have tonnage (that causes the local conflicts) is disguised by the calculation of been lost) contributes to stop conflicts. A fourth point of disagreement percentages in money terms. Biophysical data are appropriate for esti­ relates to counting the mortal victims. mating environmental pressures because they provide evidence of the Some factual corrections to Orihuela et al. are needed in our view. pressure on environment from material extraction. Figures on meta­ bolism in tonnage for Peru both the internal consumption and for ex­ 2. The “success” rate ports are given in Perez-Rincon et al. 2019, Samaniego et al., 2017, and in two sources left aside by Orihuela et al., Minaya 2018, and Raquel We calculate how many extractive industry conflictive projects are Neyra’s doctoral thesis and book (2019, 2020) on environmental con­ stopped. For instance, in Peru (which is the main topic of Orihuela et al’s flicts in Peru. Also in UNEP, Recent trends in material flows and resource article) of 97 conflicts in the EJAtlas by September 2021, 20 are deemed productivity in Latin America, the multiplication of social environmental https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2022.101065 Received 22 September 2021; Received in revised form 8 March 2022; Accepted 9 March 2022 2214-790X/© 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by- nc-nd/4.0/). Please cite this article as: J. Martinez-Alier, The Extractive Industries and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2022.101065 Letter to the Editor The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx conflicts and the expanding and intensifying extractive activities are two environmental defender killed (by hitmen or by the police in demon­ sides of the same coin in Peru as elsewhere. (Martinez-Alier and Walter, strations). This is twice the rate than in the EJAtlas as a whole. 2016; Tetreault, 2022). 5. The environmentalism of the poor and the indigenous 4. Counting the number of relevant conflicts and counting the mortal victims Orihuela et al. are misinformed about the origins of the notion of “environmentalism of the poor”. It does not come mainly from Peru Orihuela et al.. try to bring down the social significance of although it is indeed appropriate to Peru. It comes from Brazil (Chico “conflictive projects stopped” by increasing the number of projects and Mendes’ killing in 1988) and elsewhere in Latin America, but India was conflicts. We accept that the number of relevant environmental conflicts an earlier origin (with the Chipko movement) and Africa was important in Peru in the last 30 years is higher than those registered in the EJAtlas. with the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and companions in 1995, because of The EJAtlas (with 3520 entries by September 2021) is a sample of their opposition to Shell in the Niger Delta. Academically, it comes from conflicts. In Peru, it is a good sample, with 3 entries per million in­ Ramachandra Guha’s book on the Chipko movement (1989) and the habitants. We choose “emblematic” conflicts. “Emblematic” means international meetings we had around 1990 on the “environmentalism representative, symbolic of the various sectors of the economy. They are of the poor” (Martinez-Alier, 1991; Martinez-Alier and Hershberg, representative in Peru of a worldwide movement for environmental 1992), where Victor Toledo of Mexico (another promoter of “the envi­ justice. Going to Table 3 that summarizes Orihuela et al. findings, we ronmentalism of the poor”) was present. None of these meetings was in accept their figures in the EJAtlas of two years ago, for total number (76) Peru. I know well Peru since the early 1970s, so I agree that the notion of and cancelled projects (18). Both have increased in the last two years, the “environmentalism of the poor and the indigenous” is very relevant but this does not matter here. Then we disagree for the following rea­ to the country. Raquel Neyra’s book (2020). has shown this in detail. sons. They provide two columns from the Defensoría del Pueblo DdP (Ombudsman) (2005–2019) for mining conflicts (349) and total envi­ 6. Conclusion ronmental conflicts (517). We leave aside the 517 because they refer (Methods section, para 2) to environmental politics (and policies) in In the EJAtlas we do not study all projects in the extractive industries general (including local conflicts). We focus on the 349. We also or waste disposal but only conflictive projects. Therefore, Orihuela et appreciate and use the DdP information. However, there is a difference al’s article is wrong on this point and should be corrected. Second, we do between the Defensoría and the EJAtlas. We name conflicts from the not apply the “measuring rod of money” to study the increase of social name of the project or the place (Antamina, Las Bambas, Grupo Melka, metabolism, we use physical measures. Third, we study “emblematic” Pantanos de Villa) while the DdP includes as different conflicts those environmental conflicts, and for the Andes and Peru, we have a good arising in the same project along time, and involving different com­ sample. This abundance of environmental conflicts has given rise to munities around the mine or dam or oil palm plantation in question. several articles, theses and books on Peru and also on Ecuador and Thus, Las Bambas (with many environmental victims, two different Colombia apart from those quoted by Orihuela et al. (Chacón, 2003; firms along time, many surrounding villages involved) is one conflict in Damonte 2008; Neyra, 2019, 2020; Minaya, 2018; Latorre et al., 2015; the EJAtlas (with a rather long description and some updating) while Pérez-Rincón et al., 2019; Samaniego et al., 2017; Silva Macher and DdP includes from time to time a new conflict case for Las Bambas (the Farrell 2013). Fourth, in future we are interested on increasing further last one in July 2021). In the methods section (end of second paragraph), the number of conflicts registered in the EJAtlas, and looking at whether Orihuela et al.. acknowledge that the 349 conflicts according to the DdP they can be deemed as successes (often meaning project stopped), or arise from only 175 mines. In the EJAtlas these 175 mines, if conflictive failures or “don’t knows”. They are all part of world environment enough, would give rise to 175 entries and not to 349 entries. movements of the poor, the indigenous, the “subaltern”, the down­ So, to go back to point 1, let’s assume there are 100 extractive in­ trodden, the dispossessed, the peasants, citizens and neighbours, the dustry projects, of which 40 are conflictive. Of these conflicts, 8 are local EJOs and sometimes the international EJOs, some trade unions, “successful” (project cancelled). If you count twice the conflictive pro­ also some scientists and professionals, and in Latin America some clerics jects (because of a change in the company involved, or a second com­ from Liberation Theology. Peru is a particularly violent country against munity is affected and complains), then the proportion of “success” goes environmental activists (Neyra, 2020; Global Witness 2021) in part down from 20% to 10% of all conflictive projects. This is what Orihuela because of long traditions of coloniality and racism (Quijano 2000), and et al’s article do in a two-step reduction of “success” cases. Compared to nevertheless some conflictive extractive projects are being stopped. the EJAtlas, they count all projects and not only the conflictive projects, Perhaps only 20%, not yet reaching Argentina’s rate (Walter and Wag­ and they count the conflictive projects at least twice. Therefore, the ner, 2021). percentage of “blocked” projects registered in the EJAtlas in Peru goes down drastically, to 2 or 5%. Our rate of “success” was 18/76 (for two References years ago) or 20/97 now. Orihuela et al. increase the denominator to 349, 517 and even more in the last column of their Table 3. We wonder Chacón, R, 2003. El nacimiento del ecologismo popular en el Perú o la lucha sinfín de las how this could pass peer-review. comunidades de Vicco y San Mateo de Huanchor. Ecologia. Politica. 24, 113–127. Regarding the forms of contention and the mortal victims, Orihuela Walter, M., Wagner, L., et al., 2021. Mining struggles in Argentina. The keys to a suc­ cessful story of mobilisation. Extractive Ind. Soc. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. et al. (section 3.2.4) report that the Defensoría del Pueblo counted only exis.2021.100940. 30 environmental defenders killed between 2013 and 2019. Orihuela et Damonte, G. 2008, The Constitution of Political actors: Peasant communities, mining, al’s article deals with the period 2005–2019 (second line, Methods and Mobilization in Bolivian and Peruvian Andes, Verlag Dr Mueller, Dusseldorf. Global Witness, 2021, Annual report, https://www.globalwitness.org/en/last-line- section) but activists victimized are included only for 2013–19. Neyra defence-en/. (2020, p. 166–169). reports and maps 96 environmental victims (listing Latorre, S., Farrell, K., Martinez-Alier, J., 2015. The commodification of nature and names, ages, gender, places and dates) between 2003 and 2019, to socio-environmental resistance in Ecuador: an inventory of accumulation by dispossession cases, 1980-2013. Ecol. Econ. 116, 58–69. which 9 more have been added until July 2021. More than one hundred Martinez-Alier, J., 1991. Ecology and the poor: a neglected dimension of Latin American in less than twenty years, distributed in many conflicts. This is the tip of history. J. Latin Am. Stud. 23 (3), 621–639. an iceberg of the wounded, displaced and frightened. Peru is a rather Martinez-Alier, J., Hershberg, E., 1992. Environmentalism and the poor: the ecology of violent country against environmental defenders. This is clear in the survival. Items (Soc. Sci. Res. Council) 46 (1), 1–5. Martinez-Alier, J., Walter, M., 2016. Social metabolism and conflicts over extractivism. statistics of Global Witness and in the EJAtlas. Taking the 97 conflicts In Environ. Governance in Latin Am. 55–85 https://link.springer.com/chapter/ recorded by September 2021, in 28 of them there was at least one 10.1007/978-1-137-50572-9_3. 2 Letter to the Editor The Extractive Industries and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx Minaya, G., 2018. La curva de Kuznets ambiental basada en el indicador de consumo Silva Macher, J. C. and K. Farrell, 2013, The flow-fund model of Conga: exploring the material doméstico: perú 1970-2015. Thesis Lic. 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