Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439) 2022, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 28–38 https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v10i3.5363 Article Journalist‐Twitterers as Political Influencers in Brazil: Narratives and Disputes Towards a New Intermediary Model Luiz Peres‐Neto Department of Journalism and Communication Sciences, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain; luiz.peres@uab.cat Submitted: 30 January 2022 | Accepted: 11 July 2022 | Published: 28 July 2022 Abstract The ascendency of Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency of Brazil in 2018 put the role of traditional media companies and jour‐ nalists under the spotlight. Bad news or opinions against his government have been officially treated as fake, inaccurate, or false information. In this context, data show a decrease in news trust and growing news consumption through platforms. According to the 2021 Reuters Institute report on news trust, only 21% of Brazilians trust the press as an institution, with 71% using social media platforms to be informed. As part of a broad and complex crisis of the traditional intermediary model, several journalists appeared in the Brazilian public sphere as influencers on social media platforms such as Twitter. Based on a qualitative perspective, this article aims to research the role of journalists as political influencers and their use of Twitter to express their voices. A sample of 10 journalists with more than 10,000 followers on Twitter, five working for traditional media and five from native digital media, were interviewed in depth. We realized that they use their digital cap‐ ital in two political directions. On the one hand, as part of a digital strategy promoted by media outlets to gain attention and call the audience, journalists share their spots and comments on daily issues. On the other hand, in a polarized political context, journalists have found Twitter a means to express their voices in a context of increasing violence and restrictions on free expression among this collective. Keywords Brazil; freedom of the press; influencers; Jair Bolsonaro; journalists Issue This article is part of the issue “Journalism, Activism, and Social Media: Exploring the Shifts in Journalistic Roles, Performance, and Interconnectedness,” edited by Peter Maurer (Trier University) and Christian Nuernbergk (Trier University). © 2022 by the author(s); licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu‐ tion 4.0 International License (CC BY). 1. Introduction fied as having “restricted” freedom of expression and media (Article 19, 2021). In addition, to Human Rights The Brazilian 2018 election and Bolsonaro’s political com‐ Watch (“Brazil: Bolsonaro blocks,” 2021), the Brazilian munication strategy represent an important case to dis‐ President’s action across social media—blocking oppo‐ cuss the crisis of journalism and the consolidation of nents or influential political journalists’ critics of him— new structures of informational powers. After his inau‐ corroborates the downplaying of free speech in Brazil. guration, the violence against journalists increased by This article assumes that journalists’ precarious and 218%, with President Bolsonaro himself being responsi‐ vulnerable position in Brazil has forced them to use ble for 34% of these cases in 2021 (Federação Nacional or combine social media platforms, such as Twitter, to dos Jornalistas, 2022). According to the Report Without express and share their production and views. To discuss Borders Index, between 2020 and 2022, Brazil has this, we designed the following research questions: become “the second most lethal country in the region for reporters” (Reporters Without Borders, 2022). Also, RQ1: Are Brazilian political journalists using Twitter to censorship in all its manners (persecutions, threats, influence political narratives due to Bolsonaro’s com‐ lawfare) has increased, making Brazil a country classi‐ munication strategy? Media and Communication, 2022, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 28–38 28 RQ2: What are Brazilian political journalists’ concerns cians, even before his election to the presidency of Brazil, and perceptions of free expression using Twitter on Bolsonaro has had a hostile relationship with the press, political issues? openly supported censorship, and suggested through‐ out his digital platforms, including Twitter (where he has Although citizens still recognize journalism as a cru‐ up to 7,2 million followers), actions against media out‐ cial contributor to understanding the complexity of our lets or journalists considered subversives, communists, times, the press is an institution that struggles to inspire or bad professionals. As sustained by Article 19 (2021, sufficient confidence in several countries such as Brazil, p. 33), “populist leaders and those who seek to entrench Spain, Mexico, and the US, among others (Toff et al., their own power hate accountability, which is why we 2021). The use of social media by former US President have seen attacks on journalists and online censorship Donald Trump and its relationship with journalists from intensify in many countries,” and Brazil was mentioned traditional media (until his banishment from Twitter and as a paradigmatic exemplum of these threats. After the Facebook) should be mentioned as a paradigmatic exam‐ arrival of Bolsonaro, as argued by Silva and Marques ple (Gutsche, 2018; Morini, 2020; Ouyang & Waterman, (2021), Brazilian journalists became more vulnerable to 2020), with connections to the Brazilian case. harassment and violence. Brazil’s situation goes beyond In fact, Trump’s communication strategy, designed by merely being a parallel of “Trumpism.” According to Steve Bannon, has changed the basis of political com‐ Nemer (2021), Bolsonaro’s supporters could attempt to munication, not only during an electoral campaign but reproduce the US Capitol invasion if he were defeated in before, during, and after it (Morini, 2020). As explained the 2022 Brazilian presidential election. by Feffer (2021), Bannon, based on his experience as The extensive available literature mainly discusses creator and editor‐in‐chief of Breitbart News, idealized Bolsonaro’s tactics of using WhatsApp to share disinfor‐ an international movement of right‐wing leaders. Most mation (Canavilhas et al., 2019; Chagas, 2022; Chaves of them, such as Bolsonaro in Brazil, adopted his strate‐ & Braga, 2019; C. Machado et al., 2019; Moura & gies. Based on a populist, fragmented and partial edition Michelson, 2017). However, news production, distribu‐ of facts, manipulation of truth, and against everything tion, and consumption in a polarized public space like that ethical journalism stands for, the idea was to cre‐ Brazil have changed (J. Machado & Miskolci, 2019). As a ate propaganda instead of news, to engage the social result, social media platforms appeared as a real‐time media audience by offering supporters shareable mate‐ source of information for Brazilians. Consequently, polit‐ rial to legitimize their political views; paraphrasing Petre ical journalists have become more attached to their (2021), news designed as clickbait to polarize, despite social media networks. As in many other countries and the moral consequences. All these right‐wing leaders, contexts, Twitter has become a new form of interac‐ such as Trump or Bolsonaro, continuously discredit tradi‐ tion with political journalism and its audiences (Bruns & tional journalism critics or report on politically sensitive Nuernbergk, 2019). Based on a qualitative perspective, topics. They blamed it for not being neutral and support‐ we questioned journalists on their use of social media ing new media outlets or traditional media that expres‐ as political influencers to control narratives and hold on sively helped them, such as Fox News TV or Record TV, in to their voices under rampant violence and increasing the US and Brazil (Almeida, 2019; Morini, 2020). restrictions on free expression. In turn, journalists’ presence on social media changed their traditional roles as gatekeepers. Some 2. Literature Review of them assumed the category of political influencers (Casero‐Ripollés, 2020), and journalistic outlets stim‐ In this article, the epistemological lens requires differ‐ ulated an apparently win‐win process, incorporating ent layers to achieve the designed objective. Hence, journalists‐influencers in newsrooms as well as encour‐ firstly, we will review social media’s impacts on news aging their employees to use their reputation and credi‐ production, distribution, and consumption, particularly bility to create active profiles on social media platforms on political journalism. Secondly, we will also discuss it (Pérez Serrano & García Santamaría, 2021). Progressively, based on the idea of influence or the creation of an indi‐ journalists are becoming an essential part of the mes‐ rect system of influence. Platforms such as Twitter and sage. Reframing and mixing McLuhan’s thesis with enun‐ Facebook, among others, have created the category of ciation theory, the medium, and the enunciator is (also) influencers. However, we argue that this peer position, the message. In particular, in this article, we assume applied to political journalists, can be better explained by the statement that Twitter is now a central intermediary the “two‐step flow” theory. Finally, we will review stud‐ place—although not the only one—for political debates ies on how political journalists have been using social (Bouvier & Rosenbaum, 2020). media platforms, especially Twitter, to circumvent restric‐ Taking this context as a background, as mentioned tions on freedom of expression in critical regimes. earlier, this article aims to explore the role of journalists As an institution, journalism faces a defining moment as political influencers using Twitter in Brazil after Jair while being in a state of disarray. According to Zelizer Bolsonaro became President (in January 2018). As part et al. (2021, p. 14), “in journalism, the institution ends of the populist spectrum of extreme right‐wing politi‐ up being disconnected from the everyday realities of Media and Communication, 2022, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 28–38 29 everyone who matters,” which means failing to keep flow of communication defends that the primary group in tune with journalists, sources, and subjects of news, of socialization in a given community or group is deci‐ and audiences. Many layers can be employed to explain sive in building opinion on any specific topic. This primary it. Social media’s impact on news presentation is an group of opinion leaders is responsible for receiving and essential one, as explained by Welbers and Opgenhaffen processing information from the mass media and inter‐ (2019). Among other social media platforms, Twitter, acting with it. This group is responsible for mediating Facebook, and WhatsApp transformed journalism and and sharing (ideas or information) with the other audi‐ its effect on society, from production to consump‐ ence members, the second flow. As Livingstone (2006) tion (Steensen & Westlund, 2020). Social media turned explains, although it proposes a shift from direct to an the agenda‐setting and the meaning of public interest indirect system of effects based on a mass media mind‐ (Napoli, 2019), opening up the struggle to set a new inter‐ set, it is not limited to it. In the age of media convergence, mediary model. Also, it changed the gatekeeper process. with a globalized and even more personalized media In the US context, Singer (2014) explored and described environment, some insights should be considered, espe‐ how editors of digital newspapers understood the role of cially that “processes of media influence are mediated users as secondary gatekeepers. According to his study, by social contexts, including community and face‐to‐face social media, journalists and editors perceive the value interactions” (Livingstone, 2006, p. 243). In addition, to of users in news production, resulting in a “two‐steep support the inquiry on contextual‐textual mediation in gatekeeping process,” in which one editor’s decision to the new media environment, Livingstone suggests the include a topic as news is followed by users’ participa‐ importance of including artifacts or devices, activities tory capacity—allowed by technology—to downgrade or and practices, and social arrangements employed to upgrade the visibility of the information piece. communicate or share information. Social media impacts on political journalism have O’Regan (2021) suggests that Katz’s assumptions con‐ been framed from different angles in this context. For stitute an essential raw material for discussing how example, Bruns and Nuernbergk (2019) suggest creating social media influencers emerged and have become, new structures and forms of power relations, influence, in some cases, political influencers nowadays. Social and information flows among political journalists, their media, according to Lindgren (2017, p. 29), “enables audiences on Twitter, and other stakeholders. Although the co‐creation and constant editing by multimodal con‐ circumscribed to Germany and Australia, they identified tent, that is, content that mixes several modalities (writ‐ that journalists’ voices throughout social media com‐ ten text, photographic images, videos, and sounds).” peted with experts, commentators, and other sources for The revolutionary possibilities generated by web 2.0 cre‐ the same space. These new power structures are part of ated a new media ecology or, as mentioned before, a a new media ecology or a “hybrid media system” in which hybrid media system where information and its circu‐ boundaries between traditional and new media are blur‐ lation gained a central place. Reviewing it with a soci‐ ring. As a consequence, both are becoming more inter‐ ological lens, Manuel Castells (2009) coined the idea dependent, and taking politics as an example, the “news of “self‐mass communication” to explain the potential cycle” should be replaced by the “political information capacity that web 2.0 and social media gave to indi‐ cycle” (Chadwick, 2017). viduals to make their voices reach a mass audience. Mainstream media accepted new forms of collabo‐ As an optimist, the same author analyzed how these rations from citizens, blurring the frontiers of news pro‐ voices became capable of organizing social movements duction in the context of alternative platforms’ and alter‐ and taking actions that trembled political structure dur‐ native media’s growing credibility (Salaudeen, 2021). ing the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street, or the 15‐M Moreover, under the empire of networked society and Indiguinados Movement (Castells, 2012). However, he the rampant social media presence in daily life, digital did not explain what it is to be a relevant figure in social influencers appeared and got the capacity to battle to set media or an influencer in a networked society. public opinion on matters of interest (Fernandez‐Prados In the context of new media ecology, while limited et al., 2021). to a profit‐driven theory, marketing analysts figured out Before defining what a digital influencer—or politi‐ earlier new media potentiality and developed a tiny the‐ cal journalist influencer—is and what is their capacity ory of influencers. In the early days of Twitter, Facebook, to influence (the public opinion or the public or politi‐ and YouTube, Paul Gillin (2007) offered an attempt to cal agenda), the meaning of influence must be contextu‐ explain the emergent role of digital influencers, the alized in the light of media studies. Katz and Lazarsfeld majority of whom at that point were bloggers. It goes (2017) offer an opening view. Published originally in on a similar marketing theory, such as Keller and Berry’s 1955, Personal Influence proposed that the mass media (2003) thesis that there is an indirect system of opin‐ effect should not be explained in terms of a direct effect ion leaders able to persuade others on a micro‐scale his on the audience. Instead, they defended the thesis of the peers. According to Taillon et al. (2020, p. 768), “social existence of an “indirect system of influence,” turning media influencers are social media users who have built the focus from general media effects to what people do a substantial network of followers by posting textual with it as an audience. Therefore, the so‐called two‐step and visual narrations of their everyday lives and hold Media and Communication, 2022, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 28–38 30 influence over a group of viewers.” In addition, it is con‐ Twitter has opened an affective news relation redefining sidered essential that these influencers must use their the boundaries between audiences and journalists into networks to show their “human brands.” Advertising a one in which professional authenticity, personal reper‐ product or presenting a political opinion is considered toire, and responsibility become central pieces of jour‐ the same “selling” process, based on platforms’ capacity nalists’ labor and presence on digital platforms. to “earn profit from the human brands they create.” Twitter and social media platforms have allowed a If digital influencers were able to manufacture a new space for dissident voices to reach an audience particular audience of followers, engaging them with to express their thoughts (Castells, 2012). According to their content production and influencing and persuad‐ Hintz (2016), the paradox of using commercial social ing them to consume any product, political leaders and media to express dissident voices has generated an their spin‐doctors visualized a fertile field to conquer. intermediary model where protestors or activists artic‐ The connections between marketing and politics are not ulated social mobilization by it. Though, these private new. However, social media has changed the way it is companies can restrict the circulation of messages and done. According to Highfield (2016), it has politicized the surveil them. In short, what was a public right—free personal on an everyday scale and made politics even expression—becomes subordinated to a private interpre‐ more personal. Throughout social media, politicians got tation and will. However, as explained by Price (2015), an audience to comment daily on news and any occur‐ the new architecture of information flows allowed a rences, from the most serious to the most trivial fact. reshaped marketplace of ideas where social media can By extension, political journalism also turned. contribute to journalists, and activists, among others, to Casero‐Ripollés (2020) argues that, recovering Katz and circumvent political and authoritarianism temptations to Lazarsfeld’s (2017) thesis, one of the most relevant limit free expression. Undoubtedly, a side effect of it is changes introduced by social media in the field of political that journalists become more exposed to private and communication “is the emergence of political influencers public (including police) surveillance (Thurman, 2018) or digital opinion leaders” (p. 171). The two‐step flow in an ambiguous context where, apparently, they can re‐appeared in a more complex relationship between express their opinions more freely. producers and audiences. Lou (2021) argues for the need for a “trans‐parasocial relation—to capture a collectively 3. Methods reciprocal, (a)synchronously interactive, and co‐created relation between influencers and their captive follow‐ This article aims to research the role of Brazilian journal‐ ers” (p. 3). In the social media age, the audience was ists using Twitter to become political influencers. A sam‐ classified by many as fragmented by new technologies, ple of 10 journalists with more than 10,000 followers on interactional opportunities, and pitfalls. But, as Huertas Twitter, five working for traditional media outlets, and Bailén (2021) explains, more than this, we face an even five with labor activities in native new media were inter‐ more personalized consumption experience. viewed in depth. Hence, news media outlets and journalists are reframing social media in many ways. On news produc‐ 3.1. Sampling Procedures tion, Welbers and Opgenhaffen (2019) highlight how Twitter and Facebook made news presentations more As a qualitative study, the number of interviews (10) interpersonal and subjective. Canter (2015), focusing was defined by saturation. To reach the journalists, we on Twitter, supports the thesis on how it has affected used a snowball technique. We must point out that news‐making, news‐gathering, live reporting, verifica‐ we did more than 60 contacts with potential partici‐ tion; although the uses of Twitter to drive traffic to news pants until we achieved the sample. Most journalists companies did not feature in her study, she did present contacted declined, and anonymity was a natural condi‐ the idea of “personal branding and journalists present‐ tion requested by participants. Since 2018, the Federal ing a personalized—but not personal—account of their Police, the Ministry of Justice, and other institutions job via their tweets” (p. 888). Studies on journalists’ per‐ from the Brazilian government have started to pressure sonal branding on Twitter identify a new form of social or intimidate activists, journalists, scholars, and inter‐ capital for journalists in a field of dispute for the audi‐ net influencers, among others, who publicly show criti‐ ence attention and visibility among peers and media out‐ cal positions with Bolsonaro’s government. Bolsonaro’s lets (e.g., Brems et al., 2017; Lawrence et al., 2014). hostility especially targeted female journalists. A histor‐ Also, Twitter or the activity of microblogging has ical barometer on violence against journalists in Brazil, become part of the journalists’ routine and provided released in 1990, has indicated that since Bolsonaro’s them with a new way to be accountable and to share inauguration, the number of cases has been increasing: and engage with user‐generated content (Lasorsa et al., 58% more in 2019 and 105% more in 2020 compared 2012); however, with a transparency paradox, whether with the previous years, respectively. The President they disclosure more about how news is produced and himself, in 2021, was considered responsible, in per‐ less on their personal lives they get fewer interaction son, for 34% of the 430 cases (Federação Nacional dos claims (Hedman, 2016). To Saipera and Iliadi (2015), Jornalistas, 2022). Media and Communication, 2022, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 28–38 31 Therefore, to protect participants of the study, we the methodological proceedings into three stages (socio‐ took some measures: a) all the interviews were con‐ historical analysis, formal or discursive analysis, and ducted using an encrypted open‐source videoconfer‐ re‐interpretation), “which must not be seen as separate encing system to avoid external interference or unau‐ stages of a sequential method but rather as analytically thorized recording; b) a pseudonym was attributed to distinct dimensions of a complex interpretative process” all participants in any materials, including this article; (Thompson, 2011, p. 137). Therefore, we articulate the c) all data that could potentially identify any participant findings’ explanation with the results of the interpreta‐ were encrypted and protected by passwords; d) hence, tive analysis. To do so, using Atlas.ti software, we classi‐ along with this article, any mention that could pro‐ fied hermeneutic units according to their relevance for fessionally compromise any participants was omitted. the analysis. Interviews were analyzed individually and For this reason, in Table 1 and throughout this article, then in relation to each other and in light of the social‐ we avoid linking any name to the company or inde‐ historical context. Theories mobilized in the previous sec‐ pendent project that participants were collaborating tion offered the epistemological lens to interpret the on. Interviews were carried out from 26 October till data and create clusters. Figure 1 summarizes the ana‐ 28 November, 2021. All the discursive material produced lysis procedure under the DH perspective. was in the Portuguese language. Thompson (2011) sustains that DH is not a research The sample from traditional media includes at least method but a perspective that allows theory‐method one journalist from Folha de S. Paulo, O Globo, and articulation and the creative combination of different Estadão. These are the three most influential newspa‐ research techniques. Thus, we could combine a discur‐ pers in Brazil. Participants from native new media include sive analysis with contextual/historical interpretation in journalists from UOL (the most significant content site), the light of the theories reviewed. Agência Pública, and The Intercept.br, among other inde‐ pendent journalists. In this sense, although there is a his‐ 3.3. Scope and Limitation torical field of alternative and popular community media in Brazil (including radio and newspapers), it is impor‐ As Bourdieu (1999) argues, qualitative interviews are tant to point out that, in Brazil, most alternative media an interactive procedure. Therefore, the discourse pro‐ in recent years has used new media or born as native duced results from a social interaction process between (Cavalcalte, 2021). For that reason, the new media sam‐ researcher and participant. It is a constructive social ple included journalists from digital native alternative process where the meanings of a linguistic exchange media projects. All the journalists interviewed had from are negotiated. eight up to more than 30 years of experience. Regarding Qualitative analyses are essential to offer a close view gender, six were men, and four were women. of an object but do not allow generalization. Moreover, although necessary to access participants, anonymity 3.2. Analysis Procedures reduces the possibilities for interpretation and discus‐ sion. Therefore, the analysis does not include partic‐ We adopted Thompson’s (2011) depth‐hermeneutics ipants’ social networking analysis. Nevertheless, find‐ (DH) as a methodological perspective considering that ings and discussion offer possibilities to figure out the it allows an extensive articulation between the the‐ uses of Twitter by Brazilian journalists in the context oretical framework mobilized and its analytical possi‐ of a right‐wing authoritarian government as part of bilities. The DH incorporates the socio‐historical con‐ an accentuated dispute to control political narratives ditions of production, circulation, and receptions of and change the intermediation model, but they are discourses as symbolic forms. Following that, we divided also limited. Table 1. Sampling profile. Code Name (Fake) Experience Media Company Twitter Followers Day of Interview (2021) 1 Gabriel < 18 years New media 140 K 26 October 2 Pedro 13 years Traditional 10.7 K 31 October 3 Carlos < 25 years New media 70.8 K 4 November 4 Amanda < 10 years New media 11.7 K 8 November 5 Cesar 33 years Traditional 13.1 K 8 November 6 Ronaldo < 30 years Traditional 18 K 9 November 7 Roberta 19 years Traditional 22 K 9 November 8 Juliana 11 years New media 19.1 K 10 November 9 David 20 years Traditional 22.4 K 10 November 10 Mariana 8 years New media 49.6 K 28 November Media and Communication, 2022, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 28–38 32 Interviews Socio-historical analysis Re-interpreta on Interpreta on Figure 1. Depth‐hermeneutics and analysis procedure. 4. Findings and Discussion painted himself as a victim after having suffered an assas‐ sination attempt in September 2018, one month before 4.1. The Context of “Bolsonarism” and Its Social Media election day (Almeida, 2019). Uses in a Polarized Brazil Bolsonaro also used social networks and a systematic method of spreading fake news to gain attention, sup‐ Explaining why Bolsonaro got elected, in 2018, as port, and control the narrative during the 2018 presiden‐ President of Brazil and his political movement known as tial campaign (Canavilhas et al., 2019; Machado et al., “bolsonarism” is a complex endeavor and goes beyond 2019; Statista, 2020). In this context and since, along‐ the objective of this article. However, some contextual side his continuous threats to traditional media outlets elements can be highlighted. Brazil faced a unique elec‐ (Silva & Marques, 2021), he did not attend any debates or tion process for several reasons. A few years before, interviews with professional journalists. Rather, his social in 2013, massive protests occurred when young people media profiles were used to comment on any topic of his went to the streets to protest against all the established interest (Lopes et al., 2020). political institutions and parties (Machado & Miskolci, 2019). In 2016, a parliamentary coup d’état impeached 4.2. The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Journalists and president Dilma Rousseff from the Worker’s Party and the Influencer Paradoxes a former prisoner of the dictatorial military regime in Brazil (1964–1985; Fagnani, 2017). Polarization and Not only the internet but social media appearance political hate divided Brazilian society. During the men‐ changed the daily activities of journalists. “It’s not easy” tioned impeachment, Bolsonaro, a former military mem‐ was a common argument used by participants to explain ber, and an MP with more than six consecutive man‐ daily activities, both in traditional and native digital dates without any political achievement, praised the newsrooms. Pressure and the convergence of modali‐ members of the military who had tortured Rousseff ties made journalists multimedia. Digitalization was a with a misogynist tone (Possenti, 2018). In addition, an significant event for those with more than 20 years of anti‐corruption judiciary operation targeted the former experience. Downsizing, which was considered a natu‐ Brazilian President, Lula da Silva, also from the Worker’s ral consequence, occurred to an even greater extent. party, using lawfare tactics (Santoro & Tavares, 2019). As Ronaldo explained: Lula was sent to jail in 2018 when he was his party’s candidate and led all the polls for the 2018 presiden‐ When I was editor, in the first decade of this century, tial election (“Lula se entrega,” 2018). Without Lula as I remember sending a journalist and a photographer a real competitor, Bolsonaro used the polarization and to a political event and my colleague, editor of the the hate against the Worker’s Party (and the political site, doing the same. Now, we have both lost our posi‐ establishment) in his favor, framing himself as a polit‐ tion, there are fewer editors in all newsrooms, and we ical outsider because he had never been in a major send only one journalist, and s/he feeds our site, digi‐ political party. Ideologically, he generated a narrative tal TV, platforms, and print paper with all the content. of anti‐corruption, ultraconservative (anti‐LGBT rights In addition, s/he also tweets! and misogyny) fitting with evangelism perspectives, and Media and Communication, 2022, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 28–38 33 Being resigned to this state of affairs was a common fea‐ other physical spaces.” She added that when reporting on ture of all participants’ opinions. government scandals, for example, the journalist must be With this context as a given fact or a background, prepared to receive a huge amount of virtual attacks. many good aspects of social media, in general, and The ugliness became clear when all participants Twitter, in particular, emerged in the field. “Twitter is the from new media described virtual harassment, cancel‐ most journalist social media,” said Carlos. “For me [César], ing, and continuous aggression. “Brazil’s reality is ugly. it is a great source of information and keeps me up‐to‐ It is not a safe place for journalists. Especially if you are date.” According to informants, forecasting issues and women, gay, black, or other minority groups that the scoops is another good aspect. In other words, to Pedro, President and their digital militia continuously attack,” Twitter allows him “to set a kind of information playlist said Amanda. She describes how she receives daily to monitor facts and sources, and then, to reply or share threats of sexual violence, among other violent acts. it with my audience.” Not only in the political context of Gabriel, who was attacked several times by what he Brazil, where many politicians, including Bolsonaro, use called “Bolsonaro’s digital militia,” added that reporting social media to make firsthand statements. “Press confer‐ these issues in Brazil requires strong mental preparation. ence? I never attended,” said Mariana. The political spec‐ tacle takes place in the digital sphere. 4.3. Social Capital, New Intermediaries, and the Political Becoming an influencer, however, for all of them Information Cycle was a natural happening in their professional lives. None of them assumed the role of influencer in terms “I don’t know when it has happened, but Twitter in of “human brand,” as marketing theories described Brazil has become the journalist curriculum vitae,” said (Taillon et al., 2020). “Journalist can never be the news,” Amanda. All of the interviewees agreed upon this to said Carlos. To Amanda, “we are not celebrities; we some degree. Some explained their decision to erase old inform!” However, after some discussion, the interview‐ posts, considering that someone could use them to can‐ ers described what being an influencer means to a polit‐ cel, discredit, or harass. However, political volatility in ical journalist. Although all of them made a vigorous Brazil puts journalists under constant scrutiny. “When defense of information as a protagonist, they recognized you disclose some political scandal of this [Bolsonaro] the journalist’s role in explaining or influencing people government, you know that you become the target in their growth. All interviewers mentioned the informa‐ immediately,” explains Pedro. If this could happen in the tion disorder and the growth of fake news in Brazil to past, all participants agreed that it has become more vio‐ explain “my responsibility to explain better and help peo‐ lent in the present. Protecting reputation seems to be a ple to get the meaning of the news,” as said by Pedro. core issue for all of them to hold on to their positions as The liberal mindset that shapes most journalism theories influential journalists. also came up. “Yes, in some way, I am an opinion leader. New media journalists are proud of their social cap‐ But I just bring my view. People need to make their own ital and their potential audience on Twitter. All the conclusions. But in Brazil, the educational divide and the participants, however, identified a “new intermediary polarization make it hard,” explained Roberta. model.” David criticized those journalists who become In this context, all of them expressed how Twitter bigger than the media companies, but in general, all of helped them to produce more personalized content. them explained from their field Chadwich’s thesis on “I don’t look at metrics. But I learned empirically, tweet‐ a “hybrid model” where the news cycle was replaced ing, what my followers like and engage with,” said by the political information cycle. The way to inform Gabriel. However, the personalized or sectorial special‐ about politics has changed. In a more polarized and ization shaped in Twitter is not enough to be an active informed social media, Roberta explains that she takes influencer. All of the participants convey the idea that notes from sources, during interviews, in the format of the more you use your personal touch, the more follow‐ tweets. Similar practices were described and, in gen‐ ers, reputation, and influence you get. The two‐step flow eral, participants explained that they first publish the model seems to be an accurate model to explain how headline, then expand the narrative in a fluid con‐ using Twitter journalists influence political opinions as tent relation from/for social media. According to all, part of an indirect system of influence. reporting becomes a real‐time activity. Hence, similar to Although for those working on traditional media out‐ Singer’s (2014) findings, a secondary gatekeeper seems lets, it seems easier to establish a boundary between to articulate editors/journalists and user’s roles, mak‐ personalized content and personal life, the Brazilian polit‐ ing them more attentive to this collaboration on the ical landscape, since 2018, due to Bolsonaro’s commu‐ re‐distribution of news and, as mentioned by Mariana, nication strategy, makes it hard. “You lose the right to “building the news in a real‐time mood, with more trans‐ be human,” says Gabriel as he explains the bad side of parency,” in line with Hedman’s results (2016). being a twitterer who is considered a political influencer. For that reason, it was no surprise when journalists This perception was shared by all participants working for from traditional media outlets explained that “the news‐ new media. According to Juliana, “the journalist’s online paper (traditional media) helps us to tweet what is good. life is much more fragile and susceptible to harm than in Twitter Brazil, for example, has an agreement with the Media and Communication, 2022, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 28–38 34 company. They organized a course in our newsroom to journalists settled in new media naturalized the percep‐ help us to be (or act) as influencers,” said César. Despite tion that their Twitter profiles are something exchange‐ that, as Gabriel expressed, “traditional media companies able with news outlets. used to see social networks and digital media as enemies, Some convergent views on the weakness of Twitter’s as one who has stolen something that belongs to them.” terms of use appeared in all interviews. Hate speech and New media journalists—even those who are not in new the platforms’ incapacity to control attacks on journalists media outlets—agreed that traditional media still uses emerged in all interviews. “The law exists. Crime is crime the mindset of competitors. As Mariana says: inside or outside Twitter. But it seems that for some peo‐ ple, they will never be punished by Twitter or by the When you publish a political issue using Twitter and authorities,” explained Mariana. It arose in all interviews your media site, you can expand it and connect with that platforms and Twitter contain disinformation, hate others’ work…and the story can become bigger. But speech, and all types of continuing violence against jour‐ traditional media still wants all the audience for them, nalists, and anyone who expresses a political opinion in all the credits, etc. Brazil has to deal with it. Amanda, Ronaldo, Gabriela, Pedro, Paulo, and 4.4. Tweeting and the Journalism Crisis in a Collapsed Roberta explained violent situations with credible details, Democracy including one in which they suffered a coordinated digital attack on Twitter by the “hate cabinet” after comments The continuous attacks perpetrated by Bolsonaro harass‐ that criticized or disclosed a scandal regarding Bolsonaro, ing journalists, as described earlier, created a sort of his government, or family. The existence and actions of precaution or self‐care protection feeling when talk‐ a “hate cabinet” are under investigation by Brazilian ing about them. Without mentioning Bolsonaro’s name, Supreme Court (STF Inquire Nº 4.781, under secret). carefully, Pedro said that “this government crossed a Furthermore, it was the object of analysis by a Special red line on institutionalism. Since 2018 (maybe a bit Parliamentary Commission in the Brazilian Congress (CPI before), in Brazil, the press and journalists have lived a das Fake News). In short, it would be a complex of sites sort of permanent under‐pressure state.” In this context, and trolls used to attack Bolsonaro’s opponents since the as expressed by Juliana, “people in Brazil tweet very pas‐ electoral campaign in 2018. sionately.” All participants mentioned that, because of The “hate cabinet,” according to the participants these elements, they do not polemize on Twitter, which mentioned above and the available information released means they do not answer unpolite comments or engage by institutions, can spread fake news about a person or in rhetorical disputes with followers or other twitterers. change the truth using a disinformation technique. We “I have my voice and, as a public figure, I need to act consider it a nightmare for democracy which exemplifies responsibly,” said Ronaldo. the attacks on journalists and journalism as an institution. Yet, traditional media have “style manual” and com‐ Also, it illustrates that audiences are no longer confident pliance guidelines for their journalists on what they in the traditional intermediary model. Under this kind of can and cannot do in their personal social media pro‐ attack, as said by informants, the only thing that works files. It was expressed as something natural or a pro‐ is to have a prominent position on Twitter where you fessional agreement by those who work for traditional can explain your situation, sources, and views. Therefore, media. Contrarily, journalists from new media criticized being an influencer helps a lot. that. “Social media profiles must have our face! I would never ever accept censorship,” said the youngest par‐ 5. Conclusions ticipant, Mariana. For some, the existence of guide‐ less is a way to censor and control what can be pub‐ Although it is not a novelty, it is convenient to point lished. “I still have colleagues working on traditional out that social media has changed political journalism. media, and they call these ‘documents’ ‘Social Media In a globalized world with new information flows and AI‐5,’ ” explained Gabriel. During the military dictator‐ networks, extreme right‐wing political leaders such as ship period (1964–1985), the AI‐5 was an institutional Bolsonaro in Brazil followed the Bannon–Trump strat‐ act imposed to suspend rights and freedoms, particularly egy to set new forms of political communication. In the those related to press and expression. Brazilian context, this includes the extensive use of fake It was not unanimous. On the contrary, the idea news, hate speech, harassment, and other forms of vio‐ that all journalists have a responsibility embodied in lence against journalists. their function, especially when they become influential Journalism, as a practice or an institution, and democ‐ figures on Twitter, indicates that the discussion is not racy, in Brazil and other parts of the globe, are at a defin‐ precisely on the existence of rules but its legitimacy ing moment. Social Media in general, and Twitter in par‐ (imposed by employer or platform). Moreover, for those ticular, are playing a core role. As Bruns and Nuernbergk who work for new media companies, the perception that (2019) suggested, new power structures emerged from Twitter profiles are part of themselves is stronger than political journalists’ relations with social media audi‐ for those who work for traditional media. Also, political ences. Brazilian journalists who participated in this study Media and Communication, 2022, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 28–38 35 exemplify different forms of Twitter’s use to influence lic sphere, and the chaos of online deliberation (pp. political narratives (setting the public or political agenda 1–22). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978‐3‐030‐ or building the public opinion). It has become part 41421‐4 of their daily role, changing news production routines, Brazil: Bolsonaro blocks critics on social media. (2021, offering a secondary gatekeeper to distribute news, and August 21). Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw. providing a more transparent process in the context of org/news/2021/08/19/brazil‐bolsonaro‐blocks‐ rampant fake news and pressure from the government. critics‐social‐media Results indicate the existence of a similar two‐step Brems, C., Temmerman, M., Graham, T., & Broersma, M. flow system, similar to Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (2017), (2017). Personal branding on Twitter: How employed based on journalists/influencers–audiences/followers and freelance journalists stage themselves on social relation as part of a new intermediary model. We have media. Digital Journalism, 5(4), 443–459. https://doi. identified that participants use their digital capital in two org/10.1080/21670811.2016.1176534 political directions. On the one hand, journalists share Bruns, A., & Nuernbergk, C. (2019). Political journal‐ their spots and comments on daily issues as part of a ists and their social media audiences: New power digital strategy promoted by media outlets to gain atten‐ relations. Media and Communication, 7(1), 198–212. tion and call the audience. On the other hand, in a polar‐ https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v7i1.1759 ized political context, as we inquired about in RQ1, jour‐ Canavilhas, J., Colussi, J., & Moura, Z.‐B. (2019). Disinfor‐ nalists found in Twitter a path—although not the only mation in the 2018 Brazilian presidential election: An one—to fight on the same battlefield (social media plat‐ analysis of Whatsapp family groups. Profesional de forms) that Bolsonaro uses to communicate. The fluid La Informacion, 28(5), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.3145/ connections between different media are reshaping the epi.2019.sep.03 intermediary model. As we inquired in RQ2, participants Canter, L. (2015). Personalised tweeting: The emerging indicated threats to freedom of expression in the digital practices of journalists on Twitter. Digital Journalism, landscape and the importance of being a digital influ‐ 3(6), 888–907. https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811. encer, which means having a prominent position across 2014.973148 social media platforms. They indicated it as the best, and Casero‐Ripollés, A. (2020). Political influencers in the sometimes, the only way, to control narratives about digital public sphere. Communication and Society, their productions or themselves while they are faced 33(2), 171–173. https://doi.org/10.15581/003.33.2. with continual harassment, hate, and a fake news storm 171‐173 promoted by Bolsonaro and his supporters against jour‐ Castells, M. (2009). Communication power. Oxford Uni‐ nalists and media outlets. versity Press. Castells, M. (2012). Networks of outrage and hope: Social Acknowledgments movements in the internet age. Polity. Cavalcalte, T. (2021). O papel das novas tecnologias no The author wishes to thank the insightful and construc‐ jornalismo comunitário: Voz das comunidades, do tive comments of both the anonymous reviewers and the impresso ao digital [The role of new technologies academic editors. in community journalism: Communities’ voices, from press to digital]. Revista de Comunicação Dialógica, Conflict of Interests 3(6), 10–33. Chadwick, A. (2017). The hybrid media system: Politics The author declares no conflict of interest. and power (2nd ed.). 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(2021). “Compos‐ ball.” Digital Journalism, 6(1), 76–97. https://doi.org/ tura, senhor presidente!”: O governo Bolsonaro e 10.1080/21670811.2017.1345318 a defesa do jornalismo pelas entidades representa‐ Toff, B., Badrinathan, S., Mont’alverne, C., Arguedas, A. R., tivas do campo [“Composure, Mr. President”: Bol‐ Fletcher, R., & Nielsen, R. K. (2021). Overcoming sonaro’s government and the defense of journal‐ indifference: What attitudes toward news across the ism by representative entities]. Fronteiras—Estudos global North and South tell us about building trust. Midiáticos, 23(3), 77–90. https://doi.org/10.4013/ Reuters Institute. fem.2021.233.07 Welbers, K., & Opgenhaffen, M. (2019). Presenting news Singer, J. B. (2014). User‐generated visibility: Secondary on social media. Digital Journalism, 7(1), 45–62. gatekeeping in a shared media space. New Media https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2018.1493939 and Society, 16(1), 55–73. https://doi.org/10.1177/ Zelizer, B., Boczkowski, P., & Anderson, C. W. (2021). The 1461444813477833 journalism manifesto. Polity. Statista. (2020). Fake news in Brazil. https://www. About the Author Luiz Peres‐Neto is a Serra Húnter lecturer at the Department of Journalism and Communication Science and an Associate Researcher at the Institute of Communication (InCom) at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB), Spain. He holds a PhD in Communication, and his research interests and publications focus on media and politics, political communication, ethics, and human rights perspec‐ tives in communication and journalism. Media and Communication, 2022, Volume 10, Issue 3, Pages 28–38 38