World Development 157 (2022) 105956 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect World Development journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev How are institutions included in Integrated Conservation and Development Projects? Developing and testing a diagnostic approach on the World Bank’s Forest and Community project in Salta, Argentina Louise Marie Busck-Lumholt a,⇑, Esteve Corbera a,b,c, Ole Mertz d a Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Cerdanyola del Vallès, Spain b Department of Geography, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Cerdanyola del Vallès, Spain c Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats (ICREA), Barcelona, Spain d Department of Geosciences and Natural Resource Management, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t Article history: The opportunities and challenges of ensuring participation and success of Integrated Conservation and Accepted 5 May 2022 Development Projects (ICDPs) have been fairly studied. However, it is not often well-established which Available online 25 May 2022 institutional mechanisms explain the failure in meeting participatory and project goals. To fill this gap, we develop a telecoupling-inspired diagnostic approach to assess the level of institutional distance and Keywords: opportunity for collective decision-making in ICDPs by looking at project information flows, project asset Integrated Conservation and Development flows, and rules and regulation flows between project actors. We construct three management arche- Projects types based on the direction and directness of such flows: decoupled management, telecoupled manage- Forest management Telecoupling ment and collaborative management. The archetypes are applied to a case study of a World Bank- Participatory approaches financed ICDP in Argentina, drawing on qualitative data collected from individual interviews with project Argentina actors. Our findings challenge the notion that a project becomes participatory if the project design pro- Salta vides guidelines for participatory implementation. We find that our diagnostic approach helps to con- cretize the call for inclusion of local project actors across the project cycle, which is needed to make projects collaborative, relevant, and socially just. Finally, we advocate future project assessments to build on this approach and map the practical institutional relationships between project actors to provide transparency on the de facto level of project collaboration. This article is relevant for both academics and practitioners designing and implementing conservation and development projects. Ó 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 1. Introduction (Jeanrenaud, 2002; Mosse, 2004). This trend has also been observed in cases of participatory forest management, rural devel- Development projects today are to a large extent operating opment projects, decentralization of forest management, and within the discourse of participation and integrated project designs interventions with market-based solutions to deforestation (see as rarely questioned premises for success. Centralist top-down Oberlack et al., 2018; Pfliegner, 2014; Pouliot & Treue, 2013; approaches have been increasingly replaced by ideas about more Ribot, 2004; Mosse, 2004). grounded, people-friendly, and inclusive interventions (Li, 2007). Some find that participation in ICDPs facilitates more positive In the forest sector, so-called Integrated Conservation and Devel- conservation attitudes (Morgan-brown, Jacobson, Wald, & Child, opment Projects (ICDPs) have become a popular approach that, in 2010), while others find no effect on conservation (Linkie et al., theory, is grounded in a participatory take on development (Bank 2008). Several case studies highlight the inevitable trade-offs & Sills, 2014). However, reports on the level of participation and and potentially conflicting goals of development and conserva- the environmental and social effects of ICDPs are often ambivalent tion (Barrett & Arcese, 1995; Cagalanan, 2013; Sayer et al., (Bank & Sills 2014; Mutune & Lund, 2016; Saguin, 2018; 2009) and report failure or reproduction of the status quo Wainwright & Wehrmeyer, 1998) and many ICDPs rarely or only (Arjunan et al., 2006; Bank & Sills, 2014; Oberlack et al., 2018). indirectly mirror the objectives they were intended to meet Generally, participation surfaces as the most crucial but also the most difficult element to realize in such integrated projects ⇑ Corresponding author. (Brown, 2002; Cagalanan, 2013; Tafon & Saunders, 2014; E-mail address: louise.lumholt@uab.cat (L.M. Busck-Lumholt). Gockel and Gray, 2015). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2022.105956 0305-750X/Ó 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Louise Marie Busck-Lumholt, E. Corbera and O. Mertz World Development 157 (2022) 105956 Despite this growing evidence of the success and failure of governance presented in Eakin et al. (2014). Our approach is actor ICDPs, and the availability of detailed project cycle frameworks network-based in the sense that we understand the sending system for practitioners (e.g. Ba & Kyne, 2008), the misalignment of project as made up of processes and actors involved in project design rather design and practice and the wider management issues (Aldashev & than a self-standing social-ecological system, while the receiving Vallino, 2019) should be investigated and monitored to better system involves the project actors dealing with direct implementa- understand the reasons behind participation challenges. This calls tion and the beneficiaries of project activities. for an analysis that considers not just the informational and insti- Through a telecoupling lens, it becomes possible to study not tutional flows in project actor networks but also the lack of flows only connections across distance but also how weak or missing and fragmentation of such networks (Rudnick et al., 2019) and flows between project actors cause disconnections between send- the difference between theoretical and tangible participation and ing and receiving systems (Hull & Liu, 2018) which in turn result in collaboration (Eriksen et al., 2021; Fox, 2020). a decoupling of project idea and reality, and unfeasible or irrele- We address these research gaps by presenting and testing a vant objectives and outcomes (Fox, 2020). This notion concurs with novel diagnostic archetype approach to project management those who have advocated for participatory planning tools as a assessment that visualizes issues of institutional distance and means to get the local understandings of problems and solutions opportunities for collective decision-making arenas in ICDPs. The ‘right’ (Agrawal et al., 2008; Li, 2007; Ribot, 2004) and those who approach is theoretically grounded in the concept of telecoupling believe that addressing local environmental and social needs and developed through an iterative process of literature review requires collaborative management, including strong and bidirec- and fieldwork conducted in a participatory ICDP at the various sites tional flows among project actors regarding project information, where project actors were located. Telecoupling has been consid- project assets, rules and regulations (Aldashev & Vallino, 2019; ered a useful heuristic device to analyze and better comprehend Fernández Milmanda & Garay, 2019; Fox, 2020; Grillos, 2017; sustainability challenges (Friis & Nielsen, 2017b). Still, to our Larsen, 2008). In the following, we first elaborate on these flows, knowledge, there are no studies to date which have operational- secondly, we describe the project actors and issues of institutional ized telecoupling to analyze the management and implementation distance, and finally, we present our diagnostic approach through challenges of development projects. We do this through our diag- three management archetypes that reflect different opportunities nostic approach and introduce new ways by which academics for collective decision-making as a result of the degree of and practitioners can address some of the structural problems with institutional distance between project actors. participation and collaboration that often characterize interna- tional development projects. Finally, we argue that such informa- 2.1. Flows determining management situations tion contributes to better explaining the misalignment between a project’s design and its implementation. The project management domain which we analyze, can be looked at as a network of actors and flows, where the type of flows are decisive for institutional distance and thus the ability of collec- 2. Telecoupling as a lens to study the management of ICDPs: A tive decision-making. Munroe et al. (2019) consider all decision- diagnostic approach making in telecoupled land systems to take place within a collec- tive decision-making arena due to the interdependency between In our globalized world, we have developed an interdependent actors in sending and receiving systems. We argue that a prerequi- institutional infrastructure where distant actors, processes, and site for a collective decision-making arena to exist is at least some places are connected by material (e.g. goods or people) and imma- bidirectional flows between the institutions participating in the terial (e.g. information or discourse) flows. The concept of telecou- governance situation. The ability to define development is most pling has been proposed as a heuristic device (Friis & Nielsen, likely to be possessed by actors with financial resources and polit- 2017b) to illuminate this interconnectivity across institutional ical positions to control the flows of project information, project and geographical distances, and as a framework (Liu et al., 2013) assets, and rules and regulations, which can be unidirectional from operating with five interrelated telecoupling components: sys- ‘sending’ to ‘receiving’ project actors. As such, we argue that de tems, agents, flows, causes, and effects. We apply telecoupling facto collaboration in project management situations cannot be more broadly as an analytical lens in our approach to project man- understood without attention to flows as this approach provides agement diagnosis, where the framework components of systems, more insight into what makes up institutional distance and collec- agents, and flows are integrated alongside elements of institutional tive decision-making, rather than looking at ‘actors’ and ‘links’ analysis. The sending system is considered the origin of the inter- alone (Munroe et al., 2019; Rudnick et al., 2019). action or flow, and the receiving system as the recipient. Their We understand flows broadly as the ‘‘movements of material, boundary is a dynamic delineation and a result of the literature energy, or information between the systems that are transferred review and empirical case study analysis rather than an a priori as a result of actions taken by agents.” (Liu et al., 2013:5). Telecou- definition (Friis & Nielsen, 2017b). pling literature has shown the importance of studying flows over Research adopting a telecoupling lens has often applied the con- large distances, also with regards to local responses as they might cept to study global connections driving land-use change (Kapsar get lost on their way before they can influence distant policy deci- et al., 2019) but there are calls for more integration of institutions sions, causing disconnections between signals and drivers (Hull & in the analysis of these connections (e.g. Eakin et al., 2014; Liu, 2018; Friis & Nielsen, 2017a; Oberlack et al., 2018). In an ICDP, Oberlack et al., 2018). In this paper, we respond to such calls by this is especially problematic when the project claims to have a demonstrating that the adoption of a telecoupling perspective in design based on local needs. In a situation where local opinion the study of ICDPs can shed new light on how they work and why and knowledge are not directly part of the design phase, the design they might fail as conservation and development institutions. Insti- may rely on existing research or project actors’ experience and tutions are understood as both regulatory and organizational imagination regarding local development needs (Aldashev & arrangements (Hobley, 1996) with a focus on both formal and infor- Vallino, 2019; Eriksen et al., 2021). mal practices that structure institutional behavior (Ostrom, 2005). In our analysis, we focus on 1) information and planning of Our take on telecoupling is inspired by the telecoupling network project objectives, activities, scheduling, and budgeting (project integration approach proposed by Seaquist and Johansson (2019) information flows), 2) the formulation and imposition of rules and the schematic representation of telecoupling as a way to analyze and regulations on natural resource use, restrictions on land use 2 Louise Marie Busck-Lumholt, E. Corbera and O. Mertz World Development 157 (2022) 105956 in general, zoning practices, etc. (rules and regulation flows), and geographical distance, but also reflects institutional or social dis- 3) project funds, goods, and services such as technical expertise tances (Eakin et al., 2017). The way flows are mediated between (project asset flows). Bidirectional flows of project information (di- project actors in the sending and receiving system can maintain, alogue) and transparency regarding rules and regulations are cru- increase, or reduce institutional distance because it influences cial for relevant funds, goods, and service delivery. Local the level of collective decision-making between project actors in beneficiaries need to be able to know what to ask for, and whom the design and implementation system. to hold accountable, to participate in decision-making and thereby Drawing on Eakin et al.’s (2017) telecoupling typology, we help project managers with a more efficient and effective way to understand institutional distance as something that arises when bring relevant project results (Kosec & Wantchekon, 2020). project actors or systems share few formal, social, or institutional It is necessary to be critical of the relevance of project informa- relations. For example, there can be a strong relationship between tion flows, especially in cases where the content has been decided two project actors if they are financially interdependent. Simulta- far away from the intended beneficiaries. Local community mem- neously, it can be a relationship characterized by distance if there bers, as well as other project actors, will never just be passive are indirect or missing project information flows. As such, a project recipients of flows. Therefore, it is optimal to complement a diag- design system and implementation system can be linked through nosis of a project’s management situation with an analysis that formal ties while being inherently disconnected in practice. considers the demand side, rather than only being attentive to Increasing institutional distance also increases the risk of whether or not the information is there (Ojha et al., 2016; homogenization of project actors and organizations, and vice versa. Berliner, Bagozzi, & Palmer-Rubin, 2018). While it may be conceptually helpful to construct institutional Project asset flows and rules and regulation flows are important, boundaries around ‘‘the donor”, ‘‘the local community”, ‘‘the NGO”, particularly when considering rural community actors who might and ‘‘the governmental agency”, it is problematic in practice. If be unlikely to be able to act on information flows without the corre- these constructs are distributed through flows of project informa- sponding financial resources and decision-making authority. Assets tion and there is little or no direct dialogue, it can undermine an can also flow the other way, from local beneficiaries and outwards, understanding of individual realities which may reinforce the insti- by hiring local consultants or in the form of the sharing of benefits tutional distance between project actors (Lewis et al., 2003). Thus, generated by a project activity such as tourism revenue (Larsen, as well as being a consequence of missing flows, institutional dis- 2008). Rules and regulations are decisive for the distance between tance can be produced by unidirectional flows. project actors and thus for the opportunity of a collective decision- The concept of institutional distance speaks to the organization making arena because ICDPs will never be implemented in a vac- design theory by Galbraith (1974) and the challenge he identifies uum. They are bound to specific international and domestic rules in relation to large organizations with interdependent sub-units: and regulations, directly and indirectly, affiliated with the project. ‘‘the design problem is to create mechanisms that permit coordi- Regardless of strong dialogue and collaboration through project nated action across large numbers of interdependent roles” information flows and project asset flows, top-down rules and regu- (Galbraith, 1974:28). The higher the number of project actors, lations would likely limit the collective decision-making arena and the more complex the interdependencies, and the more informa- sustainability of collaboration (Fox, 2020; Hasan et al., 2020). tion must be processed to ensure coordination. If we imagine ICDPs We discern between unidirectional, bidirectional, direct, and as large organizations and project actors as interdependent sub- indirect flows to enable a more nuanced understanding of network units, it becomes clear that strong bidirectional flows between ties and the complexity in networks that are not explicit, formally them are crucial to reduce the distance and ensure a space for coor- intended, or structured. We understand bidirectional flows as dia- dinated action i.e., what we refer to as the collective decision- logue and unidirectional flows as situations where dialogue is not making arena. required or specifically sought. This could be, for example, when Our understanding of collective decision-making in a project project managers conduct consultations and present a priori management domain is related to Rudnick et al.’s (2019) defined activities to a local beneficiary (unidirectional flow from description of a ‘shared governance network’, where project coor- project manager towards the local beneficiary) and the local bene- dination is shared among many actors through bidirectional ficiary express opinions which are then extracted as raw data by flows; more organizations with greater tie density (stronger the project manager (unidirectional flow from the local beneficiary flows) are less likely to break into fragmented subgroups. In towards the project manager) (Rowe & Frewer, 2005). Many unidi- management systems where there are direct interactions rectional flows can be indicative of information asymmetry caus- between project actors, trust-based, reciprocal relationships are ing distance between the sending and receiving system. more prevalent and there can be a stronger emphasis on the With direct flow, we mean a transfer or interaction (depending importance of local knowledge (Ostrom, 2005) and NGO experi- on whether it is unidirectional or bidirectional) between actors in a ence (Eriksen et al., 2021). situation where there is clarity about the process of the flow, the As Munroe et al. (2019), we understand decision-making by type of flow, and the actors involved. With indirect flow, in turn, actors through a telecoupling lens and thereby as interdependent we refer to cases where such transfer or interaction is less clear in the sense that the choices and abilities of one actor depend on in either process, type, or the number of actors involved. The flow’s the relation to other actors and systems. For example, implement- directness can indicate where it might be necessary to be attentive ing agencies such as NGOs can be caught in a difficult position to more informal institutional behavior. For example, an indirect between flows in two directions: towards the local community in flow of project information may reflect an underlying incentive the form of project information and service delivery, and towards to withhold information. An indirect project asset flow can indicate the government and the financing agency in the form of incoming an unclear or unofficial distribution of funds, goods, and services, flows of rules and regulations and project information (Aldashev & and indirect rules and regulation flows could indicate discretionary Vallino, 2019; Cook et al., 2017). Even though NGOs are typically rather than rule-based decision-making. considered of paramount importance for the participatory effect of ICDPs and other projects (Shin et al., 2017), their behavior 2.2. Project actors and institutional distance may not be predictable in mediating these flows. Local and interna- tional NGOs, as well as government agencies and donors, are never The term telecoupling can be translated to ‘coupled over homogenous entities and they may display contrasting behaviors distance’ where distance is relative, relational, and not limited to and distinct rule-making structures (Ostrom, 2005). 3 Louise Marie Busck-Lumholt, E. Corbera and O. Mertz World Development 157 (2022) 105956 2.3. Project management archetypes mentation system has an area of overlap to indicate some level of collective planning and decision-making. The premise for this The direction and directness of different flows between actors management situation is that two or more actors are involved in in the design and implementation systems can indicate project both design and implementation activities and that there are direct actor relationships, institutional distance, and thus which type of and bidirectional flows between two or more of these actors. It is management situation is dominant. We present below a diagnostic not possible to provide one single case that fully exemplifies tele- approach that can support both practitioners and academics alike coupled management, as it represents a situation where some but in their efforts to understand the causal mechanisms that may lie not all actors are coupled over distance, and there is some but not behind an ICDP’s ability to be managed collaboratively. Drawing full overlap between actors involved with design and implementa- on the archetype analysis tradition (Eisenack et al., 2021) and tion. For example, it can be cases where NGOs or RDAs participate inspired by the concept of telecoupling (Friis & Nielsen, 2017a), in both design and implementation and have strong bidirectional we construct three archetype management situations that can help flows with the local communities, but the local communities, in diagnose ICDPs claiming to be participatory or community-driven turn, are still detached from the other actors in the design system. (Fig. 1). We consider issues of institutional distance and thus the In collaborative management (Figure 1C), decision-making is opportunity for collective decision-making as dependent on 1) pro- more evenly shared by project actors, which is reflected in the high ject asset flows, 2) project information flows, and 3) rules and reg- number of strong and bidirectional project information flows, pro- ulation flows. Project information flows are of primary concern in ject asset flows, and rules and regulation flows between project this paper, but the other two types of flows included in Fig.1 are actors. All project actors thereby become involved in both design considered relevant to contextualize the direction and strength of and implementation which allows for collective definition- and project information. Fig.1 shows examples of three archetypes decision-making. Design and implementation become an inte- but the specific actors, direction, and directness of flows will vary, grated system of feedback and interactions in the collective also within archetypes, across cases. We exemplify this in decision-making arena, which constitutes an opportunity and Section 4.3. should not be considered a democratic output in itself. As pointed The tables that accompany the figure contain further informa- out by Grillos (2017), some participatory institutions are represen- tion for its interpretation: Table 1 provides a list of abbreviations tative and succeed in collective decision-making, while others can used in Fig.1 and the typical roles of project actors relevant to be prone to elite capture. include in the analysis of ICDPs. Table 2 sums up Section 2.1 with We see collaborative management as the ideal for projects to be an overview of the types of flows included in Fig.1, together with a democratic, implementable, socially just, and locally relevant, thus description of the ‘direction’ and ‘directness’ variables. supporting arguments related to co-management frameworks for The three archetypes are decoupled management, telecoupled natural resource governance (Addison, Stoeckl, Larson, & Jarvis, management, and collaborative management. Additional distinc- 2019; Ostrom, 2005; Ribot, 2003; Armitage, Berkes, & Doubleday, tions within the receiving system could be made between project 2007). Collaborative management is about designing with the local implementing agencies and beneficiary communities. In the send- community beneficiary instead of for the local community benefi- ing system, we include those actors that are involved in the nego- ciary, by placing them at the center of the arena where decisions on tiations on the project budget and objectives while we include project objectives are made (Eriksen et al., 2021) throughout the those in charge of implementing project activities in the receiving project cycle. We acknowledge that the collaborative management system. The archetype is then determined by the direction and archetype draws significantly on Ostrom’s school of institutional directness of flows between these project actors. analysis which has extensively shown that sustainable governance Decoupled management (Figure 1A) is characterized by a lack of requires multitiered management systems that build on rich local a collective decision-making arena, illustrated by the great dis- knowledge and institutions that match the complexity of the tance between the sending and receiving system. In this archetype, ecosystems we ought to manage sustainably. While the Ostrom implementing agencies and local communities are not part of the school is mostly concerned with the challenges and complexities design phase of the project. Those activities are reserved for the involved in common pool resource management, we focus specifi- national government, and the financing agency, and are potentially cally on project management, which in turn can hinder or enable influenced by recommendations from an international NGO (I- collective decision-making on the management of common pool NGO) or other consultants. Project definition- and decision- resources. making is likely to lie with those in the most powerful financial and political positions, such as central government institutions and financing agencies. Although a financing agency like the World 3. The Forest and Community project, Argentina Bank would emphasize that the formal responsibility of planning and implementation lies with the borrower, in practice their pro- 3.1. Case description ject supervisors often play a critical role in project design and con- ceptualization (Burns, Krott, Sayadyan, & Giessen, 2016; Ika, 2015). The project chosen to test our diagnostic approach to project Between project actors in the sending and receiving system, flows management is the Forest and Community (F&C) project, imple- are either unidirectional or indirect, coordination between actors is mented by Argentina’s government in three northern provinces poor, and there is no mechanism for bottom-up feedback or dia- of which our focus is on the province of Salta1. The project is logue. There are no or only a few bidirectional flows, and these financed by a World Bank loan to the Government of Argentina, rep- would be between the national government and the financing resented by the Ministry of Economy (MEC) as the borrower, and the agency. Such a management situation can be indicative of a failed Ministry of Environment and Sustainable development (MAyDS) as program or project (Rudnick et al., 2019). the implementing agency. The ministries do not carry out project Telecoupled management (Figure 1B) is characterized by a implementation on the ground but oversee the procurement pro- greater number and density of flows between project actors. The cesses, the financial management, the decision-making on project distance arrow is illustrated as being able to both increase and decrease to indicate that the larger the overlap, the larger the col- 1 The project is as well designed to be implemented in the provinces of Chaco and lective decision arena, and the smaller the institutional distance Santiago del Estero, but the data collection for this paper has focused on the province between the two systems and vice versa. The design and imple- of Salta. 4 Louise Marie Busck-Lumholt, E. Corbera and O. Mertz World Development 157 (2022) 105956 Fig. 1. Project management in a telecoupling perspective. Fig. 1 (continued) 5 Louise Marie Busck-Lumholt, E. Corbera and O. Mertz World Development 157 (2022) 105956 Table 1 List of key project actors. Actors Typical roles and responsibilities Donors (D) or international Support for projects through the provision of financial actors (F) loans or grants; Negotiating project activities and distribution of project funds; Risk assessment and analysis of the client’s country system and procurement capacity; Assist client with procurement planning; Provide training, technical assistance, and awareness-raising; Monitor compliance with a loan or grant agreement (Aldashev & Vallino, 2019; Rahman et al., 2016) Consultants (C) Study, design, or supervision of the project; Technical assistance; Institutional strengthening and capacity building National Government (NG) Borrower; Identification of project need, strategy, planning, and design; Carrying out procurement activities following the loan or grant agreement (Rahman et al., 2016) Provincial (PG) or Local Brokers and accountable representatives for Government (LG) the target population; Responsibility and decision-making power allocated to the local level government depends directly on the borrower (Rahman et al., 2016). In the F&C project, they are not involved with implementation arrangements. International NGO (I-NGO) Outside pressure or consultant depending on the project (Aldashev & Vallino, 2019) Local Implementing Unit (LIU) Teams of specialists and technicians hired by the ministry(ies) managing the project, to implement project activities. These units are ideally located in or very near the site(s) Fig. 1 (continued) where activities are to be realized. Local NGO (L-NGO) or Rural Bottom-up pressure or implementation Development Agency responsibilities depending on the project; activities, and are responsible to comply with the World Bank loan (RDA) Broker and representative of the target agreement. At the time of fieldwork (2019), the provincial govern- population; Service providers to assist with ment had not been part of the implementation arrangements. project implementation; Consultancy MAyDS established a Buenos Aires-based National Executing Unit (Aldashev and Vallino, 2019; Maya (NEU) integrated into the ministry’s line functions and set up Local Pasgaard, 2015) Local Communities (LC) Official target group/beneficiary; Subject to Implementation Units (LIU) in each of the three provinces where participatory activities (Maya Pasgaard, the project is being implemented. The NEU oversees project manage- 2015; Ravina, Ray, Shih, & Medvegy, 2018) ment at the national level, including inter-institutional coordination, supervision and monitoring, cumulative procurement processes, liaising and reporting to the World Bank. To make use of existing collaboration between project actors, especially local NGOs and networks and because there is only a limited allocation of resources community organizations (World Bank, 2015). to provide salaries for LIU staff, local NGOs and Rural Development The project was still active by the time of fieldwork, why it was Agencies (RDAs) are hired as so-called service providers to provide premature to identify its impact and evaluate the results. However, technical assistance and support communities in project it is a large-scale project involving a multitude of stakeholders at implementation. different scales and thus represents many of the typical manage- The World Bank’s 58.76 million USD loan for the project has ment and coordination challenges of ICDPs. It is also a very com- Sustainable Livelihoods as the largest component with 41.69 mil- plex, ambitious, and contentious project, why we argue that if lion USD in the original project documents (World Bank, 2015). our diagnostic approach can yield constructive insights in this con- This involves helping selected indigenous and Creole communities text, it will be applicable in less complicated cases as well. with the preparation and implementation of Integrated Commu- nity Plans (PICs). The PIC enables access to funding for different 3.2. Data collection land-use activities like silviculture and timber logging, but also includes non-extractive opportunities such as eco-tourism. The Data collection was conducted during two field trips to Buenos project is closely tied to the passing of the 2007 Forest Law in Aires and Salta in February and July-August 2019. Relevant actors Argentina which included provisions for provincial governments at the national and provincial levels were identified and most were to implement Land Use Planning Processes (LUPPs) as a prerequi- available for interviews, whereas project actors at the local level site for provinces to receive funds attached to the law. In turn, were more difficult to access. At the time of fieldwork, nine PICs LUPPs implied a Land Use Zonation (LUZ), where land was to be were being implemented in Salta. Since project staff in several of divided into three zones: a red zone for areas of high conservation the PICs were not responsive, the sampling strategy became largely value, a yellow zone for medium conservation value, and a green based on recommendations from central management on where to zone for low conservation value. The Forest Law has been criticized find an area where project activities had been approved and for its top-down implementation (Volante & Seghezzo, 2018). The initiated (SSI15).2 When contact was reached with two PICs located F&C project officially strives to meet this criticism by assisting with the development of PICs for the yellow zones in the Northern pro- 2 The paper will use following interview code style: SSI=semi-structured interview, vinces. Formally, the F&C project’s design is described as participa- CSSI=community semi-structured interview; #=interview number organized in tory, community-driven, demand-driven, and with strong chronological order. 6 Louise Marie Busck-Lumholt, E. Corbera and O. Mertz World Development 157 (2022) 105956 Description of flow types. Table 2 7 Louise Marie Busck-Lumholt, E. Corbera and O. Mertz World Development 157 (2022) 105956 in the same region and representing both Creole and indigenous further details on the qualitative coding). The direct quotations Wichí participants, these were selected for further data collection. presented in this paper have been corrected grammatically for A total of 44 interviews were conducted. This includes eight readability. interviews with staff from the MAyDS at the national level, seven interviews with staff from the LIU in Salta, three with World Bank employees, 12 with representatives from NGOs and RDAs, and 14 4. Applying the diagnostic approach to the F&C project household level interviews in local communities. Two project sites were visited: 1) a community of Creole ‘‘Campesinos” with 116 4.1. Flows between actors in the F&C project registered project participants (some from the same household), where 12 interviews were carried out at the household level; and 4.1.1. Rules and regulation flows 2) a registered community of approximately 53 Wichí families We consider rules and regulation flows from the national gov- where one group interview was carried out and followed up by ernment and in the context of the World Bank loan requirements one separate household-level interview. The schedule for data col- and policies since the qualitative interviews revealed these flows lection in the Wichí community involved several modifications due to be decisive for project collaboration. The World Bank sends to local frustration with the repeated project and research related direct flows of rules and regulations to the national ministries surveys carried out in their community. Therefore, the original through their loan criteria, safeguard policies, and various proto- plan to do structured interviews with a representative number of cols for procurement, monitoring, evaluation, etc. (World Bank, project participants did not work well, and a group discussion 2015). According to the NEU project director, this meant that the was carried out instead. The local NGO representative, who also Bank was very involved with project design, as they generally want participated in the group discussion, had contacted the Wichí com- to oversee the management of contracts and budget spending to munity leader, who then invited project participants to join the make sure that no project activities go against Bank policies meeting in the village center. The residents in the community were (SSI15). As the Provincial Government also demanded, another known to be very angry with interventions like the F&C project Bank requirement was the certification of ‘peaceful occupation’ that, according to them, never materialized on the ground. Conse- for the project area (SSI15). The NEU imposed the Bank-affiliated quently, the Wichí community leader was unsure if anyone would rules and regulations indirectly when they set project require- show up and therefore invited all the male household heads in the ments for LIUs and service providers (NGOs and RDAs). Since the village, out of which thirteen joined the discussion. Some left dur- LIU worked under the direct guidance of the NEU, who dictated ing the meeting, others came, and ultimately seven participated their operations, we consider the rules and regulation flows from actively in the discussions. the NEU towards the LIU to be direct and unidirectional. The LIU Following the group discussion, conversations during a walk in and NGOs/RDAs communicated some of these rules and regula- the village provided information on expected service delivery and tions in meetings and workshops at the local community level. showcased examples of initiated work that had never been fin- However, we assess this to be a more indirect flow because it ished, such as the digging of a water well. Since there were no was unclear from the interview and document analysis how and women present at the group discussion (the majority of registered to what extent this was done. project participants in the Wichí communities are men), a separate The Provincial Government was not officially included as part of household interview was carried out with two female community the F&C project management but they played an important role members. All interviews explored issues related to communica- regarding rules and regulation flows. The approval of PICs needed tion, awareness of project activities, involvement in decision- to go through the Provincial Government, which has the main making across the project cycle, roles and responsibilities, and jurisdiction to directly impose rules and regulations on land use information-sharing mechanisms (the list of questions is available interventions for both local communities, NGOs, RDAs, and the in the supplementary materials). LIU. NGO and RDA staff pointed to this jurisdiction as being very Project documents such as the World Bank project appraisal bureaucratic, limiting participation and slowing down project report, implementation manuals, and public information flyers implementation substantially. For example, they require that pro- obtained from project staff were reviewed to explore the design ject participants in the F&C project can show land titles, and they of the project and contrast official objectives and management pro- will not approve projects that do not have proper mechanisms cedures with observed practices. The F&C project officially builds installed for conflict resolution (SSI16). on a series of preparational activities and studies,3 why it has been There was no evidence of formal institutions, such as local for- described in great technical detail. The purpose of this case study is est guards or on-site forest departments, in place to control forest to share a snapshot of management practice for the sake of showing use (CSSI1; CSSI3) nor any protocol for monitoring (SSI16), and the usefulness of our diagnostic approach. Therefore, the analysis from interviews, it was unclear whether the local community addresses a sample of project documents rather than an exhaustive members were supposed to be part of the monitoring of LUZ and list. associated project activities (SSI3). Moreover, the interviewed A longer-term stay in the field may have resulted in more local community members did not seem to have been informed about voices being heard. However, we assess that it would be unlikely the relation between the project and the Forest Law, and there that perceptions about the project would have been different than were no reports on participation in the LUZ, the formulation of those gathered since the project had not yet resulted in any tangi- the law, or the setting of F&C project objectives and protocols (8 ble benefits that other local beneficiaries could value differently. CSSIs; SSI16). We consider that the interviews conducted are enough to suggest The apparent top-down flows of national rules and regulations a management archetype, which is what we seek to demonstrate resonate with evidence from the same Argentine northern pro- through our diagnostic approach. Transcriptions of the interviews, vinces presented in Volante and Seghezzo (2018). It is noteworthy written notes from community visits, and project documents were since the F&C project was closely tied to the Forest Law by arguing analyzed in Nvivo and QCAmap (see supplementary materials for to help to communicate the LUZ locally and enable a participatory implementation (SSI14). The project information flows are thus 3 These include the Forestry Development Project (P006040) (approved 1995), the closely linked to the rules and regulation flows, which seem to Native Forests and Protected Areas Project (P040808) (approved 1996), and the behave in the same unidirectional and indirect way between actors Sustainable Natural Resources Management Project (P100806) (approved 2008). in the design and implementation system. 8 Louise Marie Busck-Lumholt, E. Corbera and O. Mertz World Development 157 (2022) 105956 4.1.2. Project asset flows F&C project was limited to a consultation email with an invitation Project funds were transferred directly from the World Bank to read and revise project documents (SSI17). An employee from towards the MEC as the official borrower, and from there to the one of the RDAs noted that ‘‘there was practically no participation NEU. Towards the LIU and implementing agencies, the flow of pro- in the formulation process of the F&C project. On the other hand, in ject assets was more indirect and interrupted. This was evident this project, the only thing there is so far, is formulation.” (SSI19). partly by the fact that the project, during a mid-term review, At the community level, none of the interviewees could men- was rated as unsatisfactory, resulting in a change of project sched- tion any project-related activity aside from a project meeting in ules and budget cuts which led to a temporary halt of project funds 2018 (CSSI1-12; CSSI13). Such meetings were aimed at mapping disbursement (SSI5). Moreover, according to a previous project local land use and community needs to inform the formulation of director, the project represented a change in the approach to the PICs (SSI19; SSI14). Some of the interviewed community members management of project funds in the sense that besides small described it as events where different agencies presented ideas and amounts for office supplies, money was only transferred to the strategies for how to improve the export of forest products (CSSI3). LIU, NGOs, and RDAs on-demand after activities had been realized None of them seemed fully aware of the project’s purpose or (SSI9). expressed any role in defining this purpose (CSSI1-12; CSSI13). The management of funds and procurement processes required As put by one of the project participants, ‘‘what did they do in to implement PICs was centralized, while flows of goods and ser- these meetings? They present each topic, tell us what is going to vices required for the operationalization of project objectives were happen, inform us about things, present some idea to carry out, supposed to be delivered by the implementing agencies (SSI9; have some requests. . . those things ‘‘ (CSSI6). The local Creole lea- SSI3; SSI14). An emphasis on heavy bureaucracy and irregular dis- der described the workshops similarly, ‘‘in the workshop they tell bursement of project funds seemed to be echoed across imple- you what is good and what is bad, they tell you what to do and menting project actors (SSI19; SSI14; SSI16), and an RDA what not to do” (CSSI1). This type of communication we interpret employee underscored that there was no participatory approach as an indirect and unidirectional flow of project information from to the management and decision-making on project funds the LIU to the local community as well as from the local commu- (SSI19). The LIU project coordinator emphasized that this created nity towards the implementing project actors since the participa- great difficulties for local interaction with communities, ‘‘delays tion is characterized more by information extraction than direct generate mistrust (..) they (the local communities) are afraid. dialogue. And for me, it is very reasonable because they are living in areas The local project meetings allegedly followed the World Bank’s with many needs (..) If the project does not arrive in a reasonable consultation procedure (World Bank, 2013) to mitigate negative time, they will say that it is just more of the same.” (SSI14). From social and cultural impacts. However, this did not appear to have these findings, we consider project asset flows from the NEU translated into collaboration on early project design. There were towards implementing project actors, and from the LIU toward arguments from RDA staff that the meetings were held after over- the NGOs and RDAs, to be unidirectional and indirect. arching project objectives were already decided (SSI19). This was From the implementing project actors towards the communi- supported by statements from the NEU director who noted that ties, the distribution of project funds, goods, and services appeared there were three predefined lines of investment, namely forest very problematic, fragmented, and in some cases withheld (SSI16; management, agriculture, and ranching, within which they invited SSI17; SSI20). From field observations and unofficial sources, it was local communities to propose activities (SSI15). In addition, a sub- reported that minor goods were distributed by the LIU, such as component was included in the F&C project design to give room for kitchen equipment and solar cells, without coordination with local participants to propose their own projects, but we did not identify NGOs or RDAs and, it seemed, without coordination with the local any evidence of its operationalization. The implementing agencies communities (CSSI2-12). According to local NGO staff, this distri- seemed to agree that there was an insufficient dialogue with the bution was ‘‘alien to what was formulated in the PIC” and thus community to ensure participation in decision-making and to not mirroring requests from the communities (SSI20). The imple- guarantee that project activities were based on local priorities menting agencies questioned the amount of time allocated for par- (SSI19; SSI20; SSI16; SSI18; SSI17). The local Creole leader had a ticipatory exercises to know community needs when the only more positive perspective on the opportunity for project collabora- project activities realized did not reflect their most urgent needs, tion and argued that both Creole and Wichí communities were rep- such as access to clean water (SSI19). resented at an intercommunity and local stakeholder management Aside from the local Creole leader who unofficially seemed to roundtable4 that was overseeing all incoming investments (CSSI1)5. assist with project coordination, there was no sign of bidirectional Thus, the lack of bidirectional flows between project actors and local flows with local beneficiaries such as co-management arrange- communities that we encountered does not mean that local commu- ments regarding decision-making and distribution of funds, goods, nities are passive recipients of flows6. Further data collection at later and services. On the contrary, interview data and project reports project stages might reveal more local dialogue or multi-stakeholder conceptualize project activities as ‘offers’, provided by the imple- communication channels. menting agencies, which can be aligned with community ‘de- Generally, we did not identify any project information flows mands’ (World Bank, 2015), and describe how these offers can be between the actors designing the project (World Bank, MAyDS, either accepted or rejected by the local beneficiaries (SSI15). MEC) and the local communities. This might contribute to explain- ing why the communities’ urgent need for water (CSSI13; SSI22; 4.1.3. Project information flows CSSI1-12) was still in the process of being assessed rather than Between the World Bank, the MEC, and the NEU, we find direct bidirectional flows since there was dialogue and negotiations on 4 We did not find any evidence in any of the remaining interviews that this project activities, reporting, monitoring, and evaluation (SSI8; roundtable was an institution directly included in the design and implementation of SSI21; SSI15). From the NEU towards the LIU, the flow is unidirec- the F&C project. Further analysis could explore this issue more in-depth. 5 tional and direct, as they guided and dictated implementation Creole and Wichi attitudes were very different, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore this difference in detail. See for example Gabay and Alam (2017) for (SSI9; SSI15; SSI14). This was also the case from the LIU towards more insights to the Wichí communities and Seghezzo et al. (2011) for discussions of the NGOs and RDAs, because they were told which activities to different stakeholders’ visions of development, in the context of the Salta province. carry out without any structured dialogue or collaboration. Accord- 6 Rural communities have been active in advocacy and lobbying in relation to LUZ, ing to on-site NGOs and RDAs, their inclusion in the design of the see for example Volante and Seghezzo (2018). 9 Louise Marie Busck-Lumholt, E. Corbera and O. Mertz World Development 157 (2022) 105956 directly addressed. The PICs were supposed to bridge this gap and tation where Creole communities were informed about the oppor- make sure that activities mirrored local priorities, but at the time tunity to develop PICs, to which they answered ‘‘We don’t want of fieldwork, they were not yet implemented. Based on these find- that. We want water.” (SSI19). The Wichí community members ings, we assess the project information flows from the LIU and the described the project presence as a disturbing element because NGO/RDA toward the local communities as unidirectional and indi- they had to manage continuing visits and provide the same rect because of the low local awareness about project development answers to the same questions from different researchers and pro- and the very fragmented execution of project activities. ject actors (CSSI13). Implementing NGOs and RDAs often pointed to this as a distance between project objectives and community 4.2. Project actors and institutional distance needs, and between project development definitions and local val- ues (SSI19; SSI16). Explained by a variety of structural barriers, There seemed to be a mismatch between implementation project demands, and management responsibilities, the central responsibilities, political authority, and project decision-making project administration focused more on meeting process criteria power. The provincial jurisdiction (elaborated in Section 4.1.1) of technical input and capacity building, than the urgency of real- was argued as a big challenge for project operations (SSI15; izing certain project activities. SSI16). It is the provincial government that takes over the respon- sibility of PICs when the F&C project has been implemented 4.3. Decoupled management (SSI14). Still, they were not officially included in the project. As goes for the LIU, NGOs, and RDAs, they held implementation It was clear during fieldwork, that many actors envisioned the responsibilities but were not trusted with the administration of F&C project to be based on local community demands. However, project funds (SSI9; SSI15). The LIU was expected to be in ongoing from assessing the flows between project actors, we identified a dialogue with local communities, but they found that their lack of management situation where information on local community control over funds and restricted project staff (only a handful to needs was extracted in uncoordinated timing by the LIU and implement the 31 PICs that were planned in the province at the NGOs/RDAs and then brought into a bureaucratic machinery of time of fieldwork) limited their ability to both coordinate project provincial jurisdiction, World Bank protocols, and national policy. implementation and be locally present (SSI14). Decision-making What comes out of this is uncertain as the project is still active and information about the allocation of funds for future project at the time of writing, but we did not encounter convincing evi- activities were kept at higher management levels so when the dence of a collaborative or telecoupled management situation. financing stopped and the implementation paused, the local pro- Based on our findings, the management of the F&C project in Salta ject actors, primarily NGOs and RDAs, became the face of the pro- mirrors the decoupled management archetype (Fig.2). The way ject that had disappointed, even though they were service actors are situated, the nature of flows, and the resulting distance providers without decision-making authority on project activities created between the sending and receiving system, provides no (SSI20). arena for collective decision-making or collaboration on project There were different views, presented by project actors, on the design and implementation. gap between project design and project practice. Project staff at The World Bank and the administrating government institu- both LIU and NEU criticized the management framework as being tions in Buenos Aires surfaced as the key actors in the design sys- too complicated, and argued that ‘‘someone designed an idea, but it tem with the primary control of the direction and directness of is not realistic.” (SSI1). Attempting to design a large-scale forest flows. The LIU, the NGOs, and RDAs seemed to be part of the same and community project as participatory was a first in Argentina, implementation system as the local beneficiary communities since and the technical complexity of the design made it difficult for they worked directly with implementation but were not included many project actors to imagine and operationalize a realistic in the design of project activities. We have placed the provincial implementation (SSI14; SSI19; SSI20). The previous NEU project government in the implementation system even though they are director admitted that ‘‘There is a long way from the idea to the not official project actors; this is because they play an important actual project.” (SSI7). role in project implementation, as previously noted (SSI15). Project actors in the implementation system further argued that Our study indicates that these institutional drivers can be both implementation had not taken off because of the bureaucracy and formal and informal, although a full analysis of all the institutional top-down project design (SSI14; SSI20; SSI9; SSI16) whereas the drivers determining the direction and strength of flows was not central management explained the lack of implementation by the possible. The gap between the formal institutional commitment financial restructuring and budgetary cuts (SSI5; SSI9; SSI15). None to collaboration and the reality on the ground, which we found of the interviewed community members or local NGOs were aware to be more fragmented and decoupled than collaborative, can be that the project was rated as unsatisfactory by the World Bank or indicative that there are informal institutional arrangements at what they should have done to avoid the budget cuts (SSI5; play alongside the more generic coordination issues and structural SSI3). The lack of bidirectional flows between central management challenges. For example, the design actors in the F&C project were and on-site project actors created an institutional distance to the criticized by the NGOs, RDAs, and community members for not communities and the implementing project actors (SSI3). sharing data on project budgets, schedules, and general planning Both NGOs and RDAs believed in the good intentions of the NEU (SSI17; SSI20; CSSI13; CSSI1). If there is an agreement between and the LIU as goes for community interaction and political will to actors to not share data with others throughout a project history, move forward with project activities, but they emphasized that the it could be an important informal but institutionalized relationship realization of these intentions struggled due to a poor management that shapes where information flows to. We detected this trend of structure and coordination of project teams (SSI18; SSI19; SSI20). missing information flows, but further analysis could explore the As noted, the irregularity of the project had caused the participat- incentives of project managers withholding project information, ing communities to lose confidence (SSI14). They were frustrated or other types of flows, to understand the challenges and opportu- that the project activities in which they had expressed interest, nities of their management positions in more detail. particularly the installation of water networks, had not resulted While we did not identify any direct bidirectional flows in anything concrete. As a Wichí cacique (local leader) noted, (which is what characterizes our decoupled management arche- ‘‘Without water how do you expect us to participate in anything?” type) we cannot rule out that they exist in some corner of the (CSSI13). One of the RDAs got a similar response in an early consul- current management structure. We faced data collection difficul- 10 Louise Marie Busck-Lumholt, E. Corbera and O. Mertz World Development 157 (2022) 105956 Fig. 2. Decoupled management in Argentina’s F&C project. ties and a large-scale comprehensive project in ‘crisis’ where dif- By following the analytical steps in our diagnostic approach, we ferent project actors had different views on the flows between have shown that the F&C project represents a decoupled manage- them, why we did not get a complete picture. However, we ment situation where the project is being coordinated in a frag- believe that the qualitative insights we obtained are convincing mented and bureaucratic project actor-network with structural enough to argue for a decoupled management situation during challenges and unimplementable activity schedules resulting in the time of data collection. As it is a project that has been under more information-extracting than collaborative community preparation, pilot-testing, formulation, and implementation, back engagement, local mistrust, and feeling of time and resource and forth since 2015, the situation might have looked differently investments without tangible results. This supports existing evi- during another phase in the project. Therefore, we argue for the dence that participation, as defined and operationalized by project importance of applying this diagnostic approach throughout the actors in a design system, does not necessarily materialize on the project cycle. ground. In the decoupled management situation, local institutions and communities are at the receiving end of an already defined 5. Discussion project design, which aside from creating local disappointment can lead to an increasing distance between project actors’ perspec- We have tested the applicability of a telecoupling-inspired diag- tives on successful development (Addison, Stoeckl, Larson, & Jarvis, nostic approach for the study of ICDP management, specifically 2019) and maybe reproduce or intensify conflicts of interest looking at the case of the F&C project in Salta, Argentina. As a between international stakeholders and local users of natural result, we have advanced ongoing debates on telecoupled land- resources (Aldashev & Vallino, 2019). use systems and the effectiveness of conservation and develop- Our diagnosis shows that the so-called participatory design of ment projects in several ways. Grounded in our empirical findings, the F&C project has facilitated institutional distance rather than and through the lens of institutional telecoupling, we have devel- collaborative management; a somewhat embedded contradiction oped a diagnostic approach that enables us to relate the flows char- that appears symptomatic in other ICDPs (Bank & Sills, 2014; acterizing project design and implementation to everyday (project) Mutune & Lund, 2016). Such institutional distance between project practice, which is an analytical approach that has only been actors can be explained further by the fact that financing agencies hypothesized in earlier studies on telecoupling (Eakin et al., and central government actors remain detached from the local 2014; Oberlack et al., 2018; Newig et al., 2019; Lenschow et al., communities because they seldom receive and process the knowl- 2016). edge and information emanating from the local level i.e. showing a This approach provides a new causal perspective on the well- lack of feedback mechanisms. This is of course not new since other documented tendency that participation on paper rarely mirrors development projects have used participation as a legitimizing participation in practice, and that community-driven approaches rhetoric tool rather than as an operationalized management stan- seldom build directly on community priorities (Mutune & Lund, dard (Eriksen et al., 2021), or in some cases even copy-pasted 2016) but are rather set externally (Fama, 2020). We consider stakeholder comments from other project consultations the diagnosis important to increase management transparency (Benites-Lazaro & Mello-Théry, 2019). There has long been an and to avoid that the institutional needs of a project (e.g. shown acknowledgment that globalization and the associated in blueprints and safeguards from the borrower and financing telecouplings (trade, discourse, technology, etc.) has led to an agency) become built into community perspectives from a ‘better increasing homogenization of values and preferences often involv- than nothing’ rationale. Such tendency can make project decisions ing a loss and disregard of local knowledge (Jeanrenaud, 2002; appear perfectly participatory and the distance between theory Young et al., 2006). In some cases, the disregard for local realities and practice small (Mosse, 2004) even when the reality is that gov- become so internalized, and as a consequence somewhat hidden, ernmental project actors, or even financing agencies, have the pri- that projects can be considered collaborative because there are mary power to define project objectives (Burns et al., 2017). mechanisms for stakeholder dialogue, even if practice shows that 11 Louise Marie Busck-Lumholt, E. Corbera and O. Mertz World Development 157 (2022) 105956 local beneficiaries are left out of the decision-making arena (Ayana funded F&C project in Argentina as a case of ‘decoupled manage- et al., 2018) (cf. telecoupled management Figure 1B). ment’, we have uncovered the persistence of a blueprint develop- Our findings emphasize the lack of practical precision in ment approach where project objectives are designed in enabling participation and collaboration at the project level, which negotiations between national and international project actors complements Mosse’s (2004) focus on the conceptual precision of before any interaction with local project actors and beneficiaries. participation. The F&C project in Argentina is an example of how We have only illuminated some aspects but not all, of why the notion of a participatory process has become embodied as an large-scale ICDPs like the F&C project tend to frequently face chal- expected and formal institutional behavior among project actors: lenges with participation and implementation. In contrast to legitimized more by the process and participatory activities than better-than-nothing rationales, our case study suggests that from direct collaboration with intended beneficiaries. This evi- decoupled management and project presence without timely and dence also reflects the importance of further analyzing not only satisfactory results can end up worsening local realities and oppor- whether projects are manipulative, consultative, or participatory tunities for improvement because they create systematic disap- (Arnstein, 1969; Jones et al., 2014), but also why and by whom a pointment and mistrust. More drivers and explanations could be given project may be perceived in such terms. Future research identified from a more in-depth investigation of flows and the role could build on the diagnostic approach to better learn from cases that broader land governance processes play in the prioritization like the F&C project where participation is operationalized as a and implementation of project activities on the ground. management tool without translating the resulting community The decoupled management situation we identify is not a new demands into action beyond project-related participatory channels phenomenon as it mirrors very symptomatic challenges already (Merino, 2018), or where project concepts and ideas are shared described and analyzed in the existing literature. However, the diag- with local beneficiaries but decided beforehand by actors in the nostic approach we have developed to shed light on such challenges design system rather than being developed and defined collec- in a structured way allows for comparison across projects and pro- tively (Burns et al., 2017). ject phases. The approach makes it simple and clear where crucial Finally, we have argued that, in theory, collaborative manage- flows are broken or vague. Thus, the motivation for developing this ment situations where all actor groups in the receiving system also diagnostic approach was the lack of surprise regarding the gap participate in the early design phase can reduce the distance between theory and practice we encountered in the field, and our between project theory and practice. Each project case needs to argument that there is a need to make such shortcomings more develop site-specific approaches to operationalize collaboration transparent and traceable. Not by burying urgent local needs in com- through existing local institutions with assistance from local NGOs plex theoretical frameworks but by implementing diagnostic and RDAs that know the local communities. These actors, however, approaches that can be applied across sectors by the multitude of should not be engaged merely as service providers without owner- actors typically supposed to work together on so-called participa- ship of the project, but be part of the early negotiations and formu- tory ICDPs. lation of project activities. Both local agencies and communities Overall, we believe this work informs project practitioners could be part of a more direct collaboration on project design about the benefits of creating more direct connectivity between and implementation by installing mechanisms for participatory project actors in the sending and receiving systems and of concep- budgeting (Grillos, 2017). It is a matter of institutionalized decen- tually merging the two systems in both project design and imple- tralization of project authority to ensure that objectives are rele- mentation phases. The ability of ICDPs and other conservation and vant and implementable – resembling Ribot’s (2003) development projects to improve the well-being of rural commu- recommendations for decentralized natural resource management. nities and the state of their environments is what is at stake, and This, in turn, emphasizes the importance that impact evaluations the challenge of enabling such connectivity is one that we must assess not just project outcomes but the project system itself urgently overcome. (Mutune & Lund, 2016). Collaborating with local actors from the beginning of project development, rather than spending time on CRediT authorship contribution statement building a holistic design model, can increase local engagement and the realization and sustainability of project results (Ravina, Louise Marie Busck-Lumholt: Conceptualization, Data cura- Ray, Shih, & Medvegy, 2018). tion, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Writing - origi- Overall, we believe that the diagnostic approach can support nal draft, Writing - review & editing. Esteve Corbera: the analysis of which project actors, flows, and institutional Supervision, Writing - review & editing. Ole Mertz: Supervision, mechanisms contribute to explaining the current challenges of Writing - review & editing. ICDPs (and development projects in general) in meeting their participatory aspirations and implementation goals. It can also serve as a monitoring instrument throughout a project cycle to Acknowledgements avoid design and implementation becoming separate sending and receiving systems. Future operationalization of the diagnos- This research was supported by the European Union’s Horizon tic approach could benefit from including a temporal dimension 2020 research and innovation program under Marie Sklodowska- to, for example, visualize if and to what extent project manage- Curie grant agreement No. 765408 (COUPLED). It also contributes ment draws on information flows from past project experience. to the ‘‘María de Maeztu” Programme for Units of Excellence of Strengthening such flows could transform management practices the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (CEX2019- in ways that result in more implementable and relevant proce- 000940-M). We would like to thank those who offered their time dures and outcomes. and patience to assist the first author with data collection and feedback, particularly local community members who set aside time to help with interviews and research questions. Alejandro Bri- 6. Conclusion ones and Pablo Marcelo Vicente from the NGO CeDRUS became highly valued experts and irreplaceable friends during fieldwork This research has presented a novel diagnostic approach devel- in Argentina, assisting the first author on trips to local villages. oped through the lens of institutional telecoupling and to be Representatives from the NGO Tepeyac helped and hosted the first employed in the study of ICDPs. By looking at the World Bank- author during trips to local villages. Representatives from the Sec- 12 Louise Marie Busck-Lumholt, E. Corbera and O. Mertz World Development 157 (2022) 105956 retariat of Environment and Sustainable Development in Salta and Barrett, C. B., & Arcese, P. (1995). Are Integrated Conservation-Development Projects (ICDPs) Sustainable? On the conservation of large mammals in sub- Buenos Aires, Monica Gabay from SESD, representatives from INTA Saharan Africa. World Development, 23(7), 1073–1084. https://doi.org/10.1016/ and USUBI, and Pablo Herrera from the World Bank Buenos Aires 0305-750X(95)00031-7. office provided help during fieldwork and data search. Dr. Sally Benites-Lazaro, L. L., & Mello-Théry, N. A. (2019). Empowering communities? Local Jeanrenaud provided valuable feedback during the development stakeholders’ participation in the Clean Development Mechanism in Latin America. World Development, 114, 254–266. https://doi.org/10.1016/ of this paper and guidance during fieldwork. Finally, a big thanks j.worlddev.2018.10.005. to the World Bank DC and Giovanni Ruta and Stefano Pagiola, Ba, K. do, & Kyne, D. (2008). Success Criteria and Factors for International who hosted the first author for six weeks and devoted their time Development Projects: A Life-Cycle-Based Framework. Project Management Journal, 39 (January 2018), 28–42. doi:10.1002/pmj. and energy to teach her about their work and provide feedback. Brown, K. (2002). Innovations for conservation and development. The Geographical Journal, 168(1), 6–17. Berliner, D., Bagozzi, B. E., & Palmer-Rubin, B. (2018). What information do citizens Funding want? Evidence from one million information requests in Mexico. World Development, 109(September 2018), 222–235. doi:10.1016/ This research was supported by the European Union’s Horizon j.worlddev.2018.04.016. Burns, S. L., Krott, M. A. X., Sayadyan, H., & Giessen, L. (2016). The World Bank Improving 2020 research and innovation program under Marie Sklodowska- Environmental and Natural Resource Policies: Power, Deregulation , and Privatization Curie grant agreement No. 765408 (COUPLED). 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