TYPE Original Research PUBLISHED 22 June 2023 DOI 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 Limits to fishing: the case for OPEN ACCESS collective self-limitation EDITED BY Annette Breckwoldt, Leibniz Centre for Tropical Marine illustrated with an example of Research (LG), Germany REVIEWED BY small-scale fisheries in Catalonia Hillary Smith, Duke University, United States Elyta Elyta, Borja Nogué-Algueró 1*, Giorgos Kallis 1,2 and Tanjungpura University, Indonesia Elizabeth Ingrid van Putten, Miquel Ortega 3 CSIRO, Australia 1 Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Xochitl Edua Elias Ilosvay, Cerdanyola del Vallès, Spain, 2 Catalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA), University of Vigo, Spain Barcelona, Spain, 3 Institute of Marine Sciences, Spanish National Research Council (CSIC), *CORRESPONDENCE Barcelona, Spain Borja Nogué-Algueró borja.nogue@mailbox.org RECEIVED 30 December 2022 ACCEPTED 17 May 2023 Is there a limit to the amount of fish that can be taken from the sea? This question PUBLISHED 22 June 2023 echoes the concern of the broader environmental movement in asking: are there CITATION ‘limits to growth’? If the answer is ‘yes’, then what must be done to remain within Nogué-Algueró B, Kallis G and sustainable limits? Fifty years after the publication of the landmark report Limits Ortega M (2023) Limits to fishing: the case for collective self- to Growth, new theories about limits highlight the importance of collective self- limitation illustrated with an example of limitation, also in the context of fisheries management, in place of external, top- small-scale fisheries in Catalonia. Front. Mar. Sci. 10:1134725. down determination and imposition of limits. This paper considers the shift in doi: 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 fisheries governance from regulating and establishing Maximum Sustainable COPYRIGHT Yields to collectively co-managing territories and ecosystems as symptomatic © 2023 Nogué-Algueró, Kallis and Ortega. of a general turn from externally-imposed to self-imposed limitations. We show This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons how perceptions and practices of limits are changing based on an ethnographic Attribution License (CC BY). The use, study of six small-scale fisheries co-management plans located off the Catalan distribution or reproduction in other coast in the Northwestern Mediterranean. The study evidences the challenges forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are fishers face in attempting to define the limits of their agency to manage external credited and that the original publication in forces that are often beyond their control. It concludes by arguing for the this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, adoption of an ethos of collective self-limitation in fisheries governance to distribution or reproduction is permitted protect and benefit local communities and their environments. which does not comply with these terms. KEYWORDS fisheries management, small-scale fisheries, co-management, limits, MSY 1 Introduction What is the limit to the amount of fish that can sustainably be taken from the sea? This question has been central to modern fisheries management since the industrialization of fishing activities (Smith, 1994), when pioneering works in fisheries science began theorizing about the sustainability and efficiency of exploitation rates (Graham, 1935). This paper explores the social and environmental consequences of changing the focus of fisheries management from an externally regulated “limit-centered” approach to a collective self- Frontiers in Marine Science 01 frontiersin.org Nogué-Algueró et al. 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 limitation process. Engaging with debates about new fisheries operating space for humanity” (Rockström et al., 2009). Increasing management practices and the nature of limits in natural resource anthropogenic pressures also affect the oceans (Halpern et al., 2019; exploitation, our research sheds light on the challenges and Duarte et al., 2020). These stem from an unprecedented expansion possibilities of collective self-limitation in fisheries governance in and intensification of maritime and coastal industry (Brent et al., the context of Catalan small-scale fisheries (SSF). The paper is based 2020; Jouffray et al., 2020) and the primarily land-based “great on an ethnographic study undertaken in six SSF co-management acceleration” of economic activity that began in the mid-twentieth committees on the Catalan coast of the Western Mediterranean that century (Steffen et al., 2015a; McNeill and Engelke, 2016). incorporates a novel theoretical framework based on Cornelius Sustainability researchers argue that the cumulative effect of these Castoriadis (1997) thought on heteronomy and autonomy, new anthropogenic impacts is pushing marine systems beyond their safe theories on limits (Kallis, 2019) and the understanding of the operating boundaries, thus risking their stability, functionality, and economy as a diverse field (Roelvink et al., 2015). We engage integrity (Nash et al., 2017). with these theoretical perspectives to understand how fishers New theories of limits, however, question their purported perceive, re-think and enact limits on resource use to seek equity ‘naturalness’, pointing to the contested political processes through and sustainability through new institutions of co-management and which limits come to be negotiated and practiced (Mehta, 2013; how such different ideas of limits shape and are shaped by the Kallis, 2019). The exclusive reliance on scientific expertise to define everyday workings of the Catalan co-management committees. limits and related actions precludes a pluralist ontological, This paper is structured in the following way: first, we introduce epistemological, and normative perspective on issues of new theories of limits and explain the distinction between sustainability. This theoretical foreclosure obscures alternative heteronomous limits and autonomous self-limitation based on understandings and practices possibly better suited to address recent interpretations of the work of political philosopher complex environmental problems in their specific socio-ecological Cornelius Castoriadis. We then relate these theories with the contexts. Norgaard (1995), for example, argues that “the idea of process of shifting away from external, heteronomous limits limits does not convey what we must do to achieve sustainability. It evident in managerial fisheries governance models of Maximum is not simply a passive process of staying within limits, but an active Sustainable Yield (MSY) to the adaptive, ecosystem, and one of assuring that future generations have the sufficient natural community-based co-management schemes, while framing the and human capital to live as well as we do” (pg. 130). In practice, it concept of collective self-limitation as a practice of economic is difficult to maintain an ideal format whereby scientists establish difference. In section 2 we present the research question and an exact limit up to which a resource can be extracted or polluted, or describe the case study and the methodology of data collection an ecosystem disturbed, and policymakers then enforce a boundary and analysis. Finally, in section 3 we examine a case of community- up to which an activity is permitted in line with this ‘natural’ limit. based co-management, the Catalan SSF governance system, Ecosystem complexity does not allow such simple determinations. presenting examples of stakeholders’ changing perceptions and Science, too, is bound by uncertainty, politics, and controversy practices of establishing limits, and identifying the new challenges when limits conflict with particular interests (Jasanoff et al., 1998; faced as fishers attempt to redefine and enact such limits through Miller, 2004; Turnhout et al., 2007; Wyborn et al., 2019) and when participation in the scheme's co-management committees. We what may be a necessary and welcome limit for one resource-use conclude in section 4 with the broader lessons taken from this study stakeholder is not so for another1. Such factors make legislation and which point to the potential, but also the barriers, of SSF co- enforcement of limitations extremely difficult. Norgaard argues that management initiatives in facilitating practices of economic if limits are to remain useful, they should not concern a property of difference –such as autonomous collective self-limitation— that the world ‘out there’ but should concern limiting our negative can benefit resource-use communities and their environments. impacts on each other and on the environments with which we interact. In this, he shifts the importance from determining precise limits ‘out there’ to developing institutional mechanisms for 1.1 Moving from limits to growth to limiting human activity. collective self-limitation This distinction between ‘limits out there’ and limits in our interactions can be further developed through the work of Fifty years after the Limits to Growth report (Meadows et al., philosopher, psychoanalyst, and economist Cornelius Castoriadis 1974), debates are ongoing about whether limits to growth exist (1922-1997). Castoriadis’ thinking on limits was motivated by a (Nature, 2022). Pioneering detailed computer simulations of global concern for building emancipatory forms of social organization development scenarios, the report was a landmark study on the based on direct democracy (Castoriadis, 2010). He distinguishes unsustainability of industrial growth trajectories, and it kickstarted autonomous and heteronomous forms of organization, that is, the modern debate on ecological limits to economic growth. between societies that freely and consciously establish their own Currently, sustainability scientists are still concerned about how goals, rules, and limits and those that, although having themselves to conciliate the existence of planetary boundaries with increasing established their limits, attribute such limitations to an external human activity in the event of such limits growth (Steffen et al., 2015b; O’Neill et al., 2018; Brand et al., 2021). The prevailing climate crisis and the accelerating rates of biodiversity loss suggest a 1 For a case study example of such controversies in fisheries governance transgression of boundaries that, up until now, have offered a “safe see (Garcıá Lozano et al., 2019). Frontiers in Marine Science 02 frontiersin.org Nogué-Algueró et al. 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 force, be it the Gods, the King, or ‘the markets’ (Kallis, 2019). In the readoption of such an ethos as the basis for environmental Castoriadis’ view, theocracies, dictatorships, and capitalist societies governance in the 21st century. epitomize heteronomous social orders. He saw growth-based The discussion about environmental limits to human activity development as the latest heteronomy: an unquestionable ‘law’ has parallels with the debate around the governance of the of the economy externally given (i.e., not a choice) that equates commons, which has long been central to fisheries social science human progress with the compound growth of production and (Berkes, 1985; Pontecorvo, 1988; McCay and Jentoft, 1998; consumption and the unlimited development of the means of Acheson, 2014; Armitage et al., 2017). In fact, the management of production (Castoriadis, 2010). common-property resources was theorized in fisheries (Gordon, Autonomy, on the other hand, refers to the capacity of a group to 1954; Scott, 1955) before the popularization of Garret Hardin’s consciously constitute a rule with its own norms, goals, and values. Malthusian parable of the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin, Castoriadis finds elements of such autonomy in Athenian democracy 1968). The basic model of limitless drives in a limited and the early Enlightenment. An autonomous society is truly environment underpins Hardin’s story, where herders entering democratic when it establishes its own limits on what is socially his imagined commons are assumed to have the drive to increase desirable and what is not, how much is desirable, and in what way it their herds at a compound rate, even knowing that such expansion should be attained. Collective self-limitation is thus the ultimate form will bring ´ruin to all.’ Elinor Ostrom (1990), among others, of autonomy and, perhaps paradoxically, of freedom of action. The demonstrates that there is nothing natural in such a tragedy. On tendency is to think of limits in reverse: as curtailing freedom of the contrary, there are many historical and current examples of action because of the predominant understanding and experience of commoners communicating and devising rules to limit their herds limits as an external, heteronomous force imposed upon the subject (or their catch, in the case of fisheries) to sustain the commons over (Kallis, 2019). Limits are, nonetheless, relational: one is limited always time while satisfying individual needs and providing collective in relation to something or someone. This limitation is necessary if wellbeing (Berkes et al., 1989; Feeny et al., 1990; McCay and true freedom of action is to be experienced–both of the ‘self’ and the Acheson, 1990; Ruddle et al., 1992; Ostrom et al., 1999; Agrawal, ‘other’. Without limits, there is little point in talking about freedom of 2001; Dolšak and Ostrom, 2003; Cinner and Aswani, 2007; Burger action (think of a pianist trying to play piano on an infinite keyboard et al., 2013). Moreover, critical analyses of the political economy of or a painter trying to paint a limitless canvas). capture fisheries offer alternative and more comprehensive Kallis (2019) has reformulated the conception of limits and explanatory frameworks of overfishing that account for property limitless growth under capitalism by integrating the ideas of relations, power inequities, and the systemic pressures toward Norgaard and Castoriadis. In the dominant model of economic privatization, competition, and accumulation as key drivers for thinking, traced from neo-classical economics back to Malthus, resource exploitation and ecological decline (Campling et al., 2012; humans have limitless drives or needs that conflict with an Longo et al., 2015; Longo and Clark, 2016; Barbesgaard, 2018; environment that is, by its nature, limited in satisfying infinite Campling and Havice, 2018). needs. The pursuit of technological innovation and growth Following Foley (2022), we build on previous research in marine paradoxically emerges as the only viable response to such social science, which argues that people who live permanently near perceived limits, allowing more of this infinity to be satisfied, one resources and depend on them tend to have a long-standing concern notch at a time, but without ever overcoming the problem of about using those resources sustainably and are capable of “designing scarcity inherent in unlimited ends and limited means. This is institutions that can limit access to adjacent fish resources equitably central to understanding how, under capitalism, limits are invoked and effectively” (p.59). Similarly, Bavinck and Jentoft (2011) stress the to justify the pursuit of limitless growth. This idea is present in relevance of subsidiarity as a guiding principle for a more democratic Malthus: his population model assumes a limitless propensity for and sustainable fisheries governance system, where smaller (and humans to grow their numbers and advocates for agricultural and usually politically weak and economically vulnerable) fishing industrial growth as a response rather than redistribution. The same communities should be given preference in managing their fishing idea is central to neo-classical economics, premised on scarcity and grounds and meeting their needs. In this context, collective self- growth. One can even find it in recent theories of planetary limitation practices can be a way to reinforce the autonomy boundaries going hand-in-hand with claims in support of green local fishing communities in sustaining their livelihoods and growth (or blue growth for the oceans), geo-engineering, or environments. Hence, theories of self-limitation, such as those of colonization of other planets (Kallis, 2019). Castoriadis’ work Castoriadis or the commons literature, speak to works that provides an alternative to this pairing of external limits and problematize the ontological foundation dominant in natural limitless growth: collective self-limitation or the deliberate control resources and fisheries management, where fishers are assumed to of supposedly unlimited needs that propel limitless expansion. be socially detached, value-free rational individuals seeking the Kallis (2019) identifies an ethos of self-limitation in ancient maximum utility from their activity (Dyer and McGoodwin, 1994; civilizations, spiritual movements, premodern egalitarian societies, Feeny et al., 1996; McCay and Jentoft, 1998; St. Martin, 2001; and modern environmental and social movements, advocating for Mansfield, 2004; St. Martin, 2005a; Bresnihan, 2019a). Such Frontiers in Marine Science 03 frontiersin.org Nogué-Algueró et al. 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 assumptions about human desires and behavior are formalized into approach to uncertainty (Larkin, 1977; Murawski, 2000; Corkett, many of the abstract models that mainstream natural resource 2002; Mesnil, 2012; Pauly and Froese, 2021). On the other, management relies on, such as the Maximum Sustainable Yield mathematical models like the MSY were historically developed to (Bavington, 2002; St. Martin et al., 2007; Bavington, 2010a; Finley, meet the challenges of industrializing fisheries which required fish 2011; Longo and Clark, 2016; Fressoz and Bonneuil, 2017). to be turned into ‘stocks’ that responded to fishing effort (Holm, 1996; Bavington, 2002; Bavington, 2010a), as Smith and Basurto (2019) summarize “scientific techniques of translation were needed 1.2 Moving from maximum in order to transform fish into natural resources—inputs suitable sustainable yield to sustainability for capitalist production” (p.2). Therefore, these models do not through self-limitation account for most fishers’ real-world socioeconomic status and wellbeing (Giron-Nava et al., 2019; 2021). Despite these criticisms Since its origins in the first scientific observations of declining and shortcomings, MSY, expressed in updated and more fish stocks in the late nineteenth century (Finley, 2011), modern sophisticated forms, continues to be a pillar of fisheries policy and fisheries science and management has posed the question of limits management globally, evident in its status as the ultimate and as its core challenge (Graham, 1935; Beverton and Holt, 1957; overarching goal in the European, national, and regional fisheries Schaefer, 1957; Mace, 1994; Smith, 1994). As a result, a concern policies governing our case study (Common Fisheries Policy, 2013; around limits in the fisheries literature has centered on defining, Decret de governança, 2018; European Commission, 2021; Ley de quantifying, and setting adequate limits to fishing activity to achieve pesca sostenible, 2023). ecological sustainability or profit (Ludwig et al., 1993; Pauly, 1995; The social and political construction of limits discussed in the Schrank and Pontecorvo, 2007; Rindorf et al., 2017). This general previous section is evident in the genesis and evolution of MSY, as is approach relies on management models that assume that stock the paradox in the link between limits and growth. Finley and levels can be estimated accurately, recognize when a maximum level Oreskes (2013) depict MSY as a “policy disguised as science”, given of sustainable harvest has been reached, and restrict fishing activity the crucial role of the U.S. State Department in its emergence. This until stocks recover, and then fishing can resume at optimal levels policy model opposed more precautionary approaches focused on (Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis, 2007; Finley and Oreskes, 2013). The managing human activity to control fishing effort (Finley and epitome of this way of thinking is Maximum Sustainable Yield Oreskes, 2013). The U.S., in the context of the Cold War and its (MSY). Originating from the “gospel of efficiency” conservation consolidation as a global superpower, began extending its sovereignty ideals of German forestry science (Hubbard, 2014) and further claims over waters well beyond its traditional national boundaries. At developed through colonial forestry in India in the late nineteenth the same time, other nations, such as Mexico and Peru, protested the century (Ramesh and Namboothri, 2018; Scott, 2020), MSY moved U.S. trawling in their waters and sought to limit the incursion of from land to sea, becoming the governing concept of fisheries foreign maritime powers into their areas of sovereignty (Finley, science from the 1930s onwards (Pilkey and Pilkey-Jarvis, 2007; 2011). Significantly, the U.S. State Department anticipated that Hubbard, 2014; Hubbard, 2018). The reasoning behind MSY owes restricting entry to fishing boats would pave the way for much to the fundamental ideas of optimum and equilibrium in restrictions on the freedom of passage for other vessels, such as the neoclassical economics, from which natural processes are conceived military (Finley and Oreskes, 2013). Fressoz and Bonneuil (2017) saw as linear and reversible (Finley, 2011; Fressoz and Bonneuil, 2017). such imperialist dynamics as the reason for U.S. lobbying to adopt The theoretical tenets of MSY became the cornerstone of fisheries MSY as a principle in international fishery law, which stipulated that management with the scientific establishment of fishery bio- “fishing had to be authorized as long as the ratio of catch to effort had economics in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United not yet reached a maximum” (p.12). Limits, in other words, became States in the 1950s, which identified the problem of fisheries the basis for justifying growth and permitting expansion up to the overexploitation in its open access character and the lack of supposed, but difficult to define, limit. clearly defined property rights (Gordon, 1954; Homans and Similarly, fisheries policies and management plans in growth- Wilen, 1997; Scott, 1955). Fisheries bio-economics helped propel driven industrialized western fisheries consistently use MSY as a MSY as the guiding principle of sustainable fisheries in western goal to reach rather than a threshold to avoid (Worm et al., 2009; countries in the following decades, coinciding with the Mesnil, 2012; Pauly and Froese, 2021), a tendency that can lead to industrialization of fishing fleets (Finley, 2011; Finley and disastrous outcomes such as the infamous Newfoundland cod Oreskes, 2013). collapse of 1992 (McGuire, 1997; Schrank and Pontecorvo, 2007; Since its popularization in fisheries science and management, Bavington, 2010a; Bavington, 2010b). Such stories support the MSY model has faced several criticisms for its scientific Norgaard’s (1995) thesis, presented above, about the exhaustion shortcomings. On the one hand, researchers have pointed out of a scientific paradigm within which scientists are expected to how the model entails an oversimplification of ecological know and define natural limits and policies and then confirm dynamics due to its single-species approach, as well as a disregard human activity according to those limits. The dependence of for broader ecosystem impacts, and have also problematized its mainstream fisheries management on expert-defined limits risks reliance on difficult-to-obtain data and its lack of precautionary advancing fragmented and partial understandings of complex Frontiers in Marine Science 04 frontiersin.org Nogué-Algueró et al. 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 ecological conditions, thereby naturalizing the socially constructed 2019; Gelcich et al., 2019a; Westlund et al., 2019; Cavallé et al., 2020). character of environmental limits and excluding relevant We distinguish here two relevant and interconnected discursive stakeholders (e.g., the users/fishers) from knowledge building and arenas concerning the discussion on limits: one focused on the decision-making. The shortcomings of such “managerial ecology” mechanisms through which resource users establish their own (Bavington, 2002; Bavington and Slocombe, 2003) that dominates rules, boundaries, and restrictions and their effectiveness in fisheries governance indicate the need to shift from the traditional achieving beneficial social and ecological outcomes (Adger et al., understanding of limits as external objective realities to a relational 2005; Cinner and Huchery, 2014; Rohe et al., 2017; d’Armengol et al., and normative perspective focusing on the praxis of self-limitation. 2018; Cinner et al., 2019; Gelcich et al., 2019b; Pinkerton, 2019a; We argue that the more recent shift towards adaptative community- Viana et al., 2019). From this perspective, the concept of community- based co-management schemes in natural resource management based co-management, a specific form of co-management that can under certain conditions open the space for an alternative endows place-based communities organized through cooperatives, understanding of limits that is more beneficial to the marine guilds, or fisher organizations with the right to access and control environment and the people who depend on it. local resource use, is relevant to this study (Singleton, 1998; Kearney et al., 2007; Wiber et al., 2010; Pinkerton, 2011; McCay et al., 2014; Raicevich et al., 2018; Garcı́a Lozano et al., 2019). 1.3 Moving from managerial ecologies The other discursive arena understands co-management as a tool to co-management for developing new governance frameworks that extend beyond deterministic models focused on establishing limits to human The concept of co-management in fisheries became prominent in action with regard to nature, as per MSY or carrying capacity. This the common property theory literature in the 1990s as a response to the perspective stems from a growing consensus in the fisheries observed shortcomings of top-down bureaucratic management management literature that complexity and uncertainty are systems for natural resources, on the one hand, and the structural inherent characteristics of marine socioecological systems that push for the enclosure of the commons, on the other (Pinkerton, 1989; require the incorporation of adaptive and anticipatory governance Berkes et al., 1991; Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997; Jentoft et al., 1998; systems to achieve resilient, sustainable fisheries (Olsson et al., 2004; McCay and Jentoft, 1998; Singleton, 1998; Mccay, 2011; Pinkerton and Berkes et al., 2007; Armitage et al., 2009; Gelcich et al., 2010; Pecl Davis, 2015). Although there is no universally used definition of the et al., 2019). For instance, Berkes et al., (2007) argue that “non- term, most authors coincide in defining co-management as a form of linearity, feedback processes, and system self-organization challenge power-sharing between government and resource users (Olsson et al., established assumptions of scientific certainty, stability paradigms in 2004; Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Berkes et al., 2007). Svein Jentoft, for both the ecological and social sciences and the primacy of expert- instance, defines it as a “collaborative process of regulatory decision- driven solutions” (p.2). Indeed, researchers have become increasingly making between representatives of user-groups, government agencies, concerned with accounting for the complexity of marine and coastal research institutions and other stakeholders” in which power sharing socioecological systems to enable holistic and adaptive approaches and partnership are essential elements (Jentoft, 2019). Moreover, co- (Oviedo and Bursztyn, 2016; Alexander et al., 2019; Ferro-Azcona management is usually understood as a fisheries regulatory regime et al., 2019; Herró n et al., 2019; Lindkvist et al., 2020; Woods et al., (Ojea et al., 2017) situated at a middle ground position in a governance 2021; Lindkvist et al., 2022) which incorporate local ecological continuum from centralized, command-and-control systems at one knowledge as well as user participation and perception in end to autonomous self-managed user-communities at the other researching and managing natural resource systems (Beyerl et al., (Pinkerton, 1992; Pomeroy, 1995). In addition, as Berkes et al. 2016; Fitzpatrick et al., 2020; Holm et al., 2020; Franco-Melé ndez summarize (2007), different authors emphasize different aspects of et al., 2021; Bastari et al., 2022; Puley and Charles, 2022). Ecosystem- co-management, such as stakeholder engagement, institutionalization, Based Management (EBM) is one such approach (Pikitch et al., 2004; trust building, problem-solving, or governance issues. Most authors Alexander et al., 2019; O’Higgins et al., 2020) in that it aims to also concur that co-management requires, firstly, an institutionalized encompass social-ecological complexities and uncertainties while arrangement to ensure the participation of resource users in the spanning multiple sectors of human activity (Long et al., 2015; decision-making process and, secondly, formalization of power and Link et al., 2017; Link and Marshak, 2021). In theory, EBM is responsibility sharing to ensure that decisions taken are binding and better suited to adapt to social and environmental change in are not seen merely as a form of public consultation or ad hoc fisheries, although researchers have pointed out that EBM has participation (Pinkerton, 1989; Kearney et al., 2007; Berkes, 2009; proven difficult and slow to implement in real settings and that Gutiérrez et al., 2011). ecosystem resilience does not necessarily translate into social well- Co-management has recently gained renewed attention in being (Ogier et al., 2016; Stephenson et al., 2018; Alexander et al., fisheries research, policy-making, and environmental advocacy, due 2019; Woods et al., 2021) while it risks overlooking fundamental to its perceived advantage in social and ecological outcomes in issues regarding power relations, social conflict and epistemic contrast to centralized and yield-oriented managerial approaches injustice (Bavinck et al., 2018; Bennett, 2019; Campling et al., 2012; (Worm et al., 2009; Gutié rrez et al., 2011; FAO, 2015; Cinner et al., Dahlet et al., 2021; Fischer et al., 2022). Despite these shortcomings, Frontiers in Marine Science 05 frontiersin.org Nogué-Algueró et al. 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 EBM is becoming increasingly prominent in the specialized literature Snyder and St Martin, 2015; Pinkerton, 2017; Gó mez and Maynou, and policy schemes, such as the European Marine Strategy 2021). Based on the insights from our case study, we argue that under Framework Directive and the Catalan Co-Management Decree itself. certain circumstances co-management schemes might facilitate commoning processes of collective self-limitation which can help place-based resource-use communities to resist or disrupt neoliberal and managerial rationalities in foregrounding livelihoods, wellbeing, 1.4 Collective self-limitation as and sufficiency against the systemic pressures of efficiency, competition, economic difference and accumulation (Davis, 1996; Pinkerton, 2017). Our argument is premised on the ontological assertion of the Fisheries social scientists have had a long and critical economy not as a singularity but as a diverse field (Gibson-Graham, engagement with management approaches that have led to the 2006; Roelvink et al., 2015; Gibson-Graham and Dombroski, 2020), privatization and commodification of fishing rights and the where different forms of production, distribution, and consumption enclosure of fishing commons (Pontecorvo, 1988; St. Martin, can exist. Furthermore, theorists of the diverse economy perspective 2005a; Olson, 2011; Foley and McCay, 2014; Pinkerton and argue that some of these forms might be mediated by an ethics of Davis, 2015) 2 . Some researchers extend this critique to community and environmental wellbeing, instead of exploitation community-based management systems, which they see as likely and competition (Gibson-Graham, 2008; Community Economies facilitators of enclosure, privatization, and neoliberal capture Collective, 2019). Indeed, in the following sections, we imbue our (Mansfield, 2004; Macinko, 2007; Mansfield, 2007; Bresnihan, analysis with an anthropological perspective that treats fishers as 2019a; Bresnihan, 2019b). Macinko, (2007) indicates that “many subjects who do not necessarily pursue endless accumulation and policies that might ostensibly appear to be place-based are, upon private wealth but rather who can negotiate and decide on their own closer inspection, revealed to be focused on the endowment of limits, individually and collectively, based on different ethics, particular individuals, not places, significantly rights-based fishing” priorities, and economic desires (Kallis, 2019). In this way, we (p.73) therefore identifying placelessness as an entry point for engage with other researchers studying economic diversity in private rights-based management and increased market dynamics. fisheries (St. Martin, 2005b; Snyder and St Martin, 2015; Foley Similarly, in studying the transformation of contemporary Irish and Mather, 2016; Arias Schreiber et al., 2020), emphasizing ethical fisheries, Bresnihan (2019a) argues that implementation and negotiations and practices based on the values of interdependency, development of co-management projects represent an extension sufficiency, and self-limitation in the reproduction of more of, rather than an alternative to neoliberal rationalities, in that they autonomous and sustainable commons. We understand collective aim “to align the economic interests of individual fishers with the negotiations and practices over what and how to limit as part of a vagaries of a global seafood market and the unpredictable marine ‘commoning’ process (De Angelis, 2014; Gibson-Graham et al., environments they work in”, concluding that “over time this 2016), that is, the production and reproduction of the commons protracted process of ‘improvement’ (and) the tightening of over time, the articulation of a collective commoner subject, and the economic and regulatory pressures will exclude more fishers from situated and negotiated practices of sustaining life in common the fisheries than any one-off regulatory event (e.g., privatization)” (Bresnihan, 2015; Karnad et al., 2021). Through our case study, (p. 169). we emphasize how commoning processes also include those We concur with such criticisms in questioning the role that actions that the collective decides not to take or chooses to limit, projects of power devolution from centralized state institutions play in contrast to the usual emphasis on doing and making as a sign of in the context of neoliberal restructuring of fisheries management the expansion of the communal reach, or as determined by natural (Pinkerton and Davis, 2015; Pinkerton, 2017; Pinkerton, 2019b) where limits already ‘out there’. Combining insights from new theories of processes of decentralization are at risk of market co-optation and limits with scholarship on fisheries management, the governance of privatization. Moreover, researchers have long pointed out how co- the commons, and diverse economies, we frame collective self- management schemes can function as a tool of regulatory capture by limitation practices as active negotiations over what to limit based powerful actors, leading to an extension rather than a reduction of state on different ethics, priorities, and economic desires than those often and market rule resulting in the disenfranchisement and assumed in dominant fisheries management models. marginalization of resource-dependent communities (Agrawal and From this conceptual basis, we formulate the driving question Gibson, 1999; Blaikie, 2006; Ribot et al., 2006; Nayak and Berkes, for our research: how are limits re-thought, negotiated, and enacted 2008; Ramenzoni, 2021). Although we recognize the wider power in the co-management schemes to ensure equity and sustainability imbalances and structural constraints that economically vulnerable and in fisheries management? With an eye toward the challenges of politically weak communities are subject to, we also want to make space implementing such limits, we wish to understand how fishers’ for seeing mechanisms of collective self-determination in the face of engagement with the everyday workings of new institutions of co- such constraints and imbalances (Foley et al., 2015; Pinkerton, 2015; management shapes and is shaped by different ideas of limits. Here, we advance three key insights from our case study research: First, the way that adaptative co-management works in practice marks a 2 In the Mediterranean context, relevant work has been written on the shift from limits as something out there (as in MSY) to practical commodification and privatization of the tuna fisheries (Longo et al., 2015; decisions for collective (self-)limitations in the face of socio- Longo and Clausen, 2011; Said et al., 2016). environmental uncertainty, complexity, and high stakes. Second, Frontiers in Marine Science 06 frontiersin.org Nogué-Algueró et al. 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 fishers perceive benefits in collectively limiting their activity because Vasilakopoulos et al., 2014; Cardinale et al., 2017; Colloca et al., this might give them the freedom to work less and improve their 2017; Piroddi et al., 2020) together with other anthropogenic quality of life, because they feel empowered to become creators of pressures that are affecting the ocean globally such as climate their own rules, and because they understand their actions as having change, habitat destruction, and pollution (Poe and Levin, 2017; a positive impact in their environments and communities. Third, Halpern et al., 2019; He and Silliman, 2019; Gissi et al., 2020), which commoning processes through collective self-limitation confer have had a cumulative negative effect on Mediterranean ecosystems partial protection from external threats, although the inside/ leading to their increased degradation (Coll et al., 2012; Micheli outside distinction within such processes can be problematic. et al., 2013; Piroddi et al., 2017). A consequence of this ecological decline is a decrease in catch volumes throughout the 2 Materials and methods Mediterranean over recent decades (Piroddi et al., 2020). Thus, Catalan fisheries, located in the northwestern Mediterranean, 2.1 Case study exemplify the relationship between the deteriorating ecological system and declining socio-economic activity. Over the past 15 Our case study concerns SSF in the Mediterranean Sea off the years, Catalan fisheries have witnessed a 50 percent fall in catches coast of Catalonia (Figure 1). The Mediterranean, together with the and the loss of nearly half of the fishing fleet, with SSF facing the Black Sea, is one of the most overfished seas on the planet. (FAO, largest decline in boats. (Figure 2). 2022a): 73% of the evaluated available commercial stocks are Catalan fisheries’ most relevant fleet segments comprise SSF currently overfished. Although fishing pressure is lower than in vessels (331 units), trawlers (211 units), purse seiners (61 units), and the last decade, it is still double what is considered sustainable, with longliners (30), whose activity occurs mainly with daily trips and some stocks being fished eleven times over the estimated sustainable catches are commercialized in fresh markets (Gó mez and Maynou, yield (General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean, 2022). 2020; Gó mez and Maynou, 2021). The term “small-scale fisheries” Sustained overfishing since the 1990s (Colloca et al., 2013; refers, in this case, to the part of the fishing fleet that is distinct both FIGURE 1 The Catalan region and its co-management system. Frontiers in Marine Science 07 frontiersin.org Nogué-Algueró et al. 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 FIGURE 2 Number of vessels by gear type in the Catalan fishing fleet 2000-2023 (Source: Gencat, Department of Climate Action, Food and Rural Agenda). by the scale of the vessels and fishing activity, as well as a range of productive both in terms of captures and revenue (see Table 1). shared (although not universal) characteristics such as labor Patterns in Catalan fisheries are mirrored in regional estimates of intensity, low productivity, the use of artisanal gear, reliance on the size and catch contributions of SSF as well as in their family labor, the diversity of the catch, or their location in near- sociocultural dimensions (Battaglia et al., 2010; Leleu et al., 2014; shore waters (Pauly, 2018; Smith and Basurto, 2019; Boonstra et al., Pascual-Ferná ndez et al., 2020; Villasante et al., 2021). In the 2020; Smith et al., 2021). Approximately 90% of the world’s fishers Mediterranean, most vessels belong to SSFs (82%), and despite are considered small-scale (FAO, 2015) which provide close to 40% comprising only 17% of the total catch, they represent more than of the global catch, and sustain the livelihoods, well-being, and half of all fishers and earn a third of total revenue (FAO, 2022b). social fabric of coastal communities worldwide, particularly in the global South (Weeratunge et al., 2014; Teh and Pauly, 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Jentoft et al., 2022). Despite this, coastal and marine resource governance has traditionally marginalized SSF concerns in 2.2 Governance system favor of more productive and modernized fishing sectors that are considered of greater economic relevance and better suited to The overarching policy framework for fisheries management in output-oriented management and assessment tools, such as MSY the Mediterranean is the European Union’s Common Fisheries (Pauly, 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Smith and Basurto, 2019; Said et al., Policy, which combines technical restrictions, minimum 2020; Ayilu et al., 2022; Jentoft et al., 2022). conservation reference sizes for some stocks, area-based Catalan SSFs are characterized by the seasonality of their fishing management measures, and effort-control regimes (mainly activity, their small-volume but high-value catch, and the variety establishing limits on fishing days and spatial closures) for the and selectivity of their fishing techniques and gear. Most Catalan stated aim of achieving the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) for SSF boats are owner-operated in a particular labor regime akin to all Mediterranean fisheries. At the national level, fisheries in self-employment and usually depend on the help of family labor, Catalonia are subject to state regulations of the Spanish Ministry whether at sea or on land (Gó mez and Maynou, 2020). Although of Food, Fishing, and Agriculture and regional regulations in Catalan SSFs represent most of the vessels, they are overshadowed inshore waters where the Catalan Government has jurisdiction. by more intense extractive modalities in policy-making and public Locally, fishing communities throughout Spain are organized discourse, such as purse seiners and trawlers, which are more around fisher guilds or cofradı ́as (meaning ‘brotherhoods’). These TABLE 1 Catalan fisheries catch by sector in 2022: weight, value, and average price of the catch (Source: Gencat, Department of Climate Action, Food and Rural Agenda). Catch (Tn) Revenue (thousand €) Average price (€/kg) Trawling 7,096.68 55,397.21 7.81 Purse seine 11,485.83 19,239.39 1.68 SSF 1,843.73 16,180.55 8.78 Surface longline 365.74 2,883.84 7.89 Bottom longline 53.78 710.55 13.21 Shellfish gathering 284.17 2,007.26 7.06 Frontiers in Marine Science 08 frontiersin.org Nogué-Algueró et al. 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 are public law entities originating from traditional fishery self- The Decree draws from previous experiences of co-management governance institutions. Cofradias are rooted in the territory and in the region, such as the red shrimp management plan in Costa have established legitimacy among most fishers (Herrera-Racionero Brava (Bjørkan et al., 2020), the sand-eel management plan (Lleonart et al., 2019; Gó mez and Maynou, 2021; Herrera-Racionero et al., 2014), the management of marine reseves of fishing interest in et al., 2022). Galicia (Perez de Oliveira, 2013; Ferná ndez-Vidal and Muiño, 2014), The cofradı ́as have a long history through which their and the “Plan Castelló n” a pioneering management plan of the 1960s organizational form and functions have changed, from devotional involving local trawling fleets from southern Catalonia and northern associations in medieval times to fisher guilds with the power to Valencia (Dahlet and Sá nchez Lizaso, 2021). At the time of fieldwork manage the commons in the modern period and to cooperatives, for this study, the Catalan co-management system consisted of six mutual-aid societies, and trade unions with the arrival of liberalism SSF active management committees, managing only about 10% of the and capitalist development (Alegret, 1999). In the northern Catalan catch but involving around 60% of the SSF fleet. Mediterranean, other historical and contemporary analogues of Committees are constituted by representatives of the main collective self-governance institutions exist, such as the French stakeholder sectors: local fisher communities involved in the plan, Prud’homies and the Venetian Fraglie (Raicevich et al., 2018). the wider fishing sector, scientific bodies, government, and civil Nowadays, the cofradı ́as’ function as representative bodies of the society, which have equal footing in decision-making. The fishing sector (usually grouped into territorial federations), as committees are structured around the plenum, the principal mediators of internal sectoral conflicts (such as those that can decision-making body, and the technical committees, which are arise between different sectors of the fleet or between boat-owners in charge of the elaboration, supervision, and execution of the and workers), and as managers of some shared infrastructures (such management plans. Decisions are taken by majority vote, as first-sell points or port facilities). Beyond their representative although consensus is preferred and sought. After approval, the function, cofradı ́as regulate and control access to specific resources General Directorate of Maritime Policy and Sustainable Fisheries within their territory of jurisdiction, establishing port entry and exit ratifies the committees’ decisions, which then become legally schedules, assigning zones of fishing activity specific to each type of binding. One such decision is the endowment of fishing rights fleet, determining closed seasons, organizing first-sell Dutch to local fishing communities. The licenses that give fishers rights auctions, and stipulating specific norms of behavior based on to fish are contingent on the committee’s yearly approval based on local social and environmental characteristics (Raicevich et al., the collectively established entry criteria, such as historical 2018; Gó mez and Maynou, 2021; Herrera-Racionero et al., 2022). catches, dependence on the resource, stock status, maximum Cofradı ́as act in a regulatory constrained context, adapting and length of the boat, gear restrictions, or overall compliance complementing the European, national, and regional legislations. In with regulations. Catalonia, the regional government has endowed the cofradı ́as with Although fishing rights are assigned to individual boats, these a key role in the structure and workings of the co-management rights are not the property of the boat owners, nor are they tradable. plans. The Catalan SSF co-governance model was formally Moreover, the boats with fishing rights need to be part of a cofradı ́a, constituted with the approval of the Professional Fisheries and their fishing activity is circumscribed to the territorial Governance Decree in 2018 and has since then been presented as boundaries of the management plan, which encompasses the a flagship model for the Mediterranean in international policy and customary and traditional fishing grounds). In this way, the co- sustainability arenas (United Nations, 2023). The Decree management committees seek to incorporate the “socioecological established the legal architecture for developing a series of embeddedness” (Gó mez Mestres and Lloret, 2017) of local fishing management plans based on a form of the territorial user rights communities in the articulation of place-based community for fisheries (TURF) system (Hilborn et al., 2005; Huppert, 2005; management schemes (St. Martin, 2001). Mccay, 2011; Gelcich et al., 2019a; Villaseñor-Derbez et al., 2019) which limits access to specific inshore fisheries to license holders 2.3 Methodology from adjacent cofradı ́as. The Decree institutes co-management committees as the primary governance body, able to develop, For this research, the first author collected data during ten implement and supervise the management plans for each specific months of fieldwork (February – November 2021), including 60 region or target species to establish hours of non-participatory observation at the monthly technical committee meetings (held in a hybrid format due to COVID “the management framework that must guide the activity of restrictions), complemented with 35 semi-structured interviews, extractive fishing in Catalonia, based and set on concepts such lasting two to three hours, with representatives from each as co-management, ecosystem-based, adaptive and sector (fifteen fishers, eight scientists, seven NGO and five precautionary management, with the final objective of government representatives). Interviewees were selected given achieving the Maximum Sustainable Yield through the their participation in the technical committees as representatives. control of fishing effort and the increase of the selectivity of At the time of fieldwork, most committees had been running for a the gear, with the participation and implication of the short period, and their development was temporarily stalled due to government, the fishing sector, the scientific collective and the COVID emergency. The sand-eel committee, which was the first civil society” (DECRET 118/2018, Gencat). constituted and served as a role model for the rest of the Frontiers in Marine Science 09 frontiersin.org Nogué-Algueró et al. 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 committees, was the most well-established and had been in the management of the marine ecosystem precludes easy functioning for longer when fieldwork was carried out. More determination of external limits as per MSY and calls for a more insights and data were therefore drawn from the workings and pro-active and adaptive response, based on pragmatic and experience of this committee. normative decisions on what and how to limit, for what purpose Interviews were conducted and recorded in-situ or online, with and to whose benefit. This situation conforms to Norgaard’s (1995) the previous informed consent of the participants. Transcriptions critique of the external limits paradigm. It shows how practical and were coded with ATLAS.ti software and ethnographic data were normative considerations drive novel fisheries governance models triangulated with information from grey literature analysis of towards a ‘self-limitation’ approach, emphasizing the social and scientific and policy documentation from Catalan, Spanish, and ecological implications of limiting human activity, independent of European government and scientific bodies, as well as from other the predictive capacity of management expertise based on stock secondary sources. The primary data were analyzed from a critical assessments and calculation of surplus yield. In fact, no co- realist perspective (Bhaskar, 2008), which refers to a body of work in management plan was based on stock assessments, the scientific political ecology that “seeks to understand ecological change method for establishing overfishing, because of a systematic lack of through epistemological skepticism but ontological realism to data for most of the fished stocks, which is a common characteristic underlying biophysical processes” (Forsyth, 2001). We find this in SSF (Salas et al., 2007; Smith and Basurto, 2019; Smith et al., approach relevant to our conceptual perspective and normative 2021). Knowledge about the state of fisheries was primarily derived stance as our study coincides with the aims of critical realist political from reported catches, fishers’ local ecological knowledge (LEK), ecology which are, following Forsyth, to indicate “how supposedly and complementary indicators, such as average individual size or apolitical scientific laws in fact reflect historic political and social catches per unit of effort for some species. relations” while also seeking “to reconstruct new and more effective Comments from scientific representatives indicate that they science for environmental policy” that is ecologically more adequate readily recognize the difficulty of establishing predictive certainties: and socially more just (ibid). “I often tell them [the fishers] that they shouldn’t expect scientists to Similarly, we found grounded theory (Charmaz and Belgrave, know everything about the fishery and that they themselves might 2015; Glaser and Strauss, 2017) a suitable methodological approach know better what’s going on, because of their daily direct experience for gathering and analyzing the primary data. Grounded theory is a and their shared knowledge” (interview #16). Given the localized, well-established qualitative research framework that aims to explore circumscribed, and small-scale nature of the Catalan management complex phenomena in depth from the participants’ perspective plans, it proved particularly challenging to assess the stock status, to (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). This approach attempts to minimize know the reasons for environmental change, or to predict the researcher assumptions and biases to uncover previously evolution of marine ecosystems and their populations as a unconsidered topics (Creswell and Poth, 2016). Accordingly, we response to management actions. As another scientific began data collection prior to making hypotheses to develop representative warned: “we cannot leave everything to science to contextual understanding before articulating our research decide what to do. To have some scientific certainty, we would need questions. We immediately analyzed our observations from the years of systematic, reliable data collection and consistent committee meetings to determine if recurrent themes should application of a management measure to see its results. Even influence the direction of the research effort. We then developed then, we wouldn’t be sure because there’s always uncertainty on our interview protocol by identifying recurrent themes and topics how natural systems work, and it could very well be that one year (such as motivations behind self-limitation, perspectives on you are fishing in the best way possible and catches fall nonetheless, environmental limits, or opinions on co-management). Finally, it and another year, you don’t apply any of the approved measures should also be noted that smaller sample sizes are standard in and catches go up” (interview #18). grounded theory research because the emphasis is on quality and Fishers and scientists, in the technical committee meetings and depth of findings over quantity and generalizability. The number of during our conversations, showed a deep-seated familiarity with the interviews is not defined by statistical significance but by the unpredictability of the sea, which explains why limits were rarely saturation of discursive concepts through theoretical coding and negotiated in abstract or absolute terms. Discussions focused forming a narrative grounded on empirical observations (Charmaz instead on concrete actions meant to limit fishing and its impact. and Belgrave, 2015; Creswell and Poth, 2016). These actions can take the form of technical restrictions (maximum meters of nets or quantity of fishing devices, the maximum length of boats, minimum mesh size, minimum fish size) or restrictions 3 Results and discussion on the fishing activity itself (closed-off seasons, closed-off areas, fishing days reductions, tighter schedules). For instance, the self- 3.1 Moving from limits as ‘something out managed quota system of the sand-eel committee signals the there’ to limits based on human and multidimensional effects of such a shift. In this case, both fishers natural-world interactions and scientists recognized that it is difficult to assess if the sand-eel population has responded positively to management actions Our observations of committee meetings and discussions with because it is a species of annual reproduction. Further, seasonal participants pointed us to a core finding: the actors involved in the variations of the sand-eel population increase the difficulty of decision-making perceive that the high level of uncertainty involved obtaining conclusive and updated data on stock status to inform Frontiers in Marine Science 10 frontiersin.org Nogué-Algueró et al. 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 management action. Instead, fishers establish a conservative quota shared equally among themselves based on their observations and We took this decision mostly because of becoming self- available scientific data. They adjust the quota weekly to allow for conscious about what we were doing and how we were doing the maximum extension of the fishing season, according to the it. And from asking ourselves, what does work well for us? The evolution of catches. It is customary to preventively close the fishing cuttlefish is a nice fishery for us; we fish it close to home, we season when catches fall below a previously co-produced security don’t destroy the gear, and we fish it when it’s good weather … threshold to allow the population to recover. Also, between three to five months a year, we know we can rely Concerning the uncertainty around the sand-eel population on this fishery. That’s why it wasn’t difficult for us to agree biology, a fisher representative explained that: amongst ourselves that we wanted to take good care of it (interview #7). “When scientists came and told us they wanted to study the Even in the cases where negotiations on self-limitation were sonso [popular name for sand-eel] ecology, I told them: good fraught with disagreement and conflict, discussions in the technical luck with that! Because I tried to understand it myself for many committees did not center on how much fish was still out there or years, and really, there’s no logic to it. I know it seems foolish, what was the optimal amount of fishing to be allowed, but rather but I assure you that it is like this: the year when there’s got to be what was the most ecologically adequate and socially fair way to sonso, there will be. And the year that’s not, there won’t be. It limit fishing pressure and protect the fishery (i.e., which technical doesn’t matter what you do. It could very well happen that now restrictions to apply or when to establish the closing season, under for two years in a row, there would be very little sonso, and which criteria and for what aim). people would freak out because they would think it’s been These findings contradict the primary management goal of the exhausted. But then suddenly, there could be plenty of it in the Catalan co-management Decree, which intends user involvement in third year. This type of thing has already happened.” devising plans together for achieving MSY. Moreover, the case study of the Catalan co-management committees validates the Tellingly, when scientists studied the sand-eel ecology, they claims of researchers regarding the difficulty of establishing cause- arrived at similar general conclusions, stating “that the fluctuating and-effect relationships between specific management actions and population dynamics of the Mediterranean sand-eel imply periods their outcomes or establishing objective thresholds prior to their of 2-3 years of high abundance followed by similar periods of very transgression (Funtowicz, 1993; Ludwig et al., 1993; Schrank and low abundance when fishing mortality should be kept to a Pontecorvo, 2007; Armitage et al., 2012). Our observations in the minimum” (Institut Català de Recerca per a la Governança del technical committees indicate that stakeholders’ efforts were not Mar (ICATMAR), 2020, p.41). This shift of focus from finding devoted to finding out environmental limits at sea but to regulating objective thresholds in nature to a praxis of adaptation and and restricting human activity to control its environmental impact. collective self-limitation of fishing activity represents a shift from Indeed, the workings of the committees’ technical groups were an instrumental and means-end-oriented type of management to a based on a shared understanding, most prevalent in fisher and more reflexive, deliberative, value-rational negotiation of the scientific representatives, of the marine environment as a complex hermeneutics and the practices of fishing (Jentoft, 2006; Linke system within which predictive certainty is difficult to establish. In and Jentoft, 2014; Arias Schreiber et al., 2022). Fisher this context, finding objective certainties about environmental representatives, for example, do not seem to view environmental limits to human activity becomes an impractical management limits at sea as external impositions or a source of heteronomy. On approach. Therefore, instead of establishing outside limits to their the contrary, they appear to view their position within marine extractive activity, fisher representatives tended to foreground resource systems from a more relational standpoint in line with the collective self-limitation practices when trying to manage latest theories of limits that emphasize the interaction between resources sustainably and equitably in contexts of socio- internal demands and external conditions: “the sea is what it is. It environmental uncertainty, complexity, and high stakes for decides what and when to offer. If you ask too much of it and do not their communities. let it rest, you will destroy it” (interview #9). Similarly, in the cuttlefish committee, the fishing communities involved decided to self-impose a restriction on net mesh-size, 3.2 Self-limitation as freedom establishing a minimum size to allow young specimens to escape. This and autonomy decision did not come from a detailed calculation of how such management action would increase surplus biomass population, neither was it motivated by the observation of an alarming decline in “Now we have to fish more, work more hours, invest more on catches. Instead, it was taken from a collective desire to care for a machinery, gear, and fuel to sustain ourselves. What we must do commons that fishers appreciate, identify with, and understand as being is fish less but better” (interview #23). in a relation of interdependency. As a fisher representative summarized: Frontiers in Marine Science 11 frontiersin.org Nogué-Algueró et al. 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 A common desire that we encountered in our conversations Fishers often concur during our interviews that, assuming a with fishers was that limiting their harvesting activity would confer decent living standard could be secured, they would prefer to fish benefits of wellbeing in terms of ‘fishing less, but better’, that is, less and improve their quality of life by reducing working time, reducing self-exploitation by decreasing work intensity and fishing having better schedules, and engaging in more comfortable and pressure, leaving them more free time while maintaining their relaxed fishing practices. Such insights align with the findings of livelihoods, that they see being under threat. As a fisher recent studies which do not see a strong positive correlation representative and president of a local cofradia said: “maybe we between fishers’ subjective well-being and the amount of fish will have to work less, but in exchange, we might get a better quality caught (Miñarro et al., 2022) and resonate with established of life and similar economic output. This is the key: to manage critiques in fisheries social science on the ontological assumption things well so that there isn’t as much fishing effort and hours of in fisheries management of economic rationality as the primary work while maintaining our livelihoods. But if you tell me that my driver of fishers’ behavior and desires (Holm, 1996; Bavington, income must go down 20%, I won’t accept it, because I have to live 2002; Mansfield, 2004; St. Martin, 2005a). from it! But I think we should try, and I believe that things can get A second common opinion about the benefits of co- better” (interview #8). Indeed, fishers often complained about how management concerned fishers taking matters into their own the decline of catches has entailed having to work harder and longer hands and not having to comply with unjust or ad hoc external to sustain themselves: “if I could go back, maybe I wouldn’t have limitations. Fisher representatives commonly described higher-level gone to sea. The sea has changed a lot, each time is more difficult, fisheries governance as inadequate, partial, and unadjusted to local you have to work much more, and it isn’t like before. In these boats, conditions. As Herrera-Racionero et al. (2015) noticed, large you must work a lot, you must be on top of too many things, both governance institutions lack legitimacy among the Spanish on land and on the sea, just to get going. It takes so many hours out Mediterranean cofradı ́as. Fishers often complained of bureaucrats of your life, and in the end, you only live to work and don’t have “sitting in offices in Barcelona, Madrid or Brussels telling us what time to live your life” (interview #27). we should do without ever coming here or going out to sea like we Fisher representatives from the sand-eel co-management do every day” (interview #9). Instead, fisher representatives often committee repeated positive perceptions of working less invoked a closer relationship and dependence on the environment intensively. This committee managed to obtain higher prices for as rationales for claiming legitimacy in managing adjacent natural their catch by fishing less while reducing total working hours and resources and the value of their local ecological knowledge. This achieving a better quality of life overall for its members. Fishers of observation supports Pinkerton’s (1999) statement that parties with the management plan, which includes all boats of the sand-eel long-term relationships and dependence on local resources are the modality, collectively define a seasonal quota to be approved by the best suited to use them sustainably and to be more accountable for committee. Fishers can lower their quota weekly either to avoid their conservation. As Herrera-Racionero et al. (2022) recently overfishing or to reduce landings and stabilize prices if fishmongers observed, some cofradı ́as in the Spanish Mediterranean already pay low prices for the catch as sand-eel is greatly appreciated in the self-impose restrictions to their harvesting activity (such as the region, and fishers have control over the supply. The management delimitation of fishing zones, establishment of closures, shared plan has made the sand-eel fishery more adaptive and resilient to quotas or minimum mesh sizes) further than their legal socio-environmental change, thereby better securing the livelihoods commitments as a way to protect their fishing grounds. Hence, of its participants. Moreover, according to sand-eel fishers, Foleys’ (2022) claim that proximity enhances the legitimacy and collective self-limitation helped reduce the competitive dynamics effectiveness resonates with fisher representatives’ tendency to within them and fostered a more cooperative ethos based on equity perceive rules and limits imposed by outside parties as illegitimate and sufficiency. For instance, now fishers shared information about and arbitrary, whereas those deliberated on and decided upon via their catches more easily with their peers. Further, when a boat the committees’ mechanisms as adequate and valid. catch goes over its assigned quota, it is customary for the fisher to This perception of the adequacy of co-management was not give the surplus to those who have not yet reached it. Echoing this without its detractors. In some committees, mainly the most shift, a fisher representative stated: recently established or those experiencing more difficulties in their development, fishers felt that the Catalan administration “This thing that we do of self-regulating and self-imposing the imposed the co-management system on them: “they [the quota and adjusting it as we see fit is something good. Today, I government representatives] made it very clear to us: either we make less money because I used to be the one that caught more fish make a good management proposal (from their perspective, of than anyone. But there were people who were not doing as well as course) or the Generalitat [Catalan administration] will impose me. Now we are regulating our fishery in a way that everyone can theirs” (interview #9). Some fisher representatives from other co- make a living, and that’s better. I got used to not having to work as management plans concurred, depicting fisher’s position in the much, that’s all. I work much less; to me, this is like going to play! It committees as vulnerable and in the minority. They complained is like a hobby, as it was before, but with the difference that before I about having only a quarter of the votes when the rest of the was always tired, and now I’m not” (interview #4). stakeholders often sided against their interests. Indeed, many of the fishers interviewed feared that the socioeconomic unsustainability Frontiers in Marine Science 12 frontiersin.org Nogué-Algueró et al. 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 of the fishery was rapidly leading to its collapse making collective fishers do not regard all external limitations as negative or self-limitation a futile and unjust management strategy, due to the inadequate. For example, most fishers view state and regional unequal distribution of benefits and burdens between the different bodies’ surveillance and punitive functions as a necessary actors using the marine space. As an interviewee stated: “why prerogative for the appropriate functioning of fisheries should we sacrifice when others keep damaging the sea and management. Notwithstanding this assessment, all fisher taking advantage of it?” (Interview #21). representatives in our interviews concurred that such functions However, in other technical committees, fisher representatives were not always well implemented, frequently resulting in fishers would give a different view claiming that fishers do not experience being treated as ‘criminals’ while the actual offenders went much resistance in the decision-making process, being able to push unpunished (interview #6). collective decisions closer to their interests. Despite any good intentions behind the co-management plans, it was evident that structural constraints and power imbalances were present in the 3.3 Limits as protection Catalan co-management scheme. Indeed, the regional government fisheries directorate had a clear role as promoter and moderator in SSF in Catalonia are facing major challenges in maintaining fishers’ most committees and ultimately held the decision-making power as livelihoods (Gó mez et al., 2006; Lloret et al., 2018; Gó mez and Maynou, the management plans had to be approved by its general director. 2020; Pascual-Fernández et al., 2020), as signaled by the rapid Although often functioning as a heteronomous source of limitations disappearance of fishing vessels in the last decade. Beyond the drastic itself, the regional government representatives sometimes invoked reduction of catches due to overfishing and the environmental impacts the existence or the threat of externally imposed rules coming from of economic growth (such as climate change, pollution or habitat higher-level governmental institutions at the State or European destruction), Catalan SSF face competition of other fishing sectors level: “either we set our own limits, or they will be forced upon us” (commercial and recreational), tourist development, increased (interview #11, government representative). In fact, the first co- bureaucratic control, and the pressures of corporate actors, mirroring management plan was constituted as a response to an EU ruling the situation of SSF in other European and Mediterranean countries which banned the sand-eel fishery in 2012 due to its lack of (Said et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Ertör-Akyazi, 2020; Said et al., 2020; compliance with European management measures for Jentoft et al., 2022). In this context of adversity, the setting of collective Mediterranean fisheries (Lleonart et al., 2014). self-limitations in the co-management committees is often articulated In that sense, an interesting dynamic played out between as a way to protect the fishing grounds, and hence fisher livelihoods and heteronomous limits, coming from the ‘outside’ the first co- autonomy, from external pressures. Importantly, in interviews and management committees, and internal limits set by committee committee discussions, fisher representatives did not express a desire members autonomously. This is a fine balance. To the extent that for self-limitation as protection alone but also as a means to achieve fishers incorporate and control the process, the inside-outside better social and ecological outcomes for their communities and future distinction attenuates; but to the extent that there is little generations in particular. As a fisher representative stated: consensus on the implemented actions, perceptions of co- management as an externally imposed limitation can intensify, “the crux of the issue is not only that you might make a living and the power imbalance and diverging interests become more from it [fishing], but that the ones who come after you can also apparent among stakeholders. In their study on cofradı ́as live from it. That’s the thing. I have two children, and I hope development of self-management practices for sustainability, that they don’t go to sea because the situation is very bad. But if Herrera-Racionero et al. (2019, p.11) describe this process along it turned out that they wanted to go to sea, they must be able to similar lines: live from it. However, if we continue as we do now that won’t even be possible” (interview #27). Moreover, they [the fishers] feel that public policies regarding this area are often inspired by measures previously tested by the References to intergenerational stewardship as part of the ethics guilds. Nevertheless, they denounce that, paradoxically, when of collective self-limitation were common in our conversations with their local rules are translated into general laws, self-control fishers. Such statements reflect Norgaard’s (1995) argument that the becomes hetero-control and loses effectiveness or even causes idea of limits “is not simply a passive process of staying within limits, results opposite from those that were expected. Since those but an active one of assuring that future generations have sufficient controls that fishers respected before, when “we controlled natural and human capital to live as well as we do” (pg. 130). ourselves”, are considered to be illegitimate (“they are Indeed, there were instances where collective self-limitation was imposed on us”), they now feel that circumventing and perceived or used as a tool for community resilience in the face of disobeying rules that were once accepted is justified. heteronomous pressures. In the cuttlefish committee, for example, fishers from neighboring cofradı ́as came together through a A further problem in drawing clear boundaries between internal common purpose to counter one such external pressure, the and external limits, or between autonomy and heteronomy, is that expansion of an economically powerful and technologically Frontiers in Marine Science 13 frontiersin.org Nogué-Algueró et al. 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 advanced recreational fisheries sector (Said et al., 2018; Cooke et al., It should be noted, however, that such protections are only partial, 2021; Gó mez et al., 2021; Gó mez, 2022), and established a closed-off as local fisheries are also affected by pressures other than the SSF’s season that was binding for all fishers, both professional and fishing activity that are not the purview of the co-management recreational. Hence, the self-imposed closed-off season functioned committees, such as the impact of other segments of the commercial to limit the negative impact at a local level of an actor external to the fishing fleet, recreational fisheries, pollution, coastal development, or committee. Similarly, the sand-eel committee’s efforts to control climate change. Market forces are a paradigmatic pressure for SSF supply to regulate prices to the fishers’ benefit also worked to communities which is beyond the committee’s control (Pascual- partially limit the power of market forces in shaping fishers’ labor Ferná ndez et al., 2019). Fish is one of the most globalized food and livelihoods while also better adapting their harvesting activity commodities; between 30-40% of all fish caught is traded to the sand-eel population dynamic. Notably, of the six co- internationally, while Spain is the 4th largest importer of seafood by management plans we studied the sand-eel achieved the best value in the world (FAO, 2022a). In fact, the Catalan fishing fleet socioeconomic outcomes, to a great extent because it is based on provides about just 20% of fresh fish consumed in Catalonia and only a circumscribed fishery, in which there is no competition from 12% of total fish products, including frozen and canned fish (Gencat, recreational fishers nor other sectors of the commercial fishing fleet 2021); the rest is often imported as price-reduced commodities or and neither is there high-volume imported produce entering the extracted by industrial distant-water fleets from fisheries in global regional markets. This exceptional instance of protection and South. Hence, the limitation of user rights can partially secure a fishing insulation from market pressures makes self-limitation and co- community’s catch since once the catch is landed, the price is defined management easier and more effective, which is difficult for other through market mechanisms (Gó mez and Maynou, 2021) in a context fisheries where prices driven by globalized market dynamics dictate dominated by fish wholesalers and big retailers that buy seafood intense competition and resource exploitation in already declining products from multiple and geographically disparate sources fish stocks for fishers to stay afloat (Gó mez and Maynou, 2021). (Ortega-Cerdà and Coll, 2022). As an NGO representative stated: From this perspective, community-based co-management can “We shouldn’t only look to production (catching the fish) when act as a form of collective ownership of fishing rights which, thinking about social and environmental sustainability; we should although in some aspects mimics enclosure by excluding users also look at distribution and commercialization. The fish is external to the committees, can be used to protect the livelihoods ‘abandoned’ once it is fished and then it is the market that sets the and fishing grounds of economically vulnerable communities by price, and in the end, the fisher will only get a very small fraction of this building socioeconomic alternatives to ever-increasing resource price” (interview #13). We concur with Gó mez and Maynou (2021) in exploitation, as documented in other studies (Johnson, 2000; seeing the potential for socio-economic transformation in alternative Foley et al., 2015; Snyder and St Martin, 2015; Foley and Mather, seafood marketing systems that are emerging in Catalonia, particularly 2016; Pinkerton, 2017; Foley and Mather, 2018; Pinkerton, 2019b; in initiatives such as community-supported fisheries and fishers Ertör-Akyazi, 2020). In explaining that property can have multiple cooperatives (Snyder and St Martin, 2015; Ertör-Akyazi, 2020). logics, Mansfield (2007) points at social relations (goals, values, and However, when prices fall most fishers have little room to fish less power) as structural elements in the establishment of particular and sell at a higher price: they are forced to fish as much and to sell as property arrangements which in turn define a set of rights, cheaply as the market dictates to stay afloat. Therefore, without a obligations, interdependencies, and allocations. Based on that greater higher-level public control of market systems of provisioning, observation, Mansfield (2004) notes that “market rationality is any co-managed system which focuses on the capture segment of the not necessarily a dimension of property in general; property can fishing activity will struggle to provide many benefits to most SSF involve multiple types of arrangements, with different goals and communities, as most fishers will continue working under the outcomes” hence arguing that “to the extent that control over access structural pressures of increasing resource exploitation and of the self. to resources and places can be about protecting traditional livelihoods, assigning property rights can actually challenge purely market-based approaches to resource use” (p. 314). Similarly, St. 4 Conclusion Martin (2020) notes that not all kinds of property arrangements become “an essential determinant of economic efficiency, This paper has linked ongoing changes in fisheries governance rationality, and growth” (p.273) but rather that it is private and management to recent debates in environmental studies about property, as signaled by the European enclosures of the the nature of limits. We show how the shift from determining and eighteenth century, which is attached to a vision of human nature imposing external limits, as in MSY, towards shared and negotiated defined by individual self-interest, a will for constant improvement limits to fishing activity, as in adaptive co-management schemes, (of the means of production and the self), and the satisfaction of resonates with theory-informed calls to understand resource limits as infinite desires which calls for perpetual profit maximization and projects of collective self-limitation rather than as boundaries accumulation. In this context, collective self-limitation practices can inherent in the natural properties of the resources themselves. be read as a search for autonomy and economic difference that Based on the case study of SSF co-management schemes in actualizes aspects of traditional place-based self-management Catalonia, we show how fishers can engage in collective practices of systems (Raicevich et al., 2018) that functioned for centuries in self-limitation which can lead to concrete measures to improve many Catalan’s fisher communities under the customary principle fisheries governance. Our results emphasize how, under certain “que tothom visqui” [so that everybody may live] (Garrido, 2012). conditions, place-based community co-management initiatives can Frontiers in Marine Science 14 frontiersin.org Nogué-Algueró et al. 10.3389/fmars.2023.1134725 become spaces for economic difference in which values of sufficiency Data availability statement and practices of collective self-limitation can be articulated as part of a commoning process that benefits local fishing communities and their The raw data supporting the conclusions of this article will be ecosystems. The results suggest, however, that the relationship made available by the authors, without undue reservation. between external and internal sources of limitation is complex, extending beyond single dimensions. Maintaining a certain degree of autonomy from a higher level of government, for instance, is Ethics statement crucial for experimentation with and developing self-limitation mechanisms through the co-management schemes, which in turn The studies involving human participants were reviewed and also risk becoming an unauthorized form of heteronomy when power approved by CEEAH - Comissió d’Ètica en l’Experimentació inequities are not addressed, and fishers do not regard such Animal i Humana, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. The limitations as just or sustainable. These processes of collective self- patients/participants provided their written informed consent to limitation are vulnerable to the extent that external forces can intrude, participate in this study. specifically those of the market that push relentless competition and intensification of resource exploitation and of the self, making such self-limitations irrelevant –a core finding of our research. Author contributions In the case of SSF in Catalonia, our results evidence how economic forces threaten to make the limitations imposed by the fishers All authors developed the initial concept of the study. BN-A themselves less stable or less relevant if the pressures driving fishery compiled the data, did the analysis and drafted the paper with degradation are beyond their direct control. This raises the question of inputs and feedback from GK and MO. GK and MO contributed to how lower-level limitations can act to force limitations at higher levels major revisions in structure and content. All authors contributed to of governance. In the case of co-management, the challenge is for actors the article and approved the submitted version. participating in the fisheries committees to become agents of structural change in coastal zone governance and in reforms of seafood markets and broader commodity chains. This research clarifies that the Acknowledgments deliberation unleashed by co-management schemes’ politicize fisheries management through the collective articulation of group We thank the editor’s support and the reviewers for their boundaries, goals, and limits, making participants aware of the thorough comments and constructive input. We are grateful to broader political and economic forces that constrain their choices. Prof. Kevin St. Martin for the discussions relating to this paper. Finally, we see a potential in the Catalan co-management plans in This work contributes to the “María de Maeztu” Programme for protecting the livelihoods and environment of economically vulnerable Units of Excellence of the Spanish Ministry of Science and and politically weak local fishing communities. Based on our Innovation (CEX2019-000940-M). BNA is supported by the observations, we argue that, under certain conditions, co- Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through the FPU management schemes can give space to commoning actions that fellowship program (FPU17/05908). MO acknowledges the foreground collective prosperity, autonomy, and sufficiency, as a institutional support of the ‘Severo Ochoa Centre of Excellence’ response to the pressures toward increased resource use, private Accreditation (CEX2019-000928-S) and the project “Mejora del enclosure, and individual profit maximization. In the context of the conocimiento científico-técnico para la sostenibilidad de las rapidly disappearing SSF sector in Catalonia, collective self-limitation pesquerías demersales del Mediterráneo occidental”, with funding can become a place-based mechanism to help resist and disrupt the from EU NextGeneration (EU/PRTR), MAP2021-01 (SOSMED). encroachment of market imperatives, such as the need for privatization, competition, and relentless accumulation. Moreover, as instances of economic difference and commoning, collective self- Conflict of interest limitation practices can also advance and inform alternative ways of The authors declare that the research was conducted in the relating to and living with the marine environment. Through our absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be observations and interviews, we saw fishers that do not necessarily construed as a potential conflict of interest. want to catch ever more fish, given secured and decent living conditions, and who are willing to self-limit their activity to the benefit of their community, environment, and of future generations. Publisher’s note However, we also observed how fishers could perceive the institution of collective self-limitation as a heteronomous imposition that results in All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the disagreement, conflict, and opposition amongst co-management authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated stakeholders. Hence, how can fisheries governance further embrace organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the and broaden a collective self-limitation ethos that uphold the reviewers. 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