Sustainability Science https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-022-01258-0 SPECIAL FEATURE: ORIGINAL ARTICLE Networks of Action Situations in Social-Ecological Systems Research Understanding the governance of sustainability pathways: hydraulic megaprojects, social–ecological traps, and power in networks of action situations Pablo F. Méndez1 · Floriane Clement2 · Guillermo Palau‑Salvador1 · Ricardo Diaz‑Delgado3 · Sergio Villamayor‑Tomas4 Received: 2 August 2021 / Accepted: 31 October 2022 © The Author(s) 2022 Abstract To enable sustainability pathways, we need to understand how social–ecological systems (SES) respond to different gov- ernance configurations, considering their historical, institutional, political, and power conditions. We advance a robust methodological approach for the integrated analysis of those conditions in SES traps. Our advancement consists of a novel combination of the networks of action situations approach with an agency-based polycentric power typology and the concept of discursive power. We test the approach by building on previous research on the Doñana estuary–delta SES (Guadalquivir estuary), which is characterized by a rigidity trap in the context of ecosystem and water governance. Specifically, we focus on a recent hydraulic megaproject involving deep dredging in the Guadalquivir estuary, finally canceled due to its broad negative socioeconomic and environmental repercussions. According to our analysis, certain governance, institutional, and informational mechanisms currently prevent further SES degradation in Doñana. However, key governance actors are caught in a lasting coordination failure prone to mutual defection strategies owing to power dynamics and discursive-institutional inertia. Although seemingly stable due to counteractive mechanisms among actors, this situation is at continuous risk of being unbalanced by powerful actors promoting large SES interventions such as deep dredging. Such interventions bear the systemic risk of strong suppression of SES functions, and a regime shift to a lock-in trap. This overall undesirable situation might be escaped through transformative policy designs that take into account meso-level mechanisms, such as discursive power and its role in non-decision-making, pragmatic inaction, and inefficient investment and infrastructure. Keywords Water resource governance · Sustainability pathways · Social–ecological traps · Agency-based power · Discursive power · Networks of actions situations Introduction Sustainability pathways have become more urgent than ever to safeguard our life-support systems (Coloff et al. 2021; Folke et al. 2021; UNEP 2021; Ely 2022). Understanding Handled by Elke Kellner, Eidgenossische Forschungsanstalt fur Wald Schnee und Landschaft, Switzerland. 3 * Pablo F. Méndez Remote Sensing and GIS Lab, Estación Biológica de pfmendez@ingenio.upv.es Doñana, EBD (CSIC), Cartuja TA‑10, Edificio I, Calle Américo Vespucio, S/N, 41092 Seville, Spain 1 Institute of Innovation and Knowledge Management, 4 Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, INGENIO (CSIC-Universitat Politècnica de València), Autonomous University of Barcelona, Edificio 8E, Camino de Vera, S/N, 46022 Valencia, Spain 08193 Cerdanyola del Vallès, Barcelona, Spain 2 DYNAFOR, Université de Toulouse, INRAE, 24 Chemin de Borde-Rouge, Auzeville CS 52627, 31326 Castanet Tolosan Cedex, France 13 Vol.:(0123456789) Sustainability Science the role of governance in change processes towards sustain- or lock-in of social situations producing environmental or ability is critical at both empirical–theoretical (how does resource degradation (e.g., Steneck et al. 2011; Méndez et al. current change happen) and normative (how change ought 2012; Enfors 2013; Haider et al. 2018). In the past decade, to happen) levels (Berkes 2007; Patterson et al. 2017; Turn- increasing focus has been directed to analyzing the role of heim et al. 2018; Donges et al. 2021; Pickering et al. 2022). historical, discursive, political, and power phenomena in the However, despite growing attention in the last decade, the emergence and persistence of traps (e.g., Beier et al. 2009; understanding of the role of governance and its underly- Chapin et al. 2010; Méndez et al. 2012; Wrathall et al. 2014; ing processes remains underdeveloped (Muñoz-Erickson Enqvist et al. 2016; Laborde et al. 2016; Baker et al. 2018; et al. 2016; Patterson et al. 2017; Kellner 2021; Orach and Graziano et al. 2019; Schlüter et al. 2019). However, within Schlüter 2021; Muiderman et al. 2022; Rocha et al. 2022). current research, there is still a lack of systematization of In particular, interventions to foster sustainability path- the interweaving influence of such phenomena over histori- ways must reflect on how social–ecological systems (SES) cal configurations and their outcomes (Méndez et al. 2019). respond to different governance configurations, considering Advances are still challenged by the intractable nature of their local arrangements of actors, institutions and power, different power forms (Boonstra 2016; Morrison et al. 2019; and historical legacies (Clark and Harley 2020). Avelino 2021). A methodological engagement with the Here we contribute to fill the gap in the literature regard- effect of power as a property of both actors and structures ing the role of governance and its underlying processes in vis-a-vis historical, institutional (Boonstra 2016; Dewulf fostering change towards sustainability, with a particular et al. 2019) and discursive (Méndez et al. 2019) dynamics focus on SES traps (Holling et al. 2002; Carpenter and can help uncover richer sources of resilience and transforma- Brock 2008). We define governance broadly as the processes tive capacities in entrapped SES. through which actors create the conditions for social coordi- In this article, we explore a methodological approach nation, resource allocation, sharing power and making pol- to integrate historical, institutional, discursive and power icy (based on Folke et al. 2005). SES traps are processes of factors for enhanced explanations of the governance con- involution of social–ecological interactions (Boonstra 2016), figurations of SES traps. Specifically, we combine three driven by strong feedback loops “with negative outcomes for different concepts: (1) the “Networks of Action Situations people and/or ecosystems” (Cumming 2017). We deal with (NAS) approach” (e.g., McGinnis 2011a; Kimmich and Vil- two SES traps: the rigidity trap (Herrfahrdt-Pähle and Pahl- lamayor-Tomás 2019; Möck et al. 2019; Basurto et al. 2020; Wostl 2012; Enqvist et al. 2016; Stedman 2016; Méndez Kimmich et al. 2022 this issue); (2) the “polycentric power et al. 2019) and the lock-in trap (Allison and Hobbs 2004; typology” (Morrison et al. 2017, 2019; Mudliar 2020); and Boonstra and de Boer 2014). Rigidity traps are character- (3) “discursive power” (Clement 2010). To test the approach, ized by a mutual reinforcement of power, politics, and profit we build on a long-term social–ecological research program through the recurrent application of command-and-control in the Doñana region, an estuary–delta SES (Guadalquivir approaches (Holling and Meffe 1996) for resource and estuary, SW Spain). The Doñana SES is stuck in a rigidity ecosystem management. Eventually, these features hinder trap characterized by path dependence, strong command- potential for change, diminish SES resilience (i.e., the capac- and-control management of water resources, the historical ity of a SES to absorb change and disturbance and avoid a loss of key SES functions, a pronounced development vs regime shift to undesirable sets of processes and structures), conservation paradigm, and lack of mechanisms to facilitate and promote strong dependence on limited sets of resources learning from management failures and environmental crises (Gunderson et al. 1995; Holling and Meffe 1996; Walker (Méndez et al. 2012, 2019; see also perspectives from, e.g., and Salt 2006; Cox 2016). In a lock-in trap, the economic Martín-López et al. 2011; Fernández-Delgado 2017; Green sectors bear high sunk costs and so risk degrading SES func- et al. 2017). Our proposed approach is tested on a recent tions and the resource base until capital is totally removed, hydraulic megaproject in the Guadalquivir estuary (hence- thus dramatically diminishing economic returns, resource forth “estuary megaproject”), and as such, brings an entirely yields, and overall potential for socioeconomic change (Alli- new analytical effort to the Doñana research program. As son and Hobbs 2004). We assume that the rigidity and the we show below, the megaproject constituted a large inter- lock-in traps exist in an evolutionary continuum, whereby if vention bearing a substantial risk of pushing the Doñana the former is pushed enough against resilience thresholds, SES to a lock-in trap, thus hindering sustainability path- it can enter a self-reinforcing dynamic leading to a lock-in ways. Although finally canceled, important lessons can be trap and so suppresses the potential of change toward more derived from the megaproject using counterfactual reasoning favorable situations (based on, e.g., Gunderson et al. 2017; (Boonstra and de Boer 2014): what if deep dredging, a dis- Reyers et al. 2018; Dornelles et al. 2020). turbance of catastrophic magnitude, had been implemented? A general goal of SES traps studies is to understand Why and how did it take almost two decades for it to be the causal mechanisms underlying the degree of rigidity canceled? Under which governance configuration would it 13 Sustainability Science have operated? Given the above context, our exploratory Research Council (CSIC study hereafter; CSIC 2010). This aims were: study showed poor environmental and ecological conditions in the estuary (e.g., biochemical pollution; high organic mat- • Methodological aim: to advance a novel approach that ter content and turbidity; non-stratified water body leading to integrates rigorous institutional and power analysis habitat reduction and decreased potential for fishing activi- via combining three conceptual components: the NAS ties). Two main conclusions from the study were (1) over- approach, the polycentric power typology and discursive all resource optimization for both the socioeconomic and power. conservation sectors is not possible—especially in the cur- • Research aim: to refine the explanatory mechanisms rent scenario of climate change; (2) the cumulative impacts underlying Doñana’s rigidity trap, to assess the risk of from deep dredging could worsen the environmental situa- a lock-in trap and the prospects for fostering a sustain- tion and socioeconomic prospects (CSIC 2010). Moreover, ability pathway.1 the assumption of socioeconomic development resulting from new infrastructures and enhanced maritime tourism Next, we describe our methodological approach, includ- and trading has been convincingly argued as very specula- ing our unit of analysis (estuary megaproject), the concep- tive (Sancho-Royo and Del Moral 2014, 2015; Vargas 2014; tual components used and the methods employed to opera- Vargas and Paneque 2015). The megaproject was finally tionalize such components. We then present our results in canceled by the Spanish Supreme Court in 2019. narrative form, followed by our discussion and conclusions. A key insight from previous research provides the basis for our current approach in this iteration. Doñana’s SES “sta- bility landscape” (Walker et al. 2004) is characterized by the Methodological approach path-dependent rigidity trap (current domain) plus the lock- in trap and a sustainability pathway (alternative domains) Unit of analysis: the estuary megaproject—the port (Fig. 2). The fast development of irrigation and rice agricul- awakens ture between the 1950s and the 1980s reduced the original marshland surface area by ~ 80% (Fernández-Delgado 2017). The research presented here constitutes a third iteration of This process of natural capital destruction could have driven the Doñana long-term social–ecological research program, the Doñana region directly into a lock-in trap (Allison and which follows an iterative adaptive inference protocol (based Hobbs 2004). Instead, a rigidity trap with higher potential on Holling and Allen 2002; see details in S1). As described for change materialized due to the creation of the Doñana above, our unit of analysis is the Guadalquivir estuary National Park in 1969, thanks to the innovative action of an megaproject: a major hydraulic intervention for improving international coalition of institutional entrepreneurs (Fig. 2) the maritime access to Seville’s inland port, promoted by the (Méndez et al. 2012)—also envisaged as a process of “eco- Port Authority in 2000 as part of its broader 2020 Strategic logical diplomacy” (Camprubí 2020). In this conception, the Plan. After several years of shallow dredging, the estuary estuary megaproject appears as a disturbance posing (again) megaproject proposed, among other measures, deeper dredg- a risk of a regime shift to a SES lock-in trap, which has less ing of the Guadalquivir estuary (Fig. 1) to allow for heavy- potential for change due to high sunk and trajectory-shifting ship navigation, based on the assumptions that (1) the best costs (Fig. 2). development alternative for the port was to increase freight traffic and to make the port accessible for larger and higher Conceptual components tonnage ships (e.g., deeper draft vessels), thus improving its connection to the Trans-European Transport Network (SPA Networks of action situations: a systems‑based application 2013); (2) this infrastructure development would be key for socioeconomic development at provincial level (e.g., genera- The action situation is a core component of actor-centered, tion of thousands of jobs; increasing cruise tourism) (Vargas pluralistic institutional analysis frameworks focused on and Paneque 2015; Donadei 2020). understanding the micro-level of natural resources govern- However, deep dredging posed large negative socioeco- ance problems (Anderies et al. 2004; Hagedorn 2008; Pahl- nomic and environmental impacts (Vargas and Paneque Wostl et al. 2010). Here, we conceive an action situation 2015), as identified through a study led by the Spanish as an analytical component, in the rational-choice tradi- tion of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom 2005), as the social space where: (1) 1 policies or institutions are designed or developed by actors This research has been designed to inform the development of the policy analysis task of eLTER Research Infrastructure (https://​elter-​ri.​ engaged in strategic interactions at multiple levels (opera- eu/). tional, collective-choice and constitutional); (2) the patterns 13 Sustainability Science Fig. 1  Geographical location of the Doñana social-ecological system and the main elements characterizing our unit of analy- sis (estuary megaproject) (modi- fied from Méndez et al. 2019, under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC 4.0 International License) of interactions, plus the decisions made and actions taken, other, thus stretching the explanatory power of the action shape certain internal or external outcomes associated with situation component (McGinnis 2011a; Möck et al. 2019; different payoffs for the different participating actors; (3) Kimmich et al. 2022 this issue; Srigiri and Dombrowsky such outcomes feedback into the action situation and its con- 2022). Formally, a network of action situations (NAS) con- text, potentially changing them and shaping future dynamics stitutes an array of action situations differing in, e.g., degrees (based on Ostrom 2005; McGinnis 2011b). The action situ- of proximity, function, and the game into which they theo- ation is a strong analytical device for seeking explanations retically fit (McGinnis 2011a; Kimmich 2013). More gener- within place-specific settings, addressing their biophysical, ally, four types of links across the NAS can be distinguished institutional, and cultural conditions (Ostrom 2005). (Kimmich 2013; Hoffmann and Villamayor-Tomas 2022 this Recently, scholars have started to apply a relational per- issue): biophysical transactions; information; institutions; spective by applying a network of action situations (NAS) and actors involved. The application of the NAS approach approach to analyze how and when situations affect each involves two initial steps: (1) the definition of a “focal action 13 Sustainability Science to explain processes and outcomes at SES level (e.g., SES traps), and deals with the macro properties of path depend- ence. Indeed, both emergence from bottom-up interactions and systems-to-micro effects are crucial to understand cau- sality in SES (Schlüter et al. 2019). Path-dependent SES traps constitute an emergent phenomenon that results from micro-level actor interactions embedded in macro- or sys- tem-level trajectories (Boonstra and de Boer 2014). To that end, Boonstra and de Boer (2014; based on Elias 1978) pro- pose game concepts to capture the essential features of path- dependent SES traps. Over time, player interactions shape the course of a game, each course gaining in autonomy over initial player choices in an unanticipated way, and which then repeatedly influences the future moves of individual players (Boonstra and de Boer 2014). Fig. 2  Landscape of stability domains of the Doñana social-ecologi- A power typology cal system (SES) (inspired by figure in Bennett et al. 2021), includ- ing: the rigidity trap (grey trajectory; intermediate potential for SES Power, both endogenous and exogenous to actor-centered change) as the current domain, and the lock-in trap (brown trajec- phenomena, is increasingly being analyzed to understand tory; lowest potential for SES change) and sustainability pathway (blue trajectory; highest SES potential), as alternative domains. The its role in resource and environmental governance (Clement creation of Doñana National Park appears as an event that prevented 2010; Theesfeld 2011; Epstein et al. 2014; Kashwan 2016; the fall to a lock-in trap in 1969 and resulted instead in the realization Morrison et al. 2017; Bennett et al. 2018; Brisbois et al. of a rigidity trap; the estuary megaproject appears as a counterfactual 2019; Cole et al. 2019; Mudliar 2020). Here, concerning the event that might have led to a lock-in trap. Design credits: Sistèmika (Silvia Jiménez Izquierdo and Sonia Rodríguez Martínez) analysis of power relationships and dynamics, we drew on two conceptualizations: “discursive power” (Clement 2010) and the “polycentric power typology” established by Mor- situation” (FAS) and the “adjacent action situations” affect- rison et al. (2017, 2019; see Table 1). The discursive power ing it; (2) the identification of the strategic games that might notion was introduced into the IAD framework by Clement be at play, thus helping to unravel the foundational structure (2010) to systematize the analysis of how power shapes the of dilemmas, conflicts, or coordination problems (Kimmich decisions of actors located in action situations, factoring in and Villamayor-Tomás 2019). The NAS-linked game models the political-economic context. From a discursive power per- help to understand outcomes (e.g., equilibria) which would spective, discourses hold a capacity to reinforce or under- otherwise remain unexplained (McGinnis 2011a; Kimmich mine the credibility and legitimacy of institutions, and so are 2013). constitutive elements that can confer/drain power to/from Here, we used the micro-level NAS approach keeping a institutions (i.e., discourses have power on their own) (Clem- meso-micro analytical tension to connect logically with the ent 2010). In a dynamic two-way interaction, discourses can Doñana research program. The latter works at meso-level, mobilize power and function as drivers of policy and insti- aggregating institutional, discursive, and power mechanisms tutional dynamics, with actors’ values, interests, and beliefs Table 1  Polycentric power typology (Morrison et al. 2017, 2019; Mudliar 2020), including discursive power (Clement 2010) as a fourth type Type of power Description Power by design Power written in rules and incentives. Formal authority with capacity to make rules, allocate resources, undertake structural adjustment, redesign markets and administrative structures, to tax, and regulate resource use and externalities. Includes legal power, political power and administrative power Pragmatic power Discretion associated in implementing rules. Includes cooperation as well as false compliance, feigned ignorance, tokenistic behavior, non-decision-making, inability, and reluctance of formal government to implement policies, and lack of compli- ance Framing power Actors construct frames to manipulate, persuade, induce, sanction, and coerce the contest of top-down decisions and present them as illegitimate to subvert, disrupt, and avoid formal rules Discursive power Discourses exercise power by influencing how actors perceive reality and by constituting their interests and preferences. They also exercise power by limiting the range of institutions and policy options perceived as possible and acceptable 13 Sustainability Science built in. In turn, power dynamics are shaped by the politi- the analytic narrative approach (e.g., Levi 2004), in that it cal–economic context and the pre-existing institutional prac- specified how the narrative was assembled, and contributed tices in which they are embedded (Clement and Amezaga to explanation on a par with game-theoretic language and the 2013). empirical material against which the proposed games were The polycentric power typology allows for a closer evaluated (Mongin 2018). examination of the power-laden conditions and various power sources enabling actors to fulfill their interests and achieve their goals (Morrison et al. 2019). Using that typol- Results ogy (Table 1), we sought to complement our use of discur- sive power in previous research (Méndez et al. 2019) with Our narrative first presents the identified Focal Action Situ- agency-based theories of power. By combining these two ation (FAS), its linked Network of Action Situations (NAS) conceptualizations of power with the NAS approach, we and the initial conditions of the analysis. The narrative then sought to explore the role of power in explaining strategic provides an analysis of the games that best approximate the interactions among actors. In our view, whilst discursive strategic interactions among FAS actors and their inter- power allows the capture of power phenomena not easily weaving with NAS dynamics. The narrative finishes with attributable to a specific group of actors, the polycentric the power analysis using the polycentric power typology and power typology allows the capture of actors’ agency and, discursive power. notably, their capacity to influence the way environmental problems are framed and thus to change/reinforce discourses. Focal action situation, linked network of action Here, the strengths of the polycentric power typology were situations and initial conditions—the lock‑in leveraged in the context of a command-and-control para- menace digm. This paradigm was inherited from previous authori- ties, and it continues to imbue the current multiple governing The FAS was composed of three main organizational actors authorities operating at different levels in Doñana. at operational level (i.e., directly affecting or affected by the estuary megaproject): Port Authority (­ A1), Rice Growers Methods: operationalizing the conceptual ­(A2) and Nature Stewards (­ A3) (Fig. 3). Nature Stewards components encompassed actors with similar interests in preserving healthy ecosystem processes and functionality in the Gua- To operationalize our conceptual components, we followed dalquivir estuary (e.g., fisheries sector), the Doñana marshes two main steps. First, we collected information to build a (e.g., National Park) and Veta la Palma (e.g., sustainable historical profile of the estuary megaproject between 2000 aquaculture operation) (see Fig. 1 for geographical location and 2019. This was done through a critical review of (1) key and S1 for further description). Those actors are represented primary sources for direct evidence and historical data, here mainly by the World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) and and (2) secondary sources for interpreted evidence and con- in key governance structures such as the Doñana Participa- text found in similar research (see sources consulted in S2). tion Council. The FAS was then linked to a NAS composed Second, we performed our core analytical task by probing of six main action situations. Closer to the FAS, at collec- the historical profile and concurrently constructing a quali- tive-choice level, we identified three specific action situa- tative narrative for reporting our results. To maintain a sys- tions: water planning ­(ASwp), knowledge generation ­(ASkg) tems perspective and meso–micro tension in our exploratory and governance ­(ASgovc). At a higher constitutional level, exercise, we decided a priori to identify and apply game- we identified three broader action situations operating top- theoretic logics to the core FAS situation (micro-level), and down: government ­(ASgov), ruling ­(ASrul) and supranational to perform a more descriptive analysis of its adjacent NAS authority ­(ASsup). See Fig. 3 for detailed descriptions. dynamics (meso-level). Third, drawing on discursive power Analysis concentrated on the period 1985–2000. In 2000, and the polycentric power typology, we analyzed power the estuary megaproject proposed four major measures (SPA relationships over the whole NAS, letting the required 2013): meso–micro tension to arise ex post. Analysis and narrative construction proceeded through a cyclic recursive process 1. The construction of a new lock through enlarging the of information collection, interpretation, and inference (Yin old lock that connected the estuary and the commercial 2018). Our focus was on (1) interactions within and between quay. action situations, and how and why such interactions might 2. Deep dredging of the estuary to increase its depth (from influence SES outcomes, and (2) the risk of regime shift to 6.5 to 8 m on average) and width (from 60 to 90 m on a lock-in trap and the prospects for a sustainability path- average) along the whole course of the navigable canal. way at Doñana SES level. Our procedure borrowed from 3. Maintenance of the deep dredging for 20 years. 13 Sustainability Science Fig. 3  Focal Action Situation of the estuary megaproject, linked Network of Action Situations, main interrelationships and actors’ descriptions 4. Auxiliary infrastructure (e.g., new bridges, port infra- For our analysis, the relevant measures were (1) the structure, road and rail communication network). new lock, named “Sea Gate,” and (2) the “deep dredging measure” (DDM; never implemented). These measures are 13 Sustainability Science now subsequently contraposed to (1) the status quo “shal- way than (counterfactually) a world where DDM had been low dredging measure” (sqSDM; subcontracted by the Port implemented—probably leading to a lock-in trap. We termed Authority for maintenance since 1985), and (2) a potential this situation “grey equilibrium” (see game-based descrip- sustainability pathway. tion below). Prompted by these insights, we applied our Before 2000, the FAS actors seemed to have co-existed game-theoretic NAS approach and power analysis. in a quite stable pattern of strategic interactions. This stable state was characterized by a local use of water resources Focal action situation games and network of action that (arguably) did not imply net short-term deterioration of situations dynamics—a knowledge hope overall quality, nor an excessive withdrawal by any single actor that significantly reduced availability for others. We A pattern of uncooperative behavior (2000–2010) argue that this was due to existing infrastructure, governance and institutional mechanisms that contributed (and still con- We merged the estuary megaproject’s historical profile with tribute) to the minimization of impacts and the de-escalation our description of NAS dynamics, to show such dynamics of conflictive situations. Key mechanisms included (based vis-a-vis key influencing events and linkages (Fig. 4). We on Del Moral 1991; González-Arteaga 2005; Méndez et al. identified three relevant cycles characterizing NAS dynam- 2019; See also SES boundaries in S1): ics (we describe the most important linkages; for further details see Fig. 4): • A massive hydraulic-irrigation infrastructure that allows for command-and-control water management across sec- 1. A governance cycle (2000–2007) that originates in tors. ­ASgovc, triggered bottom-up by the prescriptive report of • The coordination of estuary water intakes required for the Doñana Participation Council rejecting the estuary rice cultivation with (1) salinity wedge control through megaproject (δ2ι1, ­ASgovc), and the participatory deci- managed freshwater discharges from upstream and head- sion to create the Estuary Scientific Commission (δ4, waters dams, and (2) maintenance shallow dredging. ­ASgovc). The cycle closed with the commissioning of the • The aquaculture operation, which has the ability to con- CSIC study (δ5, ­ASkg). trol water quality through sluice gates and internal recir- 2. A government cycle (2010–2014) that originates in culation. ­ASgov, triggered by the publication of the CSIC study • The protection of the Doñana marshes both legally and (δ6ι2, ­ASkg), which set into motion national (δ7, ­ASgov) physically through surrounding natural levees and artifi- and supranational (δ9, ­ASsup) governmental reactions cial embankments equipped with sluice gates. in response to the study plus formal complaints from • Governance bodies such as the Doñana Participation Nature Stewards (e.g., δ8, FAS). Council, through which conflicts, if not resolved, are at 3. A final ruling cycle (2015–2019) triggered by the inclu- least made explicit and liable to closer inspection. sion of DDM in the two subsequent Guadalquivir River • No destabilizing large megaprojects or developments in Water Plans of 2013 (δ10, ­ASwp) and 2016 (δ14, ­ASwp), a region already saturated by hydraulic infrastructure and both of which entailed sentencing against such inclusion that was probably close to its limits in terms of agricul- by the Spanish Supreme Court in 2015 (δ13, ­ASrul) and tural economic yield. 2019 (δ16, ­ASrul), respectively. Subsequently, three pertinent insights were gained. First, The entry point for our analysis was the informational- the FAS stable state characterized water resources/wet- institutional linkage δ6ι2 created between ­ASkg and the FAS lands governance and the rigidity trap in Doñana to a large through the 2011 CSIC study (Fig. 4). With such linkage extent pre-2000, and it currently remains the status quo, as absent, the FAS, between 2000 and 2010, seems to fit a one- DDM was never implemented. We thus conjecture that: pre- shot game of conflict. Here defection and free riding on estu- 1985 the three FAS actors were (and still are) enmeshed ary water resources were the chosen behaviors of the Port in a rather regularized pattern of expectations and strategic Authority, and such behavior was passively supported by the interactions posing no immediate risk of large irreversible River Authority through its water planning functions, A ­ Swp socioeconomic impacts or environmental degradation in the (Fig. 4). The game approximates a prisoner’s dilemma where short term. Second, in 1985, sqSDM gave the Port Author- the Port Authority sets an action course (defection strategy) ity a first-mover advantage and increased the probability of to its own advantage, choosing to maximize economic tar- DDM, thus setting the initial conditions to destabilize the gets irrespective of the strategies of the Rice Growers and FAS state. Third, in 2000, DDM posed a looming systemic Nature Stewards. Between 2000 and 2010, those two actors risk at SES level, jeopardizing a stable situation with higher also had their own defection strategies—which, to the best potential to achieve a sustainable pathway in a less costly of our knowledge, they still have in 2022. Rice Growers had 13 Sustainability Science Fig. 4  Dynamics of the Network of Action Situations of the estu- cycles (governance, government and ruling) and resulted in a major ary megaproject vis-à-vis the megaproject’s historical profile. Such shift in the underlying rules of the game within the Focal Action Situ- dynamics evolved between 2000 and 2010 through three relevant ation after 2010 13 Sustainability Science Fig. 5  Stag-hunt game model of the Focal Action Situation in exten- tories, which can be characterized by three outcome equilibria: tur- sive form. The game progresses from the start of the game (Ø) to bid equilibrium (achieved by the Nature Stewards “surrendering the four terminal histories describing the sequential structure of actors’ SES”), grey equilibrium (maintained by the Port Authority “striking decision-making. The differing preferences of actors are represented back”) and blue equilibrium (characterized by all actors “working by the structure of their payoff functions for each of the terminal his- with nature”) a strong lobbying power to achieve the construction of an stag-hunt (assurance) game (Fig. 4, game shift) (see, e.g., alternative hydraulic megaproject granting water resources Mielke and Steudle 2018). As we show below, the stag hunt upstream of the Port or from other basins. Nature Stewards continues to reflect the prisoner’s-dilemma situation (i.e., had the capacity to isolate wetlands and the aquaculture propensity to defect from the “grey equilibrium”), but it also operation from the biophysical conditions in the estuary via reflects two other equilibria that would have not material- engineering means (e.g., sluice gates, see S1). ized in the absence of a knowledge input such as the CSIC In this situation, the prospects for cooperation and keep- study. The latter shifted a situation dominated by imperfect ing the status quo “grey equilibrium” were limited. But information and possible payoffs from the actor’s defect the relevance of this analysis does not lie in how well the strategies, to a more informed situation with the potential to situation adjusts to a prisoner’s dilemma, but in how the achieve a higher equilibrium dominated by risk—but also estuary megaproject appears to have concurrently induced more rewarding if considering overall socioeconomic wel- three things. First, the launch of the megaproject caused the fare at SES level. However, as we show next, this situation (somewhat hidden) “grey equilibrium” to emerge in 2000. was characterized by a coordination failure among actors—a Without the megaproject’s launch, such an equilibrium failure that, to the best of our knowledge, still characterizes might have gone unnoticed for either the playing actors or the situation in 2022. any external observer. Second, the realization of that equi- librium induced an unstable prisoner’s dilemma, making the An escapable coordination failure (2011–2019)? Port Authority’s overall development strategy highly vulner- able. The other two players became rapidly aware of the risk We reflect on our argument about the game shift using an posed by the Port Authority’s first-mover advantage, and the extended-form game model (Fig. 5; shift also marked in Nature Stewards in particular chose to fight back throughout Fig. 4). To simplify our causal interpretation, we combined the NAS governance cycle (Fig. 4). Third, this fightback Rice Growers and Nature Stewards into a single actor A ­ 2+3, stance made possible the CSIC study, which then induced a but diagnosed separately their different interests, behaviors, game shift in 2011. and influence over SES outcomes. The differing preferences In 2011, the CSIC study (δ6ι2, ­ASkg, Fig. 4) and addi- of actors are represented by the structure of their payoff tional studies questioning the assumptions of socioeco- functions (Fig. 5), for which there seem to be three outcome nomic growth underlying the estuary megaproject changed equilibria. Each equilibrium results from a respective termi- the underlying rules of the game. We argue that, in 2011, nal history describing the sequential structure of decision- the FAS actors entered a coordination game resembling a making from the start of the game Ø (Fig. 5): 13 Sustainability Science • “Strike back” (­ HA): the Port Authority chooses to “disen- relevant, as they reflect on the actual sequence of decision gage” from the rest of actors, hence precluding the find- events and the likeliest potential outcomes of the stag-hunt ing of a coordinated SES-level solution. Such a choice game (Fig. 5). These two outcomes are both Nash equilibria: thus means a proactive role in keeping the status quo players choosing to hunt stag and move towards the “blue “grey equilibrium” which shows intermediate payoffs equilibrium” risk that other players choose not to cooperate (2,2) associated with past prisoner’s-dilemma-like stra- and hunt hare (risk dominance); non-cooperating players tegic interactions. This equilibrium situation keeps open maintain the “grey equilibrium,” foregoing potential payoffs the possibility of “fight” responses from both the Nature of successful stag hunts whilst securing a lower payoff (pay- Stewards (hard responses) and Rice Growers (lukewarm off dominance) (Skyrms 2008). Therefore, in terms of best responses, due to their plan B megaproject). In game-the- response strategies, the decision sequences leading to ­HA oretic terms, actors continue their uncooperative behavior and ­HB are “strategies from which no one finds it unilater- and “choose” to hunt hare to secure a more certain gain, ally convenient to deviate” (Conte and Paolucci 2002, p.52). i.e., the “grey equilibrium” is payoff dominant. This equi- As argued above, the FAS, between 2000 and 2011, was librium also reflects on a terminal history in which the configured around the “grey equilibrium,” stabilized by a estuary megaproject was never put forward, i.e., “doing series of governance and institutional mechanisms that cer- nothing” beyond sqSDM (HA’). tainly come with advantages to prevent further SES degrada- • “Working with nature” ­(HB): the Port Authority chooses tion. The “grey equilibrium” is, however, characterized by to “engage” with the other actors to find a coordinated a fragile stalemate among actors underlain by a sub-optimal solution at SES level. This choice, therefore, means a payoff structure that, with a sufficient disturbance level (e.g., potential collective bet to coordinate the achievement of DDM), can develop into a below-sub-optimal outcome (“tur- a “blue equilibrium” showing the highest payoffs (3,3). bid equilibrium”). Such a shift could lead to a tighter and This equilibrium situation would arise from new strategic more reactive command-and-control of water resources for interactions emerging in the FAS and spreading to, or two reasons. On the one hand, the shift might entail higher facilitated by, its linked NAS, to secure a robust sustain- risks and uncertainties posed by uncharted biogeochemical ability outcome and pathway. Here, we do not discuss and physical conditions in the estuary. On the other hand, the in detail the governance configuration or policy instru- “turbid equilibrium” would have resulted in an asymmetric ments required for the “blue equilibrium,” but use it as social dilemma in water appropriation. Such a result would a likely future scenario in which we speculate that all see a shift from non-consumptive to consumptive water use actors would be better off—although not without tak- by the Port Authority, due to the net quantity subtraction ing certain risks. Indeed, if the actors coordinate, they implied in increased freshwater discharges from headwa- “choose” to hunt stag and seek riskier long-term gains ter dams to control for the quality (e.g., salinity and turbid- at SES level: the “blue equilibrium” is, therefore, risk ity levels) required by the other actors. The Rice Growers, dominant. however, were already lobbying for their own alternative • “Surrender the SES” ­(HC): the Nature Stewards choose megaproject (defect strategy) for provision/allocation from to “acquiesce” to the estuary megaproject and DDM is upstream waters (Vargas 2014). If materialized, such a implemented. This choice thus means a below sub-opti- megaproject would probably have created subtractability mal “turbid equilibrium,” potentially showing the lowest problems and new dilemmas with upstream actors. For the payoffs for all actors (hunt precluded). Based on exist- Nature Stewards, the impacts would have been mixed. For ing evidence (see main text and S1), we assume that in example, concerning the Doñana marshes, DDM would have this equilibrium situation: the purported socioeconomic entailed a higher uncertainty for the decision to fully reopen benefits of the estuary megaproject are highly specula- them to natural dynamics (see S1). In relation to the estu- tive and are not achieved; the Rice Growers manage to ary’s ecosystems, it would have been disastrous (see CSIC lobby effectively for a new megaproject granting their study). Regarding the aquaculture operation, it would have required resources but in doing so create similar alloca- entailed a medium risk, due to its capacity to recirculate tion issues elsewhere; the estuary ecosystems become water inside the operation to control for quality (see S1). highly degraded; and the protected wetlands remain dis- If looked at through a purely rational-choice game-based connected from their natural dynamics; therefore, failing lens, the sub-optimal and stalemate “grey equilibrium” to achieve their original hydro-ecological functions. seems to emerge, with actors interacting, yet unconscious of their overall (tragic) strategic situation. Since 2000, FAS The peripheral terminal histories ­HC and HA’ reflect on actors seem to have been interacting as if their interests counterfactual decision events, with ­HC representing an were aligned to produce a stable equilibrium with regular- unlikely, but still possible scenario. For our explorative ized gains from uncooperative behavior. Through the lens research here, two central histories, ­HA and H ­ B, are the most of a stag-hunt game, which factors in the CSIC study as 13 Sustainability Science an informational input reducing overall uncertainty in the current stalemate “grey equilibrium” within the FAS and system, it is striking the persistence of the Port Authority in the risk of regime shift from a rigidity to a lock-in SES trap. resolutely maintaining its defect strategy, a strategy poten- tially leading to the “turbid equilibrium.” Considering the Enter power into the analysis—the rise of hydraulics poor socioeconomic prospects of the estuary megaproject, the knowledge provided by the CSIC study and the Supreme Our power analysis was guided by questions concerning the Court’s rulings, the Port Authority appears as though it was Port Authority’s persistence of DDM and the River Author- behaving irrationally. This seemingly irrational behavior was ity’s tolerance of such a measure. The Port and the River compounded by the existence of the nearby more competi- Authority wielded power by design, backed by their respec- tive and accessible seaport of Cádiz, and by probable high tive national government mandates to promote maritime sunk and maintenance costs derived from DDM (e.g., regu- trading and water use planning. Formal authority operation- lar deep dredging, corrective measures for large environmen- alizes resource allocation, infrastructure development, infra- tal impacts). If finally built, the megaproject’s infrastructure structural adjustments, and regulation of resource use. The would have more than likely become unfit for purpose and critical issue is that both Authorities executed their mandates inefficient, i.e., a white elephant, even more so in a context despite general disproof and lack of support for the estuary of accelerating climate change (see, e.g., Zittis et al. 2019), megaproject. Thus, a more nuanced interpretation points e.g., leading to an uncertain water supply–demand ratio to a discretionary use of legal and administrative back- upstream and potentially reduced volumes in the headwater ing, i.e., pragmatic power. The Port Authority’s pragmatic regulatory reservoir system. power stemmed from misdirected power-by-design, through In our view, the current trajectory of the game is highly feigning ignorance of the megaproject’s negative forecasted dependent on the two available choices for the Port Author- impacts. The behavior of the River Authority was clearly ity to either “disengage” or “engage” as described above. marked by a non-decision-making attitude, running counter If the Port Authority disengages, not yielding to the evi- to EU regulations that are superordinate to the Authority’s dence of the negative impacts of deep dredging after the planning competencies (inclusion of DDM in two subse- ruling cycle, nor seeking alternative coordinated solutions quent Water Plans, δ10 and δ14, ­ASwp; Fig. 4). The inclu- for the Port’s function contributing to overall socioeconomic sion of DDM as a “complementary measure” in the River welfare, it might proactively be putting itself on a collision Authority’s 2013 Water Plan (δ10, ­ASwp; Fig. 4) is striking, course—approximating, e.g., a chicken game—with the as such measures must be conducive to “good environmental other two actors, especially with the Nature Stewards. The status,” a key aim of the European Union’s Water Frame- latter would probably not change their strategy, as they cur- work Directive. Paradoxically, DDM would have surely rently have precedent legal and knowledge-based mecha- needed its own “complementary measures” to counteract nisms to prevent harmful interventions entailing systemic the large socioeconomic and environmental impacts foreseen risks. If these mechanisms were to fail in the future, due to by the CSIC study (Vargas and Paneque 2015). The Port no further “fight” responses from the Nature Stewards, and Authority also showed framing power in using questionable the “deep dredging” measure was to be implemented due to grounds to characterize the estuary megaproject as a panacea a choice to “acquiesce” (i.e., full realization of “surrender for socioeconomic development and in presenting the “com- the SES” terminal history), then all three actors would fall plementary measure” issue as a “procedural defect” (Diario into a massive coordination failure. Such a failure is char- de Sevilla 2015; El Mundo 2015). This might be seen as an acterized by a below-sub-optimal payoff structure in which attempt to disrupt formal rules, such as the new knowledge actors are worse-off environmentally, probably leading to requirements for the Environmental Impact Assessment economic loss and requiring a complex readaptation of (δ7, ­ASgov; Fig. 4). We found no evidence of use of framing expectations and strategies. power on the part of the River Authority, but the question Understanding or even predicting how the game might remains of whether it was acting in collusion with the Port end, and informing how to escape the current coordination Authority. Why was the Sea Gate built before DDM was failure, requires a more nuanced explanation of the Port implemented (i.e., why the cart was put before the horse)? Authority’s seemingly irrational behavior potentially leading Were both the “complementary measure” and the Sea Gate to the “turbid equilibrium,” i.e., an apparent odd game out- acting as Trojan horses? come. Below, we show how the polycentric power typology Our analysis above illuminated “how” both authorities and insights from previous research drawing on discursive operationalized their persistent (Port Authority) and tolerant power cast some “rationality” to the Port Authority. Further, (River Authority) behaviors but answering “why” provided those types of power contributed to a more refined explana- us with a more robust explanation. Why such behavior given tion of the current situation in terms of the inertia of the the mounting evidence that DDM would not bring about the argued benefits? Why not change the approach and search for 13 Sustainability Science alternative solutions? Why bring into play the agent-based forces (based on Schwartz 2004, unpublished manuscript). power sources identified above? Based on previous research, Indeed, mechanism B above constitutes the continuation of we argue that discursive power was both overarching and the hegemonic hydraulic-mission discourse to signal mas- funneled through those power sources, albeit differently for sive increasing returns downstream. It thus induces large each Authority. In Doñana, previous research evidences a hydraulic interventions such as the estuary megaproject, for hegemonic hydraulic mission discourse operating from the example, through: political–economic context at national level (e.g., Méndez et al. 2019). This discourse operates through two meso-level 1. Large setup costs (i.e., the inertia of sunk costs) arising mechanisms: (A) it mobilizes discursive power top down, after the spending of public funds for the construction of imbuing institutional arrangements across multiple levels, the Sea Gate (€163 million; Vargas and Paneque 2015). and (B) it signals increasing-returns mechanisms that prompt This created a high payoff for further Port Authority bottom-up strategic reactions from actors at lower levels. investment in the estuary megaproject as a single option We assessed that (A) influenced the River Authority more for the estuary’s future. In other words, such setup costs markedly, further explaining its tolerant behavior, and (B) could not be recovered unless the full estuary megapro- influenced the Port Authority, leading it to become heavily ject had been fully implemented through the execution invested in potentially inefficient large infrastructure. We of DDM. reason as follows. 2. Learning effects, due to the knowledge gained in the In our analysis, discursive power seems to be acting as recursive operation of the estuary’s navigable canal an overarching frame. Since the beginning of the twenti- (e.g., combining shallow dredging and light ship traf- eth century, the hydraulic mission discourse has defined fic since 1985), leading to higher efficiency and higher Spanish water policies to a large extent, steering regional returns from continuing the same type of operation over socioeconomic development in a particular direction, and time. relying on large public hydraulic infrastructure and irrigation 3. Adaptive expectations, whereby the increasing preva- agriculture (Swyngedouw 1999; Saurí and Del Moral 2001; lence of the selected choice created a self-reinforcing López-Gunn 2009; Font and Subirats 2010; Castán-Broto mechanism, thus increasing its prevalence (1985–2019). 2015; Swyngedouw 2015; Vargas and Paneque 2015; Kim- mich and Villamayor 2019; Donadei 2020). Key features of such a discourse are: increasing water provision (supply Discussion side) through state intervention via economic planning and modernization; massive public funding of large hydraulic Several key insights can be derived from our results. We infrastructures; passive concern for both water quality and have evidenced how the dynamics of meso-level mecha- hydrological system conditions; low water prices for final nisms (discursive power, signaled increasing returns) in users under the assumptions of net returns on investments the Doñana SES interweave with micro-level FAS strategic to national wealth; hegemony of technocratic elites and civil interactions and agency-based (polycentric power typol- engineering corps; and the paradigm of nature as an object ogy) forms of power. Hydraulic-mission discursive power to be dominated and modified (Saurí and Del Moral 2001; seems to be imprinted in the rationality of central actors in Swyngedouw 2015; Vargas and Paneque 2015). Doñana’s water governance, showing the capacity of hegem- Discursive power, imbued by the above features of the onic discourses to influence actors’ agency-based pragmatic hydraulic mission discourse (mechanism A above), legiti- power. This pragmatic power, in turn, has materialized in mated, in this case, the use of pragmatic power by the River water policies and planning, showing how feigned ignorance Authority, i.e., misdirected power-by-design. From a differ- and non-decision-making can increase the likelihood of large ent angle, the estuary megaproject would have been improb- interventions posing risks of high environmental deteriora- able without discursive power persistently structuring the tion and suppression of key SES values. Our research thus perception of reality of both the River and Port Authorities. contributes to fill a key gap in action-situational institutional Indeed, the latter appears as the last in a row of socioeco- analysis, which currently fails to accurately capture inac- nomic actors responding to opportunities and constraints tion and non-decisions, thus missing related forms of power deeply embedded in upper level institutional arrange- imbalances at play—even when incorporating “politicized” ments, which, in turn, were infused by cognitively power- variables such as discursive power (Brisbois et al. 2019). ful ideas stemming from the hydraulic-mission discourse. In Doñana, key power fronts at local level seem to recur- Such a discourse constrained the Port Authority’s choices rently counteract each other over time. Despite the exist- and its course of action; hence, it was perhaps not behav- ence of formal bodies with actual capacity for central coor- ing irrationally, but manifesting a logical strategic behavior dination (such as the Doñana’s Participation Council or the that was embedded within larger structural and discursive Guadalquivir River Authority), they seem unable to direct 13 Sustainability Science governance to escape the current stalemate (“grey equilib- biases or small-random historical accidents. This, in turn, rium”) situation or the system-level rigidity trap. This cre- might result in not getting the incentives or the rules right ates a space where any actor with a first-mover advantage (Bowles 2009), which then leads to a wider misaligned insti- might grab power and intervene within the SES, potentially tutional fit for resolving problems at SES level (Epstein et al. leading others or all to be worse-off, and thus decreasing 2015) or framing innovative policies to trigger a sustain- overall SES welfare. But more relevant for our case, any ability pathway. In Doñana, as our results show, two meso- actor moving first, supported by forceful discourses and level mechanisms (discursive power and increasing returns), institutional arrangements, seems to get immediately coun- aggravated by the power-counteraction mechanism argued teracted by other actor(s) supported by the very same mecha- above, still serve to decrease the attractiveness of sustainable nisms. While this power-counteraction mechanism seems to alternatives at present. Therefore, we must go beyond micro- neutralize large perturbations in the short-term, nothing truly level institutional analysis to adequately inform the design of prevents the weakening of current governance controls, the policy instruments which trigger collective action towards results of which might lead to the authorization of larger, more sustainable outcomes (e.g., high “blue equilibria”). riskier interventions. As we have shown above, the inertia Indeed, power imbalances might have macro- or meso- of increasing-returns mechanisms and the hydraulic mis- level contextual or historical origins and be “congealed” in sion discourse is sometimes sufficient a risk (e.g., Sea Gate current institutional arrangements that purposive actors use and “complementary measures”). Further, this power-coun- as vantage points (Kashwan 2016), thus operating “below teraction mechanism is impeding coordination to trigger a the radar of institutional analyses” (Ingalls 2017). It would sustainability pathway—i.e., precluding increasing returns therefore be advantageous to work at the intersection of from sustainability coordination effects. Interestingly, past post-structuralism and rational-choice institutionalism to research in Doñana has shown how this mechanism can be understand how people self-organize to overcome govern- productively filled, whether through entrepreneurial action ance challenges (Bennett et al. 2018), by, e.g., seeking philo- to (1) develop rice agriculture (1950s–1980s), or (2) as a sophical middle ground (Clement 2010). Cox (2019) argues counteraction to create the Doñana National Park (1969), for a focus on the dynamics and disparities of power and potentially preventing the fall into a lock-in trap (Méndez authority, codified through “the language of institutions” et al. 2019; see Fig. 2). Therefore, Doñana’s power-counter- (e.g., property rights), and making best use of institutional action mechanism constitutes a double-edged sword: it can path dependence (e.g., historical institutionalism à la North enable agency from an actor coalition to prevent a locked-in 1990). According to Cole et al. (2019), we need “combined” situation (but stabilizing rigidity), but can also block col- frameworks systematizing the analysis of “hidden” struc- lective agency (i.e., coordinated collective action) from all tures of power and human agency. Instead of viewing them relevant actors to pursue a SES sustainable outcome. Our as an analytical contingency, such structures are significant, insights resonate with recent understanding on discursive- as they can shape or be shaped via collective action and can institutional inertia mechanisms underlying the dominance enable or prevent change (Cole et al. 2019; Méndez et al. of actors’ groups in water governance (Williams 2019; see 2019). An epistemological connection between power-cen- also Méndez et al. 2022). Furthermore, our insights align tric and actor-centric institutional approaches can indeed be with research showing how the passivity of authorities can very productive in gaining insights on the interconnections be a cause of water resources degradation and entrenchment between macro- and micro-level processes and outcomes of rigidity traps, and how such passivity can effectively be (Knight 1992). Here, we have shown how interpretations counteracted by social movements inducing individual from game-theoretic micro-level analyses of strategic agency (Enqvist et al. 2016). interactions and agency-based power relationships can be Our meso-micro analytical tension, which deals with the strengthened by logically connecting with previous meso- macro-level properties of the path dependence notion used level analyses which combined post-structural power, and in previous Doñana research, led us to a final key epistemo- rational-choice and historical institutionalism (Méndez et al. logical insight with normative implications. In path depend- 2012, 2019). ence logics, to sustain a certain path, whatever the scale of analysis and/or mechanisms identified, at least one of these mechanisms (e.g., contextual factors, positive/nega- Conclusions tive externalities) must act to decrease the relative attractive- ness of alternative paths (Arrow 2000; Kay 2005; Vergne Understanding the governance of sustainability pathways in and Durand 2010). Premature assessments based solely on, SES traps is imperative, since the wrong configuration might e.g., a rational-expectations standard alone, and obviating lead from escapable to inescapable states (e.g., from a rigid- contextual (institutional, discursive, power, etc.) conditions, ity to a lock-in trap). It is critical to understand how histori- might end up concluding local irrational behaviors, cognitive cal, institutional, discursive and power factors interweave 13 Sustainability Science and can create or hinder governance configurations more Supplementary Information The online version contains supplemen- favorable to fostering sustainability pathways. Here, we have tary material available at https://d​ oi.o​ rg/1​ 0.1​ 007/s​ 11625-0​ 22-0​ 1258-0. contributed to such understanding through a novel combi- Acknowledgements Pablo F. Méndez gratefully acknowledges funding nation of the NAS approach, the polycentric power typol- from the European Commission through the Horizon 2020 Framework ogy and the concept of discursive power. We have shown Programme for Research and Innovation under Grant Agreement No. how certain institutional (e.g., forceful legal frameworks) 871128 to eLTER PLUS Project. The work of Sergio Villamayor- Tomas was supported by the Ramon y Cajal Fellowship (RyC-2017- and informational (e.g., new knowledge generation) mecha- 22782), from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Uni- nisms within a NAS can result in a governance configuration versities, through the “Maria de Maeztu” Programme for Units of that prevents further SES degradation. However, underlying Excellence (CEX2019-000940-M). The authors greatly appreciate the these apparent robust governance configurations, key actors comments made by David Barberá, Melf-Hinrich Ehlers and Jill Tellier who reviewed initial drafts of the manuscript and helped strengthen it. can be caught in lasting coordination failures and fragile sub-optimal equilibria situations prone to mutual defection Funding Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC strategies. While if persisting over time such strategies might agreement with Springer Nature. seem irrational, they become more explicable in the pres- Data availability The authors confirm that the data supporting the ence of meso-level mechanisms involving power dynamics findings of this research are available within the article and its sup- and discursive-institutional inertia. These situations are plementary materials. constantly at risk of being unbalanced by powerful actors promoting large SES hydraulic and technocratic interven- Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri- bution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adapta- tions, backed also by the inaction of tolerant authorities. tion, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long Such interventions bear systemic risks of governance falling as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, to below sub-optimal equilibria situations, characterized by provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes a strong suppression of SES functions and values, and the were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated high sunk- and trajectory-shifting costs of a lock-in trap. otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in Coordination failures among water governance actors in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not SES must be pushed to higher equilibria—termed here “blue permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will equilibria”—situations, more conducive to enable collective need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://​creat​iveco​mmons.​org/​licen​ses/​by/4.​0/. action for fostering sustainability pathways. Those situations present greater risks for all actors involved, as they might require relinquishing economic maximization goals and power grabbing at all levels. 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