Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-022-01273-1 SPECIAL FEATURE: ORIGINAL ARTICLE Networks of Action Situations in Social-Ecological Systems Research Networks of action situations in point‑source pollution: the case of winery wastewater in Aragon, Spain Ignacio Cazcarro1,2 · Sergio Villamayor‑Tomas3 · Maria Pilar Lobera4,5 · Joaquín Murría6 · María Bernechea1,4,5 Received: 31 August 2021 / Accepted: 30 November 2022 / Published online: 16 January 2023 © The Author(s) 2023 Abstract In this article, we offer an analysis of point-source water pollution governance in the European agri-food sector. Specifi- cally, we tackle the case study of the wine industry in Aragon (Spain) through the lenses of the networks of action situations approach. We unveil key strategic decisions of wine producers in relation to compliance with water discharge regulations and explore the feasibility and effectiveness of potential solutions. According to our quantitative and qualitative analyses, the problem of peak load discharges in the sector can be explained by the strategic behavior of wine producers in the context of enforcement deficits, as well as by particularities of the wine production process, and controversies around the construc- tion and management of public treatment plants. Coordination among wine producers and public treatment plant managers to invest in in-house treatment infrastructure or to smooth discharges out so they fit the capacity of treatment plants would be a promising solution; however, economic incentives and tightened enforcement of discharge regulations would also be necessary. Graphical abstract Handled by Christian Kimmich, Institut fur Hohere Studien- Institute for Advanced Studies, Austria. Extended author information available on the last page of the article 13 Vol.:(0123456789) 202 Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 Keywords Networks of action situations · Point-source pollution · Winery · Wine industry · Wastewater · Aragon (Spain, EU) Abbreviations release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the AS Action situations proportion of untreated wastewater and substantially increas- BOD5 Biological oxygen demand (in mg ing recycling and safe reuse globally”. The reality, however, ­O2/l) is far from this goal. According to some estimations, only CHE (in Spanish) Ebro Water Agency 32% of wastewater worldwide receives some type of treat- CLC Corine Land Cover ment (Habitat and WHO 2021; Sato et al. 2013). COD Chemical oxygen demand (in mg The European Union has been a leader in the implementa- ­O2/l) tion of the SDGs and in ensuring the sustainability of water DGA (in Spanish) General Council of Aragon systems (EEA 2018; Ritchie and Mispy 2018; Niestroy ECODES Ecology and Development et al. 2019; Tsani et al. 2020; Kurrer 2021). The European ESM Electronic Supplementary Water Framework Directive (WFD) (EC 2000) represented Material a milestone in the regulation of wastewater discharges and EU European Union treatment in the continent; however, well-known compliance FNCA (in Spanish) New Water Culture Foundation issues remain, including issues associated with point-source GIS Geographic Information System pollution from agglomerations and industries. In Spain and IAA (in Spanish) Aragonese Water Institute other countries, these issues have mostly to do with compli- IAD Institutional Analysis and ance deficits during peak discharge periods. Development Understanding why polluters fail to comply with envi- IAEST (in Spanish) Aragonese Statistics Institute ronmental regulations is challenging. This article proposes ICA (in Spanish) Water pollution tax to explore the causes and processes of compliance failure INE (in Spanish) National Statistics Institute through an analysis of governance in the Spanish context. NAS Networks of action situations Many authors have looked at water problems through the OECD Organisation for Economic Co- governance lenses and highlighted the importance of, e.g., operation and Development administrative fit between EU and national regulations (Bor- PASD (in Spanish) Aragonese Sanitation and Purifi- zel 2000; Ptak et al. 2020), coordination gaps across govern- cation Plan ance levels (Zikos and Bithas 2006; Vinke-de Kruijf et al. PDO Protected designation of origin 2009), or local collective action challenges (Villamayor- PGI Protected geographical Tomas et al. 2019; Dennis and Brondizio 2020). In this indications paper, we explore the extent to which incentives to comply SDGs Sustainable Development Goals with discharge regulations depend on strategic decisions TN Total nitrogen (in mg/l) made by both polluters and public authorities about waste- TP Total phosphorus (in mg/l) water production and treatment. TSS Total suspended solids (in mg/l) The research questions that guide the article are: Which UWWTD Urban Wastewater Treatment technological, financial, and institutional constraints shape Directive wastewater production, treatment, and discharge decisions WFD European Water Framework by polluters? How are those decisions interrelated? Which Directive solutions along the production–treatment–discharge chain WWTP Wastewater treatment plant might facilitate compliance with discharge requirements? To ZINNAE (in Spanish) Cluster for the efficient use of address these questions, we rely on the networks of action water situations (NAS) approach (McGinnis 2011a; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2010), which understands the behavior of resource users as being interdependent and embedded in decision- Introduction making situations (action situations, ASs) that are intercon- nected. Also, we focus on the case of the wine production According to Target 6.3 of the Sustainable Development industry in the region of Aragon, which is well known in Goals (SDGs) by 2030, we need to “improve water quality Spain for facing problems of discharge irregularities and by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimizing the overloading of public treatment plants. To analyze the 13 Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 203 Fig. 1  Map of the Ebro basin (black contour), Aragon region (brown able and sensitive zones (indicated in purple and pink contour lines, contour), showing (details in the text and note): wine areas (yel- respectively). Many of the vulnerable and sensitive areas coincide low and orange with transparency), agricultural irrigated areas (tur- with large agricultural farming (see in turquoise also particularly quoise), vulnerable water masses and areas (red, purple and pink) and the important agricultural irrigated areas, typically of more produc- key municipalities (marked with arrows). Note: As detailed in the tion intensification). For example, the municipality of Ejea is covered legend, the figure shows the wine Protected Geographical Indications by a PGI, which overlaps with nitrate vulnerable zones and under- (PGI) and the most important protected designation of origin (PDO) ground masses in bad chemical status. The municipality of Calatayud in the Ebro basin (thick black contour) and the region of Aragon (in falls within a PDO which overlaps with an underground mass in bad thick brown contour). PGIs and PDO, represented in light yellow and chemical status. Source: Own elaboration based on data from the orange, respectively (with transparency), overlap with groundwater Ebro Water Agency (CHE), Aragonese Statistical Institute (IAEST) masses in poor chemical status (red areas) and with nitrate vulner- and National Geographic Institute case, we use quantitative and qualitative data obtained from Case background interviews and public wastewater treatment data. In the next three sections, we further contextualize the Point-source pollution from the agri-food industry, and the case and introduce the NAS approach (see also Electronic wine industry in particular, have been less of a public con- Supplementary Material) and methods, respectively. In the cern than diffuse contamination from agriculture in Aragon. subsequent sections, we introduce and describe the ASs that However, this may change in the future, given the recent are key to understanding the governance of wastewater treat- ment in the case, and we explore the feasibility and effective- ness of potential solutions, respectively. 13 204 Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 promotion of large agri-food projects in some municipali- have a WWTP in 2019 (this number is near the average of ties, and the expansion of the wine industry into areas that 73% of municipalities in all Aragon without a WWTP5). In already suffer from diffuse pollution. Figure 1 shows in dif- addition, some of the WWTPs have limited capacity. Dis- ferent colors the wine Protected Geographical Indications1 charges from wine producers and other activities are highly (PGI) and the most important protected designation of ori- seasonal, and treatment plants, particularly those located in gin2 (PDO). These areas (indicated in yellow and orange, relatively small agglomerations, are not always able to guar- respectively) overlap with groundwater masses in poor eco- antee optimal treatment during peak load discharges. logical status (red areas) and with nitrate vulnerable and According to the Aragonese Water Institute (IAA), which sensitive zones3 (indicated in purple and pink contour lines, is the main entity managing wastewater treatment plants in respectively; see note on Fig. 1 for more details). The wine- the region, average concentrations of pollutants (see note to producing industry is highly concentrated in five regions, Fig. 2) beyond standard limits are very infrequent, or non- which represent more than 80% of employment in the sector existent. Statistics show that many WWTPs have exceeded in Aragon (Zaragoza, Cariñena, Somontano de Barbastro, in at least one month per year (maximum month) the pol- Campo de Borja and Calatayud; the last four being PDO lutant load levels for which the WWTPs were designed (see regions, see GA 2010; Duarte et al. 2012; Aragonesa de bubbles that are > 1 in Fig. 2). This is particularly relevant in Consultoría 2016; IAEST 2020). WWTPs that process large amounts of wastewater (see large The main regulatory and planning instruments for waste- size bubbles in Fig. 2), like those located in Ejea, Calatayud, water treatment in Aragon are the Aragonese Sanitation and and Alcañiz. Purification Plan (PASD) (BOA 2009), and regulations gov- erning wastewater discharges in municipal networks (BOA 2004, 2018a, b).4 The positive impact of these instruments The NAS approach in the region is evident. From 2005 to 2019, the number of treatment plants in Aragon almost quadrupled. Furthermore, The NAS is an approach to study governance. Governance the concentration of pollutants from urban point sources has analysis focuses on understanding whether and how govern- decreased and the water quality of discharges from many ments, agencies, companies, and other governmental and treatment plants in the region have improved (GA 2021). non-governmental organizations coordinate to manage pub- Still, the ability of small municipalities to cope with occa- lic goods (such as wastewater treatment). The NAS approach sional discharges coming from seasonal tourism or industrial builds on the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) activities remains a concern. Presently, around 200 (27%) of (Ostrom et al. 1994; McGinnis 2011a, b), which is widely the 731 municipalities in Aragon rely on a Wastewater Treat- recognized as one of the leading frameworks in the policy ment Plant (WWTP). Some municipalities have more than 1 sciences (Weible and Sabatier 2018) and governance studies WWTP, but many, especially small ones, have none. In the (Poteete et al. 2010; McGinnis 2011b; Cole et al. 2019). At agri-food sector, 65% of the 199 municipalities within PGIs, the heart of the IAD framework is the AS, an abstraction of and 72% of the 120 municipalities within PDOs, did not yet decision environments in which individuals and/or organiza- tions make decisions that affect each other and, potentially, 1 broader groups. A look at environmental problems through These are drawn in yellow (30% transparency): Bajo Aragón, Rib- era del Jiloca, Valdejalón, Valle del Cinca, Ribera del Gállego-Cinco Villas and Ribera del Queiles. 5 2 According to the data, the Population (of 2019) served by the 188 These are drawn in orange (30% transparency): Cariñena (also WWTP managed by the IAA is 430,000 people (32% of the popu- with the municipality of Cariñena in gray), Calatayud, Somontano lation of Aragon in 2019). We may add the handful of municipali- (also with the municipality of Barbastro in dark green) and Campo ties with a WWTP not IAA managed, with only one large munici- de Borja. 3 pality (actually the largest), Zaragoza, with 675,000 people. By Directive 91/676/CEE of December 12, relative to the protection of adding these, it becomes 84% of the population of Aragon served waters against contamination produced by nitrates used in agriculture by a WWTP. Hence, most of the municipalities without WWTP (Nitrates Directive), imposes on the Member States the obligation to are relatively small (in population). The quite small municipalities identify the waters affected by contamination by nitrates of agricul- (with barely a few dozens of inhabitants) either do not have a treat- tural origin. It establishes criteria to designate vulnerable areas, as ment plant or they are municipal septic tanks (not accounted in the those territorial surfaces whose drainage gives rise to nitrate contami- WWTP data) which tend to lack maintenance. There are no large nation, more specifically in the cartography compiled here from the water-polluting effluents in municipalities not covered by a WWTP. National Geographic Institute, when the concentration of nitrates in Still, medium-sized municipalities of a few hundreds of inhabitants water is greater than 50 mg/l. It is considered a sensitive area, where are more of a problem, since although they may have a sewage treat- water is at risk, when the concentration of nitrates is between 40 and ment plant, they do not have nitrogen and phosphorus treatment (only 50 mg/l. These identified areas are included in the Register of Pro- mandatory for more than 1000 equivalent inhabitants, with the exist- tected Areas of the Basin Hydrological Plans. ing many municipalities—86% of the total—having less than 1000 4 These are in turn based on the European Urban Waste Water Treat- inhabitants). Eutrophication, especially due to nitrogen, is the main ment Directive (EC 1991). problem. 13 Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 205 Fig. 2  Ratio between the load treated in the maximum month and through concessions)], and the data has been available since 2005 optimal treatment load (both in terms of equivalent inhabitants) for (many municipalities began to have WWTP and data from 2008– several Wastewater Treatment Plants (WWTPs) in Aragon. Notes: 2009, illustrating similar values). Note also that the data refers only to The size of the bubbles reflects the size of the (average) load treated municipalities with WWTPs. The Supplementary Material provides in the maximum month in each WWTP. Each color represents one of the original data. The optimal treatment load is defined as the design the 188 different WWTPs. Ratio > 1 indicates overload of the WWTP treating volume. As explained in full in IAA (2019), the criteria for at some point in the year. According to the IAA, the main indicators obtaining the design volume is described in the Zonal Plans, in the of wastewater overloads are total suspended solids (TSS), biological projects that develop them, and in the Guidelines, General Urban oxygen demand (BOD5), chemical oxygen demand (COD), and, in Planning Plans, Partial Plans and instruments that develop them. sensitive areas, total nitrogen (TN) and total phosphorus (TP). The The theoretical influent flow will be calculated by applying the fol- size of the bubbles reflects the size of the (average) load treated in the lowing criteria: urban unit endowments, industrial unit endowments, maximum month in each WWTP (measured in terms of equivalent livestock unit endowments, current average demand, current peak inhabitants). Data corresponding to 188 WWTPs are illustrated [the demand, future average demand, estimate of the inflow to the treat- most recent information suggests that there are around 220 WWTPs ment plant. Source: Own elaboration from Open data IAA-Govern- in Aragon (some are managed by companies in service contracts and ment of Aragon (GA 2022) the lenses of AS allows limiting a problem to a particular network is built by adding situations that can have an influ- set of actors and their decisions, as well as to the social, ence on the focal situation and on each other (Kimmich and biophysical and institutional circumstances that shape those Villamayor-Tomas 2019). Links between two situations decisions (see Fig. 5 for a visualization of the ASs within occur when physical flows (e.g., of water), information or the IAD framework). rules/policies emerging from one situation affect the behav- Environmental problems are complex and usually involve ior of actors in another situation (Kimmich 2013; Hoffmann several interconnected ASs. The NAS approach provides and Villamayor-Tomas 2022, in this issue). methodological guidance on how to analyze multiple ASs Here, we rely on the NAS approach for two reasons. systematically (McGinnis’s 2011a; Kimmich 2013; Kim- First, the approach is instrumental to our interest in look- mich and Villamayor-Tomas 2019). The “focal AS” is the ing beyond the wastewater discharge decisions of pollut- situation most directly related to the outcome/s of inter- ers. Important decisions that polluters make other than dis- est (McGinnis 2011a). Once the focal AS is identified, the charge decisions may include, for example, wine production 13 206 Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 decisions and decisions about whether to invest in in-house among interviewees was the mismatch between wastewater treatment devices. The NAS approach can not only assist discharges by wine producers and the capacity of munici- in the identification of those decisions, but also the analy- pal wastewater treatment plants to treat those discharges. A sis of how they influence wastewater discharge decisions. majority of the interviewees referred to the lack of on-site From the NAS approach perspective, polluters’ decisions water treatment devices by wine makers as the most direct are interdependent6 and shaped by incentives (i.e., costs and cause of such mismatch. Thus, we took this situation as the benefits) that can be evaluated. Second, the NAS approach focal situation and named it as the “Upstream Treatment” can help in ex ante policy evaluation (Kimmich and Vil- situation (AS2). Then, to populate the NAS we followed the lamayor-Tomas 2019). Interventions aiming at correcting value chain of wastewater production, treatment and dis- undesirable outcomes in one situation can be assessed with charge stages, each of them potentially representing an AS.8 regard to (1) their indirect impacts on other ASs and (2) their Additionally, we observed key governance/managerial tasks ultimate ability to improve final outcomes. Here, we use the associated with pollution treatment and control that could NAS approach to evaluate ex ante actions that could modify affect the on-site wastewater treatment situation (McGinnis untreated wastewater discharges by wine producers. 2011b). Our review of the literature suggests that this is the first To characterize incentives within each AS, we observed study that applies the NAS approach to the point-source pol- material, socio-economic and institutional conditions (Ober- lution context (see also Kimmich et al. 2022, in this issue). lack et al. 2018; Kellner and Brunner 2021). In terms of Thus, we believe a first contribution of this study consists material conditions, we looked at quantitative data on the in the specification of key important ASs and their linkages chemical status of water and the financial constraints of in this context. We expect our study serves as a reference installing on-site wastewater treatment devices.9 Regarding for similar ones in the future. This is not trivial because the social conditions, we looked qualitatively at features of the IAD (and NAS approach) has been used to understand natu- winemaking industry in the area (including size, business ral resource management problems (e.g., irrigation water use type, or financial conditions), as well as the heterogeneity appropriation, monitoring, or infrastructure maintenance; of interests among polluters and public authorities around Villamayor-Tomas et al. 2015), but not pollution problems. wastewater treatment and enforcement. Institutionally, we Also, our analysis contributes to illustrate the use of the NAS collected qualitative information on existing rules (formal approach for ex ante policy analysis. Contrary to previous laws and regulations, subsidies for wastewater infrastruc- efforts (Kimmich and Villamayor-Tomas 2019), we assess ture provision), shared understandings regarding water use the feasibility and effectiveness of policies that have actually priorities, and informal standards and expectations about been proposed by public authorities and stakeholders. Last wastewater discharges and their timing. but not least, this study combines qualitative and quantita- We obtained quantitative data (on discharges and treat- tive information in a systematic and meaningful way. In our ment, see Fig. 2; and location of wine producers, see Fig. 1) understanding, few of the involved actors in this case had a from public websites and data repositories (CHE 2021; GA full picture of the pollution problem and this had to do with 2021; IAA 2021b). Qualitative data were obtained from sec- the lack of quantitative and qualitative syntheses like ours. ondary documents (e.g., GA 2021; MAPA 2021; BOA 2004, 2018a, b) and interviews with key stakeholders, among other sources (see Table 1 in the Appendix). We interviewed 25 Methods key informants from October 2020 to May 2021. Interviews addressed representatives of the main water governance Although there is no clear protocol about how to draw organizations in the region (see Albiac et al. 2014; Bielsa boundaries of ASs, some patterns start emerging in the and Cazcarro 2014; CESA 2003). We interviewed repre- literature (Kimmich et al. 2022). As hinted in the previ- sentatives of the Ebro Water Agency (CHE)10 board, the ous section, a common strategy is to first identify the focal Aragonese Water Institute (IAA), key agri-food and wine AS and then observe the incentives7 of actors that make decisions in that situation. In our study, the main concern 6 Wine producers are interdependent in the compliance/pollution emission decision, because as more wine producers control their 8 emissions the need that others comply decreases. See Villamayor-Tomas et al. (2015) and Oberhauser et al. (2022) 7 for other applications of the value chain heuristic to identify AS. By incentives, we refer to the costs and benefits that affect indi- 9 vidual and collective decisions, i.e., of wine producers and pub- On the cost of urban wastewater treatment in the South of Spain, lic authorities in a particular AS. For example, constraints that may see Pajares et al. (2019). 10 shape incentives to, e.g., install on-site wastewater treatment plants by The CHE has traditionally been the main water management wine producers include the financial costs of those devices and the authority in the Ebro River basin. This basin is the main one within effective enforcement of discharge regulations. the region of Aragon, and most of the rivers in the region flow into it. 13 Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 207 Fig. 3  Action situations (AS) associated with the schematic and spatial view of water intake, pollution and treatment flows. Note: The blue boxes indicate the wastewater treatment plant, the wine related discharges and “other discharges” (from indus- try, services, households, etc., which often are all gathered in collectors before reaching the plant). The red boxes try to approximate in space the places where the ASs mainly occur. WWTPs: wastewater treatment plants. Source: Own elaboration clusters, wine producers, farmers’ (irrigation) communities, potential downstream incompliance is studied in relation to the Cluster for the Efficient Use of Water (ZINNAE), and the regulations/enforcement and environmental harm (AS5). key wastewater treatment businesses and managers. Addi- Figure 3 shows the spatial location of ASs. We identify these tionally, we interviewed researchers who were experts in the ASs individually in “ASs”, the full network in “The NAS”, matter. Interviews were semi-structured and included ques- and the appraisal of potential interventions in the "Discus- tions about the history of wastewater treatment in Aragon; sion" section. main management barriers or challenges; key agents/stake- holders “responsible” for the challenges; knowledge and ASs opinion of other views, arguments, challenges, etc.; and solutions and their feasibility. AS1: wastewater production The wine-producing industry in Aragon has four impor- tant particularities connected with wastewater pollution. Results First, as indicated by the main representative of the agri- food (and wine industry) cluster, wine producers require In our analysis, we found the lack of upstream wastewater high-quality water as an input for the production process. treatment capacity (or use) of wine producers as the focal Second, and most importantly for us, the wine produc- AS (AS2). The wastewater is generated by wine producers tion process needs water for cleaning purposes. This (and depending on the context, especially in urban areas, water constitutes the main source of discharges and can also by other businesses), AS1. Two directly connected be quite irregular throughout the year. The peak of dis- situations are: AS4—water pollution and overloads at the charges occurs during ‘the vintage’, which lasts around WWTPs from wine producers’ discharge regimes (the detec- 3 months. After the vintage, the production process is less tion of those overloads being the main warning of water intense, but more irregular. It concerns the racking of wine treatment challenges); and AS6—wastewater treatment and cleaning of deposits. These operations can discharge enforcement, which requires paying attention to the incen- significant volumes of pollutants in very short periods of tives and constraints of monitoring agents. The building and time, sometimes within one day, and can be more problem- maintenance of treatment plants (AS3) allow us to explain atic to manage than vintage-related discharges. Third, as the case with an eye on the historical development of the highlighted by the Head of the Water Quality Area of the wastewater treatment industry in the region. Finally, the CHE, although average loads from wine producers are not 13 208 Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 particularly high (as compared to pig farms, for example), is not generalizable to most wine producers in the region due they can be highly polluting. Water has a low pH and high to their small scale, unless they pool resources. sulfur, sodium and organic matter concentrations, all of which can severely threaten the eutrophic balance of riv- AS3: building wastewater treatment plants ers and aquifers, or affect/destroy the WWTPs’ biological systems. Fourth, the wine sector enjoys a strong tradition By default, the municipalities are responsible for wastewa- and has significant economic weight in Aragon, albeit at a ter treatment in the region. However, in the 1990s many small scale, relatively atomized, and geographically dis- delegated this responsibility to the IAA, due to their lack of persed (see also ESM for more details on each of these financial capacity to build and operate the plants (for further four aspects). information on this and the role of the EU, see the ESM). The PASD, approved by the regional government (Gen- AS2: capacity and use of in‑house/upstream wastewater eral Council of Aragon, DGA in Spanish) in 2001, organ- treatment ized the financing and construction of plants that would be managed by the IAA and set standards for all others. Given the peri-urban location of many of the wineries, As indicated by IAA managers, the regional governments most of the discharges flow into municipal sewage systems imposed a new water pollution tax (ICA in Spanish) to all or collectors connected to them. As highlighted by legal the affected municipalities (GA 2019; IAA 2021b) to finance academics and WWTP managers, even if municipalities the WWTPs construction and operation. Indeed, nowadays have wastewater treatment plants, the legislation requires the IAA obtains 90% of its budget (70 million euros) from that any polluter, including wine producers, install in-house this tax. Currently, few plants in the region are managed treatment facilities when COD discharges are expected to by the municipalities themselves and 220 are managed by go beyond 1500–2000 mg/l. However, as recognized and the IAA (IAEST 2021a), a public agency dependent on the identified both by wine producers and wastewater treatment DGA. managers, producers are quite resistant to making these The implementation process has not been entirely investments. They are considered as non-productive invest- smooth. Some municipalities complained about pressure ments that jeopardize producers’ returns and, in some cases, from the IAA to delegate the management in exchange for their capacity to break even. financing. Furthermore, there have been complaints about Treatment costs depend on technologies, but are seen as the public–private management model used by the IAA to high given the small scale of producers. Biological treat- operate the plants and collect the ICA (a tax with a highly ment, which is the cheapest option in terms of operational disputed social response; see Lisbona 2021, which is to be costs, faces high upfront costs due to the required water replaced) and the preference given to multinational firms storage and retention infrastructure. Indeed, some produc- over public management. The PASD was supposed to be ers may not have the financial resources, or space (e.g., water reassessed every 6 years; however, the first revision took storage capacity), to install the treatment equipment within place in 2009. In 2015 the government initiated an evalua- their premises, involving around 100,000–150,000 € on aver- tion that was never finalized, and in 2017 organized a par- age (according to the wastewater treatment businesses and ticipatory process to reform it. winemakers). Moreover, wine industry wastewater produc- tion is very seasonal, but the biological treatments require AS4: operations and maintenance of municipal/ continuous maintenance throughout the year for proper downstream wastewater treatment plants performance. This could be seen as a waste of resources, given that the infrastructure is not regularly used (for further Most of the systems used in municipal wastewater treatment details on the costs and technologies, see the ESM). plants rely on activated sludge biological treatment tech- In terms of in-house treatment facilities, there are a nologies, which are considered more robust against peak few large, very localized producers in Aragon who have loads. In particular, according to the most up-to-date data, invested in, and use, their own systems, e.g., Viñas del Vero 82% of the WWTPs rely on activated sludge with some in the Municipality of Barbastro and Bodegas San Valero other combination of treatment (e.g., 77% of the total have in Cariñena. Outside the wine sector, the pulp industry is activated sludge in prolonged aeration; IAEST 2021b; see characterized by very large and spatially concentrated com- also the type of treatment in each municipality, column X of panies, all of which include in-house treatment facilities. tab “Data for Ratios” in the ESM). Peak discharges are not Large, localized firms can afford research and innovation a problem in large municipalities that have large capacity investments and enjoy scale economies, all of which can treatment plants that are able to cope with very large and ultimately reduce treatment operating costs. However, this polluting discharges. Municipal governments are generally able to absorb overloads and to sanction producers for not 13 Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 209 having in-house treatment facilities. Imposing the install- The main enforcement authority of downstream dis- ment of those facilities on producers would not only be a charges is the CHE, whose responsibilities have included waste of resources, but would also prevent municipalities water quantity and quality. The CHE (which also supplies the from gaining the extra income obtained from sanctions. (See data for the National Census of Discharges; MITECO 2021) also enforcement situation.) has an inventory of authorized direct wastewater discharges, The real issue (highlighted by several interviewed agents) including those from WWTPs (CHE 2021). Based on these emerges when producers and municipalities are small (i.e., data, one can observe that the largest yearly volumes (of the WWTPs). For example, in small municipalities within authorized entities) are: the Industrial Refrigeration of the a wine area (say, e.g., Longares in Cariñena or Miedes in Nuclear Ascó-Vandellós II plant in Tarragona (1651 ­hm3/ Zaragoza), the main wine industries (that employ around 25 year), several industrial fish farms (all below 160 ­hm3/ people) produce relatively high-quality wine for export. The year) and urban or similar type installations with more than municipal sewage treatment plant is designed for only 500 or 50,000 habitants-equivalent discharges (typically in cities, 1000 inhabitants in the village, so that when the wine pro- all below 60 ­hm3/year, including Zaragoza, Pamplona, Vito- ducer hits a certain level of discharges, it surpasses the figure ria-Gasteiz, Lleida and Logroño). To obtain authorization, for equivalent inhabitants. This, at best, can decrease the discharges need to fulfill standards of maximum pollutant efficiency of the WWTP and, at worst, overflow its capacity. concentrations according to the Urban Wastewater Treat- The wine producer should therefore install in-house treat- ment Directive (UWWTD) and the Drinking Water Direc- ment equipment or be fined. Theoretically, the fine for not tive. For most of them this means ensuring proper treatment. treating wastewater is higher than the treatment investment In turn, authorized discharges must comply with daily and itself. However, fines may not be sufficiently discouraging annual load limits and rely on a self-managed registry of if the wine producer considers the occupied (productive) discharges and water quality measurements that are shared space, the difficulties with storing water, the operational regularly and on-demand with the CHE. Furthermore, pol- costs of treating the water and the need to treat non-stora- luters need to pay a pollution monitoring fee depending on ble volumes. We may add the fact that pollution limits are the discharge volume, the environmental conditions of the measured as concentration (g/ml), which creates incentives affected water system, and whether it is industrial or urban. for wine makers to dilute the effluent. Moreover, produc- The fee is used to protect and improve the water system. ers at small municipalities must comply with the same con- Last but not least, the CHE relies on a series of measurement centration limits as those generating larger discharges (in stations within the basin to regularly collect water quality absolute terms). Producers are often not capable of reaching data and to flag transects within the Ebro River subjected to the required concentration limits despite having low or no occasional high pollution concentrations. WWTP capacities and small discharges that are generally In terms of interactions, the CHE can impose sanctions not dangerous to the environment. As a result, producers are on non-authorized discharges or authorized discharges that more likely to be fined generating frustration and feeling of do not comply with the standards. The CHE has acquired unfairness among producers. a reputation for being quite inflexible in sanctioning firms and municipalities, especially those that do not have treat- AS5: enforcement of downstream wastewater emissions ment plants in place. Sanctions on these municipalities have created conflict with the CHE, as most municipalities had The enforcement authority of wastewater emissions is shared delegated the construction of their treatment plants to the between the CHE, the IAA and municipal authorities (Arra- IAA, but were still without them. In 2018, in recognition of zola Martínez 2013). The CHE was originally the main the conflict, the CHE approved a moratorium on sanctions authority until the approval of the Aragonese Sanitation for those municipalities that continues today. Plan. Since then, the CHE has been responsible for direct discharges, while the IAA and the municipalities have been AS6: enforcement of upstream wastewater emissions responsible for indirect discharges (i.e., discharges that are collected from various wastewater sources), including those By default, municipalities have the authority to monitor indi- from wine producers. Enforcement of wastewater treatment rect discharges, e.g., those flowing from wine producers into regulations involves two different sets of actors and, indeed, urban sewage systems and the WWTPs (where they exist). two different dynamics, depending on whether it applies to However, very few municipal governments have articulated upstream (in-house, wine-producing plants) or downstream this responsibility with regulations. Additionally, the IAA (WWTP) treatment plants. Thus, we conceptualize enforce- self-assigned the responsibility to manage WWTPs under ment as involving two situations, considered here and in the its jurisdiction (i.e., delegated by the municipalities; BOA next subsection (AS6). 2004). Based on this assurance, the ambition of the IAA is to run regular inspections. However, these inspections are 13 210 Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 mostly ad hoc reactions to events (e.g., overloads). Further- a water treatment challenge was found mostly to be AS4, more, the IAA inspection process relies mostly on the man- which puts the focus on the ability of WWTPs to do their agers of the WWTPs themselves. In the interviews, manag- job and avoid out-of-law pollution discharges into the water ers monitor discharges into plants and releases from plants system. These discharges are effectively monitored by the into water streams on a daily basis. Inflow peaks are not CHE (institutional link from AS5 to AS4 in Fig. 4), which necessarily inspected, unless there is a high concentration is the main water management authority with responsibility of pollutants or relatively frequent. More importantly, there for direct discharges into the system. The ability of WWTPs are no operating protocols, such as those of the CHE, for to keep treated water within the required standards is chal- the IAA (or the municipalities) to obtain regular discharge lenged by irregular peak loads coming from a large number information from polluters. Thus, even when the IAA initi- of small-scale wine producers (physical link from AS2 to ates an inspection, it is very difficult to trace overloads back AS4), particularly where WWTPs are small. to the polluter, particularly in municipalities with multiple As stated by the institutional agents, and by many peo- wine producers and/or other industrial polluters. Ultimately, ple from academia and social organizations, wine producers the dispersion of polluters makes ad hoc monitoring very should comply with the discharge regulations. To do so, in difficult, especially considering the IAA’s limited resources most cases, they should have (and use) an in-house treatment for field monitoring. plant. They tend not to install them because the investment Regarding sanctioning, the IAA and municipalities have and operational costs appear disproportionate to them as been less strict than the CHE. The IAA is constrained by compared to the cost (and probability) of being sanctioned the already controversial situation generated around the for violating discharge standards (institutional link from construction and financing of WWTPs and conflicts related AS6 to AS2). In addition, there is only partial information to the ICA. The municipalities, particularly small ones, are about the actual capacity of WWTPs. Many have been con- constrained by the dependence of their economies and popu- structed by the IAA without clear criteria about dimensions lation on the activities of polluters. This is clearly the case and treatment technologies (information link from AS4 to for wine producers and other agri-food industries, which AS2). The peak load issues appear at certain stages of the make use of local or regional inputs, with strong backward wine production process (physical link from AS1 to AS2) linkages with the agrarian and related sectors. and are related to the relatively atomized structure of the Finally, there is the opportunistic behavior of wine pro- industry (institutional link from AS1 to AS2). This makes ducers. As far as could be ascertained from interviews, many the case of wine producers diverge from archetypal point- producers are aware of the difficulties in tracing discharges source pollution cases. Tracing pollution back to the source back to the origin and reliance of the IAA on WWTP per- is difficult, because the industry is dispersed and there are sonnel for monitoring. Building on this knowledge, to reduce not regular registries of wine producers’ discharges into the chances of raising any flags, they tend to store discharges sewage systems (institutional link from AS5 to AS2). Fur- during the week and release them at the weekend when the thermore, the economic and symbolic weight of industry WWTPs operate with minimum personnel. Moreover, since in the municipalities (information link from AS1 to AS6), the legal limits are established by concentration (mass/vol- the conflict between municipalities and the IAA associated ume), there is the incentive and practice to dilute wastewater with the ICA tax (information link from AS4 to AS6), and (to produce less concentrated effluents) and disperse it over the conflict between municipalities and the CHE (informa- days. Additionally, producers know that sanctions are rare tion link from AS5 to AS6) make sanctioning difficult. The and factor this into their calculations of the risk of being complaints have forced the CHE to make sanctioning excep- caught and needing to pay a fine. Fines for first-time offences tions (information link from AS4 to AS5, and institutional amount to approximately 3000€ and increase progressively link from AS5 to AS4), which originated when the IAA built as infractions become more frequent. Ultimately, the permit the WWTPs. As a result, there is a dearth of treatment plants to discharge wastewater into the municipal sewage system across the region and issues associated with cost optimiza- can be revoked if infractions recur frequently, although this tion in existing WWTPs (physical link from AS3 to AS4). is rare. These circumstances can make infractions quite Up to the last 10–15 years, the main outcome of this NAS appealing, particularly when compared to the cost of install- was an evident failure to comply with the EU and national ing an in-house treatment plant. regulations on water discharges, both upstream and down- stream. This has created additional costs for wastewater treatment plants and effluent emissions to the environment The NAS with potentially damaging levels. The current outcome in terms of the downstream discharge parameters compliance is As inferred earlier in this section, there are important con- much more optimistic than before, and further downstream nections across the ASs. The main alert on the existence of enforcement (AS5) is not necessary. These good values are 13 Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 211 Fig. 4  Network of action situations (NAS), linking the physical, PDO protected designation of origin. Blue arrows = physical links; institutional and information links, including current and potential red arrows = institutional links; yellow arrows = information links; solutions. Notes: AS action situation, Munic. Municipality, muni-t dashed arrows = currently absent links that could be created as part of municipalities with treatment plants, muni-wt municipalities without solutions; dashed boxes = ASs that could be part of solutions; crossed treatment plants, CHE Ebro Water Agency, IAA Aragonese Water text = current features of links that would change as part of a solution. Institute, WWTP wastewater treatment plant, ICA water pollution tax, Source: Own elaboration a result of some recent public and private investments in consult on the issues. Doing so would aid in the develop- treatment. Still, some places without WWTPs show negative ment of appropriate regulatory indicators and an improved outcomes, and several places with WWTPs need to operate regulatory framework and system (which would be repre- at high costs, decreasing efficiency. Also, conflicts still exist sented with additional yellow arrows in Fig. 4), to develop related to penalizations and to the discussion on the financial the regulatory framework (taking into account local cir- possibilities for public and private investments. cumstances, needs and capacities), etc. This case study (in Regulation and compliance solutions are on the table particular for wine producers) has found that the private and they might be key to improving the outcomes of the sector requests stable and clear regulatory frameworks that NAS. “Monitoring and evaluation” are highlighted as key allow planning (e.g., investments needed to address AS2) processes for proper water management and its continu- in the medium and long term. These aspects also relate ous improvement. To achieve this, building confidence and to the desirable principle (OECD 2015) of “integrity and engagement with the regulatory framework agents will be transparency” practices across water policies for greater of utmost importance. For example, many interviewees accountability and trust in decision-making. voiced the importance of engagement to ascertain and 13 212 Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 Discussion being sanctioned) and encourage polluters to make those investments. As discussed in AS3, the possibility of com- Appraisal of mainstream compliance solutions bining biological and non-biological treatment technologies could facilitate reducing fixed and operational costs of in- Our findings about the strategic behavior of wine producers house facilities. Additionally, producers could use the sludge and public authorities can inform the environmental eco- for agricultural and energy generation purposes (see more nomics literature on enforcement and compliance. Stand- information in the ESM on bio-factories). The refurbish- ard enforcement theory would predict a direct relationship ing of WWTPs would make sense in cases where WWTPs between the political benefits of inspections (e.g., good suffered from design issues and need updates, but would social image, damages avoided) and their frequency, but find- be more problematic to justify in WWTPs that work well ings do not always align with predictions (Gray and Shadbe- under average discharge conditions. More importantly, both gian 2004; Cai et al. 2016). Similarly, although enforcement interventions could contradict the “polluter pays” principle is an important predictor of regulatory compliance, evidence and face adaptability issues in the long term depending on shows that polluters (e.g., pulp and paper mills, steel plants, the evolution of discharges (see physical links that connect oil transport activities) react to a diversity of enforcement AS1, AS2 and AS4). modes (e.g., lagged inspections and/or sanctions, threats All the above connect with previous works pointing to the of inspections) showing contradictory responses (Earnhart necessary, but insufficient role of regulatory action. Regu- 2004). We have not systematically focused on the factors that lations matter greatly, but they do so “less as a system of explain polluters’ decisions, but we have studied how these hierarchically imposed, uniformly enforced rules than as a decisions are affected by decisions made in other stages of coordinative mechanism, routinely interacting with market the value chain or by other actors (i.e., public authorities). pressures, local and national environmental activists, and As mentioned above, the strategic non-compliance of wine the culture of corporate management in generating environ- producers can be explained by specificities of in-house treat- mental improvement while narrowing the spread between ment capacity, but also by features of the wine production corporate leaders and laggards” (Kagan et al. 2003, p. 51). process and monitoring deficits inherited from a particular Indeed, our assessment indicates that bottom-up coordina- history of government decisions related to investment in tion among polluters and/or with WWPT managers could wastewater treatment. be a relatively cost-effective solution as compared to other When asked about solutions to the problem of wastewa- solutions. ter discharges, most interviewees suggested two potential Coordination could involve only producers (see dashed solutions that align with the above literature. The first was outline of the AS2 box in Fig. 4) or both producers and the strengthening of monitoring and sanctioning (see dashed WWTP managers (see “Discharges” box in Fig. 4). Small arrow/institutional link from AS6 to AS2 in Fig. 4). The and large wine producers could partake in cooperative second was the use of subsidies to finance investments in arrangements to share resources and technology for waste- treatment capacity (see dashed arrow/institutional link from water treatment. Governments could promote the process AS3 to AS2 in Fig. 4). The first solution could emulate the by issuing collective pollution rights, covering some of CHE’s system of self-reporting and information-sharing pro- the coordination and information-gathering costs, or pro- tocols. However, even assuming that the IAA had the neces- moting “trust and engagement” activities among polluters sary resources, this solution would still face the issue of dis- (Villamayor-Tomas et al. 2019; OECD 2015). Additionally, charge variability. As shown by previous studies, regulatory producers and WWTP managers could schedule discharges, enforcement in contexts of discharge variability can result in adjusted to WWTPs capacity. inefficiencies due to overcompliance with emission stand- All the above would require that producers develop their ards (see Brännlund and Löfgren 1996; Bandyopadhyay and own rules and monitoring systems to allocate financial Horowitz 2006). This would be assuming that polluters have responsibility and ensure that schedules are complied with, the capacity to comply, which is not even the case for many which would involve transaction costs (see Gorelick et al. small wine producers in Aragon. Furthermore, depending 2019, for an assessment of capacity sharing agreements on the severity of sanctions, producers might still prefer to among water utilities). Additionally, producers would need pay the fines than comply with regulations (see costs link to disclose discharge information, which they may resist to from AS2 to AS1). do. Moreover, not all WWTPs have equal leverage to adapt Subsidizing in-house treatment facilities or improving to producer’s discharge needs (physical link from AS3 to WWTPs are possible solutions to the issue of discharge AS4), and current relationships between the IAA and munic- variability. The subsidies would balance the costs of new ipalities are not favorable for collaboration (complaint links investments for polluters (i.e., as compared to the costs of from AS4 to AS3, and from AS4 to AS6). 13 Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 213 Moving beyond single situations and solutions “information-sharing and consultation” also contribute to pol- in the study of water pollution and treatment icy planning. These aspects would be key in the solutions dis- cussed above about the possibility that producers and WWTP One take home message from the above is that it is unlikely managers coordinate to co-manage the problem. that one solution alone solves the pollution problem in the Aragon case. Solutions focusing on a single AS risk to be Conclusion undermined by or result in unattended effects in another AS. This sounds intuitive by default, but was not necessar- Wastewater produced by the wine industry can be easily ily internalized by our interviewees. Most of them either located, identified, and controlled. Yet, it has generated severe focused on one solution or saw the solution of the prob- problems in the past and still does in the present. In this study, lem out of their reach. Only interviewees from organiza- we have applied the NAS approach to understand issues associ- tions without authority to act, such as academics or people ated with peak load discharges by wine producers in the region from social organizations, pointed to the existence of shared of Aragon, Spain. The questions driving the study were: Which responsibilities across situations, like WWTP building technological, financial and institutional constraints shape (AS3) and upstream enforcement (AS6). wastewater production, treatment and discharge decisions by The study of multiple AS can also inform us about the polluters? How are those decisions interrelated? Which solu- complexities involved and the risks of extrapolating solu- tions along the production–treatment–discharge chain facilitate tions across contexts. We believe our study can help other compliance with discharge requirements? studies in different contexts, but with certain similarities, Our analysis shows that the issue of peak loads is not a sim- e.g., in other Southern European regions (see, e.g., the simi- ple problem that can be addressed through more enforcement. larity of attitudes toward the environment in Portugal and The issue stems from a particular configuration of actors, their Italy; EC 2021; Rodríguez 2021). However, our findings may characteristics, interrelationships, their incentives for action (or not be valid in other contexts. Major water systems around lack of it), and the consequent impact on enforcement, pollu- the world do not count on public water treatment capacity tion, investment and treatment decisions. Ideally, wine produc- or have endemic corruption problems associated with infra- ers should have in-house treatment plants; however, they do not structure investments.11 have them due to the disproportionate investment and opera- More broadly, our study questions reductionist approaches tional costs required, compared with the risk of being sanc- to environmental policy making. According to De Geest and tioned and fined for violating discharge standards. The wine Dari-Mattiacci (2013), economic incentives can be particu- producers’ discharges into sewage systems are not monitored larly effective in two situations: when lawmakers lack suffi- and it is difficult to trace the pollution back to specific producers cient information to monitor and sanction individual behavior; because of the dispersed nature of the industry. Furthermore, and when compliance requires significantly bigger efforts from sanctioning is hindered by the economic and symbolic power of some citizens than others. Our study, however, shows that solu- the industry locally, the conflictual relationship between public tions are less straightforward. We found consensus around the authorities in charge of the WWTPs and other local actors, and application of the “polluter pays” principle, but also around the deficits in the WWTP monitoring capacity. Enforcement the involvement of governments as co-participants in solu- solutions alone would not be effective if not complemented by tions. International organizations like the OECD have indeed other interventions that, e.g., promote the coordination between emphasized the importance of promoting policy mixes and co- large and small polluters with the treatment plant operators. responsibility on the basis that environmental problems tend To our knowledge, this is the first study that applies the NAS to be more complex than initially expected by the stakeholders approach to a point-source pollution case. Further research is and policy makers involved. Looking for example at the Over- needed to validate the relevance of the selected situations and view of OECD Principles on Water Governance (OECD 2015), the usability of the NAS approach for ex ante policy evaluation “trust and engagement” has a role to play in enforcement; and in other contexts. Although we have briefly discussed the envi- “integrity and transparency”, “stakeholder engagement”, or ronmental economics literature on enforcement, further work is needed to integrate this vast and rich literature within the lens of governance analysis and the NAS approach. 11 20% of discharges in Australia and New Zealand, Europe and Northern America, 35% in Eastern and Southeastern Asia, North- ern Africa and Western Asia, 60% in Latin America and the Carib- bean, and close to 75% in central and southern Asia and sub-Saharan Appendix Africa are not treated (UN 2021; Sato et al. 2013; Mateo-Sagasta et al. 2015). Also, according to the World Health Organization and See Table 1 and Fig. 5. World Bank, globally 20–40% of water sector finances, in the range of USD155 to 700 billion annually, are lost to dishonest and corrupt practices (UN 2021). 13 214 Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 Table 1  Quantitative and qualitative data collected and methods of analysis (a) Type of quantitative data Source WWTP data on the treated volume (equivalent inhabitants of the Own elaboration from Open data IAA-Government of Aragon (GA maximum month), the optimal treatment load (equivalent inhabitants), 2022). For details see also (IAA 2021a): the year of starting of operation and the municipalities in which the 1.1. Treatment plants, general data WWTPs are located and serve 1.2 Treatment plants, population centers served 1.3 Treatment plants, annual data: treated load and volume, discharge quality Population in 2019 where the WWTP is located or municipality served IAEST (2021b) (if any) WWTPs data on the reported input (into the WWTP) and output (out of Open data IAA-Government of Aragon (GA 2022)—see also (IAA the WWTP) water concentrations for several parameters ­(BOD5, COD, 2021a): 1.3. Treatment plants, annual data: treated load and volume, TSS, TN, TP) discharge quality Discharge census for each business (industrial or urban or similar) indi- CHE (2021) cating the characteristics, volume, category, and receiving area type Main legislation on maximum admissible water concentrations for BOA (2004, 2018a, b) several parameters GIS (Geographic Information System shapefiles) data on water and Own elaboration based on data from the CHE and the National related areas: protected zones, vulnerable and sensitive areas to Geographic Institute. The vulnerable and sensitive areas are derived nitrates; linear surface masses noncomplying river stretches; chemical from these sources. Rechecked with the data on WWTPs, in which status of underground masses (Hydrological Ebro Plan, 2016–2021) the area of water discharge is also characterized as normal or as sensitive area GIS (shapefiles) contours and auxiliary information (population, INE CHE (Ebro basin). For the municipalities and associated data by the codes, voting results, etc.) INE, IAEST and Interior Ministry (voting results) and databases elaborated by Prof. Ángel Pueyo from the Department of Geography and Spatial Planning GIS (shapefiles) data on irrigated areas Corine Land Cover (CLC) from (Copernicus 2021) and HYDE 3.2 (Klein Goldewijk et al. 2017) GIS (shapefiles) data on PGI (Protected Geographical Indications) and Own elaboration based on the PGI and PDO definitions (GA 2021; PDO (protected designation of origin) contours MAPA 2021), generic and specific PGI and PDO webs, and merging municipalities’ contours Quantitative and qualitative data on the type of contracts (exploitation, Own elaboration from Open data IAA-Government of Aragon (GA concession) and budgets of WWTPs. List of signed contracts for the 2022), see also (IAA 2021a): operation of the treatment plants, indicating the effective dates of 1.4. Contracts, general data each contract and the management model used. List of WWTPs in the 1.5. Contracts, treatment plants included exploitation or concession contracts 1.6. Contracts, annual expenses (b) Type of qualitative data interviews/reports Main role of person interviewed/invited to present in conference/press and reports insights Ebro Water Agency (CHE) Interview with the main Head of the “Water quality” department Aragonese Water Institute (IAA) Interview with the main responsible person (Head) on water treatment and WWTP management Agri-food and wine clusters Discussion with/from the Aragonese main representative of the agri- food cluster, belonging to the wine-producing sector Wine producers Interviews and discussions with personnel who work or have worked in wine producing industries in Aragon Cluster for the Efficient Use of Water (ZINNAE) Interviews with the main representative (manager), who provided information, talks, press notes on the topic and from stakeholders in the cluster Wastewater treatment businesses and managers Interviews with several representatives (of different businesses provid- ing depuration solutions (e.g., Ingeobras S.A., Geezar S.A., PAMA group) Farmers’ communities Interviews and discussions with/from the technicians, e.g., of the Water Supply, Environment and External Relations of the largest farmers confederation 13 Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 215 Table 1  (continued) (b) Type of qualitative data interviews/reports Main role of person interviewed/invited to present in conference/press and reports insights University and research centers At least two people interviewed from each of the following expert areas: wine economic history, wine business management, water economics, water governance, water treatment solutions, law and environment Social organizations Interviews and discussions with organizations such as the New Water Culture Foundation (FNCA), Ecology and Development (ECODES) and Ecologists in Action Type of tool Software/sources Text and data processing Office software, Happyscribe and Dictation.io to convert audio/video to text GIS processing and analysis Arc Map 10.5 as the main Geographical Information System (GIS) software Text mining and Natural Language Processing (NLP) tools Google cloud, Python (Natural Language Toolkit), to create classifica- tion of concepts, counting vocabulary, simple statistics and frequency distributions. This was done for all the discourses from interviews and for selected (audio and video) conferences and text (articles, journals) Fig. 5  Institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework. Source: Ostrom (2005), adapted from Ostrom et al. (1994) Supplementary Information The online version contains supplemen- sustainable wastewater treatment in the wine sector”), held online on tary material available at https://d​ oi.o​ rg/1​ 0.1​ 007/s​ 11625-0​ 22-0​ 1273-1. 11th November 2020. The authors also greatly thank the guest editor and the anonymous reviewers for taking the time and effort necessary Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge Programa Operativo to review the manuscript. We sincerely appreciate all valuable com- FEDER Aragón 2014-2020, “Construyendo Europa desde Aragón” ments and suggestions, which helped us to improve the quality of the (“Building Europe from Aragon”), for their financial support for the manuscript. Any possible remaining errors or biases are the authors’ project (Ref. LMP35_18) entitled “Desarrollo de nuevos procesos de sole responsibility. oxidación avanzada para purificación de Aguas Residuales de Indus- tria Agroalimentaria” (“Development of new advanced oxidation pro- Funding Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC cesses for the purification of agri-food wastewater”). IC also thanks agreement with Springer Nature. the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities, through PID2019-106822RB-I00 and the Government of Aragon (through Data availability Data supporting the results reported in the article the group S40_20R_CREDENAT, and with the PDR REURIEGO) comes from the cited public sources and is available in the Supple- funding. The work of Sergio Villamayor-Tomas was supported by the mentary Material. Also, the authors can make accessible additional Ramon y Cajal Fellowship (RyC-2017-22782), the Spanish Minis- information and data upon reasonable request. try of Science, Innovation and Universities, through the “Maria de Maeztu” Programme for Units of Excellence (CEX2019-000940-M); Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attri- and the support of the Federal University of Minas Gerais’ Visiting bution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adapta- Professor program (Contrato nº 253/2020). The authors sincerely thank tion, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long the people interviewed for this research and the participants in the as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, workshop “Retos y soluciones en la depuración sostenible de aguas provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes residuales en el sector vitivinícola” (“Challenges and solutions in were made. The images or other third party material in this article are 13 216 Sustainability Science (2023) 18:201–218 included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated es/d​ ocume​ nts/2​ 0127/6​ 74325/U ​ SO_G ​ ESTIO ​ N_A ​ GUA.p​ df/5​ 9a92​ otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in f51-​e640-​2efb-​37e6-​6477e​c0630​95 the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not CHE (2021) Censo de vertidos = Discharge census. Confederación permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will Hidrográfica del Ebro (CHE). Ministerio de Agricultura, Ali- need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a mentación y Medio ambiente. 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Authors and Affiliations Ignacio Cazcarro1,2 · Sergio Villamayor‑Tomas3 · Maria Pilar Lobera4,5 · Joaquín Murría6 · María Bernechea1,4,5 4 * Ignacio Cazcarro Instituto de Nanociencia y Materiales de Aragón (INMA), icazcarr@unizar.es CSIC‑Universidad de Zaragoza, Department of Chemical and Environmental Engineering, University of Zaragoza, 1 ARAID (Aragonese Agency for Research and Development), Campus Río Ebro‑Edificio I+D, C/ Mariano Esquillor S/N, Government of Aragon, Av. de Ranillas 1‑D, planta 2ª, 50018 Zaragoza, Spain oficina B, 50018 Zaragoza, Spain 5 Centro de Investigación Biomédica en Red de Bioingeniería, 2 Department of Economic Analysis, Agri‑Food Institute Biomateriales y Nanomedicina, Instituto de Salud Carlos III, of Aragon (IA2), University of Zaragoza, Gran Vía 2, 50018 Zaragoza, Spain 50005 Zaragoza, Spain 6 INGEOBRAS S.A., C. Madre Rafols, 2, 50004 Zaragoza, 3 Ramon y Cajal Research Fellowship at the Institute Spain of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA-UAB), Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain 13