Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463) 2023, Volume 11, Issue 2, Pages 235–248 https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v11i2.6391 Article Twitting Against the Enemy: Populist Radical Right Parties Discourse Against the (Political) “Other” Laura Cervi 1, *, Santiago Tejedor 1 , and Mónica Gracia Villar 2 1 Department of Journalism and Communication Sciences, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain 2 Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universidad Europea del Atlántico, Spain * Corresponding author (laura.cervi@uab.cat) Submitted: 30 October 2022 | Accepted: 6 March 2023 | Published: 17 May 2023 Abstract There is a common agreement in considering populism as a Manichean worldview that oversimplifies and polarizes political options reducing them to a symbolical struggle between an “us” and a “them.” “Us” is embodied by “the people,” equated with “good,” and “them” is identified by political “Others,” often embodied by “the elites” who are depicted as inherently “evil.” Naturally, the nature and composition of the people and the elite vary according to both ideology and political opportunities. This article examines the discursive construction of political opponents in two populist radical right parties: Lega in Italy and Vox in Spain. Based on the analysis of a selection of tweets by the two party leaders, Santiago Abascal and Matteo Salvini, this study applies clause‐based semantic text analysis to detect the main discursive representations of political opponents. The article concludes that Salvini focuses all the attention on the left, while Abascal, although predominantly identifying the left as the main enemy, also targets pro‐independence parties. The discursive construction of the “enemy” is based on two main strategies: demonization, the framing of opponents as “enemies of the people” who, along with dangerous “Others” such as immigrants, conspire against the “people” and are blamed for everything that is “wrong” in society; secondly, character assassination of individual politicians through personal attacks, which aim to undermine their reputation and deflect attention from the real issues towards their personal traits and actions. Keywords character assassination; demonization; Italy; Lega; political discourse; populism; populist radical right; social media; Spain; Twitter; Vox Issue This article is part of the issue “Hate Speech, Demonization, Polarization, and Political Social Responsibility” edited by Luis M. Romero‐Rodríguez (Rey Juan Carlos University), Pedro Cuesta‐Valiño (University of Alcalá), and Bárbara Castillo‐Abdul (Rey Juan Carlos University). © 2023 by the author(s); licensee Cogitatio Press (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY). 1. Introduction & Kaltwasser, 2017). Accordingly, the populist construc‐ tion of both “the people” and its “Others” has been the Populist radical right (PRR) parties are on the rise in focus of comprehensive literature (Betz, 2017). PRR par‐ Western Europe (Zulianello, 2020). Their emergence and ties’ xenophobic and anti‐immigration stances have been electoral success have generated considerable scholarly deeply scrutinized (Cervi et al., 2020). research (Ostiguy et al., 2020) that has dug into their dis‐ Nonetheless, studies have so far devoted little atten‐ tinctive elements (Hawkins et al., 2012). tion to showing how these parties discursively address In particular, there is wide agreement on considering their political opponents (Van Kessel & Castelein, 2016). populism as a Manichean worldview that oversimplifies Although this aspect has been tangentially touched and polarizes political options reducing them to a sym‐ on by previous works (Capdevila et al., 2022; Cervi bolical struggle between an “us” and a “them” (Mudde & Carrillo‐Andrade, 2019; Marcos‐Marne et al., 2021), Politics and Governance, 2023, Volume 11, Issue 2, Pages 235–248 235 mainly focusing on the anti‐elitist aspect of populism approach to critical discourse analysis, discursive scholars (March, 2017), very few studies have dedicated exclu‐ have suggested shifting the focus of analysis away from sive attention to the construction of political opponents ideologies to concentrate on how discourses are con‐ (Berti & Loner, 2021). structed. Populism is, therefore, viewed as a discourse Therefore, this article aims to make an empirical con‐ that seeks to confront “the people” against “the elite,” tribution to the current debate about PPR parties disclos‐ and studies examine the ways in which this construction ing how political opponents are constructed in the dis‐ takes place and how these signifiers play out to simplify course of contemporary PRR parties. To do so, we study the world’s complexities (Stavrakakis et al., 2018) and trig‐ the discourse of two PRR parties in Southern Europe: ger emotional reactions (Krzyżanowski & Ekström, 2022). Lega in Italy and Vox in Spain. After providing an overview Other authors have centered their analysis on the of PRR parties and their discourse and the role social non‐verbal and stylistic aspects of the phenomenon. media plays in their communication, the article applies Ostiguy (2009, 2017), the main proponent of the socio‐ clause‐based semantic text analysis (CBSTA) to a dataset cultural or performative approach, for instance, argues of tweets by the two party leaders, Matteo Salvini and that populism should be seen as the “flaunting of the Santiago Abascal, concluding that both politicians iden‐ low” in politics, paying attention to language, body lan‐ tify the main political opponent as “the left” who are stig‐ guage, gestures, and ways of dressing. In line with this matized through the use of two main rhetorical devices: approach, Moffitt (2016) defined populism as a distinct demonization and character assassination. “political style,” a particular repertoire of mediated per‐ formance that includes the appeal to “the people” versus 2. Populism “the elite,” “bad manners” as well as the performance of crisis. While populism is one of the trendiest research topics in We contend, together with Ekström et al. (2018) contemporary literature (Ekström et al., 2018), it is also and Kefford et al. (2022), among others, that the above‐ one of the most contested concepts in the field of politi‐ mentioned approaches, especially the ideational and cal science (Kefford et al., 2022). the discursive‐performative approach, are not mutually Most literature single out the existence of three exclusive; thus, there is “room for synergic and cumula‐ main conceptual approaches to studying populism tive work” (Olivas, 2021, p. 834). (Kaltwasser et al., 2017): the ideational approach, the First, as Ostiguy (2017, p. 74) points out, there are political‐strategic approach, and the sociocultural or clear connections between the “believe in” and the communicative/performative approach. “act as,” that is to say, between the ideological and Arguably, the dominant approach today is the the communicative/performative aspects of populism. ideational approach, defining populism as a “thin‐ In other words, although diverse definitions may dif‐ centered” ideology that considers society to be ulti‐ fer on which requirements or sets of criteria to use, all mately divided into two antagonistic and homogenous these approaches coincide on a conceptual core of basic groups—“the pure people” and “the corrupt elite”— attributes associated with populism and its manifesta‐ and that politics should be an expression of the volonté tions, such as the Manichean interpretation of politics, générale (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). This conception sug‐ anti‐elitism, and an idealized conception of the people. gests that populism does not offer a complete worldview Second, and most importantly, granting that populist and fails to exhibit the degree of consistency, depth, and ideas, as with any other ideas, need to be communi‐ scope of other fully developed, “thick” ideologies such as cated to reach the audience and achieve the communica‐ socialism and liberalism. tor’s goals, disclosing the communicative tools used for This approach entails the main benefit of disclosing spreading them should be just central (De Vreese et al., why populist parties are so varied and flexible regard‐ 2018) or at least a needed complement to the scrutiny of ing their programs, organization, and leadership and pro‐ populist ideas. This growing recognition of the centrality vides the possibility to connect the supply and demand of discourse has led many proponents of the ideational sides of populism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 10). approach to use the term “discourse” and “ideology” The political‐strategic approach, mainly represented interchangeably (Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 514). by Weyland (2001, p. 14), states that populism can be Ergo, aligning with De Vreese et al. (2018), we com‐ defined as a “political strategy through which personalis‐ bine Mudde’s (2004) ideology‐centered and Hawkins’ tic leaders seek or exercise government power based on (2010) discourse‐centered understanding of populism, direct, un‐mediated, un‐institutionalized support from considering populism as a discursive manifestation of a large numbers of mostly un‐organized followers.” thin‐centered ideology. Accordingly, in our analysis, we The third strand gathers different approaches which, will not only focus on disclosing the “set of basic assump‐ taken together, provide the conceptual tools for broadly tions about the world” contained in the populist message making sense of populism as a particular mode of politi‐ but on “the language that unwittingly expresses them” cal communication (Moffitt, 2016). (Hawkins et al., 2012, p. 3). Conceiving populism as an Mostly following Laclau’s (2005) seminal work ideology articulated discursively by political actors and, on political logic, but also Wodak’s (2015) historical as such, an expression of political communication not Politics and Governance, 2023, Volume 11, Issue 2, Pages 235–248 236 only allows bridging political science and communication populism sees a naturally antagonistic world, rejecting studies’ literature but also grants the chance to deepen any form of difference (Mudde, 2007). the understanding of populism, expanding the analysis The label “radical,” finally, refers to both the outspo‐ to take into consideration broader communicative and ken position at the far end of the political spectrum on performative repertoires. issues related to immigration and ethnic diversity and the disruption of political norms, emerging from the 3. Populist Radical Right Parties and Their Discourse rejection of pluralism. This disruption becomes particularly evident observ‐ According to Mudde’s (2007) influential definition, three ing populist leaders’ discourses, positioned clearly on main features characterize the PRR party family: pop‐ the “low” end of Ostiguy’s (2009) low‐high continuum, ulism, nativism, and authoritarianism. triggered through the continuous appeal to common Populism has been defined in the previous section. sense and enacted using “bad manners” (Winberg, 2017). However, it is important to stress that, as previously The frequent use of vulgar language, aimed at pulling explained, due to the thinness of populist ideology, away from the lexicon of mainstream politicians (Berti populist actors combine populism with one or more & Loner, 2021), in particular, has been considered a other ideologies, so‐called “host ideologies” (Mudde & key element in fostering the perception of authenticity Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 21). While left‐wing populists often (Forchtner & Kølvraa, 2017), strengthening a sense of incorporate some form of socialism into their ideology, closeness to “the people” (Ostiguy et al., 2020), and gen‐ nationalism, particularly in its exclusionary, nativist form, erating hostility towards the elites. is the most common addition for right‐wing populists. Last but not least, as noted by Meny and Surel (2002, Nativism is the belief that states should be inhab‐ p. 17), “populism advocates the power of the people, ited exclusively by members of the native group (the yet it relies on the seduction by a charismatic leader.” nation) and that non‐native elements (persons and A recurrent populist trope, in fact, also entails the rep‐ ideas) threaten homogeneous nation‐states (Mudde & resentation of a salvific leader who is at the same time Kaltwasser, 2017). Under a nativist notion of citizenship, a “man of the street,” that is to say, “one of us” and populists’ characteristic appeal to the people becomes the savior, the “champion of the people” (Bracciale & an appeal to “our people,” the “pure” people (Betz, Martella, 2017). 2017). Accordingly, PRR parties distinguish “the people” from the “Others,” aliens who do not belong to “us” 4. Populist Radical Right Parties and Social Media and are consequently considered enemies, accused of conspiring—together or with the direct or indirect help The effectiveness of PRR parties’ communication would of the elite—against the people (Mudde & Kaltwasser, be incomprehensible without considering the impact of 2017). Exactly as for the elites, the selection of whom new technologies. Social media disintermediation pro‐ to identify as “Other” depends on the contextual discur‐ vides direct communication with citizens, allowing pop‐ sive opportunities (Koopmans & Muis, 2009); however, a ulists to circumvent the journalistic gatekeepers that are vast strand of literature has shown that in recent decades often hostile to them (Groshek & Engelbert, 2012). In this most right‐wing populists in Western Europe have cap‐ way, they can capitalize, not only on the generalized mis‐ italized on the growing concerns on immigration, acti‐ trust in traditional politics but also the mistrust towards vating people’s grievances against immigrants (Cervi & mainstream media (Fawzi, 2019), presenting themselves Tejedor, 2021; Betz, 2017) and ethnic minorities, (Cervi as authentic, thus closer to the “people.” & Tejedor, 2020). In addition, social media’s attention economy Authoritarianism (the belief in the value of obey‐ makes them the arena par excellence of emotional‐ ing and valuing authority, granted that it is their own) ity (Hameleers et al., 2017). This feature inherently requires the government to have a significant moral runs counter to the key traits of establishment politics, weight in citizens’ freedoms and rights (Hooghe & Marks, perfectly matching with populists’ discursive dynamics 2018), favoring strict order and severe punishment for (Gerbaudo, 2018), which spread a fragmented ideology violations (Mudde, 2007). This characteristic perfectly (Engesser et al., 2016) characterized by emotional ele‐ matches another key feature of populism: anti‐pluralism ments (Hameleers et al., 2017) and a simplified dichoto‐ (Galston, 2017). Pluralism emphasizes the inevitability mous vision of the world. Especially in right‐wing pop‐ and desirability of differences in society, calling for insti‐ ulism (Hameleers, 2020), the use of anger and fear tutions that protect minority rights and differences in exacerbates the distance and antagonism between the the pursuit of a majority will. Thus, those who adhere people and the elites or between the people and such to pluralism are normally inclined to think of popu‐ outgroups as migrants (Cervi, 2020a). lar sovereignty as a dynamic and open‐ended process. As such, populist messages entail a high potential for Populism, on its side, treats it as the fixed, reified, and virality that allows them to acquire news value (Wodak, unified will of the people (Espejo, 2011), craving moral 2015); in other words, “the more provocative the mes‐ clarity. Therefore, whereas pluralism sees political rela‐ sage, the more traditional media might be compelled to tions as essentially those of cooperation and dialogue, turn it into news” (Berti & Loner, 2021, p. 5). Politics and Governance, 2023, Volume 11, Issue 2, Pages 235–248 237 5. Methods we understand all those groups that compete in the respective electoral arena. Accordingly, political oppo‐ 5.1. Selection of the Cases nents were defined as political parties/groups officially recognized as being part of the electoral process that Understanding the comparative method as a method can support candidates for elections on a regular basis for identifying and explaining similarities and differences (Sartori, 2005). In addition, individual politicians com‐ between cases using common concepts, we compare per peting in the same arena were also considered political genus et differentiam (Sartori, 2005) two parties that opponents, acknowledging the growing personalization belong to the same party family and share common fea‐ of politics (Garzia, 2011). Therefore, to be included in the tures but operate within divergent political contexts. sample, tweets had to mention Italian or Spanish politi‐ Both Vox and Lega exemplify radical right‐wing pop‐ cal parties or individual politicians. ulism (Zulianello, 2020) and can be considered critical Due to the relatively small n, tweets were analyzed case studies in their social media communication. Lega, manually. First, we isolated all the tweets containing par‐ in particular Salvini’s personal massive use of social ties’ names and personal names of politicians operating media (Cervi, 2020b), has been identified as the core ele‐ in each country. ment of both the construction of his political and medi‐ In a second round, acknowledging that discursive ated persona (Bobba, 2018) and his electoral success practices happen within specific sociocultural contexts (Diamanti & Pregliasco, 2019). The effective use of social that require a deep understanding of both the textual networks has also been found to be key to Vox’s mobi‐ and contextual facts (Ekström et al., 2018) and in affor‐ lization strategy (Barrio et al., 2021, p. 246) and success dance to the driven context that might embed latent (Capdevila et al., 2022). messages, the rest of the tweets were analyzed through In addition, the two countries share a similar fas‐ content analysis, in order to guarantee that all the tweets cist past. However, while Italy has been widely recog‐ referring to parties and politicians using other wordings nized as “the promised land of populism” (Tarchi, 2015, (nicknames, metaphors, indirect reference to current p. 1), Spain is witnessing a new—and, for many analysts, news, etc.) would be properly included in the sample. unexpected—rise of this form of politics (Marcos‐Marne The methodology implemented was created by the et al., 2021). Populism Team to compile the Global Populism Database Last but not least, during the analyzed time frame, (Hawkins et al., 2019): Each tweet was double‐coded in Vox was in the opposition and Spain was ruled by a its original language by two authors who did not share left‐wing coalition (Marcos‐Marne et al., 2021), while their work with each other until it had been completed. Lega, despite disagreeing on many points, formally Discrepancies were subjected to a reconciliation session supported the technocratic government led by Mario to adjust criteria. The final Cohen’s kappa inter‐rater Draghi (Garzia & Karremans, 2021). Therefore, we can agreement was 0.97, showing nearly perfect agreement expect that the two parties might show similar discur‐ among the coders. sive strategies but also some contextual differences con‐ cerning both their political and discursive opportunities 5.3. Data Analysis (Koopmans & Muis, 2009). After analyzing whom the two leaders identify as their 5.2. Data Collection and Annotation political opponents, our main aim is to disclose the con‐ struction of actors. Accordingly, we consider Twitter’s Scientific literature has shown that Twitter is largely texts as narrative texts that tell a story made of actors. used by political elites for agenda‐building purposes Narratives are the core mechanism of constructing real‐ (Parmelee, 2013), especially by populist actors (Jacobs ity at the sociocognitive level: According to Mayer (2014, & Spierings, 2018). Accordingly, our empirical analysis is pp. 66–71), by “translating experience into the code of based on a Twitter dataset. story—with plot, and character, and meaning,” it allows Recognizing the centrality of leaders in PRR parties the incomprehensible to be transformed into some‐ (Meny & Surel, 2002), the official Twitter accounts of thing meaningful. the two party leaders were selected for the analysis. Accordingly, Franzosi’s (2010) model of CBSTA was Tweets published by the party leaders, Matteo Salvini and implemented. This model starts from the premise that Santiago Abascal, were downloaded using the Twitter API any story, in any language, can be analyzed, taking into from January to August 2022, excluding retweets. The account the structural categories subject–verb–object total number of tweets collected was 1,901 for Salvini and (Aslanidis, 2018). Concretely, thus, CBSTA consists of 1,698 for Abascal. After downloading all the tweets, only extracting triplets formed by the elementary syntactic those mentioning political opponents were selected. components of language: subject–verb–object. Triplets Understanding that in the center of politics lies the allow one to deconstruct and reconstruct a narrative into competition for political power—intended as the abil‐ clusters (Popping & Roberts, 2014), allowing one to code ity to shape and control the content and direction of not only the signifiers but their structure in a statement, public policy (Stoppino, 2001)—by political opponents, unveiling the actions of political subjects, the objects Politics and Governance, 2023, Volume 11, Issue 2, Pages 235–248 238 of those actions along with their positive and negative It is also interesting to note that there is very little dif‐ affect, and the combination between these elements ference in the percentage, showing that although Lega in (Aslanidis, 2018). the analyzed timeframe formally supported the govern‐ CBSTA, therefore, allows both quantitative and qual‐ ment, while Vox was in opposition, their behavior does itative analysis: The quantitative dataset, composed of not seem to change. the retrieved triplets, shows word co‐occurrences and As per the selection of whom to target, Figure 1 can be analyzed by qualitatively observing the attributes shows that the majority of the references refer to indi‐ of the actors and their actions, along with epithets and viduals. In the case of Salvini, out of 956 tweets contain‐ adjectives (Franzosi, 2010). ing mention of political opponents, 587 contain person‐ Textual analysis is widely recognized as one of the alized references; Abascal calls out individual politicians best techniques developed to measure the rhetoric of 800 times out of a total of 951 tweets. politicians (Hawkins et al., 2012); CBSTA, in particular, In other words, both leaders personify their “ene‐ as suggested by Aslanidis (2018), and proven by differ‐ mies” (Garzia, 2011) by choosing specific individuals as ent studies (Cervi, 2020b; Cervi et al., 2021), appears to targets. While Salvini mostly refers to the politicians by be a particularly fitting instrument for measuring pop‐ their names, Abascal tends to use nicknames or ref‐ ulist discourse. erences to their political position (The Minister, etc.). Only written text was considered: All multimedia con‐ In addition, it is possible to observe how official party tent (videos, images) was excluded from the sample. For names are less frequent, being the “Other” category each main actor, we selected the characteristic seman‐ most recurrent. In this category, we have collected all the tic triplets to establish the lexical universes built around mentions of political parties that do not contain their offi‐ each of the aforementioned actors. Consequently, we cial names; rather, they are roughly or derogatorily iden‐ qualitatively observed adjectives, verbs, and objects to tified by their ideological positioning: The Communist, establish relationships between actors and consequently Los Progres (ironic epithet to mock leftwing leaning indi‐ draw the frameworks of reference. viduals), etc. Unsurprisingly, Salvini’s tweets entirely refer to 6. Results the left (100%). The only party mentioned is Partito Democratico, and the most recurrent definition is “the 6.1. Selection of the Opponents Left,” defined by other adjectives that will be analyzed in the next session. This is due to the Italian party system The total number of tweets collected for Salvini is 1,901, being divided into two main blocks, the center‐left led by of which more than half (956) contain mention of polit‐ Partito Democratico and the center‐right, the coalition to ical opponents. As for Abascal, the result is even more which Lega belongs (Zulianello, 2020). overwhelming: 56% of the tweets contain mention of the On the other hand, the Spanish political system is political opponents. more complex since its multiparty system (Gray, 2020) Thus, it is possible to state that, coherently with the is crossed by the traditional right–left axis and mul‐ populist dichotomous vision of the world, most of the tiple territorial axes. Accordingly, Vox confronts both tweets are dedicated to attacking the adversary. the left, mainly represented by the Socialist Party and 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Poli cians’ names Other personal Par es’ names Other references Salvini Abascal Figure 1. Distribution of the retrieved tweets. Politics and Governance, 2023, Volume 11, Issue 2, Pages 235–248 239 Unidas Podemos (governing in coalition by the time Spanish government is made up of the Socialist Party and of this research), and the center‐right party, Partido Unidas Podemos. Popular in the traditional axis, together with regionalists/ In both cases, the opponents show no positive quality separatist parties on the territorial axis (Fernández‐ and are represented as incapable, shameless, and guilty. García & Valencia Sáiz, 2022). However, Abascal refers to In the case of Salvini, the accent is placed on their dis‐ the Socialist Party and its partner in government, Unidas tance from “normal people” about whom they have no Podemos, in 82% of the tweets that mention political knowledge. The Left is accordingly identified as “radical opponents, clearly defining them as the main opponent. chic.” The term, coined in the 1970s by American journal‐ In the rest of the tweets, he targets independentist par‐ ist Tom Wolfe to satirize composer Leonard Bernstein for ties (11%), and only 3,7% of the tweets mention the hosting a fundraising party for the Black Panthers, aims at Popular Party. Both these actors are more frequently lampooning upper‐class individuals who endorse leftist framed as “allies” of the left rather than subjects of radicalism merely to garner prestige rather than to affirm the tweet. A residual 0,3% is dedicated to other parties genuine political convictions (Colantone et al., 2022). (mainly regionalist parties from other areas of Spain). To stress this distance from the “real world,” they As per the general references, exactly as in Salvini’s case, are also portrayed as lacking common sense, living on the most recurrent definition is “the Left,” followed by another planet (“live on planet Mars”), or with words mentions of Catalan independence parties. openly referring to madness, specifically fuori (from “fuori di testa,” literally out of their mind, a colloquial 6.2. Construction of the “Enemy”: Demonization word to say that someone has lost his head). In addition, “the Left” is portrayed as only interested in “keeping their As previously mentioned, both Salvini and Abascal chairs” (poltrone), that is to say, holding their position mainly refer to political opponents as “the Left.” of power without really caring for the will or interests of Table 1 displays the semantic triplets defining the the people. left, illustrating the construction of the enemy. Salvini Abascal, on his side, also underlines the elitist aspect mainly refers to the left as “these” but also as “com‐ of the ruling class and their distance from “normal peo‐ munists” and “them,” stressing out the typical populist ple” by using the expression progres. However, he openly dynamic of the “us vs. them.” Similarly, Abascal identi‐ refers to the left‐wing parties ruling the country as crimi‐ fies the political opponent with “the Left,” but he also nals identifying with a dictatorship. Figure 2, for instance, describes the opponent as autarchy, dictatorship, or displays how the Spanish government is identified as a “the Government” since, as previously mentioned, the criminal “gang.” Table 1. Semantic triplets defining “the Left.” Variable Salvini Abascal Subject The Left The Left Definitions The Left, them, these, the communists The Left, the autarchy, the dictatorship, the government Positive adjectives — — Negative adjectives Inept, useless, crazy, irresponsible, shameless, Criminal, dictatorial, shameless, irresponsible, guilty, fuori, incompetent, radical chic, guilty, progre buonisti, live on planet Mars Positive actions Like, defend, love, show tenderness Empathize, defend Object Immigrants, illegals, poltrone Immigrants Negative actions Have no clue, do not care Do not care, are unable, hate, betray, attack Object The people, normal people, Italians Spaniards, citizens Figure 2. Santiago Abascal’s Tweet. Note: “Spain needs a government which serves the people, not a gang who serves personal, global, or independentist interests.” Politics and Governance, 2023, Volume 11, Issue 2, Pages 235–248 240 Both politicians, therefore, implement the strategy 2003, p. 59), the protagonist, that is to say, the hero, of demonizing their political opponents. The concept of generally attracts empathy, affinity, and positive feelings, demonization resonates with what Sabatier et al. (1987) because the qualities assigned to the character resonate identified as the “devil shift,” the tendency for people emotionally with the audience (Homolar, 2022). to exaggerate the power and maliciousness of politi‐ In other words, highlighting that “the Left” accuse cal opponents. In its original conception, the devil shift or insult them, both Salvini and Abascal can straighten appears unintentional, but the narrative policy frame‐ their position of “champion of the people” (Bracciale work (Katz, 2018) has widely shown how it corresponds & Martella, 2017). Figure 3 displays a perfect example to an intentional strategy to build a villain figure. of this dynamic: According to Salvini, a “desperate left Recognizing that human beings make sense of them‐ exploit a murder to accuse Salvini, his party, and there‐ selves by defining themselves and rhetorically construct‐ fore Italians of being racist.” ing binaries implies that the role administered to the As previously anticipated, coherently with the dif‐ “Other” sets meaningful boundaries (Thurlow, 2010, ferent settings of the Spanish political system, Abascal p. 227). Demonization can be defined as a process also identifies independence movements, especially in through which a source promotes “a symbolic construc‐ Catalonia, as political opponents. Although statistically, tion of reality created under the conceptual simplifica‐ the mentions of these parties are not as meaningful as tion protagonist–antagonist” (Civila et al., 2020, p. 2), in the references to the left, it is worth analyzing them which the ideas of the sender are exposed as correct since, for Vox, the unity of Spain is as central as their posi‐ and justified, while the demonized group is accused of tioning on the left–right continuum (Fernández‐García & going against the common interest, dissociating them of Valencia Sáiz, 2022; Marcos‐Marne et al., 2021). an equitable moral nature to the “us”(Romero‐Rodríguez Parties asking for Catalonian independence are et al., 2015). Accordingly, the demonization of the oppo‐ demonized following the same discursive pattern pre‐ nent provides the opportunity to represent the people viously illustrated (see Table 2). In particular, they are as victims (Maronitis, 2021). defined as separatistas (those who want to break away Previous studies (Michener et al., 2021) have shown from Spain) or openly as “those who want to break that the perceived remoteness of those in high‐status Spain” and called out as a mafia or terrorists and, as positions in the eye of the lower social strata fosters what such, framed as a danger to the homeland. Interestingly, Lamont (2018) calls the “recognition gap,” causing feel‐ they are never called by their official name but only with ings of alienation, exclusion, discontent, and resentment. derogatory epitomes, somehow discursively underlining The political opponents are accordingly represented as a their illegitimacy. danger to the people (those who suffer from their inca‐ On the other hand, the Popular Party, Spain’s main pacity, lack of interest, etc.) and coherently, with PRR par‐ center‐right party, is not only less frequently mentioned, ties’ nativist ideology, only represented as showing com‐ but also its discursive treatment is completely different. passion or positive attitudes only toward the immigrants. Table 2 illustrates how, while independentists are demo‐ In addition, by stressing that “the Left” is persecut‐ nized, the Popular Party is treated like a legitimate polit‐ ing, obsessed by, or insulting them, both leaders can also ical competitor and framed as weak or incapable while present themselves as victims, creating a further bond also being granted positive qualities when it agrees with with “the people.” Victimhood here should be under‐ or supports Vox’s political stances. stood as a performative action taking place on a public This difference, on the one hand, stresses the party’s stage in which actors create and project performances intrinsic anti‐pluralism (Galston, 2017), showing an open of their life experiences, anxieties, and motives tailored rejection of worldviews that differ from theirs. On the to audiences (Maronitis, 2021). other hand, it highlights an opportunist change of tone Thus, acknowledging that the hero–villain narratives when dealing with a party with which Vox has formed— are “ethically constitutive” stories which “have special and might form—different alliances and coalitions in capacities to inspire senses of normative worth” (Smith, regional and local government (Barrio et al., 2021). Figure 3. Matteo Salvini’s Tweet. Note: “A desperate left uses a poor guy murdered to accuse me, Lega, and millions of Italian of racism. Shameless.” Politics and Governance, 2023, Volume 11, Issue 2, Pages 235–248 241 Table 2. Semantic triplets defining the Catalonian independentist parties and the Popular Party. Variable Catalonian independentist parties Popular Party Definitions Separatistas, those who want to break Spain “El PP” Positive adjectives — Show good intentions Negative adjectives Criminal, dangerous, threat, enemies Weak, unable, irresponsible, guilty of Spain, mafia, terrorist Positive actions — Have understood Object — VOX, Spaniards Negative actions Hate, want to break, destroy Cannot or are not able to, lack the capacity Object Spain Spaniards, citizens 6.3. Character Assassination words, is not to engage in a political debate with the opponent but rather to undermine the opponent’s rep‐ As displayed in Table 3, Abascal personalized attacks utation (Berti & Loner, 2021). unsurprisingly mainly focus on Pedro Sanchez, Spanish These political figures are targeted as individuals prime minister and leader of the PSOE. In the case of using their alleged personal flaws (such as ignorance or Salvini, the most recurrent names are not members of stupidity) or characteristics (being posh, aloof, or distant) the government but politicians from the left, particularly, and mocked in their personal style (such as wearing or Calenda and Letta. not wearing a tie, as illustrated in Figure 4). The attacks against Sanchez, Calenda, and Letta, These kinds of attacks can be defined as “character respectively, do not consist of argument‐based political assassination,” that is to say, “a deliberate and sustained criticisms but, through aggressive tones, irony, mockery, effort to damage the reputation or credibility of an indi‐ and insult (Schwarzenegger & Wagner, 2018), they focus vidual’’ (Samoilenko et al., 2016, p. 115) that works on individual traits and behaviors. Their aim, in other similarly to argumentum ad hominem (Wodak, 2015). Table 3. Semantic triplets of the main political enemies. Variable Salvini Abascal Subject Calenda, Letta Pedro Sanchez Definitions These, Enrico (for Letta), Renzi’s friend Swindler, hustler, dictator (el autócrata) (for Calenda) Positive adjectives — — Negative adjectives Ignorant, Bocciati, goes to the beach with Dangerous, ignorant, useless, stupid, dictator, a tie (for Calenda), posh, stupid, obsessed shameless, far (from reality and from the people), (by Salvini) do not wear a tie Positive actions Like, defend, love, show tenderness — Object Immigrants, illegals — Negative actions Have no clue, do not care, are dangerous, Ruin, damage, betray, hate hate, attack, has an obsession Objects Home, Italy, Italians, people, us, me People, working class, Spain, Spaniards, our homeland Figure 4. Santiago Abascal’s Tweet. Note: “Not only does he not wear a tie. The problem is that he is shameless.” Politics and Governance, 2023, Volume 11, Issue 2, Pages 235–248 242 Character assassination directed toward individuals is of kindness which transforms a positive attribute, good‐ often not focused on political and professional actions ness, into an insult. but rather on the target’s personality and behavior and The background of this word, from a historical per‐ can include insults, defamation, and irony (Samoilenko spective, comes from the term “pietism,” used by the et al., 2016). Fascist regime, after 1938, against those who positioned Interestingly, following this dynamic, the most recur‐ themselves in favor of Jews who were being harassed rent characters after the previously mentioned are two by racial laws. Here, too, a virtue (piety or compassion) women who seem to have been chosen based more on became distorted into a vice, a source of weakness (Cervi, their symbolic meaning than on their position. As illus‐ 2020b). Accordingly, she is made fun of by portraying her trated in Table 4, Salvini mainly points out Laura Boldrini, as out of her mind and obsessed with Salvini, calling her president of the Chamber of Deputies, between 2013 “this” (seminal to “she,” someone who does not deserve and 2018, as having no institutional mandate in 2022, to be called by their name or title), and by identifying her and Abascal focuses on Irene Montero, Minister of by reference to her physical appearance as “tiger eyes” Equality since 2020. (see Figure 5). The harsh attacks against Laura Boldrini are a leit‐ Similarly to Boldrini, Irene Montero is depicted as a motif of Salvinian rhetoric (Cervi, 2020b). The reason sort of “source of every evil,” but if Salvini embodies in why Boldrini seems to be the perfect personification of Boldrini the “immigrant loving elite,” Abascal identifies “the enemy” is that she is represented as the archetypi‐ in Montero the perfect representation of the “feminazi” cal example of the above‐mentioned “radical chic.” Such (Bernardez‐Rodal et al., 2022). individuals, politicians, and intellectuals of the left are Exactly as in the previous case, she is mostly defined believed to “earn a lot of money,” “have no clue about as “that lady/person” (again, someone who does not the real problems of people,” and actually “not care deserve to be called by her name or title), mocked as about the people,” being in favor of immigrants. Boldrini “la marquesa de Galapagar,” referring to her being Pablo is accused of being a buonista, meaning a “do‐gooder,” Iglesias’ partner, and described as a danger for Spaniards a neologism for those who carry out unnecessary acts (see Figure 6). Table 4. Semantic triplets for Boldrini and Montero. Variable Salvini Abascal Subject Laura Boldrini Irene Montero Definitions Tiger eyes, lady, this La marquesa de Galapagar, that lady, that person Positive adjectives — — Negative adjectives Buonista, live on another planet, hopeless, Criminal, dangerous, ignorant, crazy, feminazi, obsessed (by Salvini) threat (to our sons) Positive actions Like, defend, love, show tenderness Empathize, defend Object Immigrants, illegals Immigrants, rapists Negative actions Have no clue, do not care, hate, attack, Damage, harm, endanger, watch TV series, hate, has an obsession fear, insult, accuse Objects Home, Italy, Italians, people, us, me Spain, Spaniards, our homeland, us, Vox, the people Figure 5. Matteo Salvini’s Tweet. Note: “Didn’t you miss tiger‐eyed Boldrini?” Figure 6. Santiago Abascal’s Tweet. Note: “It’s an international scandal that this person is still the minister. She is a threat to our children.” Politics and Governance, 2023, Volume 11, Issue 2, Pages 235–248 243 7. Conclusions tem whose structure allows him to identify one political enemy to be blamed for everything, Abascal, who mainly Our study has focused on two similar parties, Lega and focuses on the left (identified with the government), also Vox, operating in divergent political contexts. Our find‐ has to deal with independentists, that are framed as ene‐ ings, on the one hand, show that, despite the differ‐ mies of the nation and with the Popular Party, positioned ences, both parties identify the left as the main oppo‐ on the right side of the political spectrum and poten‐ nent. Because of the structure of the party system, these tially representing a possible ally, is regarded as a legit‐ findings are not surprising in the Italian case. In fact, imate competitor. although in the analyzed time frame Lega formally sup‐ In addition, we have observed how these emotional ported the technocratic government led by Mario Draghi attacks are mostly personalized. Personalization, besides (Garzia & Karremans, 2021), Italian political competition being a central feature of much contemporary political is always based on the confrontation of the center‐right communication (Garzia, 2011), is a key element of pop‐ versus the center‐left block (Zulianello, 2020). ulism, which tends to construct charismatic leaders who In the case of Vox, it is interesting to note that despite claim to be the only authentic representatives of the peo‐ the unity of Spain being as central to the party as the ple (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). right–left continuum (Barrio et al., 2021), for Abascal, the In this sense, social media constitute a breeding left epitomizes the political enemy. ground for personalized politics: Communication can In both cases, the discursive construction of “the be filtered, re‐framed, and re‐contextualized, allowing Left” is based on two main strategies: demonization, the populists to directly reach their audience (Groshek framing of opponents as “enemies of the people” who, & Engelbert, 2012 and showcase their authenticity along with dangerous “Others” such as immigrants, con‐ (Forchtner & Kølvraa, 2017) and closeness to the people. spire against the “people” and are blamed for everything Thus, character assassination becomes the ideal dis‐ that is “wrong” in society; and character assassination cursive strategy to fully exploit social media affordances of individual politicians through personal attacks, which to strengthen populist communication (Berti & Loner, aim to undermine their reputation and deflect atten‐ 2021), focusing on opponents’ personal lives and quali‐ tion from the real issues towards their personal traits ties, that is to say, on their personae, to undermine their and actions. reputation. In the same way, personalizing the “enemy” The demonization of political opponents, deprived strengthen the “us vs. them” dichotomy that character‐ of any positive qualities and emotionally blamed izes populist discourse. (Hameleers et al., 2017) for all the “evil,” allows populist Choosing a target that symbolically embodies all the leaders to capitalize on the anger of those groups who “wrong” in society and attacking them through the use perceive that their lives have been ignored, marginal‐ of mockery, insults, or impoliteness not only allows pop‐ ized, or negatively affected by the actions of politicians ulists to distance themselves from establishment politics, (Horwitz, 2018). In this way, the subsequent victimiza‐ characterized by moderation and issue‐based arguments tion of the “people” offers populist leaders the chance (Gerbaudo, 2018) but fosters polarization that has been to establish a powerful bond. proven to benefit them (Schulze et al., 2020). In other words, this discursive dynamic appears very In conclusion, our study has shed some light on PRR similar to that identified by other studies (Carr & Haynes, parties’ discursive construction of the political “Other.” 2015; Cervi et al., 2020) regarding the framing of immi‐ Nonetheless, our results are inherently limited to the grants as the “Others”: Both dynamics consist of blaming cases under analysis. Accordingly, future studies should the othered “Other” (Williams, 2010) through emotional extend the universe to prove if there is a common pat‐ appeal, avoiding any rational discussion and capitalizing tern outside Southern Europe. on citizens’ discontent. In addition, in the specific case of Abascal, another Conflict of Interests political opponent is targeted, although its presence is less relevant from a quantitative perspective: indepen‐ The authors declare no conflict of interests. dentist parties. 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Carrol (Ed.), The SAGE encyclo‐ Zulianello, M. (2020). Varieties of populist parties and pedia of corporate reputation (pp. 115–118). SAGE. party systems in Europe: From state‐of‐the‐art to Sartori, G. (2005). Parties and party systems: A frame‐ the application of a novel classification scheme to work for analysis. ECPR Press. 66 parties in 33 Countries. Government and Oppo‐ Schulze, H., Mauk, M., & Linde, J. (2020). How populism sition, 55(2), 327–347. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov. and polarization affect Europe’s liberal democracies. 2019.21 Politics and Governance, 8(3), 1–5. https://doi.org/ About the Authors Laura Cervi is a Serra Húnter associate professor of the Department of Journalism and Communication Sciences at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain. She holds a PhD in political science from the University of Pavia (Italy) and the Autonomous University of Barcelona. She is a member of the research group Gabinete de Comunicación y Educación, a recognized and consolidated research group at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. Her main research interest is political communication, with a focus on populism and its relations with new technologies. Politics and Governance, 2023, Volume 11, Issue 2, Pages 235–248 247 Santiago Tejedor is a professor and director of the Department of Journalism and Communication Sciences at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He holds a PhD in journalism and communica‐ tion sciences from the Autonomous University of Barcelona and a PhD in project engineering from the Polytechnic University of Catalonia. He is currently the director and principal investigator of the research group Gabinete de Comunicación y Educación, a recognized and consolidated research group. His lines of research focus are, in particular, on media literacy, cyberjournalism, media convergence, and new transmedia narratives. Mónica Gracia Villar has a master’s degree in human resources and knowledge management from the European University of the Atlantic and a PhD in Project Engineering: Environment, Safety, Quality, and Communication from the Polytechnic University of Catalonia, Spain. She is currently a researcher and teacher of internal communication and the development of entrepreneurial social skills. Politics and Governance, 2023, Volume 11, Issue 2, Pages 235–248 248