The Extractive Industries and Society 15 (2023) 101275 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect The Extractive Industries and Society journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/exis Original article Mining coal while digging for justice: Investigating justice claims against a coal-phase out in five countries Henner Busch a, *, Vasna Ramasar b, Sofia Avila c, Brototi Roy d, e, Tara van Ryneveld b, Ana Mandinic b, Eric Brandstedt f a Lund University Centre for Sustainability Studies, Sweden b Department of Human Geography, Division of Human Ecology, Lund University, Sweden c Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales UNAM, Mexico d Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain e Department of Environmental Science and Policy, Central European University, Austria f Human Rights Studies, Department of History, Lund University, Sweden A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T Keywords: Coal has long been one of the fossil fuels underpinning the energy systems of many countries around the world. Coal phase-out Because of its long-standing history, many actors have an interest in retaining the status quo. In this article, we Coal phase-down explore the complexities of a coal phase-out in different countries. Drawing on empirical material from Germany, Just transition India, Mexico, Serbia and South Africa, we look at the way coal is represented in public debate. We do so by Climate delay analysing the respective political arguments of key actors about coal phase-out in the chosen countries and Germany India analyse their inherent justice claims. Our research illustrates how state institutions, fossil fuel companies and Mexico other actors have contributed to framing coal as a formative factor of social relations and as an asset for Serbia development. Further, we find that there is considerable overlap of justice claims between global North and South africa global South countries, even though actors from global South countries also invoke global inequalities and historical climate debt. Based on our results, we argue that policymakers must (a) critically interrogate justice claims and (b) consider injustices created by the status quo to ensure a Just Transition. 1. Introduction security (Kalt, 2021) to endangering cultural identities (Johnstone and Hielscher, 2017). This scholarly attention reflects public discourses on The unfolding climate crisis makes drastic cuts in global greenhouse coal in which diverse actors voice resistance to a phase-out of coal. This gas emissions an imperative. Nearly two-thirds of today’s emissions resistance became evident at the COP26 in Glasgow in 2021 where the stem from our global energy system and it is the sector where emissions original ambition to find an agreement on a global coal “phase-out” was have risen the most in absolute and relative terms since 1990 (Ritchie watered down to a “phase-down” (Arora and Mishra, 2021). et al., 2020). The most carbon intense source of energy in the global Calls for a Just Transition to mitigate the negative impacts of a coal energy mix is coal (IPCC, 2022; IPCC et al., 2014). Emissions from phase-out have grown louder in recent years. The concept emerged and coal-fired power generation have more than doubled between 1990 and was popularised in the 1970s/80 s in the US with chemical plant workers 2018 (International Energy Agency, 2019). However, to stay within 1.5◦ and local communities affected by environmental externalities, but it of global warming, nearly 90% of all coal needs to stay in the ground has been used in current days much more widely in the context of just (Welsby et al., 2021). This turns coal into a defining factor in the energy transitions (Stevis et al., 2020). The original ambition of a Just struggle to stabilise the climate. Transition was to ensure that workers and their communities are not Against this backdrop, calls for a phase-out of coal in the near future unproportionally affected by hardship that arise from new environ­ have gotten louder in recent years (Welsby et al., 2021). Many scholars mental legislation. Several researchers have recently turned to the recognise that this question opens up a whole host of issues starting from concept of Just Transition to investigate the social problems related to energy security (Nolting and Praktiknjo, 2020) via questions of job low-carbon transitions and how to address them (Brandstedt et al., 2022; * Corresponding author. E-mail address: henner.busch@lucsus.lu.se (H. Busch). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2023.101275 Received 19 December 2022; Received in revised form 27 April 2023; Accepted 23 May 2023 Available online 19 June 2023 2214-790X/© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). H. Busch et al. The Extractive Industries and Society 15 (2023) 101275 Gürtler et al., 2021; Heffron and McCauley, 2018; Jenkins et al., 2020; 2021). India and China lobbied to replace the term ‘phase-out’ with Swilling et al., 2016). This work highlights the importance of justice ‘phase-down’ in the final agreement document, which essential means claims that are raised in the context of energy transitions and their im­ that although use of coal might increase in absolute terms for national plications for public acceptance. ‘development’ needs, there should be a decline of coal as a percentage of In this article, we systematise arguments supporting the continued the overall energy mix. Nevertheless, China and the US agreed to seize use of coal in a number of countries where it is still a central resource for financing coal power projects in other countries and China has the national energy mix and/or the dynamics of specific productive re­ committed to phase-down power production from coal between 2021 gions. Specifically, we focus on the cases of Germany, India, Serbia, and 2026. South Africa and Mexico to explore how the support for coal activities is In recent months, the unlawful Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine currently mobilised in different economic, social and political contexts. has changed the situation in Europe. Several EU countries, amongst Three questions guide our analysis: them Germany and Austria, are considering expanding coal power production because of decreased gas deliveries by the Russian aggres­ 1) What are the main claims brought forth in favour of continuing the sors. Plans go as far as the reopening of already closed power plants (see use of coal within the analysed cases? e.g., Lory, 2022) and fuelling them with domestically mined and im­ 2) How do justice claims differ between the cases, especially between ported coal. It is difficult to predict what further impact the war will global North and global South countries? have on the phase-out of coal, but it potentially adds further fuel to the 3) How can the results inform approaches to policy making for Just fires (literally and argumentatively) of those who oppose a quick end of Transitions? coal. Existing research around coal-supporting narratives has largely 2.3. Background and status of coal in the national energy contexts focused on single country analysis (Curran, 2021; Jacob, 2017; Kalt, 2021; Trencher et al., 2019). Building upon those insights, we integrate In situating coal phase-out in each of the case study countries, we a wider number of cases into a single study highlighting how the rela­ first provide a brief overview of the status of coal (Table 1). We do this in tively central position of coal across different contexts creates “climate relation to its role in the national energy systems, the history of coal in delay narratives” (Lamb et al., 2020) while producing specific chal­ each country and future plans. lenges to achieve just transitions. With this analysis, we aspire to iden­ tify key issues that decarbonisation strategies must address, either by 3. Methodology presenting counterarguments or by developing responsive policies, to gain public acceptance and democratic participation in designing Our analysis is based on a multi-country case study approach. We alternative energy futures. Further, we seek to introduce a global South have drawn empirical data from five countries where coal is a central perspective into the scientific debate on coal phase-outs. Consequently, resource for the national energy mix and/or the dynamics of specific our findings are relevant to academics by outlining a research agenda productive regions. These countries are Germany, India, Mexico, Serbia and to policymakers by identifying points of conflict related to the and South Africa. We selected the countries based on convenience transition. sampling. Our research team includes citizens of all the selected coun­ tries, and we have native speakers of all the relevant languages present 2. Coal in the world in the data. This sampling approach allows only for limited general­ isability. Nevertheless, it still enables us to do two things: first, to 2.1. Coal’s role in today’s global energy system identify a set of justice claims articulated against a coal phase-out, and second, to draw conclusions about differences between coal phase-out Coal, the most carbon-intensive fuel currently used extensively in discourses in the global North and the global South. All countries we electricity generation, accounts for 35,25% of electricity generation selected are - at least nominally – democracies1 in which debates about a globally in 2020 (International Energy Agency, 2022a). Phasing out coal phase-out or phase-down of coal are taking place. This means that po­ is thus critical to limiting emissions that drive climate change. In 2020, litical debates in all countries needs to acknowledge a variety of justice total coal consumption was 7456 Mt globally. This figure resulted from claims to show good democratic practice in designing policies (Dobson, slow growth during the pandemic, but the projections are for significant 2000).. We included data from 2019 to early 2022. However, in the case rebound as the economy recovers from pandemic losses. Most of the of Germany, we extended this period to start already in 2017. We did so growth in coal consumption is taking place in China, India and USA to account for the discussion around the German coal phase-out which (International Energy Agency, 2021). was suggested by the Commission on Growth, Structural Change and Global coal trade in 2020 was 1 298 Mt, a drop of 11% from the Employment in February 2019. Our data collection stopped shortly record volumes in 2019. Traded coal made up 17% of global coal con­ before Russia’s unlawful full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which had im­ sumption and most of this trade was seaborne. Indonesia remains the plications on national discourses about coal phase-out, not least in world’s largest exporter of coal (by weight) at 405 Mt with Australia Germany. following. China was the largest importer of coal in 2020 with 314 Mt We started our data collection by identifying the main arguments with Turkey being the largest importer outside the Asia Pacific region against the phase-out or phase-down of coal through a scan of the main with 40 Mt imported in 2020. actors and documents influencing the public debate in each country. We did so by distilling the arguments from a set of sources that have 2.2. Coal phase-out & coal phase-down particular relevance to the discussions in the different countries and thus hold the power to influence the public debate. For each of the countries, Discussions about the necessity of a phase-out of coal have gained we looked at a set of key-actors and, through an online search, identified traction in recent years. For example, coal was first explicitly mentioned in the agreement of the COP26 negotiations in Glasgow in 2021. A coalition of 190 states committed to phasing-out coal power production 1 According to the Economist Democracy index, these countries are ranked as by 2030 (or 2040 respectively for non-OECD countries) (IPCC, 2021). follows: Germany (15), India (46), Mexico (86), Serbia (63), South Africa (44). Notable exceptions from this list were the four largest producers of coal Only Germany counts as a "full democracy", South Africa, India and Serbia energy, namely, China, Japan, India and the US who together account count as "flawed democracies", and Mexico as a "hybrid regime" (i.e. hybrid for 75% of global coal consumption (Human Rights Watch (HRW), between democracy and an authoritarian state). 2 H. Busch et al. The Extractive Industries and Society 15 (2023) 101275 Table 1 Overview of the past, present and future of coal for electricity in the 5 case study countries. Present Historical development Future Country Percentage (%) of Percentage change in First instances of Major coal producing Phase-out plans coal in current electricity generation (commercial) coal regions electricity from coal in 2020, mining in the country generation relative to 1990. Germany 24 − 53,9 18th century Rheinisches Revier, Lausitzer Phase out by 2038 Compensation for regions and Revier, Helmstedter Revier, companies affected Mitteldeutsches Revier, Mexico 4 +16,8 19th century Municipalities in Coahuila No explicit phase-out of coal, but commitments Sabinas, San Juan de Sabinas, to increase clean energies in the national mix Múzquiz, Juarez, (35% by 2024) and a reduction of GHG Progreso emissions (50% by 2050) India 70 +517,1 18th century Jharkhand, Odisha, No explicit phase-out of coal. Aims to meet net- Chhattisgarh, West Bengal, zero emissions by 2070 and to meet fifty percent Madhya Pradesh of its electricity requirements from renewable energy sources by 2030. Serbia 70 − 6,2 19th century Kolubara basin, Kostolac No explicit phase-out of coal but the country basin foresees a 9.8% reduction in emissions compared to 1990 levels by 2030 (equivalent to a 15% increase in emissions at the time of the commitment.) South 88 +34,7 19th century Limpopo province, No explicit phase-out of coal. By 2030, Africa Mpumalanga province, decommission 35 GW (of 42 GW currently KwaZulu-Natal, Free State operating) of coal-fired power capacity and supply at least 20 GW of the additional 29 GW of electricity needed by 2030 from renewables and gas Data on% coal in current electricity generation sourced for Germany from Statistisches Bundesamt (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2022), for Mexico from the Global Electricity Review, 2021 (Jones, 2021), for India from the IEA India Energy Outlook 2021 (International Energy Agency, 2021), for Serbia and for South Africa calculated from the IEA electricity information (International Energy Agency, 2022b). Data on percentage change in electricity generation from coal in 2020, relative to 1990 calculated from IEA country profiles. data, such as grey literature, speeches, interviews, videos, etc. pertain­ below). This enabled commonalities and differences between the argu­ ing to the phase-out of coal. We used the following list to identify actors ments made in the different countries to become visible (Table 2). and data: 4. Theoretical framing 1 If there has been a decision to phase out coal in the country, we start two years before the decision. Else, we start with the current debate. In this section of the article, we describe the different theoretical 2 When we collected data, we looked at sources in the following order: concepts that are relevant to our research process. These concepts are 1 If applicable: commissions on coal phase-out or energy/climate useful tools for our analysis of the empirical materials from the five case commissions studies. The main bodies of theory that we draw on are discourses of 2 Main government sources (prime minister/president; ministries climate delay, scalar interactions and theories of justice in relation to concerned with energy, climate, mining, environment or work) climate change and energy transitions. 3 Companies involved in energy production from coal 4 Companies involved in coal mining 5 Labour unions involved in the coal industry 4.1. Discourses of climate delay 6 Other relevant voices (non-unionised coal workers, local pop­ ulations in coal regions, regional and local politicians. Non Lamb et al. (2020) identified common climate delay discourses and exhaustive but illustrative showcase of narratives in media, civil so­ developed a typology of the logic underpinning these discourses (Fig. 1). ciety reports) This typology identifies four broad categories: (1) discourses that redi­ rect responsibility for action; (2) that push non-transformative solu­ In total, we looked at 81 arguments made by a variety of actors in the tions; (3) that emphasise the downsides of action; or (4) that surrender five countries (see Table2 for an example). The justice dimensions of to climate change. This paper expands and nuances this understanding many of the arguments we encountered are implicit and need to be of delayed decarbonisation in the context of coal as a specific teased out in the analysis. Our approach does not aim to present a socio-technical system and sets in conversation with two additional comprehensive analysis of the discourses in the different countries. concepts, namely justice and scale (see below). Instead, we want to provide an overview of the dominant arguments to highlight how justice claims in favour of coal are being constructed in Table 2 different contexts. For each of the actor groups, we collected arguments Example of data collection matrix. from the data until we reached the point of theoretical saturation Argument/ claims Example: Coal is a blessing/resource that should be utilised (Bryman, 2008). After the collection of arguments, we distilled the for Economic Empowerment inherent justice claims of the arguments. These were then categorised Category of climate Emphasize the downsides delay according to where (countries) these claims were made, the scale they Where South Africa appeal to (local, regional, national), what institutions and actors have Scale National made them and the themes that emerged from each argument (is it Theme Developmental technological or developmental etc.). We analysed this data through the Institutions/ Actors Government (Mineral Resources, Planning), Business (Minerals Resources Council) framework of climate delay developed by Lamb et al. (2020) (see section Documents Mining Charter, National Development Plan 2030, 3 H. Busch et al. The Extractive Industries and Society 15 (2023) 101275 Specifically, we map here: 4.2. Scalar interactions • Who is saying something? Another element that becomes relevant to the study of debates about • Which delay category do they appeal to? coal phase-outs is how scale is engaged and invoked in different claims. • Which justice dimension do they invoke? The concept of scale is seen as a way of ordering social relations as well • Which scale do their claims refer to? as non-human parts of the environment (Smith, 1992). Different types of scales are defined such as spatial, temporal, jurisdictional and institu­ We acknowledge that the “discourses of climate delay” framework tional and each of these scales has different levels within. For example, a has predominantly been applied in a Western and global North context. spatial scale (such as global, regional, and local levels) can interplay We are also aware of the polemic undertone of the framework and its with a jurisdictional scale (such as local, provincial, national and in­ accompanying material. This brings with it the danger that all argu­ ternational government levels). Within scalar research, we identify that ments against any form of rapid decarbonisation might be categorised as there are interactions between levels in a scale as well as between scales “delay discourse” and consequently get disqualified irrespective of the themselves. For instance, responsibility for decision-making that relates potential validity of these arguments. In this research, we attempt to free to coal phase-out may be taken by the local government deciding on ourselves of this polemic baggage and treat the framework first and local road infrastructure; regional or provincial governance may be foremost as a mapping tool without far reaching normative implications. responsible for economic development in the region and national gov­ We argue that this is possible because even in the original framework ernment may be responsible for mining permits and carbon emissions. most categories are not just fake arguments that aim at delaying climate Andonova and Mitchell (2010) recognize that environmental gover­ action per-se. The different discourses of climate delay do not aim to nance has been dramatically rescaled and become increasingly complex delay action on climate as an end in itself, but rather they serve the and interconnected with respect to the level at which it takes place, the purpose of protecting particular (often material) interests, some of range of actors engaged in it, and the linkages between it and nominally which might indeed be justified. Many of the existing categories of the non-environmental issues. As we will highlight in our discussion, this framework have an inherent justice dimension by e.g., appealing to the adds complexity to justice claims in the energy transition (Gürtler et al., principle that unnecessary burdens should be avoided if a political goal 2021). cannot be reached (change is impossible) or that one should not take advantage of others’ effort (free riding) or that we need to balance 4.3. Justice claims in the coal phase-out different policy goals (emphasize the downsides) in political conflict. Consequently, we refrain from delivering normative judgements when The last theoretical lenses that we use to interrogate arguments for collecting and categorising the different judgement claims here (Fig. 1). maintaining coal-based activities is justice. Here we consider what Fig. 1. discourses of climate denial taken from Lamb et al. (2020). 4 H. Busch et al. The Extractive Industries and Society 15 (2023) 101275 justice claims underlie resistance to a coal phase-out and how these requires an orderly process to transition from one economic activity to claims allude to calls for fairness and equality (Muttitt and Kartha, another and that this orderly transition would be impossible without the 2020). Some of the justice questions that come up are: how can we economic benefits provided by coal. Jobs and livelihoods are often understand and foster justice when considering past, present and future repeated reasons against the coal phase-out. It is mainly articulated by energy access and production - energy for whom and at what cost? companies involved in coal and regional politicians. In essence, it un­ Claims for the maintenance of coal and against a coal phase-out may derlines that the sector provides jobs and livelihoods for many people. relate to the distribution of impacts; the procedures by which such de­ The claim is often accompanied by concrete numbers of people cisions are made and whose claims are recognised in the employed in the sector. E.g. LEAG, the company that runs the Lusatian decision-making process (McCauley et al., 2019). These claims may mines and power plants referred in 2019 to “8000 direct and 16,000 relate to different scales - local employment or global climate change indirect” jobs related to coal mining in the region. The company lists and refer to different institutions and jurisdictions. only 7000 jobs on their homepage in 2023. Statistics released by the coal Additionally, the notion of transitional justice is relevant to this sector claim that in 2022 17,216 people were employed by the sector in study of coal phase-out (Klinsky, 2018). It refers to claims to fairness Germany, down from 20,336 in 2019, the year the phase-out compro­ that come up in the energy transition and coal phase-out process. mise was reached (Statistik der Kohlenwirtschaft, 2023). However, these Implementing transitional justice may include a wide range of policies in numbers must be taken with a grain of salt. Both industry and politics order to redress injustices caused by a coal phase-out. However when have applied very generous methodologies when counting employment, considering transitional justice, the legitimacy and moral grounds of e.g., including workers who work on the remediation projects of closed different claims must be interrogated such as the right to extract or the open pit mines (Staude, 2018). so-called process of grandfathering which may lead to coal lock-ins A pre-decision claim is about return on investment. An early coal (Ackerman et al., 1999). phase-out would lead to hardship for the companies involved in the sector. In particular, the companies argue, the long-term planning pro­ 5. Results cesses for open pit mines which might work with decade-long time ho­ rizons make a rapid phase-out particularly damaging to the companies. In the following, we will present the prevalent arguments against a One of the coal companies warns in the post-decision debate that an phase-out of coal in the five different countries. We will proceed country earlier and rapid phase-out would inflict damage to the German and by country and link our results to information from the background European energy system. This claim is not further substantiated, and the Section 2.3. nature of this damage remains entirely unclear. In post-decision times, an entirely new argument against an even earlier coal phase-out 5.1. Germany emerged which falls into the emphasis the downsides: Faced with pro­ tests by Fridays for Future demonstrators, coal companies stressed the Amongst the countries we investigated, Germany holds a special necessity of upholding the rule of law and honouring the compromise position. This is because the phase-out of coal has already been set for the commission had reached. The justice dimension of this argument the year 2038 by the Commission on Growth, Structural Change and centres around the principle of legitimate expectations, e.g., the idea Employment, which published its report in 2019. This means that we that it is unjust if one makes plans and investments based on good faith technically have two data sets for Germany, one from the pre-decisions and these plans suddenly become forbidden and investments worthless discourse and one from the past-decision discourse. Not surprisingly, the (Brown, 2017). pre-decision arguments feature much more prominently in our data. In summary, the claims from the German debate display no surrender Many of the German justice claims in the debate focus on emphasising and no redirect responsibility narratives. In connection with redirect re­ the downsides of a coal phase-out. A recurring argument is that coal is the sponsibility, it is worth noting that prior to 2015 e.g., the union IG BCE main source to ensure energy security in Germany. Both the German used to frame German and even European emission cuts as ineffective in government (chancellor and minister of economics) and coal companies face of Chinese emissions growth rates. However, it appears that the raise this point in pre-decision times. However, the argument is still Paris agreement has thankfully eliminated such arguments from the raised by coal companies in post-decision times as a response to calls German debate. Surprisingly, also a push for non-transformative solu­ from researchers and social movements like Fridays for Future for an tions (e.g. Carbon Capture and Storage or Carbon Capture and Usage) is earlier phase-out date than 2038. The justice implication of this argu­ not present. This means that nearly all claims fall into the category of ment stays somewhat implicit. However, the actors refer to the need of emphasize the downsides which reflects a general social acceptance for a ensuring supply to enable the required structural changes in the coal (n eventual) coal phase-out by all relevant actors. Within the category of producing regions. The causal link between national energy security and emphasize the downsides, all subcategories (social, developmental and regional structural change remains unclear. A second pre-decision policy perfection) are present. However, the German data also in­ argument against a coal phase-out is affordability. The national gov­ troduces one new subcategory: the rule of law. The rule of law subcategory ernment as well as companies argue that a phase-out of coal would lead is particularly interesting as it came up after the phase-out date was to higher energy prices for consumers in the whole country. This would decided. The fact that coal companies defend the decision possibly in­ eventually put an unacceptable economic burden on citizens in general dicates that the compromise constitutes a good deal for the companies and poorer households in particular, which would be unjust. In the run- who are allowed to continue using coal until 2038 while also receiving up to the decision on the phase-out, several actors stressed the impor­ generous compensation payments. Finally, the reference to disadvan­ tance of coal for the economy. While energy companies mainly stressed taged regions is a reoccurring theme in the German case. the importance of coal for certain (disadvantaged) regions, the national government underlined the importance of coal for the national econ­ 5.2. India omy. How this importance of coal for the national economy actually plays out in concrete terms stays, however, vague. The claim never­ Similar to the other middle-income countries, there is a strong focus theless appeals to social justice by referring to the disadvantaged regions on the developmental benefits of coal in India. Social benefits include who should not be subject to further economic hardship. electricity access and lowering the cost of energy for households as well In line with fossil-fuel solutionism, companies argue that the economic as jobs. With a growing population, much of India’s narrative is focused benefits provided by the coal industry are essential to enable the tran­ on the needs of the population and the impossibility of meeting these sition to a renewable energy system. This claim comes up both in our needs without coal (Roy and Schaffartzik, 2021). This also ties into pre- as well as in our post-decision data. The central argument is that it energy security for the nation and its development. The central justice 5 H. Busch et al. The Extractive Industries and Society 15 (2023) 101275 argument here is that Indian citizens and the country have a right to progress of this country, by working hard and fighting for their rights” develop, especially as India is a country with lower living standards and (Presidencia de la República, 2020). In line with the official narratives very low per-head emissions in international comparison. appealing to social justice, one of the main union leaders in the coal sector Economic benefits were also highlighted in terms of revenue gener­ has stated that coal-powered plants should continue working because it ation from privatisation. This was a slightly contrasting narrative from is the source of jobs for many people (Guardiola, 2017). However, it is those found in Mexico and South Africa which emphasised public in­ worth noting that young generations of Coahuila are trying to look vestment in coal. beyond the coal dependency and imagine alternative futures than those The Environmental Ministry also justifies the continued growth in experienced by their grandparents and parents (Ballesteros, 2021). The coal as a result of approvals already given and commitments to uphold arguments in favour of progress and development might resonate with these decisions. This is similar to the rule of law discourse in Germany these new generations who are also experiencing the loss of their fam­ and reflects the justice principle of legitimate expectations (Brown, ilies in the recent major accident at the Pinabete coal mine (Vega, 2022). 2017). To a lesser degree there is a narrative of technology optimism Summarising the Mexican case, we find that justice claims differ regarding clean coal technology. between the national and the regional level. On the national level, we In summary, coal in India is framed as a requirement in the face of find the redirect responsibility discourse, which appeals to the principle energy needs of the population. This suggests a discourse of surrender as that rich nations should decarbonise first. On the regional level, the right change is impossible. The narrative is less about the losses that will come to development is invoked. from a transition away from coal and more about the potential benefits coal might bring to the nation in the future. To a lesser extent, the 5.4. Serbia emphasize the downsides narrative is brought up in terms of rising cost of energy and employment. There is also a push for non-transformative so­ In Serbia, most of the claims made in favour of delaying a coal phase- lutions with clean coal technologies. out emphasize the downsides with a focus on jobs, quality of life for citi­ zens, energy security and the economy (locally and nationally). 5.3. Mexico Considering that Serbia relies mainly on coal for its electricity produc­ tion, there is a very strong call that the country cannot stop relying on Within our sample, Mexico is positioned as a middle-income country coal in the next 2–3 years. These arguments are made by the President of (and OECD member) whose coal sector is relatively small in terms of its the country down to local citizens and workers of coal mining areas. The participation in the national energy matrix. However, coal has been President of the country, Aleksandar Vučić, has been vocal in this central to the contemporary history of the country and the economic argument in international climate negotiations; in meetings with coal profile of Coahuila, a state that holds 95% of the national coal reserves. workers and mining companies using emotive language to emphasize the For the coal sector, several concerns were raised by communities in downsides of coal phase-out. Further arguments emphasising the down­ Coahuila -particularly older generations- whose livelihoods depend on sides of a coal phase-out have been put forward on the national level by the continuity of mining and processing activities. officials from the Ministry of Mining and Energy. On that note, the At a national scale, pro-coal measures have been particularly justi­ claims are articulated in such a way that they elucidate job security is­ fied after the shortcuts in electricity supply derived from the Texas sues, suggesting that coal miners, as well as other miners, have been in climate-energy crisis triggered by an unprecedented storm during 2021, that sector for generations. Thus, it is often insinuated that the miners which led to temporary cuts of up to 75% in fossil gas exports from Texas lack professional skills that could be used in sectors other than mining, to Mexico. This event resulted in the reactivation of two coal power making the energy transition more problematic due to the question of plants in Mexico and a consequent narrative that Mexico must produce what to do in terms of jobs with those who are currently employed in the energy independently with coal being part of that strategy. As such, mining sector. This turns the arguments into social justice claims. discourses at national level largely emphasize the downsides of phasing In a push for non-transformative solutions, a set of claims relate to out coal by appealing to well-being through securing electricity supply for technology optimisation and green growth. Whilst on the one hand there the nation. These measures have encounter strong criticism from are claims that coal cannot be phased out in the short term; a second set different actors supporting the need of strong climate policies. However, of arguments suggests that with the right technology coal can have a official discourses counter such critiques by redirecting responsibilities to lifespan that would continue even after 2050. Such arguments are major coal consumers and polluters such as China and the United States frequently given by government officials. Nonetheless, the arguments (Mariano, 2022). With such statements, Mexico reinforces the narrative suggesting the right technology remain undeveloped in practice and that the national carbon footprint is relatively small compared to other vague in discourse. The inherent justice claim here is that a costly and economies and therefore there is no justification to jeopardise the burdensome phase-out is unnecessary and it would, thus, be unjust to developmental aims of the country. impose these costs on the nation in general and communities involved in Discourses mobilised to regional audiences in Coahuila are aligned coal in particular. with national ones, yet tend to further emphasize the downsides of fuelling Additionally, in practice, a new thermal power plant is close to being disruptive change. As such, discourses from the president and some na­ finished by the end of 2023, which also indicates little dedication to an tional representatives favour the idea that coal should be used energy transition and coal phase-out. Different actors adjust their nar­ throughout the remaining lifetime of coal power plants and until the ratives, according to the situation they find themselves in. For example, reserves in Coahuila are depleted (estimated 90 years). Following an when speaking to mining workers, job security is promised, and coal is anti-neoliberal discourse, the President has stated that Mexico will still presented as the most important energy source needed for the recover its public energy facilities without violating any climate law. By country’s development and energy security. In dialogues with EU offi­ ensuring that publicly produced electricity will be dispatched, the cials, the Serbian government tends to present itself as an actor dedi­ government will promote the purchase of coal, thus helping coal pro­ cated to decarbonisation, ready to work on investments in the energy ducers and the continued development of the coal region (Mariano, sector to increase renewables to meet EU requirements as well as on 2022; Presidencia de la República, 2020). building strategies to ensure a just energy transition. Yet, our research Similarly, national representatives delivering speeches in the State of has shown that Serbia’s policy landscape lacks acknowledgement of Coahuila, have emphasised that the country should continue the energy transition as an element that has and will have a major impact on extraction and usage of coal, otherwise Coahuila’s coal region will the economy and labour market of the country. disappear (Zerrega, 2019). The governor of the state has similarly stated To summarise, in Serbia we see that the coal phase-out is mainly that “people of the State of Coahuila have strongly contributed to the hindered by claims that change will be disruptive as it has too many 6 H. Busch et al. The Extractive Industries and Society 15 (2023) 101275 downsides, which arguably justifies the lack of incentive in creating a analytical framework. Second, make suggestions on how to introduce a policy landscape needed for just energy transition in practice. global South perspective into the framework on analytical framework. Third, we turn to the implications our results have for thinking about 5.5. South Africa justice in the coal phase-out. Fourth, we revisit the concept of scale and raise justice implications that are caused by scalar complexity. The majority of claims made against a coal phase out explicitly emphasized the downsides of change and how it will be disruptive as a 6.1. The nature of discourses of climate delay main reason to avoid phasing out coal. This was articulated at different scales (national, regional and local), by banks, national government, and While we found claims banking on all four main categories of climate mining businesses. The disruptions noted related to energy security; delay, our results show that most claims fall into the category of social justice through job loss; and economic implications at both local emphasise the downsides and push for non-transformative solutions of the and national levels. Additional claims articulated by some trade unions Lamb et al. framework. We want to stress again that we do not aim to motivated against disruptive change that was not transformative, calling pass judgement on the validity of the justice claims we categorised here. for either radical transformative change that prioritises workers’ rights, We did not find any indication for outright climate denialism; or no change at all, thus, representing a case of policy perfectionism. however, the case of India showed a discourse that is coloured by the These were not fundamentally against a coal phase-out, but in practice change is impossible narrative. This reflects a global trend, which has are against it because of the way it is being carried out in South Africa made it increasingly difficult to sell straightforward denialism (Cann (privatising and procuring independent rather than state run renewable and Raymond, 2018). Most of the claims made were from the expected energy, etc.). actors such as the Ministries responsible for energy and mining; and Yet another group of arguments implied that disruptive change workers unions but discourses of climate delay were also presented at should not be required of developing countries, thus, reproducing the the highest levels of government including the Presidents of the coun­ redirecting responsibility of the framework. Banking on an anti-imperialist tries. An extreme case is the Environmental Ministry in South Africa agenda, the claim stresses the unfair character of global inequalities, thus, which made claims emphasising the downsides of a coal phase-out (instead creating a new subcategory for the framework. Interestingly, this claim of highlighting climate, health or environmental benefits as one would was made by the Ministers of Environment and Mineral Resources and expect of this portfolio). speaks to the justice principle of differentiated responsibility at the in­ There is only one instance where we found actors mentioning ternational level. The Minister of Environment also mentioned stranded shareholder value explicitly (India). There has been an implicit refer­ assets thus showing a focus on economic interests based on the justice ence to shareholder value in the German debate where one of the principle of legitimate expectations. These emphasised a continuation as companies claimed that an early coal phase-out would have “negative the “unemotional” choice for South Africa, and framing activists as consequences for the company”, however, the interests of investors do “emotional” and spouting “rhetoric”. The Minister of Mineral Resources not feature clearly in our data, even though, we found claims related to at a coal indaba (a coal conference or workshop) went further to suggest stranded assets in the data for South Africa and Mexico. At the same that government pursuit of international finance was motivated by time, we found ongoing discussions about the (desired) ownership “greed” for international climate finance rather than the country’s best structure of the coal sector. Like South Africa, an interesting facet of the interests. Closely following this line of argument were claims that discussion in Mexico relates to the problems with privatisation of parts disruptive change is not necessary because of technical solutions (clean of the energy system and the need to maintain public sector investment coal technology, CCS, etc.), thus, pushing technological optimism. This and involvement in coal. This question has profound implications for was also articulated by the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy what policies can do “to” the coal sector. And it very much defines who and mining businesses as well as the National Union of Mineworkers. A pays and who benefits from the status quo and/or transitional policies. common thread in the many claims was the lack of alternatives to coal Claims referring to procedural justice were not particularly visible. mining, either that were “rational” enough or that were transformative and the need to uphold the rule of law came up in Germany and India enough to justify disruptive change. Here the justice claim rests on the where appeals to procedural justice and related legitimate expectations principle that a disruption with insufficient effects should be avoided as were used to defend the status quo of ongoing coal use (in the case of it would impose undue burdens on miners and their communities. Germany until 2038) and thus forming a new subcategory in the Most of the arguments in the South African debate related to the emphasize the downsides category (Fig. 2). In Germany, the legally category of emphasize the downsides for society, economy and energy binding character of the compromise on the phase-out of coal was security. This is not surprising for a middle-income country that is invoked in post-decision time to counter demands for an earlier end to reliant on cheap electricity to attract foreign direct investment. This coal. Ironically, this argument was presented by one of the coal com­ came across in comments from both local and national levels with the panies (LEAG) who previously had attacked the legitimacy of the coal local concerns expressed in relation to closure or expansion of specific commission that negotiated the compromise. In the case of India, the mines. The developmental argument was also extended to the redirect government invoked the importance of upholding the rule of law to responsibility category to other, more “developed” countries. Perhaps the justify that already issued permits for coal producers could not be most interesting finding for South Africa was trade unions whose posi­ withdrawn again. In both cases, violating existing laws is portrayed as an tion called for radical transformative change and a just transition. unreasonable transitional cost. Based on the two cases we suggest add­ However, in making this argument for systemic change and demanding ing a new subcategory by the name of rule of law to the framework’s much more radical climate action they suggest that the current state- emphasize the downsides category. owned system would be better to maintain than a privatised system and thus seemingly support the status quo in an all or nothing transition 6.2. Adding a global south perspective argument. Counterintuitively, this call for exclusively radical changes to the coal sector and rejection of incremental change aligns with the policy While the Lamb et.al. framework was mainly developed for a global perfectionism argument. North context, we found it useful for the analysis of cases from the global South, even if the context requires adjustment to make the framework 6. Discussion more encompassing. Based on our analysis we suggest two new sub­ categories to the framework. In the following we discuss our results in four ways. First, we focus on First, in the context of Mexico and South Africa, we found a number the nature of the discourses of climate delay we found and reflect on the of claims related to the redirect responsibility category. Different actors 7 H. Busch et al. The Extractive Industries and Society 15 (2023) 101275 Fig. 2. Our suggested addition to the framework developed by Lamb et al. (2020). New sub-category “The rule of law” in brown added to “Emphasize the downsides” category. direct responsibility to mitigate climate change towards countries with Second, the South African case produced a second distinct argument higher emissions and greater financial means. By pointing at low do­ from a global South context. The argument rests on the explicit reference mestic (per-head) emissions, actors in these countries derive a right to to historical carbon debt and the common but differentiated re­ emit more from existing global inequalities (see Fig. 3). sponsibility to first demands action from rich nations who have Fig. 3. Our suggested addition to the framework developed by Lamb et al. (2020). New sub-categories “Global Inequality” and “Climate debt” in green added to “Redirect responsibility” category. 8 H. Busch et al. The Extractive Industries and Society 15 (2023) 101275 contributed much more to climate change in the past. Therefore, we through the Just Transition concept that trade-offs must be made. Put suggest adding a new subcategory by the name of invoking global carbon simply, Just Transition strives to alleviate social burdens that occur debt to the redirect responsibility part of the framework (see Fig. 3). when environmentally damaging industries have to close. It mainly fo­ Both new subcategories are embedded in discourses that problem­ cuses on the most vulnerable actors in this context, namely, workers and atise global inequalities and they appeal to notions of global climate their communities (Harrahill and Douglas, 2019; Newell and Mulvaney, justice and anticolonial critiques. As mentioned before, we do not aim 2013). Our findings indicate that the discourses of climate delay narrow here to pass judgement on these claims. However, the two new sub­ the opportunity for a constructive and serious engagement with the categories stress the need to investigate justice claims against a coal possibilities of a Just Transition. Instead, they allow for the status quo to phase-out in their respective context. By that we mean that these claims be maintained through arguments that a just transition to a low-carbon to not exist in a social vacuum. Instead, researchers, activists and poli­ energy system is too costly, not necessary, not possible or an issue for ticians alike must consider entanglements in historical injustices when someone else to deal with. engaging with justice claims against decarbonisation policies (Fig. 3). To achieve a Just Transition, policymakers must do two things: First, it is essential that justice claims are critically interrogated. Part 6.3. Implications for just transitions of this interrogation is to carefully scrutinise who makes claims and in whose name. For example, if mining companies claim to speak in the We need to contextualise our findings to work out their importance name of their workers, it is worth investigating if these companies have for policymakers. First, it is worth noting that we did not find any indeed acted in the best interest of their employees in the past. If indication for outright climate change denialism. This is a positive sign shareholders, who made a fortune in the past, frame coal as an indis­ as it shows that debates between powerful key actors in the investigated pensable tool to deliver energy services, one should see if these needs countries avoid such lows. It also suggests that science illiteracy is not a cannot be met in other, less climate-damaging ways. This investigation serious hurdle on the road to a Just Transition. can help to differentiate between genuine justice concerns that e.g., Nevertheless, coal is a contested source of energy with a variety of strive for global climate justice and pretextual claims made to protect interests attached. The data shows how these interests are framed as particular interests of profiteers of discourses of climate delay. justice claims in the public debate. This leads to a situation where de­ Second, if we only focus on these – loudly articulated - downsides of a cisions on the status of coal are necessarily political. Our data shows that coal phase-out and uncritically accept them, we risk overlooking the most of the claims made are about material wants and needs based on upsides such a phase-out brings about. Apart from contributing to our current understanding of society. Invoking such wants and needs is climate change, the status quo of ongoing coal extraction and combus­ an attempt to create legitimacy, and, in extension, public acceptance for tion produces a number of negative impacts for people and the envi­ coal energy. However, even when something is justified when placed in ronment, ranging from the destruction of landscapes and settlements by a specific context, it can be unjustified from a different point of view open pit mines to air pollution causing roughly 34.000 premature deaths (Brandstedt et al., 2022). As an example, employment is certainly an per year in Europe alone (Kushta et al., 2021). In face of these numbers, important and legitimate claim in a national context but if the it becomes essential that a Just Transition process not only considers the employment of a small number of coal workers is dependant on vast potential justice violations a transition implies but that it also looks at emissions, it might be illegitimate in a global (climate justice) context. those justice violations that the status quo enables, justifies and nor­ When analysing our data through different dimensions of justice, we malises. Put differently, a society will not achieve a Just Transition found that most claims appeal to distributional justice. We found a very without holding those accountable who benefitted in the past without strong focus on workers and communities who will be worst affected by bearing a burden (e.g. incumbents in the energy market, shareholders). the coal phase-out. This suggests a social justice angle in the arguments. However, those opposing a (earlier) phase-out of coal benefit from a Whether this is followed through in reality is hard to say. It, however, political status quo bias (Zhao and Luo, 2021) in the form of different shows that these justice claims can, in theory, be addressed by ambitious discursive and ideological lock-ins (Buschmann and Oels, 2019; social policies that centre on the needs of workers in the coal sector and Kraushaar-Friesen and Busch, 2020). These lock-ins limit the range of their communities. what is politically imaginable or desirable. This is problematic in the Against our expectations, our empirical material did not produce context of the different cases we presented here, as all countries are many claims regarding the loss of identity that a coal phase-out would nominally democracies where long-term societal change such as a Just entail for miners. E.g., this claim was part of the wider discourse in Transition project ideally is ultimately dependant on public acceptance. Germany (Buchholz, 2021), however, it seems that it was mostly iden­ Our results show that the majority of justice claims are in the category of tified as a problem by left-leaning actors such as foundations and think emphasize the downsides. They refer explicitly to questions of distribu­ tanks (e.g. the Green party or the Rosa-Luxemburg foundation). Previ­ tional justice, which opens the door for overcoming resistance to a coal ous research also showed that this has been a topic discussed amongst phase-out by policies of redistribution. This underlines the importance miners themselves. To a lesser extent, actors link coal to the identity of of a combination of a) policy packages that alleviate the burden on the coal producing regions as is the case of the Mexican State of Cohauila. most vulnerable who are affected negatively by the transition and b) the This discrepancy between the claims raised by workers and the actors we skilful crafting of a political narrative that can refute some of the justice analysed for this research hints that workers’ interests are not neces­ claims that will inevitably be made by actors such as incumbents, by e. sarily a central consideration of opponents of a coal phase-out in the g., pointing at the societal benefits and justice gains that stem from different countries. Policy makers should engage with the “soft” aspects eliminating coal from the energy system. of the Just Transition concept to address this oversight and gain acceptance for the transition amongst miners and their communities. 6.4. Revisiting scale There is, thus, a need for moral choices to be made in the face of a warming planet. Greater attention should be paid to consequences of We found that many proponents of continued use of coal appeal to political decisions along different scales, in particular the transitional different scales. From a scalar point of view, the emphasize the downsides grievances that climate and energy policies may give raise to. The dif­ narrative was framed in terms of local, regional and national injustices, ficulty for society in general and policy makers in particular is now to often referring back to energy security and developmental needs. decide which justice claims to prioritise. Here we turn to the concept of Oftentimes, local or even individual energy needs are tied back to an Just Transition and what it might offer to justice claims in the coal agenda of energy security, thus, discursively jumping scale and phase-out. 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