Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 107 (2023) 102125 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbee Climate policy versus growth concerns: Suggestions for economic research and communication Jeroen van den Bergh a, b, c, * a Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra 08192, Spain b ICREA, Barcelona 08010, Spain c School of Business and Economics & Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam 1081HV, The Netherlands A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T Keywords: Climate change has revived the old debate on growth-vs-environment. In view of lack of definitive evidence for Economic growth polarized pro- and anti-growth positions, I propose a different take on the debate which may provide new in­ Climate policy sights for designing climate policy to garner sufficient socio-political support. To this end, I explain a third Green growth position of being indifferent about economic growth – known as ‘agrowth’ – and argue it merits serious attention Degrowth Agrowth in education and research. In addition, I pay attention to how support for climate policy and views on growth- Behavioural biases versus-environment are connected in a dynamic way. Better understanding of this may help to reduce resistance against climate policy that is motivated by growth concerns. To this end I propose a new framework, namely the policy-support cycle, which can be formally elaborated through a set of connect models and procedures. I end with providing a set of recommendations for the economic profession regarding participation in current debates on climate policy versus economic growth. Behavioural considerations will appear throughout the discussion as opinions about economic growth and climate policy by all stakeholders – citizens, journalists, scientists and policymakers – tend to be mediated by a variety of behavioural biases. 1. Introduction reasons. Whereas the current high atmospheric CO2 concentration is mainly due to emissions by high-income countries, an increasing share Climate change has revived the debate on growth-versus- of future emissions will arise in middle-income countries – recognizing environment (Antal & van den Bergh, 2016; Fankhauser & Jotzo, that a considerable part of this will relate to production for exports to 2018; Jakob et al., 2020). This debate may intensify in coming decades high-income countries. Hence, both types of countries matter for miti­ or even years as the time window to limit global warming to 1.5–2 ◦ C gating climate change, even though it is evident that high-income closes. It is therefore important to connect research on climate-policy countries carry a larger responsibility. In addition, in middle-income design (Aldy et al., 2010; Rogge et al., 2017; van den Bergh et al., countries the friction between climate goals and growth, aimed at 2021) with the environmental-limits-to-growth debate (Mishan, 1977; reducing inequality and poverty, may become fiercer over time. Hence, de Mooij & van den Bergh, 2002), particularly its application to climate the debate on growth vs climate policy may play out differently than in change and decoupling CO2 emissions from growth. A key question here high-income countries (Hussein et al., 2013; Caetano et al., 2020; is how we can increase support for, and thus the political feasibility of, Soergel et al., 2021). Many middle-income countries are also expected to effective climate policies to considerably reduce greenhouse gas emis­ be hit hard by climate change due to their geographical location in arid sions, notably those taking the form of regulation and pricing. Currently, zones and limited economic and institutional capacity for adaptation concerns about economic growth contribute to not achieving majority (Burke et al., 2015; Dell et al., 2012, 2014; Lemoine & Kapnick, 2016; support for such policies. Indeed, decisions by many voters and politi­ Kalkuhlab & Wenz, 2020). This means climate change may severely cians indicate that they regard stringent climate policy as a high risk to depress their economic growth (Bowen et al., 2012; Millner & Dietz, future growth, i.e. an increase in real GDP (Gross Domestic Product). 2015). While in middle-income countries it may be possible to forego The debate about climate policy versus economic growth is relevant growth to prioritize climate targets, the story is different for low-income for not only high-income but also middle-income countries – for various countries as here poverty relief and meeting basic needs will inevitably * Correspondence to: Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra 08192, Spain. E-mail address: jeroen.bergh@uab.es. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2023.102125 Received 29 May 2023; Received in revised form 6 October 2023; Accepted 25 October 2023 Available online 26 October 2023 2214-8043/© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by- nc/4.0/). J. van den Bergh Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 107 (2023) 102125 go along with GDP growth (Adams, 2004; Škare & Družeta, 2016). the attention to persistent inequality at both national and global levels. There is a rich literature on the factors driving support for climate In essence, different contributions to this debate try to answer one or policy (Tobler et al., 2012; Rhodes et al., 2014, 2017; Drews & van den more of three key questions (De Mooij & van den Bergh, 2002): (1) Is Bergh, 2016a; Kyselá et al., 2019). It suggests three types of factors: (1) economic growth desirable (i.e. are there social/psychological limits)? social-psychological factors like political orientation, worldviews, (2) Is economic growth feasible (i.e. are there physical/biological knowledge about climate change, risk perceptions, and emotions like limits)? (3) Is economic growth controllable (i.e. are their limits to interest and hope; (2) the perception of (current or hypothetical) climate governance)? Since these questions have binary (yes/no) answers, in policy performance (regarding effectiveness, fairness or costs), and principle one can distinguish 23=8 positions. However, some combi­ preferences regarding policy design, such as pull versus push measures; nations of answers do not make much sense. Hence, de Mooij and van and (3) contextual factors, such as trust, norms and participation, eco­ den Bergh identify five core positions in the debate, labelled as: the nomic and geographical context, and information obtained from media immaterialist/moralist, pessimist, technocrat, opportunist/sceptic and and peers. Recent studies of policy acceptance concentrate on the rela­ optimist. Recently, this debate has been revived by the policy challenges tionship between carbon-tax support, use of tax revenues, and fairness of avoiding extreme climate change. In this context, three positions perceptions of distribution impacts (Klenert et al., 2018; Carattini et al., dominate: growth-optimist or a belief in green growth, anti- or 2019; Maestre-Andrés et al., 2019; Savin et al., 2020); others adopt a degrowth, and “agnostic agrowth” (for a detail comparison see van den broader view, considering communication strategies or presence of Bergh 2017). other policies (Rhodes et al., 2014; Carattini et al., 2018; Hagmann Growth-optimism, i.e. belief in green growth or decoupling emis­ et al., 2019; Douenne & Fabre, 2020; Maestre-Andrés et al., 2021). sions from growth, is often motivated by the fact that much growth in The previous literature on climate-policy support has not given the past was fuelled by innovations improving product quality or systematic and profound attention to the specific role of growth-vs- creating new functions, both encouraging purchase, i.e. being environment positions underlying climate-policy support and instru­ commercially attractive (e.g., Stern 2008, Bowen et al. 2012, Hallegatte ment preferences, nor to the associated co-dynamics of policy design and et al. 2012, GCEC 2014). This may not apply to low-carbon innovations, public opinion. This is surprising given that opinions tend to change over however, as these tend to be factor (i.e. energy/carbon) saving, which is time and perceptions of tensions between climate and growth goals are less attractive to commercial markets (van den Bergh, 2013). Moreover, common in public and political debates – reinforced by economic many so-called cleaner activities, including those driven by com­ downturns, such as recently triggered by the COVID-19 epidemic and puter/internet technology, indirectly rely on energy-intensive sectors. the invasion of Ukraine. It is important, therefore, that we deepen our Even production of renewable energy and electric-vehicle equipment understanding of how growth positions relate to climate-policy prefer­ will for the time being remain highly dependent on fossil-fuel energy, i. ences, and which information and strategies can alter them. Attention to e. until renewables dominate energy production (King & van den Bergh, the role of growth positions in the study of climate-policy support is 2018). Furthermore, a large-scale shift in R&D and capital investments warranted also as a low-carbon transition will be complicated if we fail to low-carbon research will crowd out investment in labour-productivity to weaken policy resistance driven by growth concerns. Rather than improvements – the very basis of economic growth. So at least during a assessing which growth position is right about decoupling CO2 emissions transition phase, economic growth could possibly result to be lower, from growth, it is useful to study how growth-vs-environment beliefs although this also depends on a series of other mechanisms (Smulders relate to dynamic support of climate policy and views on policy et al., 2014). Finally, global growth is significantly driven by low- and instruments. middle-income countries with a relatively high carbon intensity of The relationship between positions in the growth debate and opin­ production. In addition, the hypothesis of secular stagnation is relevant, ions on climate policy is not trivial. One can observe that many citizens/ i.e. mature economies showing decreasing growth rates over time due to voters, policymakers and politicians profess optimism about the possi­ a slowdown in technological progress and diminishing marginal returns bility of green growth. To illustrate, EIB (2022) finds that 56, 57 and 67 to human capital of education and labour division (Gordon, 2015, 2016; % of Europeans, UK and US citizens, and Chinese, respectively, express Teulings & Baldwin, 2014). An additional explanation may be that support for green growth. However, this often comes down to merely energy-return-on-investment (EROI) of energy sources, another pro­ paying lip service to green growth – witness the limited actual support duction factor, is decreasing (Hall, 2017). This could, in combination given to stringent environmental and climate policies. Such behaviour with the importance of energy for the economy (Ayres et al., 2013), poses challenges for research as it easily evades scrutiny and criticism, in translate into higher energy costs and lower growth. contrast to explicit resistance against climate policies or outright denial Some of these considerations have catalysed anti-growth sentiments. of climate change. As illustrated by Victor and Jackson (2012), another Popular accounts of it have recently been gathered under the label of form of paying lip service is found in research, namely when the terms “degrowth” (Kallis, 2011; Schneider et al., 2012; Klein, 2014; Hickel, “green growth” and “green economy” are used to denote scenarios that 2021). They suggest the need for “income and consumption degrowth”, never reach sustainable or zero-emission outcomes. “downsizing the economy” or “downscaling of production and con­ sumption”, strategies that likely would result in GDP decline. In fact, 2. Growth positions since degrowth proponents are sceptical of decoupling of GDP and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, they consider GDP decline as inevi­ The renewed battle between pro- and anti-growth proponents, table for achieving climate goals (Hickel & Kallis, 2020). The evidence driven by the urgency of climate solutions in a growing economy, is on decoupling is mixed, though, suggesting that for both production- taking place in academic journals, newspapers and social media plat­ and consumption-based emission indicators, a non-trivial number of forms. Although the confrontation results in interesting reading, it may (mainly developed) countries have decoupled in recent years (Haberl undercut democratic support for effective climate policy. et al., 2020; Hubacek et al., 2021). Of course, since decoupling may be The debate on growth versus the environment can be traced back to temporary, empirical studies can never deliver definite proof for the the writings of Malthus (1798) on food limits to wellbeing and popu­ (im)possibility of decoupling (Stern, 2004), which explains continuing lation growth. In the 20th century industrialization and mass con­ debate (e.g., Hickel and Hallegatte 2021). Another reason to be cautious sumption in the U.S.A. inspired Galbraith (1958) to write about social about claiming that decoupling is impossible or too slow, and suggest influence and status-seeking as a zero-sum game in terms of social anti-growth strategies in response, is that we have not yet tried out welfare. A little later, the limits-to-growth model study by Meadows, serious climate policies during an extended period of time, notably Meadows, Randers, and Behrens (1972) put resource and pollution stringent regulation and pricing with comprehensive emissions limits clearly on the agenda. Recent writings on degrowth have shifted coverage. Past studies, therefore, have limited relevance to clarify a 2 J. van den Bergh Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 107 (2023) 102125 future with such policies, which means one must be modest in making growth may alternate as long as there is progress in welfare terms. any claims about the future. Moreover, degrowth policies (Hickel et al., In terms of public policy, and climate policy in particular, agrowth is 2022) seem rather ad hoc and lack good evidence on their effectiveness not about proposing different policies or instruments but about getting and systemic effects (Savin & van den Bergh, 2023).1 Next, degrowth is support for, or weakening resistance to, (effective and stringent) climate often presented as an end instead of a means, which underrates the role policies that have already received much attention in academia and can of other than scale factors co-determining emissions, such as technology, count on considerable theoretical support and empirical evidence. By input mix, sector structure and demand composition. The feasible bal­ removing the constraint of “unconditional or always growth”, an ance of all these factors can only be explored by trying out serious agrowth position is likely to weaken public and political resistance climate policies. This is not to deny reverse causality, i.e. negative against climate and other environmental policies. Indeed, the removal of growth as a potential outcome of inevitable climate policies – which the constraint means the growth-test is no longer decisive for policy differs from degrowth as an end in itself. Finally, in the political spec­ support. trum of most countries, support for anti-growth and anti-capitalistic It would be useful to know whether different stakeholders (citizens, messages plays a marginal role – even among left-wing parties. Never­ experts/advisers, journalists, policymakers, NGOs) are open to change theless, general calls for less consumption or moving away from capi­ their opinions on growth vs climate policy. In particular, if their opinion talism, appeal to many people – witness frequent expressions of this kind is pro- or anti-growth, whether understanding of an agrowth strategy in popular and social media (e.g., Twitter – notably by Jason Hickel). could entice them to discard their current position; and to what extent The problem with these is that they are vague and do not guarantee this depends on knowledge, opinions and preferences about climate effective ways of reducing emissions, while they may have many un­ policy as well as opinions of peers. This would require analysis of foreseen negative social and economic effects. For effective emissions opinion dynamics. Whereas general factors of opinions like political reduction with minimal negative socio-economic side-effects policies views have received much attention already, belief in green growth is are needed that specifically target emissions and set systemic limits to found across the political spectrum, from right to left (Drews & van den them to avoid rebound. In addition, the response of degrowth to un­ Bergh, 2016b); moreover, growth opinions are not identical among solved climate change lacks a certain logic as the main problem is not stakeholder groups (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016b; Drews & van den that we are in doubt about effective policies (we know from theoretical Bergh, 2017). For these various reasons, growth opinions may well be and empirical studies what works) but such policies still lack sufficient easier to change by policies than factors like political views, likely voter and political support. To respond to this by suggesting radical and depending on other moderating factors. thus less politically feasible solutions, such as a move away from capi­ Empirical studies show that agrowth thinking can count on consid­ talism (whatever this precisely means), lacks logic. Instead, one should erable support from citizens (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016b; Tomaselli investigate social-political support of policies and try out different de­ et al., 2019), and more so from scientists (Drews & van den Bergh, signs or policy sequencing (Meckling et al., 2017). This is, however, not 2017), and other experts at the science-policy interface (Lehmann et al., a topic receiving serious attention in “degrowth research” so far (Savin 2022). It, moreover, is consistent with ideas proposed by others, e.g. & van den Bergh, 2023). Daly (1977), Victor (2019) and Jackson (2009, 2021). Indeed, while In sum, while unconditional pro-growth may be regarded as taking a these authors are critical of growth, they do not embrace a degrowth risk with the climate, categorical anti-growth is considered by many to position. Daly’s “steady state” seems not inconsistent with the agrowth be taking a risk with the economy. According to Jakob and Edenhofer perspective as it constrains the physical scale of the economy, not its (2014), this relates to either position not being embedded in a welfare monetary GDP dimension. However, from an environmental economics’ framework. Since, as argued, they also lack definite empirical support, position constraining the physical size of the economy is a rather blunt ultimately both positions very much rely on hope. strategy, less environmentally effective and less economically efficient than regulating with detailed standards and incentives. To illustrate, 3. Agrowth and beyond-GDP metrics enforcing less consumption overall will not guarantee the best approach to reduce emissions as some types of consumption contribute relatively A decade ago, I proposed a third position called “agrowth”, where much or little, so targeting these with specific instruments is more “a” denotes being “agnostic” about growth, motivated by GDP being far effective. In addition, Herman Daly’s proposal of an alternative measure from a robust indicator of welfare and progress (van den Bergh, 2011a). (ISEW) to replace the GDP matches well with an agrowth perspective This position moreover recognizes deep uncertainty impeding definite stressing to ignore GDP information (for more discussion of comparison answers to key questions in the environmental limits-to-growth debate, of agrowth with Daly’s and other ideas in ecological economics, see in turn complicating a rational ending of it. For example, there is un­ Section 3.4 in van den Bergh 2023). More recent writers on growth vs certainty about the feasibility and speed of decoupling GDP and certain environment, such as Victor (2019), stresses low growth; and Jackson environmental pressures (Jackson & Victor, 2019). Rather than denying (2021) recommends “post-growth” as balancing limits and aspiration. such uncertainties, it aims to tackle them head-on, through balancing Others employ this term as well – sometimes with a meaning close to precaution towards both climate and economy (van den Bergh, 2017, agrowth (Petschow et al., 2021; Lehmann et al., 2022), and in other 2018). An agrowth position means one can be concerned or critical cases as a synonym for degrowth (Hickel et al., 2021). about growth without this translating into a strict anti-growth position. Agrowth thinking denies the relevance of GDP (per capita) as the Instead, one rejects “unconditional/always growth” – what some call main indicator of societal welfare and progress (van den Bergh, 2009), “growthmania” (Mishan, 1967) or “growth fetishism” (Stiglitz, 2009). which logically translates into ignoring GDP information, rather than Under an agrowth strategy, periods with high, low or even negative striving for GDP to continually rise, decline or stay constant (“zero growth”). Agrowth means we would – without being aware, due to ignoring GDP – sacrifice some GDP growth in exchange for a better 1 environment, more equality or more leisure. To weaken preoccupation Oberholzer (2023) show that worktime reduction, a common advice from with GDP patterns, some suggest replacing GDP with a “beyond-GDP” degrowth proponents (Hickel et al., 2021, 2022), means a threat to macro­ metric, i.e. a progress indicator (set) that is as appealing as GDP but economic stability, while Malmaeus et al. (2020) finds that a universal basic more inclusive regarding environmental and social dimensions of income, another popular policy among degrowth proponents, is less compatible with a labour-intensive local self-sufficiency economy than with a progress (O’Neill, 2012; Neumayer, 2000; Costanza et al., 2014; Hoek­ capital-intensive, high-tech economy. In addition, Sorman and Giampietro stra, 2019; van den Bergh, 2022). A well-known example is the ISEW (2013) argue that degrowth studies ignore indirect effects of voluntary indicator developed by Daly and Cobb (1989). The argument is that by restraint. thus shifting attention away from GDP, one automatically becomes 3 J. van den Bergh Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 107 (2023) 102125 agnostic and indifferent about its growth, or at least will give less weight (2012). to it in evaluating societal progress. This facilitates political support of stringent climate and social/equity policies because they are no longer 4. Dynamics of linked opinions on climate policy and economic subject to the “GDP-growth test”. While there is a considerable literature growth on methodological scrutiny and comparison of beyond-GDP metrics (Bleys, 2012; Munda, 2013; Blanchet & Fleurbaey, 2013; van den Bergh Climate policy and growth opinions are connected in various ways. & Antal, 2014; Hoekstra, 2019), what is missing is research on their Preferences for instruments may correlate with those for growth posi­ communicative appeal as well as their potential for inclusion in policy tions: e.g., bans or personal carbon allowances seem to be popular modelling, along with perceived implications for evaluation of growth among degrowth proponents, whereas adoption subsidies tend to strategies and climate policy. In order to decide in which beyond-GDP receive more support from pro-growth proponents (Fuso Nerini et al., indicator to invest, policy-makers would do good to know more about 2021). In addition, some climate policies may be perceived as affecting which of these can count on positive responses from relevant stake­ economic growth differently than others: e.g., regulatory policies tend to holders. In addition, they should have information about which of these be seen as limiting production or making it more expensive, hence indicators are well understood, and whether they can genuinely replace constraining growth; but innovation policies are widely considered as GDP and thus reduce its subtle dominance in political debate and de­ initiating new technological pathways that contribute to economic cisions. So more research on these issues is urgent as it may well be the growth. A third connection is that preferences about general climate case that ambitious climate policies are impossible until we “dethrone” solutions, such as demand-side changes or technological innovation, GDP (Costanza, 2014). Only then we can implement an agrowth strat­ likely depend on how they affect growth and emissions; but their ulti­ egy. Table 1 provides a list of motivations to support it. For a systematic mate impacts vary with the type of policy triggering the changes. To comparison – on multiple statements or criteria – of agrowth with illustrate, the effectiveness of energy-efficiency improvements depends pro-growth and degrowth, see Table 1 in van den Bergh and Kallis strongly on whether a policy is in place to limit energy/carbon rebound effects (Freire-Gonzáles, 2020); if not, one must count on considerably higher macrolevel energy use and emissions (Brockway, Sorrell, Semi­ Table 1 eniuk, Heun, & Court, 2021). Another example relates to renewable Main reasons to support an agrowth position. energy, which is a more effective climate solution if it substitutes for 1. GDP is not a good measure of social welfare and progress. It thus should not fossil fuels rather than drives growing energy demand. However, this increase or decrease; instead, it should be ignored, which automatically leads to requires not only pull measures like adoption subsidies and innovation the agrowth position. support but also serious regulation and pricing of fossil fuels (Gugler 2. The previous point implies “against growth fetishism” but not “against growth”, a et al., 2021). In fact, the historical absence and weakness of the latter subtle but important distinction. Sometimes growth may be an outcome of good policies in social, economic and environmental domains, in other situations not. explains the finding of York (2012) that globally over the previous fifty There is no need for dogma, whether of an anti-, pro- or zero-growth type. It is more years, energy use from non-fossil-fuel sources displaced on average less rational to be indifferent about growth and focus on well-being, distribution and than one-quarter of fossil-fuel energy use. Against this broad back­ environment. ground, developing a good understanding of stakeholder positions on 3. A beyond-GDP indicator is likely to sketch a very different picture, irrespective of growth vs climate policy, including perceptions of the effectiveness of whether GDP grows much or little or whether it stagnates. It is unlikely to generally suggest growth or degrowth as a good welfare strategy for a society. specific policy instruments, will help to find a balance between effec­ 4. There is high uncertainty about whether we can achieve an absolute decoupling of tiveness (emissions reduction) and support. GDP and environmental pressure (also accounting for climate solutions shifting To move beyond subjective opinions and speculation, there is a clear environmental problems). Pessimism is understandable given little progress on need to develop empirical models that allow comparison between pro, environmental and climate solutions, but we still have not tried out serious policies (supported by scientific arguments, theory, modelling and evidence), which is a de- and agrowth strategies and related policy proposals. This could be reason for moderate optimism. realized by designing models in such a way that they generate a variety 5. There are socio-economic risks associated with radical degrowth solutions as we of beyond-GDP metrics. We can then use the models to test if combi­ have no experience with them and little scientific rigorous study to understand nations of growth strategies and climate policies perform differently on their implications. Instead, it seems wiser to focus on traditional policies (regula­ these metrics. Current climate policy studies lack such metrics, and tion and pricing) that are shown by theory and empirics to work well. This suggests focusing attention on how to increase political support for these. It may require moreover often assume continued growth. Moreover, few models have more cooperation among the various policy sciences to assure that experts and systematically and in a robust manner studied degrowth proposals advisors start speaking with more shared knowledge and unanimity. (D’Alessandro, 2020; Keyßer & Lenzen, 2021). Among others, this re­ 6. Many developed economies show secular stagnation, and generally the growth rate quires including both markets and social networks in models as distinct seems to steadily go down the more mature is an economy. In view of this, we may want to temper our expectations about future growth, for specific countries as well policies operate through different channels, which may moreover drive as for the world as a whole. Such a position of “relax about growth” is consistent synergistic effects (Konc et al., 2021). Ultimately, one could model what with agrowth. I call the “policy-support cycle” (PSC) as visualized by Fig. 1. It covers 7. An agrowth position will reduce resistance against climate and other policy design, impact measured by beyond-GDP metrics, opinion­ environmental policies as the growth-test is no longer decisive. This means the s/support, and finally adaptation of the current policy. Through search space for societal progress and associated social, economic and environ­ mental policies will be larger. As opposed, growth targets restrict this space. modelling the PSC one could identify pathways of opinion dynamics that 8. Green growth has turned out to be cheap talk as it has not led to stringent policies – guarantee support for pathways of policy dynamics resulting in stringent many of its proponents pay only lip-service to the concept as their revealed pref­ effective policy to reduce emissions considerably. erences do not show a deep belief in it. So, embracing green growth is no guarantee Note that this PSC differs from the “policy cycle” notion of policy for solving urgent environmental problems. It just hides genuine motivations of giving priority to the economy. An agrowth position instead allows better to bal­ sciences (which has a variety of interpretations; see Jann and Wegrich ance economy and environment. 2007). The latter is more about the administrative phases of agenda 9. Degrowth talk is likely to scare most citizens and voters as it suggests that we must setting, implementation/administration and evaluation. The PSC also make a huge sacrifice for environmental sustainability. Most people will be differs from policy dynamics, experimentation and learning as elabo­ unwilling to do this – witness majority voting around the world. One can also not rated in transition studies (Sengers et al., 2019; van Mierlo & Beers, expect people or individual countries to support big sacrifices – this denies the public-good nature of climate solutions which invites for free riding. Hence, 2020), energy policy research (Schimidt & Sewerin, 2019) or policy degrowth is not a strategy that can create large political support for effective sciences (Howlett et al., 2018). PSC links a bit to the idea of “policy climate policy. It is important to gradually move people away from dogmatic sequencing” to garner political support (Meckling et al., 2017). Different growth targets (=agrowth) but it is unrealistic to expect that a majority of voters policy phases are further distinguished in sustainability transition support an anti-growth perspective. studies (Geels et al., 2017; van den Bergh et al., 2020). Evidently, other 4 J. van den Bergh Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 107 (2023) 102125 many social contacts which often have relatively high incomes. Finally, the choice of social network topologies (small world, scale-free, etc.) in the analysis would be different for distinct stakeholders and can rely on insights of previous studies on opinion dynamics (Jackson, 2010; Ace­ moglu & Ozdaglar, 2011; Moussaïd et al., 2013; Grabisch & Rusi­ nowska, 2020), voting (Gilens & Page, 2014), lobbying (Grey, 2018) and norms (Allo & Loureiro, 2014). A final step is to design policy-adaptation rules, to test what works best for maintaining effectiveness and support. This can involve strengthening or weakening initial policies such as standards or levies, but also adding instruments such as information provision and adoption subsidies, or revenue recycling to specific social groups to break policy resistance or extend support. Research could identify what policy adaptation has been popular in the past (e.g., Schmidt and Sewerin 2019). In addition, through interviews with relevant policy-makers, it could assess what options there are for future policy adaptation and longer term dynamic policy paths. The resulting approach could be used to test which beyond-GDP metrics are able to foster a co-dynamic path of opinions and policy design that results in a stringent and effective climate policy needed for deep decarbonization. 5. Biases in opinion formation Fig. 1. A schematic representation of the policy-support cycle. Bounded rationality and social influence affect all stakeholders, whether citizens, voters, journalists, lobbyists, business managers, pol­ aspects matter to policy support and political complexity, such as icymakers or politicians. The resulting behavioural regularities of consensus building, community mobilization, temporal dominance of stakeholders matter in many ways for the debate on climate policy non-environmental topics, power issues or sector lobbying (Ingram versus economic growth. For example, it is easy to overestimate the et al., 2007; Bardach, 2011; Cairney, 2021). importance of GDP and growth, to overestimate average past growth, or To elabore or operationalize this PSC, one first needs to assess the to misunderstand how distinct policy instruments perform on criteria socio-economic and emission impacts of the three growth strategies and like effectiveness, efficiency, equity and potential for global harmoni­ associated climate policies using distinct beyond-GDP metrics (Bleys, zation. It becomes even more complex if one considers policy mixes or 2012; van den Bergh, 2022). Comparative analysis of beyond-GDP packages that involve complementarity and positive or negative synergy metrics is a logical response to progress indicators being contested as among instruments. Since the literature does not offer a coherent view part of the growth-vs-environment debate (Botzen & van den Bergh, (Jaffe et al., 2005; Antal & van den Bergh, 2013; Kern & Rogge, 2018; 2014; Jakob & Edenhofer, 2014; Bleys & Whitby, 2015; Mill­ Geels, 2020; van den Bergh et al., 2021; Fitzpatrick et al., 2022), this ward-Hopkins et al., 2020; van der Slycken & Bleys, 2020). The result is issue is difficult to judge for stakeholders, including journalists and insight into the differential performance of growth strategies, and policymakers. For all these reasons, the connection between climate associated climate policies, on specific beyond-GDP metrics used to policy and economic growth may be easily misinterpreted. measure something that approximates genuine progress better than Scientists in their role as policy advisor are supposed to reflect the GDP. Such work can build on previous model studies of low growth most rational and logical side of humans and thus should aim – through impacts (Victor, 2008,2019; Jackson & Victor, 2020; D’Alessandro frank interaction and ongoing debate – to minimize biases and fallacies et al., 2020; Keyßer & Lenzen, 2021). in their work. Unfortunately, one can identify various behavioural biases A second step would be to develop a model of opinion dynamics, and logical fallacies that apply to human judgment in general (Dhami & likely using agent-based modelling (ABM) with a social network (Castro Sunstein, 2022; Hamblin, 2004) as well as in scientific debates (Grimes, et al., 2020; Will, Groeneveld, Frank, & Müller, 2020), to study opinion 2021), including about economic growth and climate policy. I illustrate dynamics about growth and climate policy, and their interdependence. this below focusing on carbon pricing. This could be done for one stakeholder (e.g., voters) or multiple (e.g., One can easily detected confirmation bias and cherry-picking in also NGOs, business lobbies, journalists and policy-makers). Such a writings on both green growth and degrowth, or in opinion or even model could describe a process of opinion initialization informed by research papers on climate policy. An illustration of the first is the view exogenous emission, economic, and social impacts of a policy, based on commonly expressed by degrowth proponents that evidence shows that (heterogenous) individual weights for each impact; followed by decoupling of GDP and CO2 emissions is impossible. However, one can repeated and mutual social influence in a network until opinions imagine it is possible if we go large scale into renewables (even though converge. First exercises of this type were undertaken by van den Bergh during a transition these will require still considerable fossil-fuel support et al. (2019) and by Konc et al. (2022). The innovation would be to to create the renewable infrastructure). Moreover, the evidence is sup­ include the information influence of beyond-GDP indicators on opin­ posedly the lack of decoupling in the past – but this is without stringent ions. This approach will also allow to study how income distribution and effective climate policies. Until we have experimented well with affects opinion dynamics, in two ways: first, through impacts on overall such policies, one cannot say decoupling has been disproven. The consumption and emissions which are mediated by income distribution empirical evidence only shows that decoupling is not possible with weak as low and high income housholds consume differently; this then affects policies – hardly a surprise. One underexamined complication may be the input to the opinion dynamics; and second, through correlation of that of environmental problem shifting, i.e. climate mitigation leading income and social influence, which affects the opinion dynamics to reinforcement of other environmental problems through solutions themselves (Pena-López et al., 2021). An illustration of the impact of that themselves involve polluting practices or depend on materials that income distribution is found in Konc et al. (2022), who find, among are harmful in mining, use or waste phases (van den Bergh et al., 2015). others, that transfers to low-income households often result in limited An example of cherry-picking is the reiteration by critics of carbon policy support as social influence is mainly driven by households with pricing that resulting prices have remained low and inequitable – which 5 J. van den Bergh Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 107 (2023) 102125 ignores the high prices of the EU-ETS and literature recommendation as carbon pricing explicit may seem confrontational. But perhaps it is the well as recent practice (e.g., several provinces in Canada) to use reve­ only way to become aware of them and improve the quality of science nues for inequity compensation. Many critics also ignore the rich liter­ and scientific debate. I call for the participants in climate-policy and atures on theoretical and empirical studies of carbon pricing as well as growth debates to avoid quick judgments (Kahneman, 2011), interact the older related literature on energy taxes (van den Bergh & Savin, more with other disciplines and become better informed about the basic 2021). They further suggest that political feasibility is low as if it con­ theoretical and empirical literature supporting instruments. It is more­ cerns an absolute law, downplaying the many studies that show over vital that everyone is transparent about the key criteria they carbon-pricing design, rising-tax or falling-cap schedules, revenue employ and how in this light they judge the performance of the main schemes and information provision can help raising support. Critics types of policy instruments. often are considerably less critical, or even optimistic, about certain other policies rather than apply the same set of evaluation criteria 6. Recommendations for the role of the economic profession in consistently to all policies or instruments. In addition, they often seem to relevant debates expect that a narrow focus of climate policy, such as on innovation policy or regulation through standards, can result in deep decarbon­ Economists could do a better job in debates on climate policy versus isation. They do this without providing evidence, which – ironically – economic growth and in motivating climate policy, notably carbon they (incorrectly) argue is missing for carbon pricing. This optimistic pricing. To start with the latter, they could discuss a broader set of ar­ view is also reflected in neglecting that other instruments than carbon guments rather than focusing on efficiency and cost-effectiveness – not pricing tends to result in higher rebound effects. In addition, behav­ denying the importance of these. Among others, economists could stress ioural biases like loss aversion and endowment effect tend to contribute more that the aim of carbon pricing is not generating public revenues to more support for (adoption) subsidies than (carbon) taxes, since but changing behaviours towards low-carbon choices, namely by regu­ “losses loom larger than gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kahneman lating or altering relative prices of high- and low-carbon alternatives in et al., 1990). the entire economy. The reason is that many non-economists misun­ Disciplinary bias sure also plays a role due to discipline-specific derstand the difference between regulating and revenue-generating mental models of the world, such as giving less importance to markets taxes or pricing, and in line with this think the main purpose of car­ than to social movements. Social norms in one’s network of colleague bon pricing is generating revenues to finance so-called “climate pro­ researchers may play a role in this regard as such norms – backed by jects” to reduce emissions (Maestre-Andrés et al., 2021). Economists negative/positive reactions from colleagues – can impede individuals to should also stress more that carbon pricing can function as the most adopt an opinion that goes against the majority in the discipline. Many effective instrument for emissions reduction, due to its systemic impact scientists tend to be unsystematic and incomplete in accounting for how which discourages both direct and indirect emissions in the complex instruments compare and perform on multiple criteria (efficiency, web of economic production and consumption relationships, with the effectiveness, equity and global harmonization). They also tend to crucial consequence that all kinds of rebound effects are limited as the neglect indirect emission and systemic effects. cost rise due to pricing discourages decisions underlying these effects. A recurring argument of critics, namely that carbon pricing is not With regard to climate policy versus economic growth, economists well implemented and lacks sufficient political support, overlooks that could take more distance from pro- and green growth stories. The evi­ unfounded criticism can in fact weaken such support. One could there­ dence for these is, like the evidence for decoupling not being possible, fore ask the critics to fight for better implementation of, and creating weak. Hence, an agnostic position in the form of agrowth is warranted. more support for, carbon pricing rather than succumb to non-systemic Many economist and climate policy experts have expressed sympathy and thus ineffective instruments. Finally, it is worth mentioning the with it in personal communication, resulting recently in writing together anecdotal fallacy as echoed by giving a lot of weight to the singular an EU research proposal. For a less polarized debate it would be good if Yellow Vest protest, or as reflected in studies by researchers from the more economists would become aware of this third position and express USA focusing on resistance to carbon pricing at home while ignoring their views on it. This is especially timely given widespread perceptions success stories in other countries. of strong friction between continued growth and climate solutions – and One also gets the impression that both strong beliefs in green growth as discussed in previous sections, perceptions matter for public support and degrowth are founded on a lack of deep understand of challenges of climate policies. An agrowth position, being less radical and recog­ and policy features to solve climate change. For instance, it is easy to nizing both economic and environmental risks, might contribute to less believe in green growth until one sees the challenges in terms of annual concern about economic growth and thus less opinion polarization; this improvement of carbon or energy productivity versus past achieve­ could help getting a political majority for tough climate policies. Post­ ments. Or it is easy to believe that less consumption is the key, until one growth is a too cryptic and geographically biased concept (e.g., most realized that it is a vague concept (less in money, volume, kgs?) and that popular in Germany, less so in other countries); it easily lends itself to instead policies should discourage high-carbon consumption. This re­ multiple interpretations, including degrowth and agrowth (Jackson, quires more education and information about traditional climate policy 2009; Antal, 2014; Petschow et al., 2021; Lehmann et al., 2022), which instruments – notably regulation and pricing. Many degrowth pro­ is not helpful for transparent and productive debate. This does, of ponents show instead more interest in radical solutions or strategies that course, not deny that there may be useful ideas in publications using the are more oriented towards welfare and justice than effectiveness of term post-growth. emissions reduction (e.g., worktime reduction, free public transport or Regarding behavioural dimensions, economists could give more universal basic income). But they do this before giving a chance to more attention to the diverse bounded rationalities of the various stake­ traditional instruments and looking into the wide theoretical and holders, such as consumers, voters, policymakers, journalists, NGOs and empirical support for these. It would also be interesting to know what business lobbies. Public choice theory offers basic insights, but these distinct stakeholders think about the agrowth position and “agrowth would need to have to be applied with relevant details to the context of measures”, such as good practices in education, journalism, policy­ climate policymaking. Developing more insights about this could making and politics regarding the acceptance of GDP shortcomings, possibly benefit other areas of policy studied by economists, such as moderating (excessive) growth expectations, avoiding misuse of termi­ related to labour, health, transport, safety and well-being in general nology (GDP growth as “progress”, new technologies as “zero-carbon”), (Walker et al., 2021). and resisting the automatism of giving priority to growth over climate Finally, it would be good if climate policy and the complicated and inequality. challenges and debates, including about growth-versus-environment, Making these various potential biases and fallacies of critics on occupy a more central role in economic education. It seems this topic 6 J. van den Bergh Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 107 (2023) 102125 is still at the margin, whereas future generations will be confronted with Bleys, B., & Whitby, A. (2015). 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