Political Geography 105 (2023) 102925 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Political Geography journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo Full Length Article The “Greening” of Empire: The European Green Deal as the EU first agenda Diana Vela Almeida a, b, *, Vijay Kolinjivadi c, Tomaso Ferrando d, Brototi Roy e, f, Héctor Herrera c, Marcela Vecchione Gonçalves g, Gert Van Hecken c a Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 8, 3584 CS, Utrecht, the Netherlands b Department of Geography, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, NO-7491, Trondheim, Norway c Institute of Development Policy (IOB), University of Antwerp, Prinsstraat 13, 2000, Antwerpen, Belgium d Faculty of Law (Law and Development Research Group), and Institute of Development Policy (IOB), University of Antwerp, Venusstraat 7, 2000, Antwerpen, Belgium e Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals (ICTA-UAB), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain f Department of Environmental Science and Policy, Central European University, Vienna, Austria g Centre for Advanced Amazonian Studies (NAEA), Federal University of the State of Pará, Av.Perimetral, N.1, Cidade Universitária do Guamá, Belém, Pará, Brazil A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T Keywords: The recent past has seen the proposal of multiple ‘Green New Deals’ across geographies as a means to fight European green deal against the climate crisis and ecological breakdown. Of these, the European Green Deal- EGD represents the Green transition world’s first public commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions of at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 Climate change levels. Because the EGD plans to “transform the EU,” in this paper we examine how it fits within a historical Europe continuum of colonial and neo-colonial relations. We argue that the EGD is the latest discursive strategy for the Climate neutrality ‘greening’ of empire through four registers: (1) turning ecological crises into profitable opportunities; (2) por­ traying the EU as a ‘moral’ intervener; (3) building on a ‘green’ “will to improve”; and (4) securitizing and consolidating the empire. We find how the EU acts in key policy arenas of diplomacy, trade and investment leading to the ‘greening’ of the empire that ensures its continued economic and political leadership while fundamentally maintaining a status quo. We conclude with some reflections on the role of the EU to cede place to other possibilities of building anti-colonial ecologies. 1. Introduction grassroots initiatives such as the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth (22 April 2010), the Green New In the recent past, proposals for “Green New Deals” (GND) have Deal For Europe (DiEM25, 2019), the Latin American Pacto Ecosocial del emerged as comprehensive policy packages involving states, civil soci­ Sur (2020) and the Red Deal (Nation, 2021). ety, and private actors in the fight against climate change and ecological The EGD was presented as the world’s first public state-led commit­ breakdown. In many cases, these Deals involve considerable public in­ ment to climate neutrality. According to the European Commission, the vestment and focus on green jobs and dignified living conditions EU Green Deal (henceforth EGD) aims to reduce EU net domestic pro­ (Aronoff et al., 2019; Mastini et al., 2021). Around the world, ‘green’ duction of greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared Keynesian approaches to climate change have been advanced by policy to 1990 levels and attain climate neutrality by 2050 (European makers and environmental groups alike, with contents being adapted to Commission-EC, 2019a). For the European Commission (EC), the EGD is political contingencies and pressures (Ajl, 2021; Mastini et al., 2021; “… Europe’s structural response and new growth strategy that sets out Tienhaara and Robinson, 2022). These Deals have not only been dis­ ambitions to transform the EU into a modern, resource-efficient, and cussed in the Global North, with the United Kingdom, the European competitive economy” (EC, 2019). The multi-pronged plan covers an Union (EU), the United States and Canada at the forefront of ‘green re­ array of policies, premised on the common goal of boosting ‘green’ covery’ policies, but have also been at the centre of policy proposals in economic growth (recently repackaged as ‘post-COVID recovery’), and China and South Korea (Leonard et al., 2021; Yoon, 2021) and its commitment for decarbonization, dematerialization and decoupling * Corresponding author. Copernicus Institute of Sustainable Development Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 8, 3584 CS, Utrecht, the Netherlands. E-mail addresses: d.r.velaalmeida@uu.nl (D. Vela Almeida), vijaykrishnan.kolinjivadi@uantwerpen.be (V. Kolinjivadi), tomaso.ferrando@uantwerpen.be (T. Ferrando), brototi.roy@uab.cat (B. Roy), hector.herrera@uantwerpen.be (H. Herrera), mvecchione@ufpa.br (M. Vecchione Gonçalves), gert.vanhecken@ uantwerpen.be (G. Van Hecken). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2023.102925 Received 30 September 2021; Received in revised form 25 August 2022; Accepted 2 June 2023 Available online 7 July 2023 0962-6298/© 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by- nc-nd/4.0/). D. Vela Almeida et al. Political Geography 105 (2023) 102925 economic growth from carbon emissions and other ecological impacts. second majority party Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the center Above all, the EGD is about forging a more resource-efficient and pro-European with the third majority party: Renew, and the progressive technologically advanced EU economy that not only reinforces its po­ forces coalition Greens/EFA (Legislative Observatory of the European sition as a global economic leader, but also better distinguishes the bloc Parliament, 2020). Contrary to other climate initiatives, parliamentar­ geopolitically from competing actors in a globalized world. ians from The Left did not support the Deal because of their criticism of Despite the enthusiastic engagement, the mainstream focus on the carbon policies being reliant on market mechanisms. On the other side EGD misses a consideration for the social and ecological effects that the of the ideological spectrum, the European Conservatives and Reformists promotion of “eco-conscious” economies in Europe implies elsewhere, Group coalition mobilized against the EGD because of the possible im­ particularly how they generate what Zografos and Robbins (2020) call plications on jobs, businesses and farms (Stegrud, 2020). One of the “green sacrifice zones” located beyond the boundaries of Europe. Also most contested aspects of the proposal revolved around establishing missing is a serious engagement with the historical unevenness of binding national targets in future energy legislation, which received a Europe’s contribution to ecological breakdown as being inseparably narrow majority of 51% of members supporting the targets and exposing twinned with its colonial legacies abroad and how such legacies are a divide between conservative and progressive camps (Europe Jacqes reproduced through a universal approach to a ‘green’ transition. In this Delors, Notre Europe Jacqes Delors Notre Europe Vote Watch Europe, article, we critically assess both its continuity with the colonial past and 2021). its global epistemic and material implications for the future. Particu­ Although in purely legal terms the EGD is a communication by the EC larly, we are interested in unpacking how non-European societies and -an instrument of soft-law-, its content, guidelines and targets inform a economies are brought into the EGD’s radar as territories to be subjected multiplicity of EU and national actions (Sikora, 2021) (See Fig. 1 for a to its ‘greener’ policymaking, trade and investment strategies. complete set of EGD policies). This means the EGD is not technically While not aiming to reduce the EU’s ethical position to a homoge­ binding, but derivative laws will produce legal effects through imple­ nized and non-shifting prescription, we look at the EGD as a regime mentation by each Member State. The key areas EGD Strategic Frame­ imbricated in colonial and neo-colonial motivations viewing peripheral work include: (1) Climate ambition for 2030 and 2050, which focuses on countries and societies as policy deficient, climatically unambitious and carbon pricing; (2) Clean, affordable and secure energy; (3) Industrial in need of ‘capacity-building’ for sustainability and development strategy for a clean and circular economy; (4) Sustainable and smart (Rutazibwa, 2010). Our aim is to explore how the pro-growth orienta­ mobility; (5) Greening the Common Agricultural Policy/“Farm to Fork tion of the EGD reproduces a colonial and capitalist ecology by deepening strategy”; (6) Preserving and protecting biodiversity; (7) Zero pollution the hegemony of resource imperialism and in greening a historically ambition for a toxic free environment; (8) mainstreaming sustainability Euro-centered empire. By ‘empire’, we refer to the implementation of an in all EU policies (including trade and foreign policy); (9) positioning the economic, social, and cognitive order historically birthed through vio­ EU as a global leader, and (10) European Climate Pact (EC, 2019a). All lent colonial subjugation by Western European powers, and subse­ measures involve a combination of EU and national actions, and heavily quently constituted and defended by multinational corporations, draw on market mechanisms. multilateral trading and military arrangements, global financial and Within these areas, specific Strategies, Action Plans, and Laws have trade institutions, among others (Hardt & Negri, 2000; Wood, 2003). been issued defining objectives and identifying more specific initiatives Empire here also refers to the unspoken hegemony of the modernizing to achieve them, all under the paradigmatic umbrella of the Deal. So far, project, which involves the structural imposition of a universal about 20 strategic documents have been adopted as part of the EGD Euro-centric system of knowledge (Ngugi wa Thiong’o, 2005; Ndlovu-­ Strategic Framework. Recent policies are the Circular Economy Action Gatsheni, 2021). This manifests in the case of the EGD through the Plan (implemented on March 11, 2020), the EU Biodiversity Strategy for obfuscation of ecological crisis and climate debt, while foreclosing 2030 and the Farm to Fork Strategy (both implemented on May 20, grounded social and political struggles, and the actors that work on their 2020), the Action on Critical Raw Materials Supply (implemented on behalf, as new recipients of EU technical expertise. September 29, 2020) and the European Climate Law (implemented on In the next section, we describe the origins, design, and core ele­ 30 June 2021). Along with this, the EGD will require significant in­ ments of the EGD. In the third section, we identify four registers vestments, with an estimated 260 billion euros a year (about 1.5% of EU, deployed in public discourses and policies that define the “greening” of 2018 GDP) to achieve the 2030 climate and energy targets. Climate and empire by: (1) making ecological crises profitable opportunities; (2) environmental risks of these investments will require public and private portraying the EU as ‘moral’ intervener; (3) building on a ‘green’ will to to be integrated into the financial system, notably through the European improve; and (4) securitizing and consolidating economic interests. We Green Deal Investment Plan launched in 2020 (EC 2019b). complement each of these registers with specific examples drawn from The EGD is not limited to Europe. It is also officially accompanied by the EGD policies. To do this, we discursively analyzed press releases, climate diplomacy and the redefinition of international trade and carbon policies, statements, webinars and communications related to the EGD tariffs, and transnational investment relationships (European Climate to elaborate a critique of three key policy arenas that underpin the EGD Foundation, n.d.). The ‘global turn’ of the EGD allows the EU to reinvent at a geopolitical level: ‘green’ diplomacy, ‘green’ financialization, and itself, amidst competition from global actors, and deploy an “eco-­ the ‘greening’ of trade and access to raw materials. We conclude by friendly” narrative. Much in line with its foreign relations more gener­ proposing questions for future research that reframe Green Deals in ally, this allows the EU to inject “a sense of moral responsibility and favour of alternative, anti-colonial ecologies. ethical concern in all areas of its international relations as well as in the domestic affairs” of the countries it intervenes in (Rutazibwa, 2010, p. 2. EGD: origins, design and core elements 210). In the following section, we further assess how the EGD encom­ passes a distinctive set of narratives that are translated to a set of policies The EGD was presented in 2019 as the European Union’s hallmark with specific material consequences beyond the EU’s borders. for a comprehensive strategic package to prevent the planet from “being polluted and destroyed” (EC, 2019a: 2). The EGD proposal was designed 3. The “greening” of empire by a team led by Frans Timmersmans as Executive Vice President of the EC for the EGD. It was presented as a communication to the European To understand the material and cognitive consequences of the EGD Parliament and adopted as a Joint Resolution by majority on January as a futuristic vision, it is essential to revisit what European moral 15, 2020. (European Parliament Press Release, 2020). The Deal was standing and managerial agenda has historically meant for the rest of the supported by the parliamentary coalitions comprised of the center-right world. In the course of over 500 years, the world has been driven by a and majority party European People’s Party (EPP), the center-left and European-initiated civilizational project fundamentally premised upon 2 D. Vela Almeida et al. Political Geography 105 (2023) 102925 Fig. 1. Set of policies derived from the EGD. capitalist value creation and circulation through colonization of lands, economic expansion is viewed as aspirational under the oft-claimed bodies, knowledge-systems, and imaginaries (Naylor et al., 2018; Qui­ guise of “efficiency improvements.” The second is when ecological jano, 2000; Tzouvala, 2020). Galeano (1971) and Rodney (1972) both breakdown is recast as risk prevention (e.g. Scoones & Stirling, 2020, pp. masterfully illustrated the ways that poor nations were deliberately 1–30) and perceived as a threat to the security of continuing an “im­ exploited by European-US-centered rule in a concerted effort that perial mode of living” (Brand & Wissen, 2017). combined asymmetrical power politics, cultural norms of what ‘prog­ The design and implementation of the EGD inherits this eurocentric ress’ and ‘civilization’ refers to; the imposition of legal and institutional vision for the future of the world by building on the imposition of a infrastructure as well as asymmetrical terms of economic trade policy. renewed round of direct and indirect geopolitical power amidst global The European colonial and capitalist empire pushed a cultural and ecological collapse. On the one hand, the EU attempts to cement itself as socio-economic shift that replicated universal truths about the world’s climate leader. On the other hand, the EU willingly fails to human-nature relations, whereby production systems centered on seriously confront its own imperialistic institutional and economic primitive accumulation and the exploitation for mass commodity pro­ baggage that deeply circumvents truly sovereign political projects the duction (Federici, 2014; Mies, 2001). To this end, the independence of world over. By replicating its stance as global leader, colonial legacies former colonies to the European powers meant very little in terms of and debates on climate/ecological debt and historical reparations are continuing the siphoning of wealth, labour, and knowledge from conveniently silenced. Instead, the EU opts to maintain these uneven resource frontiers to be accumulated in European and North American relations in service of greenwashed notions like decarbonization, urban centers (Ferdinand, 2019; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2021). It is this dematerialization, and decoupling economic growth from socio continuation of unequal exchange that severs the regenerative capacities ecological impacts (Hickel & Kallis, 2020) - none of which have occurred of the planet and exacerbates ecological disorder (Hornborg, 2009). in absolute terms (Haberl et al., 2020). We contend that by strategically Science and technological innovation have played a pivotal role in overlooking colonial relations of power and ‘sacrifice zones’, these constructing this economic blueprint, while violently categorizing and policies and actions reinforce invasive and ultimately anti-ecological subjugating Indigenous Peoples, women and children as slaves and un­ logics, maintaining and reinforcing unequal development. derpaid workers (Galeano, 1971; Moore, 2015; Rodney, 1972). Analyses Recent studies have focused on how the EGD proposal reproduces of material, energy, land, and labour flows around the world illustrate racial and colonial injustices and suppresses alternative voices and how high-income countries overwhelmingly continue to appropriate proposals from within and beyond the EU by placing the demands of the embodied labour and resources to generate, own and circulate monetary subalterns beyond the realm of political possibility (Equinox, 2021; surplus today through uneven ecological exchange (Dorninger et al., Samper et al., 2021). In this article, we discuss how the ‘greening’ of the 2021; Infante-Amate et al., 2020). It cannot be emphasized enough that empire takes form through a range of narratives and strategies that this uneven relation is not simply attributable to some nations being employ regulatory power, depend on geopolitical sanctions and exercise better at accumulating surplus value; it is a by-design vestige of colonial the soft power of moral standing to frame urgency and direct the exploits which continues to not just maintain but reinforce a capitalistic response to address climate change. We describe these nuanced forms of uneven development predicated on both white supremacy and patriar­ legitimization for ‘greening’ empire through four registers in the rest of chy (Amin, 2009; Arboleda, 2020; Escobar, 1995). this section (see Fig. 2 for a summary of registers). At the same time, eurocentric hegemony acts as a foreclosure of In characterizing these registers, we provide direct examples of how alternative ways of being and thinking to manage or tweak existing the EGD advances each in specific ways. While we have described the economic models, but never to openly contest them, under two cir­ registers of ‘greening’ empire as being distinct categories with distinct cumstances. The first is when the cheapness of resource inputs for examples, they more often function as a cohesive strategy within the 3 D. Vela Almeida et al. Political Geography 105 (2023) 102925 Fig. 2. The four registers of ‘green’ empire. EGD. We draw upon secondary data and public quotations by EGD rounds of managerial intervention serves as new profitable opportu­ policy architects to illustrate the ways in which EGD attempts to ‘green’ nities and the cycle continues ad nauseum (Ross, 2017). the EU’s influence in terms of global trade, diplomacy, finance and access Ecological crises are not simply emergent challenges, but the direct to raw materials. We selected these policy areas because they reflect the outcome of the colonial and capitalist project. Yet, these crises get four registers presented before and they are inspired by the geopolitical strategically repackaged as isolated technical and thoroughly depoliti­ position of the EU in framing its relations to other societies and econo­ cized externalities for humankind, particularly when they can be mies globally.1 While our aim is not to discuss all components of the leveraged to generate new flows of surplus value and speculative returns EGD, we illustrate how some of the Deal’s principle programs replicate on investment within preexisting, unquestioned and asymmetrical po­ and reinforce the four registers of ‘greening’ empire, particularly in litical and economic relations (Igoe et al., 2010). The dependence on terms of their effects beyond the boundaries of the EU. “cheap nature” (Patel & Moore, 2018), and efforts to optimize (e.g. further cheapen) all inputs for the faster production of goods and ser­ vices is rarely directly acknowledged as problematic (Moore, 2015). 3.1. Ecological crises as profitable opportunities to manage status-quo Indeed, it is the latter element of optimization and efficiency-orientation that has been recast as the “environmental-friendly” or “green” solution, Attempts to respond to social and ecological injustices that are when in fact, it is a requisite component to keep capital flowing. When generated by a commitment to capital accumulation and economic the ‘root causes’ are dismissed (Marks, 2011), climate change from fossil growth are all too often translated into policies and actions that never fuel combustion, irreversible planetary tipping points, and the ongoing actually interrogate the modernizing project itself. They merely aim at mass extinction are presented as a combination of public relations ex­ predicting, managing, and neutralizing crises in the name of enhancing ercises and technical stop-gaps. the project’s efficiency. Every new crisis that emerges from previous What remains deeply problematic is the belief that presumed ‘external’ socio-ecological effects offer opportunities to reinforce the 1 relations of capitalist ecology that have invariably resulted in the We consider international aid as another key aspect in defying international ecological breakdown that the EGD claims to address (Selwyn, 2021). relations within the EGD. This area of analysis implies a large process of Despite the perverse circularity of how the EGD is rationalized, pro­ engagement with EU aid agencies that goes beyond the specific aims of this ponents of the Deal emphasize the “win-win” potential in which article. 4 D. Vela Almeida et al. Political Geography 105 (2023) 102925 economic growth can be decoupled from ecological and social impact. (Said, 1978). For centuries, these acts were justified in the name of the Yet, this “win-win” prophecy has remained in place for nearly 30 years others’ incapacity or not-quite-there-yet capacity to meet responsibilities as ecological breakdown has accelerated, extended from the concept of expected by their more fully modern human benefactors (Mbembe, “sustainable development” in the early 1990s, to the “green economy” of 2019). Extending this logic to today’s ecological crises, the presumed the Rio+20 Convention in 2012, and to today’s eco-modernist “green “firsting2” strategy of the EGD as an attempt by the EU to be the world’s transition”. In short, the climate emergency was supposed to change first to legislate carbon neutrality and zero pollution by 2050 is invari­ everything about how society should organize (Klein, 2014) yet has ably linked with its attempt to generate moral credo to justify its pro­ changed nothing (Gills & Morgan, 2021). active stance as a ‘force for good’ while positioning others as Financing for climate change adaptation and mitigation highlights continuously in need of “catching up” (Rutazibwa, 2010). how the environment has become a new frontier for private finance, In ‘greening’ the empire, EU moral authority is intrinsically linked which the EGD aims to set in motion. For instance, although the with universalism. Generation of wisdom of non-Eurocentric traditions commitment to $100 billion of climate funds per year adopted at the that have fused thought, theory, and spirit with place and physical COP21 in Paris has never been respected, national and regional au­ embodiments have been consciously supplanted throughout the history thorities alike have utilized their policy and regulatory powers to of the modernizing project (Murdock, 2018; Watts, 2013). Part of Eu­ structure and uphold a new global market for ‘green and climate ropean exceptionalism creates a practice of hierarchization that dictates finance’ (EC, 2021f; Perry, 2021). The EU has been at the forefront of the rules of the game for the global climate fight, fomenting the idea that this endeavor and the EGD represents the policy umbrella under which ‘we are all part of the same boat in the climate fight’, yet remaining blind multiple actions are undertaken in the establishment of this new global to historical injustices in the name of “pragmatic/feasible solutions” and playing field for private investors, now organized in the European Green the need to “move forward”. The EU’s moral authority as the ‘inter­ Deal Investment Plan (EGDIP) as a key component of the EGD (EC, vener’’ is by no means benevolent. The seemingly benevolent and 2020b). innocent posture of the EU masks its larger historical responsibility for The EGDIP was presented by the EC in early 2020 from the premise the ecological consequences of modern development felt most severely that sustainability requires significant investment in all economic sec­ by people least responsible for them (Sultana, 2022). tors to interlink the policy objectives with the significant private In what we term “green gaslighting”,3 formal recognition of envi­ financial resources available (EC, 2020c). The EGDIP includes a ronmental crises and their “solutions” get reframed by those actively pluri-annual and multi-sectoral Public-Private-Partnership for the Green directing the very colonial and capitalist economic processes that have Transition aiming to utilize EU financial and regulatory capacity to historically led to these crises, and in ways that positively reinforce the attract more private funds (EC, 2020c). The quest to achieve sustain­ language, logics, and standing of the perpetrator. Those who have suf­ ability thus translates to the notion that it is impossible to achieve the fered across many generations from the violent dehumanizing and socio- goal of building a “modern, resource-efficient and competitive econ­ ecologically destructive legacy of the perpetrator(s)’ actions are now to omy” without the engagement of private capital. As such, EGDIP has be schooled with (green) “solutions”, permitting the perpetrator(s) to become a regulatory and political platform to mainstream the role of emerge as the moral saviour and the world’s most ecologically distin­ global financial capital in the ‘green’ transition, a choice that engenders guished (Chakrabarty, 1992). Uncomfortable discussions around sys­ new opportunities for accumulation and to capture the value of un­ temic failures, ecological/climate debt, and the need for reparations, are tapped or underutilized wealth (Cerrato & Ferrando, 2020; Igoe et al., eschewed in favour of reinforcing European exceptionalism, urgency, a 2010). TINA (‘there is no other alternative’) stance, as well as resigning to This ‘blended’ approach to private and public financing reinforces “moving on” from a regrettable past. the neoliberal ideology that there are insufficient public funds available A clear example of the EU as ‘moral intervener’ comes in the way the and that some investments needed for the transition entail more risk to EGD influences global politics through ‘Green Deal’ diplomacy. From its profits and growth-oriented portfolios than the private sector can bear conception, the EGD aims at influencing decisions of foreign govern­ alone. The discursive move towards ‘blended finance’ portends to the ments by organizing a joint effort of foreign policy and global gover­ ways in which the role of the State is limited to that of facilitating private nance in creating mechanisms of soft regulatory power for climate enterprise and showcasing its own entrepreneurial credentials in doing response. To build up climate diplomacy, the current president of the so (Mazzucato, 2013). Ultimately, the vision of the EGDIP shifts the EC, Ursula von der Leyden, proposed a Geopolitical Commission to political question of whether and how private financing is needed to the develop a “coherent strategy for the external aspects of the Green Deal.” technical question of how to optimize private finance to shape the (Leonard et al., 2021). The conclusions of this Commission establish the economic prospects of the EU (Amoore, 2014). need to implement an external policy to fast-track the global energy transition through EU energy diplomacy. It does so by promoting energy-efficiency and renewable technologies and discouraging in­ 3.2. The EU as moral ‘intervener’ vestments in fossil-fuel-based infrastructure in third countries, “unless they are aligned with an ambitious climate neutrality pathway, and will Greening the planet as a universalizing project offers a new means to support international efforts to reduce the environmental and green­ showcase the EU as a moral ‘intervener’, or geopolitical steward for the house gas impact of existing fossil fuel infrastructure” (Council of the common good to rid the world of emergent threats (Rutazibwa, 2010). European Union, 2021, emphasis ours). Incidentally, it is the EU who Cognitive, discursive, and material imperial intervention have and has the upper hand in determining what counts as an “ambitious climate continue to justify the issuance of an almighty rule in the name of neutrality pathway.” general improvement of the uncivilized or uneducated (Koskenniemi, 2001). In doing so, the colonizer constructs a subordinated other and forces this other into an established framework and a specific social, religious, and cultural system of domination through moral superiority 2 "Firsting" is described by Liboiron (2021) as publicly broadcasting being the "first" to discover something, do, or go somewhere. It is a form of virtue signaling that erases other experiences and histories as a means to gain greater standing or acclaim. Here firsting refers to the EU being the frontrunner of legislating climate action. 3 Gaslighting refers to a type of manipulation that successfully tricks the target into questioning their own perceptions of reality, replacing their actual experiences with those of the manipulator. 5 D. Vela Almeida et al. Political Geography 105 (2023) 102925 After the Trump administration left a void in global ‘green leader­ extractive countries. Consequently, the carbon intensive stage of added ship’, the EU was quick to cement Europe as a leading steward in global value to products are cushioned from the effects of the policy. Further­ climate policy and to reap the benefits of first-mover effects for its green more, even though it is expected that CBAM will help reduce carbon interventions. As the following quote from the Institute for European emissions inside and outside the EU, its reduction only represents a small Environmental Policy (IEEP), a European think tank focusing on the percentage of global carbon emissions (UNCTAD United Nations Con­ development of EU policies attests: ference on Trade and Development, 2021). Europe, therefore, shifts its responsibility for achieving carbon-neutrality of raw materials produc­ “The EU is a global leader in climate negotiations … climate and tion to countries it depends upon within the supply chain. This perverse environmental action have already contributed to a European ‘voice logic adopts an eco-modernist environmentalism in which environ­ in the world’ and have been a part of soft power. It is also an example mental concerns are conveniently used against rights to sovereign of a leading role for the Union in multilateral debates and institution- development in the South (Ajl, 2021, p. 45). building, and of the global regulatory power of the EU.” (IEEP, 2021, emphasis ours). 3.3. The ‘green’ will to improve This position alludes to the ways the EU assumes a “proven ability to be a global environmental and sustainability standard-setter and, Several authors have discussed how environmental policies have through that, a market creator” for sustainable practices with EU’s become post-political managerial stop-gap measures designed to tech­ trading partners (IEEP, 2021). The assumption is also underlined by the nically tweak rather than entertain structural transformation (Ajl, 2021; EU commitment to be the largest contributor to public climate finance, Swyngedouw, 2010). Li (2007) uses Foucauldian and Gramscian anal­ to “scale up the mobilisation of international climate finance” (EU ysis to explain how forms of power are not always coercively imposed Council, 2021, p. 5). but result from the ‘will to improve’ what is presumed to be “common With increasing expectations for carbon neutrality in the EU, a key sense” rational measures sedimented as a kind of manufactured consent point of the EGD diplomacy is the EC’s concern about private enterprises to a singular interpretation of reality. In the context of manifold ‘Green transferring their production to countries with less strict regulatory Deal’ proposals across the world, the EU’s “green” will to improve oper­ frameworks for carbon emissions, resulting in carbon leakage and falling ates by determining the scope of a problem (i.e. diagnosis, prescription) short in achieving the goal of reduced emissions. To address such that needs to be fixed or improved and is always linked to an identifiable concern, the EGD foresees the inclusion of a Carbon Border Adjustment solution that comes from within its own rhetorical and political toolbox Mechanism (CBAM), a carbon tariff on selected EU imports from carbon- (i.e. governed by specific scientific expertise and technical know-how), intensive industries (e.g. steel, cement, chemicals, energy) with lower never questioning whether existing power hierarchies might need to be standards than those of the EU (EC, 2021i). considered. The self-defined role of experts is the one that knows what’s While avoiding carbon leakage through the CBAM is one of the main best for other people and claims specialized and privileged know-how on strategies (EC, 2021i), it is not the only intention of the CBAM. CBAM is how people should live and behave (Li, 2007). The intention of this a market mechanism whose implementation aims to make sure that approach is not for overt domination but to facilitate action and direct international partners “share the same ambition as the EU” and will not change in specific ways that invariably erase recourse to alternatives. “frustrate the efforts of the EU” (EC 2019b,: 6). According to the IEEP, its Subsequently, social and ecological problems and solutions are crucial goal is to “level the playing field for EU and non-EU producers” “rendered technical”, through a set of practices that make crises legible (IEEP, 2020). The EU’s concern is that the “lack of ambition” by coun­ and manageable, with techniques devised for directing solutions in tries outside the EU (EC, 2021i) may jeopardize the efforts undertaken at specific ways under the illusion of societal transformation from potential the EU level. Put differently, a “level playing field” for the EU acts is an threats (Myers et al., 2018). egregious instance of ‘green’ gaslighting whereby colonial exploitation ‘Rendering solutions technical’ legitimizes the centrality of a scien­ and reinforced EU-led patterns of “underdevelopment” of ex-colonies tifically sanctioned authority and provides it with the standing to di­ are conveniently converted as equal trading partners when they agnose deficiencies in others. The knowledge systems of ‘non-experts’ is adhere to the EU’s self-defined climate ambitions. Considering that the seen as that of people who are only capable of improvement through the EGD claims multiple times how the EU is a global leader and mentions a guidance of expert direction, or whose non-expert views can be put to just transition with a ‘leave no one behind’ clause (EC-European Com­ better use in direct function of a more “holistic” form of expert knowl­ mission, 2019a; EC 2020e), the intertwined international relations of the edge (Lave, 2012). Empire advances through an outward expansion of EGD make the expected beneficiaries of the green transition to be within the frontiers, whereby “receivers are expected to integrate and assimi­ EU member states only. late Western realities as opposed to primarily focusing on local, internal Furthermore, the CBAM operates through a process of categorization needs or preference” (Rutazibwa, 2010, p. 219). and the creation of hierarchies. According to the IEEP (2020, October The know-how of European expertise commands new global policies 27), “the Commission will need to carefully evaluate which third by standard-setting for regulatory frameworks in uneven geopolitical country climate policies it deems comparable to EU climate policies, or relations (trade, investment, finance, tariffs, sustainable norms). Ulti­ which developing countries are eligible to receive exemption so that the mately, when fragmented interventions are (inevitably) revealed to be CBAM is not perceived as an unfair trade measure.” Citing Davidson unsuccessful, affected groups and jurisdictions get blamed for their Ladly (2012), the IEEP (Blot et al., 2020, p. 5) states: “The CBAM indi­ inability to improve their own living conditions. The moralizing weight rectly extends the EU’s climate policy beyond its own borders, poten­ of this blame and its psychological effects is what we have referred to tially conflicting with the principle of “common but differentiated and earlier as ‘green’ gaslighting. The perverse consequences of trying to historical responsibilities” as enshrined in the UNFCCC treaty and Paris technically-fix socioecological “externalities” generates a never-ending Agreement.” Furthermore, if the EU is to “carefully evaluate” which cycle of emergent “externalities” associated with failed interventions, third countries’ policies are comparable (or not) to EU climate policies, accumulating in highly unpredictable and unequal ways. This cycle it remains unclear as to how this can be accomplished in a transparent circumscribes any and all attempts to confront uneven relations of and democratic manner. power, essentially demanding then that the poor are “to pay the cost of It is expected that CBAM will mainly cover carbon-intensive sectors empire as a way of life.” (Ajl, 2021, p. 9). for the emissions of the production of raw materials but would exclude One way in which the EGD exemplifies a ‘green will to improve’ is downstream manufacturing or the in-use phase of products (Blot et al., via the Green Taxonomy Regulation (e.g. EC, 2020a; EC 2021d; EC 2020). This means that the CBAM is not considering decarbonization of 2021e; TEG, 2020), which aims to consolidate the EU’s regulatory the whole value chain and is primarily shifting the burden to resource power to set “expert” standards and demarcate what is considered 6 D. Vela Almeida et al. Political Geography 105 (2023) 102925 ‘green’ and how this influences EU finance. The Green Taxonomy outcome of a scramble to maintain growth forecasts, ensure “just-in- Regulation is a EU legislative act that empowers the EC with the help of time” global trade and same-day deliveries, sustain, and reinforce an ad hoc Technical Expert Group (TEG) on Sustainable Finance, to existing built infrastructure and other asset classes. It also serves to produce a selected list of “environmentally sustainable” sectors, estab­ displace blame from an increasingly agitated European populace in an lish technical criteria for meeting environmental objectives and define era where climate impacts are becoming ever-more palpable. As a result, ‘sustainability benchmarks’. This process has raised legitimate criticism the accurate “emergency” and “urgency” stance of ecological break­ regarding the eligibility criteria for representativeness, given that the down is strategically instrumentalized to frighten people into accepting vast majority of the TEG members and the overall EU sustainable finance soft-power initiatives framed by technical experts working in service of expert group belong to sectors that advocate for a stronger role of private preserving the empire. financial markets (Ferrando & Tischer, 2020). The first taxonomy list By framing the alleged problem as a security issue, securitization can produced by the EC (2021c) is a technical exercise that defines what it be understood as the conservation of ‘capitalist’ nature and the practices means to be ‘sustainable’ (or not) in the framework of the EGD: the of dehumanization and ecological simplification that accompany it. This practices and activities that appear on the list normalize selected prac­ means framing problems, identifying stakeholders, and proposing so­ tices in an effort to ‘improve’ future economic growth prospects of the lutions that preserve uneven relations of power by “future proofing” or EU and in the investment plans of private actors within Europe and enhancing the resilience of (and thus the continuation of cheap condi­ abroad (EC 2020d; EC 2021a). tions for) capitalist production systems. Furthermore, it also puts for­ In line with register 1 on viewing ecological crises as profitable op­ ward Europe’s interest in securitizing the lives of (European) people by portunities, the Green Taxonomy Regulation is embedded in narratives recognizing the “intrinsic link between climate change and security and of an ‘urgent need for private funding’, ‘net-zero carbon emissions’, defense” and the importance of “maintaining and strengthening the ’decoupled growth’ and ‘carbon neutrality’ as both threats and oppor­ energy security and resilience of the EU and its partners” (Council of the tunities. In particular, the invocation of urgency and the need for in­ European Union, 2021, p. 9). vestments has resulted in the adoption of a depoliticized definition of By securitizing the empire, ecological consequences are merely sustainability defined by separating a so-called “environment” from external risks to be neutralized and absorbed into the primacy of im­ social justice and subsequently being achieved in relation to how much perial overtures (Ferdinand, 2019). Nature conservation is repackaged it contributes to economic growth. Put differently, sustainability is about in financial terms in line with a recognition that biodiversity loss is a creating the conditions for generating new ‘green’ investments that can “top-five” risk to the global economy according to the World Economic land liquidity (equity or debt) and from which rent can be obtained. The Forum. Globally, the threat of financial loss from biodiversity (i.e. result is that social and cultural components are rendered as technical life-sustaining relationships of non-human species) is framed to the tune details to be managed, while the historical responsibilities of financial of US$44 trillion and harnessed to justify the importance of the EU’s actors in the production of new commodities are dismissed. commitment to conserve 30% of its territory (and in line with a global Furthermore, the Taxonomy Regulation is not limited to EU projects 30% conservation coverage goal) by 2030 through protected area con­ or EU investors. On the contrary, it includes any economic activity servation (EC, 2021g). abroad that aims to receive ‘sustainable’ financing from a European ‘Securitizing empire’ to maintain and reinforce US-EU hegemony is investor or any business that aims to report its practices as ‘sustainable’. evident in the way that ‘greening’ is strategically employed, and in the The bloc’s financial and diplomatic powers are then deployed to uni­ roll-out of the EGD. In joining forces with its main geopolitical partner, versalize sustainability categories rooted in a specific episteme of de- linked to the EGD, the EC put forward a new EU-USA Transatlantic coupling and net-zero growth as defined by a limited number of EU Agenda for Global Change in December 2020, summarized through the ‘experts’. Once these lines of ‘green’ arbitration and good governance following joint communication: are drawn, the role of the EU as the first provider and first recipient of “Today, our combined global power and influence remains unrivalled. Foreign Direct Investment in the Global South becomes par for the We are home to nearly a billion people and are the two largest blocs course. Despite already existing definitions and categorizations of ‘sus­ of advanced democracies. We account for about a third of the world’s tainability’ in these third countries, EU capital that follows the EGD will GDP and trade, and 60% of foreign direct investment. This combined have a commanding role in claiming authority in setting the ultimate power and influence is indispensable to anchor global cooperation in standard of what kind of ‘sustainability’ matters in its push to establish a the 21st century – whether it be on health, security, climate, trade supposed ‘green level playing field’. Investments in afforestation, and technology, or on the multilateral rules-based order. Our joint reforestation and forestry conservation as defined in the Commission commitment is essential in a world where authoritarian powers seek delegated regulation 2021 (EC, 2021h), but also in the production of to subvert democracies, aggressive actors try to destabilise regions heat/cool from bioenergy (wood), the acquisition and ownership of and institutions, and closed economies exploit the openness our own building, carbon capture and storage, along with tens of other ‘green’ societies depend on.” (EC, 2020b, p. 1, emphasis ours). activities contained in the technical documents (including gas and nu­ clear power plants) may be realized across the globe in the name of the The joint agenda specifically proposes that both power blocks work EGD, its parameters and objectives. A list defined by a limited group of together in setting ambitious global proposals for net-zero emissions by ‘experts’ and adopted by the EU institutions may thus have profound 2050 and lead the fight against deforestation and protection of oceans. material repercussions in the lives and territories of the Global South, The quote both recognizes the “unrivaled” power of the EU and the USA likely to be the sacrifice zones where green investments are realized, and and their categorical dismissal of competing authoritarian powers as a the reproductive capacity of ecosystems appropriated into private profit. means to consolidate efforts and manage global risks. By leveraging ‘greening’ to secure their interests, the EGD contributes in invisibilizing 3.4. Securitizing and consolidating empire the historical legacies of imperialism and colonial oppression that have generated their “unrivalled” and “combined global power”. EU global Resounding interest to address climate change and ecological leadership, in alliance with the US, means claiming the legitimacy to breakdown by the EU’s ruling class and the corporate sector that normalize the geopolitical posturing of “green” technical expertise that bankrolls them is not a surprise. Securitizing the empire implies sus­ less developed countries could benefit from, including internally within taining the conditions that both expand the commodity frontier and its own member states (Skjærseth, 2021). As such, the EU-USA entente enhance the resilience of capitalist production systems from ecological are attempting to redefine the rules of the game as standard setters in risks. The frequent use of the words “risk”, “threats”, and “emergency” global green diplomacy. This is evident in the need to work together on when describing ecological breakdown in EU policy documents is the emissions trading, carbon pricing, taxation, and frameworks for 7 D. Vela Almeida et al. Political Geography 105 (2023) 102925 sustainable finance (EC, 2020b). intensifying production under the guise of ‘greening’ mineral extraction, The analysis of the EU’s ‘green’ responses to global social and while a report by GRAIN (2021) on digital agriculture highlights the environmental crises reflect securitization of the empire contextualized decreasing autonomy that both farmers and non-human kin have to within global competition for strategic resources and through its need to escape production logics under the guise of “climate-smart” agriculture secure investment of EU companies abroad. Indeed, access to key nat­ strategies similarly proclaimed to be “greener.” As Zografos and Robbins ural resources is of utmost importance for EU security as its transition to (2020) claim, the cost-shifting of harmful socio-environmental impacts carbon neutrality is based on internal extraction as well as an expected from economic production away from Europe “is a pervasive rather than transformation of the trading relations between the EU and the rest of exceptional practice for production systems oriented toward increasing the world (European Commission, 2020f). The EU-28 trade is one of the profit margins” (p. 544). largest importers of raw materials (ores and intermediate products) from abroad and is currently in need of securing a steady supply of raw ma­ 4. Conclusions terials (Ankersmit & Partiti, 2020). Indeed, mineral extraction has steadily increased in the last decade and is forecasted to keep growing Pre-defining "solutions" that shift risks onto non-European societies with the constant demand for energy transitions (Ayuk et al., 2020). and territories upholds a common historical thread in the development Raw materials are typically extracted from key primary-producers with of Western Europe that fuses socio-ecological breakdown with racialized whom the EU has been negotiating or renegotiating several free trade oppression. As described above, the EGD imposes itself on populations agreements (FTA). These have included the EU-Chile agreements, the around the world through a discursive moral exceptionalism that EU-Mercosur agreement, and the EU-Indonesia agreement. In these necessarily puts both non-European labour and nature to work for its negotiations, “sustainable” extraction is at the core of the FTAs in own realization. Yet, the EGD is oblivious to this impact, and more securing access to natural resources for the European energy transition. broadly to the power wielded by transnational corporations to shape Securing access for EU investors to mineral deposits and other raw supply and finance governance. In doing so, it works foreclosing materials is also a key element in EU-FTAs. Yet, EU corporations seek to cognitive, material and political spaces for alternatives. optimize raw material for commodity production while preventing do­ Although critical, our aim is not to condemn European efforts for mestic regulation-setting for working conditions or job creation at the green transitions, but to contextualize the geopolitical implications of its site of extraction. In a recent report on the EU-FTAs under negotiation narratives as embedded within historically colonial relations, globalized with Chile and Australia, Ankersmit and Partiti (2020) critically capitalism, and its future material implications for ecological homoge­ analyzed the draft texts made public on the provisions to raw materials. nization and dehumanization. In our view, there is a need to destabilize The authors explain that the agreements have an “almost exclusive focus assumptions being made through the EGD. Such destabilization requires on trade liberalization commitments over trade regulation” and suggest dismantling the colonial structures of power while recognizing that the that there is a “separation of economic interest from social and envi­ inherited (stolen) wealth from colonized peoples has always and con­ ronmental interests in raw material extraction” (p. 11). In the mining tinues to enable reproductions of cultural, political and technical supe­ sector for example, once a deposit is opened for extraction, it becomes an riority for Western Europe. In its current ahistorical form, the EU’s open bid for all EU corporations. Accordingly, FTAs infringe states’ stance as a ‘force for good’ -even with the best intentions-works simul­ sovereign decisions for economic development and industrialization by taneously as a mechanism of erasure of its historical responsibilities imposing restrictions on the ability of exporting nations to add-value to towards reparative justice and dismissal of alternative futures beyond raw materials. Put differently, they demand exporting nations to export the domination of Europe and its sphere of influence. We do not suggest raw materials cheaply to the EU. the EU does not have a role to play in an anti-colonial transition; on the Despite historically having a carte blanche for resource extraction, contrary, deep processes of disassociation with colonial habitus will Western European nations are now economically profited off of disci­ require significant commitment at the heart of the empire. To do so plining economic protectionism to ensure “free and fair markets” that requires a genuine commitment from European actors to prioritize cul­ work in their favour (Nelson & Bigger, 2021). Moreover, the EU requires tural, economic and territorial sovereignty, significant restructuring of new strategies to (re)assert its hegemony in the face of growing com­ production and consumption, as well as reparations aligned to historical petitors. "Greening" precisely serves this role; it permits protectionism to ecological debt. be jointly justified in the name of acting on a global climate emergency Europe could seize the opportunity of an EGD with emancipatory while simultaneously maintaining control over new and emerging potential to cede place in the articulation of alternative visions of the markets by disadvantaging emerging economies for their incapacity to future with clear historical responsibilities for global ecological crises as be as "green" as the EU is (Mehling et al., 2019; Pasgaard et al., 2017; repercussions of five centuries of intertwined colonial and capitalist Zachmann & McWilliams, 2020). development. Such a Green Deal would do more than acknowledge The provisions negotiated in the FTAs, together with carbon tariffs generic responsibilities but establish targeted actions to hold political such as the CBAM, illustrate how the empire of carbon-neutrality is and corporate actors accountable for their historical and ongoing actions reinforced through technical mechanisms of trade imposition. While EU- justified in the name of development. At the same time, such a Deal FTAs get pegged to the condition of primary producers being restricted would need to be led by grassroots movements and organized struggles from adding value to materials exported to Europe and to capitulate to that hold economic powers like the EU and connected corporations the unfair historical advantage of Europe’s industrializing capacities, liable for their actions. It would clearly define actionable justice-based the CBAM directly punishes non-EU nations due to its carbon-intensive public policies and commensurate forms of reparation. It would extractive economies in the name of decarbonizing production and require much more than re-distributing financial resources, but be pre­ “going green”. The dependency on cheap labour and raw material as the mised on setting anti-colonial ecologies in motion through: a) facili­ very foundation of what ‘green’ technological development requires tating (but not intervening in) culturally and economic sovereign socio- becomes inconsequential under the terms and conditions of trade ecological transformations in the Global South, b) engaging in material demanded by Europe. transfers of land back to Indigenous peoples and dispossessed peasant The ‘global green agenda’ for a ‘green’ transition generates financial and pastoralist communities, c) re-centering invisibilized or erased incentives to establish new territories of extraction under the guise of knowledge systems; and d) defending abolitionist demands to end ra­ “ecological consciousness”. However, the production of “green” as a cialized state-sanctioned violence on migrants and Black, Indigenous, process of extraction and “ecological” as relational responsibility have and People of Colour (BIPOC) communities. been deliberately confused and the consequences could not be more fatal. Voskoboynik and Andreucci (2021) describe the new strategies of 8 D. Vela Almeida et al. Political Geography 105 (2023) 102925 Declaration of competing interest EC-European Commission. (2019a). The European green deal. Brussels: European Commission. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/european -green-deal-communication_en.pdf. I wish to confirm that there are no known conflicts of interest asso­ EC-European Commission. (2019b). Communication from the commission to the European ciated with this publication and there has been no significant financial Parliament, the European Council, The Council, The European Economic and Social support for this work that could have influenced its outcome. Committee and The Committee of the Regions The European Green Deal. https://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1576150542719&uri=COM%3A2019% I confirm that the manuscript has been read and approved by all 3A640%3AFIN. authors and that there are no other persons who satisfied the criteria for Ecosocial, P. (2020). For a social, ecological, economic and intercultural pact for Latin authorship but are not listed. America. https://pactoecosocialdelsur.com/#1592362596334-8e141cec-613c. Equinox. (2021). Towards climate justice. Rethinking the European green deal from a racial I confirm that I have given due consideration to the protection of justice perspective. https://www.equinox-eu.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Tow intellectual property associated with this work and that there are no ards-Climate-Justice-Equinox.pdf. impediments to publication, including the timing of publication, with Escobar, A. (1995). Encountering development (STU-Student edition). JSTOR: Princeton University Press. respect to intellectual property. In so doing I confirm that I have fol­ Europe Jacqes Delors, Notre Europe, Vote Watch Europe. (2021). Climate: How do MEPs lowed the regulations of our institutions concerning intellectual vote?. https://institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/VoteWatch-special- property. report-on-climate-3-May.pdf. European Climate Foundation. EU green deal diplomacy. n.d. https://europeanclimate. I understand that the Corresponding Author is the sole contact for the org/expertises/eu-green-deal-diplomacy/ Editorial process (including Editorial Manager and direct communica­ European Commission. (2020a). COMMISSION DELEGATED REGULATION (EU) …/… tions with the office). I confirm that I have provided a current, correct Supplementing Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council by establishing the technical screening criteria for determining the conditions under which email address which is accessible by the Corresponding Author and an economic activity qualifies as contributing substantially to climate change mitigation or which has been configured to accept email from (d.r.velaalmeida@uu. climate change adaptation. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/? nl). uri=PI_COM:Ares(2020)6979284. European Commission. (2020b). Sustainable Europe investment plan European green deal investment plan COM/2020/21 final. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/T Acknowledgements XT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0021. European Commission. (2020c). The European green deal investment plan and just transition D.V.A. acknowledges the financial support of the Norwegian mechanism explained. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qa nda_20_24. Research Council (EPICC project, Grant 321659). T.F. and M.V.G. European Commission. (2020d). Commission communication on the sustainable Europe acknowledge the financial support of the Belgian Science Policy Office investment plan. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/fs_20_48. (BELSPO) (EPICC project, Grant B2/20E/P1/EPICC) and CAPES Foun­ European Commission. (2020e). Financing the green transition: The European green deal investment plan and just transition mechanism. https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/e dation. V.K. and G.V.H. acknowledge the financial support of the FWO- n/newsroom/news/2020/01/14-01-2020-financing-the-green-transition-the-europe FRQ bilateral Flanders-Quebec research cooperation grant (ePEStemol­ an-green-deal-investment-plan-and-just-transition-mechanism. ogy project, Grant G0E8121N), and the FWO Senior Postdoctoral European Commission. (2020f). Critical raw materials resilience: Charting a path towards greater security and sustainability. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ Fellowship (Grant 12ZA921N). B.R. acknowledges the Margarita Salas PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0474&from=EN. Postdoctoral Fellowship granted by the Spanish Ministry of Universities European Commission. (2021a). 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