Sustainability Science https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-022-01136-9 SPECIAL FEATURE: ORIGINAL ARTICLE Networks of Action Situations in Social-Ecological Systems Research Irrigation modernization and the efficiency paradox: a meta‑study through the lens of Networks of Action Situations Patrick Hoffmann1,2 · Sergio Villamayor‑Tomas1 Received: 2 September 2021 / Accepted: 27 February 2022 © The Author(s) 2022 Abstract Infrastructure and technology investments that increase water-use efficiency (also called modernization investments) have become one of the most preferred solutions to cope with water scarcity in the context of climate change, increase produc- tivity to satisfy growing demand, and save water to maintain ecosystems. In many cases, however, the higher efficiencies have led to more, instead of less, water consumption. This is generally known as the efficiency paradox or rebound effect. Understanding the processes behind the efficiency paradox remains a difficult task, given the variety of variables that either directly or indirectly factor into farmers’ water-use decisions and the strategic nature of many of those. This is even more the case when water is managed collectively by water-user associations, as in many irrigation systems worldwide. In order to better understand this complexity, our study applies the Networks of Action Situations approach to 37 studies of irriga- tion modernization investments in collectively managed irrigation systems. Through a systematic case review method, we identify 12 different action situations and 192 institutional, physical, and informational linkages that connect them. Although some studies report linkages between the modernization-investment and water-saving decision situations, many others relate them to situations typically associated with the collective management of irrigation systems (like the water application or infrastructure maintenance situations). A number of these situations, also including the water-saving situation, involve col- lective action problems that need to be integrated in current analyses. The solution towards more water saving may indeed benefit from a more active involvement of irrigation associations, given their proven capacity to promote collective action among farmers vis-à-vis other irrigation management situations. Keywords Networks of action situations · Social dilemmas · Irrigation · Modernization · Efficiency paradox · Rebound effect · Meta-study Introduction socio-ecological and -technical systems towards more sus- tainable modes of production and consumption have become Despite repeated warnings, the climate and ecological cri- increasingly salient (Markard et al. 2012; El Bilali 2019; ses have only deepened over the last decades (Ripple et al. Köhler et al. 2019). In the irrigation sector, the transfor- 2021). With it, research and calls for the transformation of mation of irrigation systems through the modernization of infrastructure and technology (e.g., via investments in water storage, or sprinkler/drip irrigation) has been portrayed as Handled by Christian Kimmich, Institut fur Hohere Studien- the main way to move to more sustainable water use. Mod- Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna ernization sets the goal to increase water-use efficiency, * Patrick Hoffmann which, in turn, is expected to contribute to alleviating water patrick.hoffmann@autonoma.cat scarcity by reducing agricultural water-use. However, a 1 growing body of literature indicates that water consump- Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals (ICTA), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Carrer de les Columnes tion increases rather than decreases after the implementation s/n, 08193 Cerdanyola del Vallès, Barcelona, Spain of modernization measures (Perry et al. 2017; Sears et al. 2 School of Business and Economics, University of Marburg, 2018; Grafton et al. 2018; Freire-González 2019; Pérez- Barfüssertor 2, 35037 Marburg, Germany Blanco et al. 2020; Wheeler et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2020; 13 Vol.:(0123456789) Sustainability Science McCarthy et al. 2020). This seemingly paradoxical effect, The paper is structured as follows: “Background” intro- known as the efficiency paradox or rebound effect, reveals a duces the literature on the institutional analysis lens that conflict with the goal of conserving water-dependent ecosys- inspires the theory of Networks of Action Situations. ”Meth- tems and demonstrates how well-intended interventions in odology” explains the methodology. “Results” presents the socio-technical systems can produce unanticipated and unde- results in three subsections. First, we provide a descriptive sirable consequences. That conflict is particularly important summary of the case studies used in the meta-analysis. Sec- given the growing world population, the associated increase ond, we describe the set of identified action situations that in demand for food, and climate change (FAO 2017; World characterize the studied irrigation systems in moderniza- Bank 2020). Scholars have tended to justify the efficiency tion contexts. Finally, we explore institutional, physical, and paradox mostly based on economic theory, which predicts informational linkages among dyads of action situations. that an increase in irrigation efficiency results in an income “Discussion” discusses the implications of our findings, effect, permitting farmers to increase production by expand- reconstructs the analytic narratives behind two of the Net- ing irrigated area or by switching to more valuable and works of Action Situations (NAS) coded, and highlights water-consuming crops (Ward and Pulido-Velazquez 2008; gaps for future research. In the conclusion, we recap on the Contor and Taylor 2013; Pfeiffer and Lin 2014). The income main findings. effect can also be the result of other processes, like decreases in operation and maintenance (Gómez and Pérez-Blanco 2014) or energy costs (Stambouli et al. 2014). Additionally, Background as we argue in this paper, the efficiency paradox may owe to collective action dynamics and strategic decision-making, Despite the growing literature on the irrigation rebound just like other unattended effects of infrastructure invest- effect (Perry et al. 2017; Grafton et al. 2018; Berbel et al. ments in irrigation systems (Lam 1998; Sanchis-Ibor et al. 2019; Pérez-Blanco et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2020), few stud- 2017a). ies consider that irrigation systems are managed collectively To our knowledge, there is little systematic understanding by farmers via water-user associations (WUAs). This is not on collective action dynamics and strategic decision-making trivial, because user-managed irrigation systems are wide- as they relate to the efficiency paradox, particularly in the spread in many rural areas of the world, and many of them context of collectively managed irrigation systems, where have operated with remarkable success over decades and said dynamics and decision-making are particularly salient centuries (Wade 1987; Bardhan 1993; Ward et al. 2020). among farmers. Considering this gap, our paper addresses More importantly, the functioning and success of such col- the following research questions: which strategic decision lective systems is pervaded by collective action dynamics, situations and their linkages encompass the management of the exploration of which can complement our knowledge collective irrigation systems in modernization contexts? To on the drivers of the rebound effect. Irrigation systems are which extent do those decisions allow us to understand the a typical example of a common-pool resource (CPR), the emergence of water-use rebound effects? To address these management of which faces collective action problems asso- questions, we rely on the theory of Networks of Action Situ- ciated to its depletability and difficult excludability, as well ations (McGinnis 2011a) which understands the manage- as to the strategic decision-making of users (Ostrom et al. ment of irrigation systems as a series of strategic decision- 1994). Decades of research have shown the capacity of farm- making situations, the outcomes of which affect each other ers to overcome those collective action problems to manage and social and ecological outcomes. The contribution of this irrigation systems, and adapt to scarcity situations (Ostrom paper is thus to start delving into the complex behavioral 1993; Poteete et al. 2010; Villamayor-Tomas 2014; Lam and dynamics behind the efficiency paradox and to provide a Chiu 2016; Ma’Mun et al. 2020). They have accomplished basis to systematize the so far scattered knowledge about it this via rules that comprise water allocation, financial con- in the irrigation sector. tributions, or monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms, as Methodologically, we conduct a meta-analysis of 37 case well as the creation of WUAs with the power to design and studies of irrigation modernization in community-managed modify said rules. systems. In the coding process, we first identified and named The increase in productivity associated with efficiency- key action situations. Furthermore, the same strategy was enhancing modernizations is likely to affect farmers’ used for linkages among dyads of action situations. In the water-use decisions, as well as the way WUAs manage analysis, we unveil collective action problems potentially the irrigation systems (i.e., the abovementioned rules) associated to the situations, with particular attention to what (Bandaragoda 1998; van der Kooij et al. 2015; Ortega- we name the water-saving situation. Reig et al. 2017). Yet, there is still little research that 13 Sustainability Science addresses modernization processes with an eye on the col- Methodology lective management dynamics within those systems. In an early study of small-scale irrigation systems in Nepal, In the last years, a growing number of scholars have Lam (1996) found that externally imposed infrastructure applied the NAS approach to single and comparative investments were unlikely to achieve irrigation efficiency case studies (Kimmich et al. 2022), including irrigation levels if local conditions and institutions were not taken management cases (Kimmich 2013; Villamayor-Tomas into account, an argument that was further supported in et al. 2015; Kimmich and Villamayor-Tomas 2019; Möck a follow-up study of the performance of irrigation mod- et al. 2019). We complement that literature by conduct- ernization (Lam and Ostrom 2010). García-Mollá et al. ing a meta-analysis of case studies that cover irrigation (2014) illustrate how modernization in a collective irriga- modernization and its effects in the context of collective tion scheme in Spain translated into water savings but also irrigation management systems. Our variables of interest in an increase of water fees the association charged to its are action situations and their respective linkages, but we members (to finance the new infrastructure). Albizua and also coded for geographical, biophysical, and technologi- Zaga‐Mendez (2020) assess in a Spanish irrigation system cal variables (the complete list of variables can be found how collective management conditions changed before and in Table 2 in the Appendix). Many irrigation studies do after a modernization project. They find that the techno- not explicitly mention NAS but contain information about logical conversion led to a decrease in farmers’ autonomy linkages, nevertheless. After a first exploratory phase (see to self-organize but also to tighter monitoring due to the S1 for more details), we collected case studies from two externalization of this task to an external company. complementary sources: a database from Pérez-Blanco In this study, we rely on the Institutional Analysis and et al. (2020)’s review on water conservation technologies, Development (IAD) framework (Kiser and Ostrom 1982; and a database resulting from a systematic literature search McGinnis 2011b). Its focal units of analysis are action via Scopus. The first database provides a collection of 230 situations which capture decision-making points for two empirical studies analyzing the effect of water conserva- or more individuals whose decisions jointly produce out- tion technologies, which we narrowed down to a subset comes (Ostrom 2005). Irrigation scholars using the IAD of cases with sufficient and relevant information, result- lenses have tended to focus on two typical action situa- ing in 152 studies reported in 139 articles. For the sec- tions: the water appropriation situation (whereby farm- ond database, we ran a document search with Scopus by ers decide how much water to use), and the infrastruc- applying the “related documents” algorithm based on four ture maintenance situation (how much to maintain the preselected papers which we considered exemplary appli- infrastructure) (Ostrom et al. 1994). Action situations cations of the NAS approach in the irrigation sector and/ are affected by contextual factors as well as biophysical, or modernization effects. We carried out one search per socioeconomic, and institutional conditions. Their out- each of the 4 selected papers. For each search we selected comes can in turn feedback to the contextual factors of the 50 most relevant results, mostly to guarantee a repre- other action situations (see Fig. 9 in the Appendix). For sentative but still manageable size of articles. Aggregating example, how well the irrigation infrastructure is main- the resulting 200 articles and deleting duplicates resulted tained will affect efficiency of water conveyance and the in a second database of 182 documents, which, together amount ultimately needed to satisfy farmers’ needs and with the first database, returned a database of 321 articles. cope with scarcity (Tang 1992; Villamayor-Tomas and These were then filtered by applying a set of exclusion and García-López 2017). To account for this interdependence, inclusion criteria related to availability (i.e., accessible), McGinnis (2011b) coined the approach of Networks of document type (e.g., not grey literature), methods (e.g., Action Situations (NAS). Linkages between action situa- not modelling studies or theoretical papers), and substan- tions can be categorized into types depending on which of tive information (i.e., on collective irrigation management the contextual factors of one action situation (and therefore and modernization) (Fig. 1). More details on the Scopus strategic decisions) are altered by the outcome of another. search, the justification of the preselected papers, and the According to Kimmich (2013), linkages can be biophysi- applied criteria are outlined in S1. cal, institutional, actor-based, or informational. Physical The goal of the coding process was to identify action linkages are, for example, changes in water availability or situations and linkages between them. Several action consumption; and institutional linkages are, for instance, situations in the context of irrigation management have water allocation rules. In sum, a linked set of action situa- already been identified by Kimmich (2013) and Kimmich tions can be displayed as a network. The analysis can then and Villamayor-Tomas (2019). In our analysis, we built be carried out by focusing on one action situation (the focal action situation) and exploring how it is affected by all others and their linkages. 13 Sustainability Science Fig. 1  Selection process of studies according to the applied exclusion (red) and inclusion (green) criteria on the set of action situations from the latter study and all continents except Oceania.1 Spain is the only European complemented it with new action situations based on the country featured in our analysis, and its overrepresenta- information found in the reviewed cases. The identification tion can be explained by the fact that it is a country that of linkage types was mostly inductive although inspired by has a long history and recognition for collective irrigation Kimmich (2013)’s distinction between biophysical, insti- management (Lopez-Gunn 2003), and has experienced tutional, actor-based, and informational linkages. large-scale modernization processes in the last decades The exploratory phase revealed sufficient evidence in the (Berbel et al. 2019). Also, three of the four articles used studies to code for dyads of action situations, as expressed in the Scopus search were located in Spain, which could in causal effects between pairs of variables. For example, the partially explain the overrepresentation of this country. The statement “Energy tariff impacts timing of water pumped” size of irrigation systems studied is heterogeneous, with the indicated for us that the outcome of an energy allocation smallest irrigated acreage being 67 ha and the largest being situation affects decisions in a water allocation situation 800,000 ha. The water source in most of the cases is surface (further examples for such statements are listed in Table 3 in water (e.g., water diverted from rivers) (Fig. 2). the Appendix). Since connecting those dyads into a NAS for The cases put forth various reasons for the engagement each of the studies would have required interpretation from in a modernization process (Fig. 3). Saving water was by our part (e.g., about the direction of effects throughout the far the most frequently indicated goal, followed by increas- network), we decided to stick to the coding of causal dyads. ing the system’s productivity, saving water and increasing Finally, although we sought for empirically supported productivity simultaneously, as well as increasing the water statements, we also coded theory-informed statements that supply in the system, among others. were relevant and directly connected to the cases (as when Looking at the impacts of modernization, the information an author uses premises or interprets findings based on on whether modernizing the system leads to actual savings strong theory). is only provided by 17 case studies, most of which negate water savings (Fig. 4). Also, less than half of the cases com- pare water use levels before and after the investment (Fig. 5). Results In 7 of them water use decreased, while in 10 water use increased. Descriptive summary Geographically, the 37 selected case studies cover a range of 11 countries. Most of the cases are based in Spain (24), 1 The remaining studies are based in Tanzania, Chile, USA, Ecuador, while the remaining 13 are spread over 10 countries from Philippines, Mexico, China, Algeria, and Morocco. 13 Sustainability Science Fig. 2  Water source used for irrigation (n = 37) Fig. 3  Reasons for moderniza- tion (n = 37) Fig. 4  Cases with reported actual water savings (n = 37) Fig. 5  Changes in water use after modernization (n = 37) Action situations ing capacity of conveyance canals) can prevent individual demands to be met at all times across the irrigation system. Overall, our review resulted in the identification of 12 action This is particularly the case for surface irrigation systems situations relevant for irrigation modernization contexts. On and makes water allocation a central action situation in average, we found 5 situations per case (standard deviation these systems. In this situation, farmers face a coordination of 2.4). Below, we describe each of the action situations, i.e., problem, i.e., one that requires the ordering of irrigation. We the main decision involved and the stakes at hand. identified the water allocation situation in 21 of the cases reviewed, for example when authors made statements like Typical action situations “water usage is regulated by water use turns and irrigation schedules” (Dessalegn and Merrey 2014: 13), or “water We start with the four basic action situations that are already users smartly adapted to the rotational water distribution” known from the NAS literature in the irrigation context (van der Kooij et al. 2017: 6). Typical water allocation rules (Ostrom et al. 1994; Kimmich and Villamayor-Tomas 2019). in the reviewed papers include turns, irrigation schedules, or timed irrigation, the appropriateness of which depended Water allocation (WAL) Even in contexts where water is on the dominant irrigation technology in the systems (Dinar abundant, infrastructure constraints (e.g., the limited carry- et al. 1997; Ortega-Reig et al. 2017), biophysical aspects 13 Sustainability Science (van der Kooij et al. 2015), or the availability of groundwa- in remote monitoring (Lecina et al. 2010a), or monitoring ter (Cox and Ross 2011). activities carried out by farmers themselves (van der Kooij et al. 2015). As was also illustrated in the papers, monitoring Water application2 (WAP) More frequently than not, water is effort is highly contingent on the irrigation technology (e.g., scarce, and farmers face the challenge of deciding how much metered water or water in open ditches is easier to track than of it they should use. Throughout the irrigation campaign, otherwise) and water sources (e.g., aquifer conditions and farmers seek to apply the optimal amount of water to satisfy extractions are less visible than surface water conditions and their crop requirements. This decision confronts them with extractions) (Lopez-Gunn 2003; van der Kooij et al. 2015). the typical CPR appropriation dilemma, especially if their water needs are higher than the water available. We coded Focal action situations in the modernization context for this action situation in 21 cases, i.e., whenever authors referred to changes in water withdrawals (e.g., Sanchis-Ibor Here, we introduce the two focal action situations relevant et al. 2017b) or water use (e.g., Lopez-Gunn et al. 2012a). for an analysis of the modernization context. Additionally, we included cases informing about changes (frequently increases) in irrigated area (e.g., Sese-Minguez Infrastructure investment (IINV) Investing in the improve- et al. 2017). ment or construction of new infrastructure usually involves collective efforts (Lam and Ostrom 2010; Ostrom et al. Infrastructure operation and maintenance (IMNT) In many 2011). The conversion of flood to sprinkler or drip irrigation, irrigation communities, operation and maintenance of the for example, typically involves investments at the system system are carried out by farmers themselves via commu- level, such as water storage works and equipment to pressur- nity work or collectively paid laborers (Lankford 2004; ize water throughout the system, all of which would require Communal et al. 2016; Kimmich and Villamayor-Tomas collective action among irrigators (Blanke et al. 2007). Sim- 2019). Yet, collective maintenance efforts are not trivial ilar to in the infrastructure maintenance or the monitoring as the infrastructure itself is a local public good. To cope situations, system level investments benefit the community with free rider issues, water associations usually condition (to the extent that they, e.g., improve water efficiency or water application to compliance with maintenance rules and control), which is a disincentive for farmers to contribute to engagement in monitoring (Ostrom 1993). We identified this their financing or implementation.3 We coded for this action action situation in 23 of the cases whenever authors referred situation whenever a study reported on a (collective) mod- to “operation practices” or “maintenance of the system”. As ernization decision, which was the case in almost all studies illustrated in some of these papers, ongoing technological (note that our search strategy required the cases to involve advancements have led to operation and maintenance being some sort of modernization). Typical investments reviewed outsourced in some occasions to private companies, and included headworks and in-system water storage works, the financed through fees collected from farmers (Sanchis-Ibor conversion from flood to sprinkler or drip irrigation, and the et al. 2017a; Molle and Sanchis-Ibor 2019). lining of canals (Lopez-Gunn et al. 2012b; Stambouli et al. 2014; Sese-Minguez et al. 2017). Monitoring compliance (MON) As mentioned above, moni- toring of rule compliance and/or resource conditions is an Water‑saving (SAV) This action situation sheds light on essential action situation for successful collective action in whether modernization investments lead to water savings irrigation and other CPR contexts (Tang 1992; Cox et al. or not. Water savings can remain within the boundaries 2010). However, the provision of monitoring is also con- of the system (which is mostly the case for groundwater), fronted with a public goods problem. Since the benefits or flow to the outside environment or external water users from monitoring accrue to the community as a whole, indi- (e.g., urban or industrial uses, or other water users), i.e., vidual farmers lack the incentive to contribute towards it. their value for the community depends on the systems' bio- This action situation was coded from 8 cases, e.g., when physical conditions. Everything being equal, an increase in studies pointed to the commissioning of guards or ditch rid- irrigation efficiency reduces the amount of water applied per ers by the WUAs (Lecina et al. 2005), collective investments crop, hence freeing up a fraction of the water used before. Lankford (2013: 1) proposes labeling this freed-up fraction paracommons, i.e., “commons of the material gains from 2 Although institutional analyses of irrigation management refer to efficiency improvements”. We follow this distinction to water appropriation, most of the studies here reviewed refer to water application. Also, in those analyses, water appropriation has the con- notation of water being consumed; however, as explained by recent 3 irrigation studies, it is important to separate water used from water More precisely, the modernized system is an impure public good, effectively consumed (see water‑saving situation below). as farmers enjoy also private benefits from an investment. 13 Sustainability Science trace water savings analytically, finding sufficient evidence government officials in releasing modernization subsidies in the reviewed cases where water savings were mentioned can be high if these are understood to increase political clout apart from overall application rates. or votes (Molle and Sanchis-Ibor 2019), especially if irri- The decision to distinguish the water-saving situation gators also lobby for them (Zeitoun et al. 2012; Kimmich from the WAP situation is further supported by the theory 2016). Agricultural policies are more frequently than not of mental accounting (Thaler 1999). This concept suggests shaped by the farm lobby in favor or against certain poli- that individuals' decision-making on expenditures and sav- cies; however, we did not find evidence for action situations ings depends on separate mental accounts that they hold for related to lobbying activities in the reviewed studies. financial and material endowments. Applied to our context, we assume farmers to keep distinct mental accounts on the Cropping (CRO) This action situation captures farmers’ water they are endowed with and the water that is freed-up cropping decisions at the beginning of the cultivation cycle. after an increase in efficiency. It was coded when the studies provided information about Thus, the decision on how to allocate water savings con- cropping patterns (Lecina et al. 2010b), cropping calendars fronts irrigators with a social dilemma, essentially like the (Delos Reyes and Schultz 2021), or other crop-related deci- dilemma in the WAP situation. Using the freed-up water sions. We found this action situation in 22 cases. benefits the water user directly given that they can effectively As is shown in the reviewed studies, cropping decisions put that “extra” water to work and increase agricultural pro- are usually driven by changes in crop prices or input costs; duction (Berbel and Mateos 2014; van der Kooij et al. 2015). however, changes in water availability (e.g., in the aftermath Alternatively, saving water could allow other irrigators of modernization investments) can also motivate them (Soto- within or outside the system to use it, or sustain the environ- García et al. 2013; Graveline et al. 2014; Stambouli et al. ment. Water does not only have an agronomic function but 2014), which tightly links this action situation to the WAP also contributes to sustaining freshwater ecosystems and the situation. In dry environments, the availability of irrigation biophysical environment at large, both of which are public water may encourage farmers to water winter crops or switch goods (Chiesura and de Groot 2003; Martin-Ortega et al. to summer crops for their higher productivity or economic 2015). For the individual farmer, the benefit from increased returns (Lecina et al. 2010b). Ultimately, if too many farm- crop production likely exceeds the benefit from contributing ers within a system grow high water demand crops, issues to the public good (Molle and Tanouti 2017). Thus, farmers of water availability and compliance with management rules may be more willing to use the freed-up water than to save may arise. Interestingly enough, irrigation associations usu- it, even if the benefits of environmental conservation offset ally do not have the authority to tell farmers what to grow, private ones overall. This aligns with the observation that even though there are exceptions (Villamayor-Tomas and farmers perceive modernization rather as a means to increase García-López 2017). production and yield rather than as a means to save water (Benouniche et al. 2014; Ortega-Reig et al. 2017). Overall, Energy application and allocation (EAL) This action situa- we found evidence of this action situation in 15 cases, i.e., tion was found in 12 cases, e.g., whenever energy or elec- whenever authors referred to “water consumed” or “water tricity costs were mentioned. As shown in the studies, in the saved”. context of transitions from flood to drip or sprinkler irri- gation, many surface systems have become dependent on Modernization‑specific action situations energy to pump water into pressurized pipes (e.g., in Spain see Molle and Sanchis-Ibor 2019). This can result in a rise The following action situations are considered auxiliary as in electricity costs, depending on the elevation of the system they were less frequently reported. However, they can be or the existence of a water storage facility (Jackson et al. salient in the context of modernization. 2010; Rodríguez-Díaz et al. 2011). In the context of col- lective irrigation, energy costs are shared to some degree, Modernization policy (POL) In the context of self-governed which makes energy a CPR and confronts farmers with a irrigation systems, governments usually take responsibility similar dilemma to that of the WAP situation. Also, there for coordinating operations across said systems (Frey et al. are infrastructure limitations (i.e., power limitations) that 2016). Hence, governmental policies can also influence the prevent the use of energy simultaneously by any number of incentives of farmers regarding other decisions, like those farmers. This confronts farmers with a coordination prob- associated with infrastructure. A modernization-supporting lem that is very similar to that of the WAL situation. The policy was mentioned in 22 of the cases, most of which energy application dilemma and coordination problem are referred to governmental subsidies towards modernization evident when the irrigation association collectively owns (Renault 1998; Mollinga and Bolding 2004; Berbel et al. an energy generation plant, as well as when WUAs sign 2019). As pointed out by some of the studies, the stakes of collective contracts with electricity suppliers that provide 13 Sustainability Science Table 1  Number of linkages per WAL WAP CRO IMNT IINV MON POL EAL MKT MIP FER SAV Sum action situation WAL 2 3 1 1 1 8 WAP 1 3 2 1 1 3 1 12 CRO 2 5 1 3 11 IMNT 4 4 IINV 9 14 14 25 7 7 1 7 6 8 98 MON 0 POL 1 4 2 1 21 2 1 32 EAL 3 2 3 4 12 MKT 1 1 MIP 3 2 3 2 10 FER 0 SAV 2 2 4 Sum 24 29 29 35 26 9 0 11 1 9 6 13 192 Direction of a linkage: from row to column WAL water allocation, WAP water application, CRO cropping, IMNT infrastructure maintenance and oper- ation, IINV infrastructure investment, MON monitoring, POL policy, EAL energy allocation, MKT water market, MIP management improvement, FER fertigation, SAV water-saving energy according to scheduled tariffs (Stambouli et al. 2014; Villamayor-Tomas et al. 2020a). This action situation was Villamayor-Tomas 2018; Kimmich and Villamayor-Tomas found in nine cases e.g., when authors included descriptions 2019). of institutional reforms associated with modernization pro- jects, such as the establishment of new thematic commit- Water market (MKT) In some cases, users can exchange tees within the WUAs (Lankford 2004) or the automation of water concessions in formal or informal markets. Water administrative processes (Soto-García et al. 2013). markets are supposed to add flexibility to water-use conces- sions and allocate water to its most productive use (van der Fertigation (FER) The change of irrigation practices also Kooij et al. 2015; Wheeler et al. 2020). This includes the affects the choice of fertigation. Fertigation is the injection possibility for farmers to sell concessions to the govern- of fertilizers into irrigation water to save the additional step ment, which can then allocate water towards other produc- of applying fertilizer at the field level. In collectively used tive or environmental uses (Berbel et al. 2015). We found infrastructures, members must agree on the amount of fer- this action situation to be relevant only in one case study tilizer to be injected into the water at the irrigation head, (van der Kooij et al. 2015). which bears potential for conflict (Ortega-Reig et al. 2017). We coded this action situation in five studies, i.e., whenever Management improvement/adaptation (MIP) WUAs need the possibility for collective fertigation management was to revise managerial practices and adjust them to changing mentioned. conditions (Playán and Mateos 2006; van der Kooij et al. 2015). This can also be the case in the aftermath of mod- ernization processes, as existing rules and practices need Linking the action situations to be reviewed to adapt to the new technologies (Molle and Sanchis-Ibor 2019). Some authors argue that manage- Table 1 displays the count of links for each pair of action rial improvements are as important as technical improve- situations; the direction of the linkages is from the action ments to enable sustainable and efficient water manage- situation in the row to the action situation in the column. ment (Lecina et al. 2010a). Changes in management rules, The linkage matrix with all links characterized qualitatively however, are not smooth processes. They require coopera- is provided in S2. tion among farmers, e.g., to diagnose problems and come Expectedly, we did not find links between all action situa- up with amendments to existing practices (Ostrom 1990). tions (see blank cells in Table 1). Our focal action situation, Moreover, changes in rules usually create winners and los- the water-saving situation (SAV), was affected by four other ers. That is why some authors have pointed to the impor- action situations in 13 cases (see also Fig. 6). A direct link tance that said changes are better accomplished whenever from the infrastructure modernization investment action sit- stakes in water-use are low (Fernandez and Rainey 2006; uation (IINV) to SAV was reported in 8 cases. Out of these, 13 Sustainability Science Fig. 6  Dyads of linked action situations represented as a network. The thickness of the arrows represents the number of studies reporting on that link. WAL water allocation, WAP water application, CRO Cropping, IMNT infrastructure maintenance and operation, IINV infrastructure investment, MON monitoring, POL policy, EAL energy allocation, MKT water market, MIP management improvement, FER fertigation, SAV water-saving three connect water use efficiency increase to increases in situation are recognized in 9 cases. Six out of these report water consumption or depletion, which provides evidence changes in the allocation procedure, mostly (4) from “turns” for the rebound effect. In contrast, two cases assert water to “on-demand” allocation. The other three links are associ- savings, in one case helping to recharge an aquifer. The ated with cases where modernization led to improved com- remaining three cases are ambiguous, as they acknowledge pliance to distribution rules, the requirement for additional a fraction of freed-up water associated to modernization coordination effort, and an improved scheduling of water without making claims on whether it is allocated towards volumes, respectively. Links from the IINV to the cropping consumption or conservation. In another 5 cases, SAV was (CRO) situation are reported in 14 studies. Nine of them linked to the outcomes of other action situations, including state changing cropping patterns in general or for specific the cropping (CRO), state policy (POL), and water applica- crops, two cases estimate the crops after modernization to tion (WAP) situations. be of higher value, and another 2 cases describe the move- The highest number of links identified (98) originate in ment towards more intensive cropping or a more productive the IINV situation. This can be attributed to our explicit crop. We also found links from the IINV to the water appli- focus on modernization studies. The link mentioned by the cation (WAP) situation in 14 cases. Eight of them point to largest number of cases (25) is that between the IINV and the expansion of irrigated land, four remark on a reduction the infrastructure maintenance (IMNT) action situations. In in water applied (without referring to water consumption), 8 of the 25 cases, the link speaks about an increase in opera- one case describes a reduction in quantities of water sup- tion and maintenance costs after modernization. Six other plied, and another case states that the timing of extractions cases describe how irrigators had to employ technical staff changed after modernization. or a private company for operation and maintenance due IINV was also linked to the monitoring (MON), energy to the need for technical expertise, and 5 other cases men- allocation (EAL), and management improvement (MIP) situ- tion a change in operation and maintenance practices for ations in 7 cases each. Linkages typically report changes irrigators themselves. The remaining cases point towards to automated monitoring or metering systems, increases changes in operation rules, improved working conditions, in energy costs, and institutional and managerial reforms, and the introduction of new communication devices such respectively. The studies also provide linkages from the as remote control. IINV to the fertigation (FER) situation, pointing to changes A relatively high number of studies also report links in fertilizer management (4 cases) and changes in fertiga- from IINV to the water allocation (WAL), cropping (CRO), tion costs (2 cases). IINV was linked to the market (MKT) and water application (WAP) situations. Links to the WAL situation in only one case study (van der Kooij et al. 2015): 13 Sustainability Science Fig. 7  Dyads of linked action situations categorized according to relative occurrence within each category. The network of informa- their institutional (left) and physical (right) nature. The number shows tional links is omitted here due to the low frequencies the count of each link while the thickness and opacity represent their modernization enabled a better control over water allocation identified between IINV and WAP, as e.g., when the new and use and this facilitated water exchanges among farmers technology allows increases in water application rates and/ within the system. or irrigated acreage; or between IINV and CRO, as, e.g., Importantly, authors report an influence of the moderni- when the new technology allows for cropping high-value zation policy action situation (POL) on the IINV situation crops. in 21 cases. All the cases mentioned governmental (or, in Additionally, we found only 17 informational links (9% one case, NGO) support for modernizing the irrigation sys- of all links). This may relate to the difficulties that we tem through subsidies. Conversely, we could not identify found in finding linkages that were purely informative and links directed at POL, although many authors acknowledge not institutional or physical (see S2 for examples). Finally, the role of influential groups and lobbying organizations in we did not find actor-based linkages; farmers were the shaping agricultural policies (e.g., Dessalegn and Merrey main actors involved in all the action situations identified, 2014; van der Kooij et al. 2015; see also discussion). except for the POL situation. None of the studies reported The exploration of types of linkages reveals additional on, e.g., whether certain organizations or leaders played insights (see Fig. 7). Overall, out of the 192 links in the any role in connecting situations. database, 29% and 62% are represented by institutional and physical linkages, respectively. The most salient linkages for each category are the subsidies that incentivize mod- ernization investments (institutional; POL → IINV) and Discussion the infrastructural modifications that affect operation and maintenance aspects (physical; IINV → IMNT), including Studies addressing the effects and consequences of mod- working conditions, remote control services, and the hiring ernization processes have grown in number over the of technical staff or the outsourcing of certain tasks. last years. Much of this literature is based on modelling Institutional links connect 11 out of the 12 action situa- approaches which simulate the performance of infrastruc- tions, showing the relevance of rules and property rights in tural and technological reforms under different scenarios collective irrigation governance. This is telling, given that (Pérez-Blanco et al. 2020). In this study, we focus on most of the studies reviewed are not institutional analy- actual evidence on water-use and consumption changes in ses per se. Other than modernization subsidies that link an attempt to shed new light on the rebound effects associ- POL to IINV (38% of the institutional linkages network), ated to said reforms. more than three linkages only exist between IINV and MIP (13%), which include mostly institutional reforms of A diversity of action situations practices. Physical links are mainly the outcome of the infrastruc- Several of our findings illustrate strengths and deficits in tural change and, therefore, depart most frequently from the literature on irrigation rebound effects. Although a IINV to 9 other action situations. Other than the above- fair number of studies identify the reasons for moderniza- mentioned links between IINV and IMNT (22% of the tion improvements, only half measure how water-use was physical linkages network) non-deniable links are also affected by modernization, and only 17 report whether 13 Sustainability Science Fig. 8  Networks of Action Situations for Berbel et al. (2015), left, ysis. Green arrows represent institutional linkages; blue arrows rep- and Lecina et al. (2010a), right. Note: The networks have been recon- resent physical linkages; and yellow arrows represent informational structed by “putting together” the dyads identified for the main anal- linkages water was saved. These variables need be considered more comply with certain conditions to receive the subsidies, thoroughly in future research. Among the cases that assess including the reduction of their water rights and a pro- water-use changes, most of them do consider changes in scription to increase the irrigated area (POL → WAP). As both water application rates and environmental returns, pointed out by the authors, these constraints contributed to which is good news considering the tendency in the past to actual water savings (POL→ WAP; WAP → SAV), which ignore the distinction between water use and consumption are used by the government to fulfill environmental flow (Dumont et al. 2013). An important finding of the study is standards. Additionally, the case also describes farmers the relatively high and diverse number of action situations changing cropping patterns (towards crops of higher value, that we found per case, which illustrates the need to look at as citrus and vegetable crops) as a result of the policy modernization effects from beyond a one to one relationship (POL → CRO), likely because of the reduction in water between the infrastructure investments and water savings rights. Moreover, the increased electricity costs after mod- (Perry et al. 2017; Sears et al. 2018). Two other findings ernization led to higher operation and maintenance costs we want to highlight in this section refer to the potential (IINV→ EAL; EAL → IMNT). Nevertheless, no links of pathways thinking and the distinctiveness of the water- connect these action situations to SAV. saving situation. On the contrary, Lecina et al. (2010a) illustrates how subsidized investments in sprinkler irrigation The potential of NAS for pathway thinking (POL → IINV) in the Ebro River basin, Spain, resulted in an increase in the proportion of high-value, high-water The process of linking dyads of action situations has proven demand crops (IINV → CRO) like horticultural crops, itself useful to start uncovering the complexity of moderni- orchards, and summer crops; and how these resulted in zation investments and their effects on water savings. As an increase in evapotranspiration (CRO → SAV) (Fig. 8). explained in the methods, we did not code for networks of As the authors further illustrate, pressurized irrigation action situations due to the difficulties of doing it without also comes with automated monitoring systems (IINV → much interpretation from our part. MON); and allows for more fine-grained irrigation sched- Thus, although our data show how studies linked water uling (IINV → WAL), which favors increases in crop saving to modernization and to other situations, it does productivity (WAL → CRO). That being said, the control not show whether and how all those situations were inter- over irrigation scheduling depends on system maintenance related. Despite this, we can still make some speculations (IMNT → WAL), which is affected by improvements in about those cross-situational pathways or networks. One labor conditions associated to the modernization (IINV example of such a pathway, and an illustration of achieved → IMNT), and changes in energy prices (among other water savings (Fig. 8), builds on Berbel et al. (2015). Here, agricultural input prices) (IINV → EAL) affected the will- the government partially subsidized the investment costs ingness of farmers to intensify cropping (EAL → CRO). for installing micro-irrigation (POL → IINV) in the Gua- The two examples above demonstrate that our data allow dalquivir River basin, Spain. However, farmers needed to to build analytic narratives in terms of networks of action 13 Sustainability Science situations (Kimmich 2016). As shown above, the networks mistrust, inducing cooperative behavior among farmers is can vary notably across case studies even if relying on a possible through the promotion of self-regulation by the similar set of action situations. At the same time, it is likely government, collective control of extractions (monitor- that there are different pathways leading to similar outcomes ing), and cultivation plans (Lopez-Gunn 2003; Esteban and and quite similar pathways that lead to different outcomes. Albiac 2012). Similar approaches may work when planning Further research should identify and test those patterns (see for modernization processes, even though the choice of the Villamayor-Tomas et al. 2020b for a method that could be correct solution needs to be considered carefully depending adapted for that purpose). This would inform not only bet- on the situation at hand (Villamayor-Tomas et al. 2019). ter irrigation water-saving practices but also our knowledge An interesting point to consider regarding the water-sav- on sustainability transitions of socio-technical systems ing situation is the role of biophysical conditions. Whether more broadly (Markard et al. 2012). Water-saving policies farmers appropriate water from a surface or groundwater are promising levers to transition towards more resilient and pool might be a relevant biophysical factor influencing the sustainable irrigation systems (Pérez-Blanco et al. 2020). As efficiency paradox, as groundwater inherits the characteris- illustrated here, governmental policies in the form of infra- tics of a local common good and surface water those of a structure improvement subsidies can be quite effective at global common good (Stern 2011). initiating said transitions and result not only in water savings Our data are limited to explain this connection. Our but also in improvements in water allocation and infrastruc- review includes 20 surface irrigation cases and 4 ground- ture maintenance and management. water cases. The number of cases where actual water savings were reported is 1 and 2, respectively. Although difficult to The distinctiveness of the water‑savings situation interpret, these results trigger some reflections about the role of resource system characteristics. By default, groundwater Our results also show that conceptualizing the water-saving systems are less visible and, therefore, incentives for saving situation as a distinctive situation offers analytical traction to water might be lower; however, the incentives for water users further understand behavioral dynamics behind the rebound in surface systems could also depend on their location along effect. Specifically, we posit that water users perceive water the basin. Further research shall thus explore this and other savings as a “separate” resource, which is in line with the related conjectures and their influence on the water-saving concepts of the paracommons (Lankford 2013) and mental situation. accounting (Thaler 1999). Inherently, the decision of how to allocate the freed-up fraction of water takes the form of a social dilemma. Modernization investments open the pos- Limitations and further research sibility to save water for environmental conservation or for other water users; however, farmers perceive modernization The study also sheds light on data gaps that should be as a means to increase production and yield rather than to addressed in further research. First, the only action situa- conserve water (Benouniche et al. 2014). This makes the tion being influenced by IINV and not affecting any other dilemma of saving vs. using the water nontrivial and calls action situations in our review is the monitoring situation for policy interventions. Policymakers should consider MON. This was surprising for us, as monitoring is a key redistributing the incentives between promoting higher effi- action situation in the management of CPRs at large (Slough ciencies and encouraging water conservation, as it has been et al. 2021). Further primary research shall explore whether done, for example, through payment for ecosystem service our findings are an artifact of the empirical choices made schemes (Fisher et al. 2010; Lima et al. 2019). Further- by the authors of the reviewed studies or are indeed worth more, CPR theory suggests that social dilemmas in natural explaining. resource use can be overcome by collective action and strong Second, about half of the studies reviewed do not report institutions (Ostrom 1990; Poteete et al. 2010). Collective water savings, which limits our ability to draw quantitative action in irrigation communities is realized by adherence to conclusions about the efficiency paradox. Qualitatively, rules and norms, bottom-up participation in decision-making however, the few studies that do report on water savings can processes, and collaboration in collective tasks. Thus, water- provide interesting insights through the NAS lenses about saving as a goal might be easier to achieve if the community pathways that would explain the complexities behind the as a whole is persuaded to take ownership over the need to rebound effect. As shown here, the modernization invest- self-organize and to promote water-conserving behavior. The ments on water savings are mediated by what farmers do case of the Eastern La Mancha aquifer in Spain, for instance, vis-à-vis water allocation, infrastructure maintenance, moni- shows that even in a context of severe overexploitation and toring, or energy allocation, and would indeed be key to 13 Sustainability Science better understand the origins and potential solutions to the An explanation of the direction of outcomes needs to be rebound effect. addressed through more thorough analyses of the contextual Third, a blind spot in irrigation research are power factors that shape decisions within the action situations, and dynamics and their influential role in (strategic) decisions. in particular the modernization and saving situations. Our results show unidirectional linkages from modernization Fifth, finding evidence on informational links was chal- policies POL to other action situations, but not vice versa. lenging. We found it difficult to disentangle institutional and Revisiting the case studies from our sample and conduct- biophysical links from informational links (as information ing a keyword search for ‘power’ and ‘lobby*’, we found 6 can refer to both institutions and biophysical conditions). In cases that acknowledge power dynamics but fail to establish the end, only the evidence we could not categorize as insti- a direct link between them and modernization policies. Such tutional or biophysical was classified as informational links. linkages need to be recognized and incorporated more thor- Further research should better conceptualize and operation- oughly into institutional analyses, as has already been pro- alize informational links as compared to the other types. posed by other scholars (Clement 2010; Bennett et al. 2018). Sixth, based on data availability, we decided to include Our own approach and choices are also subject to several decisions associated with cultivated acreage into the water limitations. First, 24 of the studies included in the review application situation, and collapsed the energy applica- assess Spanish irrigations systems. This is mostly due to our tion and allocation situations into one. This rather induc- search strategy, which partially relied on 4 preselected stud- tive approach to draw the boundaries of action situations ies, 3 of which were based in Spain. Thus, our findings may should, however, be tested and complemented with more not be entirely generalizable to a wide diversity of contexts. deductive approaches, e.g., based on existing archetypes of At the same time, they would apply quite well to the Spanish games (Kimmich and Villamayor-Tomas 2019; Bruns and one. This is not ideal but neither that limiting. The fact that Kimmich 2021). 3 out of the 4 preselected studies were located in Spain is Finally, we have focused on identifying action situations telling of the quality (as per our selection criteria) and the and linkages. We have not featured the situations them- momentum of irrigation modernization and rebound studies selves (e.g., farmer’s decisions and the factors that shape in this country. It also indirectly speaks about the cutting- them within each situation) for lack of data. Identifying the edge work that Spanish practitioners and researchers have situations was indeed already quite challenging because the been carrying out on irrigation over the years. authors barely get into behavioral dynamics and just focus Second, in this study, we focused on WUAs that have on variables and outcomes. Thus, our results should be taken quite some managerial autonomy with regard to key irriga- with caution: although we are positive about the linkages tion management tasks (e.g., water allocation, maintenance, between the action situations, we cannot say much about investments etc.); however, it is not unusual that WUAs the actual decisional dynamics within each, or even whether share some of those tasks with public authorities or others some of the non-typical action situations here identified (Hunt 1989; Frey et al. 2016). Further research shall explore (like the cropping, fertigation, or management improve- more in detail whether the action situations and linkages ment situations) are totally relevant with regard to strategic identified here would still be relevant in co-managed systems decision-making. or similar governance arrangements. Third, although we excluded modelling studies from our study, we recognize the value of our analysis to conceptual- Conclusion ize future models that formalize and explore different sets of the linkages presented here. Sensitivity analyses could Rebound effects in water consumption in the aftermath of be quite informative of the cascading effects of different modernization investments in irrigation systems are part of water-saving interventions across action situations (see Kim- complex processes that have yet to be fully understood. This mich and Villamayor-Tomas 2019 for a similar diagnostic is all the more important given current pressures around approach). transitioning towards more sustainable agricultural prac- Fourth, we only identified the existence of linkages from tices (El Bilali 2019). In principle, the rebound effect can one action situation to another, but not whether the outcome be explained according to the argument that a higher water of one action situation had a negative or positive effect on use efficiency leads to higher productivity, which translates the outcome of the adjacent situation. As was shown, mod- into farmers expanding their irrigated area, intensifying their ernization investments affected energy allocation through production, or switching to higher value but also higher increased energy costs in a fair number of cases but not water-demand crops. To better frame and understand the in all of them (in one case the effect was the opposite). behavioral dynamics involved in that process, we conducted 13 Sustainability Science a meta-analysis of 37 case studies describing irrigation mod- benefits). The evidence about increases of water-use in the ernization processes and their effects in collectively man- aftermath of modernization processes aligns with economic aged irrigation systems. We organized the coding around the predictions about the inability of farmers and governments idea of adjacent action situations in an attempt to shed light to overcome the dilemma. By the same token, however, this on the strategic decision-making situations that farmers are understanding also calls for a more active involvement of confronted with as they participate in modernization invest- farmers and irrigation associations in the management of ments and adapt to the new infrastructure. the dilemma, as they have done already in the context of As shown in our results, it is possible to meaningfully other collective irrigation management situations. Over- understand relevant variables as either outcomes of or fac- all, it would be desirable to incorporate collective action tors in strategic decision-making situations (action situa- dynamics and institutional analysis more systematically in tions). Here, we identified 12 of those situations, and 192 the study of the manifold drivers of and potential solutions institutional, physical, and informational links that con- to the rebound effect. This should in turn contribute to more nect them. Also, our findings illustrate that the connection realistic water-saving policies in the sector. between modernization and water savings is not as straight As a final reflection, the collected data show that there is forward as frequently portrayed. First, although some stud- sufficient material in the literature to speculate about causal ies report on linkages between the modernization invest- pathways that connect modernization investments and water ment and water-saving situations, many other studies also savings. As illustrated here, it is possible to build networks link those two situations to situations not strictly connected of action situations after a first identification of dyads of with modernization processes but to the collective manage- them. In our view, advances in this direction will require ment of irrigation systems (like the water application, infra- expanding primary research on the behavioral dynamics structure maintenance, or monitoring situations). Second, a within specific situations or pairs of them, as well as new number of those situations potentially involve social dilem- meta-analyses that synthesize primary research. mas and coordination problems that need to be integrated in analyses. Here, we pay special attention to the water-saving situation, which we frame as a public goods dilemma that Appendix confronts farmers with the decision of reusing the freed-up water (private benefits) or conserving it for reuse by others See Fig. 9 and Tables 2 , 3 . (common-pool benefits) or environmental purposes (public Fig. 9  Extended IAD framework. The thick arrows depict stylized examples for a connection between the outcome of Action Situation (AS) 1 and the contextual factors of Action Situation (AS) 2. Examples are presented in italic. Source: own elaboration 13 Sustainability Science Table 2  List of variables Variable Definition Answer General information Country Country where the study is located Name of the country Country region Country region/s where the study is located Name of the country region/s Water basin Name of the studied water basin/s Name of the basin/s, n/a Irrigation district Name of the studied irrigation district/s Name of the district/s, n/a Biophysical variables Water source Type of source of the water used in the agricultural Surface water, groundwater, treated wastewater production process Water supply Quantity of water supplied to the system (per year) m3/year, n/a Irrigated area Area of land under irrigation ha, n/a Infrastructural and technological characterizations A Technology0 Irrigation technology used before modernization Furrow, sprinkler, drip Technology1 Irrigation technology used after modernization Furrow, sprinkler, drip B Improvement Type of infrastructural improvement of an existing tech- Canal lining, Capacity increase nology that improves water use efficiency, and which parts of the system it concerns Purpose Stated purpose of the modernization Water saving, productivity, supply increase, development Outcomes Water use How did water use change after modernization? Increase, deacrease, no change, n/a Water saving Was water saved after modernization? Yes, no, n/a Action situations WAL Does the case inform about farmers engaged in interde- 0, 1 (0 for no, 1 for yes) pendent water allocation decisions? WAP Does the case inform about farmers engaged in interde- 0, 1 pendent water application decisions? CRO Does the case inform about farmers engaged in interde- 0, 1 pendent cropping decisions? IMNT Does the case inform about farmers engaged in collective 0, 1 operation and maintenance decisions? IINV Does the case inform about farmers engaged in collective 0, 1 modernization investment decisions? MON Does the case inform about farmers engaged in collective 0, 1 monitoring decisions? POL Does the case inform about state policies that have a 0, 1 direct effect on decision-making processes? EAL Does the case inform about farmers engaged in interde- 0, 1 pendent energy allocation decisions? MKT Does the case inform about the existence of a water 0, 1 market? MIP Does the case inform about farmers engaged in interde- 0, 1 pendent management improvement decisions? FER Does the case inform about farmers engaged in collective 0, 1 fertigation decisions? SAV Does the case inform about farmers interdependently 0, 1 deciding upon allocating water savings due to efficiency gains? 13 Sustainability Science Table 3  Examples for coded linkages Information found in article Interpretation The volume of water flows depends on the maintenance of the struc- We can identify a link between the action situations WAL and ­IMNT, tures. (study id:14a, p. 273) namely that the outcome of IMNT affects the WAL Energy tariff impacts timing of water pumped. (16a, p. 71) The choice of the energy tariff in a collective irrigation system is described by EAL, whose outcome changes the water allocation rule and therefore the WAL This higher cost was due to new operating and maintenance costs, As a consequence of the technological conversion from furrow to drip particularly because the cost of energy increased from an average of (IINV), operation and maintenance (IMNT) was affected by higher 25% of total water costs before the investment, to around 43% after the costs. Furthermore, higher energy costs will affect the situation of conversion. (1b, p. 666) choosing an energy tariff in EAL, which in turn affects IMNT Supplementary Information The online version contains supplemen- explain actual drip irrigation performance. Irrig Sci 32:405–420. tary material available at https://d​ oi.o​ rg/1​ 0.1​ 007/s​ 11625-0​ 22-0​ 1136-9. https://​doi.​org/​10.​1007/​s00271-​014-​0438-0 Berbel J, Mateos L (2014) Does investment in irrigation technol- Acknowledgements We are thankful to two anonymous reviewers ogy necessarily generate rebound effects? A simulation analy- and colleagues from the University of Marburg for providing valuable sis based on an agro-economic model. Agric Syst 128:25–34. feedback and comments on earlier versions of the manuscript. Sergio https://​doi.​org/​10.​1016/j.​agsy.​2014.​04.​002 Villamayor-Tomas’ work was supported by the Ramón y Cajal Fel- Berbel J, Gutiérrez-Martín C, Rodríguez-Díaz JA et al (2015) Litera- lowship (RyC-2017-22782) and the financial support of the Federal ture review on rebound effect of water saving measures and anal- University of Minas Gerais´ Visiting Professor program (Contrato ysis of a Spanish case study. Water Resour Manag 29:663–678. nº 253/ 2020). 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