Political Geography 107 (2023) 102997 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Political Geography journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo Full Length Article The coloniality of green extractivism: Unearthing decarbonisation by dispossession through the case of nickel Diego Andreucci a, *, Gustavo García López b, Isabella M. Radhuber c, Marta Conde d, f, Daniel M. Voskoboynik e, J.D. Farrugia e, Christos Zografos e a Department of Economic History, Institutions, Politics and World Economy, University of Barcelona, Spain b Center for Social Studies (CES), University of Coimbra, Portugal c Department of Political Science, Research Network Latin America, University of Vienna, Austria d Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA), Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain e Johns Hopkins University–Universitat Pompeu Fabra (JHU-UPF) Public Policy Center & Research Group on Health Inequalities, Environment, and Employment Conditions (GREDS), Department of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain f Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining (CSRM), Sustainable Minerals Institute (SMI), The University of Queensland, St Lucia, Queensland, Australia A B S T R A C T This article elaborates on the notion of “decarbonisation by dispossession” in order to shed light on the contradictory character of capital-driven energy transitions. First, we suggest conceptualising “decarbonisation” as a “socio-ecological fix” to intersecting, climate-induced crises of accumulation and hegemony, aimed at saving capital rather than the planet. Second, reflecting on the mineral intensity of “low carbon” technologies such as industrial-scale solar and wind farms, we approach ongoing transitions as a form of “extractivism”: a form of predatory appropriation of land and resources, embedded in global geographies of unequal ecological and value exchange. Third, examining the case of nickel, we argue that, despite elements that complicate a clear North-South binary, capital-driven transitions are ultimately reinforcing the colonial character of energy provision; they are causing an expansion of “transition mineral” frontiers and associated dispossession effects, and creating sacrifice zones of extraction and processing concentrated in formerly colonised countries. Considering also the contradictory outcomes of mineral- intensive transitions in terms of CO2 emissions reduction, our findings point to a structural inability of capital to solve its ecological contradiction. We conclude that radical proposals for a genuinely “just” transition, including those that mobilise a Green New Deal framework, should aim to decouple energy provision (and the reproduction of life more generally) from the material and epistemic violence of colonial-extractive capitalism. 1. Introduction Ocasio Cortez in 2019 (Milman, 2021). Yet, as mainstream and critical analyses have highlighted (Hund et al., 2020; Mastini et al., 2021), plans The climate crisis is deepening and accelerating, highlighting the to “decarbonise” energy and transport systems will require substantial urgent need to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. As a amounts of raw materials, whose extraction and processing are them­ response, ambitious political and economic programmes for transition­ selves carbon intensive, environmentally destructive and socially ing away from fossil fuels are being proposed, largely aimed at damaging. expanding investments in renewable energy generation and electric The socio-environmental implications of expanding renewable en­ transport.1 The most prominent among these programmes refer explic­ ergy frontiers are becoming central to research and debate in critical itly to the framework of the Green New Deal, which has re-emerged in geography and political ecology (Sovacool, 2021). There is increasing public debate in recent years. For instance, in late 2019, the European attention, for instance, to the “greening” of large hydropower projects Union adopted the European Green Deal (European Commission, 2019); (Atkins, 2020; Del Bene et al., 2018); the land grabbing and conflicts and, in the US, the climate and recovery plans of the Biden adminis­ associated with wind energy generation (Alonso Serna, 2021; Avila, tration draw on the Green New Deal bill sponsored by Representative 2017; Siamanta & Dunlap, 2019); the expansion of photovoltaics and * Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: diego.andreucci@ub.com (D. Andreucci), gustavo.garcia@ces.uc.pt (G. García López), isabella.radhuber@univie.ac.at (I.M. Radhuber), marta. conde@uab.cat (M. Conde), danielmacmillen@live.com (D.M. Voskoboynik), jdfarrugia@gmail.com (J.D. Farrugia), christos.zografos@upf.edu (C. Zografos). 1 In this article we use the terms “renewable energy” or “renewables” primarily to refer to industrial-scale wind and solar power plants. We are aware that the “renewability” of such energy technologies is contested by political ecologists (e.g., Dunlap, 2018) because, as this article will also show, they are often associated with dispossession, ecological destruction and energy intensive mineral extractivism. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2023.102997 Received 19 November 2021; Received in revised form 13 September 2023; Accepted 12 October 2023 Available online 2 November 2023 0962-6298/© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by- nc-nd/4.0/). D. Andreucci et al. Political Geography 107 (2023) 102997 “solar colonialism” (Allan et al., 2021; Brock et al., 2021); or the use of visible the neo-colonial character of mainstream climate policies. climate mitigation funds to promote biofuel and timber plantations, and The article is structured as follows. In the next section, we present fortress-style conservation (Alonso-Fradejas, 2021; Camargo & Ojeda, our analytical framework for approaching decarbonisation by dispos­ 2017; Devine & Baca, 2020; Lyons & Westoby, 2014). session. By bringing the concept of “socio-ecological fix” into dialogue Although these literatures highlight the extractivist and colonial with the notion of (green) extractivism, we posit that a capital-driven character of industrial-scale renewable energy projects, the focus on shift to low-carbon technologies, primarily in the North, is organically “transition minerals” is still incipient. Recent political ecology research linked with the production of sacrifice zones of extraction and dispos­ has paid particular attention to lithium, due to its primary use in “low- session, concentrated in the South. Section 3 argues that a sharp carbon” technologies, notably batteries, as well as its unique materiality expansion of renewable technologies entails changes in the socio- and extraction process (Bustos-Gallardo et al., 2021; Jerez et al., 2021). ecological production of space, whereby the historical association of “Green conflict minerals” (Church & Crawford, 2018, p. 56), among capitalism with the intensive spatial logic of fossil fuels is increasingly which cobalt and rare earths feature most prominently, have been compounded by an extensive and more diffused geography of energy and another focus of research (Phua & Barraclough, 2016; Sovacool, 2019). extractive conflicts. In section 4, we direct attention to the case of nickel. However, base metals such as nickel – common metals already widely We detail the severe socio-environmental impacts resulting from nickel employed in conventional technologies, and not so closely associated production in extractive peripheries, and argue that these exemplify the with low-carbon “socio-technical imaginaries” (cf. Barandiarán, 2019) – type of geographically uneven dispossession which is likely to be are equally important or critical for renewable technologies, despite increased by capital-driven energy transitions. Before concluding, in having received much less attention. section 5, we present some reflections on political action, and in In this article, we argue that the energy intensity and socio- particular on how to imagine a “just transition” beyond colonial- environmental impacts of transition minerals can help us reflect on extractive capitalism. the contradictions of capital-driven decarbonisation plans, including mainstream versions of the Green New Deal. We address two empirical 2. Unpacking decarbonisation by dispossession objectives: 1) to outline how the global geography of energy and extraction is being reconfigured in response to the climate crisis; and 2) This section elaborates on the idea of decarbonisation by disposses­ to detail the socio-environmental implications of transition mineral sion, which refers to how mainstream efforts to mitigate climate change extraction and processing. This exploration offers a theoretical entry go hand in hand with a new wave of dispossession resulting from point for arguing that the ongoing energy transition is premised upon an expanding energy and extractive projects. In order to unpack this dia­ extractivist logic, linked to neo-colonial patterns of uneven development lectic of decarbonisation and dispossession, we draw on and bring into and the creation of sacrifice zones of mineral extraction in the global dialogue two critical conceptual perspectives. First, the notion of the South.2 We adopt the concept of “decarbonisation by dispossession” to “socio-ecological fix” helps us to see that, as envisioned by dominant underscore the centrality of these patterns to current energy transition capitalist institutions, decarbonisation plans are centrally concerned with plans (cf. Ojeda, 2014; Sovacool et al., 2021). saving capital rather than the climate. Second, we characterise mineral- The empirical arguments presented in this paper are primarily based intensive energy transitions as extractivism, so as to highlight their on the analysis of press reports and grey literature focused on nickel and predatory and colonial character, predicated on uneven geographies of other transition minerals, their significance for energy transitions, and dispossession. their socio-environmental challenges. Sources analysed include envi­ ronmental and development agency reports; documents published by 2.1. Decarbonisation as a socio-ecological fix the nickel and associated industries and consultants; and reports by civil society movements and organisations. The identification of case studies The notion of the “socio-ecological fix” was introduced by critical and relevant sources was supported by consulting on-line archives such geographers in recent years, to refer to any intervention or strategy that as the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (https://www.busin “directly engages with and resolves, mitigates, or postpones a structural ess-humanrights.org) and the Environmental Justice Atlas (https://ej impediment—including any environmental one—to sustained capital atlas.org; Temper et al., 2018). Research for one of the cases analy­ accumulation” (McCarthy, 2015, p. 2495). The socio-ecological fix sed—the Cerro Matoso nickel mining project in Colombia—was based approach, as outlined by McCarthy (2015) and others (e.g. Ekers & on fieldwork conducted by one of the authors in 2016, including Prudham, 2015), places emphasis on how capitalism responds to crises observation of socio-ecological impacts associated with the mine and 20 through socio-ecological and spatial reconfigurations. Specifically, formal and informal interviews with representatives of affected com­ climate change is associated with interlocking crises of accumulation munities. The positionality of the authors is at the interface of academic and hegemony. First, the ongoing climate and ecological catastrophe, as and advocacy-oriented work on extractivism and climate justice. Our well as reduced access to easily available resources such as fossil fuels, shared experiences of researching (with) socio-environmental move­ present short-term challenges and aggravate structural impediments to ments, including indigenous organisations, motivate our goal to render sustained capital accumulation. Second, this is linked with an increas­ ingly visible crisis of hegemony or legitimacy of global capital (Fraser, 2022; Mann & Wainwright, 2018), to the extent that the association of 2 We use the term “neo-colonial” to reflect the continuation of colonial re­ capitalism with fossil fuels is leading more and more people to identify lations today. The concept of neo-colonialism was coined by anti-colonial capitalism as the main culprit of climate change. freedom fighters such as Kwame Nkrumah and Walter Rodney to refer to the Following McCarthy (2015), we suggest considering mainstream European political economic domination and extractivism that prevailed in energy transition plans, including versions of the Green New Deal, as Africa after independence. The term coloniality is also often used to refer to attempts to fix such interlocked crises. This expands on Harvey’s this, particularly in the Latin American tradition of political ecology (see Ali­ concept of the “spatial fix”, by placing additional emphasis on how monda, 2011) – though “coloniality” tends to emphasise the epistemological nature is appropriated and “produced” in the process in new ways realm (the way social and racial hierarchies, cultures and knowledge systems (McCarthy, 2015, p. 2489). Fixing is meant here in a double sense: as are colonial) rather than the material one (unequal patterns of socio-ecological extraction, exchange, or development). For a discussion of the wide array of solving or staving off accumulation crises, at least partly and tempo­ terms used to capture different aspects of neo-colonialism/coloniality in rela­ rarily; and of doing so by “fixing” capital into the built environment in tion to socio-environmental dynamics – including eco-imperialism, environ­ ways that give rise to novel socio-ecological arrangements (Ekers & mental colonialism, and toxic/energy/fossil/carbon colonialism – see García Prudham, 2017). This also resonates with the idea and critique of a López and Navas (2019). depoliticising “techno-fix” to socio-environmental issues (Clark & York, 2 D. Andreucci et al. Political Geography 107 (2023) 102997 2012). demonstrates (Arboleda, 2020)—overall, they tend to reproduce and The current demand boom for renewables and associated technolo­ reinforce spatial and power relations formed since colonial times. gies may provide new outlets for investing over-accumulated capital, pushing new rounds of primitive accumulation. All the while, it helps to 2.3. Green extractivism, dispossession and sacrifice address the crisis of legitimacy by presenting capital not as the cause of global heating but as the way out of it: energy, extractive, and financial In recent years, the term “green extractivism” (Dunlap & Jakobsen, capital, as well as neoliberal governments and international institutions, 2020; Voskoboynik & Andreucci, 2022) has been introduced in political refashion themselves from villains to global saviours of both climate and ecology research to refer to the paradox whereby an environmentally economy, shifting blame unto the depoliticised materiality of fossil fuels destructive mode of extraction and accumulation loaded with colonial or CO2, and to individualized citizen-consumers (Supran & Oreskes, legacies is being promoted as a solution to the ecological and climate 2021; Swyngedouw, 2010). crisis (cf. Sultana, 2022).3 Mining extractivism has long been presented Thinking of decarbonisation plans as a globally operating socio- as a vehicle of modernisation, development and progress (Machado ecological fix suggests that what they aim to save is not so much the Aráoz, 2014). Since the 1990s, the mining industry and institutions like climate, but capital (McCarthy, 2015). This is only an ambition and the World Bank have dedicated increasing effort to framing mining as future potentiality. There is no evidence that capital is being saved by key to sustainable and inclusive development (e.g., World Bank, 1996; increasing investment in green technologies, nor are there guarantees Andreucci & Kallis, 2017). And, increasingly, resource extractivism is that this will happen in the coming years and decades. However, this being repackaged not only as compatible with planetary sustainability, framing allows us to stress that the core logic or concern of the (uneven but indeed as essential for urgent and effective climate action (Hund and contradictory) global effort to transition away from fossil fuels et al., 2020). Researchers working on lithium in South America, for through private investment in renewables is to leave dominant power instance, have shown how transition minerals are imbued with novel relations and political economic arrangements intact, while staving off imaginaries of clean, high-tech development and industrialisation, accumulation crises associated with capital-induced climate disruptions capable of saving the climate while ushering in an era of unprecedented (Mann & Wainwright, 2018). prosperity and geopolitical power for southern countries (Barandiarán, 2019; Voskoboynik & Andreucci, 2022). 2.2. The “green energy-extractivism nexus” and its colonial character These techno-optimistic discourses find a counterpoint in accounts, increasingly present in popular media, of the “dark side” of electric A central, conceptually under-appreciated aspect of the current low- batteries, the most infamous case being that of cobalt mining in the carbon transition is the corresponding expansion in transition minerals, Democratic Republic of Congo (Sovacool, 2019). Overall, however, and how this connects to long-standing colonial-extractive dynamics of there is a clear tendency on the part of mainstream development in­ capitalism. Producing electricity from renewable energies is currently stitutions to present transition mineral extraction as necessary for ten times more mineral intensive than doing so from fossil fuels (Mastini reducing emissions globally, endorsing the World Bank’s mantra that, if et al., 2021, p. 5), and there is a clear consensus in policy and industry done correctly, mineral extraction contributes to sustainable and “cli­ literature that a shift to renewables will entail an unprecedented in­ mate-smart” development (Hund et al., 2020). This strategy is accom­ crease in mineral mining (e.g., Barbesgaard & Whitmore, 2022; Hund panied by a discourse of universal salvation from climate change via the et al., 2020, p. 11). Therefore, we argue that expanding industrial-scale greening of the global economy, which obscures the uneven, (neo-) renewables and transition mineral extraction should be considered part colonial geographies of sacrifice upon which such greening is predicated of the same emergent regime, what we call the “green energy–extrac­ (Zografos & Robbins, 2020). tivism nexus”. There is broad evidence that extractivism is associated with This concept is informed by, but also moves beyond, Bainton and co- ecological destruction, dispossession and violence (Menton & Billon, authors’ (2021) formulation of the “energy-extractives nexus”. Defining 2021). The systematic creation of sacrifice zones of industrial pollution capital-driven energy transitions as a form of extractivism highlights not and waste has long been denounced by environmental justice move­ only the mineral intensity of such transitions, but also how they follow a ments (Lerner, 2012). Zografos and Robbins’ (2020) notion of “green predatory logic of land and natural resource appropriation. Moreover, sacrifice zones” expands on this idea: by adding the label “green”, not seeing the socio-ecological fix as extractivist points to the ways that it only does it signal the contradictory dialectics between greening and (re)produces uneven geographical relations globally (Acosta, 2013; Vela sacrificing, but it also spatializes this dialectic by signalling the divide Almeida, 2020). From the point of view of the countries where extrac­ between territories or populations that are greened, and others that are tion takes place, extractivism may be understood as a national, sacrificed (cf. Sovacool et al., 2020). It highlights the spatial injustices resource-based development or accumulation strategy (Brand et al., traversed by neo-colonial hierarchies and racialization of populations 2016; Gudynas, 2016). However, from the perspective of its political connected to global resource and energy provision and use (Andreucci & economy, it should be approached as a structural necessity of capital, Zografos, 2022). inherently global in character, and linked with neo-colonial processes of Decarbonisation plans based on expanding industrial-scale renew­ commodity frontier expansion and reconfiguration (Arboleda, 2020; able and electric technologies are giving shape to these injustices, Moore, 2015). whereby cities and industries in the North are increasingly striving to The historico-geographical dynamic of extractivism has been inti­ achieve the status of low-carbon or “zero-emissions”; while peripheries, mately imbricated with colonialism (Machado Aráoz, 2014). As Luis primarily in the South (but also in economically and politically Tapia (2014) argues in the case of Bolivia, the systematic conversion of marginalized spaces in the global North), are being assigned the role of peasant economies into extractivist ones is a core defining feature (a extraction areas, waste or carbon dumps. As such, decarbonisation is “constitutive moment”) of colonialism, establishing a hierarchical rela­ becoming a widespread means of “accumulation by dispossession”, tion whereby one society is made to work for another and is partly embedded in neo-colonial patterns of extractive capitalism (Bumpus & disarticulated in the process. Today, extractivist expansion continues to Liverman, 2008; Ojeda, 2014; Siamanta & Dunlap, 2019; Sovacool et al., insert indigenous and peasant territories and economies into complex global production networks and circuits of capital valorisation (Arbo­ leda, 2020; Dorn & Huber, 2020). Even though such uneven 3 In this sense, the idea of green extractivism builds on related conversations geographical patterns are not unchangeable and do not always conform in critical geography around “green neoliberalism”, “green grabbing”, and the to a clear North-South or core-periphery binary—as the rise of China as “green economy” (Cavanagh & Benjaminsen, 2017; Devine & Baca, 2020; the epicentre of raw material demand and industrialisation Fairhead et al., 2012). 3 D. Andreucci et al. Political Geography 107 (2023) 102997 2021; Yenneti et al., 2016). energy, and to access to the fuels themselves. The spatial implications of this are extremely significant: subterranean fossil fuels were much less 3. Changing geographies of energy and extraction space extensive than organic fuels such as wood, thereby reducing the land footprint of energy generation and, indirectly, changing the orga­ In this section, we argue that a sharp expansion of low-carbon nisation of production and (geo)politics of energy access. In sum, the technologies entails changes in the socio-ecological production of materiality of fossil fuels had the effect of freeing up land for other uses, space; and that this complicates predictions for a relatively smooth low- and reduced the relative social power attached to control over land carbon transition. First, we provide some evidence on the current and (Huber & McCarthy, 2017). projected expansion in renewables and electric automotion globally. A transition to renewables represents a partial return to a more Second, we show that such expansion is changing the geography of spatially extensive mode of energy production and provision. The spatial energy production and provision, whereby the historical association of or land footprint of renewable energy provision is several times greater capitalism with the intensive spatial logic of fossil fuels is increasingly than that of fossil fuels (and nuclear). This is particularly true for bio­ compounded by an extensive and more diffused geography of energy and fuels, but applies also to wind and solar. For instance, producing one associated conflicts. Third, we argue that considering the extractivist unit of energy from wind farms requires up to 600 times more land than character of energy transitions helps us to highlight their impacts in from coal (from solar panels, 60 times more).4 terms of socio-ecological destructiveness, carbon emissions, and spatial The increased land footprint of renewables has a disproportionate injustice. impact on marginalized rural areas, which have lower population den­ sities and land prices (McCarthy, 2015). This could lead to an unprec­ 3.1. Decarbonisation in energy and transport edented wave of agrarian enclosures; the industrialisation of large areas; and other forms of dispossessions resulting from the construction of Energy decarbonisation is a central goal of mainstream climate ac­ energy transmission grids and infrastructures (Dunlap, 2020). Such new tion. The consensus is that achieving “net zero” emissions by 2050, enclosures are already being denounced by critical agrarian scholars, required to keep temperature rise within the 1.5 ◦ C threshold (IPCC, under the label of “green grabbing” (Fairhead et al., 2012). These are 2018), would involve an unprecedented increase in renewable energy primarily associated with biofuels (Franco & Borras, 2019); yet generation and a rapid electrification of transport globally (IEA, 2021b). increasingly land grabs and other forms of dispossession are being found Energy generation from renewables has already been increasing sharply by political ecologists to result from wind and solar projects (Franquesa, in the last decades, particularly in solar photovoltaic and wind, and this 2018; Siamanta & Dunlap, 2019; Stock & Birkenholtz, 2019; Yenneti trend is projected to continue in the near future (IEA, 2021b). This will et al., 2016). require an unprecedented redirection of capital into new energy infra­ These dynamics are advancing “energy colonialism” in rural pe­ structure (IEA, 2021b, p. 22), related to a concomitant (though partial ripheries in the North and South (Batel & Devine-Wright, 2017; Dunlap, and uneven) “phasing out” of fossil fuels (Furnaro, 2021). Trans­ 2020), with regions such as the Isthmus of Tehuantepec in Oaxaca, portation is also at the threshold of a systemic shift away from fossil Mexico emerging as global hotspots of renewable energy contestation fuels. The automotive sector is investing heavily in a reconversion to and conflicts (Alonso Serna, 2021; Avila, 2017; Avila et al., 2021; electric vehicles (EVs), in order to respond to actual and predicted Ramirez & Böhm, 2021). Such projects are also increasingly inserted regulatory and reputational pressures. Forecasts by the International into fraudulent climate mitigation schemes whereby northern countries Energy Agency (2021b, p. 134) estimate that, in order to achieve and corporations are granted emissions offsets for investing in renew­ net-zero, 60% of car sales would need to be electric by 2030, reaching able projects in the global South (Bachram, 2004; Lyons & Westoby, 100% by 2050. This would entail a rather spectacular increase in the 2014). Indeed, we see a continuity in these dynamics with the ways that total number of light-duty EVs on the road globally, from 11 million in fossil fuels have been intertwined with colonialism (Smith-Nonini, 2020 to approximately 2 billion in 2050. 2020). These are emerging and consolidating features of decarbon­ As with renewables, this would imply a significant expansion of isation by dispossession. resource extraction and production networks. Electric automotion is also becoming exemplary of the uneven geographical dynamics inherent 3.3. The impacts of extractivism compound those of energy infrastructure to energy transitions (Bonelli et al., 2022; Brand & Wissen, 2021; Jerez et al., 2021): sales of electric cars are strongly correlated with consumer These trends signal that, as Huber and McCarthy (2017, p. 666) purchasing power as well as state subsidies and investments in charging argue: “far from being inherently progressive or environmentally infrastructure, and therefore concentrated (in per capita terms) in benign, the geographies of industrial-scale renewable energy production wealthy, northern countries like Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands might involve just as many ‘extractive peripheries’ or ‘sacrifice zones’ as (IEA, 2021a). Meanwhile, as we will discuss in the next section, the current geographies of fossil fuel extraction” (see also Brock et al., extraction of minerals for the components of those cars takes place 2021). However, considering the raw material intensity of renewable predominantly in global South regions. Again these patterns are energy transitions, as part of what we called the green complicated by the growing centrality of China as the main consumer energy-extractivism nexus, the argument can be pushed further: and industrial processor of raw materials, but by no means reversed by land-based forms of energy production and provision are not simply it. replacing a regime of intensive verticality, but adding to it. In other words, the horizontal and extensive installation of industrial-scale 3.2. Renewables and the socio-ecological production of space renewable energy is compounded by the intensive and vertical extrac­ tion of minerals, which in turn results (as we will show later) in localised The expansion of renewables is part of a fundamental change in the increases in fossil fuel extraction and energy generation. Moreover, geography of energy (Avila et al., 2021; Bridge et al., 2013). For Huber given the slow pace (at best) of fossil fuel phase out (Furnaro, 2021; Roy and McCarthy (2017, p. 658), a shift to renewables marks a historic & Schaffartzik, 2021; Sweeney et al., 2021), increased land based break with the “subterranean energy regime” of fossil-fuelled capitalism, whose spatiality is “structured by an overall ‘vertical’ reliance upon the underground stocks of energy and minerals”, concentrated around more 4 We calculate this on the basis of data about the respective “power density or less fixed points in space. Historically, the rise of this energy regime per unit area” of these technologies, cited in Huber and McCarthy (2017, p. reduced the relative significance of land compared to that of 665): 2–3 W/m2 (Watts per square meter) for wind, 20 W/m2 for solar, 1200 productivity-enhancing machines and technologies enabled by fossil W/m2 for coal. 4 D. Andreucci et al. Political Geography 107 (2023) 102997 conflicts could coexist, for decades to come, with growing struggles over more complex: while sulphide extraction is done through conventional the extraction and processing of both fossil fuels and transition minerals. underground mining techniques, laterite extraction tends to require Thinking of renewables as part of the same complex as fossil fuels open-pit mines or strip-mining of topsoil. This requires more energy and and mineral extractivism means that not only rural areas in general, but is generally more impactful on surrounding ecosystems (Smith, 2018). primarily extractive peripheries in the global South are likely to be This shift from sulphide to laterite ore deposits is reconfiguring and disproportionately affected by dispossession. This is not to deny that the expanding the geography of nickel extraction. Most sulphide nickel increase in mining will also affect marginalized populations in the pe­ extraction took place from deposits in Australia, Canada and Russia. The ripheries of capitalist cores (del Mármol & Vaccaro, 2020; Lassila, move towards laterites has shifted the epicentre of nickel mining to­ 2018). Yet, the geography of transition mineral deposits shows a clear wards Southeast Asia: in 2017, the top two nickel producers were prominence of resource-rich, colonized or formerly colonized countries Indonesia and the Philippines, concentrating 41% of global production (World Bank, 2017). Therefore, renewable energy expansion will rein­ (Smith, 2018). In 2019, they each exported over 1.2 billion US dollars in force rather than challenge the extractivist dynamics of global depen­ nickel ores, adding up to 58% of global exports (Atlas of Economic dent peripheries. The next section will detail some of the Complexity, 2021a). In the coming decade, it is predicted that Indonesia socio-environmental implications of such expansion in the case of a will be responsible for most growth in nickel extraction and processing key transition mineral, nickel. (Sanderson, 2020). Most of this production is routed through China, which is the world’s largest purchaser of nickel ore (73% of imports) 4. Transition minerals and dispossession: the case of nickel (Atlas of Economic Complexity, 2021b), being the main producer and exporter of batteries and other nickel-based low carbon technologies In this section we present the case of nickel in order to illustrate some globally. of the socio-ecological implications of a mineral-intensive decarbon­ isation. First, we observe that growing demand for nickel is causing a shift to lower grade ore deposits and an expansion of mining frontiers in 4.2. The paradox of “decarbonising” through energy intensive extraction formerly colonised countries, centred on Southeast Asia. Second, we show that, in places where nickel extractivism is growing, this is driving Considering the overall life-cycle, the CO2 emissions of renewables a paradoxical increase in carbon intensive, fossil-fuelled energy pro­ are significantly lower than those fossil fuels (Hund et al., 2020, p. 87). duction, due to the high energy intensity of mineral production. Finally, However, at the point of extraction and production, renewable tech­ we detail the impacts of nickel extraction and processing on affected nologies generate more emissions than fossil fuels. This has relevance for territories and populations in different countries—including deforesta­ energy and carbon colonialism, to the extent that such emissions (and tion, land dispossession, soil, water and air-borne contamination, associated socio-ecological impacts of fossil energy generation) are indigenous rights violations, and violence against environmental de­ largely concentrated in poorer countries where minerals are extracted fenders.5 Taken together, these impacts give a clear indication of the and processed and renewable technologies assembled (cf. Lennon, type of sacrifice and dispossession that sustain decarbonisation. 2021). Paradoxically for a mineral expected to contribute to global decar­ bonisation, nickel production is remarkably carbon intensive, particu­ 4.1. Reconfiguration and expansion of the nickel frontier larly in the smelting and refining stages (Eckelman, 2010), as it requires high temperatures in order to break down chemical bonds.7 According Nickel is a key material for low-carbon technologies. It is used pri­ to a World Bank report (Hund et al., 2020), nickel is the third most marily in energy storage, particularly rechargeable batteries for electric impactful transition mineral in terms of its “global warming potential” vehicles (Hund et al., 2020, p. 61). Nickel is also employed in thermal (GWP), after aluminium and graphite. Together, producing these three solar plants, concentrated solar power, geothermal energy production, minerals to meet projected global demand increase would “account for a generators for wind energy, and for protecting energy infrastructure in cumulative 1.4 Gt CO2 up to 2050, nearly equivalent to the total 2018 corrosive marine settings (Church & Crawford, 2018, p. 56; Henckens & CO2 emissions from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom com­ Worrell, 2020; Hund et al., 2020; IEA, 2021c; Månberger & Stenqvist, bined” (Hund et al., 2020, p. 90).8 These figures may be optimistic, to 2018). Currently, nickel used in green technology still represents only a the extent that, first, this report (unlike previous ones, e.g., World Bank, fraction of the global market (Azevedo et al., 2020). Yet, demand for 2017) factors recycling and reuse in its growth estimates for transition nickel is set to grow sharply over the coming decades. For instance, a minerals (Whitmore, 2021, p. 14); and second, it does not take into recent report by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2021c, p. 8) account decline in ore grades, which significantly increases energy and estimates that (in an optimistic decarbonisation scenario) overall nickel material expenditures for extracting the same amount of metal (Bainton demand could increase 19 times by 2040. et al., 2021, p. 6). Growing demand is causing nickel mining to shift towards lower This high energy demand relies on burning significant amounts of grade ores. Nickel is largely found in two types of deposits: sulphide ores fossil fuels for mineral production. For instance, in Sulawesi, Indonesia, (found in the subsoil, generally a product of volcanic or geothermal the boom of nickel mining and smelting has tripled the electricity needs activity), and laterite ores (abundant in the topsoil in tropical regions). of the region (Harsono, 2020), and four new coal-fired power stations Historically, sulphide ores mining was more commonplace, due to higher ore grade. However, production is increasingly shifting towards lower grade, laterite ores, which are more abundant (60% of global 7 Energy costs are often very high in nickel-processing facilities and can make reserves) (U.S. Geological Survey, 2020).6 The processing of laterites is up to half of operating costs (Tsang & Zhang, 2012). Moreover, high levels of carbon emissions are released when acid effluents are neutralised after acid leaching. Overall, the emissions of nickel extraction from laterite deposits are 5 These cases were selected on the basis of their representativeness, showing significantly higher than from sulphides extraction (Smith, 2018). 8 the diversity of socio-ecological impacts associated with nickel extraction, The authors of the report obtained this figure by multiplying the estimated processing, and associated infrastructures. total demand in tons for each mineral, multiplied by its GWP per kilogram. 6 Nickel is normally differentiated into classes of quality, which indicate what Mineral demand estimates are derived from the 2017 IEA’s “2DS” (two-degree it can be used for. The highest-grade, or Class 1 nickel, is what is needed for scenario), defined as a scenario with at least a 50% chance of limiting the lithium-ion batteries. This was typically extracted from sulphide mines. Of the average global temperature increase to 2 ◦ C by 2100. For nickel, the estimated two categories of laterites (saprolites and limonites), only limonites are of good global demand through 2050 is 20 million tons, assuming a 35% recycling rate enough quality to be used for battery production (Azevedo et al., 2020). (Hund et al., 2020, pp. 11, 82). 5 D. Andreucci et al. Political Geography 107 (2023) 102997 are being planned to meet the demand (Fikri et al., 2022; Global Energy 4.4. Dispossession, health impacts and human rights violations Monitor, 2021). Indeed, some of the largest socio-ecological impacts of nickel mining and smelting have emerged from the energy apparatus Nickel projects have been associated with dispossession effects on required to sustain it. Norilsk Nickel is currently facing the largest communities, particularly indigenous people and the rural poor (EJAt­ environmental fine in Russian history (2.1 billion US dollars) for a las, 2015; 2022b). Contamination of soils and water bodies presents massive spill which leaked over 150,000 barrels of diesel from a power major threats to food sovereignty and security. An example of this can be plant owned by the company into the Ambarnaya River (Fedorinova, found in Papua New Guinea, where fisher-folk communities have long 2020). This is considered the worst ecological disaster to ever occur in challenged the Chinese-owned company Ramu NiCo over its dumping of the region. millions of tons of mine waste into the ocean, affecting fisheries relied on Offsetting such emissions is also linked with environmental impacts by around half a million people (Morse, 2020; Mudd et al., 2020). and dispossession. The Cerro Matoso nickel project in Colombia is the Populations affected by nickel mining (including mine workers) also fourth largest open-cast nickel mine in the world, owned by the suffer from grave health impacts (Genchi et al., 2020). For instance, Australian company South32 (formerly part of Anglo-Australian mining indigenous Zenú, Afro-Colombian, and campesino communities living giant BHP Billiton) (El País Cali, 2018; Opray, 2017). Its processing fa­ near the aforementioned Cerro Matoso nickel project in Colombia have cility is the most energy-intensive industrial project in the country denounced a significant rise in respiratory illnesses, congenital defects, (Arcila, 2020). In order to offset its emissions, the Cerro Matoso project and dermatological conditions linked to the heavy polluting generated has established a series of new palm oil and fast-growing teak planta­ by the mine and smelter (Idrovo, 2018). In 2018, the company was tions (Voskoboynik, 2016). This type of plantations has been associated found guilty by the Colombian Constitutional Court for causing irrepa­ with deforestation, pollution from agrochemicals, water scarcity, loss of rable damages to residents and ecosystems’ health through contamina­ livelihoods, and violent expulsions, land grabbing and murders of local tion (El País Cali, 2018; Heinz & Sydow, 2020). The court found that the residents (Ojeda, 2014). company had violated numerous environmental regulations through its 30 years of operation, and in this lengthy period, had not once consulted 4.3. Socio-environmental impacts of nickel production the region’s indigenous communities. However, due to the difficulty of specifying causal linkages and measuring impacts, the payment for Nickel extraction and processing are associated with severe impacts damages to residents was later annulled. on ecologies and communities (EJAtlas, 2019). As with other metals, the Concessions for nickel mines often overlap with the ancestral lands of dumping or leaking of toxic waste (acid mine drainage) is a main source indigenous communities (Dominish et al., 2019; Horowitz et al., 2018; of contamination (Müller & Reckordt, 2017). The nickel industry faces Whitmore, 2021), generating resistance and conflicts. For instance, the significant waste management challenges, given that often low-grade Aborigen Forum, a coalition of communities across the Russian Far East, ores and rock materials extracted will only contain a sliver of nickel North and Siberia have organised a concerted campaign against nickel (around 1% or less) (Wollschlaeger, 2017). The significant amounts of mining in the region. In 2020, the forum called on car manufacturer remaining material (known as waste rock and tailings) are often inad­ Tesla to boycott any purchases of nickel from Nornickel, until the equately stored or treated, causing contaminants such as heavy metals to company conducts an independent assessment of the damage of its op­ affect adjacent soils and water bodies (Bartzas et al., 2021). Moreover, erations, compensates indigenous communities for the destruction of the disposal of tailings into the sea—known as sea waste disposal or deep their way of life, implements plans for re-cultivating contaminated lands sea tailings (DSTs)—is a growing practice in the nickel industry, and an in both the Taymyr peninsula and Murmansk Oblast, and revises its increasing concern associated with nickel mining projects (Whitmore, policies on relationships with indigenous peoples (Indigenous Russia, 2021). 2020). The smelting process of nickel is also linked with severe air- and Multiple human rights violations have been documented across water-borne pollution. The smelting of nickel from sulphide ore emits nickel extraction supply chains over the last decades (EJAtlas, 2022a). very high amounts of sulphur dioxide, which is a significant contributor Colombia, the Philippines, Guatemala and Indonesia—where some of to acid rain (Azevedo et al., 2020). Companies in the industry are among the world’s largest nickel mining projects are located—are among the 10 the largest global and historical emitters of sulphur dioxide.9 Just one deadliest countries for environmental defenders, according to Global smelter facility, constructed in the Siberian city of Norilsk in 1942 and Witness (2020).10 In the Philippines, a well-known case is that of Gerry decommissioned in 2016, was responsible for 350,000 tonnes of annual Ortega—a radio broadcaster, environmental activist and outspoken emissions of sulphur dioxide (Luhn, 2016). Monchegorsk, home to the critic of nickel mines—who was murdered in January 2011, as he was world’s largest nickel refinery that was only recently closed, is one of the preparing to launch a major campaign to ban mining operations in most polluted areas in Russia (Nilsen, 2021). Palawan (Mariano, 2011). The socio-environmental impacts of nickel mining are worsened by Guatemala has been another hotspot of human rights abuse linked to the fact that 40 percent of global reserves (all of them laterite deposits), nickel production. The Fenix mining project in El Estor, particularly, has are located in high biodiversity areas, and 35 percent in areas with high long been a source of grave impacts affecting Q’eqchi’ Maya indigenous water stress (Smith, 2018). Nickel mining expansion implies the clear­ communities (Rodríguez, 2021). Conflicts have reactivated particularly ance of territories and, in some cases, the eviction of communities reliant after 2004, when the mine was acquired by the Canadian company Skye on them. In 2017, the government of the Philippines suspended 28 Resources.11 At least three people have been killed, and dozens injured, mining projects (half of its nickel producing capacity), citing concerns in protests by community members against the mine (Brigida, 2020). over their environmental damage (Almendral, 2017). In 2021, the The project’s activities have also been linked to a range of human rights government suspended nickel mining operations on Tumbagaan Island, abuses, including eviction, arson, unjust detention, forced displacement, over its “devastation”. Cabinet secretary Karlo Nograles noted: “the is­ and sexual violence (Church & Crawford, 2018, p. 56; Deonandan et al., land has, at this point, been mined out” (Jacinto, 2021). 10 Over half of all killings of environmental defenders reported in 2019 (107 out of 212) occurred in Colombia and The Philippines. Mining is the industry most directly associated with such killings (50 deaths) (Global Witness, 2020). 9 11 The world’s main nickel companies by production are: Vale (Brazil), Norilsk In 2008, the project was acquired by another Canadian company, HudBay (Russia), Jinchuan (China), Glencore (Switzerland) and BHP (UK-Australia) (NS Minerals; and it has been owned since 2011 by the Swiss-based Solway In­ Energy, 2020). vestment Group. 6 D. Andreucci et al. Political Geography 107 (2023) 102997 2017; Kassam, 2017). The mine, one of the largest nickel mines in we discuss in the rest of this section. Central America, has also faced legal disputes over its environmental impacts, and for denying indigenous communities the right to “free, prior and informed consent” (Rodríguez, 2021). 5.2. From post-extractivism to post-capitalism Colombia’s Córdoba region, where the Cerro Matoso mine is located, has registered some of the worst human rights violations in recent years Based on our findings, we argue that Green New Deals should (Moreno Montenegro, 2016), with 37 activists murdered since the 2016 envision transitions beyond the logic of a socio-ecological fix. This does Peace Accords (Heinz & Sydow, 2020). Though not officially linked to not mean that renewable energy or even extraction itself are necessarily the company, mining attracts paramilitary groups seeking to capture part of the problem (Lennon, 2021). What must be overcome is the funds from local authorities, while the violence allows the company to system of extractive-colonial capitalism that currently governs the way perpetuate weak environmental governance. energy is produced and materials are mined. Our exploration of the case To sum up, attention to these highly unequal geographies of sacrifice of nickel is consistent with political ecology critiques reviewed above and dispossession casts serious doubts regarding the desirability of (section 2), which consider extractivism as a neo-colonial mode of decarbonisation plans centred on the green energy-extractivism nexus. accumulation predicated upon the devaluation of territories and First, mineral extraction and processing are very energy intensive, and racialised populations in extractive peripheries, primarily in the global they become more so as the quality of mineral ores diminishes. Second, South: one that results in ecological destruction, dispossession, severe the dispossession effects of low carbon energy generation are further health impacts, human and indigenous rights violations, and murderous aggravated by the socio-environmental impacts of extracting and pro­ violence against environmental defenders. cessing of minerals. Such impacts are concentrated primarily in the Extractivism, therefore, cannot be a part of a just solution to the global South, and disproportionately affect indigenous peoples, rein­ ongoing climate crisis. A report on transition minerals published by War forcing neo-colonial spatial relations and uneven geographies of sacri­ on Want and the London Mining Network argues that a just transition fice. Considering all this is fundamental for envisioning a genuinely just must be a “post-extractivist” transition (Hitchcock-Auciello, 2019). The transition, to which the next section turns. report endorses Eduardo Gudynas’s (2011) proposal for “indispensable extraction”, according to which, in a transition scenario, the only 5. Envisioning a Green New Deal without extractivism extractive activities permitted would be those that are “genuinely necessary” (Gudynas, 2011, p. 200, our translation). Moving away from 5.1. The limitations of “corporate-led governance” a commodity-driven and expansionary model of extractivism, “indis­ pensable extraction” would require for Gudynas (2011, p. 200) a sharp In 2019, Amnesty International (2019) challenged electric vehicle reduction of material demand, a redefinition of needs centred on manufacturers to commit to sourcing “ethical batteries”. This is no easy ensuring a good quality of life for all, and a vision of resource use feat. While there are various mining industry initiatives in this sense, focused on minimising pressure on ecosystems. This proposal is broadly these are voluntary: producers can unilaterally decide to comply (or not) consistent with post-development approaches and the recently emerged with them. The same goes for other international reporting standards on tradition of pluriverse (Kothari, Salleh, Escobar, Demaria, & Acosta, sustainability and sourcing codes (Church & Crawford, 2018, p. 56; 2019), as well as with degrowth advocates’ call for considerable re­ Whitmore, 2021). ductions in material use and resource and energy consumption, partic­ Transparency is also a major challenge, given that the supply chains ularly in global North economies (e.g. Hickel, 2020). of transition minerals such as nickel are convoluted and murky (Church In endorsing such proposals, however, we also emphasise that, for a & Crawford, 2018, p. 56; Müller & Reckordt, 2017). From extraction, to post-extractivist vision to materialise, control over the means of (re) processing and smelting, to incorporation into steel and alloys, to production, including energy, land and subsoil resources, must be embedding in renewable technologies, the trajectory from mine to wrestled away from capital and the (trans)national institutional struc­ renewable technology involves a wide range of actors, across countries tures that sustain its dominance, and given back to indigenous, peasant and industries. Various nickel mining operations are shrouded in opac­ and other dispossessed populations. A path to post-extractivism, there­ ity. The Solway Investment Group mentioned in the previous section fore, must emerge out of the actually existing indigenous, peasant, (footnote 9), for instance, is a mining company headquartered in working class, anti-racist and feminist-territorial struggles against the Switzerland, but operationalised through a network of subsidiaries and material and epistemic violence of colonial-extractive capitalism. shell companies in Malta, the Virgin Islands, and St. Vincent and Grassroots initiatives engaging with the Green New Deal and related Grenadines (Garside, 2019). Understanding and unpacking these supply frameworks offer promising opportunities in this sense. For instance, the chains is an important challenge for activists wishing to tackle the social Ecosocial Pact of the South (Pacto Ecosocial del Sur), developed by a Latin and environmental injustices that characterise the green American alliance of scholars and activists, puts forward a “radical energy-extractivism nexus, a challenge that future political ecology socio-ecological transition” away from extractivism as one of its core research could contribute to addressing. proposals, together with a move towards “a renewable, decentralised, Several organisations scrutinising transition mineral supply chains decommodified, and democratic energy matrix” (Pacto Ecosocial del have called for a prioritisation of recycling and recovery processes to Sur, n.d., our translation). Similarly, the US-based Climate Justice Alli­ minimise the growth of new extractive frontiers (Bolger et al., 2021; ance’s proposal of a “Frontline Green New Deal’’ is rooted in a just Dominish et al., 2019; Whitmore, 2021). Additionally, they propose transition from an extractive to a regenerative economy (based on caring minimising the socio-ecological abuses described above as endemic to and sacredness, cooperation, social and ecological well-being, and deep mineral supply chains through various measures: a strengthening of democracy) (Climate Justice Alliance, 2019; Lennon, 2021). A corporate accountability and due diligence legislation; more robust post-extractive vision of Green New Deals also requires us to transcend regulations for the import and export of metals; and the creation and the national imaginary in which such proposals have remained trapped, protection of “no-go zones” for mining (Church & Crawford, 2018, p. 56; supplanting it with an internationalist framework that is cognisant of Müller & Reckordt, 2017). All this may help to reduce some of the and seeks to counteract the (neo-)colonial and capitalist dynamics of socio-environmental burdens associated with transition mineral mining, unequal exchange between North and South (Kaur Paul and Gebrial, and perhaps improve its development potential for affected populations 2021). This implies making central considerations of reparations for and countries. Without dismissing such proposals, however, we suggest colonial, ecological and climate debts (Ajl, 2021), and the dismantling of that a truly just transition would need to be placed in the context of a corporate monopolies and the forced trade of international financial more radical socio-environmental transformation, whose main features institutions. 7 D. Andreucci et al. Political Geography 107 (2023) 102997 5.3. The socio-ecological fix as a “battlefield” minerals adds to critical geographical literatures that consider the expansion of industrial-scale renewables as a central feature of an Before concluding, we want to briefly return to the notion of the ongoing socio-ecological fix to climate-induced crises of capitalism. socio-ecological fix, and the question of its implications for emancipa­ These literatures contend that a shift toward wind and solar technologies tory politics. Informed by the Regulation approach, the main focus of the is increasing the spatial requirements of energy generation, leading to socio-ecological fix is, in a sense, conservative: it is “fundamentally new rounds of primitive accumulation, land enclosures and green concerned with how capitalism survives, not with how it might be ‘dis­ grabbing. We have argued that considering the material intensity of assembled’” (Ekers & Prudham, 2015, p. 2442). Critics point out that this industrial-scale renewables, as part of an expanding green energy- approach may be politically disempowering, to the extent that it posits extractivism nexus, points to the likelihood that land-based conflicts capital and the capitalist state as more unitary, rational and able to will be increasingly compounded by the dispossession effects of overcome socio-environmental challenges than it actually is; and that it extracting and processing transition minerals. may divert attention from revolutionary strategy (Chambers, 2021). We have elaborated on the idea of decarbonisation by dispossession While mindful of this risk, we maintain that the notion of the in order to direct attention to the grave socio-environmental implica­ socio-ecological fix could nonetheless be useful for understanding the tions of the ongoing, capital-led transition. Not only does renewable profoundly contradictory, haphazard and irrational character of capi­ energy expansion tend to impact disproportionately rural populations talist responses to the climate crisis, and the political opportunities that who are often historically marginalized; it is also accompanied and may emerge as a result. sustained by an unprecedented expansion in mining, largely concen­ Much like what Thea Riofrancos (2019) argues with regard to the trated in extractive peripheries of the global South. As we detailed Green New Deal framework, we suggest considering the ongoing through the case of nickel, this expansion contributes to ecological socio-ecological fix as a “battlefield”. Capital’s efforts to adapt to a destruction and territorial dispossession, propagating human rights changing climate are no doubt politically regressive, and likely to abuses and direct as well as indirect violence. This contributes to the reinforce socio-environmental injustice, colonialism, racism and, creation of green sacrifice zones, that is, territories and populations that potentially, fascism (The Zetkin Collective, 2021). At the same time, are socio-ecologically debased for the sake of decarbonising economies however, the conjuncture of a profound political economic and in the imperial cores. geographical restructuring of capital’s energy matrix, which the idea of At the same time, our analysis casts serious doubts as to whether a the socio-ecological fix captures, also opens up spaces of political shift to renewable energies and electric automotion will be enough to engagement and emancipatory possibilities. save capitalism from itself. Such a shift is unlikely to usher in more so­ As shown by the deeply contradictory and uneven character of global cially and environmentally just futures. Genuinely emancipatory ways decarbonisation strategies, the capitalist class is extremely divided in its of tackling the ongoing climate catastrophe, we have argued, must be attitude towards climate change (think, for instance, of how the fossil pursued against and beyond the material and political infrastructures of fuel industry keeps trying to sabotage attempts to regulate the sector, or colonial-extractive capitalism. It remains to be seen whether grassroots the rampant climate negationism of most far right parties). There is also and radical reclamations of the Green New Deal will succeed in opening a clear disconnection between the impressive projected expansion of up opportunities for a post-extractivist (and hence anti-colonial and technologies such as renewables and electric automotion, and its rela­ post-capitalist) transformation, capable of disconnecting decarbon­ tive irrelevance in terms of global emissions reduction to date (Sweeney isation from dispossession—or if this framework will remain trapped in et al., 2021). The expansion of the green energy-extractivism nexus as the regressive logic of a socio-ecological fix. the core strategy for global “decarbonisation” has so far failed to deliver in terms of emission reductions from energy. At the same time, as the Declaration of competing interest findings of this article suggest, it is clearly aggravating the ongoing socioecological crisis, with particularly disastrous effects on extractive None. peripheries, primarily in the global South. This points to something of a structural inability of capital to stop digging its own grave—or, perhaps Acknowledgements more precisely, an ingrained tendency to make the grave deeper through each attempt at getting out of it (Fraser, 2022). We wish to thank Antonis Vradis and four anonymous reviewers for In this sense, we are sceptical of the “cautiously hopeful” position of their helpful comments on previous versions of this article. Castree and Christophers (2015) regarding the ability of capitalism in Diego Andreucci’s research for this article was funded through a general, and of financial capital in particular, to lead a transition to­ postdoctoral fellowship at the International Institute of Social Stud­ wards less environmentally harmful and more socially necessary in­ ies–Erasmus University Rotterdam, co-financed by the Dutch Research frastructures. Yet, we do see in capital’s muddled response to the crisis Council (NWO) as part of its support for the Prince Claus Chair opportunities for radical ruptures, and argue that the existence of a fix 2020–2022 (grant no. W 02.24.111); and by a “Maria Zambrano” doesn’t preclude pursuing such ruptures. This has implications for social postdoctoral fellowship of the Spanish Ministry of Science and movements concerned with climate justice. For instance, seeing energy Innovation. transitions as a fix to a crisis of accumulation helps us to be more wary of Gustavo Garcia Lopez acknowledges support by the Portuguese how simply focusing on the negative impacts of fossil fuels, while losing Foundation of Science and Technology (FCT), under the Individual track of the capitalist and colonial structures underpinning their pro­ Scientific Employment Stimulus (CEEC Individual), Contract CEECIND/ duction, may be insufficient: there is little reason to believe that the 04850/2017/CP1402/CT0010. same, socio-ecologically destructive and unjust modes of energy pro­ Marta Conde received funding from a Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant duction and provision will not continue even under optimistic renew­ (No. 897072) and from the research project Recercaixa 2017 ‘Activism able scenarios. Mobilising Science’ (Obra Social La Caixa and ACUP). Christos Zografos would like to acknowledge support by the GRES 6. Conclusions research project (Contract number: CNS2022-136115) funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation MCIN/AEI/10.13039/ This article has contributed to ongoing research and conversations 501100011033 and the European Union Next Generation/PRTR on extractivism and energy transitions, by highlighting the centrality of programme. minerals for so-called low-carbon technologies such as renewables and electric automotion. We have shown that a focus on the role of transition 8 D. Andreucci et al. Political Geography 107 (2023) 102997 References Bridge, G., Bouzarovski, S., Bradshaw, M., & Eyre, N. (2013). Geographies of energy transition: Space, place and the low-carbon economy. Energy Policy, 53, 331–340. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.10.066 Acosta, A. (2013). Extractivism and neoextractivism: Two sides of the same curse. In Brigida, A. C. (2020). Contentious Guatemala nickel mine ‘ignores coronavirus lockdown’. M. Lang, & D. 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