Articles Is green growth happening? An empirical analysis of achieved versus Paris-compliant CO2–GDP decoupling in high-income countries Jefim Vogel, Jason Hickel Summary Background Scientists have raised concerns about whether high-income countries, with their high per-capita CO2 Lancet Planet Health 2023; emissions, can decarbonise fast enough to meet their obligations under the Paris Agreement if they continue to 7: e759–69 pursue aggregate economic growth. Over the past decade, some countries have reduced their CO2 emissions while Sustainability Research Institute, School of Earth and increasing their gross domestic product (absolute decoupling). Politicians and media have hailed this as green growth. Environment, University of In this empirical study, we aimed to assess whether these achievements are consistent with the Paris Agreement, and Leeds, Leeds, UK (J Vogel MSc); whether Paris-compliant decoupling is within reach. Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA-UAB) and Department of Methods We developed and implemented a novel approach to assess whether decoupling achievements in high- Anthropology, Autonomous income countries are consistent with the Paris climate and equity goals. We identified 11 high-income countries that University of Barcelona, achieved absolute decoupling between 2013 and 2019. We assessed the achieved consumption-based CO2 emission Barcelona, Spain reductions and decoupling rates of these countries against Paris-compliant rates, defined here as rates consistent with (Prof J Hickel PhD); International Inequalities Institute, London national fair-shares of the remaining global carbon budgets for a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1·5°C or School of Economics and 1·7°C (representing the lower [1·5°C] and upper [well below 2°C] bounds of the Paris target). Political Science, London, UK (Prof J Hickel) Findings The emission reductions that high-income countries achieved through absolute decoupling fall far short of Correspondence to: Paris-compliant rates. At the achieved rates, these countries would on average take more than 220 years to reduce their Prof Jason Hickel, Institute of Environmental Science and emissions by 95%, emitting 27 times their remaining 1·5°C fair-shares in the process. To meet their 1·5°C fair-shares Technology, Autonomous alongside continued economic growth, decoupling rates would on average need to increase by a factor of ten by 2025. University of Barcelona, 08193 Barcelona, Spain Interpretation The decoupling rates achieved in high-income countries are inadequate for meeting the climate and j.e.hickel@lse.ac.uk equity commitments of the Paris Agreement and cannot legitimately be considered green. If green is to be consistent with the Paris Agreement, then high-income countries have not achieved green growth, and are very unlikely to be able to achieve it in the future. To achieve Paris-compliant emission reductions, high-income countries will need to pursue post-growth demand-reduction strategies, reorienting the economy towards sufficiency, equity, and human wellbeing, while also accelerating technological change and efficiency improvements. Funding None. Copyright © 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open Access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. Introduction growth can be made green. For evidence, they point to High-income countries, with their high per-capita CO2 countries that have recently achieved absolute decoupling emissions, must reduce their emissions at an extremely of gross domestic product (GDP) from trade-corrected fast rate to comply with the climate targets and equity CO2 emissions (ie, increasing GDP alongside declining commitments of the Paris Agreement. Economic growth emissions).11–13 Several commentators have cited these makes such rapid emission reductions very difficult to achievements as examples of green growth; perhaps most achieve. The problem is that, under any given scenario of prominently is a 2022 Financial Times article claiming technological change, an increase in aggregate that “green growth is already here”, and “may take us to production and consumption entails more energy net zero all on its own”.14 demand, and consequently more CO2 emissions, than In this study, we assess whether high-income countries would be the case without such an increase (appendix have achieved what can reasonably be considered green See Online for appendix p 6).1–4 Therefore, there are major concerns as to whether growth, or whether they are likely to achieve it in the it is possible for high-income countries to uphold their future. To do this, we need a meaningful benchmark of obligations under the Paris Agreement while continuing what it would take for growth to be green. to pursue economic growth.4–10 It has long been understood that emissions can Politicians in high-income countries have typically decline alongside growing GDP, specifically when the responded to this problem by insisting that economic percentage increase in GDP is outweighed by a larger www.thelancet.com/planetary-health Vol 7 September 2023 e759 Articles Research in context Evidence before this study such Paris-compliant emission reductions alongside continued Scientists have warned that growth can only be green if economic growth (ie, required for what could legitimately be decoupling is fast enough to reduce emissions in line with the called green growth). Paris Agreement. Previous studies have compared national Implications of all the available evidence decoupling-based emission reduction rates to the global Decoupling achievements in high-income countries fall average rates required for meeting particular climate targets, dramatically short of Paris-compliant emission reductions. but not to the (much faster) rates required in high-income Green growth is therefore not occurring, and appears out of countries to align with the climate and equity commitments of reach for high-income countries. Our findings suggest that the the Paris Agreement. continued pursuit of economic growth in high-income Added value of this study countries is at odds with the climate and equity commitments Our study addresses this gap by calculating nation-specific of the Paris Agreement. Paris-compliant mitigation in high- emission reduction rates consistent with the Paris climate and income countries will require post-growth demand-reduction equity commitments, and decoupling rates required to achieve strategies in addition to technological decarbonisation efforts. percentage reduction in the emissions intensity of GDP. Furthermore, several previous analyses of absolute Such absolute decoupling is of course necessary for decoupling, or of emission reductions in the context of green growth, but it is not sufficient. It is not enough to decoupling, have not excluded periods of recession (which just reduce emissions by any amount; countries need by definition are not absolute decoupling, and where to reduce their emissions to net zero, and fast enough to emission reductions cannot be attributed to decoupling limit global warming to 1·5°C or at least well below 2°C in alone), and have not excluded countries where emissions an equitable manner, as per the requirements of the Paris have formerly decreased but recently plateaued or Agreement. Insufficient emission reductions will result increased (ie, no longer absolute decoupling).8,11–13 in dangerous and possibly catastrophic global warming and exacerbate climate injustice. Such a scenario cannot Methods be considered green. Several studies have established that Identifying high-income countries that have recently the benchmark for green growth should therefore not achieved absolute decoupling just be about whether countries achieve absolute For the purposes of this study, we defined absolute decoupling, but whether they achieve sufficiently rapid decoupling as a sustained reduction trend in consumption- absolute decoupling to meet Paris climate and equity based CO2 emissions alongside simultaneous continuous commitments.5,7,15 It is ultimately a question of speed. increases in real GDP. We developed a novel empirical approach for assessing We considered sustained reduction trends in whether high-income countries are decoupling GDP emissions (here, 7 years), because informing reliable from CO2 emissions fast enough to meet the climate and multidecade mitigation strategies requires a robust equity targets of the Paris Agreement. We identified all reduction signal. To identify overall reduction trends Annex-1 countries that have recently achieved sustained despite year-on-year fluctuation, and to distinguish reductions in consumption-based CO2 emissions along­ reduction trends from plateauing or rebounding trends side continuous GDP growth. We assessed whether the (which regression techniques alone might not capture), mitigation rates these countries achieved through such we considered the symmetric 5-year moving average absolute decoupling are consistent with their fair-shares (3-year average at the start and end of the time series) (defined here as population-proportionate shares) of of annual emissions data. We primarily considered Paris-compliant carbon budgets, as a basic criterion for consumption-based CO2 emissions (rather than green growth. Finally, we compared these countries’ territorial emissions), because in a globalised economy, achieved decoupling rates to the future decoupling rates national contributions to global emissions (reductions) that would be required to meet their fair-share carbon need to reflect emissions embodied in trade. Territorial budgets alongside continued economic growth, to eval­ emissions are less suitable, because they do not capture uate whether green growth is within reach. (changes in) imported goods and services, or offshoring This research addresses an important gap. Previous of industrial production (appendix pp 11–13).7,13 We studies have compared achieved national decoupling rates considered continuous year-on-year increases in GDP, or mitigation rates to the global average rates required because this is what green growth proponents seek to for 1·5°C or 2°C,7,11,16,17 but not to the nation-specific achieve, and because even a short-term reduction in requirements that result from the equity commitments of GDP is considered a crisis (and can cause profound the Paris Agreement. These equity commitments are hardship) in the current economic system. crucial for protecting the prospects for development On the basis of this definition, and focusing on high- and poverty eradication in lower-income countries. income countries, we looked for absolute decoupling e760 www.thelancet.com/planetary-health Vol 7 September 2023 Articles among all Annex-1 countries for which data were 2°C”.23 We note however that global warming of 1·7°C is available (36 countries), using GDP data (GDP at extremely harmful and dangerous,24 and should not be purchaser’s prices in constant 2015 prices in US dollars) accepted. from the World Bank18 and CO2 emissions data from the Global Carbon Project.19–22 Estimating fair-share national carbon budgets We analysed recent achievements of absolute decoupling, We operationalised national climate targets in terms of to assess the near-term mitigation and decoupling national fair-shares of the remaining global carbon budgets requirements for green growth against relevant (recent) for a 50% probability of limiting global warming to 1·5°C historical precedents. For this purpose, we considered the or 1·7°C, using the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate period from 2013 to 2019, after the 2008–09 financial crisis Change (IPCC)25 estimates of the remaining global carbon and its aftermath (which in many countries continued budgets from 2020 (appendix p 3). We derived national until as late as 2012, in some countries even longer), and fair-shares by allocating global carbon budget shares in before the COVID-19 crisis (which caused recessions in proportion to each country’s share of the global population26 most countries; appendix p 2). (averaged between 2020 and 2050), using the United Nations’27 historical population estimates (for 2020–21) and Estimating achieved rates of emission reductions, the medium fertility population projection (2022–50).28 GDP growth, and decoupling This operationalisation of the Paris Agreement29 We considered mitigation rates m in terms of year-on-year commitment to reducing emissions in line with common relative reduction rates (or negative relative change rates) but differentiated responsibilities should be seen as a min­ in consumption-based emissions. imum inter­pretation of equity regarding future mitigation, We defined decoupling as a decrease in the carbon taking historical carbon debt to be a separate issue that intensity of GDP, that is to say a decrease in CO2 emissions must be compensated in other ways (appendix pp 8–10). per unit of GDP. The decoupling rate d is then defined as The fair-share national carbon budgets are defined the relative reduction rate in the carbon intensity of GDP. from 2020 to the time of global net zero. To obtain This definition conceptualises relative decoupling (g>d>0 a country’s remaining fair-share national carbon budgets and m<0) and absolute decoupling (d>g>0 and m>0) as as of 2023, we subtracted its cumulative 2020–22 special cases of the general case of decoupling (d>0), and consumption-based CO2 emissions from its 2020 fair- ensures that the decoupling rate is well defined for growing share national carbon budget. Given that our dataset of or declining emissions and growing or declining GDP consumption-based emissions extended only until 2020, (where g is the GDP growth rate). Moreover, this definition we estimated 2021 and 2022 consumption-based CO2 enabled us to calculate decoupling rates implied in emissions on the basis of data or estimates of GDP and pathways or scenarios of emissions and GDP, or to carbon intensities of GDP. Our estimates of 2021 calculate emissions pathways from scenarios of decoupling and 2022 carbon intensities of GDP, in turn, were rates and GDP. It is important to note that the inverse computed as an extrapolation of the 2013–19 trends. Our inference is not valid; pathways of GDP cannot reasonably estimates of 2022 GDP data were obtained by multiplying be inferred from assumed emissions pathways and 2021 GDP data (from the World Bank) with the ratio decoupling rates because emissions are the outcome of of 2022 GDP forecasts to 2021 GDP data (on the basis of economic activity, not the other way around, and because OECD30 data and forecasts). decoupling reflects both physical and monetary changes in the economy. Emissions pathways, mitigation rates, and decoupling For each country, we estimated annualised compound rates consistent with fair-share national carbon budgets 2013–19 mitigation rates using linear regression on the We calculated national CO2 emissions pathways negative natural logarithm of CO2 emissions,20 GDP consistent with national carbon budgets on the basis of growth rates using linear regression on the natural Raupach31 curves. For each country, we thus computed logarithm of GDP, and decoupling rates using linear a fair-share emissions pathway, starting from current regression on the negative natural logarithm of the emissions via a smooth transition from the 2013–19 carbon intensity of GDP. For simplicity, we will refer to average mitigation rate to an asymptotic mitigation rate, these as 2013–19 average rates (noting they are technically with ramp up starting in 2023, such that cumulative annualised compound rates). emissions under that pathway meet a given fair-share national carbon budget from 2023 (appendix pp 3–5). Global climate targets This method is consistent with a limited level of Our primary analysis focused on a 50% chance of limiting deployment of negative-emission technologies, up until global warming to 1·5°C, as aspired to in the Paris a level that balances residual, impossible-to-eliminate Agreement, and reaffirmed in the Glasgow climate pact. CO2 emissions (such as in cement pro­ duction), thus For comparison, we repeated the analysis for a 50% chance bringing overall CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and of staying under 1·7°C, operationalising the minimum industry down to net zero. However, net-negative CO2 Paris target of keeping global warming to ”well below emissions are precluded, given the profound risks and www.thelancet.com/planetary-health Vol 7 September 2023 e761 Articles 160 2013–19 data (absolute decoupling) Role of the funding source 2020–22 data and estimates (recession and rebound) There was no funding source for this study. Business-as-usual pathway (continues 2013–19 decoupling and GDP trend) 1·5°C fair-share pathway (meets fair-share carbon budget for 50% chance of 1·5°C) 140 Results Only 11 of the 36 assessed high-income countries 120 achieved absolute decou­ pling of consumption-based CO2 emissions from GDP between 2013 and 2019. CO2 emissions (% of 2022 levels) 100 These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. However, none of 80 these countries achieved emission reductions that are fast enough for a 50% chance of staying under 1·5°C 60 with minimum equity principles (figure 1). The discrepancy between existing trends and required 40 emission reductions is extremely large. The 11 high-income countries that achieved absolute 20 decoupling differ in how far they fall short of the required mitigation rates (figure 2). These differences are caused by differences in their achieved mitigation rates (red 0 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 trend lines), and differences in how fast they need to cut Year their emissions (dotted green curves) to stay within their respective carbon-budget fair-shares, as they start from Figure 1: Emission reductions achieved in high-income countries through recent absolute decoupling are substantially different per-capita emissions (appendix highly insufficient for complying with their fair-shares of the 1·5°C global carbon budget Empirical data and future scenarios of consumption-based CO2 emissions (expressed as percentages of 2022 levels) for pp 19–20). The UK comes closest to what would be the 11 high-income countries that have recently achieved absolute decoupling (thin curves), and their population- required for meeting its 1·5°C fair-share, but still falls weighted average (bold curves) are shown. Data for the absolute decoupling period (2013–19) are shown in dark grey, markedly short. with data and estimates for the recession and rebound period (2020–22) shown in light grey. The dashed red curves A continuation of the 2013–19 average emission show projected future emissions for a continuation of country-level 2013–19 average GDP growth rates and decoupling rates (business as usual). The dashed blue curves show emissions pathways that would limit the reduction rates achieved in the 11 countries through cumulative future emissions of countries to their respective fair-shares of the remaining global carbon budget for decoupling (business as usual) would not even suffice to a 50% chance of a maximum increase of 1·5°C. Differences between different country pathways (thin curves) reflect reduce their emissions to net zero by 2050, much less differentiated mitigation achievements and fair-share mitigation requirements (not uncertainty as such). GDP=gross to deliver the earlier net-zero dates (on average, in the late domestic product. 2030s) required for these countries to comply with their challenges associated with large-scale deployment of 1·5°C fair-shares. On the basis of their 2013–19 decoupling negative-emission technologies (appendix p 15).32–35 achievements, the 11 countries would take between For each country, the required mitigation rates, that is 73 years and 369 years (223 years, on average) to reduce the mitigation rates required to deliver the fair-share their respective 2022 emissions by 95%, and would burn emissions pathway, were calculated as the year-on-year between five times and 162 times (on average, 27 times) relative emission reduction rates under that pathway. their respective remaining post-2022 national fair-shares The required decoupling rates (ie, the decou­ pling of the global carbon budget for 1·5°C in the process. rates that would be required to deliver the fair-share The emission reductions achieved via decoupling during emis­sions pathway in a scenario of continued GDP 2013–19 are clearly inadequate for high-income countries growth) were calculated as the year-on-year relative to deliver on their 1·5°C fair-shares. Furthermore, the reduction rates of the carbon intensities of GDP disjuncture between achieved and required mitigations implied in the combina­tion of the fair-share emissions rates is very large (figure 3). On average, the 2013–19 pathway and a GDP path­way of continued growth at the decoupling achievements in the 11 high-income countries 2013–19 average growth rate. delivered mitigation rates of 1·6% (range 0·8–4·0) per year. By contrast, the fair-share emissions pathways would on Business-as-usual emissions pathways average require mitigation rates of 30% per year by 2025, For comparison, we also calculated business-as-usual and 38% per year by 2030. Even the UK would need to emissions pathways for each country, assuming a con­ accelerate its year-on-year mitigation rate by a factor of five tinuation of 2013–19 average GDP growth rates and by 2025 and by a factor of seven by 2030 (from its 2013–19 decoupling rates (appendix p 5). average of 3·1% per year to 16% per year by 2025, and 22% Sample averages reported in this manuscript give the per year by 2030). The other ten countries would all need population-weighted average across the 11 high-income to accelerate their mitigation rates by more than a factor of countries (or subsamples, where indicated). Reported ten within the next 4 years, and the lowest-performing ranges indicate the minimum and maximum values countries in our sample (Belgium, Australia, Austria, across our sample countries, not uncertainty as such. Canada, and Germany) by more than a factor of 30. e762 www.thelancet.com/planetary-health Vol 7 September 2023 Articles GDP 2013–19 CO2 2013–19 CO2 2013–19 trend CO2 business as usual CO2 1·5°C fair-share pathway Australia Austria Belgium Canada 120 Percentage of 2013 levels 100 80 60 40 20 0 Denmark France Germany Luxembourg 120 Percentage of 2013 levels 100 80 60 40 20 0 Netherlands Sweden UK Population-weighted average 120 Percentage of 2013 levels 100 80 60 40 20 0 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 Year Year Year Year Figure 2: In all high-income countries that have recently achieved absolute decoupling, the achieved emission reductions are far from the emission reductions required to comply with their 1·5°C fair-shares GDP and consumption-based CO2 emissions (expressed as percentages of the respective 2013 levels) for the 11 high-income countries that have recently achieved absolute decoupling, and for their population-weighted average (last panel) are shown. For the period 2013–19, GDP is shown in purple, and CO2 emissions are shown in dark grey, with the 2013–19 emissions trend superimposed in red. For the volatile period since the COVID-19 crisis (2020–22), GDP is shown in light purple, and CO2 emissions are shown in grey. The dashed red curves show projected emissions for a continuation of 2013–19 average GDP growth rates and decoupling rates (business as usual). The dashed blue curves show emissions pathways that would limit the future emissions of countries to their fair-shares in the remaining global carbon budget for a 50% chance of staying below 1·5°C. GDP=gross domestic product. To explicitly account for GDP growth rates, we need to to accelerate their decoupling rates by a factor of ten by consider decoupling rates (ie, year-on-year relative 2025 and by a factor of 12 by 2030. reductions in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP). The The above-mentioned analysis establishes that decoupling rates achieved in high-income countries decoupling achievements in high-income countries are between 2013 and 2019 fall far short of what would be inadequate for 1·5°C fair-shares. We now turn to our required for these countries to respect their 1·5°C fair- sensitivity analysis for 1·7°C fair-shares (reflecting the shares while continuing to pursue GDP growth at their minimum ambition of the Paris Agreement to limit 2013–19 average rates. In other words, the achieved global warming to “well below 2°C”).23 For this less decoupling rates are markedly insufficient to meet the ambitious (and more dangerous) global climate target, requirements for green growth (figure 4). the disjuncture between achieved and required rates of The UK, which combines relatively low per-capita mitigation and decoupling is less extreme, but emissions (6·9 Gt/cap in 2022) with relatively fast 2013–19 nevertheless very large in most cases (figure 5). On decoupling of 5·3% per year, would need to more than average, mitigation rates would need to accelerate by triple its decoupling rate by 2025 (to 17·4% per year) and more than a factor of eight by 2025, and by a factor of accelerate it by a factor of almost five by 2030 (to 23·9% 12 by 2030. Even across the better-performing countries, per year). Sweden, the country with the lowest per-capita mitigation rates would need to triple by 2025 (double in emissions (5·8 Gt/cap in 2022) and accordingly, the the UK) and accelerate by a factor of five by 2030 (by lowest required mitigation rates in our sample, would a factor of three in the UK). The required decoupling need to almost quadruple its decoupling rate by 2025 and rates would be more within reach in the best-performing accelerate it by more than a factor of five by 2030 (from its countries, but on average, decoupling rates would still 2013–19 average of 3·4% per year to 12·8% by 2025 and need to almost quadruple by 2025 and accelerate by 18·6% by 2030). On average, the 11 countries would need a factor of five by 2030. www.thelancet.com/planetary-health Vol 7 September 2023 e763 Articles 100 2013–19 average 220 years to reduce CO2 emissions by 95% and will exceed Required by 2025 for 1·5°C fair-share their fair-share carbon budgets by more than 27 times in Required by 2030 for 1·5°C fair-share 90 the process. If high-income countries exceed their fair- share carbon budgets, they either exacerbate climate 80 breakdown or appropriate the carbon budget shares of lower-income countries, or most likely they do both. There CO2 emissions reduction rate (% per year) 70 is nothing green about this. If we are to refer to what is happening in these countries as green growth, then green 60 growth is not adequate for avoiding climate catastrophe, much less for achieving climate justice. Alter­natively, if 50 green growth is supposed to be consistent with the climate and equity targets of the Paris Agreement, then green 40 growth has not been achieved in high-income nations, and it appears very unlikely to be achieved in the future. 30 Our findings are robust to different future population scenarios (high-fertility variant and low-fertility variant)28,36 20 and to meaningful variations in the criteria for absolute decoupling of consumption-based CO2 emissions from 10 GDP. In the assessed period, no high-income (Annex-1) 0 country came closer to achieving the required decoupling rates than the best-performing countries that meet our a ia um da k ce y g ds en e UK an ali ar ur ag str an lan na ed nm definition for absolute decoupling (ie, the best cases in our lgi bo str rm er Au Fr Ca Sw er Av Be m Au Ge De th xe Ne analysis). For many other high-income countries, the Lu required decoupling rates are even further out of reach, and many in fact still increased their emissions between Figure 3: The emission reduction rates required for high-income countries to respect their 1·5°C fair-shares 2013 and 2019. Importantly, falling short of the required (blue) are several times faster than the emission reduction rates they have achieved through recent absolute decoupling (red) mitigation rates in any given year makes it even harder for The red bars indicate 2013–19 average year-on-year emission reduction rates. For the 1·5°C fair-share emissions a country to be on course to meet its fair-share carbon pathways, the required year-on-year emission reduction rates increase from 2025 (light blue) to 2030 (dark blue), budget, because higher emissions in a given year would as the emissions pathways (Raupach curves) involve a gradually ramped-up exponential decay rate. The bars require even faster mitigation and decoupling rates labelled "Average" refer to the population-weighted average of the 11 high-income countries. subsequently. Our conclusions remain the same when Discussion assessing our sample countries on territorial rather than Our results show that the mitigation rates achieved in consumption-based emissions, that is to say when high-income countries through recent absolute ignoring emissions embodied in trade (appendix pp 11–13). decoupling fall markedly short of the rates required for For a few countries, the required decoupling rates for these countries to remain within their fair-shares of the 1·5°C and in particular 1·7°C fair-shares would be more global carbon budget for a 50% chance of limiting global within reach, but across all sample countries, by 2025, warming to 1·5°C. The immense increase in decoupling decoupling rates would on average need to be accelerated rates that would be required to make continued economic by a factor of 13 to comply with 1·5°C fair-shares, and by growth in high-income countries compatible with a factor of five to comply with 1·7°C fair-shares. national 1·5°C fair-shares appears to be empirically out Our analysis is conservative in several regards and of reach, even for the best-performing countries. In most should thus be seen as a best case for green growth. First, cases, even the decoupling rates required for reconciling our allocation of the global carbon budget reflects only continued economic growth with national fair-shares for a minimum interpretation of equity regarding future a 50% chance of 1·7°C (reflecting the lower-end ambition mitigation. Stronger notions of equity would result in of the Paris Agreement) remain out of reach. Our smaller carbon budgets for high-income countries, and analysis thus suggests that green growth approaches, thus require even faster mitigation and decoupling rates understood here as pursuing climate mitigation (appendix pp 8–10). Second, recent estimates37–39 suggest alongside continued economic growth, are inadequate that the remaining global carbon budgets might be even for high-income countries to deliver on their Paris smaller than the ones used here, which would require obligations. Further economic growth in high-income even faster mitigation and decoupling rates. Third, we countries is at odds with the climate and equity estimate decoupling rates for the business-as-usual and commitments of the Paris Agreement. fair-share pathways assuming a continuation of 2013–19 Narratives that celebrate decoupling achievements in average GDP growth rates, whereas green growth high-income countries as green growth are thus misleading advocates typically aspire to higher growth rates. With and represent a form of greenwashing. At the achieved higher future growth rates, emission reductions from mitigation rates, these countries will on average take over a continuation of achieved decoupling rates would be e764 www.thelancet.com/planetary-health Vol 7 September 2023 Articles 2013–19 data 2020–22 data and estimates 2013–19 average Required for 1·5°C fair-share Australia Austria Belgium Canada 60 40 60 80 50 Decoupling rate 50 30 (% per year) 60 40 40 30 20 40 30 20 20 10 20 10 10 0 0 0 0 Denmark France Germany Luxembourg 30 25 20 40 50 Decoupling rate 20 40 (% per year) 15 30 15 30 10 20 10 20 5 10 10 5 0 0 0 0 Netherlands Sweden UK Population-weighted average 40 25 40 20 30 Decoupling rate 20 30 (% per year) 15 20 15 10 20 10 10 5 10 5 0 0 0 0 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 Year Year Year Year Figure 4: The decoupling rates achieved in high-income countries between 2013 and 2019 fall far short of the rates required for green growth Decoupling rates (ie, year-on-year percentage reduction rates in CO2 emissions per unit of gross domestic product [GDP]) for the 11 high-income countries that achieved absolute decoupling between 2013 and 2019, and for their population-weighted average (last panel) are shown. For the period of absolute decoupling (2013–19), decoupling rates are shown in dark grey, with the 2013–19 average rates superimposed in red. For the volatile period since the COVID-19 crisis (2020–22), decoupling rates are shown in light grey. The dashed blue curves show the decoupling rates that would be required for green growth (ie, required for these countries to deliver emission reductions consistent with their fair-shares in the remaining global carbon budget for a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1·5°C, while continuing to grow their economies at their 2013–19 average GDP growth rates). even smaller, and even faster decoupling rates would be can certainly be accelerated. However, there are real required to respect fair-share carbon budgets. Fourth, physical limits to how much and how fast decoupling can our analysis assumes adequate mitigation beginning in be sped up within a growth-based approach. Under 2023, but this mitigation does not appear to be occurring. growth-oriented conditions, decoupling (indeed miti­ This delay and any further delay in decisive mitigation gation) relies mainly on replacing existing infrastructure action necessitates even faster mitigation and decoupling and technology (eg, energy infrastructure and the car rates subsequently, thus moving green growth even fleet) with low-carbon or low-energy alternatives. This further out of reach. type of transition cannot be done at just any desired A limitation of our analysis is that the consumption- speed, nor promptly accelerated at any desired rate, given based CO2 emissions data used here do not include available production facilities, know how, labour, material emissions from agriculture, forestry, and land use, nor resources, existing infrastructure, and so on. And slower emissions from international aviation and shipping decoupling rates in the near term would require much (appendix p 14). It is worth noting that adding these faster decoupling rates later to remain within a given emissions would mean that high-income countries carbon budget. The large, near-instantaneous accel­ would need to reduce their emissions even faster (to eration of decoupling that would be required for high- meet an even smaller remaining budget from an even income countries to achieve green growth is thus very higher starting point), and the disjuncture between unlikely to be feasible. achieved and required decoupling would be even larger, Given the limitations of green growth approaches, what thus reinforcing our conclusions. Given the robustness can high-income countries do to achieve faster emission of our results, the conservativeness of our methodological reductions? A crucial step is to stop the pursuit choices, and the conservativeness of the limitations, we of aggregate economic growth and instead pursue are confident that our conclusions are robust. post-growth approaches oriented towards sufficiency, Our findings have important implications for climate equity, and wellbeing.4,40–42 Post-growth approaches entail mitigation policy in high-income countries. Decoupling equitably reducing carbon or energy intensive and www.thelancet.com/planetary-health Vol 7 September 2023 e765 Articles 2013–19 data (absolute decoupling) 2013–19 data 2020–22 data and estimates (recession and rebound) 2020–22 data and estimates Business-as-usual pathway (continues 2013–19 decoupling and 2013–19 average GDP trend) Required for 1·7°C fair-share 1·7°C fair-share pathway (meets fair-share carbon budget for Required for 1·5°C fair-share 50% chance of 1·7ºC) 1·5°C fair-share pathway (meets fair-share carbon budget for 50% chance of 1·5ºC) 45 140 40 120 35 CO2 emissions (% of 2022 levels) Decoupling rate (% per year) 100 30 80 25 20 60 15 40 10 20 5 0 0 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050 Year Year Figure 5: Emission reductions (left) and decoupling rates (right) achieved in high-income countries through absolute decoupling are insufficient for complying with their 1·5°C fair-shares or even just with their 1·7°C fair-shares Population-weighted averages across the 11 high-income countries that achieved absolute decoupling between 2013 and 2019 are shown. Left panel: consumption- based CO2 emissions for the 2013–19 absolute decoupling period (dark grey), a business-as-usual continuation of 2013–19 trends (dashed red), and fair-share pathways that meet national fair-shares of the global carbon budgets for a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1·5°C (dashed dark blue) and 1·7°C (dashed light blue), expressed as percentages of 2022 emissions levels, are shown. Right panel: 2013–19 annual (dark grey) and average (red) decoupling rates versus decoupling rates required for 1·5°C fair-shares (dashed dark blue) and 1·7°C fair-shares (dashed light blue)—ie for reducing emissions in line with emissions pathways that comply with national fair-shares of the global carbon budgets for a 50% chance of limiting global warming to 1·5°C and 1·7°C, respectively, while continuing to grow national gross domestic product at 2013–19 average growth rates are shown. less-necessary forms of production and consumption,42–45 provisioning systems.44–46,51–55 Policy makers can take several improving provisioning systems,46–50 and shifting to low- steps toward this end: shifting away from economic growth carbon, low-energy alternatives for necessary goods and as a core objective, and instead prioritising equity, human services.44,45,51,52 These measures reduce aggregate wellbeing, and ecological sustainability;40,41,57–59 scaling down economic activity and decrease total energy demand, thus energy-intensive or carbon-intensive and less-necessary directly driving down emissions while also enabling forms of production and consumption (eg, sports utility faster decarbonisation3,52–55 (by reducing the amount of vehicles, air travel, industrial meat and dairy, fast fashion, renewable energy infrastructure that needs to be deployed weapons, cruises, mansions, and private jets);43–45,51 reduc­ing overall, and the emissions entailed in the production, income and wealth inequality, and curtailing the purchasing installation, and maintenance of that infrastructure;3 power and consumption of wealthy classes (eg, via wealth appendix p 6). Rapid renewable-energy deployment and taxes and maximum income thresholds);54,60–62 insulating efficiency improvements remain essen­ tial and can be buildings and repurposing buildings to min­ imise new accelerated through public finance and regulation. builds;42,51,52,63 reducing food waste, and shifting to Indeed, post-growth demand-reduction strategies free up agroecological farming techniques and predominantly productive capacities (factories, labour, materials), which plant-based diets;51,64–66 introducing laws to end planned can be redirected to further accelerate decarbonisation obsolescence, lengthen product lifespans, and guarantee efforts, with public works and a job guarantee. rights to repair;42,51,67 shifting away from private cars while In decoupling terms, the measures described here also improving public transit, bike systems, and substantially and rapidly reduce the overall carbon walkability;42,51,68 and shifting from commodified for-profit intensity of the economy, and thus accelerate decoupling provisioning to decommodified, socially and ecologically beyond what can be achieved in a growth-oriented beneficial not-for-profit provisioning.69,70 Livelihoods and scenario through replacement of infrastructure and wellbeing can be secured independently of economic technology. growth,71 by shortening and redistributing working hours The latest IPCC report56 and recent studies highlight the to secure employment,72 introducing a public job huge and thus far largely untapped mitigation potential of guarantee,73 living wages, living pensions,74 and a minimum demand-reduction strategies, with an emphasis on income guarantee,75 and providing universal access to sufficiency, equity, wellbeing, and improvements to affordable housing and good-quality public services.76,77 e766 www.thelancet.com/planetary-health Vol 7 September 2023 Articles Model studies suggest that such strategies, with to largely avoid these problems, thus improving tech­ equitable and sufficiency-oriented demand reduction in nological feasibility as well as international and high-income countries and international convergence intergenera­tional equity. in per-capita consumption levels, could decrease global We want to emphasise that post-growth climate- emissions fast enough to limit warming to 1·5°C.4,42,55 mitigation scenarios cannot be modelled by assuming A sufficiency-based climate mitigation scenario could cut some decoupling rate and simply reducing GDP. Indeed, total energy demand across 30 European countries by post-growth scholarship explicitly rejects the idea of 55% by 2050 (around half due to sufficiency measures reducing GDP as a lever for climate mitigation, focusing alone), and limit their combined cumulative CO2 instead on specific sufficiency and efficiency policies (as emissions to their combined fair-share carbon budget for described above), along with public investment to 50% chance of 1·5°C.53 Similar demand-reduction accelerate decarbonisation. Crucially, post-growth scenarios have been put forward for the UK,52 France,78 proposals do not seek to reduce all production and and Germany.79 In these scenarios, these countries get consumption, but primarily carbon or energy intensive close to meeting their 1·5°C fair-shares (as defined in this and less-necessary forms of production and consumption, study), but effectively still fall short, because they do not while also increasing necessary forms of provisioning as account for the often substantial net-imported emissions needed. Whereas the energy and emissions impacts of of these countries, and assume transformative mitigation key post-growth climate-mitigation policies have been has already begun. Fortunately, there is still scope for modelled,52,53,78 what would happen to GDP in a post- further ambition and speed.44–46,54 However, countries with growth scenario depends on various factors, including very high per-capita emissions (such as Belgium, the what sectors are reduced or expanded, how provisioning USA, or Saudi Arabia) have already depleted most of their systems and income distributions are transformed, carbon budget fair-shares since 2020. For those countries, to what extent provisioning gets decommodified, to ambitious demand-reduction policies are all the more what extent currently unpaid work or production gets imperative, but even that might not reduce their remunerated, and what happens to prices. Clearly, emissions fast enough to prevent them from exceeding changes in GDP cannot be simply deduced from an their remaining carbon budget fair-shares, and thus from assumed emissions pathway and decoupling rate (see the either appropriating the fair-shares of other (poorer) Methods section). It is quite possible that GDP could countries, or exacerbating climate breakdown. In these decline in a post-growth scenario, but post-growth labour cases, compensation and reparations should be paid.80 and welfare policy can secure livelihoods and improve Debates about green growth relate to high-income wellbeing independently of what happens to GDP.71 countries. Lower-income countries typically have much Climate-mitigation policy should not be seen in isolation lower emissions per capita, which makes the mitigation but in the context of the broader ecological crisis. The and decoupling rates required for them to stay within global economy is also transgressing six other planetary their fair-share carbon budgets more modest and boundaries,85 and high-income countries are overwhelm­ therefore more achievable. Countries such as Uruguay ingly responsible for this.86 We have focused on emissions and Mexico are already making strides in this direction.81 here, but ultimately the benchmark for green growth is With adequate access to the necessary finance and whether it can limit not only emissions but also other technology, freedom to use industrial policy, and a devel­­- environmental impacts to national fair-shares of planetary opment strategy focused on human needs, lower-income boundaries.5 Future research should involve a similar countries should be able to stay within their fair-share analysis of national performance on these other planetary carbon budgets even while increasing production and boundaries. We know that ecosystem damage and consumption to achieve decent living standards for biodiversity loss are closely related to material use, which all. Indeed, post-growth transitions in high-income is being driven in large part by economic growth.87,88 countries are crucial for enabling and creating space for Indeed, there is little evidence that high-income countries sovereign development in lower-income countries. are achieving sufficient absolute decoupling of GDP from It is worth noting that virtually all dominant climate- material footprint.8 Here, too, post-growth demand mitigation scenarios involve continued economic growth reduction and sufficiency strategies are urgently needed to in high-income countries. The problems created by this complement and accelerate feasible technological changes approach are concealed in these scenarios by relying on and efficiency improvements.8,89,90 unrealistic assumptions about decoupling and energy Overall, our analysis suggests that if high-income efficiency,4,72,83 unrealistic assumptions about the rollout countries are to reduce emissions in line with the Paris rate of renewable energy,4 unrealistic and risky assumptions Agreement, they will need to abandon the pursuit of about future negative-emission technologies,32–35 highly aggregate economic growth and instead adopt equitable unequal international burden sharing (future cumulative and sufficiency-oriented post-growth policies. The evi­ emissions per capita), and undermining energy use dence is clear. Society must act quickly or “will miss a brief and development in low-income and middle-income and rapidly closing window of opportunity to secure countries.84 Post-growth approaches would enable societies a liveable and sustainable future for all”.91 www.thelancet.com/planetary-health Vol 7 September 2023 e767 Articles Contributors 18 World Bank. Data bank: GDP (constant 2015 US$). 2022. https://data. JH conceived the study. JV led the design of the methods, curated the worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD (accessed Aug 19, 2022). data, did the computations, and produced the visualisations. JV and 19 Global Carbon Project. Carbon emissions. 2022. http://www. JH accessed and verified the data, interpreted the results, wrote the globalcarbonatlas.org/en/CO2-emissions (accessed Dec 17, 2022). original draft, and made revisions and edits. JH supervised the work. 20 Friedlingstein P, O’sullivan M, Jones MW, et al. Global carbon Both authors had full access to all the data in the study and had final budget 2022. Earth Syst Science Data Discuss 2022; 2022: 1–59. responsibility for the decision to submit for publication. 21 Andrew RM, Peters GP. The global carbon project’s fossil CO2 emissions dataset. Zenodo, 2022. https://zenodo.org/ Declaration of interests record/5569235 (accessed July 20, 2023). We declare no competing interests. 22 Peters GP, Minx JC, Weber CL, Edenhofer O. Growth in emission Data sharing transfers via international trade from 1990 to 2008. The source data used for this study are publicly available from the Global Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 2011; 108: 8903–08. Carbon Project, the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic 23 Calverley D, Anderson K. Phaseout pathways for fossil fuel Co-operation and Development, and the United Nations Population production within Paris-compliant carbon budgets. 2022. https:// Division. 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