Copyright © 2023 by the author(s). Published here under license by the Resilience Alliance. Open Access. CC-BY 4.0 Coenen, J., G. Sonderegger, J. Newig, P. Meyfroidt, E. Challies, S. L. Bager, L. M. Busck-Lumholt, E. Corbera, C. Friis, A. Frohn Pedersen, P. C. S. J. Laroche, C. Parra Paitan, S. Qin, N. Roux, and J. G. Zaehringer. 2023. Toward spatial fit in the governance of global commodity flows. Ecology and Society 28(2):24. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-14133-280224 Synthesis Toward spatial fit in the governance of global commodity flows Johanna Coenen 1 , Gabi Sonderegger 2,3 , Jens Newig 1 , Patrick Meyfroidt 4,5 , Edward Challies 1,6 , Simon L. Bager 4 7 8,9 10 11,12,13 , Louise M. Busck-Lumholt , Esteve Corbera , Cecilie Friis , Anna Frohn Pedersen , Perrine C.S.J. Laroche 14 , Claudia Parra Paitan 14 , Siyu Qin 11 , Nicolas Roux 15 and Julie G. Zaehringer 2,3,16 ABSTRACT. Global commodity flows between distally connected social-ecological systems pose important challenges to sustainability governance. These challenges are partly due to difficulties in designing and implementing governance institutions that fit or match the scale of the environmental and social problems generated in such telecoupled systems. We focus on the spatial dimension of governance fit in relation to global commodity flows and telecoupled systems. Specifically, we draw on examples from land use and global agricultural commodity governance to examine two overarching types of governance mismatches: boundary mismatches and resolution mismatches. We argue that one way to address mismatches is through governance rescaling and illustrate this approach with reference to examples of three broad types of governance approaches: trade agreements, due diligence laws, and landscape approaches to supply chain governance. No single governance approach is likely to address all mismatches, highlighting the need to align multiple governance approaches to govern telecoupled systems effectively. Key Words: environmental governance; human-environment interactions; scale; spatial mismatch; supply chain; telecoupling INTRODUCTION and non-material flows (Liu et al. 2013, Eakin et al. 2014, Friis Local sustainability problems are increasingly shaped by distal et al. 2016). The telecoupling concept supports analysis of how actors and processes through global flows of information, people, social-ecological changes in one place are related to social- goods, and services. Demand for commodities such as palm oil, ecological processes elsewhere. Rather than confronting soy, meat, cocoa, and rubber produces negative social and globalization as a diffuse, complex, and all-pervasive environmental impacts, including deforestation, biodiversity loss, phenomenon, a focus on telecoupling helps to delineate and food insecurity, agri-chemical pollution, and consolidation of analyze particular connections, place-specific social and landholdings, in production regions that are often far removed environmental impacts, and their (often remote) drivers in a from sites of consumption (Laroche et al. 2021, Cotta et al. 2022, globalizing world (Challies et al. 2014, Friis and Nielsen 2019, Roux et al. 2022). Such sustainability problems often transcend Sonderegger et al. 2020). traditional political boundaries, which makes it challenging to Governance in telecoupled systems is challenging because the design governance institutions to fit the scale of the problems. drivers and effects of global flows often lie beyond the reach of Where governance institutions do not match the scale of the national governments, companies, or citizens. Existing problems they are expected to address, scholars have diagnosed sustainability governance initiatives that govern global flows of “problems of fit”, “mismatches”, or “misfits” (Young 2005, Folke agricultural and forestry commodities, such as corporate pledges, et al. 2007, Galaz et al. 2008). The degree of fit may pertain to voluntary sustainability standards, public-private partnerships, alignment between a given social-ecological problem and a and multistakeholder initiatives, are not necessarily effective in governance response in spatial, temporal, or functional terms driving sustainable supply chains (Garrett et al. 2019, 2021, Grabs (Cumming et al. 2006, Folke et al. 2007). Issues of governance fit et al. 2021, Meemken et al. 2021). Research has attributed the are well researched with regard to regionally bounded or ineffectiveness of governance interventions in part to mismatches transboundary social-ecological systems such as aquatic or between the scale of the governance institution and the scale of riverine ecosystems (Moss 2012, Bergsten et al. 2014). However, the underlying problem (Young 2005). research has not yet systematically explored solutions to spatial mismatches in social-ecological systems connected across long Here, we explore the problem of spatial fit between governance distances, so-called telecoupled systems (Sikor et al. 2013, arrangements and the social-ecological problems they address in Munroe et al. 2019, Newig et al. 2020). relation to land use, as well as global agricultural commodity governance and telecoupled systems more broadly. We focus Telecoupling denotes long-distance connections between two or specifically on the question of spatial fit because telecoupled more social-ecological systems that are linked through material sustainability problems are inherently related to issues of spatial 1 Institute of Sustainability Governance, Leuphana University Lüneburg, Germany, 2Centre for Development and Environment (CDE), University of Bern, Switzerland, 3Institute of Geography, University of Bern, Switzerland, 4Earth and Life Institute, UCLouvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, 5 Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique (F.R.S.-FNRS), Brussels, Belgium, 6School of Earth and Environment, University of Canterbury, New Zealand, 7 Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain, 8Institució Catalana de Recerca i Estudis Avançats (ICREA), Barcelona, Spain, 9Institute of Environmental Science and Technology & Department of Geography, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain, 10Department of Geosciences and Natural Resource Management, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, 11Geography Department, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany, 12IRI-THESys, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany, 13Department of Anthropology, Aarhus University, Denmark, 14Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 15Institute of Social Ecology (SEC), Department of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna, Austria, 16Wyss Academy for Nature, University of Bern, Switzerland Ecology and Society 28(2): 24 https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol28/iss2/art24/ scale. We distinguish two overarching types of spatial mismatches: to “come to terms with local variations in biogeophysical boundary mismatches and resolution mismatches, building on conditions and [lack] sensitivity to both the knowledge and the previous work by Cumming et al. (2006) and Bergsten et al. (2014). rights and interests of local stakeholders” (Young 2002b:283; see Whereas boundary mismatches denote situations in which social- also Ostrom 1990). For example, much of European Union ecological processes transcend governance boundaries, resolution legislation has been criticized for being too insensitive to local mismatches refer to governance schemes designed at too coarse contexts, despite the EU’s principle of subsidiarity (Article 5 a spatial scale to effectively address the issue at hand (Bergsten et Treaty on European Union), which demands that decisions al. 2014).[1] We present illustrative empirical examples from land should be taken at the most appropriate level of governance, and and global agricultural commodity governance to elucidate how that the EU should only take action when national, regional, or problems of spatial fit impede the effective governance of land local governments are unable to achieve a particular objective. and land-based resources in telecoupled systems. We also examine The EU Water Framework Directive provides an example of governance approaches to address this problem. We contend that governance that seeks to avoid resolution mismatches. It requires a better understanding of the types of mismatches that arise in member states to develop River Basin Management Plans to guide efforts to govern global commodity flows will contribute to local and context-specific implementation (Jager et al. 2016). An identification of leverage points for effective governance institutional fit emerges if the governance scale equals the social- interventions in telecoupled systems (Carrasco et al. 2017, ecological scale (Fig. 1E), as in the case of the global agreements Munroe et al. 2019, Newig et al. 2020). reached in the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer to address a global problem (Epstein et al. 2014). THE PROBLEM OF FIT The problem of fit has been widely researched in political science Fundamentally, the problem of fit concerns the question of how and social-ecological systems literature. Scholars have examined to scale or rescale governance arrangements so that they have the mismatches between the spatial, temporal, and functional scales best possible institutional fit with the targeted social-ecological of governance institutions and the scales of social-ecological dynamics. Establishing the most appropriate fit requires a trade- processes (Cumming et al. 2006, Folke et al. 2007, Galaz et al. off between the advantages of better coordination at higher scales, 2008, Ekstrom and Young 2009, Epstein et al. 2015). Here, scale which may reduce the risk of overlooking spatial externalities, is understood as “the various levels at which a phenomenon occurs and the risk of lacking context sensitivity and legitimacy among in the dimensions of space and time” (Young 2002a:26). Because local actors, impeding effective implementation (Newig and Moss of institutional mismatches, governance responses to 2017). Importantly, problems do not occur at a single scale that environmental threats often struggle to address the full extent of is objectively given, but different actors perceive and frame the problem (Ekstrom and Crona 2017). For example, drivers of problems at different scales and levels (Padt et al. 2014). For land-use change operate at multiple levels and spatial scales. example, if state actors aim to meet forest restoration International trade, regional development policies, national commitments made under international agreements and frame property rights regimes, and local people’s agricultural practices the problem solely at an ecological scale, a national afforestation are among the many factors that may lead to land conversion program fits with the objective of forest restoration for carbon (Geist and Lambin 2002). However, governance mechanisms storage. However, if the problem is framed at a social-ecological typically target a single level (e.g., national forestry laws), and thus scale, a single homogeneous afforestation program may suffer do not provide adequate solutions to the challenge of governing from a resolution mismatch and fail to address context-specific wider resource systems (Nagendra and Ostrom 2012). challenges related to rural livelihoods (Wiegant et al. 2020, Governance arrangements that only partially cover the resource Coleman et al. 2021). Thus, evaluations of fit depend upon how or ecosystem in question have built-in limitations that impede a problem is framed and by whom (Epstein et al. 2015). What is their ability to fulfill their goals (Young 2005). perceived as the “optimal scale” may vary among actors, and the scale at which they define a problem will influence their Various possible configurations of spatial mismatches exist (Fig. preferences for governance rescaling. For example, political and 1). The governance scale may be smaller than the social-ecological societal actors may strategically frame certain problems at the system scale (Fig. 1A). For example, a municipality may not be global scale if they perceive national governments as a possible able to effectively address air pollution, which is caused by local hindrance to solving the problem, or if they want to avoid factories but dispersed beyond municipal boundaries. assuming responsibility and implementing domestic measures Governance at larger scales, such as national regulations, may (Gupta 2014). solve the problem (upscaling of governance). Similarly, the governance scale may only partially cover the social-ecological Here, we build on the concept of institutional fit, which is based scale (Fig. 1B), as is often the case, for example, with governance on the underlying normative assumption that institutional scale of transboundary rivers. In such situations, upscaling may be can be optimized to avoid spatial externalities (Moss and Newig more difficult in the absence of an authority at a higher governing 2010). Thus, we focus on how individual institutions face this level. Moreover, governance institutions and actors may have no problem of fit. Nevertheless, we recognize that governance always jurisdiction at all over the social-ecological scale of an identified involves the interplay of different institutions. Analysis of problem (Fig. 1C), such as in the case of a country lacking the institutional fit is closely linked to the analysis of institutional authority to regulate illegal logging by a company domiciled in interplay because social-ecological problems are typically the country but operating in a neighboring country. Lastly, the governed by various institutions at different spatial scales (Young governance scale may be greater than the social-ecological scale 2002a). Although no institution operates in a vacuum, it can be (Fig. 1D). In such cases, regulation at a (much) larger scale than useful to assess the spatial fit of a specific institution in isolation that of the ecological problem may lack the regulatory specificity from the broader institutional landscape. This approach simplifies Ecology and Society 28(2): 24 https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol28/iss2/art24/ Fig. 1. Scale (mis-)matches between social-ecological (green) and governance (orange) scales. (A–C) Boundary mismatches. The institutional boundaries do not match with the spatial boundaries of the social-ecological problem, creating spatial spillover effects. (D) Resolution mismatch. The governance institution does not fit the specifics of the (local) social-ecological context that is to be addressed by governance and hence lacks sufficient spatial specificity. A single governance institution typically addresses a class of social-ecological problems that occurs in multiple distinct localities that have specific contextual features, to which a single governance institution cannot necessarily be adjusted. (E) Spatial fit. Illustration inspired by Newig et al. (2013:13). the analysis and does not consider all interdependencies, but it telecoupling is increasingly addressing this research gap by enhances analytical tractability and makes it easier to identify investigating the causes, drivers, and implications of globally governance weaknesses and gaps (Young 2005). The analysis of linked social-ecological systems. Telecoupling research has institutional mismatches can be complemented with considerations referred to the problem of mismatches, but the definition and of how to create linkages and facilitate interactions among application of the concept in the context of telecoupling remains various institutions. We return to considerations of the relation limited (Oberlack et al. 2018, Munroe et al. 2019, Zaehringer et between institutional fit and interplay below. al. 2019, Newig et al. 2020). The important question of how to align the scale of governance with the scale of the social-ecological THE PROBLEM OF SPATIAL FIT IN TELECOUPLED problem at hand remains largely unaddressed in research on SYSTEMS governing telecoupled social-ecological systems. Research on institutional fit has primarily focused on cases of natural resources in specific social-ecological systems. Studies Telecoupling is one distinct ideal-typical configuration of have been conducted on forest governance (Shkaruba and interdependent social-ecological systems (Fig. 2). Telecoupled Kireyeu 2013, Bodin et al. 2014, Melnykovych et al. 2018), water systems arise when the activities of actors in one system affect a governance (Lebel et al. 2005, 2013, Moss 2012, Enqvist et al. social-ecological system elsewhere (e.g., through international 2020), and land and wildlife management (Bergsten et al. 2014, trade or the displacement of extractive activities from one place Dressel et al. 2018). Most research has focused on mismatches to another), thereby creating social-ecological interdependencies. between local, regional, and national governance institutions and Consequently, feedbacks can develop, for example, when actors the social-ecological systems they target, but a small and growing in one location become aware of the displaced effects of their pool of literature investigates transboundary and larger scale actions and seek to mitigate them through measures such as social-ecological problems such as depletion of the ozone layer increased conservation funding. or pollution of international watersheds (Cox et al. 2014). Challies Telecoupled systems are characterized by geographical distance et al. (2014) observe that social-ecological systems research itself between the place where the social or environmental impacts has mostly examined small, tightly coupled systems, rather than occur and the places where underlying causes are found. The connections and interdependencies that exist between multiple geographical distance is often associated with social and social-ecological systems linked through global production institutional distances between the socioeconomic systems (Eakin networks and supply chains (Nyström et al. 2019). Research on Ecology and Society 28(2): 24 https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol28/iss2/art24/ et al. 2014, Niewöhner et al. 2016, Friis and Nielsen 2017) because of resource users will have direct effects on other users (Lebel et they tend to be governed by different, functionally independent al. 2005, Bergsten et al. 2014, Kininmonth et al. 2015). With institutional arrangements, social networks, and actors (Eakin et transboundary water resources, for example, withdrawals in one al. 2017). Even when distant actors are willing to work together, place affect downstream availability. In telecoupled systems, transaction costs of cooperating on sustainability issues are often however, there is usually no such direct ecological feedback. For much higher than in local or transboundary settings (Newig et al. example, tropical ecosystem degradation driven by commodity 2020). Geographical, social, and institutional distances thus production for export to European markets causes biodiversity hinder the creation of appropriately scaled governance loss in producing regions or carbon emissions, but does not institutions in telecoupled systems in at least four ways. directly affect European consumers in the short term. Where feedbacks are delayed or indirect, it is also difficult to attribute Fig. 2. Ideal types of interconnected social-ecological systems specific social-ecological effects to particular activities (Carlson and their interdependencies. Systems comprise socioeconomic et al. 2018). Consequently, the actors driving telecoupled building blocks (blue), ecological building blocks (green), and interactions do not necessarily experience the negative effects of their interdependencies (arrows). (A) In a regionally bounded their actions or recognize the connections between past actions system, two socioeconomic systems share the same ecological and subsequent negative effects (Newig et al. 2020). They may resource base; e.g., two communities harvest wood from the therefore have very little incentive to formulate or adapt same forest. (B) In a transboundary system, two socioeconomic governance responses. systems rely on resources or ecosystems that are ecologically Second, as a result of the above situation, recognition of and connected; e.g., pollution of a river by an upstream riparian concern about specific problems may depend on social or political country may affect fish populations in a downstream riparian actors highlighting causal linkages between certain actions and country. (C) In telecoupled systems, the ecological systems are distant outcomes. “Problem-brokers” or “political entrepreneurs” geographically separate but are connected through social- can play important roles in framing and problematizing ecological processes such as trade in agricultural commodities. unsustainable connections between telecoupled systems (Bastos Lima et al. 2019, Meyfroidt et al. 2022). Once distant ecological or social conditions attract sufficient public attention and concern, a policy window opens wherein various governance interventions may become possible (Kingdon 1984, Eakin et al. 2017). Improved transparency, through the collection and dissemination of information on flows and impacts, can enable or instigate governance responses to telecoupled issues (Gardner et al. 2019). For instance, increasing media attention on environmental issues such as deforestation has put pressure on the EU to address soybean production in the Amazon region (Mempel and Corbera 2021). Several interventions have emerged to tackle deforestation embedded in international trade and to reduce “imported deforestation” from EU consumption (Bager et al. 2021). Third, governance mismatches arise when governance responses misdiagnose a problem or neglect its wider drivers. Interventions that target only the direct ecological effects of an activity risk merely displacing it to other social-ecological systems. For example, European demand for soy is associated with negative ecological impacts such as deforestation in producer countries (Pendrill et al. 2019, Schilling-Vacaflor et al. 2021). Addressing tropical deforestation at the scale of a single region such as the Amazon is unlikely to be effective because demand for forest-risk commodities will persist. Therefore, governance interventions such as the Brazilian Soy Moratorium, which targets the Amazon specifically, have displaced deforestation to other areas such as the Cerrado region (Dou et al. 2018). Fourth, the places and governance institutions implicated in telecoupled systems may have very little history of prior collaboration (Newig et al. 2020). The social and institutional distance between telecoupled systems may mean that separate policies, actors, and networks govern largely independently. In the First, the absence of manifest ecological feedbacks between absence of joint institutional structures, governing telecoupled telecoupled systems obscures the remote causes and effects of systems is challenging because governance actors face issues that certain decisions and actions. In many locally bounded or closely extend beyond their jurisdiction. For example, consumption in neighboring social-ecological systems, the activities of one group Ecology and Society 28(2): 24 https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol28/iss2/art24/ the EU has social-ecological effects beyond EU borders (Kastner their suppliers and therefore lack the ability to control the et al. 2015, Dorninger et al. 2021, Roux et al. 2021). However, the environmental and socioeconomic effects of production. For EU’s ability to govern these issues has clear limitations given the example, approximately one-quarter of the solid wood furniture national sovereignty of external countries and World Trade that IKEA sells is manufactured in Chinese factories that source Organization rules. their timber from other countries, in particular Russia (Newell and Simeone 2014). IKEA attempted to control the timber DIFFERENT TYPES OF MISMATCHES IN sourcing of its Chinese subcontractors to “green” its supply TELECOUPLED SYSTEMS chain but was unsuccessful because of the geographical distance We apply the concepts of boundary and resolution mismatches to upstream activities, the large number of intermediaries to telecoupled systems. We identify the underlying governance between timber extraction and retail, and an inability to trace problem associated with each type of mismatch, outline two timber to a specific logging permit (Goldstein and Newell 2020). particular mechanisms of boundary mismatches and illustrate Additionally, supply chain configurations change over time (dos with examples from both public and private governance Reis et al. 2020). China has long depended on Russian wood for perspectives (Table 1). Our distinction between ideal-typical the manufacture of finished wood products for export to the configurations of mismatches helps in elaborating how the scale United States, but the specific companies within these supply of governance institutions often does not align with the scale of chains change regularly (Goldstein and Newell 2020). Even social-ecological problems.[2] where large, powerful retailers dictate prices and quality Boundary mismatches in telecoupled systems standards to their suppliers, their ability to control sustainability Boundary mismatches arise in telecoupled systems when the along the value chain is often limited because of the mismatch spatial reach of governance structures is such that these structures between their governance reach and the scale of the social- do not internalize existing social-ecological externalities of ecological problem. Companies are often not able to monitor activities (i.e., spillovers; Fig. 3A) or when public policies or their indirect suppliers, which makes it difficult to implement transnational economic activities produce new externalities (i.e., chain-wide sustainability policies (zu Ermgassen et al. 2022). leakages; Fig. 3B). Spillovers describe events or developments that Second, companies may govern particular segments of their are not targeted by a given governance intervention, whereas supply chain but neglect others, which constitutes a boundary leakages are a form of spillover caused by a governance mismatch if the goal is to create sustainable supply chains that intervention (Meyfroidt et al. 2020). encompass the full value chain. For example, textile certifications generally focus on either the upstream end of the supply chain Spillover (i.e., organic and fair cotton production) or the midstream In case of spillovers (Fig. 3A), part of the problem remains section (i.e., working conditions of garment workers; Partzsch unaddressed because it lies outside the domain of the governance 2020), but seldom cover all segments of the supply chain. institution. The omitted part of the problem is referred to as a spillover, which is broadly understood as an indirect effect of an Leakage activity or intervention (e.g., policy, program, or new technology) A leakage may emerge when a governance intervention induces that occurs outside the targeted area (Meyfroidt et al. 2020). externalities (Fig. 3B). The governance intervention produces Spillovers emerge because governance actors may not be aware effects that contradict its objectives and reduce the overall benefit of the full scale of the social-ecological problem, may be of the interventions, which constitutes a leakage effect uninterested in or unable to govern what happens beyond their (Meyfroidt et al. 2018, Bastos Lima et al. 2019). For example, jurisdictional boundaries, or may intentionally neglect parts of the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive created additional demand the problem (Bastos Lima et al. 2019). For example, voluntary for biofuel crops produced outside of the EU and thereby fuelled sustainability standards often focus on reducing harmful on-farm land-use change and deforestation in tropical countries, effects at sites of production but tend to neglect off-farm effects counteracting the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions such as reduced downstream water availability or air pollution (Bastos Lima 2021). This process has also been described as from pesticide use (Zaehringer et al. 2018, Parra-Paitan and “governance inducing telecoupling” (Newig et al. 2019), i.e., Verburg 2022, Sonderegger et al. 2022). Spillovers can also situations in which governance initiatives themselves create new cascade to further social-ecological systems (as indicated in Fig. distal interactions with positive or negative outcomes. 3A) and have cumulative effects, which makes it difficult to Recognition of the negative distal effects led to revision of the identify causal connections (Busck-Lumholt et al 2022a). Renewable Energy Directive to mitigate indirect land-use change The transnational operations of companies make it challenging (Bastos Lima 2021). In other instances, the leakage effect does to achieve institutional fit and to internalize the extra- not occur across a great distance but can be in proximity to the jurisdictional social and environmental effects of global supply target area. For instance, if a forest moratorium prohibits chains. Because multinational enterprises operate beyond the deforestation within designated areas, the activity may simply jurisdictional reach of individual states, the externalities of their shift to nearby areas not covered by the moratorium (Meyfroidt activities are often not addressed by existing governance et al. 2010, Leijten et al. 2021). institutions. These actors are not accountable to any single Just like public governance, private governance can have spillover authority that matches their scope of operation (Kobrin 2009). effects and leakages. For instance, if private conservation actors Private actors may encounter boundary mismatches in their focus their efforts on specific regions such as the Brazilian efforts to govern supply chains for two reasons. First, individual Amazon, that leaves other regions such as the Cerrado and Gran companies may lack oversight and influence over some or all of Chaco comparatively less well protected, and land conversion Ecology and Society 28(2): 24 https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol28/iss2/art24/ Fig. 3. Boundary mismatches. Governance institutions neglect social-ecological problems that transcend established jurisdictional boundaries due to spillovers (A) or leakages (B). may be displaced to those regions (Soterroni et al. 2019, Qin et institutions are not supranational, meaning that they do not have al. 2022). In short, leakage occurs when the side effects of an authority beyond that of their respective members, they rely on intervention escape the scope of governance. lower-level institutions for implementation, which, however, have limited abilities to govern the causes or effects of cross-border Resolution mismatches in telecoupled systems flows beyond their jurisdictional boundaries. If the Resolution mismatches represent a second problem of implementation pathway is not defined and lower-level governance fit in telecoupled systems (Fig. 4). Because institutions have neither the capacity nor the experience to international or transnational governance institutions usually implement higher-level governance objectives, a spatial scale aim to address a social-ecological problem that occurs in more challenge emerges (Wiegant et al. 2020). Global environmental than one place, they are not specific to the social and ecological governance is often directed toward reaching global targets (e.g., attributes of a particular social-ecological system or a particular Paris Agreement, Aichi Biodiversity Targets, Bonn Challenge). telecoupling. If governance occurs at too coarse a scale, meaning However, target-based governance has been criticized for the gap that governance instruments are not context sensitive or flow between international policy and national implementation, the specific, they are unlikely to be successful because “one-size-fits- missing linkages between national governments and on-the- all” panaceas do not exist (Ostrom et al. 2007, Meyfroidt et al. ground actions, and the unclear definitions of some wording of 2022). the targets (Hagerman et al. 2021, Perino et al. 2022). For example, international governance schemes such as In the context of private governance, supply chain actors may set Multilateral Environmental Agreements tend to be too general broad, blanket-coverage sustainability goals that are meant to to govern specific telecoupled systems because international apply across entire supply chains but are, for that reason, conventions, agreements, and commitments typically involve a ambiguously defined, limited in scope, and poorly large number of signatories, have a general thematic scope, and operationalized in terms of concrete and measurable targets. For are not specific to any particular flow.[3] Of approximately 250 example, in a sample of 513 companies in the coffee sector, only Multilateral Environmental Agreements worldwide, only 15 one-third reported tangible commitments to sustainability, explicitly include trade-related provisions for environmental whereas the remaining companies reported no or vague protection (World Trade Organization 2021). International commitments (Bager and Lambin 2020). Similarly, companies governance schemes cover a large spatial scale and require a broad may adopt zero-deforestation commitments without setting clear institutional outlook that can be implemented in heterogeneous implementation goals, mechanisms, or deadlines, which impedes national and local contexts. Because most international effective implementation across the contexts in which they operate (Garrett et al. 2019). Ecology and Society 28(2): 24 https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol28/iss2/art24/ Table 1. Boundary and resolution mismatches in the governance of telecoupled social-ecological systems. Boundary mismatch Resolution mismatch † Definition Governance institutions neglect social-ecological problems that transcend Governance institutions have too coarse a spatial established administrative or jurisdictional boundaries resolution than is suitable to address the social-ecological problems at hand Underlying problem Lack of governance extent Lack of governance precision Mechanism Spillover Leakage Panacea trap Description Governance institutions do not Governance institutions address a Governance institutions are not specific enough to be govern a social-ecological problem social-ecological problem but create effectively implemented and enforced that expands beyond their leakage(s), i.e., counterproductive administrative or jurisdictional effects outside the targeted area or boundaries domain of the intervention Example from a European countries have not (yet) A forest moratorium shifts A Multilateral Environmental Agreement that is too broad public policy implemented specific public policies deforestation to neighboring areas in scope to govern particular telecoupled flows ‡ perspective to mitigate the deforestation effects or other countries, producing of their demand for soy in remote negative externalities in distant § jurisdictions jurisdictions Example from a A Voluntary Sustainability Supply chain actors implement Supply chain actors set broad sustainability goals that are private governance Standard focuses on reducing zero-deforestation policies that insufficiently operationalized and lack specific and perspective harmful on-farm impacts at sites of target only one region, allowing measurable targets, unambiguous definitions, and exact production but neglects actors in other regions or coverage sustainability issues outside the neighboring countries to deforest farm such as air pollution from pesticide use † Adapted from Bergsten et al. (2014). ‡ We present the different types of mismatches from both public policy and private governance perspectives because their analytical focus differs. From a public policy perspective, the focus is on the jurisdictional scale, defined as clearly bounded political units (e.g., towns, provinces, states, or countries; Cash et al. 2006). In contrast, the private governance perspective puts more emphasis on the scale of the supply chain or associated flows. § The newly adopted EU Regulation on deforestation-free supply chains addresses this mismatch (European Commission 2022). It is expected to enter into force in summer 2023. Once it is in force, operators and traders will have 18 months to implement the new rules. As a result of resolution mismatches, new kinds of mismatches mismatch between local goals and strategies and those of the may emerge when governing institutions do not reflect the values, wider project can emerge. In the case of a World Bank interests, and beliefs of different social groups. What Epstein et conservation project in Argentina, project concepts and ideas al. (2015) have termed “social mismatches” points to the spatial were decided by external actors, rather than in partnership with scalar challenge of matching governance objectives and rules with local beneficiaries (Busck-Lumholt et al. 2022b). Sustainability social customs and patterns of resource use, stakeholder issues prioritized at the global scale may not match with local expectations and needs, and social organization scales (Epstein people’s understanding of and aspirations for sustainability. et al. 2015). In telecoupled systems, international governance Self-governance and local rule development have been found to based on global goals carries a clear risk of diverging from issues be highly important for effective natural resource management that are seen as most important by local stakeholders. Global (Ostrom 1990). Otherwise, there is a high risk that international initiatives such as the Kimberley Process, for example, promote or transnational governance schemes are insufficiently adapted transparency in supply chains, but in so doing, they risk favoring to local contexts. If governance actors perceive that transnational global ideals (e.g., of traceability and accountability) over the day- institutions do not fit the local contexts (i.e., social mismatch as to-day needs and concerns of local communities (Pedersen et al. result of a resolution mismatch), they may create their own 2021a). Research on gold mining in Tanzania, for instance, found institutions. This situation occurred with the establishment of the that a centrally imposed transparency initiative had not addressed Icelandic Responsible Fisheries certification program as an inequalities, informal structures, and power asymmetries in the alternative to the transnational Marine Stewardship Council mining sector (Pedersen et al. 2021b). Likewise, conservation certification scheme (Foley 2017), and with the introduction of projects that are governed by external actors (such as states, Indonesian and Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil schemes as international nongovernmental organizations, or private firms) alternatives to the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (Higgins tend to subordinate local institutions, customary practices, and and Richards 2019). traditional ecological knowledge, resulting in relatively ineffective conservation management (Dawson et al. 2021). International ADDRESSING MISMATCHES IN TELECOUPLED conservation initiatives may overlook social and political SYSTEMS complexities in local systems and create unintended and These examples suggest that global commodity flows, through undesirable effects, including restricted access to land and natural boundary and resolution mismatches, pose multiple environmental resources and the erosion of customary natural resource governance challenges that are difficult to address through governance institutions (Persson and Mertz 2019, Persson et al. territorial or global governance approaches. Against this 2021). If local people are merely seen as recipients of services and background, both public and private actors have attempted to are not involved in the design of sustainability interventions, a rescale governance to account for social-ecological interactions Ecology and Society 28(2): 24 https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol28/iss2/art24/ Fig. 4. Resolution mismatches. Governance institutions have a coarser scale than is suitable to address the social-ecological problems they target. across long distances and between jurisdictions. With respect to flows may shift geographically (i.e., trade diversion), and global governance, governance rescaling has been defined as “a regulated commodities may be replaced by less regulated or shift in the locus, agency, and scope of global [...] politics and unregulated commodities within supply chains (i.e., substitution governance across scales” (Andonova and Mitchell 2010:257). effect). For example, the U.S.-Peru trade agreement includes a Scaling up governance to make it more comprehensive in terms binding Forest Annex, which details measures to strengthen forest of target area, actors, or supply chain segments can limit the risk governance in Peru, including the establishment of chain-of- of boundary mismatches. In contrast, scaling down governance custody systems to verify the legality of timber exports. However, might enhance the context sensitivity of interventions and the because the Forest Annex is strongly focused on protecting participation of local stakeholders, thus correcting resolution CITES-listed timber species, one risk is that it increases exports mismatches. Additionally, creating new governance scales can be of species not listed in CITES. It could also prompt U.S. importers another strategy to avoid mismatches. In telecoupled systems, to switch to other, less regulated markets (Del Gatto et al. 2009). such governance institutions comprise due diligence laws, as Governance institutions that target specific geographic areas or elucidated below. We next present three illustrative examples of commodities risk creating boundary mismatches. This situation public, private, and hybrid governance forms to illustrate the suggests that trade agreements may be more effective at reducing opportunities and challenges involved in addressing both leakage effects at regional scales when they contain binding, boundary and resolution mismatches. measurable, and enforceable sustainability chapters, and they involve regional blocs rather than individual countries, and Social and environmental provisions in trade agreements commodity groups rather than single commodities. However, the The inclusion of binding, measurable, carefully monitored, and risk of resolution mismatches increases when the spatial scale of sanctionable social and environmental provisions in preferential trade agreements increases. or regional trade agreements presents a potential instrument to govern trade-related environmental impacts between specific Trade agreements can suffer from resolution mismatches. For countries or regions (Kehoe et al. 2020). Recently, researchers example, Berger et al. (2020) reviewed 48 preferential trade have advocated shifting focus on the relation between trade and agreements of five emerging economies and found that three- the environment away from merely mitigating the negative quarters of the agreements make reference to general impacts of trade, and toward focusing on how to harness the environmental goals in their preamble or other chapters. However, positive environmental effects of trade through, for example, the these provisions are not of substantive nature, meaning that they use of so-called “trade-and-environment agreements” (Roux et do not imply any substantive rights or obligations in al. 2021; https://ieep.eu/news/a-cup-of-trade-and-environment- environmental matters to the parties. Additionally, some agreement-tea/). In theory, environmental provisions in trade countries restate their commitment to ratify or implement agreements can oblige parties to uphold environmental law and Multilateral Environmental Agreements in their trade implement “Multilateral Environmental Agreements”; increase agreements, thus, only restating the pledges already made cooperation, transparency, and participation in environmental elsewhere. If countries only make commitments to general matters; and trigger the uptake of voluntary sustainability environmental goals and international conventions without standards and public regulations targeted at sustainability issues defining concrete actions in their trade agreements, they are of a specific sector or product. However, empirical evidence of unlikely to address the specific social and ecological problems of the actual environmental effects of environmental provisions in telecoupling in particular social-ecological systems. trade agreements is scarce and inconclusive (Berger et al. 2020). Moreover, if the needs and priorities of local communities are Although trade agreements do address specific flows at the scale overlooked or deprioritized, social mismatches may arise. Failure of telecoupled relations, they pose a risk of leakage because trade to recognize the economic, social, and environmental concerns of Ecology and Society 28(2): 24 https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol28/iss2/art24/ affected communities can also induce a boundary mismatch. For countries, in principle, have no jurisdiction over producing example, a trade ban may prove ineffective if it does not recognize countries, where sustainability problems appear. the economic concerns of local communities, who may derive little However, due diligence policies may suffer from resolution economic benefit from the ban, and hence have little incentive for mismatches because they do not target any particular locality, but conservation or sustainable resource use (Abensperg-Traun rather general social-environmental problems, irrespective of 2009). Consequently, the resource may be sold illegally or into their local manifestation. This situation can lead to social alternative markets, creating leakage effects that limit the mismatches. The EU Timber Regulation, for example, demands effectiveness of the trade ban. For instance, Busch et al. (2022) that timber is sourced legally according to the laws of the producer estimated that a European ban on importing high-deforestation country. However, such policies that are reliant on local laws risk palm oil from Indonesia would have only minor effects on endorsing certification systems that neglect the rights of certain deforestation because, among other reasons, non-participating local communities (Bartley 2014) and work against sustainability countries would absorb the high-deforestation palm oil. More by incentivizing a regulatory “race to the bottom” among research is needed on how to avoid mismatches when designing exporting countries (dos Reis et al. 2021). Furthermore, if trade agreements and trade bans. mandatory due diligence laws require companies to report on risk Due diligence obligations and laws mitigation in their supply chains, companies may focus their The proliferation of due diligence policies shows that public sector reporting on issues that are not key priorities for local actors increasingly govern social and environmental conduct stakeholders. For example, under the French Duty of Vigilance beyond their own borders. Due diligence policies are a clear Law, companies have focused on environmental issues such as example of “rescaling” or “territorial extension”, whereby states deforestation in the soy and beef supply chains while neglecting or groups of states extend their regulatory influence to actions other issues such as biodiversity loss, pesticide use, water scarcity, abroad (Scott 2020). Although due diligence laws are and water pollution. The companies prioritize labor rights, implemented within formal administrative boundaries on a whereas the rights to health, land, water, and food may be more jurisdictional scale, they govern extra-jurisdictional processes by important for local stakeholders (Schilling-Vacaflor 2021). obliging transnational companies to monitor their supply chains Landscape or jurisdictional approaches to supply chain and to rectify unsustainable impacts. Due diligence policies tend governance to be applied at scales applicable to telecoupled systems because Landscape approaches aim to reconcile competing social, they address flows that extend beyond jurisdictional boundaries. economic, and environmental interests and objectives at the landscape scale. Landscape approaches have been widely Due diligence requirements often apply to specific commodities, employed in international conservation projects and are now also as in the case of the EU Timber Regulation, which prohibits the increasingly taken up in sustainable supply chain management sale of illegally harvested wood on the EU market, and the EU (Sayer et al. 2013, Boshoven et al. 2021). They are based on Renewable Energy Directive, under which member states can multistakeholder collaboration (e.g., public authorities, count biofuels toward the attainment of their renewable energy producers, companies, civil society organizations), which sets targets only if the biofuel production complies with certain them apart from purely public jurisdictional governance sustainability criteria (European Union 2018), irrespective of approaches that do not seek to involve all affected stakeholders. whether the biofuel crops are produced inside or outside the EU These relatively recent governance approaches rest on the premise (Scott 2020). Additionally, the EU adopted a Regulation on that the involvement of public actors allows for the deforestation-free supply chains in December 2022, which implementation and enforcement of mandatory requirements for prohibits the placing of palm oil, soy, wood, cattle, cocoa, coffee, production practices, provided that enforcement capacities exist rubber, and some derived products on the EU market if these (Bager 2021). Public actors have regulatory authority over the commodities are linked to deforestation and forest degradation area covered, “allowing for better monitoring and enforcement or if they are non-compliant with all relevant applicable laws in as well as addressing the problem of institutional mismatch” (von force in the country of production (European Commission 2022). Essen and Lambin 2021:6–7). A jurisdictional approach is a type These sector-specific due diligence policies use conditional market of landscape approach that uses formal administrative access as a mechanism to secure foreign producers’ compliance boundaries to define the scope of action and involvement of with EU rules. More recently developed, economy-wide, stakeholders (Denier et al. 2015). mandatory due diligence laws, at the national and European levels, rely on another governance mechanism, namely self-reporting Landscape and jurisdictional approaches aim to avoid the and public scrutiny. The French Duty of Vigilance Law, for boundary mismatches that commonly affect public and private example, requires companies to assess and report the risks of governance initiatives that focus exclusively at farm or supply- infringing environmental and human rights in their supply chains, chain scales. This narrow focus can create “islands of good as well as measures to mitigate such risks. If preventable human practice” while surrounding areas continue with business as usual rights violations or environmental damages occur, the company (UNDP 2019:12). Many of the social-ecological problems that can be held liable and can be required to remedy the harm sustainability initiatives such as voluntary sustainability (Schilling-Vacaflor 2021). Additionally, the European Commission standards target manifest in the wider landscape, leading to proposed a Directive on sustainable corporate governance that mismatches between the scale of the intervention and the scale of covers human rights and environmental due diligence (Schilling- the sustainability challenges being addressed (Sonderegger et al. Vacaflor and Lenschow 2023). In sum, due diligence laws attempt 2022). For example, where companies seek to reduce commodity- to alleviate the boundary mismatch that occurs because importing driven deforestation by certifying some of their own or their Ecology and Society 28(2): 24 https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol28/iss2/art24/ suppliers’ farms or plantations, deforestation may shift to non- al. 2008, Bodin et al. 2017, Enqvist et al 2020). Bergsten et al. certified areas (Heilmayr et al. 2020). Jurisdictional and landscape (2014:1) argue that “boundary mismatches are impossible to approaches are assumed to reduce the risk of leakages (and thus resolve if the focal ecological processes are not contained within boundary mismatches) because they target entire jurisdictions or the spatial jurisdiction of either a single high-level actor landscapes rather than a selected smaller area. In terms of responsible for the whole area or by several lower level actors who certification and standard-setting, landscape and jurisdictional collaborate” and thus jointly build a comprehensive governance approaches have been introduced to upscale governance to reduce system at a larger scale. This idea suggests that studying the risk that commodity sourcing produces ungoverned impacts telecoupled systems from the perspective of polycentric beyond the production area or unit (e.g., farms). Sustainable governance, defined as systems of overlapping jurisdictions with cocoa initiatives, for example, are evolving in their focus from the formally independent but interlinked centers of decision-making, farm level to sector, landscape, and jurisdictional levels could yield valuable insights into how to resolve mismatches in (Carodenuto 2019, Parra-Paitan et al. 2022, 2023). Empirical global land and agricultural commodity governance. Beyond evidence on the effectiveness of landscape and jurisdictional examining the effectiveness of single governance institutions in approaches is scant, however, given their recent emergence (Bager isolation, a more systematic evaluation of the interplay and 2021, von Essen and Lambin 2021). potential synergies between different governance interventions can advance the understanding of how to design governance Jurisdictional and landscape-based certification and sourcing solutions that match the scale of the problem at hand. also have limitations. Governance at the landscape level remains limited to a certain regionally confined scale and may not address A social-ecological network approach can be used to study all potentially relevant telecoupled dynamics such as migrant collaborative natural resource governance across jurisdictional worker flows or illicit financial flows (Sonderegger et al. 2022). boundaries (Janssen et al. 2006, Bodin and Tengö 2012, Barnes Additionally, the risk of leakage persists because neighboring et al. 2019). Studies could adopt such an approach to represent jurisdictions may have weaker environmental protections (von telecoupled systems as networks of social actors and ecological Essen and Lambin 2021). Non-compliant production may shift resources connected through commodity flows and institutional to neighboring places with fewer restrictions (Meyfroidt et al. or social linkages. Although it is difficult to account for different 2018), and commodities from non-compliant neighbors might be kinds of social actors and the processing of commodities (e.g., laundered into the more tightly regulated jurisdiction (Gibbs et from cocoa bean to chocolate bar) with this approach, it can help al. 2016, Boshoven et al. 2021). to capture how material, information, and communication flows connect different ecosystems, actors, and institutions (Janssen et Institutional interplay al. 2006, Bodin and Tengö 2012). This approach is particularly Although we focus on how specific institutions can define and suited to the analysis of landscape-scale responses to boundary address what they conceive as mismatches, in practice, telecoupled mismatches because it highlights horizontal institutional systems are typically governed by several institutions, which interplay, as demonstrated, for example, in research on an interact horizontally at the same level of social organization or agricultural landscape in Madagascar (Bodin and Tengö 2012) vertically across levels (Fig. 5). Institutions influence the decision- and wetlands in Sweden (Bergsten et al. 2014). making, commitments, behavior, and effects of one another (Oberthür and Gehring 2006). Institutional interplay is based Research on telecoupling highlights the need to combine either on functional linkages that occur when developments in traditional place-based governance approaches with flow-based one issue area unavoidably affect another issue area, such as governance, which “considers a place in light of its relationships between institutions on agricultural production and land use, or with other places, by tracking and managing where key flows start, it is based on political linkages that arise when actors recognize progress, and end” (Liu et al. 2018:65). Flows are dynamic, and interdependencies and deliberately forge institutional interactions their origin and destination may change over time as a result of, (Young 2005). For example, the EU’s Forest Law Enforcement for example, changing infrastructure, market demand, or Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative interacts with private biophysical conditions (dos Reis et al. 2023). Flow-based certification schemes and public legal timber regulations in governance arrangements such as certification schemes, zero- partner countries (Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014). FLEGT deforestation commitments, and due diligence laws are designed promotes better enforcement of forest law and the establishment to govern commodity flows, irrespective of changing trading of export licencing systems in partner countries to identify, relationships between supply chain actors. However, flow-based monitor, and export legally harvested timber products destined governance may generate new forms of social exclusion, for EU markets. Additionally, the FLEGT initiative, adopted in inequality, and ecological simplification in places of production 2003, encouraged U.S. environmental activists to advocate for an if transnational notions of sustainability do not match with local extension of the U.S. Lacey Act from fish and wildlife to plants, needs and realities (Newig et al. 2020). This idea highlights that leading to amendment of the Lacey Act in 2008. This example flow-based governance can cover the full spatial scale of highlights how institutional interactions can lead to the telecoupled systems, but their flow specificity comes at the cost convergence of separate national or regional governance regimes. of place specificity. Evidence suggests that the effectiveness of The convergence between FLEGT and the U.S. Lacey Act ensured flow-based governance benefits from synergistic place-based that illegally harvested timber is not simply diverted from one governance (zu Ermgassen et al. 2022). For example, governments market to another (Overdevest and Zeitlin 2014). can support the implementation of zero-deforestation commitments by providing additional disincentives for Creating effective collaborative ties between institutions has been deforestation through, for example, credit restrictions for non- repeatedly proposed as a solution to rectify mismatches (Galaz et compliant individuals and companies, and through anti- Ecology and Society 28(2): 24 https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol28/iss2/art24/ Fig. 5. Schematic illustration of institutional interactions in a telecoupled system. The circles denote the governance scales of different institutions. corruption measures that improve the reliability of geospatial the risk of infringing environmental or human rights is high, and forest information on which private governance schemes depend shift to places with stricter governance to meet consumer demands (Garrett et al. 2019). More research is needed to investigate the for more transparency and due diligence (Gardner et al. 2019). interplay between institutions that focus on the full spatial extent This effect increases the risk of unintentionally marginalizing of the problem and institutions that are adapted to the local small-scale producers in these regions by excluding them from context. international value chains and the economic benefits of the global economy (Zhunusova et al. 2022). The most vulnerable people CONCLUSION and countries may become subject to extraterritorial control and The governance of telecoupled systems is beset with problems of externally imposed notions of sustainability if actors of the fit. Because most social and environmental problems in a Global North seek to govern environmental and social issues globalizing world are neither purely local nor global in scale, beyond their own borders. addressing these problems requires governance responses that transcend political borders to match the spatial scale of the We do not claim that rescaling governance institutions to perfectly problem while also being sensitive to local context. Here, we match telecoupled social-ecological systems will necessarily solve applied the established concepts of institutional fit and telecoupled sustainability issues, or even that it is attainable in all governance mismatches to complex sustainability issues arising circumstances. Rather, we acknowledge that the risk of due to telecoupling. We identified two types of mismatches that mismatches persists and identifying an “optimal spatial scale” are pertinent in the governance of telecoupled systems. First, may not be possible. Any attempt to resolve boundary or boundary mismatches occur when governance institutions neglect resolution mismatches comes with the risk of creating new social-ecological problems that transcend established jurisdictional mismatches, and because material flows, immaterial connections, boundaries, either because the institutional design fails to cover and spillover relations are dynamic (dos Reis et al. 2020), the full scale of the problem or because the intervention induces governing telecoupled systems requires recognizing constantly leakages. Second, resolution mismatches arise when governance evolving problem structures and continuously evaluating and institutions have a coarser resolution than is suitable to address adapting governance initiatives. However, even if it were possible the social-ecological problem they aim to address. Because of a to create institutional fit, there would be no guarantee of effective lack of governance precision, governance instruments are too governance, due to implementation or enforcement problems. general to be effectively implemented and enforced. In the context Nonetheless, we see substantial value in distinguishing different of land and global agricultural commodity governance, types of mismatches in telecoupled settings to be more productive approaches such as due diligence laws and policies, landscape and in devising multiple, well-aligned, and adaptive governance jurisdictional approaches to supply chain governance, and arrangements that are better equipped to bring about the required environmental provisions in trade agreements present important change toward social and environmental sustainability. Looking steps toward creating institutional fit in the governance of at land-based commodity flows through the lens of boundary and telecoupled systems. resolution mismatches helps us to better anticipate potential governance weaknesses arising from a lack of governance Scaling or rescaling governance to match the scale of telecoupled precision or extent, and hence, enables better policy debates. Our systems is an inherently political process. The scale at which a analysis indicates that complementary interventions at various given problem is perceived and framed influences the scale at spatial scales, rather than single interventions, are needed to which it is addressed (Newig and Moss 2017). Rescaling govern telecoupled systems effectively. governance can entrench, rather than restructure, existing power relations and global inequalities. For instance, companies may The most pressing and challenging future research question is stop sourcing from places with weak public governance, where how to align multiple governance institutions to govern Ecology and Society 28(2): 24 https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol28/iss2/art24/ telecoupled systems. Advancing understanding of institutional E. Corbara acknowledges that this article contributes to the “María mismatches in telecoupled systems requires interdisciplinary de Maeztu” Programme for Units of Excellence of the Spanish research, which itself needs to grapple with the challenge of Ministry of Science and Innovation (CEX2019-000940-M). C. F. bridging scales embedded in different research approaches, acknowledges support through the Carlsberg Foundation problem definitions, and perspectives (Friis et al. 2023). While we Reintegration Fellowship grant CF19-0526. We acknowledge have focused on spatial mismatches in the governance of support by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the Open telecoupled systems, future investigations could analyze the Access Publication Fund of Leuphana University Lüneburg. occurrence and implications of temporal mismatches. Telecoupled systems are dynamic, and the spatiotemporal Data Availability: connections between regions and actors can change over time (dos Reis et al. 2020, 2023, Leijten et al. 2022), requiring adaptive Data/code sharing is not applicable to this article because no new governance responses. Additionally, investigating to what extent data/code were created or analyzed in this study. governance institutions fit with the complete life cycle of products merits further research because the spatial scale of governance expands when the temporal scale of governance is upscaled to the LITERATURE CITED product life cycle. The task, albeit formidable, is to design Abensperg-Traun, M. 2009. 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